SIDDAPPA VASAPPA KURI AND ANR.versusSPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER AND ANR.

A                   SIDDAPPA VASAPPA KURI AND ANR.
                                   v.
               SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER AND ANR.

                                 OCTOBER 16, 2001

B      [S.P. BHARUCHA, Y.K. SABHARWAL AND BRIJESH KUMAR, JJ.]


          Land Acquisition Act, 1894 : Section 23(JA).

           Additional compensation-Entitlement to-Starting point for calculation
    is date ~f publication ~f Not!fication under Section 4 -'-Temiinal point is either
c   date of award or date of taking possession whichever is earlier-Possession ~f
    land taken prior to publication of Notification under Section 4-That terminal
    is not available-Only available terminal is date of award.

          In land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition
D   Act, 1894 the possession of the land belonging to the appellants was taken
    prior to the publication of the Notification under Section 4. The executing
    court granted to the appellants additional compensation of the land under
    Section 23(1A) from the date on which possession of the land was taken,
    namely, 1st June, 1977 to the date on which the Section 4 Notification was
E   issued, namely, 8th March, 1991. In Revision the High Court took the view
    that the appellants were entitled to the additional compensation from the
    date of the Section 4 Notification, namely, 8th March, 1991, to the date of
    award, namely, 6th February, 1992. Against the order of the High Court
    this appeal has been preferred.
F         Dismissing the appeal, the Court

          HELD : 1. It is clear from Section 23(1A) of the Land Acquisition Act,
    1894 that the starting point for the purposes of calculating the amount to be
    awarded thereunder, at the rate ~f 12 per centum per annum on the market
G   value, is the date of publication of the Section 4 Notification. The terminal
    point for the purpose is either the date of the award or the date of taking
    possession whichever is earlier. In the present case, possession of the land
    having been taken prior to the publication of the Section 4 Notification, that
    terminal is not available. The only available terminal is the date of the award.
H   The High Court, therefore, was in no error in holding that the appellants
                                           236
    SIDDAPPA VASAPPA KUR! v. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITTON OFFICER [BHARUCHA, J.] 237

were entitled to the additional compensation under Section 23(1A) for the          A
period 8th March, 1991to6th February, 1993. [239-F-G]

       2. It is only where a provision is ambiguous that a construction that
leads to a result that is more just can be adopted. Having regard to its clear
terms, Section 23(1A) must receive the only construction it can bear. [240·A]
                                                                                   B
      Special Tahsildar (LA), P.W.D. Schemes Vijayawada v. M.A. Jabbar,
[1995] 2 sec  142, reiterated.

     Asstt.Comm., Gadag Sub-Division, Gadag v. Mathapathi Basavannewwa,
[1995] 6 SCC 355 and State of H.P. v. Dharam Das, [1995] 5 SCC 683,                C
overruled.

      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1687 < · ' 1n·

      From the Judgment and Order dated 16.7.97 of the Karnataka Hi,Qh
Court in C.R.P. No. 1373of1997.
                                                                                   0

      S.K. Kulkarni for Ms. Sangeeta Kumar for the Appellants.

      Sanjay R. Hegde for the Respondents.
                                                                                   E
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

       BHARUCHA, J. This appeal has been referred to a bench of three
Judges by reason of the contrary views taken by two banches of two learned
Judges in Special Tahsilar(LA), P. W.D. Schemes, Vijayawada, v. M.A. Jabbar,
[1995] 2 SCC 142 on the one hand and in Asstt. Commr., Gadag Sub-Division,         F
Gadag v. Mathapathi Basavannewwa, [1995] 6 SCC 355 on the other. (The
referral order also makes a reference to State of H.P. v. Dharam Das, [1995]
5 sec 683, but no reasoning can be discerned therein.)

       We are required to consider the provisions of Section 23 (lA) of the        G
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in the context of the following facts : Possession
of land bearing Survey No. 31113, admeasuring 2 acres and 16 guntas, situated
at Village Hirenandi, Gokak Taluk, Belgaum District, Karnataka was taken by
the respondents from the appellants, who were the owners thereof, on 1st June,.
1977 for the purposes of the construction of an irrigation channel. On 8th         H
    238                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A     March, 1991, a notification was issued under Section 4( 1) of the Act in relation
      to the said land .. It was followed by a notification under Section 6. The
      provisions of Section 17 were thereafter applied. On 6th February, 1993, an
    · award was made and compensation was awarded to the appellants at the rate
      of Rs. 10,000 per acre. on a reference made by the appellants, the District Judge
B     enhanced the compensation to Rs. 50,000 per acre. The Land Acquisition
      officer and the State preferred appeals before the High Court. Therein, com-
      perisatfon was reduced to Rs. 41,400 per acre. The decree so passed was .Put
      in execution. Before the executing court the question of additional compensa-
      tion under Section 23(1A) arose. The executing court granted to the appellants
      additional compensation under Section 23(1A) from the date on which posses-
c     sion of the land was taken, namely, 1st June, 1977 to the date on which the
      Section 4 notification was issued, namely, 8th March, 1991. The High Court,
      before whom a_ revision petition was presented by the LAO, took the view that
      the appellants were entitled to the additional compensation from the date of the
      Section 4 notification, namely, 8th March, 1991,· to the date of the award,
D     namely, 6th February, 1992. Against this .order of the High Court this appeal
      has been filed.

           Section 23(1A) reads thus :

E                  "23(1-A) In addition to the market-value of the land, as above
              provided, the Court.shall in every case award an amount calculated at
              the rate of twelve per centum per annum on such market-value of the
              period commencing on the from the date of the publication of the
              notification under Se.;tion 4, sub-section (1), in respect of such land
              to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession
F
              of the land, whichever is earlier.

                   Explanation- In computing the period referred to in this .sub-
              section, any period or perj.ods during which the proceedings for the
              acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunc-
G             tion by the order of any court shall be excluded."

            It is the contention of learned counsel for the appellants that the appel-
     lants are entitled to compensation for the period 1st June, 1977 to 8th March,
     1991, i.e., from the date on which possession of the said land was taken till the
H    date of publication of the section 4(1) notification. He finds sustenance for this
    SIDDAPPA VASAPPA KUR! v. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER [BHARUCHA, J.] 239

contention in the decision of this Court in Mathapathi Basavannewwa's case           A
[1995) 6 SCC 355 where a similar contention was upheld. The provision~ of
Section 23(1A) were analysed but, said the Court, "strict construction leads to
unjust result, hardship to the owner and defeats legislative object." In its view,
therefore, the expression "whichever is earlier" in Section 23(1A) had to be
construed in that backdrop and the claimant was entitled to the additional           B
amount from the date of taking possession. Since advance possession was taken
before the publication of the notification under Section 4( 1), "the claimants, by
necessary implication, are entitled to the payment of additional amount by way
of compensation from the d.ate of taking over the possession for loss Qf
enjoyment of the land."
                                                                                     c
      This Court iri Special Tahsildar (IA), P. W.D. Schemes, Vijayawada v.
M.A. Jabbar, [1995) 2 SCC 142, quoted Section 23(1A) and said "In other
words, the owner of the land who has been deprived of the enjoyment of the
land by having been parted with possession, the Act intended that the owner
be compensated by awarding an additional amount calculated at the rate of 12         D
per centum per annum on the enhanced market value for the period between
the date of notification and the date of award or date of taking possession of
the land, whichever is earlier. Admittedly, possession having already been
taken on 15-2-1965, before publication of the notification under Section 4(1)
on 6-3-1980, the award of additional amount for the period from 6-3-1980 to          E
30-9-1983, i.e., the date of making the award under Section 11 is perfectly
correct."

       It is, as we see it, clear from Section 23(1A) that the starting point for
the purposes of calculating the amount to be awarded thereunder, at the rate
of 12 per centum per annum on the market value, is the date of publication of
                                                                                     F
the Section 4 notification. The terminal point for the purpose is either the date
of the award or the date of taking possession, whichever is earlier. In the
present case, possession of the land having been taken prior to the publication
of the Section 4 notification, that terminal is not available. The only available
terminal is the date of the award. The High Court, therefore, was in no error        G
in holding that the appellants were entitled to the additional compensation
under Section 23(1A) for the period 8th March, 1991 to 6th February, 1993.

      Section 23(1A) admits of no meaning other than the meaning that we
have placed upon it. There is no room here for any construction other than that      H
     240                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS              (2001] SUPP. 4· S.C.R.
A   given above. It is only where a provision is ambiguous that a construction that
    leads to a result that is more just can be adopted. Having regan;l to its clear
    terms, Section 23(1A) must receive the only construction it can bear. We are
    of the view, therefore, that the law has been correctly laid down in the decision
    in Special Tahsildar(l.A), P. W.D. Schemes v. M.A. Jabbar, [1995] 2 SCC 142
B and that it has not been correctly laid down in Asstt. Commr., Godag Sub-
  . Division v. Mathapathi Basavannewwa, [1995] 6 SCC 355 and, for that matter
    in State of H.P. v. Dharam Das,- [1995] 5 SCC 683.

            The appeal is dismi ssecl.

C           No order as to costs.

     T.N.A.                                                      Appeal dismissed.
                                                       ,·'




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