Holding

The burden of proof to establish title lies on the plaintiff, and because she failed to discharge it, the suit must be dismissed, confirming the High Court’s reversal of the trial court decree.

Summary

The appellant, Smriti Debbarma (representing the late Maharani Chandratara Devi), filed a suit seeking declaration of title and possession of the Schedule ‘A’ property (Khosh Mahal). The trial court decreed in her favour, but the Gauhati High Court set aside that decree, holding that she failed to prove legal ownership. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the evidence, the nature of the documents, and the plaintiff’s lack of actual possession at the time of filing. Relying on Sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act, the Court affirmed that the burden of proof to establish title rests on the plaintiff, and she did not discharge it. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, upholding the High Court’s reversal of the trial court’s judgment.

Issues considered

The burden of proof in a suit for title and possession under the Evidence Act
Whether the plaintiff established a legal title to the Schedule ‘A’ property
Whether the High Court was correct in setting aside the trial court decree
Effect of the plaintiff’s lack of actual or constructive possession at the time of filing
Interpretation of Sections 101 and 102 of the Indian Evidence Act in the context of title suits

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 101, s. 102, s. 90, s. 906
Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act

Subjects

burden of prooftitle suitpossessionEvidence ActSection 101Section 102property lawdecree of possessionappellate jurisdiction

Judgment

[2023] 1 S.C.R. 355 355

SMRITI DEBBARMA (DEAD) THROUGH LEGAL A
REPRESENTATIVE
v.
PRABHA RANJAN DEBBARMA AND OTHERS
(Civil Appeal No. 878 of 2009) B
JANAURY 04, 2023
[SANJIV KHANNA AND J. K. MAHESHWARI, JJ.]

Suit – Suit for declaration of title – Burden of proof – Trial
C
court decreed the suit holding that the plaintiff had right, title and
interest in the subject property and was entitled to khas possession
of the property after evicting all the defendants – High Court
reversed the judgment of trial court holding that plaintiff on basis
of evidence and documents placed on record had not been able to D
discharge the burden of proof to establish legal ownership and title
to the subject property – Held: High Court rightly set aside the
judgment and decree of the trial court – The plaintiff took
contradictory stands – On the date of filing of the suit, the plaintiff
E
was not in constructive or actual physical possession of the property
– The defendants could not be dispossessed unless the plaintiff
established a better title and rights over the property – The burden
of proof to establish a title in the present case lay upon the plaintiff
–s.101 of the Evidence Act states that burden on proving the fact F
rests with party who substantially asserts in the affirmative and not
on the party which is denying it – In terms of s.102 of the Evidence
Act, if both parties fail to adduce evidence, the suit must fail – Onus
of proof, no doubt shifts and the shifting is a continuous process in G
the evaluation of evidence, but this happens when in a suit for title
and possession, the plaintiff has been able to create a high degree
of probability to shift the onus on the defendant – The weakness of
the defence cannot be a justification to decree the suit – The plaintiff
H
355
356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.

A could have succeeded in respect of the property if she had discharged
the burden to prove the title to the property which squarely fell on
her – This would be the true effect of ss.101 and 102 of the Evidence
Act – Suit in question liable to be dismissed – Evidence Act – ss.
B 101 and 102.

Evidence – “Burden of proof” and “Onus of proof” –
Discussed.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court
C
HELD:1. For the plaintiff to succeed, she has to establish
that she has a legal title to the Schedule ‘A’ property, and
consequently, is entitled to a decree of possession. The
defendants cannot be dispossessed unless the plaintiff has
D established a better title and rights over the Schedule ‘A’
property. A person in possession of land in the assumed character
as the owner, and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of
ownership, has a legal right against the entire world except the
E rightful owner. A decree of possession cannot be passed in favour
of the plaintiff on the ground that defendant nos. 1 to 12 have not
been able to fully establish their right, title and interest in the
Schedule ‘A’ property. The defendants, being in possession, would
be entitled to protect and save their possession, unless the
F
person who seeks to dispossess them has a better legal right in
the form of ownership or entitlement to possession [Para 30][372-
H; 373-A-C]

2. The burden of proof to establish a title in the present
G
case lies upon the plaintiff as this burden lies on the party who
asserts the existence of a particular state of things on the basis
of which she claims relief. This is mandated in terms of Section
101 of the Evidence Act, which states that burden on proving the
H fact rests with party who substantially asserts in the affirmative
SMRITI DEBBARMA (DEAD) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE 357
v. PRABHA RANJAN DEBBARMA

and not on the party which is denying it. This rule may not be A
universal and has exceptions, but in the factual background of
the present case, the general principle is applicable. In terms of
Section 102 of the Evidence Act, if both parties fail to adduce
evidence, the suit must fail. Onus of proof, no doubt shifts and B
the shifting is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence,
but this happens when in a suit for title and possession, the plaintiff
has been able to create a high degree of probability to shift the
onus on the defendant. In the absence of such evidence, the
burden of proof lies on the plaintiff and can be discharged only C
when he is able to prove title. The weakness of the defence cannot
be a justification to decree the suit. The plaintiff could have
succeeded in respect of the Schedule ‘A’ property if she had
discharged the burden to prove the title to the Schedule ‘A’ D
property which squarely falls on her. This would be the true effect
of Sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, it follows
that the plaintiff should have satisfied and discharged the burden
under the provisions of the Evidence Act, failing which the suit
E
would be liable to be dismissed. [Para 31][373-C-E; 374-A-C]

Poona Ram v. Moti Ram (Dead) through Legal
Representatives and Others (2019) 11 SCC 309 : [2019]
1 SCR 671; Nair Service Society Limited v. Rev. Father
F
K.C. Alexander and Others, AIR 1968 SC 1165 : [1968]
3 SCR 163; Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh, (2006) 5
SCC 558 : [2006] 1 Suppl. SCR 659;

R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu G
Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple and Another (2003) 8
SCC 752 : [2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 450; Union of India
and Others v. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society
Limited and Others (2014) 2 SCC 269 : [2014] 1 SCR
H
358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.

A 180 and Sebastiao Luis Fernandes (DEAD) Through LRs.
And Others v. K.V.P. Shastri (DEAD) Through LRs. and
Others (2013) 15 SCC 161 : [2013] 11 SCR 1076 –
relied on.
B Addagada Raghavamma and Another v. Addagada
Chenchamma and Another AIR 1964 SC 136 : [1964]
2 SCR 933 – referred to.

Case Law Reference
C
[2019] 1 SCR 671 relied on Para 30

[1968] 3 SCR 163 relied on Para 30

[2006] 1 Suppl. SCR 659 relied on Para 31
D
[1964] 2 SCR 933 referred to Para 31

[2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 450 relied on Para 31

[2014] 1 SCR 180 relied on Para 31
E
[2013] 11 SCR 1076 relied on Para 31

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 878 of
2009.
F
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.05.2006 of the High Court
of Gauhati (Agartala Bench) in F.A. No.40 of 1997.

Rauf Rahim, Ali Asghar Rahim, Advs. for the Appellant.
G
Kedar Nath Tripathy, Dr. P. V. Saravanaraja, P. Veerappan, Anand
Kumar V., Advs. for the Respondents.

H
SMRITI DEBBARMA (DEAD) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE 359
v. PRABHA RANJAN DEBBARMA

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
SANJIV KHANNA, J.
On 19.06.1986, Smriti Debbarma, as an attorney and on behalf of
Maharani Chandratara Devi, had filed Title Suit No. 66 of 1986, inter
alia praying for declaration that Maharani Chandratara Devi is the owner
of the property known as ‘Khosh Mahal’, described in Schedule ‘A’ to B
the original plaint, as under:
“ S C H E D U L E - A.
Old Dar Tashkishi Taluk No. 178 (now Agartala Town Sheet No.
3), Khatian No. 4882, Dag Nos. 13142, 13144, 13176/26261 and
13144/51733, commonly known as “Khosh Mahal”, within this C
land measuring One Kani five Gandas two karas, three kranta
and ten dhurs only.”
Other reliefs included a declaration that any transfer/conveyance
for and on behalf of the plaintiff made by late Bikramendra Kishore
Debbarma1 and his legal representatives, impleaded as defendant
D
nos. 1 to 7 to the civil suit, should be declared illegal and void, and
that the defendants and their agents should be restrained from
entering, selling or alienating the Schedule ‘A’ property. In addition,
the plaintiff had prayed that she has right, title and interest in
Schedule ‘B’ property, namely the shares and business of M/s.
Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited, Agartala. E
2. Post recording of the statement of witnesses, and the report of
the Court Surveyor dated 20.01.1995, marked as Exhibit-I, the plaint
was amended, and the land mentioned in Schedule ‘A’ was substituted
and increased to 2 Kanis 8 Gandas 3 Karas and 8½ Dhurs. Paragraphs
26(A) to 26(D) and paragraphs 27(A) to 27(C) to the plaint were added. F
The prayer clause was amended to include a direction to the Survey and
Settlement authority to delete/expunge the record of rights standing in
the name of defendant nos. 8 to 12 as void and inoperative. Prayer for
direction to the Director of Settlement and Land Records to issue a
record of rights in the name of the plaintiff for the Schedule ‘A’ property,
and to confirm the possession of the plaintiff of the Schedule ‘A’ property G
was made.
3. Earlier, defendant nos. 8 to 12 were impleaded as defendants
in the Title Suit vide order dated 15.09.1989. These defendants had

1
Alias “Bidurkarta”. H
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.

A purchased portions of land vide the sale deeds executed by the Managing
Director of M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited. The sale deed in favour
of the defendant no.8, marked as Exhibit-E, dated 17.07.1985, is prior to
the institution of the suit in question, which was filed on 19.06.1986.
4. Maharani Chandratara Devi was the sixth wife of the late
B Maharaja Birendra Kishore Debbarma. She was not survived by her
children who had predeceased her. Maharani Chandratara Devi did not
enter the witness box and depose as a witness. Maharani Chandratara
Devi had expired soon after filing of the suit on 27.12.1988.
5. Smriti Debbarma was substituted as the plaintiff, as the legal
C representative of Maharani Chandratara Devi, who had inherited the
Schedule ‘A’ property and other properties in terms of the Will, marked
as Exhibit-4, dated 15.10.1985 of Maharani Chandratara Devi. The Will
has not been probated, and was disputed by the defendants before the
trial court2. Smriti Debbarma, had expired during the pendency of the
present appeal and is now represented by her legal representatives.
D
6. By judgment dated 23.11.1996, the suit was decreed holding
that the plaintiff had right, title and interest in the Schedule ‘A’ property,
as amended, and the plaintiff was entitled to khas possession of the
Schedule ‘A’ property after evicting all the defendants and was entitled
to remove all obstructions. Further, any transfer and/or conveyance of
E any portion of the Schedule ‘A’ property made by late Bidurkarta and
defendant nos. 1 to 7 was illegal and void. Directions were issued to
make correction in the records of the office of the Sub-Registrar,
Municipal Holdings etc. by deleting the names of M/s. Hotel Khosh
Mahal Limited and/or defendant nos. 8 to 12, and that the name of the
F plaintiff should be recorded in all records relating to the Schedule ‘A’
property. The defendants, their agents etc. were restrained from entering
into the Schedule ‘A’ property and creating any sort of disturbance in
the peaceful possession of the plaintiff over the same. The Survey Report
(Exhibit-I) was directed to form part of the decree.
7. However, the trial court did not grant and therefore, is deemed
G
to have rejected the prayer of the plaintiff for a decree in respect of the
Schedule ‘B’ property. The plaintiff did not challenge the decree of the
2
The trial court accepted the genuineness of the will propounded by Smriti Debbarma.
It appears this finding was challenged in the first appeal filed before the High Court of
Gauhati and the appeal was allowed, albeit the question of the genuineness of the will
H has not been examined.
SMRITI DEBBARMA (DEAD) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE 361
v. PRABHA RANJAN DEBBARMA [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

trial court dismissing her suit in respect of the Schedule ‘B’ property. A
Decree of the trial court to this extent has attained finality.
8. The defendants preferred appeals against the decree in respect
of the Schedule ‘A’ property before the Gauhati High Court, which have
been allowed by the impugned judgment dated 17.05.2006. This judgment
of reversal inter alia holds that the plaintiff on the basis of evidence and B
documents placed on record has not been able to discharge the burden
of proof to establish legal ownership and title to the Schedule ‘A’ property.
We will elaborate on the evidence and reasons recorded by the High
Court subsequently. The judgment also refers to the Tripura Land
Revenue and Land Reforms Act which came into force in 1960, and
observes that certain rights may have accrued to the state government C
in respect of the Schedule ‘A’ property. Albeit the High Court clarified
that the question pertaining to the right, title and interest of the defendants
remains to be adverted, and the defendants could approach the
appropriate forum.
9. We would now proceed to examine the averments made in the D
pleadings, including the plaint, and the evidence led by the parties.
10. The plaint and the claim made by Smriti Debbarma, who had
deposed as PW-1, is predicated on the Deed of Patta, marked as Exhibit-
12, executed by Maharaja Durjoy Kishore Debbarma, son of Maharaja
Birendra Kishore Debbarma in favour of Bidurkarta on 31.10.1951. E
Subsequently, Bidurkarta on 25.06.1952 had executed an Ekrarnama,
marked as Exhibit-5, acknowledging that the rights granted to him under
the Deed of Patta (Exhibit-12) actually belong to Maharani Chandratara
Devi. To this extent, there is no dispute.
11. The plaint refers to and accepts that a charter executed by F
Maharaja Bir Bikram Kishore Debbarma, incorporated a private limited
company, on 24.01.1351 Tripura Era3 or 1941 A.D. , namely, M/s. Hotel
Khosh Mahal Limited. Further, M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited, after
its incorporation, had acquired huge properties in Agartala town. The
plaintiff claims that she is one of the major shareholders of this company. G
However, there is no evidence or material on record to show the
shareholding of Maharani Chandratara Devi in M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal
Limited. As noted above, the plaintiff’s prayer for a decree in respect of
shares and business of M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited was declined
3
For short, “T. E.”. H
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.

A by the trial court, which decree remains unchallenged by the plaintiff
and has been accepted. Paragraph 7 of the plaint states that M/s. Hotel
Khosh Mahal Limited was established after taking the land and building
of Schedule ‘A’ property, which was given on lease by Maharani
Chandratara Devi. The lease had expired long back. Date of execution
and the term of the lease is not indicated. No lease deed or surrender
B
document was placed on record and proved. Nevertheless, we would
record that the plaint accepts that M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited was
in possession of the Schedule ‘A’ property.
12. Maharani Chandratara Devi had appointed Bidurkarta as her
attorney vide registered power of attorney executed by her on 29.10.1969
C because of her ill-health, old age and religious mentality, and as she used
to primarily reside at Varanasi, Haridwar and/or Dehradun. Later on,
she cancelled this power of attorney on 06.03.1970 and instituted a civil
suit T.S. No. 95/72 in 1972 for cancellation of the registered gift deed
executed on 12.01.1970 by Bidurkarta transferring her 1/3rd share of
D the ‘Rupchaya’ Cinema Hall business to Karnakishore Debbarma and
Sahadeb Kishore Debbarma. The suit was decreed on 17.06.1983, and
the gift deed was cancelled. The facts stated in this paragraph have
been established and proved by the plaintiff.
13. The plaint states that the hotel business of M/s. Hotel Khosh
E Mahal Limited had closed down due to heavy losses and mismanagement.
Thereupon, the land and building were given to M/s. Indian Airlines
Corporation Limited. Bidurkarta used to send rent received from the
tenant to Maharani Chadratara Devi. However, with the passage of
time, the remittances became far and few, and they eventually stopped.
Bidurkarta had, in collusion with the defendants, transferred Schedule
F ‘A’ property and Schedule ‘B’ business to his wife defendant no.1- Jyoti
Debbarma. Defendant no.2- Prabha Ranjan Debbarma, son of
Bidurkarta, an I.A.S. Officer and a central government employee, would
collect monthly rent from M/s. Indian Airlines Corporation Limited, though
he had no connection with the Schedule ‘A’ property.
G 14. The plaint, post the amendment, had claimed that M/s. Indian
Airlines Corporation Limited had vacated the property on 30.06.1986.
Thereafter, the plaintiff through her workmen and agents had taken
possession of the Schedule ‘A’ property and started a guest house under
the name and style of ‘M/s. Star Guest House’. However, as the suit
H
SMRITI DEBBARMA (DEAD) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE 363
v. PRABHA RANJAN DEBBARMA [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

was dismissed in default4, the defendants took advantage, dispossessed A
the plaintiff and took possession of the Schedule ‘A’ property. The plaintiff
had initiated proceedings under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, in the court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Agartala
vide Miscellaneous No. 75/86, whereby the defendants were restrained
from disturbing the possession of the plaintiff. However, vide order dated
B
26.08.1986 passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Agartala, a police
officer was appointed as a receiver. This action of the Sub-Divisional
Magistrate, Agartala, it is contended, illegal and improper as the plaintiff
had already instituted the suit in question.
15. Defendant nos. 1 to 7 in their written statement had relied
upon the Deed of Patta, marked as Exhibit-A, executed by Maharaja C
Durjoy Kishore Debbarma on 11.10.1358 T.E. or 1948 A.D. in favour of
M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited, by which the land admeasuring 3
Kani 8 Gandas 3 Karas and 16½ Dhurs was given on lease for a period
of twenty years from 1349 T.E. to 1369 T.E. or 1939 A.D. to 1959 A.D.
We shall subsequently refer to the Deed of Patta (Exhibit-A) and also D
examine the challenge to the genuineness of this document by the plaintiff
before this Court. Relying on this document, the written statement pleads
that Schedule ‘A’ Property is owned by M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited.
By an agreement dated 25.03.1953, Bidurkarta, as the Managing Director
of M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited, had leased out the business/property
to Maharani Chandratara Devi. This lease was terminated in August E
1968 and thereafter by a fresh agreement, the business was leased to
defendant no. 2 - Prabha Ranjan Debbarma, son of Bidurkarta. M/s.
Indian Airlines Corporation Limited had started paying rent to defendant
no. 2. These lease deeds, including board resolutions, etc. are not placed
on record and proven. The fact that from 1968 onwards rent was paid F
by M/s Indian Airlines Corporation Limited to defendant no. 2 is accepted
by the plaintiff-appellant.
16. Thus, as per defendant nos. 1 to 7, the property in possession
and occupation of M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited is different and
distinct from the land, which is the subject matter of the Deed of Patta G
(Exhibit-12), and which as per the Ekrarnama (Exhibit-5) is owned by
Maharani Chandratara Devi.
4
The Title Suit No. 66 of 1986 was dismissed in default vide order dated 28.04.1988. A
restoration petition in Misc. Case No. 69 of 88 for the Title Suit No. 66 of 1986 was
filed by the plaintiff and the Title Suit No. 66 of 1986 was restored vide order dated
13.07.1989, which also disposed of Misc. Case No. 69 of 88. H
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.

A 17. Defendant no. 8 had filed a separate written statement and
had accepted that he had acquired the land vide registered sale deed
dated 17.07.1985, (Exhibit-E), from the Managing Director of M/s. Hotel
Khosh Mahal Limited. Defendant no. 8 had thereupon constructed a
building to the notice and knowledge of the plaintiff. The plaintiff had at
that time neither raised an objection nor claimed right, title or interest
B
over the purchased land. Defendant no. 8 had got his name mutated in
the Survey and Settlement office vide Khatian No. 30912, marked as
Exhibit-F, dated 16.05.1989. Defendant no. 8 has been in possession of
the purchased property.
18. Defendants no. 9 to 11 had similarly submitted that the plaintiff
C had no right, title, and interest over the Schedule ‘A’ property. They had
acquired the right, title and interest over the portions of the Schedule ‘A’
property on the strength of the purchased/sale deed executed by the
Managing Director of M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited. Further, they
had got published the record of rights of the land in their favour from the
D government. Defendant no.11 in his additional written statement had
claimed that he was not in possession or owner by way of purchase of
any land included in Schedule ‘A’ of the plaint, or the schedule mentioned
in the Will (Exhibit-4). Defendant no. 11’s wife had purchased a small
piece of land from defendant no. 1, but this land does not fall within any
plots mentioned in Schedule ‘A’ of the plaint or the Will (Exhibit-4).
E Defendants nos. 9 to 11 had questioned the genuineness of the Will
(Exhibit-4).
19. The aforesaid narration reveals that there are essentially two
interconnected issues which arise for consideration. The first aspect
relates to the demarcation of land given on lease vide the Deed of Patta
F (Exhibit-12) and the Ekrarnama (Exhibit-5), on the basis of which the
title suit was filed by Smriti Debbarma as the attorney and on behalf of
Maharani Chandratara Devi. The second issue relates to the burden of
proof and whether the plaintiff has succeeded in discharging the burden
by establishing her title for a declaratory decree of ownership and her
G right to possession of the Schedule ‘A’ property.
20. The impugned judgment in our opinion has rightly examined
the aspect of demarcation and identification of Schedule ‘A’ property
viz. the identity of the land mentioned in the Deed of Patta (Exhibit- 12)
and the Ekrarnama (Exhibit-5), and upon consideration of the evidence
H and material on record held that the plaintiff has not been able to establish
SMRITI DEBBARMA (DEAD) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE 365
v. PRABHA RANJAN DEBBARMA [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

her title and ownership over the Schedule ‘A’ property. We would refer A
to the reasoning given by the High Court in this regard and add some
reasons of our own.
21. First, the Deed of Patta (Exhibit-12) dated 31.10.1951 and
the Ekrarnama (Exhibit-5) dated 25.06.1952, demarcate and refer to
the property as under: B
“ Deed of Patta
xx xx xx
(Schedule boundaries)
Land measuring one kani five ganda two kara two kranta ten C
dhur with tashkishi taluki title included in Touji No. 178 in my
name having an annual revenue of Rs. 30/- (Rupees thirty) within
sheet no. 3, situated within Nutan Haveli Town, Pg, Agartala
Bounded on the north by Mogra Road
D
West South
on the/and/by khas ‘pati’
on the east by the passage for going to Maharajganj bazar
Within this boundary lies 2461 X 90 ft land measuring one kani
five ganda two kara two kranta ten dhur, appertaining to the portion E
marked (gha) of Dag no. 3412.”
xx xx xx
Ekrarnama
xx xx xx F
(Schedule Property)
I, in the name of Sri Bikramendra Kishore Deb Barma have been
given ‘bandobasta’ with tashkhishi dar taluki title at an annual
revenue of Rs. 100/- (One Hundred Rupees) of land measuring 1
kani 5 ganda 2 kara 2 kranta 10 dhur, in total having tashkhishi dar G
taluki title no. 178 of Sadar Collectorate, in the name of Maharaj
Kumar Srilo Srijuto Durjoy Kishore Deb Barma, at an annual
deposit of Rs. 30, within Nutan Haveli Town sheet no. 3 under
Sub-Registry Agartala Pg. and P.S. Agartala.
H
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.

A Bounded on north Mogra Road
On the West and south by Khas Patit,
On the east by the passage of Maharajganj Bazar.
Within this boundary lies 1 kani 5 ganda 2 kara 2 kranta 10 dhur of
B land measuring 2061 X 90 ft, in the portion marked (kha) of dag
no. 3412. Be it stated that value of the property is Rs. 2500 (Rupees
Two Thousand Five Hundred only)
xx xx xx”
The aforesaid description does not refer to any constructed building,
C and the building Hotel Khosh Mahal in particular. If the Deed of Patta
(Exhibit-12) and the Ekrarnama (Exhibit-5) were pertaining to the
property where Hotel Khosh Mahal had been constructed, it is normal
and natural that this position would have been specifically indicated and
mentioned.
D 22. Secondly, the trial court had appointed a surveyor, who had
given his report marked Exhibit-I dated 20.01.1995 on the basis of a site
inspection done on 18.12.1994 in the presence of the parties. The relevant
portion of the report observes:
“ xx xx xx
E The area of the identified land under C.S. Plot Nos. 13142, 13143,
13144, 13145, 26261 stands for 2 Kanies 8 ganda 3 karas 8 ½
dhurs only whereas the area of the land in the said “Ekrarnama”
was mentioned as 1 Kani 5 Gandas 2 Karas 2 Krantas only.
In the exhibit “A” of the Defdt. i.e. Regd. “Patta” created in the
F year 1948 for the land measuring 3 Kanies 8 gandas 16½ dhurs
only under the then C.S. Plot No 3424/P, 2863/P, 2661/P, 3426,
2662/P, 2663 was described bounded by:-
North:- Fallow Khas land in the Southern side of ‘Smriti Mandir’.

G East:- Central Road.
South:- Front land of Homestead of Kumar Mahendra Mohan
Deb Barma.
West:- Adjacent North side land of Kumar Mahendra Mohan Deb
Barma.
H
SMRITI DEBBARMA (DEAD) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE 367
v. PRABHA RANJAN DEBBARMA [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

There is the similarity of the North & East boundary of the identified A
Suitland and/land described in the Exhibit “A” of the Deffdt. The
Ruin of “Smriti Mandir” is found after one or two plots of the
northern side of the identified land. The Central Rd. is found in
the Eastern side of the suit land i.e. C.S. Plot No. 13142. The
South and West boundaries as described in the Exhibit “A’ of the
B
Deffdt. and the present boundaries of the suit land do not tally,
there may be total change of Record Right and shape of the land
in the lapse of so many years from 1948.
It may kindly be noted that neither the Defdt. nor the plttf. were
able to produce any Certified copy of the map of the then C.S.
Plot No. 3412 (P) described in the “Ekrarnama” exhibit No.5 or C
then C.S. Plot Nos. 3424/P, 2868/P, 2661/P, 3426/P 2663 of the
then mouja “Nutan Habeli”.
In absence of such Certified copy of the maps and difference in
described boundaries of land in “Ekrarnama” created in the year
1952 it is not possible to point out that the identified land by the D
plaintiff is the land covered by “Ekrarnama” i.e. exhibit No.5 of
the pltff.
However, there is almost similarity of area of land described in
“Ekrarnama” of the plaintiff and the land under present C.S. Plot
No. 13144 within the identified land by the plttff. The area under E
C.S. Plot No. 13144 is 1 Kani 3 gandas only. Whereas the
“Ekrarnama” was created for 1 Kani 5 gandas 2 Karas 2 Krantas
only.
xx xx xx”
F
The trial court, in our opinion, has wrongly held that the Survey
Report (Exhibit - I) supports and accepts the case of the plaintiff. The
said finding was factually incorrect. The High Court has rightly held that
the Survey Report (Exhibit - I) is against the plea and contention of the
plaintiff. As per the Survey Report (Exhibit-I) quoted above, the
description of the Schedule ‘A’ property, where the building Hotel Khosh G
Mahal is located is different from the description given in the schedule
of the Deed of Patta (Exhibit-12) and Ekrarnama (Exhibit-5). The
description of the land and identification in the Patta (Exhibit - A) in
favour of M/s. Hotel Khush Mahal Limited is as under:
H
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.

A “ PATTA
(Executed on 11-10-1358 T.E.)
(= 1948 A.D.)
xx xx xx
B This deed of PATTA of Taksishi Taluk within the territory of
independent Tripura, under Sadar Sub Registry and Police-Station
appertaining to Agartala Nutan Haveli town, land measuring 3
Kani 8 Gandas 3 Karas 16 ½ Dhurs, measured in 8 Cubit length
‘Nal’ (Chain) = 12 x 10 (‘Nal’) is executed in favour of HOTEL
KHOSH MAHAL LIMITED on a Lease for 20 (Twenty) years
C from 1349 T.E. to 1369 T.E.
xx xx xx
DESCRIPTION OF THE LAND
Land situated in Natun Haveli Town, bounded as follows:-
D
In the North- ‘Khas Land’ to the South of Smriti-Mandir.
In the East- Central Road
In the South- Front part of residence of Kumar Mahendra
Mohan Deb barma Bahadur
E
In the West- Northern Part of the said residence of Kumar
Mahendra Mohan Debbarma Bahadur
Within the said above boundary-
Plots:- 2846 (p), 2668 (p), 3423 (p), 3424 (p), 2863 (p),
F
2661 (p), 3426, 2662, 2663.
xx xx xx”
23. Thirdly, post the submission of the Survey Report (Exhibit-I),
the plaintiff in 1995 had amended the plaint and post the amendment,
G had increased the measurements mentioned in Schedule ‘A’ from 1 Kani
5 Gandas 2 Karas, 3 Krantas and 10 Dhurs, to 2 Kanis 8 Gandas 3
Karas and 8½ Dhurs. Consequent to this amendment, the figures now
recorded in Schedule ‘A’ corresponded with the measurements mentioned
in the Deed of Patta (Exhibit-A), which patta was executed in 1948 in
favour of M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited. The trial court in the
H
SMRITI DEBBARMA (DEAD) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE 369
v. PRABHA RANJAN DEBBARMA [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

impugned judgment has overlooked this discrepancy by observing that A
the quantity of land was immaterial as the basic dispute is whether the
Schedule ‘A’ property belonged to the plaintiff or to M/s. Hotel Khosh
Mahal Limited. The trial court, in support, observed that earlier land was
measured by eye estimation and the quantity of land in actual possession
would always be in excess of what is written in the instrument. Scientific
B
survey began in Tripura in 1960. It is difficult to accept this reasoning in
light of the fact that the Deed of Patta (Exhibit-A) refers to the
measurement and demarcation of land which is vastly different from
both point of view of location as well as the total measurement of land
mentioned in the Survey Report (Exhibit-I). The assumption made by
the trial court is fallacious and flawed, for the documents in question, i.e. C
the Deed of Patta (Exhibit-A), is earlier in point of time, whereas the
Deed of Patta (Exhibit-12) and Ekrarnama (Exhibit-5) were executed
later on. The difference in area recorded is substantial. No corrigendum
to correct the area in the Deed of Patta (Exhibit-12) and Ekrarnama
(Exhibit-5) was made at any point of time.
D
24. Fourthly, the power of attorney executed by Maharani
Chandratara Devi dated 16.10.1985 and relied upon by Smriti Debbarma
had equally identified the land in question, the land which belonged to
her, as under:
“ S C H E D U L E – ‘B’. E
Building and land known as “Khosh Mahal” pertaining to District-
West Tripura, P.S. West Agartala in the town of Agartala Dag
No. 3412- Area- 2061 X 901 – land measuring 1 (one) kani 5
(five) gandas 2 (two) karas, 2 (two) krantas 10 (ten) dhurs;
erstwhile Hotel Khosh Mahal now M/s. Indian Airlines F
Corporation, Agartala Office, Land recorded in the name of late
Bikramendra Kishore Deb Barma as Benamdar of Maharani
Chandratara Debi (Principal).”
No doubt, Schedule ‘B’ in the power of attorney statedly executed
by Maharani Chandratara Devi refers to ‘Khosh Mahal’ but the area in G
the measurement given is vastly different. The area and location
mentioned in the power of attorney corresponds with the area and location
mentioned in the Deed of Patta (Exhibit-12) and Ekrarnama (Exhibit-
5). Thus, the contention that the area and location were wrongly mentioned
in the Deed of Patta (Exhibit-12) and the Ekrarnama (Exhibit-5) is an
H
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.

A afterthought, and the said stand was taken after the discrepancies
highlighted in the Survey Report (Exhibit-I) had come on record.
25. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-plaintiff had
submitted that the Deed of Patta (Exhibit-A) is a fabricated document.
In support, he referred to the contents of this document and, in particular,
B our attention was drawn to the fact that the lease given to M/s. Hotel
Khosh Mahal Limited was for a period of twenty years from 1349 T.E.
to 1369 T.E. or 1939 A.D. to 1959 A.D. It was highlighted that the Deed
of Patta (Exhibit A) refers to dates 1351 T.E. or 1941 A.D. as the year
when M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited was established5. We feel that
the appellant-plaintiff should not be permitted and allowed to raise this
C plea, as this contention was not raised before the trial court or the High
Court. The Deed of Patta (Exhibit-A) is a registered document/
instrument. The document enjoys the presumption, being more than thirty
years old, in terms of Section 906 of the Indian Evidence Act, 18727.
Moreover, the plaintiff had not impleaded M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal
D Limited as a party to the civil suit.
26. Counsel for the appellant-plaintiff has also drawn our attention
to the letter marked as Exhibit-C dated 11.04.1968 purportedly sent by
Maharaja Durjoy Kishore Debbarma as an attorney of Maharani
Chandratara Devi. It is highlighted that Maharaja Durjoy Kishore
E Debbarma had expired in 1962, which has been accepted by Maharani
Chandratara Devi, who had deposed as PW-1 in her cross-examination
in the Civil Suit T.S. No. 95/72, marked as Exhibit-13. The plaintiff could
be correct that this letter is forged, and we would not rely upon the

5
We have taken these dates from the translated copy of the Deed of Patta (Exhibit-A),
F assuming them to be correct.
6
Section 90: Presumption as to documents thirty years old.- Where any document,
purporting or proved to be thirty years old, is produced from any custody which the
Court in the particular case considers proper, the Court may presume that the signature
and every other part of such document, which purports to be in the handwriting of any
particular person, is in that persons handwriting, and, in the case of a document executed
or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the persons by whom it purports
G to be executed and attested.
Explanation.- Documents are said to be in proper custody if they are in the place in
which, and under the care of the person with whom, they would naturally be; but no
custody is improper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin, or if the circumstances
of the particular case are such as to render such an origin probable.
This explanation applies also to section 81.
7
H For short, “Evidence Act”.
SMRITI DEBBARMA (DEAD) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE 371
v. PRABHA RANJAN DEBBARMA [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

same. However, it is also a matter of record that M/s. Hotel Khosh A
Mahal Limited has been recorded as the owner and possessor of the
Schedule ‘A’ property in the revenue records vide entry of 1974, marked
as Exhibit-15. The revenue entries were challenged by the plaintiff only
in the year 1994 in Revenue Case No. 4 of 1994. As noted above,
Maharani Chandratara Devi had filed a Civil Suit T.S. No. 95/72 in 1972
B
after having cancelled the power of attorney in favour of Bidurkarta for
cancellation of gift deeds executed by Bidurkarta. Given the fact that
she doubted the intent and acts of Bidurkarta, she would have known
and should have pressed her claim in respect of the Schedule ‘A’ property,
more so when she was admittedly not being paid any rent since 1968.
The gap of 18 years in the filing of the present civil suit has not been C
explained by the appellant-plaintiff8.
27. The plaintiff has relied upon the deposition of Kishalaya Kishore
Debbarma, son of Bidurkarta, who had deposed as DW-1, and accepted
that rent received from M/s. Indian Airlines Corporation Limited till 1968
was paid to Maharani Chandratara Devi. This is correct and accepted D
by defendant nos. 1 to 7. These defendants have stated that in 1953 the
Schedule ‘A’ property was given on lease by M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal
Limited to Maharani Chandratara Devi, which lease was extended till
1968. The defendants have not proved this fact by any documents or
lease deed to the said effect. The defendants have also not placed on
record the resolutions, if any, passed by the Board of Directors of M/s. E
Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited. The present status of the company is rather
ambiguous and unknown. This would reveal chinks in the defence of the
defendants, albeit, as elucidated below, the plaintiff cannot succeed in
the present suit on the basis of the weakness of the defendants’ case.
We would first refer to the plaint, then the evidence on record, which F
has been partly noticed above, and the legal position on burden of proof.
28. The plaintiff had taken a contradictory stand. In the plaint it is
pleaded that the M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited was established by
the management after taking the land and building of Schedule ‘A’
property on lease from Maharani Chandratara Devi, virtually accepting G
that M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited were in possession. At the same
time, the plaintiff had pleaded that M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited
was established in 1941, and in 1951 Chandratara Devi had acquired
8
Earlier, but post stoppage of payment of rent in 1968, Maharani Chandratara Devi
had on 29.10.1969 executed a power of attorney in favour of Bidurkarta. H
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.

A lease hold right in the Schedule ‘A’ property from Maharaja Durjoy
Kishore Debbarma vide Deed of Patta (Exhibit- 12). The pleading by
the plaintiff is acceptance of the fact that when M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal
Limited was established in 1941, and subsequently Schedule ‘A’ property
got vested with it. In 1941, the plaintiff was clearly not the owner or in
possession of the Schedule ‘A’ property/Khosh Mahal. Construction of
B
the hotel building on the land, it is apparent, was undertaken and done by
M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited. The plaintiff has made no such claim.
29. As per the plaint, the Schedule ‘A’ property was given on
lease by Maharani Chandratara Devi to M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited.
The plaintiff, however, has not placed any document on record in support
C of this claim that Maharani Chandratara Devi had given Schedule ‘A’
property on lease to M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited. Equally, defendant
nos. 1 to 7 have not been able to establish and show that M/s. Hotel
Khosh Mahal Limited had given the property on lease to Maharani
Chandratara Devi. Be that as it may, we would accept as pleaded by the
D plaintiff that M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited was in possession of
Schedule ‘A’ property, though the nature and right to possession is
disputed. Further, the plaint accepts that after 1968 M/s. Indian Airlines
Corporation Limited had paid the rent to defendant no. 2 – Prabha Ranjan
Debbarma till M/s. Indian Airlines Corporation Limited had vacated the
property on 30.06.1986. The plaintiff’s claim that thereupon she had
E taken possession of Schedule ‘A’ property through her workmen and
agents and started a guest house in the name and style of ‘M/s. Star
Guest House’ is unsubstantiated, or rather implausible. Not only there is
no document or evidence to support the assertion, the possession would
normally be given to the landlord to whom rent is being paid. Findings
F recorded supra support the case of the defendants. Further, it is clear
that defendant no. 8 vide the registered sale deed (Exhibit-E) dated
17.07.1985, had come in actual physical possession of a portion of the
Schedule ‘A’ property. The sale deed was executed on behalf of M/s.
Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited. Similarly, defendant nos. 9 to 11 have stated
that they have purchased portions of the Schedule ‘A’ land on the basis
G of purchase/sale deeds executed in their favour by M/s. Hotel Khosh
Mahal Limited. In this factual background, we would accept the claim
of the defendants that on the date of filing of the suit the plaintiff was not
in constructive or actual physical possession of the Schedule ‘A’ property.
30. In the above factual background, for the plaintiff to succeed,
H she has to establish that she has a legal title to the Schedule ‘A’ property,
SMRITI DEBBARMA (DEAD) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE 373
v. PRABHA RANJAN DEBBARMA [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

and consequently, is entitled to a decree of possession. The defendants A
cannot be dispossessed unless the plaintiff has established a better title
and rights over the Schedule ‘A’ property. A person in possession of land
in the assumed character as the owner, and exercising peaceably the
ordinary rights of ownership, has a legal right against the entire world
except the rightful owner.9 A decree of possession cannot be passed in
B
favour of the plaintiff on the ground that defendant nos. 1 to 12 have not
been able to fully establish their right, title and interest in the Schedule
‘A’ property. The defendants, being in possession, would be entitled to
protect and save their possession, unless the person who seeks to
dispossess them has a better legal right in the form of ownership or
entitlement to possession. C
31. The burden of proof10 to establish a title in the present case
lies upon the plaintiff as this burden lies on the party who asserts the
existence of a particular state of things on the basis of which she claims
relief11. This is mandated in terms of Section 10112 of the Evidence Act,
which states that burden on proving the fact rests with party who D
substantially asserts in the affirmative and not on the party which is
denying it. This rule may not be universal and has exceptions13, but in
the factual background of the present case, the general principle is
applicable. In terms of Section 10214 of the Evidence Act, if both parties
fail to adduce evidence, the suit must fail.15 Onus of proof, no doubt
shifts and the shifting is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence, E
9
See Poona Ram v. Moti Ram (Dead) through Legal Representatives and Others (2019)
11 SCC 309 and Nair Service Society Limited v. Rev. Father K.C. Alexander and Others,
AIR 1968, SC 1165.
10
See Paragraph 19 in Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 558 where the
expression– ‘burden of proof’ is used in three ways, namely, (i) to indicate the duty of
bringing forward evidence in support of a proposition at the beginning or later; (ii) to F
make that of establishing a proposition as against all counter-evidence; and (iii) an
indiscriminate use in which it may mean either, or both of the others.
11
See Addagada Raghavamma and Another v. Addagada Chenchamma and Another,
AIR 1964 SC 136.
12
Section 101: Burden of Proof.- Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to
any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must
prove that those facts exist. When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact,
G
it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person.
13
See Sections 103, 104 and 105 of the Evidence Act.
14
Section 102: On whom the burden of proof lies.- The burden of proof in a suit or
proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either
side.
15
See Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 558. H
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.

A but this happens when in a suit for title and possession, the plaintiff has
been able to create a high degree of probability to shift the onus on the
defendant. In the absence of such evidence, the burden of proof lies on
the plaintiff and can be discharged only when he is able to prove title.16
The weakness of the defence cannot be a justification to decree the
suit.17 The plaintiff could have succeeded in respect of the Schedule ‘A’
B
property if she had discharged the burden to prove the title to the Schedule
‘A’ property which squarely falls on her. This would be the true effect of
Sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act. 18 Therefore, it follows that
the plaintiff should have satisfied and discharged the burden under the
provisions of the Evidence Act, failing which the suit would be liable to
C be dismissed. Thus, the impugned judgment by the High Court had rightly
allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial
court. We, therefore, uphold the findings of the High Court that the suit
should be dismissed. We clarify that we have not interfered or set aside
any observations of the High Court in re the Tripura Land Revenue and
Land Reforms Act, or defendants’ claim etc. Notably, M/s. Hotel Khosh
D
Mahal Limited is not a party to the present proceedings.
32. In view of the aforesaid discussion and legal position, the
present appeal must be dismissed. We order accordingly. In the facts of
the case, there will be no order as to costs.
E
Bibhuti Bhushan Bose Appeal dismissed.
(Assisted by : Preetam Bharti, LCRA)

F

G
16
See R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple and
Another, (2003) 8 SCC 752.
17
See Union of India and Others v. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Limited and
Others, (2014) 2 SCC 269.
18
See Sebastiao Luis Fernandes (DEAD) Through LRs. And Others v. K.V.P. Shastri
H (DEAD) Through LRs. And Others, (2013) 15 SCC 161.