Supreme Court of India
SIDRAMversusTHE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR.
- Citation
- 2022 INSC 1204
- Decided
- 16 November 2022
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- SURYA KANT
Holding
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, enhanced the compensation to Rs 21,78,600 by applying a notional income of Rs 8,000 per month and a 45% disability, and ordered the insurer to pay the difference with interest.
Summary
The appellant, a 19‑year‑old utensil seller, suffered paraplegia and a 45% permanent disability in a road accident on 18 July 2012. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal awarded Rs 6,13,000 in compensation, which the Karnataka High Court enhanced to Rs 9,26,800 by increasing the notional monthly income to Rs 7,000 and the disability percentage to 40%. The appellant sought further enhancement, arguing for a higher notional income, inclusion of future prospects, future medical expenses, attendant charges, loss of amenities, pain and suffering, marriage prospects and litigation costs. The Supreme Court applied the multiplier method, fixed the notional income at Rs 8,000 per month, used the full 45% disability, and awarded compensation for all heads, bringing the total to Rs 21,78,600. The Court emphasized that "just compensation" must place the victim as near as possible to his pre‑accident position, including non‑pecuniary losses. The insurer was directed to pay the difference with interest at 6% per annum.
Issues considered
- Whether the appellant is entitled to further enhancement of compensation beyond the High Court award under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
- How to determine the notional income and multiplier for loss of future earnings in a case of permanent disability.
- Whether compensation for future prospects, future medical expenses, attendant charges, loss of amenities, pain and suffering, marriage prospects and litigation expenses should be awarded.
- Whether the permanent disability should be assessed at 45% and how that impacts loss of earning capacity.
Legislation cited
- Motor Vehicles Act, 1988s. 168, s. 169
Subjects
Motor Vehicles Actcompensationpermanent disabilitymultiplier methodfuture prospectsparaplegialoss of earningsattendant chargespain and sufferinglitigation expenses
Judgment
[2022] 8 S.C.R. 403 403
SIDRAM A
v.
THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA INSURANCE
CO. LTD. AND ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 8510 of 2022) B
NOVEMBER 16, 2022
[SURYA KANT AND J. B. PARDIWALA, JJ.]
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988: Compensation – Enhancement of
– Motor Accidents Claim – Claimant, aged 19 years suffered
C
grievous injuries in a road accident – Claimant suffered from
paraplegia due to the accident which caused permanent disability
to the extent of 45% – Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs.
6,13,000/- along with interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from the date of
filing of the petition till the date of realisation of payment – However,
the High Court enhanced the compensation to Rs. 9,26,800/- – On D
appeal, held: Courts should be mindful that a serious injury not
only permanently imposes physical limitations and disabilities but
often inflicts deep mental and emotional scars upon the victim – On
facts,oral evidence of the doctor that the claimant suffered
permanent disability to the tune of 45% – Evidence on record
E
indicate that the claimant suffered paraplegia due to the accident,
which is a form of paralysis of lower body and it restricts everyday
routine more particularly the physical activity – Paraplegia impairs
physical, mental and psychological health and had devastating
impact on the social and financial well being of the victim – It leads
to 100% loss of earning – Claimant’s business could be said to F
have been gravely impacted – In view thereof, the compensation
enhanced from Rs. 9,26,800/- to Rs 21,78,600/-.
Compensation: Just Compensation – Explanation of – Held:
‘Just compensation’ should include all elements that would go to
place the victim in as near a position as she or he was in, before the G
occurrence of the accident – No amount of money or other material
compensation can erase the trauma, pain and suffering that a victim
undergoes after a serious accident – Monetary compensation is the
manner known to law, whereby society assures some measure of
restitution to those who survive and the victims who have to face
their lives. H
403
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The process of determining the compensation
by the court is essentially a very difficult task and can never be
an exact science. Perfect compensation is hardly possible, more
so in claims of injury and disability. The principle consistently
B followed by this Court in assessing motor vehicle compensation
claims, is to place the victim in as near a position as she or he
was in before the accident, with other compensatory directions
for loss of amenities and other payments. [Para 29, 30][420-H;
421-A-C]
C 1.2 It is now a well settled position of law that even in cases
of permanent disablement incurred as a result of a motor-accident,
the claimant can seek, apart from compensation for future loss of
income, amounts for future prospects as well. There are many
orders of different tribunals and unfortunately affirmed by different
High Courts, taking the view that the claimant is not entitled to
D compensation for future prospects in accident cases involving
serious injuries resulting in permanent disablement. That is not
a correct position of law. There is no justification to exclude the
possibility of compensation for future prospects in accident cases
involving serious injuries resulting in permanent disablement.
E Such a narrow reading is illogical because it denies altogether
the possibility of the living victim progressing further in life in
accident cases - and admits such possibility of future prospects,
in case of the victim’s death. [Para 31][421-C-E]
1.3 ‘‘Just compensation” should include all elements that
F would go to place the victim in as near a position as she or he was
in, before the occurrence of the accident. Whilst no amount of
money or other material compensation can erase the trauma, pain
and suffering that a victim undergoes after a serious accident,
(or replace the loss of a loved one), monetary compensation is
the manner known to law, whereby society assures some measure
G of restitution to those who survive, and the victims who have to
face their lives. Making a monetary assessment of the injury
suffered is the only process devised to compensate the victim.
The process of making such an assessment, whether in case of
death or injury, is provided in Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles
H
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 405
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR.
Act which requires that the tribunals constituted under the Act A
determine compensation, which appears to be ‘just’. Thus, the
Act vests a wide discretion upon the tribunals. [Para 32, 38][421-
F-G; 430-A-B]
1.4 Courts should be mindful that a serious injury not only
permanently imposes physical limitations and disabilities but too B
often inflicts deep mental and emotional scars upon the victim.
The attendant trauma of the victim’s having to live in a world
entirely different from the one she or he is born into, as an invalid,
and with degrees of dependence on others, robbed of complete
personal choice or autonomy, should forever be in the judge’s
mind, whenever tasked to adjudge compensation claims. Severe C
limitations inflicted due to such injuries undermine the dignity
(which is now recognized as an intrinsic component of the right
to life under Article 21) of the individual, thus depriving the person
of the essence of the right to a wholesome life which she or he
had lived, hitherto. From the world of the able bodied, the victim D
is thrust into the world of the disabled, itself most discomfiting
and unsettling. If courts nit-pick and award niggardly amounts
oblivious of these circumstances, there is resultant affront to the
injured victim. [Para 113][473-E-G]
2.1 The courts must apply the multiplier method, while E
ascertaining the compensation to be awarded to the victim. [Para
53][453-G]
2.2 The evidence on record indicates that the appellant
suffered paraplegia due to the accident. Paraplegia is a form of
paralysis of lower body. It restricts everyday routine more F
particularly the physical activity and leads to (i) deprivation of
simple pleasures and amenities of life, (ii) 100% loss of earning
capacity, (iii) long term secondary complications requiring
continuous care, medical treatment and hospitalization, (iv) feeling
of helplessness, depression, anger, stress, anxiety, etc. In short,
paraplegia impairs physical, mental and psychological health and G
has devastating impact on the social and financial well being of
the victim. In the case on hand, the appellant was in the business
of selling utensils and used to travel to various villages to sell
the same. With this disability in the form of paraplegia being
H
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A suffered by the appellant, it is not possible for him now to walk a
long distance or stand for a long period. His business could be
said to have been gravely impacted. Further, the appellant at the
time of accident was just 19 years old. The High Court enhanced
his notional income from Rs. 5,000/- to Rs. 7,000/- per month.
The appellant claimed that his notional income be determined at
B
Rs. 9,000/-.Thus, more particularly keeping in mind the dictum
of this Court in the case of Kirti’s case that it is not necessary to
adduce any documentary evidence to prove the notional income
of the victim and the Court can award the same even in the
absence of any documentary evidence. The Court should ensure
C while choosing the method and fixing the notional income that
the same is just in the facts and circumstances of the particular
case, neither assessing the compensation too conservatively, nor
too liberally. Thus, the notional income of the appellant is
determined at Rs. 8,000/- per month. The same would result in
the compensation being enhanced as under: 8000 x 12 x 18 x
D
45% = INR 7,77,600/- [Para 56, 57, 59, 60][455-C-E; 456-A-C]
2.3 Compensation under the head loss of earning for 6
months was awarded by the tribunal and the High Court. The
tribunal awarded only Rs. 40,000/- under this head. The High
Court enhanced it to Rs. 42,000/-. The payment towards loss of
E earning for six months as awarded by the High Court is upheld
and applying the revised income, enhance the same as under:
8000 x 6 = INR 48,000/- [Para 61, 62][456-D-E]
2.4 The appellant claims Rs. 2,00,000/- towards medical
expenses. In this regard, the appellant adduced documentary
F evidence in the form of medical bills/receipts to the tune of
Rs.1,54,931/-, as stated in the order of the tribunal. The
compensation of Rs. 1,55,000/- is granted towards medical
expenses. [Para 63, 66][456-F; 457-B]
2.5 The “Future Medical Expenses” and “Attendant
G Charges” would fall within the ambit of Pecuniary Expenses. The
tribunal observed that the doctor has deposed that the appellant
is likely to incur expenses of Rs. 2,50,000/- towards future medical
expenses. However, according to the Tribunal, there was no
H
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 407
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR.
sufficient and cogent evidence in that regard under this head. A
Accordingly, the tribunal awarded Rs. 25,000/-. The High Court
thought fit not to award any amount for future medical expenses
as there was no evidence adduced by the appellant in regard to
future treatment that may be required. The High Court however,
thought fit to clarify that in the event if the appellant incurs any
B
expenses towards any surgery or treatment in future on account
of the injury suffered and if he proves the same, then the insurer
shall indemnify the same. PW-2-doctor deposed categorically that
the appellant would require future medical expenses to the tune
of Rs. 2,50,000/-. Having regard to the evidence on record that
the appellant would be incurring costs towards medical expenses C
in future along with physiotherapy and nursing and considering
that the appellant at the time of accident was 19 years old, today
his age would be around 29 years, even if a bare minimum of
Rs. 1000/- is spent per month, then it comes to:1000 x 12 x 18 =
Rs. 2,16,000/- . Rs. 2,16,000/- is awarded towards future medical
D
expenses. [Para 67-69, 72][457-C; 457-F-H; 458-A-B; 459-C]
2.6 Under the head attendant charges, neither the tribunal
nor the High Court thought fit to award anything. The evidence
on record indicates that the appellant is unable to stand, walk, sit
or bend his body or lift anything heavy. It is not in dispute that
the appellant will not be able to work in the same manner as he E
used to prior to the accident. Indisputably, the appellant has
suffered from paraplegia on account of the accident and requires
an attendant throughout the day. According to the claimant, the
cost of keeping the attendant would be Rs. 4,500/- per month. It
is fixed at Rs. 2,000/- per month. An amount of Rs. 4,32,000/- is F
awarded towards the attendant charges. [Para 73, 76][459-D-E;
462-H]
2.7 The accident took place on 18.07.2012. The appellant
is pursuing this litigation for the past almost 10 years. The SLP
before this Court was filed in 2018. It has been four years since G
then. An amount of Rs. 50,000/- is awarded towards litigation
expenses. [Para 78, 82][463-B; 465-D]
2.8 For loss of conveyance and special diet, the appellant
is granted up to Rs 50,000/- considering that after the accident at
H
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A Kulgod-Gokak Road, the appellant was shifted to Lakeview
Hospital Belgaum wherein he was admitted as an indoor patient
from 18.7.2012 to 6.8.2012 for 19 days, and took treatment for
the injuries suffered by him, and continued to take the treatment
after getting discharged from the hospital as well. Thus,
Rs. 50,000/- is awarded towards loss of conveyance and special
B
diet. [Para 89, 90][467-C-E]
2.9 Pain and suffering would be categorized as a non-
pecuniary loss as it is incapable of being arithmetically calculated.
Therefore, when compensation is to be awarded for pain and
suffering, special circumstances of the claimant have to be taken
C into account including the victim’s age, the unusual deprivation
the victim has suffered, the effect thereof on his or her future
life. Considering that the appellant was only 19 years at the time
of the accident and suffered a permanent disability of 45%, he
ought to be awarded compensation under this head. An amount
D of Rs. 1,00,000/- is awarded towards pain and suffering. [Para 93,
96, 98][468-D; 469-F; 469-H]
2.10 A sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- is awarded towards loss of
marriage prospects. [Para 103][470-G]
2.11 An amount of Rs. 50,000/- is awarded for the loss of
E amenities taking into consideration the fact that the appellant
was 19 years old at the time of the accident, and also considering
the nature of injuries suffered by him and the extent of his
disability. [Para 111][472-H; 473-A]
2.12 The total compensation awarded under different heads-
F loss of earning due to disability, loss of earning for 6 months,
medical expenses, future medical expenses, attendant Charges,
litigation charges, loss of conveyance, pain and suffering, marriage
prospects and loss of amenities is 21,78,600/- [Para 112][473-B-
D]
G 2.13 The respondent No. 1-insurance company is directed
to pay the appellant-claimant the difference in the compensation
awarded as against the amount of Rs. 9,26,800/- as awarded by
the High Court. The amount awarded by this Court would be
deposited by the respondent No. 1-insurance company within the
H
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 409
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR.
stipulated period after adjusting the amount already deposited. A
The rate of interest at the enhanced amount is to be the same
i.e., 6% per annum. [Para 114][473-H; 474-A-B]
Govind Yadav v. New India Insurance Company Limited
(2011) 10 SCC 683; Pappu Deo Yadav v. Naresh Kumar
and Others AIR 2020 SCC 4424 : [2020] SCR 968; B
Sarla Verma (Smt) and Others v. Delhi Transport
Corporation and Another (2009) 6 SCC 121 : [2009] 5
SCR 1098; Kirti and Another v. Oriental Insurance
Company Limited (2021) 2 SCC 166 – relied on.
Master Ayush v. Branch Manager, Reliance General C
Insurance Company Limited and Another (2022) 7 SCC
738; R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd.
and Others (1995) 1 SCC 551 : [1995] 1 SCR 75; Raj
Kumar v. Ajay Kumar and Another (2011) 1 SCC 343 :
[2010] 13 SCR 179; Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh and
Others (2003) 2 SCC 274 : [2002] 4 Suppl. SCR 499; D
Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Company Limited
and Others (2012) 6 SCC 421 : [2012] 3 SCR 1178;
Jagdish v. Mohan and Others (2018) 4 SCC 571 :
[2018] 3 SCR 20; Kajal v. Jagdish Chand and Others
(2020) 4 SCC 413 : [2020] 3 SCR 622; Divisional E
Controller, KSRTC v. Mahadeva Shetty and Another
(2003) 7 SCC 197 : [2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 14; Anthony
alias Anthony Swamy v. Managing Director, Karnataka
State Road Transport Corporation (2020) 7 SCC 161 :
[2020] 5 SCR 860; Syed Sadiq and Others v. Divisional
Manager, United India Insurance Company Limited F
(2014) 2 SCC 735; New India Assurance Company Ltd.
v. Amit Kumar Yadav and Another F.A.O. Nos. 1285 &
1489 of 2008 decided on March 23, 2022; Sanjay
Kumar v. Ashok Kumar and Another (2014) 5 SCC 330;
Ramesh v. Karan Singh & Anr. Civil Appeal No. 6365 G
of 2022 dated September 16, 2022; Arvind Kumar
Mishra v. New India Assurance Company Limited and
Another (2010) 10 SCC 254 : [2010] 11 SCR 857;
National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi
H
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A and Others (2017) 16 SCC 680 : [2017] 13 SCR 100;
Helen C. Rebello (Mrs.) and Others v. Maharashtra
State Road Transport Corporation and Another (1999)
1 SCC 90 : [1998] 1 Suppl. SCR 684; Laxman alias
Laxman Mourya v. Divisional Manager, Oriental
Insurance Company Limited and Another (2011) 10
B
SCC 756; Anant son of Sidheshwar Dukre v. Pratap
son of Zhamnnappa Lamzane and Another Civil Appeal
No. 8420 of 2018 dated August 21, 2022; Parminder
Singh v. New India Assurance Company Limited and
Others (2019) 7 SCC 217 : [2019] 8 SCR 986;
C Neerupam Mohan Mathur v. New India Assurance
Company (2013) 14 SCC 15 : [2013] 8 SCR 15;
Nagarajappa v. Divisional Manager, Oriental Insurance
Company Limited (2011) 13 SCC 323 : [2011] 6 SCR
70; Mohan Soni v. Ram Avtar Tomar and Others (2012)
2 SCC 267 : [2012] 2 SCR 921; Sandeep Khanuja v.
D
Atul Dande and Another (2017) 3 SCC 351; Kerala
SRTC v. Susamma Thomas (1994) 2 SCC 176;
Abhimanyu Partap Singh v. Namita Sekhon and Another
(2022) 8 SCC 489; Sanjay Verma v. Haryana Roadways
(2014) 3 SCC 210 : [2014] 1 SCR 924; New India
E Assurance Company Limited v. Gopali and Others
(2012) 12 SCC 198 : [2012] 6 SCR 834; Nizam’s
Institute of Medical Sciences v. Prasanth S. Dhananka
and Others (2009) 6 SCC 1 : [2009] 9 SCR 313;
Vijaykumar Babulal Modi v. State of Gujarat (Deleted)
& Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation 2011 SCC
F
OnLine Guj 7349; Virendra Kumar v. Vijay Kumar and
Others (2021) ILR 3 All 272; Ibrahim v. Raju and
Others (2011) 10 SCC 634 – referred to.
H. West & Son Ltd. v. Shephard 1958-65 ACJ 504 (HL,
England) – referred to.
G
Case Law Reference
(2022) 7 SCC 738 referred to Para 13
(2014) 5 SCC 330 referred to Para 14
[1995] 1 SCR 75 referred to Para 17
H
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 411
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR.
(2011) 10 SCC 683 relied on Para 30 A
[2010] 11 SCR 857 referred to Para 18
[2010] 13 SCR 179 referred to Para 18
[2017] 13 SCR 100 referred to Para 19
[1998] 1 Suppl. SCR 684 referred to Para 19 B
[2002] 4 Suppl. SCR 499 referred to Para 20
(2011) 10 SCC 756 referred to Para 20
[2012] 3 SCR 1178 referred to Para 33
C
[2018] 3 SCR 20 referred to Para 34
[2019] 8 SCR 986 referred to Para 35
[2020] 3 SCR 622 referred to Para 36
[2013] 8 SCR 15 referred to Para 37
D
[2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 14 referred to Para 38
[2020] 5 SCR 860 referred to Para 42
[2011] 6 SCR 70 referred to Para 42
(2014) 2 SCC 735 referred to Para 43, 81
E
[2012] 2 SCR 921 referred to Para 44
(2017) 3 SCC 351 referred to Para 45
[2009] 5 SCR 1098 relied on Para 53
(1994) 2 SCC 176 referred to Para 53 F
(2021) 2 SCC 166 relied on Para 59
(2022) 8 SCC 489 referred to Para 67
[2014] 1 SCR 924 referred to Para 71
[2012] 6 SCR 834 referred to Para 80 G
[2009] 9 SCR 313 referred to Para 95
(2011) 10 SCC 634 referred to Para 101
[2020] SCR 968 relied on Para 113
H
412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 8510
of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.04.2018 of the High Court
of Karnataka at Dharwad Bench in MFA No.100867/2014 (MV).
Anand Sanjay M. Nuli, Dharm Singh for M/s Nuli & Nuli, Advs.
B for the Appellant.
Maibam Nabaghanashyam Singh, Shakti K. Pattanaik, Sanjeev
Verma, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
C J. B. PARDIWALA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal has been filed against the impugned final judgment
and order dated 25th of April, 2018 passed by the High Court of Karnataka
(Dharwad Bench) in “Shri Sidram S/o Raju Bhosale v. Shri Siddu
D
Mahadev Bhosale & Anr.” urging various legal grounds and contentions
for further enhancement of compensation in the case of a motor accident
involving the appellant-claimant herein whereby the High Court enhanced
the compensation awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal,
Belgaum (for short, ‘Tribunal’) by Rs. 3,13,800/- to a total of Rs. 9,26,800/
E -. The Tribunal had awarded compensation of Rs. 6,13,000/- under the
various heads along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the
date of filing of the petition till the date of realisation of payment.
3. The briefs facts of the case are given hereinunder. The appellant-
claimant suffered grievous injuries in a road accident that occurred on
F 18.07.2012, while he was walking on the left side of the Kulgod-Gokak
road. While the claimant was near the Laxmeshwar crossing, a goods
vehicle bearing registration No. KA-23/9426, being driven in a rash and
negligent manner banged into the appellant- claimant. The appellant-
claimant was shifted to a hospital and was treated as an indoor patient
from 18.07.2012 till 06.08.2012. On account of the accident, the appellant-
G claimant suffered permanent disability to the extent of 45%. The
appellant-claimant suffered from paraplegia due to the accident. The
appellant- claimant was in the business of selling utensils in different
villages of the district.
4. The appellant-claimant filed a claim petition before the First
H Additional Senior Civil Division Judge & MACT, Belgaum at Belgaum
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 413
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
which was registered as the M.V.C. No. 1786 of 2012. Before the A
Tribunal, the appellant- claimant examined himself (PW-1) and also
examined Dr. Anil B. Patil as PW2 in respect of his claim and various
other documents were taken on record as evidence.
5. The Tribunal held that the accident took place due to the rash
and negligent driving of the offending vehicle as a result of which, the B
appellant sustained injuries and was awarded pecuniary as well as non-
pecuniary damages. The Tribunal held that the appellant was entitled to
the compensation as under:
Towards pain and suffering : Rs. 40,000/-
Loss of earning during laid of period : Rs. 4,000/- C
Loss of earning due to disability : Rs.3,24,000/-
Towards Medical expenses : Rs. 1,50,000/-
Conveyance, special diet etc : Rs. 20,000/-
D
Loss of amenities in life : Rs. 30,000/-
Towards marriage prospects : Rs. 20,000/-
Towards future medical expenses : Rs. 25,000/-
Total : Rs.6,13,000/-
E
6. Aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, the appellant filed an
appeal in the High Court praying for enhancement of the compensation
on the ground that the Tribunal ought to have awarded enhanced
compensation on the basis of the evidence adduced. The contentions of
the appellant will be taken up in detail at a later stage.
F
7. The High Court enhanced the compensation to Rs. 9,26,800/-.
The High Court in its impugned order held:
“9. The Tribunal has taken the income of the claimant at
Rs. 5,000/- which is on the lower sipe. The accident is of the
year 2012 and the notional income of the claimant could be
G
taken at Rs.7,000/- per month considering the nature of
business carried on by him.
10. Thus, the claimant would be entitled to compensation under
the head of loss of future earning as follows: Rs.7,000/- x 12
x 18 x 40% = Rs.6,04,800/.
H
414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A 11. The compensation awarded under the head of pain and
suffering, medical expenses, conveyance, special diet, etc.,
loss of amenities in life and marriage prospects is just and
proper and same is not disturbed. The claimant who suffered
grievous injury would have suffered loss of earning during
the laid up. The compensation awarded under the head of
B
pain and suffering, medical expenses, conveyance, special
diet, etc., loss of amenities in life and marriage prospects is
just and proper and same is not disturbed. The claimant who
suffered grievous injury would have suffered loss of earning
during the laid up period for a minimum period of six months.
C Therefore, he is entitled for a sum of Rs.42,000/- (Rs. 7,000 x
6). The claimant would be further entitled to litigation
expenses of Rs.20,000/-.
12. With regard to future medical expenses, the claimant has
not stated as to the nature of future treatment required. Hence,
D he would not be entitled for any compensation on the head of
future medical expenses. However, it is made clear that if at
all the claimant incurs any expenses towards any surgery or
treatment on account of the injury suffering in the present
motor accident and if he proves the same before the insurer,
the insurer shall indemnify the same.
E
13. Accordingly, the claimant is entitled for a total
compensation of Rs.9,26,800/- as against Rs.6,13,000/-
awarded by the Tribunal.
14. Thus, the claimant shall be entitled to a total compensation
F under the following heads:
SI. . Particulars Amount
No.
1. Pain and suffering Rs. 40,000/-
2. Loss of earning during laid-up Rs.42,000/-
G Period for six months
3. Loss of earning due to disability Rs.6,04,800/-
4. Towards medical expenses Rs.1,50,000/-
5. Conveyance, special diet etc. Rs. 20,000/-
6. Loss of amenities in life Rs. 30,000/-
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SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 415
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
7. Marriage prospects Rs. 20,000/- A
8. Litigation expenses Rs. 20,000/-
Total Rs. 9,26,800/-
Accordingly, there would be an enhanced compensation
of Rs. 3,13,800/-, which shall carry interest at the rate of 6%
per annum from the date of petition till date of realization.” B
8. Not satisfied with the compensation awarded by the High Court,
the appellant has appealed to this Court urging various contentions in
support of further enhancement of the compensation.
SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
C
9. Mr. Anand Sanjay M. Nuli, the learned counsel appearing for
the appellant, filed his submissions in writing. The submissions are as
under:
10. The accident had occurred on 18.07.2012 when the appellant-
claimant was walking on the left side of the Kulgod-Gokak Road, D
Karnataka when a goods vehicle bearing No. KA-23/9426 dashed against
the appellant-claimant, whilst being driven in a rash and negligent manner.
In lieu of the same, the appellant-claimant sustained grievous injuries.
The appellant-claimant was admitted to Lake View Hospital from
18.07.2012 to 06.08.2012 and was an indoor patient for 19 days. An
amount of Rs.2,00,000/- had been spent towards his medical expenses. E
It was observed that there was a permanent physical disability of 45%
of the whole body as certified by the doctor and further was a functional
disability of 100% as the appellant-claimant is unable to continue with
his vocation and unable to find any work in lieu of the accident.
11. It is submitted that the appellant-claimant was hale, healthy F
and aged only 19 years at the time of the accident. The appellant-claimant
being aggrieved, had sought compensation to the tune of
Rs. 25,00,000/- by filing MYC No.1786/20 12 before the Tribunal. The
Tribunal had awarded a meagre sum of Rs.6,13,000/- along with interest
at 6%. Being aggrieved, the appellant-claimant had proceeded to file G
M.F.A. No.100867/2014 (MV) before the High Court of Karnataka
(Dharwad Bench). The High Court vide its impugned order has only
marginally increased the compensation payable to the appellant-claimant
from Rs.6,13,000/- to Rs.9,26,800/-. The High Court had considered the
income of the appellant-claimant to be only Rs. 7,000/- as against Rs.
H
416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A 9,000/- which the appellant-claimant was earning through his utensil
business. The physical disability had only been taken as 40% as against
45% as opined by the Doctor. The table showing the heads awarded as
compensation by the High Court and the Tribunal to the appellant-claimant
is as follows:
B
C
D
E
12. It is submitted that both the Tribunal as well as the High Court
have failed to correctly provide/grant compensation under the head “future
prospects” as mandated by this Court by only taking the salary of the
F appellant-claimant to be Rs. 7,000/- and not Rs. 9,000/-. It is submitted
that it had been specifically stated by Dr. Anil B. Patil (PW-2) that the
appellant would require future medical expenses to the tune of Rs.
2,50,000/-. However, the Tribunal awarded only a sum of Rs. 25,000/-
towards future medical expenses as against Rs. 2,50,000/- as stated by
PW-2. The High Court has not considered the same at all.
G
13. It is submitted that with regard to conveyance, it ought to be
appreciated that the accident occurred on the Kulgod-Gokak Highway
and the appellant was subsequently transferred to Belgaum for treatment.
Therefore, compensation under the head of conveyance ought to be
granted on the higher side as the appellant was completely disabled and
H
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 417
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
must have received help from family members or friends to get admitted A
at the hospital and back and forth which has also been observed in
Master Ayush v. Branch Manager, Reliance General Insurance
Company Limited and Another, (2022) 7 SCC 738. Therefore, it would
be reasonable to award conveyance charges of Rs.50,000/-.
14. It is submitted that this Court in Sanjay Kumar v. Ashok B
Kumar and Another, (2014) 5 SCC 330, was pleased to award
compensation to the tune of Rs.75,000/- for loss of marriage prospects
wherein the claimant was earning only a sum of Rs.3,500/- per month.
Therefore, it would be reasonable to award compensation to the tune of
Rs. 1,00,000/- for loss of marriage prospects to the appellant-claimant in
the present matter. C
15. The appellant suffers from paraplegia because of the accident
and requires an attendant throughout the day and hence, Attendant
charges of Rs.4,500/- per month ought to be awarded to the appellant,
which has not been considered by the Tribunal as well as the High Court.
The appellant is unable to stand, walk or sit and is unable to bend his D
body or lift any weights. It is pertinent to point out herein that the appellant
as a consequence of his grievous injuries will not be able to work in the
same manner as he used to prior to the accident and therefore, functional
disability of the appellant ought to be considered as 100%.
16. It is further submitted that the appellant had been operated E
upon twice and has undergone a great deal of pain and suffering in lieu
of the accident and has had to give up his vocation as a consequence of
the grievous nature of the injuries sustained. This Court in Ramesh v.
Karan Singh & Anr. in Civil Appeal No. 6365 of 2022 dated September
16, 2022 was pleased to grant compensation to the tune of Rs. 4,00,000/ F
- after taking notice of the grievous nature of the injuries sustained by
the Claimant in the said matter and taking into consideration that he had
been operated upon 5 times. In light of the same, it would be reasonable
to award compensation of Rs. 1,00,000/- to the appellant under the head
of pain and suffering.
G
17. It is submitted that this Court in R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest
Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Others, (1995) 1 SCC 551, (Para-9) had
categorically stated that in injury cases, compensation ought to be
assessed as Pecuniary Damages i.e the costs incurred by the claimant
for the injury and Special Damages which includes damages for mental
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418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A and physical shock, loss of amenities, loss of expectation of life and
inconvenience. It may be observed that cumulatively, only a meagre
sum of Rs. 90,000/- has been awarded to the appellant for the same. It
ought to be appreciated that the appellant would not be able to marry as
a consequence of the accident and is forced to live with the pain and
suffering throughout his life as he would require an attendant to care for
B
him as well. It may be observed that it has been specifically stated that
the appellant is unable to squat or sit cross legged and unable to stand
and walk as well as per the disability certificate. Keeping in mind the
same, it would be reasonable to award compensation of Rs.50,000/-
each to the appellant-claimant under the non-pecuniary heads of loss of
C amenities. It is submitted that with regards to litigation expenses, the
appellant has contested the matter right from the point of the Tribunal
upto this Court, in light of the same, it would be reasonable to award
litigation expenses of Rs.50,000/- to the appellant.
18. It is submitted that this Court in Govind Yadav v. New India
D Insurance Company Limited, (2011) 10 SCC 683, Arvind Kumar
Mishra v. New India Assurance Company Limited and Another,
(2010) 10 SCC 254, and Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar and Another,
(2011) 1 SCC 343, has categorically held that adequate compensation
ought to be awarded not only for the physical injury and treatment, but
also for the loss of earning and his inability to lead a normal life and
E enjoy amenities, which he would have enjoyed but for the disability caused
due to the accident.
19. It is pertinent to point out herein that the appellant would be
entitled to fair and just compensation in order to place the appellant in
such a position as close to how the appellant was living prior to the
F accident as held by this Court in National Insurance Company Limited
v. Pranay Sethi and Others, (2017) 16 SCC 680, (Para-55) and in Raj
Kumar v. Ajay Kumar (supra)(Para-5). This Court has also held in
Helen C. Rebello (Mrs.) and Others v. Maharashtra State Road
Transport Corporation and Another, (1999) 1 SCC 90 (Para-36), that
G the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, ‘the Act’) is a beneficial piece
of legislation and hence the object of the Courts ought to be to assist the
injured/deceased person.
20. It is pertinent to point out herein that the claim of the appellant
-claimant before the Tribunal was only Rs. 25,00,000/-. However, it is
H submitted that this Court in Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh and Others,
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 419
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
(2003) 2 SCC 274, and in Laxman alias Laxman Mourya v. Divisional A
Manager, Oriental Insurance Company Limited and Another, (2011)
10 SCC 756, had categorically stated that there is no restriction that the
Tribunal/Court cannot award compensation amount exceeding the claim
amount.
21. Thus, in view of the aforesaid, the learned counsel prayed B
that there being merit in his appeal, the same may be allowed and the
amount of compensation may be enhanced accordingly.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
NO. 1-INSURANCE COMPANY
22. Mr. Maibam Nabaghanashyam Singh, the learned counsel C
appearing for the insurance company has also submitted his submissions
in writing. The same are as under:
23. It is submitted that the present petition is filed by the petitioner
challenging the impugned order whereby the High Court had allowed
the appeal filed by the petitioner and enhanced the compensation from D
Rs. 6,13,000/- to Rs. 9,26,800/-. The petitioner by filing the present petition
is seeking further enhancement of the award. It is submitted that the
High Court after considering the evidence on record and also after
considering the MACT award had rightly enhanced the award as claimed
by the petitioner as such there is no scope for any further enhancement E
of the amount in the present petition.
24. It is submitted that the High Court has rightly appreciated the
evidence and has taken 40% disability for whole body after considering
the nature of injury suffered and the evidence of treating doctor, which
is 10% more than what has been considered by the Tribunal. The High F
Court has rightly assessed the future earning as per the law laid down
by this Court in Anant son of Sidheshwar Dukre v. Pratap son of
Zhamnnappa Lamzane and Another in Civil Appeal No. 8420 of 2018
dated August 21, 2022. The calculation of loss of future earning where
the claimant suffers permanent disability as a result of injuries has been
dealt in the aforementioned judgment in para no. 7.2. Therefore, under G
this head there is no scope of enhancement as claimed in the present
petition.
25. It is submitted that the appellant has wrongly claimed
enhancement of the compensation towards the loss of future earnings
during the laid-up period. In fact, the High Court has awarded for loss of H
420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A earning during the laid-up period for six months. Whereas as per the law
laid down by this Court in Anant v. Pratap (supra), this Court has held
that the claimant cannot succeed in the claim of actual loss of income. It
was observed by this Court in para No. 7.3 that “The grant of loss of
future income compensates for any further period of time where
income was lost. Actual loss of income can be awarded for the month
B
in which accident took place.” In fact, the High Court had rather
awarded on the higher side under this head i.e. for actual loss income,
which ought to be have been awarded only for the month in which
accident took place.
26. It is submitted that the appellant therein without any evidence
C on record is allegedly claiming that the claimant had 100% disability. It is
pertinent to submit here that the appellant had miserably failed to produce
any document before the Tribunal, the High Court or even in this Court
to show that the claimant had 100% disability. The only document relied
upon by appellant as regards to the disability of the claimant is the disability
D certificate which shows that total permanent physical disability of 45%
to whole body. No document filed by the appellant is showing that the
claimant has 100% disability. Therefore, the contention made by the
appellant for enhancement of the compensation on the ground of disability
of 100% is nothing but a desire of the claimant to gain sympathy of this
Court to grant further amount as enhancement of the award. The
E approach of the appellant is unhealthy and will set a bad precedent if
such pleas are accepted by this Court. In view of the same the present
appeal is liable to be dismissed being devoid of merits.
27. Thus, in view of the aforesaid, the learned counsel appearing
for the insurance company prays that there being no merit in the appeal
F filed by the original claimant, the same may be dismissed.
ANALYSIS
28. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties
and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that
G falls for our consideration is whether the appellant-claimant has made
out any case for further enhancement of the amount of compensation.
POSITION OF LAW
29. The process of determining the compensation by the court is
essentially a very difficult task and can never be an exact science. Perfect
H
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 421
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
compensation is hardly possible, more so in claims of injury and disability. A
As rightly pointed out in H. West & Son Ltd. v. Shephard, 1958-65
ACJ 504 (HL, England):
“…money cannot renew a physical frame that has been
battered.”
30. The principle consistently followed by this court in assessing B
motor vehicle compensation claims, is to place the victim in as near a
position as she or he was in before the accident, with other compensatory
directions for loss of amenities and other payments. These general
principles have been stated and reiterated in several decisions.
[Govind Yadav v. New India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2011) 10 SCC 683.] C
31. It is now a well settled position of law that even in cases of
permanent disablement incurred as a result of a motor-accident, the
claimant can seek, apart from compensation for future loss of income,
amounts for future prospects as well. We have come across many orders
of different tribunals and unfortunately affirmed by different High Courts, D
taking the view that the claimant is not entitled to compensation for
future prospects in accident cases involving serious injuries resulting in
permanent disablement. That is not a correct position of law. There is no
justification to exclude the possibility of compensation for future prospects
in accident cases involving serious injuries resulting in permanent
disablement. Such a narrow reading is illogical because it denies E
altogether the possibility of the living victim progressing further in life in
accident cases – and admits such possibility of future prospects, in case
of the victim’s death.
32. This Court has emphasised time and again that “just
compensation” should include all elements that would go to place the F
victim in as near a position as she or he was in, before the occurrence of
the accident. Whilst no amount of money or other material compensation
can erase the trauma, pain and suffering that a victim undergoes after a
serious accident, (or replace the loss of a loved one), monetary
compensation is the manner known to law, whereby society assures G
some measure of restitution to those who survive, and the victims who
have to face their lives.
33. In Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Company Limited
and Others, (2012) 6 SCC 421, this Court held that:
H
422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A “14. We find it extremely difficult to fathom any rationale for
the observation made in paragraph 24 of the judgment in Sarla
Verma case [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121] that
where the deceased was self-employed or was on a fixed salary
without provision for annual increment, etc., the Courts will
usually take only the actual income at the time of death and a
B
departure from this rule should be made only in rare and
exceptional cases involving special circumstances. In our
view, it will be nave to say that the wages or total emoluments/
income of a person who is self-employed or who is employed
on a fixed salary without provision for annual increment, etc.,
C would remain the same throughout his life.
15. The rise in the cost of living affects everyone across the
board. It does not make any distinction between rich and poor.
As a matter of fact, the effect of rise in prices which directly
impacts the cost of living is minimal on the rich and maximum
D on those who are self-employed or who get fixed income/
emoluments. They are the worst affected people. Therefore,
they put in extra efforts to generate additional income
necessary for sustaining their families.
16. The salaries of those employed under the Central and
E State Governments and their agencies/instrumentalities have
been revised from time to time to provide a cushion against
the rising prices and provisions have been made for providing
security to the families of the deceased employees. The salaries
of those employed in private sectors have also increased
manifold. Till about two decades ago, nobody could have
F imagined that salary of Class IV employee of the Government
would be in five figures and total emoluments of those in higher
echelons of service will cross the figure of rupees one lakh.
17. Although the wages/income of those employed in
unorganised sectors has not registered a corresponding
G increase and has not kept pace with the increase in the salaries
of the government employees and those employed in private
sectors, but it cannot be denied that there has been
incremental enhancement in the income of those who are self-
employed and even those engaged on daily basis, monthly
H basis or even seasonal basis. We can take judicial notice of
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 423
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
the fact that with a view to meet the challenges posed by high A
cost of living, the persons falling in the latter category
periodically increase the cost of their labour. In this context,
it may be useful to give an example of a tailor who earns his
livelihood by stitching cloths. If the cost of living increases
and the prices of essentials go up, it is but natural for him to
B
increase the cost of his labour. So will be the cases of ordinary
skilled and unskilled labour, like, barber, blacksmith, cobbler,
mason etc.
18. Therefore, we do not think that while making the
observations in the last three lines of para 24 of Sarla Verma
[Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121] judgment, the Court C
had intended to lay down an absolute rule that there will be
no addition in the income of a person who is self-employed
or who is paid fixed wages. Rather, it would be reasonable to
say that a person who is self-employed or is engaged on fixed
wages will also get 30% increase in his total income over a D
period of time and if he/she becomes the victim of an accident
then the same formula deserves to be applied for calculating
the amount of compensation.”
34. In Jagdish v. Mohan and Others, (2018) 4 SCC 571, the
victim, a carpenter, suffered permanent disablement, and his claim for E
compensation including for loss of future prospects was considered by a
three-Judge Bench which included, incidentally, the judges who had
decided National Insurance Company (supra). This Court held that:
“13. In the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Pranay Sethi
[National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC F
680], this Court has held that the benefit of future prospects
should not be confined only to those who have a permanent
job and would extend to self-employed individuals. In the
case of a self-employed person, an addition of 40% of the
established income should be made where the age of the victim
at the time of the accident was below 40 years. Hence, in the G
present case, the appellant would be entitled to an
enhancement of Rs. 2400 towards loss of future prospects.
14. In making the computation in the present case, the court
must be mindful of the fact that the appellant has suffered a
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424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A serious disability in which he has suffered a loss of the use of
both his hands. For a person engaged in manual activities, it
requires no stretch of imagination to understand that a loss
of hands is a complete deprivation of the ability to earn.
Nothing—at least in the facts of this case—can restore lost
hands. But the measure of compensation must reflect a genuine
B
attempt of the law to restore the dignity of the being. Our
yardsticks of compensation should not be so abysmal as to
lead one to question whether our law values human life. If it
does, as it must, it must provide a realistic recompense for the
pain of loss and the trauma of suffering. Awards of
C compensation are not law’s doles. In a discourse of rights,
they constitute entitlements under law. Our conversations
about law must shift from a paternalistic subordination of the
individual to an assertion of enforceable rights as intrinsic
to human dignity.
D 15. The Tribunal has noted that the appellant is unable to
even eat or to attend to a visit to the toilet without the assistance
of an attendant. In this background, it would be a denial of
justice to compute the disability at 90%. The disability is
indeed total. Having regard to the age of the appellant, the
Tribunal applied a multiplier of 18. In the circumstances, the
E compensation payable to the appellant on account of the loss
of income, including future prospects, would be Rs 18,14,400.
In addition to this amount, the appellant should be granted
an amount of Rs 2 lakhs on account of pain, suffering and
loss of amenities. The amount awarded by the Tribunal towards
F medical expenses (Rs 98,908); for extra nourishment (Rs
25,000) and for attendant’s expenses (Rs 1 lakh) is
maintained. The Tribunal has declined to award any amount
towards future treatment. The appellant should be allowed
an amount of Rs 3 lakhs towards future medical expenses.
The appellant is thus awarded a total sum of Rs 25,38,308 by
G way of compensation. The appellant would be entitled to
interest at the rate of 9% p.a. on the compensation from the
date of the filing of the claim petition. The liability to pay
compensation has been fastened by the Tribunal and by the
High Court on the insurer, owner and driver jointly and
H severally which is affirmed. The amount shall be deposited
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 425
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
before the Tribunal within a period of 6 weeks from today A
and shall be paid over to the appellant upon proper
identification.”
35. The case of Parminder Singh v. New India Assurance
Company Limited and Others, (2019) 7 SCC 217, involved an accident
victim, who underwent surgery for hemiplegia (weakness of one half of B
the body on the left side; in this case, caused by an accident). According
to the treating medic, the victim could not work as a labourer or perform
any agricultural work, or work as a driver (as he was wont to); the
assessment of his disability was at 75%, and of a permanent nature. The
Court held that:
C
“5.1. The appellant has however, produced an affidavit by
his employer in this Court. As per the said affidavit, the
appellant was earning Rs 10,000 p.m. at the time of the
accident.
5.2. On the basis of the affidavit filed by the employer of the D
appellant, we accept that the income of the appellant was Rs
10,000 p.m. at the time of the accident, for the purpose of
computing the compensation payable to him.
5.3. Taking the income of the appellant as Rs 10,000 p.m.,
with future prospects @ 50% as awarded by the High Court, E
the total income of the appellant would come to Rs 15,000
p.m.
5.4. The appellant was 23 years old at the time when the
accident occurred. Applying the multiplier of 18, the loss of
future earnings suffered by the appellant would work out to F
Rs 15,000 × 12 × 18 = Rs 32,40,000.
********* ********* *********
5.7. In K. Suresh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (2012) 12
SCC 274, this Court held that: (SCC p. 279, para 10)
“10. It is noteworthy to state that an adjudicating G
authority, while determining the quantum of compensation,
has to keep in view the sufferings of the injured person
which would include his inability to lead a full life, his
incapacity to enjoy the normal amenities which he would
have enjoyed but for the injuries and his ability to earn as H
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A much as he used to earn or could have earned. Hence,
while computing compensation the approach of the
Tribunal or a court has to be broad-based. Needless to
say, it would involve some guesswork as there cannot be
any mathematical exactitude or a precise formula to
determine the quantum of compensation. In determination
B
of compensation the fundamental criterion of “just
compensation” should be inhered.”
******** ********* ********
5.9. In the present case, it is an admitted position that it is not
C possible for the appellant to get employed as a driver, or do
any kind of manual labour, or engage in any agricultural
operations whatsoever, for his sustenance. In such
circumstances, the High Court has rightly assessed the
appellant’s functional disability at 100% insofar as his loss
of earning capacity is concerned. The appellant is, therefore,
D awarded Rs 32,40,000 towards loss of earning capacity.”
36. Yet later and in near past, in an accident case, which tragically
left in its wake a young girl in a life-long state of paraplegia, this Court,
in Kajal v. Jagdish Chand and Others, (2020) 4 SCC 413, reiterated
that in addition to loss of earnings, compensation for future prospects
E too could be factored in, and observed that:
“14. In Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi
[ (1979) 4 SCC 365 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 996 : 1980 ACJ 55],
this Court held : (SCC p. 366, para 2)
F “2. … the determination of the quantum must be liberal,
not niggardly since the law values life and limb in a free
country in generous scales.”
15. In R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) (P) Ltd. [(1995)
1 SCC 551 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 250], dealing with the different
heads of compensation in injury cases this Court held thus:
G
(SCC p. 556, para 9)
“9. Broadly speaking while fixing the amount of
compensation payable to a victim of an accident, the
damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary
damages and special damages. Pecuniary damages are
H
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 427
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
those which the victim has actually incurred and which A
are capable of being calculated in terms of money; whereas
non-pecuniary damages are those which are incapable of
being assessed by arithmetical calculations. In order to
appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may include
expenses incurred by the claimant: (i) medical attendance;
B
(ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; (iii)
other material loss. So far as non-pecuniary damages are
concerned, they may include: (i) damages for mental and
physical shock, pain and suffering, already suffered or
likely to be suffered in the future; (ii) damages to
compensate for the loss of amenities of life which may C
include a variety of matters i.e. on account of injury the
claimant may not be able to walk, run or sit; (iii) damages
for loss of expectation of life i.e. on account of injury the
normal longevity of the person concerned is shortened;
(iv) inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment,
D
frustration and mental stress in life.”
16. In Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar [(2011) 1 SCC 343 : (2011)
1 SCC (Civ) 164 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 1161], this Court laid
down the heads under which compensation is to be awarded
for personal injuries: (SCC p. 348, para 6)
E
“6. The heads under which compensation is awarded in
personal injury cases are the following:
Pecuniary damages (Special damages)
(i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalisation, medicines,
transportation, nourishing food, and miscellaneous F
expenditure.
(ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured
would have made had he not been injured, comprising:
(a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment;
G
(b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent
disability.
(iii) Future medical expenses.
Non-pecuniary damages (General damages)
H
428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A (iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a
consequence of the injuries.
(v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage).
(vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal
longevity).
B
In routine personal injury cases, compensation will be
awarded only under heads (i), (ii)(a) and (iv). It is only in
serious cases of injury, where there is specific medical
evidence corroborating the evidence of the claimant, that
compensation will be granted under any of the heads (ii)(b),
C (iii), (v) and (vi) relating to loss of future earnings on account
of permanent disability, future medical expenses, loss of
amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage) and loss of
expectation of life.”
17. In K. Suresh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2012) 12
D SCC 274 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 279 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 638,
this Court held as follows: (SCC p. 276, para 2)
“2. … There cannot be actual compensation for anguish
of the heart or for mental tribulations. The quintessentiality
lies in the pragmatic computation of the loss sustained
E which has to be in the realm of realistic approximation.
Therefore, Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
(for brevity “the Act”) stipulates that there should be grant
of “just compensation”. Thus, it becomes a challenge for
a court of law to determine “just compensation” which is
F neither a bonanza nor a windfall, and simultaneously,
should not be a pittance.
******** ******** ********
Loss of earnings
20. Both the courts below have held that since the girl was a
G young child of 12 years only notional income of Rs 15,000
p.a. can be taken into consideration. We do not think this is a
proper way of assessing the future loss of income. This young
girl after studying could have worked and would have earned
much more than Rs 15,000 p.a. Each case has to be decided
H
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 429
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
on its own evidence but taking notional income to be Rs A
15,000 p.a. is not at all justified. The appellant has placed
before us material to show that the minimum wages payable
to a skilled workman is Rs 4846 per month. In our opinion,
this would be the minimum amount which she would have
earned on becoming a major. Adding 40% for the future
B
prospects, it works to be Rs 6784.40 per month i.e. 81,412.80
p.a. Applying the multiplier of 18, it works out to
Rs 14,65,430.40, which is rounded off to Rs 14,66,000.”
37. In Neerupam Mohan Mathur v. New India Assurance
Company, (2013) 14 SCC 15, this Court considered the case of a victim,
whose injury was assessed to 70% as loss of earning capacity for C
amputation of the arm; he was a postgraduate diploma holder in
mechanical engineering, 32 years of age and earning about Rs. 3000/-
per month. This Court held, approving the High Court’s order (which
had adopted the formula from the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923
to determine 70% for the purpose of deciding loss of earning capacity) D
as follows:
“12. In the present case, the percentage of permanent
disability has not been expressed by the doctors with reference
to the full body or with reference to a particular limb. However,
it is not in dispute that the claimant suffered such a permanent E
disability as a result of injuries that he is not in a position of
doing the specialised job of designing, refrigeration and air
conditioning. For the said reason, the claimant’s services were
terminated by his employer but that does not mean that the
claimant is not capable to do any other job including the
desk job. Having qualification of BSc degree and F
postgraduate diploma in Mechanical Engineering, he can
perform any job where application of mind is required than
any physical work.
13. In view of the forgoing discussion we find no grounds
made out to interfere with the finding of the High Court which G
determined the percentage of loss of earning capacity to 70%
adopting the percentage of loss of earning capacity as per
the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The total loss of income
was thus rightly calculated by the High Court at Rs 6,04,800.”
H
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A 38. However, making a monetary assessment of the injury suffered
is the only process devised to compensate the victim. The process of
making such an assessment, whether in case of death or injury, is provided
in Section 168 of the Act which requires that the tribunals constituted
under the Act determine compensation, which appears to be ‘just’. Thus,
the Act vests a wide discretion upon the tribunals. The decision of this
B
Court in Divisional Controller, KSRTC v. Mahadeva Shetty and
Another, (2003) 7 SCC 197, needs mention here (para 15):
“15. ……It has to be borne in mind that compensation for
loss of limbs or life can hardly be weighed in golden scales.
Bodily injury is nothing but a deprivation which entitles the
C claimant to damages. The quantum of damages fixed should
be in accordance with the injury. An injury may bring about
many consequences like loss of earning capacity, loss of
mental pleasure and many such consequential losses. A person
becomes entitled to damages for mental and physical loss,
D his or her life may have been shortened or that he or she
cannot enjoy life, which has been curtailed because of physical
handicap. The normal expectation of life is impaired. But at
the same time it has to be borne in mind that the compensation
is not expected to be a windfall for the victim. Statutory
provisions clearly indicate that the compensation must be
E “just” and it cannot be a bonanza; not a source of profit but
the same should not be a pittance. The courts and tribunals
have a duty to weigh the various factors and quantify the
amount of compensation, which should be just. What would
be “just” compensation is a vexed question. There can be no
F golden rule applicable to all cases for measuring the value
of human life or a limb. Measure of damages cannot be arrived
at by precise mathematical calculations. It would depend upon
the particular facts and circumstances, and attending peculiar
or special features, if any. Every method or mode adopted
for assessing compensation has to be considered in the
G background of “just” compensation which is the pivotal
consideration. Though by use of the expression “which
appears to it to be just”, a wide discretion is vested in the
Tribunal, the determination has to be rational, to be done by
a judicious approach and not the outcome of whims, wild
H guesses and arbitrariness.. …”
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 431
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
39. This Court in R.D. Hattangadi (supra), posited certain A
principles to be followed:
“9.……while fixing an amount of compensation payable to a
victim of an accident, the damages have to be assessed
separately as pecuniary damages and special damages.
Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actually B
incurred and which are capable of being calculated in terms
of money; whereas non-pecuniary damages are those which
are incapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations.
In order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may
include expenses incurred by the claimant: (i) medical
attendance; (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of C
trial; (iii) other material loss. So far non-pecuniary damages
are concerned, they may include (i) damages for mental and
physical shock, pain and suffering, already suffered or likely
to be suffered in future; (ii) damages to compensate for the
loss of amenities of life which may include a variety of matters, D
i.e., on account of injury the claimant may not be able to
walk, run or sit; (iii) damages for the loss of expectation of
life, i.e., on account of injury the normal longevity of the
person concerned is shortened; (iv) inconvenience, hardship,
discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress in
life.” E
40. In the case of Raj Kumar (supra) this Court has explained in
the following terms the general principles relating to compensation in
injury cases and assessment of future loss of earnings due to permanent
disability:
F
“General principles relating to compensation in injury cases
5. The provision of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (“the Act”,
for short) makes it clear that the award must be just, which
means that compensation should, to the extent possible, fully
and adequately restore the claimant to the position prior to G
the accident. The object of awarding damages is to make good
the loss suffered as a result of wrong done as far as money
can do so, in a fair, reasonable and equitable manner. The
court or the Tribunal shall have to assess the damages
objectively and exclude from consideration any speculation
H
432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A or fancy, though some conjecture with reference to the nature
of disability and its consequences, is inevitable. A person is
not only to be compensated for the physical injury, but also
for the loss which he suffered as a result of such injury. This
means that he is to be compensated for his inability to lead a
full life, his inability to enjoy those normal amenities which
B
he would have enjoyed but for the injuries, and his inability
to earn as much as he used to earn or could have earned.
[See C.K. Subramania Iyer v. T. Kunhikuttan Nair [(1969) 3
SCC 64 : AIR 1970 SC 376] , R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control
(India) (P) Ltd. [(1995) 1 SCC 551 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 250]
C and Baker v. Willoughby [1970 AC 467 : (1970) 2 WLR 50 :
(1969) 3 All ER 1528 (HL)].]
6. The heads under which compensation is awarded in
personal injury cases are the following:
Pecuniary damages (Special damages)
D
(i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalisation, medicines,
transportation, nourishing food, and miscellaneous
expenditure.
(ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured would
E have made had he not been injured, comprising:
(a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment;
(b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent
disability.
(iii) Future medical expenses.
F
Non-pecuniary damages (General damages)
(iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a consequence
of the injuries.
(v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage).
G
(vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal
longevity).
In routine personal injury cases, compensation will be
awarded only under heads (i), (ii)(a) and (iv). It is only in
serious cases of injury, where there is specific medical
H
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 433
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
evidence corroborating the evidence of the claimant, that A
compensation will be granted under any of the heads (ii)(b),
(iii), (v) and (vi) relating to loss of future earnings on account
of permanent disability, future medical expenses, loss of
amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage) and loss of
expectation of life.
B
7. Assessment of pecuniary damages under Item (i) and under
Item (ii)(a) do not pose much difficulty as they involve
reimbursement of actuals and are easily ascertainable from
the evidence. Award under the head of future medical
expenses—Item (iii)—depends upon specific medical evidence
regarding need for further treatment and cost thereof. C
Assessment of non-pecuniary damages—Items (iv), (v) and
(vi)—involves determination of lump sum amounts with
reference to circumstances such as age, nature of injury/
deprivation/disability suffered by the claimant and the effect
thereof on the future life of the claimant. Decisions of this D
Court and the High Courts contain necessary guidelines for
award under these heads, if necessary. What usually poses
some difficulty is the assessment of the loss of future earnings
on account of permanent disability—Item (ii)(a). We are
concerned with that assessment in this case.
E
Assessment of future loss of earnings due to permanent
disability
8. Disability refers to any restriction or lack of ability to
perform an activity in the manner considered normal for a
human being. Permanent disability refers to the residuary F
incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body, found
existing at the end of the period of treatment and recuperation,
after achieving the maximum bodily improvement or recovery
which is likely to remain for the remainder life of the injured.
Temporary disability refers to the incapacity or loss of use of
some part of the body on account of the injury, which will G
cease to exist at the end of the period of treatment and
recuperation. Permanent disability can be either partial or
total. Partial permanent disability refers to a person’s inability
to perform all the duties and bodily functions that he could
perform before the accident, though he is able to perform H
434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A some of them and is still able to engage in some gainful activity.
Total permanent disability refers to a person’s inability to
perform any avocation or employment related activities as a
result of the accident. The permanent disabilities that may
arise from motor accident injuries, are of a much wider range
when compared to the physical disabilities which are
B
enumerated in the Persons with Disabilities (Equal
Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation)
Act, 1995 (“the Disabilities Act”, for short). But if any of the
disabilities enumerated in Section 2(i) of the Disabilities Act
are the result of injuries sustained in a motor accident, they
C can be permanent disabilities for the purpose of claiming
compensation.
9. The percentage of permanent disability is expressed by the
doctors with reference to the whole body, or more often than
not, with reference to a particular limb. When a disability
D certificate states that the injured has suffered permanent
disability to an extent of 45% of the left lower limb, it is not
the same as 45% permanent disability with reference to the
whole body. The extent of disability of a limb (or part of the
body) expressed in terms of a percentage of the total functions
of that limb, obviously cannot be assumed to be the extent of
E disability of the whole body. If there is 60% permanent
disability of the right hand and 80% permanent disability of
left leg, it does not mean that the extent of permanent disability
with reference to the whole body is 140% (that is 80% plus
60%). If different parts of the body have suffered different
F percentages of disabilities, the sum total thereof expressed in
terms of the permanent disability with reference to the whole
body cannot obviously exceed 100%.
10. Where the claimant suffers a permanent disability as a
result of injuries, the assessment of compensation under the
G head of loss of future earnings would depend upon the effect
and impact of such permanent disability on his earning
capacity. The Tribunal should not mechanically apply the
percentage of permanent disability as the percentage of
economic loss or loss of earning capacity. In most of the cases,
the percentage of economic loss, that is, the percentage of
H
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 435
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
loss of earning capacity, arising from a permanent disability A
will be different from the percentage of permanent disability.
Some Tribunals wrongly assume that in all cases, a particular
extent (percentage) of permanent disability would result in a
corresponding loss of earning capacity, and consequently, if
the evidence produced show 45% as the permanent disability,
B
will hold that there is 45% loss of future earning capacity. In
most of the cases, equating the extent (percentage) of loss of
earning capacity to the extent (percentage) of permanent
disability will result in award of either too low or too high a
compensation.
11. What requires to be assessed by the Tribunal is the effect C
of the permanent disability on the earning capacity of the
injured; and after assessing the loss of earning capacity in
terms of a percentage of the income, it has to be quantified in
terms of money, to arrive at the future loss of earnings (by
applying the standard multiplier method used to determine D
loss of dependency). We may however note that in some cases,
on appreciation of evidence and assessment, the Tribunal may
find that the percentage of loss of earning capacity as a result
of the permanent disability, is approximately the same as the
percentage of permanent disability in which case, of course,
the Tribunal will adopt the said percentage for determination E
of compensation. (See for example, the decisions of this Court
in Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Co.
Ltd. [(2010) 10 SCC 254 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1258 : (2010)
10 Scale 298] and Yadava Kumar v. National Insurance Co.
Ltd. [(2010) 10 SCC 341 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1285 : (2010) F
8 Scale 567])
12. Therefore, the Tribunal has to first decide whether there
is any permanent disability and, if so, the extent of such
permanent disability. This means that the Tribunal should
consider and decide with reference to the evidence: G
(i) whether the disablement is permanent or temporary;
(ii) if the disablement is permanent, whether it is
permanent total disablement or permanent partial
disablement;
H
436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A (iii) if the disablement percentage is expressed with
reference to any specific limb, then the effect of such
disablement of the limb on the functioning of the entire body,
that is, the permanent disability suffered by the person.
If the Tribunal concludes that there is no permanent disability
B then there is no question of proceeding further and
determining the loss of future earning capacity. But if the
Tribunal concludes that there is permanent disability then it
will proceed to ascertain its extent. After the Tribunal
ascertains the actual extent of permanent disability of the
claimant based on the medical evidence, it has to determine
C whether such permanent disability has affected or will affect
his earning capacity.
13. Ascertainment of the effect of the permanent disability on
the actual earning capacity involves three steps. The Tribunal
has to first ascertain what activities the claimant could carry
D on in spite of the permanent disability and what he could not
do as a result of the permanent disability (this is also relevant
for awarding compensation under the head of loss of amenities
of life). The second step is to ascertain his avocation,
profession and nature of work before the accident, as also
E his age. The third step is to find out whether (i) the claimant is
totally disabled from earning any kind of livelihood, or (ii)
whether in spite of the permanent disability, the claimant could
still effectively carry on the activities and functions, which
he was earlier carrying on, or (iii) whether he was prevented
or restricted from discharging his previous activities and
F functions, but could carry on some other or lesser scale of
activities and functions so that he continues to earn or can
continue to earn his livelihood.
14. For example, if the left hand of a claimant is amputated,
the permanent physical or functional disablement may be
G assessed around 60%. If the claimant was a driver or a
carpenter, the actual loss of earning capacity may virtually
be hundred per cent, if he is neither able to drive or do
carpentry. On the other hand, if the claimant was a clerk in
government service, the loss of his left hand may not result in
H loss of employment and he may still be continued as a clerk
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 437
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
as he could perform his clerical functions; and in that event A
the loss of earning capacity will not be 100% as in the case
of a driver or carpenter, nor 60% which is the actual physical
disability, but far less. In fact, there may not be any need to
award any compensation under the head of “loss of future
earnings”, if the claimant continues in government service,
B
though he may be awarded compensation under the head of
loss of amenities as a consequence of losing his hand.
Sometimes the injured claimant may be continued in service,
but may not be found suitable for discharging the duties
attached to the post or job which he was earlier holding, on
account of his disability, and may therefore be shifted to some C
other suitable but lesser post with lesser emoluments, in which
case there should be a limited award under the head of loss
of future earning capacity, taking note of the reduced earning
capacity.
15. It may be noted that when compensation is awarded by D
treating the loss of future earning capacity as 100% (or even
anything more than 50%), the need to award compensation
separately under the head of loss of amenities or loss of
expectation of life may disappear and as a result, only a token
or nominal amount may have to be awarded under the head
of loss of amenities or loss of expectation of life, as otherwise E
there may be a duplication in the award of compensation. Be
that as it may.
16. The Tribunal should not be a silent spectator when medical
evidence is tendered in regard to the injuries and their effect,
in particular, the extent of permanent disability. Sections 168 F
and 169 of the Act make it evident that the Tribunal does not
function as a neutral umpire as in a civil suit, but as an active
explorer and seeker of truth who is required to “hold an
enquiry into the claim” for determining the “just
compensation”. The Tribunal should therefore take an active G
role to ascertain the true and correct position so that it can
assess the “just compensation”. While dealing with personal
injury cases, the Tribunal should preferably equip itself with
a medical dictionary and a handbook for evaluation of
permanent physical impairment (for example, Manual for
H
438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A Evaluation of Permanent Physical Impairment for Orthopaedic
Surgeons, prepared by American Academy of Orthopaedic
Surgeons or its Indian equivalent or other authorised texts)
for understanding the medical evidence and assessing the
physical and functional disability. The Tribunal may also keep
in view the First Schedule to the Workmen’s Compensation
B
Act, 1923 which gives some indication about the extent of
permanent disability in different types of injuries, in the case
of workmen.
17. If a doctor giving evidence uses technical medical terms,
the Tribunal should instruct him to state in addition, in simple
C non-medical terms, the nature and the effect of the injury. If
a doctor gives evidence about the percentage of permanent
disability, the Tribunal has to seek clarification as to whether
such percentage of disability is the functional disability with
reference to the whole body or whether it is only with reference
D to a limb. If the percentage of permanent disability is stated
with reference to a limb, the Tribunal will have to seek the
doctor’s opinion as to whether it is possible to deduce the
corresponding functional permanent disability with reference
to the whole body and, if so, the percentage.
E 18. The Tribunal should also act with caution, if it proposed
to accept the expert evidence of doctors who did not treat the
injured but who give “ready to use” disability certificates,
without proper medical assessment. There are several
instances of unscrupulous doctors who without treating the
injured, readily give liberal disability certificates to help the
F claimants. But where the disability certificates are given by
duly constituted Medical Boards, they may be accepted subject
to evidence regarding the genuineness of such certificates.
The Tribunal may invariably make it a point to require the
evidence of the doctor who treated the injured or who assessed
G the permanent disability. Mere production of a disability
certificate or discharge certificate will not be proof of the
extent of disability stated therein unless the doctor who treated
the claimant or who medically examined and assessed the
extent of disability of the claimant, is tendered for cross-
examination with reference to the certificate. If the Tribunal
H
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 439
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
is not satisfied with the medical evidence produced by the A
claimant, it can constitute a Medical Board (from a panel
maintained by it in consultation with reputed local hospitals/
medical colleges) and refer the claimant to such Medical
Board for assessment of the disability.
19. We may now summarise the principles discussed above: B
(i) All injuries (or permanent disabilities arising from
injuries), do not result in loss of earning capacity.
(ii) The percentage of permanent disability with
reference to the whole body of a person, cannot be assumed
to be the percentage of loss of earning capacity. To put it C
differently, the percentage of loss of earning capacity is not
the same as the percentage of permanent disability (except in
a few cases, where the Tribunal on the basis of evidence,
concludes that the percentage of loss of earning capacity is
the same as the percentage of permanent disability). D
(iii) The doctor who treated an injured claimant or who
examined him subsequently to assess the extent of his
permanent disability can give evidence only in regard to the
extent of permanent disability. The loss of earning capacity
is something that will have to be assessed by the Tribunal E
with reference to the evidence in entirety.
(iv) The same permanent disability may result in different
percentages of loss of earning capacity in different persons,
depending upon the nature of profession, occupation or job,
age, education and other factors.” F
41. Later, in another judgment, i.e., Jakir Hussein v. Sabir and
Others, (2015) 7 SCC 252, this Court had to consider the correctness of
a compensation assessment based on the High Court’s analysis of the
injury to the victim (a driver who suffered permanent injury to his arm,
impairing movement as well as the wrist, which rendered him incapable
G
of driving any vehicle). The High Court had assessed permanent
disablement at 30%, even though the doctor had certified it to be 55%.
This Court, reversing the High Court order, observed inter alia that:
“15. …..Due to this injury, the doctor has stated that the
appellant had great difficulty to move his shoulder, wrist and
H
440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A elbow and pus was coming out of the injury even two years
after the accident and the treatment was taken by him. The
doctor further stated in his evidence that the appellant got
delayed joined fracture in the humerus bone of his right hand
with wiring and nailing and that he had suffered 55%
disability and cannot drive any motor vehicle in future due to
B
the same. He was once again operated upon during the
pendency of the appeal before the High Court and he was
hospitalised for 10 days. The appellant was present in person
in the High Court and it was observed and noticed by the
High Court that the right hand of the appellant was completely
C crushed and deformed. In view of the doctor’s evidence in
this case, the Tribunal and the High Court have erroneously
taken the extent of permanent disability at 30% and 55%,
respectively for the calculation of amount towards the loss of
future earning capacity. No doubt, the doctor has assessed
the permanent disability of the appellant at 55%. However, it
D
is important to consider the relevant fact, namely, that the
appellant is a driver and driving the motor vehicle is the only
means of livelihood for himself as well as the members of his
family. Further, it is very crucial to note that the High Court
has clearly observed that his right hand was completely
E crushed and deformed.
16. In Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar [(2011) 1 SCC 343], this
Court specifically gave the illustration of a driver who has
permanent disablement of hand and stated that the loss of
future earnings capacity would be virtually 100%. Therefore,
F clearly when it comes to loss of earning due to permanent
disability, the same may be treated as 100% loss caused to
the appellant since he will never be able to work as a driver
again. The contention of the respondent Insurance Company
that the appellant could take up any other alternative
employment is no justification to avoid their vicarious liability.
G Hence, the loss of earning is determined by us at Rs 54,000
per annum. Thus, by applying the appropriate multiplier as
per the principles laid down by this Court in Sarla
Verma v. DTC [(2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ)
770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002], the total loss of future
H
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 441
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
earnings of the appellant will be at Rs 54,000 × 16 = Rs A
8,64,000.”
42. In Anthony alias Anthony Swamy v. Managing Director,
Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, (2020) 7 SCC
161, where the victim was a painter by profession, a three-Judge Bench
had followed Raj Kumar (supra) and Nagarajappa v. Divisional B
Manager, Oriental Insurance Company Limited, (2011) 13 SCC 323.
The High Court had assessed the injury to be 25% permanent disability,
although the treating doctor had said that the injury incurred by the bus
passenger (who was earning Rs. 9000/- per month) was 75% of the left
leg and 37.5% for the whole body. In Raj Kumar (supra), the physical
disability of the upper limb was determined as 68% in proportion to 22- C
23% of the whole-body. The High Court had assessed the injury as 25%
and granted compensation. However, this Court assessed the injury on
the basis that the disability was 75%, stating as follows:
“8. PW 3 had assessed the physical functional disability of
the left leg of the appellant at 75% and total body disability D
at 37.5%. The High Court has considered it proper to assess
the physical disability at 25% of the whole body only. There
is no discussion for this reduction in percentage, much less
any consideration of the nature of permanent functional
disability suffered by the appellant. The extent of physical E
functional disability, in the facts of the case has to be
considered in a manner so as to grant just and proper
compensation to the appellant towards loss of future earning.
The earning capacity of the appellant as on the date of the
accident stands completely negated and not reduced. He has
been rendered permanently incapable of working as a painter F
or do any manual work. Compensation for loss of future
earning, therefore has to be proper and just to enable him to
live a life of dignity and not compensation which is elusive. If
the 75% physical disability has rendered the appellant
permanently disabled from pursuing his normal vocation or G
any similar work, it is difficult to comprehend the grant of
compensation to him in ratio to the disability to the whole
body. The appellant is therefore held entitled to compensation
for loss of future earning based on his 75% permanent physical
functional disability recalculated with the salary of Rs 5,500
with multiplier of 14 at Rs 6,93,000.” H
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A 43. The question of amount of compensation payable to one
suffering injury as a result of motor vehicle accident was considered
in Syed Sadiq and Others v. Divisional Manager, United India
Insurance Company Limited, (2014) 2 SCC 735, when this Court had
to apply the correct standard for awarding compensation for loss of
future prospects for a vegetable vendor, whose right leg had to be
B
amputated, as a result of a motor accident. The High Court had considered
the disability to be 65%. This Court held as follows:
“7. Further, the appellant claims that he was working as a
vegetable vendor. It is true that a vegetable vendor might not
require mobility to the extent that he sells vegetables at one
C place. However, the occupation of vegetable vending is not
confined to selling vegetables from a particular location. It
rather involves procuring vegetables from the wholesale
market or the farmers and then selling it off in the retail market.
This often involves selling vegetables in the cart which requires
D 100% mobility. But even by conservative approach, if we
presume that the vegetable vending by the appellant claimant
involved selling vegetables from one place, the claimant would
require assistance with his mobility in bringing vegetables to
the market place which otherwise would be extremely difficult
for him with an amputated leg. We are required to be sensitive
E while dealing with manual labour cases where loss of limb is
often equivalent to loss of livelihood. Yet, considering that
the appellant claimant is still capable to fend for his livelihood
once he is brought in the market place, we determine the
disability at 85% to determine the loss of income.
F 8. The appellant claimant in his appeal further claimed that
he had been earning Rs 10,000 p.m. by doing vegetable
vending work. The High Court however, considered the loss
of income at Rs 3500 p.m. considering that the claimant did
not produce any document to establish his loss of income. It
G is difficult for us to convince ourselves as to how a labour
involved in an unorganised sector doing his own business is
expected to produce documents to prove his monthly
income…..”
44. In Arvind Kumar Mishra (supra), the appellant at the time
H of accident was a final year engineering (Mechanical) degree student in
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 443
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
a reputed college. He was a brilliant student and had passed all his A
semester examinations with distinction. He suffered grievous injuries
and remained in a coma for about two months; his studies were disrupted
as he was moved to different hospitals for surgeries. For many months,
his condition remained serious; his right hand was amputated and vision
seriously affected. This Court accepted his claim and held that he was
B
permanently disabled to the extent of 70%. In Mohan Soni v. Ram Avtar
Tomar and Others, (2012) 2 SCC 267 (page 272), in a case of injury
entailing loss of a leg, this Court held that medical evidence of the extent
of disability should not be mechanically scaled down:
“8. On hearing the counsel for the parties and on going
through the materials on record, we are of the view that both C
the Tribunal and the High Court were in error in pegging
down the disability of the appellant to 50% with reference to
Schedule I of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923. In the
context of loss of future earning, any physical disability
resulting from an accident has to be judged with reference to D
the nature of work being performed by the person suffering
the disability. This is the basic premise and once that is grasped,
it clearly follows that the same injury or loss may affect two
different persons in different ways. Take the case of a marginal
farmer who does his cultivation work himself and ploughs
his land with his own two hands; or the puller of a cycle- E
rickshaw, one of the main means of transport in hundreds of
small towns all over the country. The loss of one of the legs
either to the marginal farmer or the cycle-rickshaw-puller
would be the end of the road insofar as their earning capacity
is concerned. But in case of a person engaged in some kind F
of desk work in an office, the loss of a leg may not have the
same effect. The loss of a leg (or for that matter the loss of
any limb) to anyone is bound to have very traumatic effects
on one’s personal, family or social life but the loss of one of
the legs to a person working in the office would not interfere
with his work/earning capacity in the same degree as in the G
case of a marginal farmer or a cycle-rickshaw-puller.
******** ********* **********
10. This Court in K. Janardhan case [(2008) 8 SCC
518 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 733], set aside the High Court H
444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A judgment and held that the tanker driver had suffered 100%
disability and incapacity in earning his keep as a tanker driver
as his right leg was amputated from the knee and, accordingly,
restored the order passed by the Commissioner of Workmen’s
Compensation. In K. Janardhan [(2008) 8 SCC 518 : (2008)
2 SCC (L&S) 733] this Court also referred to and relied upon
B
an earlier decision of the Court in Pratap Narain
Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata [(1976) 1 SCC 289 : 1976 SCC
(L&S) 52] in which a carpenter who suffered an amputation
of his left arm from the elbow was held to have suffered
complete loss of his earning capacity.
C ******** ********* **********
13. Any scaling down of the compensation should require
something more tangible than a hypothetical conjecture that
notwithstanding the disability, the victim could make up for
the loss of income by changing his vocation or by adopting
D another means of livelihood. The party advocating for a lower
amount of compensation for that reason must plead and show
before the Tribunal that the victim enjoyed some legal
protection (as in the case of persons covered by the Persons
with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights
E and Full Participation) Act, 1995) or in case of the vast
multitude who earn their livelihood in the unorganised sector
by leading cogent evidence that the victim had in fact changed
his vocation or the means of his livelihood and by virtue of
such change he was deriving a certain income.
F 14. The loss of earning capacity of the appellant, according
to us, may be as high as 100% but in no case it would be less
than 90%. We, accordingly, find and hold that the
compensation for the loss of the appellant’s future earnings
must be computed on that basis. On calculation on that basis,
the amount of compensation would come to Rs 3,56,400 and
G after addition of a sum of Rs 30,000 and Rs 15,000 the total
amount would be Rs 4,01,400. The additional compensation
amount would carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum
from the date of filing of the claim petition till the date of
payment. The additional amount of compensation along with
H
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 445
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
interest should be paid to the appellant without delay and not A
later than three months from today.”
45. One more decision, Sandeep Khanuja v. Atul Dande and
Another, (2017) 3 SCC 351, too had dealt with the precise aspect of
assessing the quantum of permanent disablement. The victim was aged
about 30 years, working as a chartered accountant for various institutions B
for which he was paid professional fees. The injuries suffered by him
resulted in severe impairment of movement; as he had problems in
climbing stairs, back trouble while sleeping, etc. A rod was implanted in
his leg. He suffered 70% permanent disability, and mental and physical
agony. This Court enhanced the compensation, observing the proper
manner to calculate the extent of disability. This Court held as under: C
“13. In the last few years, law in this aspect has been
straightened by this Court by removing certain cobwebs that
had been created because of some divergent views on certain
aspects. It is not even necessary to refer to all these cases. We
find that the principle of determination of compensation in D
the case of permanent/partial disablement has been
exhaustively dealt with after referring to the relevant case
law on the subject in Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar [(2011) 1 SCC
343 : (2011) 1 SCC (Civ) 164 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 1161] in
the following words: (SCC pp. 348-50, paras 8-11) E
“Assessment of future loss of earnings due to permanent
disability
8. xx xx xx
9. The percentage of permanent disability is expressed F
by the doctors with reference to the whole body, or more often
than not, with reference to a particular limb. When a disability
certificate states that the injured has suffered permanent
disability to an extent of 45% of the left lower limb, it is not
the same as 45% permanent disability with reference to the
whole body. The extent of disability of a limb (or part of the G
body) expressed in terms of a percentage of the total functions
of that limb, obviously cannot be assumed to be the extent of
disability of the whole body. If there is 60% permanent
disability of the right hand and 80% permanent disability of
left leg, it does not mean that the extent of permanent disability
H
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A with reference to the whole body is 140% (that is 80% plus
60%). If different parts of the body have suffered different
percentages of disabilities, the sum total thereof expressed in
terms of the permanent disability with reference to the whole
body cannot obviously exceed 100%.
B 10. Where the claimant suffers a permanent disability
as a result of injuries, the assessment of compensation under
the head of loss of future earnings would depend upon the
effect and impact of such permanent disability on his earning
capacity. The Tribunal should not mechanically apply the
percentage of permanent disability as the percentage of
C economic loss or loss of earning capacity. In most of the cases,
the percentage of economic loss, that is, the percentage of
loss of earning capacity, arising from a permanent disability
will be different from the percentage of permanent disability.
Some Tribunals wrongly assume that in all cases, a particular
D extent (percentage) of permanent disability would result in a
corresponding loss of earning capacity, and consequently, if
the evidence produced show 45% as the permanent disability,
will hold that there is 45% loss of future earning capacity. In
most of the cases, equating the extent (percentage) of loss of
earning capacity to the extent (percentage) of permanent
E disability will result in award of either too low or too high a
compensation.
11. What requires to be assessed by the Tribunal is the
effect of the permanent disability on the earning capacity of
the injured; and after assessing the loss of earning capacity
F in terms of a percentage of the income, it has to be quantified
in terms of money, to arrive at the future loss of earnings (by
applying the standard multiplier method used to determine
loss of dependency). We may however note that in some cases,
on appreciation of evidence and assessment, the Tribunal may
G find that the percentage of loss of earning capacity as a result
of the permanent disability, is approximately the same as the
percentage of permanent disability in which case, of course,
the Tribunal will adopt the said percentage for determination
of compensation.”
H
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 447
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
14. The crucial factor which has to be taken into A
consideration, thus, is to assess as to whether the permanent
disability has any adverse effect on the earning capacity of
the injured. In this sense, MACT approached the issue in the
right direction by taking into consideration the aforesaid test.
However, we feel that the conclusion of MACT, on the
B
application of the aforesaid test, is erroneous. A very myopic
view is taken by MACT in taking the view that 70% permanent
disability suffered by the appellant would not impact the
earning capacity of the appellant. MACT thought that since
the appellant is a Chartered Accountant, he is supposed to
do sitting work and, therefore, his working capacity is not C
impaired. Such a conclusion was justified if the appellant
was in the employment where job requirement could be to do
sitting/table work and receive monthly salary for the said work.
An important feature and aspect which is ignored by MACT
is that the appellant is a professional Chartered Accountant.
D
To do this work efficiently and in order to augment his income,
a Chartered Accountant is supposed to move around as well.
If a Chartered Accountant is doing taxation work, he has to
appear before the assessing authorities and appellate
authorities under the Income Tax Act, as a Chartered
Accountant is allowed to practice up to Income Tax Appellate E
Tribunal. Many times Chartered Accountants are supposed
to visit their clients as well. In case a Chartered Accountant
is primarily doing audit work, he is not only required to visit
his clients but various authorities as well. There are many
statutory functions under various statutes which the Chartered
F
Accountants perform. Free movement is involved for
performance of such functions. A person who is engaged and
cannot freely move to attend to his duties may not be able to
match the earning in comparison with the one who is healthy
and bodily abled. Movements of the appellant have been
restricted to a large extent and that too at a young age. Though G
the High Court recognised this, it did not go forward to apply
the principle of multiplier. We are of the opinion that in a
case like this and having regard to the injuries suffered by
the appellant, there is a definite loss of earning capacity and
it calls for grant of compensation with the adoption of
multiplier method……. H
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A 15. In Arvind Kumar Mishra case [Arvind Kumar Mishra v.
New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2010) 10 SCC 254 : (2010) 4
SCC (Civ) 153 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1258], after following
the judgment in Kerala SRTC v. Susamma Thomas [(1994) 2
SCC 176 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 335], the Court chose to apply
multiplier of 18 keeping in view the age of the victim, who
B
was 25 years at the time of the accident.
16. In the instant case, MACT had quantified the income of
the appellant at Rs 10,000 i.e. Rs 1,20,000 per annum. Going
by the age of the appellant at the time of the accident,
multiplier of 17 would be admissible. Keeping in view that
C the permanent disability is 70%, the compensation under this
head would be worked out at Rs 14,28,000. MACT had
awarded compensation of Rs 70,000 for permanent disability,
which stands enhanced to Rs 14,28,000. For mental and
physical agony and frustration and disappointment towards
D life, MACT has awarded a sum of Rs 30,000, which we
enhance to Rs 1,30,000……..”
46. In the case of Arvind Kumar Mishra (supra), this Court
observed as under:
“9. We do not intend to review in detail state of authorities in
E relation to assessment of all damages for personal injury.
Suffice it to say that the basis of assessment of all damages
for personal injury is compensation. The whole idea is to put
the claimant in the same position as he was insofar as money
can. Perfect compensation is hardly possible but one has to
F keep in mind that the victim has done no wrong; he has
suffered at the hands of the wrongdoer and the court must
take care to give him full and fair compensation for that he
had suffered.
10. In some cases for personal injury, the claim could be in
G respect of lifetime’s earnings lost because, though he will live,
he cannot earn his living. In others, the claim may be made
for partial loss of earnings. Each case has to be considered
in the light of its own facts and at the end, one must ask
whether the sum awarded is a fair and reasonable sum. The
conventional basis of assessing compensation in personal
H
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 449
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
injury cases—and that is now recognised mode as to the A
proper measure of compensation—is taking an appropriate
multiplier of an appropriate multiplicand.”
47. In Pappu Deo Yadav v. Naresh Kumar and Others, AIR
2020 SCC 4424, it was held that courts should not adopt a stereotypical
or myopic approach, but instead, view the matter taking into account the B
realities of life, both in the assessment of the extent of disabilities, and
compensation under various heads. In this case, the loss of an arm, in
the opinion of the court, resulted in severe income earning impairment
upon the appellant. As a typist/data entry operator, full functioning of his
hands was essential to his livelihood. The extent of his permanent
disablement was assessed at 89%; however, the High Court halved it to C
45% on an entirely wrong application of some ‘proportionate’ principle,
which was illogical and is unsupportable in law. What is to be seen, as
emphasized by decision after decision, is the impact of the injury upon
the income generating capacity of the victim. The loss of a limb (a leg or
arm) and its severity on that account is to be judged in relation to the D
profession, vocation or business of the victim; there cannot be a blind
arithmetic formula for ready application.
48. With the aforesaid broad principles in mind, we proceed to
examine the appellant’s claim for enhancement of the compensation
awarded to him by the High Court. E
MEDICAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD
49. Dr. Anil B. Patil (PW-2) who treated the appellant has issued
a Disability Certificate (Ex. P-8) wherein the following has been stated:
“This to certify that I have examined, Shri Sidram Raju Bhosle. F
Age-19 yrs/M of Kulgod. OPD No-19441 Dated-18/07/2012
at Lakeview Hospital. He has come to me for assessment of
permanent physical disability certificate as per the record
shown by the patient, the injuries were noted. The patient
had met with a road Traffic accident on 18/7/2012 time around
1:30 pm at near Laxmeshwar cross Gokak Dist-Belgaum. He G
was admitted in my Lakeview Hospital, Belgaum, for the
treatment on 4/5/09
MLC NO - outward no-BHSLVH/MRD MLC
No. 229 Dated 18/07/12
H
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A Date of admission -18/7/2012
Date of discharged - 6/8/2012
-
Diagnosis
B Burst Fracture D 12 vertebra with paraplegia.
Fracture 1 to 6 Ribs with Hydropneumothorax, surgical
emphysema.
X-Ray Report:
C -Burst fracture D 12 vertebra. X-ray no.-9832 Dated on 23/
07 /2012
-Fracture 1 to 6 ribs with Hydropneumothorax, surgical
emphysema. X-ray no.- 753 dated 18/07/2012.
CT CHEST(PLAIN): on 18/07/2012
D
-Fracture of right 1st to 6th ribs along posterior/lateral aspect.
-Gross hydropneumothorax/hemothorax on the right side with
pneumomediastinum causing gross shift of mediastinum
towards left side and partial collapse of right lung.
E -Cystic lesions(two) in right upper lobe? post traumatic with
fluid levels A/W patchy opacities in right lung S/o contusions.
-burst anterior wedge compression fracture of D12 vertebral
body involving both pedicles with retropulsion.
F
Case Examination
1.History
2-On Clinical Examination
G 1-History At Present Patient Con1plaints
-Pain and weakness in both legs and back.
-lnability in squatting & sitting crossed leg.
-Inability to stand and \Valle
H
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 451
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
2-On. Clinical Examination . . A
Inspection:-Linear Scar extending fron1 DS to L5 present over
spine.
-scar over anterior lateral aspect of right side of chest
-Unable to squat and sit cross leg. B
-Movements of Left knee Right knee grade 3-4
Flexion grade 2
Extension grade 3
Muscle wasting C
Calf and thigh muscles ++
X-ray Shows- x-ray no. 2852 dated 29.07.2013
Old fracture D12 with implants in situ.
Observed function disability D
-Pain in the left knee & left leg and weakness in both the legs
and inability to stand and walk.
-Unable to squat and sit cross leg.
Conclusion E
I am of the opinion that considering the clinical signs &
radiological findings the patient has got the total permanent
physical disability of 45% to whole body in respect to D12
fracture and neurological weakness with inability to stand,
sit & walk. F
Place-Belgaum”
50. Dr. Patil (PW-2) in his oral evidence has deposed as under:-
“I state that at present petitioner complains of pain and
weakness in both legs and back. Inability in squatting and G
sitting cross leg. Inability to stand and walk. And on clinical
examination of the petitioner it reveals that inspection linear
scar extending from D5 to L5 present over spine, there is
scar over anterior lateral aspect of right side of chest,
unable to squat and sit cross leg.
H
452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A I state that movements of left knee flexion grade-2,
extension grade-3, right knee grade 3-4 and movements
of left foot, plantar-grade -1 dorsiflexion-grade-3 and left
foot grade 3-4 and muscle wasting calf and thigh muscle++
Further I state that X-ray taken on 29-07-2013
B reveals old fracture D12 with implants in situ, functional
disability observed to the petitioner are:- pain in the left
knee and left leg and weakness in both legs and inability
to stand and walk, unable to squat and sit cross leg.
Further I state that petitioner needs future medical
C expenses would be Rs. 2,50,000/-.
After considering the clinical signs and radiological
finding, the petitioner has got the total permanent physical
disability of 45% to whole body in respect of D-12 fracture
and neurological weakness with inability to stand, sit and
D walk.
I have issued the disability certificate to the petitioner and
it bears my signature and said disability certificate is
already marked as Ex.P-8 and now my signature is marked
as EX.P-8 (a), (b), (c) respectively.”
E 51. In his cross-examination at the instance of the owner of the
vehicle, he has deposed: -
“It is true that the age of the petitioner is 19 years at the time
of assessment. It is not true to suggest that heel process of the
injuries is better than old age person. It is not true to suggest
F that rib fractures 1 to 6 are not simple in nature. It is false to
say that the petitioner is of young age and the heeling process
is better improvement. It is false to say that disability given by
me is on the higher side. It is false to say that after removing
implant the petitioner will be able to walk and stand properly.
It is false to say that future medical treatment expenses will
G
Rs. 2,50,000/-. It is false to say that the petitioner is able to
walk, stand as earlier. It is false to say that to help the
petitioner I am deposing falsely.”
52. In the cross-examination at the instance of the insurance
company, he has deposed:
H
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 453
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
“It is true that I am orthopedic surgeon and I am not neuro A
surgeon. It is false to suggest that I am authorized to give
disability certificate of paraplegia. It is true that I have not
received any court summons for this case. I don’t know the
avocation of the petitioner. It is true that the petitioner had
met with a road traffic accident. It is false that by birth this
B
petitioner is having this type of injury. It is true that the
petitioner has taken proper treatment from our hospital. It is
true that after well cured he was discharged from our hospital.
It is true that I have advised him to take follow-up treatment.
It is true that the petitioner has taken follow-up treatment. It
is false to say that for not taking follow-up treatment by the C
petitioner this injury has worsened. It is false to say that from
falling from the tree this type of injury may happen. It is false
that due to rib fracture paraplegia cannot be caused. Burst
fracture D-12 vertebra has caused paraplegia. It is false to
say that this injury is not accidental injury. It is not true that
D
to help the petitioner to get the compensation, I am deposing
falsely. It is false that I have seen X-ray before discharge and
after discharge. It is true that after seeing discharge X-ray
there was improvement of the petitioner. It is false to say that
the petitioner has acted as stated in your chief examination.
It is true that basis of assessment I have referred ALIMCO. E
It is false to say that petitioner is unable to walk, stand
properly. It is false to say that I have given higher side medical
bills to help the petitioner. It is false that injuries are simple in
nature. It is true that I have given disability to the whole body
and this is higher side. It is false that whole body disability F
comes between 10% to 15% to help the petitioner. I am
deposing false to get the compensation.”
THE PECUNIARY EXPENSES
(1) Loss of earning due to disability
G
53. The courts must apply the multiplier method, while ascertaining
the compensation to be awarded to the victim. This was so held by this
Court in Sarla Verma (Smt) and Others v. Delhi Transport
Corporation and Another, (2009) 6 SCC 121. In Sarla Verma (supra),
this Court quoted the following observations from Kerala SRTC v.
Susamma Thomas, (1994) 2 SCC 176: H
454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A “The multiplier method involves the ascertainment of the loss
of dependency or the multiplicand having regard to the
circumstances of the case and capitalising the multiplicand
by an appropriate multiplier. The choice of the multiplier is
determined by the age of the deceased (or that of the claimants
whichever is higher) and by the calculation as to what capital
B
sum, if invested at a rate of interest appropriate to a stable
economy, would yield the multiplicand by way of annual
interest. In ascertaining this, regard should also be had to
the fact that ultimately the capital sum should also be
consumed-up over the period for which the dependency is
C expected to last.
It is necessary to reiterate that the multiplier method is logically
sound and legally well established. There are some cases
which have proceeded to determine the compensation on the
basis of aggregating the entire future earnings for over the
D period the life expectancy was lost, deducted a percentage
therefrom towards uncertainties of future life and award the
resulting sum as compensation. This is clearly unscientific.
For instance, if the deceased was, say 25 years of age at the
time of death and the life expectancy is 70 years, this method
would multiply the loss of dependency for 45 years%virtually
E adopting a multiplier of 45%and even if one-third or one-
fourth is deducted therefrom towards the uncertainties of future
life and for immediate lump sum payment, the effective
multiplier would be between 30 and 34. This is wholly
impermissible.”
F 54. The Tribunal held that although the appellant herein had claimed
that he was earning Rs. 9,000/- per month from his business of selling of
utensils, yet the appellant was not in a position to adduce any documentary
evidence in that regard. Although Dr. Anil B. Patil (PW-2) in his oral
evidence has deposed that the appellant suffered a permanent disability
G to the tune of 45%, yet the Tribunal held that the appellant had suffered
a permanent disability of only 30%. The Tribunal applied the multiplier
as explained in the case of Sarla Verma (supra). Accordingly, the
compensation awarded for the loss of earning capacity was determined
as follows:
H 5000 x 12 x 18 x 30% = INR 3,24,000/-
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 455
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
55. The High Court enhanced the income to Rs. 7,000/- stating A
that the same was determined by the Tribunal on a lower side. Further,
the High Court held that having regard to the evidence of the treating
doctor, the permanent disability of the appellant should be determined at
40%. In such circumstances, the High Court while applying the multiplier,
enhanced the compensation to be awarded under the head of loss of
B
earning capacity to Rs. 7,000/-, as under:
7,000 x 12 x 18 x 40% = INR 6,04,800/-
56. The evidence on record indicates that the appellant suffered
paraplegia due to the accident. Paraplegia is a form of paralysis of lower
body. It restricts everyday routine more particularly the physical activity C
and leads to (i) deprivation of simple pleasures and amenities of life, (ii)
100% loss of earning capacity, (iii) long term secondary complications
requiring continuous care, medical treatment and hospitalization, (iv)
feeling of helplessness, depression, anger, stress, anxiety, etc. In short,
paraplegia impairs physical, mental and psychological health and has
devastating impact on the social and financial well being of the victim. D
57. In the case on hand, the appellant was in the business of
selling utensils and used to travel to various villages to sell the same.
With this disability in the form of paraplegia being suffered by the
appellant, it is not possible for him now to walk a long distance or stand
for a long period. His business could be said to have been gravely E
impacted. Further, the appellant at the time of accident was just 19 years
old. The High Court enhanced his notional income from Rs. 5,000/- to
Rs. 7,000/- per month. The appellant claimed that his notional income be
determined at Rs. 9,000/-.
58. This Court in the case of Kirti and Another v. Oriental F
Insurance Company Limited, (2021) 2 SCC 166, while discussing the
issue of proving the income of the victim, held as under:
“39. Taking the above rationale into account, the situation is
quite clear with respect to notional income determined by a
court in the first category of cases outlined earlier, those where G
the victim is proved to be employed but claimants are unable
to prove the income before the court. Once the victim has
been proved to be employed at some venture, the necessary
corollary is that they would be earning an income……”
H
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A 59. Thus, we are of the view, more particularly keeping in mind
the dictum of this Court in the case of Kirti (supra) that it is not necessary
to adduce any documentary evidence to prove the notional income of
the victim and the Court can award the same even in the absence of any
documentary evidence. In the case of Kirti (supra) it was stated that
the Court should ensure while choosing the method and fixing the notional
B
income that the same is just in the facts and circumstances of the particular
case, neither assessing the compensation too conservatively, nor too
liberally.
60. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that we
should determine the notional income of the appellant herein at
C Rs. 8,000/- per month. The same would result in the compensation being
enhanced as under:
8000 × 12 × 18 × 45% = INR 7,77,600/-
(2) Loss of earning for 6 months
D 61. Compensation under the aforesaid head was awarded by the
Tribunal and the High Court. The Tribunal awarded only Rs. 40,000/-
under this head. The High Court enhanced it to Rs. 42,000/-.
62. We uphold the payment towards loss of earning for six months
as awarded by the High Court and applying the revised income, enhance
E the same as under:
8000 × 6 = INR 48,000/-
(3) Medical Expenses
63. The appellant claims Rs. 2,00,000/- towards medical expenses.
F In this regard, the appellant adduced documentary evidence in the form
of medical bills/receipts to the tune of Rs.1,54,931/-, as stated in the
order of the Tribunal.
64. The Tribunal in its order dated 21.01.2014 held:
“Medical Expenses: The claimant submitted that he has taken
G treatment a Lake view hospital, Belgaum and was indoor
patient. He has produced the hospital bill and medical bills
to1 the tune of Rs.1,54,931/-. The same has been rounded to
Rs.1,50,000/- and the petitioner is entitled to Rs.1,50,000/-
under this head.” [Emphasis supplied]
H
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 457
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
65. The High Court in Para 11 of its impugned judgment, held: A
“The compensation awarded under the head of pain and
suffering, medical expenses, conveyance, special diet, etc.,
loss of amenities in life and marriage prospects is just and
proper and same is not disturbed.”
66. In view of the aforesaid, we grant compensation of B
Rs. 1,55,000/- towards medical expenses.
(4) Future Medical Expenses
67. At the outset, we may state that the “Future Medical Expenses”
and “Attendant Charges” would fall within the ambit of Pecuniary C
Expenses. In Abhimanyu Partap Singh v. Namita Sekhon and
Another, (2022) 8 SCC 489, this Court held:
“19. In view of the said legal position, the compensation can
be assessed in pecuniary heads i.e. the loss of future earning,
medical expenses including future medical expenses, attendant D
charges and also in the head of transportation including future
transportation. In the non-pecuniary heads, the compensation
can be computed for the mental and physical pain and
sufferings in the present and in future, loss of amenities of
life including loss of marital bliss, loss of expectancy in life,
inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, E
frustration, mental agony in life, etc.”
68. The Tribunal has observed that the doctor has deposed that
the appellant is likely to incur expenses of Rs. 2,50,000/- towards future
medical expenses. However, according to the Tribunal, there was no
sufficient and cogent evidence in that regard under this head. Accordingly, F
the Tribunal awarded Rs. 25,000/-. The High Court thought fit not to
award any amount for future medical expenses as there was no evidence
adduced by the appellant in regard to future treatment that may be
required. The High Court however, thought fit to clarify that in the event
if the appellant incurs any expenses towards any surgery or treatment in
G
future on account of the injury suffered and if he proves the same, then
the insurer shall indemnify the same.
69. Dr. Anil B. Patil (PW-2) has deposed categorically that the
appellant would require future medical expenses to the tune of
Rs. 2,50,000/-. We are of the view that having regard to the evidence on
H
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A record that the appellant would be incurring costs towards medical
expenses in future along with physiotherapy and nursing and considering
that the appellant at the time of accident was 19 years old, today his age
would be around 29 years, even if a bare minimum of Rs. 1000/- is spent
per month, then it comes to:
B 1000 × 12 × 18 = Rs. 2,16,000/-
70. In Vijaykumar Babulal Modi v. State of Gujarat (Deleted)
& Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, 2011 SCC OnLine Guj
7349, the High Court of Gujarat had the occasion to consider this aspect.
The High Court held:
C “So far as future medical expenses are concerned, the amount
claimed in the petition was to the tune of Rs. 2 lac, whereas
the Tribunal has thought fit to award Rs. 25,000=00.
We have noticed that the injured as on today is 100% disabled
due to paraplegia. He has no control over his bowels or
D bladder. In such type of cases, treatment like physiotherapy,
etc. needs to be given for a very very long period of time. The
importance of physiotherapy for persons injured in road
accidents has been elaborately stressed upon by the Supreme
Court in the case of R.D. Hattangadi (supra). It is hence
important to account for all expenses incurred and likely to
E be incurred and award reasonable sum for each head. It is
also important to remember the decreasing money value. The
life expectancy of the injured is also to be kept in mind. We
feel that life expectancy of the victim in such a case can
reasonably be assumed to be atleast 55 years, given the
F advancement in medical science, etc. The claimant’s age on
the date of the accident was 17 years, which means that the
remaining period of life expectancy from that date of accident
would be 38 years i.e. 1991 to 2029. We, therefore, propose
to assess future medical expenses at about Rs. 1,000=00 per
month. In that case, the adequate amount which can be
G awarded for future medical expenses would be Rs. 1 lac. We,
therefore, enhance the amount of Rs. 25,000=00 awarded
towards future medical expenses to Rs. 1 lac.”
71. In Sanjay Verma v. Haryana Roadways, (2014) 3 SCC 210,
the claimant was 25-years-old and suffered from total disability. This
H Court accordingly held:
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 459
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
“20. Insofar as “future treatment” is concerned we have no A
doubt that the claimant will be required to take treatment from
time to time even to maintain the present condition of his
health. In fact, the claimant in his deposition has stated that
he is undergoing treatment at Apollo Hospital at Delhi. Though
it is not beyond our powers to award compensation beyond
B
what has been claimed (Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh [(2003)
2 SCC 274 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 523]), in the facts of the present
case we are of the view that the grant of full compensation,
as claimed in the claim petition i.e. Rs 3,00,000 under the
head “future treatment”, would meet the ends of justice. We,
therefore, order accordingly.” C
72. In view of the aforesaid, we award Rs. 2,16,000/- towards
future medical expenses.
(5) Attendant Charges
73. So far as this head is concerned, neither the Tribunal nor the D
High Court thought fit to award anything. The evidence on record
indicates that the appellant is unable to stand, walk, sit or bend his body
or lift anything heavy. It is not in dispute that the appellant will not be
able to work in the same manner as he used to prior to the accident.
Indisputably, the appellant has suffered from paraplegia on account of
the accident and requires an attendant throughout the day. According to E
the claimant, the cost of keeping the attendant would be Rs. 4,500/- per
month. We fix it at Rs. 2,000/- per month. As a result, we award the
attendant charges as under:
2,000 × 12 × 18 = Rs. 4,32,000/-
F
74. In Abhimanyu Partap Singh (supra), the Claimant was
suffering from 100% disability and this Court held:
“16. The High Court in the impugned order [Abhimanyu
Partap Singh v. Namita Sekhon, 2019 SCC OnLine P&H
6271] observed that the claimant has now started practice as
G
an advocate, therefore, future loss of earning has been
calculated only for 10 years, applying the multiplier of 16,
without looking to the facts that the claimant cannot perform
the work of advocacy similar to the other advocates by
attending the cases in different courts. The attendant charges
have been allowed only for 20 years with one attendant. In H
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A fact, not only for determination of future loss of earning but
for attendant charges also the multiplier method should be
followed.
17. The multiplier method has been recognised as most
realistic and reasonable because it has been decided looking
B to the age, inflation rate, uncertainty of life and other realistic
needs. Thus, for determination of just compensation to ensure
justice with the family of the deceased or the injured as the
case may be the compensation can be determined applying
the said method. Therefore, in our view the Tribunal while
granting the compensation of future loss as well as earning
C only for 10 years and attendant charges only for 20 years
was not justified. In fact, the said amount should be determined
applying the multiplier method.
********* ********* *********
D 23. In the head of medical expenses, the MACT or the High
Court has not awarded any compensation presumably because
the mother of the claimant, who was minor at the time of
accident, may have claimed the amount of medical expenses
being an IAS officer. But now the claimant has become major,
and looking to the nature of injuries, future medical expenses
E that includes the attendant charges, use of diapers due to
loss of urination senses is required to be calculated including
future medical expenses. The Tribunal awarded Rs 1,92,000
in the head of attendant charges @ Rs 1000 p.m. While the
High Court proceeded on the premises that the rate of the
F attendant charges is variable after every five years, however,
the Court calculated the amount @ Rs 2000 thereafter @ Rs
4000 p.m. for a period of 20 years and accordingly determined
Rs 9,00,000 making enhancement of Rs 7,08,000 in the said
head. As discussed, if we apply the multiplier method and in
view of the judgment of Kajal [Kajal v. Jagdish Chand,
G (2020) 4 SCC 413 : (2020) 3 SCC (Civ) 27 : (2020) 2 SCC
(Cri) 577], we accept the rate of attendant charges at Rs 5000
p.m. for 12 hours, looking to the nature of injuries and
disability the claimant is required two attendants at least within
24 hours then the expenses in the head of attendant charges
H
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 461
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
comes to Rs 10,000 p.m. If we apply the multiplier of 18, the A
amount comes to Rs 21,60,000.”
75. In Vijaykumar Babulal Modi (supra), the Gujarat High Court
had held:
“It is clear that the appellant will require an attendant to assist
him in his daily activities. However, we cannot accept the B
submission of the learned counsel for the appellant who stated
that this will require an expenditure of Rs. 3,000=00 per
month. The Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs. 15,000=00,
whereas the claim of the claimant is Rs. 4 lac.
As held in the case of R.D. Hattangadi (supra), the Court need C
not be mathematical in calculating expenses on home attendant
but ought to look upon the circumstances prevailing in the
society to decide the amount. The Supreme Court in R.D.
Hattangadi’s case (supra) held as under:-
“9. xxx xxx D
10. xxx xxx
11. In the case Ward v. James, 1965 (1) All ER 563, it was
said:
“Although you cannot give a man so gravely injured much E
for his “lost years”, you can, however, compensate him for
his loss during his shortened span, that is, during his expected
“years of survival”. You can compensate him for his loss of
earnings during that time, and for the cost of treatment, nursing
and attendance. But how can you compensate him for being
F
rendered a helpless invalid? He may, owing to brain injury,
be rendered unconscious for the rest of his days, or, owing to
back injury, be unable to rise from his bed. He has lost
everything that makes life worthwhile. Money is no good for
him. Yet Judges and Juries have to do the best they can and
give him what they think is fair. No wonder they find it well G
nigh insoluble. They are being asked to calculate the
incalculable. The figure is bound to be for the most part a
conventional sum. The Judges have worked out a pattern,
and they keep it in line with the changes in the value of money.”
H
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A In its very nature whenever a Tribunal or a Court is required
to fix the amount of compensation in cases of accident, it
involves some guess work, some hypothetical consideration,
some amount of sympathy linked with the nature of the
disability caused. But all the aforesaid elements have to be
viewed with objective standards.”
B
12. The Supreme Court in the case of C.K. Subramonia
Iyer v. T. Kunhikuttan Nair, AIR 1970 SC 376, in connection
with the Fatal Accidents Act has observed:
“In assessing damages, the Court must exclude all
C considerations of matter which rest in speculation or fancy
though conjecture to some extent is inevitable.”
13. In Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4 th Edition, Vol. 12
regarding non-pecuniary loss at page 446 it has been said:-
“Non-pecuniary loss: the pattern: Damages awarded for pain
D and suffering and loss of amenity constitute a conventional
sum which is taken to be the sum which society deems fair,
fairness being interpreted by the courts in the light of previous
decisions. Thus there has been evolved a set of conventional
principles providing a provisional guide to the comparative
E severity of different injuries, and indicating a bracket of
damages into which a particular injury will currently fall.
The particular circumstances of the plaintiff, including his
age and any unusual deprivation he may suffer, is reflected
in the actual amount of the award.
F The fall in the value of money leads to a continuing
reassessment of these awards and to periodic reassessments
of damages at certain key points in the pattern where the
disability is readily identifiable and not subject to large
variations in individual cases.”
We feel that the average cost of keeping a home attendant
G
would be around Rs. 1,000=00 per month for the period of
life expectancy. Accordingly, the annual expenses on an
attendant works out to Rs. 12,000=00. We, therefore, propose
to enhance the sum awarded for attendant to Rs. 1 lac.”
76. Thus, we award an amount of Rs. 4,32,000/- towards the
H attendant charges.
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 463
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
(6) Litigation Expenses A
77. The Tribunal thought fit not to award anything towards the
litigation expenses. The High Court took the view that the appellant is
entitled to the amount of Rs. 20,000/- towards the litigation expenses.
The appellant claims Rs. 50,000/- towards the litigation expenses.
78. We take notice of the fact that the accident took place on B
18.07.2012. The appellant is pursuing this litigation for the past almost
10 years. The SLP before this Court was filed in 2018. It has been four
years since then.
79. In Govind Yadav (supra), this Court held:
C
“12. ……Sometimes the delay and litigation expenses make
the award passed by the Tribunal and even by the High Court
(in appeal) meaningless…..”
80. In New India Assurance Company Limited v. Gopali and
Others, (2012) 12 SCC 198, this Court held: D
“1. …India is acclaimed for achieving a flourishing
constitutional order, an inventive and activist judiciary, aided
by a proficient Bar and supported by the State. However, the
courts and tribunals, which the citizens are expected to
approach for redressal of their grievance and protection of
E
their fundamental, constitutional and legal rights, are beset
with the problems of delays and costs. In a country where
36% of the population lives below the poverty line, these
deficiencies in the justice-delivery system prevent a large
segment of the population from availing legal remedies. The
disadvantaged and the poor are deprived of access to justice F
because of the costs of litigation, both in terms of actual
expenses and lost opportunities, and the laudable goal of
securing justice—social, economic and political enshrined
in the Preamble to the Constitution of India remains an illusion
for them.
G
2. The infrastructure of courts and the processes which govern
them are simply inaccessible to the poor. The State, which has
been mandated by Article 39-A of the Constitution to ensure
that the operation of the legal system promotes justice by
providing free legal aid and that opportunities for securing
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464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or
other disabilities, has not been able to create an effective
mechanism for making justice accessible to the poor,
downtrodden and disadvantaged. In the last two-and-a-half
decades the institution of the Legal Services Authorities has
rendered yeoman’s service in the field of providing legal aid
B
to the poor but a lot is required to be done for ensuring justice
to economically deprived section of the society and those who
suffer from other disabilities like illiteracy and ignorance.
3. We have prefaced the disposal of this petition, filed against
the order dated 22-3-2007 [New India Assurance Co.
C Ltd. v. Sheo Chand, Special Appeal Civil (SAC) No. 49 of
2005, dated 22-3-2007 (Raj)] passed by the Division Bench
of the Rajasthan High Court whereby the special appeal filed
by the appellant against the judgment of the learned Single
Judge was dismissed as not maintainable, by making the
D aforementioned observations because in last almost 20 years
the claimants—the aged parents, wife and five children of
Nanag Ram, who became a victim of road accident in 1992,
must have exhausted all their resources in prosecuting and
contesting the litigation till the stage of the High Court and
they must not have been left with money sufficient for engaging
E an advocate in this Court and also because in last almost five
years, during which the special leave petition remained
pending in this Court, they must have lost all hopes to get
justice.
4. The learned Single Judge of the High Court had allowed
F the appeal filed by the dependants of Nanag Ram under
Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short “the
Act”) and enhanced the compensation awarded by the Motor
Accidents Claims Tribunal, Jaipur (for short “the Tribunal”)
by an amount of Rs 4,85,000 and directed the appellant to
G pay the enhanced compensation with interest at the rate of
12% per annum from the date of filing the claim petition till
31-12-2000 and at the rate of 9% from 1-1-2001 till the
payment thereof, but on account of ex parte interim order
passed by this Court on 23-7-2007 [New India Assurance
Co. Ltd. v. Sheo Chand, SLP (C) No. 11345 of 2007, order
H
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 465
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
dated 23-7-2007 (SC)], the claimants could get only a paltry A
sum of Rs 2 lakhs and they perhaps thought that it will not be
worthwhile to spend money for contesting the special leave
petition filed by the appellant. This is perhaps the thinking of
many thousands of poor litigants, who succeed in the courts
below and the High Courts, but cannot afford the cost and
B
expenses of contesting litigation in the highest court of the
country and suffer silently in the name of the Almighty God
by treating it as their destiny.”
81. In Syed Sadiq v. Divisional Manager, United India
Insurance Company Limited, (2014) 2 SCC 735, this Court held:
C
“14. Further, along with compensation under conventional
heads, the appellant claimant is also entitled to the cost of
litigation as per the legal principle laid down by this Court
in Balram Prasad v. Kunal Saha [(2014) 1 SCC 384 : (2014)
1 SCC (Civ) 327]. Therefore, under this head, we find it just
and proper to allow Rs 25,000.” D
82. In view of the aforesaid, we award an amount of Rs. 50,000/
- towards litigation expenses.
(7) Loss of Conveyance
83. Under this head, the Tribunal vide order dated 21.01.2014, E
held:
“15. Conveyance, special diet etc: The claimant was admitted
to the hospital and thereafter attended the hospital for further
treatment. The claimant is also entitled for special diet and
nutrition. Therefore, I award an amount of Rs.20,000/- under F
this head.”
84. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 20,000/- under this head. The High
Court in Para 11 of its impugned judgment dated 25.04.2018, held:
“The compensation awarded under the head of pain and
suffering, medical expenses, conveyance, special diet, etc., G
loss of amenities in life and marriage prospects is just and
proper and same is not disturbed”
85. The High Court thought fit to confirm Rs. 20,000/- as awarded
by the Tribunal.
H
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A 86. However, the appellant has claimed Rs. 50,000/- towards
loss of conveyance.
87. This Court in Master Ayush (supra) held:
“14. The determination of damages in personal injury cases
is not easy. The mental and physical loss cannot be computed
B in terms of money but there is no other way to compensate the
victim except by payment of just compensation. Therefore, we
find that in view of the physical condition, the appellant is
entitled to one attendant for the rest of his life though he may
be able to walk with the help of assistant device. The device
C also requires to be replaced every 5 years. Therefore, it is
reasonable to award cost of 2 devices i.e. Rs 10 lakhs. The
appellant has not only lost his childhood but also adult life.
Therefore, loss of marriage prospects would also be required
to be awarded. The learned Tribunal has rejected the claim
of taxi expenses for the reason that the taxi driver has not
D been produced. It is impossible to produce the numerous taxi
drivers. Still further, the Tribunal should have realised the
condition of the child who had complete sensory loss in the
legs. Therefore, if the parents of the child have taken him in
a taxi, probably that was the only option available to them.
E Accordingly, we award a sum of Rs 2 lakhs as conveyance
charges.”
88. The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in the New India
Assurance Company Ltd. v. Amit Kumar Yadav and Another, F.A.O.
Nos. 1285 & 1489 of 2008 decided on March 23, 2022, held as under:
F “22. The question of determination of compensation directly
came up before Supreme Court in Raj Kumar Vs. Ajay Kumar
and another, 2011 (1) SCC 343. Therein, claimant sustained
fracture of both bone of left leg and fracture of left radius in
a motor accident on 01.10.1991. Tribunal awarded
G compensation under the heads of loss of future earning, pain
and sufferings, loss of earning during period of treatment,
medical expenses, conveyance and special diet. He was
awarded total compensation of Rs. 94,700/- and 9% interest.
His appeal for enhancement was rejected by Tribunal and
ultimately went in appeal to Supreme Court. It observed that
H
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 467
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
scheme of Act, 1988 shows that award must be “just”, which A
means that compensation should, to the extent possible, fully
and adequately restore claimant to the position prior to the
accident. The object of awarding damages is to make good
the loss suffered as a result of wrong done as far as money
can do so, in a fair, reasonable and equitable manner. A person
B
is not only to be compensated for physical injury, but also for
the loss which he suffered as a result of such injury. It means
that he is to be compensated for his inability to lead a full life,
his inability to enjoy those normal amenities which he would
have enjoyed but for the injuries, and his inability to earn as
much as he used to earn or could have earned……” C
89. Hence, we may grant the appellant loss of conveyance and
special diet up to Rs 50,000/- considering that after the accident at
Kulgod-Gokak Road, the appellant was shifted to Lakeview Hospital
Belgaum wherein he was admitted as an indoor patient from 18.7.2012
to 6.8.2012 for 19 days, and took treatment for the injuries suffered by D
him, and continued to take the treatment after getting discharged from
the hospital as well.
90. In view of the aforesaid, we may award Rs. 50,000/- towards
loss of conveyance and special diet.
NON-PECUNIARY EXPENSES E
(8) Pain and Suffering
91. The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in the case of
Virendra Kumar v. Vijay Kumar and Others, (2021) ILR 3 All 272,
while discussing the distinction between pecuniary and non-pecuniary F
damages held as under:
“9. The law with respect to the grant of compensation in injury
cases is well-settled. The injured is entitled to pecuniary as
well as non-pecuniary damages. Pecuniary damages also
known as special damages are generally designed to make
G
good the pecuniary loss which is capable of being calculated
in terms of money whereas non-pecuniary damages are
incapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. The
pecuniary or special damages, generally include the expenses
incurred by the claimants on his treatment, special diet,
H
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A conveyance, cost of nursing/attending, loss of income, loss
of earning capacity and other material loss, which may require
any special treatment or aid to the insured for the rest of his
life. The general damages or the non-pecuniary loss include
the compensation for mental or physical shock, pain,
suffering, loss of amenities of life, disfiguration, loss of
B
marriage prospects, loss of expected or earning of life,
inconvenience, hardship, disappointment, frustration, mental
stress, dejectment and unhappiness in future life, etc.”
92. The Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 40,000/- for the pain and
suffering. The High Court affirmed the amount of Rs. 40,000/-. However,
C the appellant is seeking enhancement of Rs. 40,000/- to make it
Rs. 1,00,000/- towards compensation for the pain and sufferings.
93. Pain and suffering would be categorized as a non-pecuniary
loss as it is incapable of being arithmetically calculated. Therefore, when
compensation is to be awarded for pain and suffering, special
D circumstances of the claimant have to be taken into account including
the victim’s age, the unusual deprivation the victim has suffered, the
effect thereof on his or her future life. This Court in the case of R.D.
Hattangadi (supra), while discussing this aspect held that:
“10. It cannot be disputed that because of the accident the
E appellant who was an active practising lawyer has become
paraplegic on account of the injuries sustained by him. It is
really difficult in this background to assess the exact amount
of compensation for the pain and agony suffered by the
appellant and for having become a lifelong handicapped.
F No amount of compensation can restore the physical frame
of the appellant. That is why it has been said by courts that
whenever any amount is determined as the compensation
payable for any injury suffered during an accident, the object
is to compensate such injury “so far as money can
compensate” because it is impossible to equate the money
G with the human sufferings or personal deprivations. Money
cannot renew a broken and shattered physical frame.
********* ********* *********
17. …..When compensation is to be awarded for pain and
suffering and loss of amenity of life, the special circumstances
H
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 469
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
of the claimant have to be taken into account including his A
age, the unusual deprivation he has suffered, the effect thereof
on his future life. The amount of compensation for non-
pecuniary loss is not easy to determine but the award must
reflect that different circumstances have been taken into
consideration…….”
B
94. This Court in the case of Mahadeva Shetty (supra), while
discussing the factors to be taken into consideration while awarding
compensation for pain and suffering held that:
“18. A person not only suffers injuries on account of accident
but also suffers in mind and body on account of the accident C
throughout his life and a feeling is developed that he is no
more a normal man and cannot enjoy the amenities of life as
another normal person can. While fixing compensation for
pain and suffering as also for loss of amenities of life, features
like his age, marital status and unusual deprivation he has
undertaken in his life have to be reckoned.” D
95. In another case of this Court in Nizam’s Institute of Medical
Sciences v. Prasanth S. Dhananka and Others, (2009) 6 SCC 1, this
Court granted a very high amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- on account of the
pain and suffering of the victim. That was a case of engineering student
aged 20 years, who was a victim of medical negligence. The case before E
this Court was of a young student who being the victim of paraplegia
was confined to wheelchair, and who pursued career in education and
ultimately got employed as I.T. engineer at a handsome salary.
96. This Court has awarded compensation for pain and suffering
by looking into the circumstances of the case. Therefore, considering F
that the appellant was only 19 years at the time of the accident and
suffered a permanent disability of 45%, he ought to be awarded
compensation under this head.
97. Furthermore, the decision of this Court in Nagappa (supra),
holds that there is no embargo in awarding compensation more than that G
claimed by the Claimant.
98. In view of the aforesaid, we award an amount of
Rs. 1,00,000/- towards pain and suffering.
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470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A (9) Marriage Prospects
99. The Tribunal held that the appellant was young, and due to the
physical disability, his marriage prospects are now almost nil. The Tribunal
awarded to Rs. 20,000/- under this head. The High Court upheld the
amount of Rs. 20,000/-.
B 100. In Sanjay Kumar (supra), this Court observed as under:
“14… On the point of loss of marriage prospects, we feel that
it is a major loss, keeping in mind the young age of the
appellant and the High Court has gravely erred in not
awarding adequate compensation separately under this head
C and instead clubbed it under “loss of future enjoyment of
life” and “pain and suffering”. We thereby award Rs 75,000
towards loss of marriage prospects…”
101. In Ibrahim v. Raju and Others, (2011) 10 SCC 634, this
Court held:
D
“19. On account of the injuries suffered by him, the prospects
of the appellant’s marriage have considerably reduced.
Rather, they are extremely bleak. In any case, on account of
the fracture of pelvis, he will not be able to enjoy the
matrimonial life. Therefore, the award of Rs 50,000 under
E this head must be treated as wholly inadequate. In the facts
and circumstances of the case, we feel that a sum of Rs 2
lakhs should be awarded to the appellant for loss of marriage
prospects and enjoyment of life.”
102. In Master Ayush (supra), this Court observed that the victim
F (5-year-old, paraplegic) was entitled to Rs.3,00,000/-.
“14.… The appellant has not only lost his childhood but also
adult life. Therefore, loss of marriage prospects would also
be required to be awarded…”
103. In view of the aforesaid, we award a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/-
G towards loss of marriage prospects.
(10) Loss of Amenities
104. The Tribunal held that an amount of Rs. 30,000/- should be
awarded towards loss of amenities. The High Court upheld the amount
H
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 471
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
of Rs. 30,000/- as awarded by the Tribunal. The claim of the appellant A
towards loss of amenities is Rs. 50,000/-.
105. This Court in the case of Pappu Deo Yadav (supra),
observed:
“6. The principle consistently followed by this court in
assessing motor vehicle compensation claims, is to place the B
victim in as near a position as she or he was in before the
accident, with other compensatory directions for loss of
amenities and other payments. These general principles have
been stated and reiterated in several decisions. [Govind Yadav
v. New India Insurance Co. Ltd. [Govind Yadav v. New India C
Insurance Co. Ltd., (2011) 10 SCC 683 .….]”
106. In R.D. Hattangadi (supra) it has been held:
“12. In its very nature whenever a tribunal or a court is
required to fix the amount of compensation in cases of
accident, it involves some guesswork, some hypothetical D
consideration, some amount of sympathy linked with the nature
of the disability caused. But all the aforesaid elements have
to be viewed with objective standards.
× × × ×
E
17. ……When compensation is to be awarded for pain and
suffering and loss of amenity of life, the special circumstances
of the claimant have to be taken into account including his
age, the unusual deprivation he has suffered, the effect thereof
on his future life…..”
F
107. This Court in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) held:
“5. ….A person is not only to be compensated for the physical
injury, but also for the loss which he suffered as a result of
such injury. This means that he is to be compensated for his
inability to lead a full life, his inability to enjoy those normal
amenities which he would have enjoyed but for the injuries, G
and his inability to earn as much as he used to earn or could
have earned…..”
108. In the case of Sri Laxman alias Laxman Mourya (supra),
this Court observed:
H
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A “15. The ratio of the abovenoted judgments is that if the victim
of an accident suffers permanent or temporary disability, then
efforts should always be made to award adequate
compensation not only for the physical injury and treatment,
but also for the pain, suffering and trauma caused due to the
accident, loss of earning and the victim’s inability to lead a
B
normal life and enjoy amenities, which he would have enjoyed
but for the disability caused due to the accident.”
109. This Court in Govind Yadav (supra) held:
“18. In our view, the principles laid down in Arvind Kumar
C Mishra v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (2010) 10 SCC 254
and Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar (2011) 1 SCC 343 must be
followed by all the Tribunals and the High Courts in
determining the quantum of compensation payable to the
victims of accident, who are disabled either permanently or
temporarily. If the victim of the accident suffers permanent
D disability, then efforts should always be made to award
adequate compensation not only for the physical injury and
treatment, but also for the loss of earning and his inability to
lead a normal life and enjoy amenities, which he would have
enjoyed but for the disability caused due to the accident.”
E 110. Vijaykumar Babulal Modi (supra), the High Court of Gujarat
observed as under:
“It appears that the claim under this head is to the tune of
Rs.3 lac. However, the Tribunal has not awarded any sum
under the head ‘loss of amenities’. We are of the opinion that
F this head must take into account all aspects of a normal life
that have been lost due to the injury caused. As per R.D.
Hattangadi’s case (supra), this includes a variety of matters
such as the inability to walk, run or sit, etc. We include here
too the loss of childhood pleasure such as the ability to freely
G play, dance, run, etc., the loss of ability to freely move or
travel without assistance. Then, there is the virtual impossibility
of marriage as well as a complete loss of the ability to have
sex and to have and nurture children.”
111. In view of the aforesaid, we award an amount of
Rs. 50,000/- for the loss of amenities taking into consideration the fact
H
SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA 473
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
that the appellant was 19 years old at the time of the accident, and also A
considering the nature of injuries suffered by him and the extent of his
disability.
112. The total compensation awarded by us under different heads
is as under:
B
C
D
113. Before we close this matter, it needs to be underlined, as
observed in Pappu Deo Yadav (supra) that Courts should be mindful
that a serious injury not only permanently imposes physical limitations
E
and disabilities but too often inflicts deep mental and emotional scars
upon the victim. The attendant trauma of the victim’s having to live in a
world entirely different from the one she or he is born into, as an invalid,
and with degrees of dependence on others, robbed of complete personal
choice or autonomy, should forever be in the judge’s mind, whenever
tasked to adjudge compensation claims. Severe limitations inflicted due F
to such injuries undermine the dignity (which is now recognized as an
intrinsic component of the right to life under Article 21) of the individual,
thus depriving the person of the essence of the right to a wholesome life
which she or he had lived, hitherto. From the world of the able bodied,
the victim is thrust into the world of the disabled, itself most discomfiting
G
and unsettling. If courts nit-pick and award niggardly amounts oblivious
of these circumstances, there is resultant affront to the injured victim.
[See: Pappu Deo Yadav (supra)]
114. We, therefore, direct the respondent No. 1 herein – insurance
company to pay the appellant-claimant the difference in the compensation
H
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A awarded herein as against the amount of Rs. 9,26,800/- as awarded by
the High Court. The amount awarded by this Court shall be deposited by
the respondent No. 1 – insurance company within a period of eight weeks
from today after adjusting the amount already deposited. The rate of
interest at the enhanced amount is to be the same i.e., 6% per annum.
B 115. In the result, the appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
There shall be no order as to costs.
116. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of accordingly.
Nidhi Jain Appeal allowed.
C (Assisted by : Neha Sharma, LCRA)
D
E
F
G
H
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