Holding

The amendment is deemed to have been filed originally, and the landlord's requirement is bona‑fide, justifying eviction.

Summary

The landlady (appellant No.1) sought eviction of her tenant under Section 21(1)(h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, initially on the ground that her husband required treatment in Bangalore. During the pendency of the suit the husband died, and the landlady amended the petition under Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC to claim her own ill health as the bona‑fide requirement. The trial court allowed the eviction, but the High Court set aside the order, holding that the original ground had ceased and doubting the landlady's sincerity. The Supreme Court held that, under the doctrine of relation back, the amendment is deemed to have been filed originally, and the landlady's need for occupation was genuine, not a pretext. Consequently, the Court restored the trial court’s decree, allowing eviction with a four‑month vacate period for the tenant.

Issues considered

The effect of an amendment under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC on the original pleadings and its relation‑back to the original filing.
Whether the landlord's claim of bona‑fide requirement is genuine despite the death of the husband and the amendment to claim her own health needs.
Whether the High Court erred in overturning the trial court's eviction order.
Whether comparative hardship between landlord and tenant is a decisive factor in eviction under the Karnataka Rent Control Act.
Whether partial eviction is permissible in such circumstances.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 6 Rule 17
Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961s. 21(1)(h)

Subjects

rent controlevictionbona fide requirementamendment of pleadingsdoctrine of relation backcomparative hardshiplandlord-tenantKarnataka Rent Control ActCPC Order 6 Rule 17

Judgment

A SIDDALINGAMMA AND ANR.
v.
MAMTHA SHENOY

OCTOBER 18, 2001

B [DR. A.S. ANAND, C.J., R.C. LAHOTI AND
P. VENKATARAMA REDDI, JJ.]

Rent Control and Evcition:

Karnataka Rent Contol Act, 1961 : Section 21(1 )(h).
c
Eviction-Eviction Petition-Bona fide requirement-Held: Rent Con-
trol Legislation generally leans in favour of tenant-However, landlord is
treated with some sympathy in the case of eviction of tenant on ground of bona
fide requirement. / ·
D
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:

Order 6, Rule 17-Amendment-Effect of-Held: On the doctrine of
relation back the petition as amended is deemed to have been .filed originally
as such-Hence, evidence has to be appreciated in the light of averments made
E in the amended petition.

The appellant No. 1 - landlady filed an eviction petition under Sec-
tion 2l(l)(h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 against the re-
spondent-tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement of the suit premises.
In the petition it was pleaded that the suit premises was required mainly
F for facilitating the treatment of first appellant's husband. However, during
the pendency of the suit, first appellant's husband expired. The petition for
eviction was amended under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure, 1908 whereby it was pleaded that appellant No. 1 herself was not
keeping well and that the suit premises was required for facilitating her
.G treatment. The trial court allowed the eviction petition. However, High
Court allowed the revision petitoin filed by the respondent on the ground
that the first appellant's husband, whose sickness and need for treatment
was the principal cause pleaded in the eviction petition, having expired, the
cause had ceased to exist during the pendency of the petition. Hence this
H appeal;
SIDDALINGAMMA v. MAMTHA SHENOY 367
Allowing the appeal, the Court A
HELD : 1. Rent Control Legislation generally leans in favour of
tenant; it is only the provision for seeking eviction of the tenant on the
ground of bona fide requirement of !andlord for his own occupation or use
of the tenanted accommodation, which treats the landlord with some sym-
pathy. [370-F] B

Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, [1999] 6 SCC 222 and
Deena Nath v. Pooran La.l, [2001] 5 SCC 705, relied on.

2.1. It is true that in the petition for eviction, as originally filed, the
health condition of the landlady herself was not pleaded, nevertheless C
evidence was allowed to be let in without objection and was recorded by
the Trial Court. An application for amendment under Order 6 Rule 17 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was moved and the deficiency in the
pleadings stood removed by the amendment permitted by the Trial Court
in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction to do so. On the doctrine of D
relation back, which generally governs amendment of pleadings unless for
reasons the Court excludes the applicability of the doctrine in a given case,
the petition for eviction as amended would be deemed to have been filed
originally as such and the evidence shall have to be appreciated in the light
of averments made in the amended petition. [371-G-H; 372-A]
E
2.2. The need of the appellant No. 1 • landlady is, as borne out from
the amended pleadings and material brought on record, bona fide and not
arbitrary, whimsical or fanciful. In a civil case, once an amendment has
been unreservedly permitted to be incorporated in the pleadings, the cor-
rectness of the facts introduced by the amendment cannot be doubted
solely on the ground that they were not stated in the original petition. So F
also genuineness of the landlady's statement that she needed to have treat-
ment cannot be doubted by the Court forming an opinion that the ill-
health of the landlady was not so serious as to warrant her shifting to a city
from a village and then substituting its opinion for the seriousness felt by
the landlady. The requirement pleaded and proved was neither·a pretext G
nor a ruse adopted by the landlady for evicting the te.nant. [372-F -G]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7292 of 2001. ·

From the Judgment and Order dated 5.2.2001 of the Karnataka High
Court in H.R.R.P. No. 504 of 1997. H
l·
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. '
A Joseph Pookkatt and Prashant Kumar for the Appellants.

Gaurav Agarwal and Chander Shekhar Ashri for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
,_
B R.C. LAHOTI, J. A decree for recovery of possession passed by the
Trial Court against the respondent has been reversed by High Court in a
revision preferred by her. The aggrieved landlady has filed this petition seeking
special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution.

Leave granted.
c
The suit premises are situated in Rajaji Nagar, Bangalore. The appellant
no. 1 is admittedly the owner and landlady of the premises and respondent is
holding the same as a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 1100. Appellant no. 2
was joined as plaintiff because she osed to collect rent for and on behalf of
D appellant no. 1. The respondent's eviction was sought for on the ground
available under Section 21(1) (h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961. It
t.~
is not disputed that there are eleven members in the family of appellant no. 1
and residing with her presently in a house situated in village Bettalasoor. In the ":"'

petition filed on 25.2.1993 the requirement as set out in the petition was that
appellant no. 1's husband was suffering from asthma and respiratory problems
E and taking oxygen regularly from the cylinder and for medical treatment he
-.yas frequently required to be taken to Bangalore from Bettalasoor, a village
situated at some distance from B_angalore. The appellant No. 1 was having two
sons and grand-children living at the village with her and the grand-children
were required to be shifted to Bangalore for better education . .The accommo-
F dation in occupation of appellant no. 1 and her family members was too small
and inconvenient for all the family members to reside in. It was also submitted
that the respondent was running a beauty parlour and also an ice-cream shop.
She was financially sound and able to secure alternate accommodation. The
.
JI~
r.
G
respondent would not suffer any hardship if she was required to vacate the suit
premises and in the event of eviction being denied the landlord would suffer
great hardship. Thus comparative hardship of the landlord was greater than that
..
,~

\ ,
-<.,_____
of the tenant.

It appears that when the case was being tried appellant no. 1's husband
expired. It also appears that appellant no. 1 does not have any issue of her ow~.
H Those who
.
are residing with her are not her own sonsI
and grand children
•
but

I.
SIDDALINGAMMA v. MAMTHA SHENOY [LAHOTI, J.] 369
her real sister's sons whom she treats as her adopted sons and their children. A
The petition for eviction was amended by moving an application on 22.1.1997
whereby it. was submitted that the appellant no. I herself was not keeping well
and she required better treatment which was available at Bangalore and there-
fore she intended to shift from the village house to her own house situated in
the city of Bangalore along with her adopted sons. The prayer for amendment
B
though contested by the respondent, was allowed by the Trial Court.

In a detailed judgment dated 4.3.1997, the learned Trial Judge held that
the suit premises were required for the use of the appellant no.1 and her family
members. The ap~llant no. 1 was aged about 55 years, who was not maintain-
ing good health and was referred by the doctor in village Bettalasoor for c
treatment to be taken at Bangalore and in the interest of better treatment of hers
she needed to shift her residence to Bangalore. The younger children in the
family of appellant no.1 were also required by the appellant no. 1 to be shifted
to Bangalore so that they could have the benefit of better schooling and better
educational facilities at Bangalore. The Trial Court also found that the accom- D
modation in Bangalore was better and sufficient for occupation by the appellant
no. I and her family members who are presently residing in an accommodation
not sufficient for their occupation in the house at Bettalasoor. The requirement
of the appellant no. 1 of the suit premises having been found to be reasonable
and bona fide the Trial Court held that the appellant no. 1 was entitled to decree
for eviction of the tenant/respondent. The Trial Court further held that in case
E
the eviction was ordered the respondent-tenant would not be put to any hard-
ship and therefore comparative hardship lay more on the side of the appellant.
Having evaluated the unit of accommodation in the light of the strength of the
family members of the appellant no. 1 the Trial Court also held that it was not
possible to pass an order of partial eviction. F

Let it be noted here itself that there was some embellishment in the case
of the appellant no. 1 inasmuch as what was sta'.ted to be 'two sons of appellant
no. l' were in fact not her own sons but the sons of her sister. The appellant
no. l not having any children of her own was treating her sister's two sons as
G
her adopted sons. Nevertheless, it was almost admitted that they along with
their families which includes their wives and children have always been resid-
ing with the appellant no. 1. It was not disputed that the number of persons
residing with appellant no. 1 was eleven.

Deciding the revision preferred by respondent-tenant, the High Court H
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A held that appellant no. l's husband, whose sickness· and need for treatment at
Bangalore was the principal cause pleaded in the eviction. petition for.shifting
to Bangalore, having expired, the cause had ceased to exist during the pendency
of the petition. The appellant did riot have any children of .her own and because
the appellant tried to project her sister's sons as her own sons there appeared
to be mala fides on her part. Insofar as her own deteriorating health and need
B
for taking treatment at Bangalore is concerned, the High Court observed - "rio
doubt the petitioner has placed some material with regard to her ill-health but
her health is not such a serious one warranting her shifting to Bangalore."
Stating these circumstances the learned Single Judge of the High Court con-
cluded that keeping in view the sociat .Purpose sought to be achieved by the
c welfare legislation of Rent Control Law, the Trial Court had colilmitted a patent
error in directing eviction of the tenant. The High Court did not go into the
question of comparative hardship. The High Court allowed the revision and
directed the eviction petition to be dismissed but observed at the fag end -
"before concluding, taking into consideration the material facts I deem it proper
D to observe that the petitioner be permitted to file a second petition if she so
chooses notwithstanding this petition by stating correct facts if she is desper-
ately in need of the same."

· Having heard the learned counsel for the parties we are of the option that
the appeal deserves to be allowed and while setting aside the order of the High
E Court, the order of the Trial Court deserves to be restored.

Rent Control Legislation generally leans in favour of tenant; it is only
the provision for seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground of bona fide
requirement of landlord for his own occupation or use of the tenanted accom~
modation which treats the landlord with some sympathy. In Shiv Sarup Gupta
F
v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, [ 1999] 6 SCC 222 this Co.urt has held that a bona
fide requirement must be an outcome of a sincere, honest desire in contra-
distinction with a mere pretext for evicting the tenant on the part of the landlord
claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family
which would entitle the landlord to seek ejectment of the tenant. The question
G to be asked by a judge of facts, by placing himself in the place of the landlord,
is, whether in the given facts proved by material on record the need to occupy
the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest? If the answer be
in the positive the need is bonafule. The concept of bona fide need or genuine
requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. An
H approach either too liberal or too conservative or pedantic must be guarded
SIDDALINGAMMA v. MAMTHA SHENOY [LAHOTI, J.] 371
against. If the landlord wishes to live with comfort in a house of his own, the A
law does not command or c6mpel him to squeeze himself and dwell into lesser
premises so as to protect the tenant's continued occupation in tenancy premises.
In Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal, [2001] 5 SCC 705 this Court has held that bona
fide requirement has to be distinguished from a mere whim or fanciful desire.
The bona fide requirement is in praesenti and must be manifested in actual need
B
so as to convince the court that it is not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire.

The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the need of the
.. appellant no. 1 who is now a widowed landlady was also in issue from the very
beginning though in the then circumstances it was the need of her husband
which was the centre of emphasis. Unfortunately, the husband expired during c
the pendency of the petition. This changed circumstance shifted the emphasis
contained in the reason for shifting from village habitat to the landlady's
premises in the city of Bangalore; earlier it was on the consideration for health
of the landlady's husband which now is on the consideration for health of the
landlady herself. Medical. prescription given by the doctor at Bettalasoor was D
produced in evidence referring the landlady for treatment at Bangalore as the
facilities for orthopaedic treatment which the landlady needed to undergo were
available in the city of Bangalore and not in the village of present residence
of the landlady. It is common knowledge that orthopaedic ailments render
frequent travelling of the patient uncomfortable and difficult and therefore the
desire of the landlady to shift to Bangalore for her own treatment is a felt-need
E
in praesenti and there is nothing unnatural, un-real or insincere about it. In
addition, the school going children residing with the landlady as members of
her family need to be shifted to the city of Bangalore and stay thereat in the
interest of schooling in educational institutions with better ambience, facilities
and standards. It is true that in the petition for eviction, as originally filed, the F
health condition of the landlady herself and the factum of children residing
with her not being her own grand-children were not pleaded, nevertheless
evidence was allowed to be let in without objection and was recorded by the
Trial Court. An application for amendment under Order 6, Rule 17 of the CPC
was moved and the deficiency in the pleadings stood removed by the amend- G
ment permitted by the Trial Court in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction
to do so. The order permitting the amendment was not put in issue promptly:
Even the High Court in its impugned order has not found fault with the order
of the Trial Court permitting the amendment nor has it expressed an opinion
that leave granted by the Trial Court for amendment in the eviction petition H
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [QOOI] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A suffered from any error of jurisdiction or discretion. On the doctrine of relation
back, which generally governs amendment of pleadings unless for reasons the
Court excluded the applicability of the doctrine in a given case, the petition for
eviction as amended would be deemed to have been filed originally as such and
the evidence shall have to be appreciated in the light of the averments made
B in the amended petition. The High Court though set aside the order of the Trial
.Court but it is writ large from the framing of the order of the High Court,
especially the portions which we have extracted from the order of the High
Court and reproduced in earlier part of this judgment, that the learned single
Judge of the High Court also was not seriously doubting the genuineness of
the landlady's requirement on the material available on record but was not
c feeling happy with the contents of the eviction petition as originally filed and
an over-zealous attempt on the part of the landlady in projecting her sister's
sons and grand-children as her own. The High Court did not doubt that the '
landlady was not in a sound state of health and that a large-size family was with
her nor was it disputed by the tenant that the number of members in the family
D of the landlady residing with her was eleven. In such facts and circumstances, '\
in our opinion, the High Court ought to have adopted a realistic and objective
approach rather than feeling sceptical about the landlady's mannerism. Had the
High Court not been convinced of the landlady's requirement it would not have
given her the liberty of filing a fresh petition solely by "stating correct facts".
E In our opinion, driving the widowed landlady to the need of filing a fresh
eviction petition and to the rigmarole of litigation· would be subversive of the
ends of justice. The need of the landlady is, as borne out from the amended
pleadings and material brought on record, bona fide and not arbitrary, whim-
sical or fanciful. In a civil case, once an amendment ,has been unreservedly
permitted to be incorporated in the pleadings, the correctness of the facts
F
introduced by amendment cannot be doubted solely on the ground that they
were not stated in the original petition. So also genuineness of the landlady's
statement, supported by medical prescription, that she needed to have treatment
at Bangalore cannot be doubted by the Court forming an opinion that the ill-
health of landlady was not so serious as to warrant her shifting to a city from
G a village and then substituting its opinion for the seriousness felt by the
landlady. The requirement pleaded and proved was neither a pretext nor a ruse
adopted by the landlady for evicting the tenant. In such circumstances, in our
opinion, the order of the Trial Court deserves to be restored. O~ the question
of comparative hardship as also on the issue of partial eviction, having our-
H selves evaluated the well-reasoned findings recorded by the Trial Court we are
SIDDALINGAMMA v. MAMTHA SHENOY [LAHOTI, J.] 373
inclined to uphold the same more so whed they have not been reversed by the A
High Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the
High Court is set aside and that of the Trial Court restored. However, the
respondent-tenant is allowed four months' time to vacate the suit premises
subject to her filing before the Trial Court the usual undertaking on her B
affidavit that she would deliver vacant and peacful possession to the landlady
on or before the expiry of four months and in between she would clear the
arrears of rent, if any, and continue to pay rent falling due month by month and
shall not induct any one else in the premises. Costs as incurred.
v.s.s. Appeal Allowed.
c