Holding

The appellant’s principal duties were administrative and managerial; consequently, he was not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Summary

Shri S.K. Maini, employed as Shop Manager/In‑charge of M/s Carona Sahu Co. Ltd., was terminated after a domestic enquiry. The Labour Court held he was a workman under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and ordered his reinstatement with back wages. The Punjab & Haryana High Court reversed, finding that his principal duties were administrative and managerial, not those of a workman, and set aside the Labour Court award. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court, stating that the determination of “workman” status must be based on the employee’s principal nature of duties, and Maini’s duties were chiefly managerial/administrative, disqualifying him from the definition of workman. The Court declined to revisit the fairness of the domestic enquiry or the admissibility of fresh evidence, and dismissed the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether Shri S.K. Maini qualifies as a ‘workman’ under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Whether the domestic enquiry conducted against the appellant was fair and unbiased.
Whether the Labour Court had jurisdiction to entertain the reference on the basis of the workman definition.
Whether the employer could be permitted to lead fresh evidence before the Labour Court.

Legislation cited

Subjects

workman definitionIndustrial Disputes Actmanagerial employeedomestic enquirylabour court jurisdictionsupervisory dutiessalary thresholdreinstatementback wages

Judgment

'
SHRI S.K. MAIN! A
' v.
'
M/S. CARONA SAHU COMPANY LTD. AND ORS.

MARCH 8, 1994

[K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY AND G.N. RAY, JJ.] B

Labour Law: Industrial Disputes Act, 1947: Section 2(s)--Workman
-· ~mployee appointed as Manager/lncharge of ShorAlso required to do
some work of clerical nature-Held, whether or not an employee is a
workman under s.2(s) is required to be determined with reference to his C
principal nature of duties and functions, facts and circumstances of case and
materials on record-Determinative factor is main duties of employee con-
cerned and not some work incidentally done-Functions of employee con-
cerned being administrative and managerial in nature, he was not a workman.

The appellant was working as the shop Manager/Jncharge or the D
shop or the respondent-Company. On an allegation or misconduct against
~ the appellant, a domestic enquiry was conducted, as a result or which his
services were terminated. The Government referred to the Labour Court
the dispute whether the termination or services or the appellant was
justified and in order. E

The respondent raised a preliminary objection before the Labour
Court that the appellant was not a workman within the definition or s.2(s)
or the Industrial Disputes Act, 1~47 because being a shop Manager/Jn-
charge of the shop, he had been discharging mainly managerial and ad-
ministrative functions and had been supervising the works of other F
employees subordinate to him for running the said shop and; even if he was
a Supervisor at the relevant time, as he was drawing a salary more thau
Rs.500 per month, he could not be held to be a workman under the Act.

The Labour Court held that though the appellant was shopa
Manager/lncharge ol .the shop his duties were mainly clerical and he had G
no independent authority to appoint or discharge the employees and to
charge-sheet them; bis functions could not be held to be supervisory or
managerial. It held t'>at the appellant was a workman under the Industrial
Disputes Act, and ·gt.we directions for his reinstatement with full back
wages. H
333
I
I

334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] 2 S.C.R.

A The respondent-Company filed a writ petition before the High Court.
The Single Judge held that the predominant duties of the appellant were ''
administrative or managerial and to some extent supervisory in nature
and as such he was not a workman under s.2(s) of the Act. Appellant's
Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High
Court. Hence the appeal by special leave.
B
Dismissing the appeal, this Court

HELD: 1.1. Whether or not an employee is.a workman under s.2(s)
of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, is required to be determined with
C reference to his principal nature of duties and functions, the fa<ts and
circumstances of the case and materials on record; and it is not possible
to lay dowu any strait-jacket formula which can decide the dispute as to
the real nature of duties and functions being performed by an employee iu
all cases. (343-E-G]

D 1.2. The designation of an.employee is not of much importance and
what is important is the nature of duties being performed by the employee.
The determinative factor is the main duties of the employee concerned and '
>
not some works incidentally done. In other words, what is, in substance,
the work which employee does or what in substance he is employed to do.
E (344-C·D)
l.3. If the employee is mainly doing supervisory work but incidentally
or for a fraction of time also does some manual or clerical work, the
employee should be held to be doing supervisory work. Conversely, if the
main work is of manual, clerical or of technical nature, the me1-e fact that
F some supervisory or other work is also done by the employee incidentally
or only a small fraction of working time is devoted to some super super-
visory work, the employee will come with in the purview of workman as
defined s.2(s) of the Act. A manager or an Administrative Officer is
generally invested with the power of supervision in contradistinction to the
G Stereo type work of a clerk. (344-D-E, 346-D)

1.4. In view of the amendment of Section 2(s) enlarging the ambit of
the classification of various types of workmen except managerial force,
entire labour force has been included within the definition of workman ·•-.\
under section 2(s). In an earlier decision of this court in S.K. Verma's case.
H But if the principal function is of supervisory nature, the concerned
i

S.K. MAIN! v. C.S.C. LID. 335

employee will not be a workman only If be draws a particular quantum of A
salary at the relevant time as indicated in Section 2(s). [345-C, DJ

1.5. On a close scrutiny of the nature of duties and functions of the
Shop Manager with reference to the admitted terms and condltl•,as of
service of the appellant, the High Court was justified in holding that the
principal function of the appellant was of administrative and managerial B
nature, and he was not a workman under Section 2(s) of the Industrial
Disputes Act. [346-H, 347-A]
- ~

1.6. Under the terms and conditions of senice of the appellant, as
the Manager/lncharge of the shop, be was responsible and liable to make
good the amount of credit whether the sale on credit bad been made by
c
him or by any other member of the staff In employment under him with or
without his knowledge; be was responsible and liable for any loss suffered
by the Company due to deterioration of the quality of the stock or any part
thereof and loss of any of the other article lying in the shop caused by
reason of any act of negligence and/or omission to take any precaution by D
the employees; he would remain fully responsible to the Company for
'
-~ damages or loss caused by acts or commission of the loss of the employees
of the shop; be was reqnired to notify to the Company the discovery in the
shop of any fire theft, burglary, loot or arson and to investigate into the
matter Immediately and get the cause and amount of loss established by
E
local authorities. The appellant as lncbarge of the Shop was required to
keep and maintain proper accounts as approved by the Company indicat-
Ing the exact amount to be paid from the receipts from the respective staff.
The appellant was authorised to take decisions In the matter of temporary
appointments and in taking all reasonable steps incidental to the proper
~ running of the shop. Precisely for the said reason he had signed the F
statutory forms as an employer. Such function.• appear to be administra-
tive and managerial. Though the appellant himself was also required to do
some works of clerical natnno, hut by and large the appellant being
lncharge of the management of the shop bad been principally discharging
the administrative and managerial work. [345-E-H, 346-A·D]
G
1.7. An employee discharging managerial duties and functions may
_., not, as a matter of course, he Invested with the power of appointment and
discharge of other employees. It Is not unlikely that In a big set up such
power is not invested to a local manager but.such power is given to some
superior officers also In the management cadre at divisional or regional H
I
I

336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) 2 S.C.R.

A level. The unit in a local shop may not be large but management of such
small unit may fulfil the requirements and Incidences of managerial
functions. [346-F·H]

Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distribution Company of India Ltd. v.
Burmah Shell Management Staff Association, (1970) II LW. 590 SC; All
B India Reserve Bank Employees' Association v. Reserve Bank of India, (1965)
II LW. 175 SC; Mcleod and Co. v. Sixth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal,
A.I.R. (1958) Cal. 273; National Engineering Industries Ltd. v. Shri Kishan ,
Bhaveria and Ors., A.l.R. (1988) S.C. 329; Vimal Kumar Jain v. Labour
Coult, A.l.R. (1988) S.C. 384; D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration &
C Ors., AIR (1984) SC 153 and Mis Anand Bazar. Patrika Pvt. Ltd. v. Its
Workmen, (1969) 2 LLJ 670 SC, referred to.

S.K Verma v. Mahesh Chandra & Anr., [1983] 3 SCR 799, rell•d on.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1581 of
D 1994.

From the Judgment and Order dated 27.8.92 of the Punjab and
'}·
Haryana High Court in L.PA. No. 935 of 1992.

Sarjit Singh, A.S. Chahil and Ms. S. Janani for the appellant.
E
G.B. Pail, Sanjay Sarin, Pawan Mutneja, Ashok Mathur for the
Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

F G.N. RAY, J. Leave granted. •
)

This appeal is directed against the judgment dated August 27, 1992
passed by the Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court dismiss·
ing in limine Letters Patent appeal No. 935 of 1992. The said Letters Patent
G Appeal was preferred against the judgment dated August 11, 1992 passed
by the Single Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in C.W.P.No.4410
of 1986. By the aforesaid judgment, the Writ petition moved by the respon·
dent Mis Carona Sahu Company Limited was allowed and the award of
the Labour Court Jalandhar dated April 21, 1986 in Reference No.389 of.
1981 directing the respondent Company to reinstate the appellant Siu{
H S.K. Maini with full backwages was set aside by the High Court.
S.K. MAIN! v. C.S.C. LTD. [G.N. RAY, J.] ~37

'
{ The appellant Shri S.K. Maini was working as the Shop Manager/In- A
charge of the respondent-Company M/s Carona Sahu Company Limited.
On an allegation of misconduct against the appellant, a domestic enq11iry
was caused by the respondent-Company and by order dated March 12,
1981 the service of the appellant was terminated. On September :.J, 1981,
Government of Punjab referred the following dispute for adjudication to
the Labour Court, Jalandhar; "whether the termination of service of Shri B
S.K. Maini is justified and in order? If not, to what relief and amount of
compensation is he entitled?'

Before the Labour Court a preliminary objection was raised by the
respondent-Company as to the maintainability of the said reference by C
contending that Sliri S.K. Maini was not a workman within the definition
of Section 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 because being a shop
Manager/lncharge of the shop, he had been discharging mainly managerial
and administrative functions and bad been supervising the works of other
employees subordinate to him for running the said shop and even if he was
a Supervisor at the relevant time, Shri S.K. Maini was drawing a salary for D
more than Rs. 500 per month. Hence, be could not be held to be a
workman under the Industrial Disputes Act. Accordingly, the reference
was not maintainable and Shri Maini was not entitled to get any relief from
the Labour Court.

The Labour Court, Jalandhar, inter alia came to the finding that E
although Shri Maini was a shop Manager/lncharge of the shop but his
duties were mainly clerical and he had no independent authority to appoint
or discharge the employee_s and to charge sheet them and his functions
could not be held mainly to be supervisory or managerial. Accordingly, Shri
Maini was a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour F
Court also came to the finding that the domestic enquiry was not properly
conducted against him and reasonable opportunity to defend in the domes-
tic enquiry was not given to Shri Maini by not allowing Shri Maini to be
represented by a lawyer. The Labour Court also held that the inquiring
Officer Shri Iqbal Singh was the Standing Counsel of the respondent-Com- G
pany for disciplinary action to be taken against the employees of the
Company. The said Iqbal Singh an advocate used to be engaged to contest
the claims of the concerned workmen of the company in various legal
proceedings. Such Standing Counsel was likely to have a bias in favour of
the Company which was bis master and consequently prejudice against the
concerned employee. It should, therefore, be held that be lacked impar- H
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] 2 S.C.R.

A tiality and objectivity to judge the case of the concerned workman. Accord-
ingly, the finding recorded by such officer against Shri Maini was not fair
and proper. It may be noted here that the Labour Court refused to grant
permission to the management to prove the case of the Company of a
bonafide action before the Labour Court by leading independent evidence
on the ground that such opportunity would tantamount to permitting the
B manage.men! to improve upon its evidence already adduced and the same
was bound to cause harassment to the concerned workman. In that view of
the matter, the Labour Court directed for reinstatement of Shri Maini with
full backwages.

C As aforesaid, the Respondent-Company challenged the validity of
such award of the Labour Court before the Punjab and Haryana High
Court. The learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court
inter alia came to the finding after analysing the powers and responsibilities
of Shri Maini as Shop Manager/Incharge and the evidence on record, that
D the predominant duties of Shri Maini were administrative or managerial
and to some extent supervisory in nature. It was also held by the learned
Single Judge that the power to employ or dismiss or even initiate discipli-
nary action was not the sole criterion to decide the true nature of duties
of a Manager or Administrator. Such test was relevant to determine
whether the duties were supervisory in nature. The learned Judge was of
E the view that although some of the duties like maintaining accounts, filling
certain profor ams were clerical in .nature, but the major job of the con-
cerned employee was administrative or managerial. Accordingly, the
employee was not workman under Section 2( s) of the Industrial Disputes
Act. The learned Judge further held that denial of the assistance of a
p lawyer to Shri Maini had not vitiated the domestic enquiry and the Labour
Court had gone wrong in holding that the Enquiring Officer being a
Standing Counsel of the Company had a prejudice against the employee
and he had bias in favour of the Company. The learned Judge further held
that duties and interest of an employee of the management by holding an
enquiry against another employee do not clash and it was well known that
G one of the employees in the department would hold enquiry against the
delinquent employee. It was further held by the learned Single Judge that
Shri Maini never raised any objection against the appointment of the said
Enquiring Officer who was an Advocate. Accordingly, Shri Maini should
not have been permitted to contend that the Enquiring Officer could not
H have held the enquiry with objectivity and with impartiality. The learned
S.K. MAIN! v. C.S.C. LTD. [G.N. RAY. J.) 339
'• Single Judge further held that the Labour Court was not right in denying A
the management to lead evidence on the ground that such opportunity
would amount to filling the lacuna in evidence adduced before the Enquir-
ing Officer. The learned Judge held that the management was entitled to
lead evidence before the Labour Court in support of the impugned order
of termination in case the enquiry was held vitiated on any ground. For the
above reasons, the Writ Petition was allowed by the learned Judge and the
B
_,, award of the Labour Court dated September 21, 1981 was set aside. The
appellant thereafter preferred the Letters Patent Appeal against the said
judgment of the learned Single Judge but the said appeal was dismissed in
limine. A special leave petition before this Court was filed by the appellant
petitioner against the order of dismissal of the Letters Patent Appeal and c
leave has been granted to such leave petition.

Mr. Surjit Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, has submitted at
the hearing of this appeal that the designation of the appellant as Shop
Manager/Incharge was of little consequence. He has submitted that the law D
•
·-i
is well-settled that it is not the designation but the true nature of duties
being performed by an employee is the determining factor as to whether
or not the concerned employee is a workman under Section 2(s) of.the
Industrial Disputes Act. Mr. Singh has contended that although under the
Punjab Shops and Commercial Establishment Act, the appellant as in-
charge of the said shop had to fill up certain proformas, which were E
exhibits before the Labour Court, as employer, such signing of such forms
by no stretch of imagination can lead to the conclusion that the appellant
was employer of the other workman rendering service in the said shop. Mr.
Singh has contended that the appellant was a poor and a humble workman
~
~ doing mainly the clerical jobs although at occasions he had to supervise the F
work of one or two employees working in the said shop. He had no
independent power to appoint and to dismiss the employees and to initiate
disciplinary proceedings against them. He had no authority under the terms
and conditions of his service to take independent decisions for the Com-
pany antl although he was designated as a Shop Manager/Incharge, he was
essentially a salesman of the Company. His principal duties were clerical G
in nature and the Labour Court, by indicating good reason, held that the
...~ appellant was a workman and he did not discharge the managerial or
administrative service and he also had not discharged mainly supervisory
service so that he cannot be held to be a workman within the definition of
Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Mr. Singh has referred to the H
.1

340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 2 S.C.R.

A decisions of this Court in D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration and '
}
others, AIR (1984) SC 153; Mis. Anand Bazar Patrika Pvt. Ltd. v. Its
workmen, (1969) 2 L.L.J. 670 SC and National Engineering Industries Ltd.
v. Shri Kishan Bhaveria and others, AIR (1988) SC 329 and contended that
in the said decision and in other decisions referred to in those decisions,
this Court has clearly laid down that the principal duties being performed
B by an employee are to be considered for the purpose of determining as to
the real status of the employee namely, whether such employee had been
discharging administrative, managerial or supervisory work. It has been
"'-
held in no uncertain terms that even if, at times managerial, supervisory or
administrative works were required to be performed by an employee, such
c occasional performance by itself does not determine the real status of the
employer but it is the principal or major duty performed by the employee
which determines the employee's real status. Mr. Singh has contended that
in the aforesaid decisions various tests have been indicated by this Court
for the purpose of determining whether and employee was performing a
skilled, unskilled, technical of clerical nature of work or whether such work
D
in pith and substance the work of an administrator or manager or of a
supervisor. Mr. Singh has contended that the Labour Court after referring
to the terms and conditions of service of the appellant and the actual duties
•
,r

being performed by him, clearly came to the finding that the principal job
of the appellant was clerical in nature. Such finding was not required to be
E reversed by the High Court by reappreciating the evidence on record and
substituting its own view point. Mr. Singh has also contended that admit-
tedly, the enquiring Officer was an Advocate having expertise in the
industrial cases. It is an admitted position that he used to represent the
Company against the employees of the Company in various legal proceed-
F ings. When the appellant without any legal background was required to •
defend himself in the domestic enquiry instituted against him being pitted ~

against an experienced Advocate who was engaged as Enquiring Officer,
it was only fair and proper that the poor employee should have been
allowed by the Company to be represented by a lawyer but the Company
in its jeal to victimise the appellant did not give such permission. The
G Labour Court was, therefore, justified in holding that a fair and reasonable
opportunity to defend in domestic enquiry was denied to the appellant by
not allowing him to be represented by a lawyer. Mr. Singh has also
contended that the question of bias was also manifest in the facts and ~ ..
circumstances of the case. The Enquiring Officer was admittedly a Stand-
H
'·
S.K.MAINI v. C.S.C.LTD. [G.N.RAY, J.] 341

ing Counsel of the Company. It was, therefore, quite reasonable that the A
•' said Enquiring Officer would have an inclination in favour of the Company
and consequently a bias against the concerned employee, namely, the
appellant. In view of such facts and circumstances, which speak for them-
selves, the Labour Court rightly held that the domestic enquiry was not
conducted impartially by the Enquiring Officer and the same was vitiated. B
Mr. Singh has also submitted that in the written statement the respondent-
Company did not allege that the principal job of the appellant was super-
visory in nature and as he had been drawing a salary of more than Rs500
per month, he could not be held as workman under Section 2(S) of the
Industrial Disputes Act. Mr. Singh has contended that the Company tried
to make out a case that Shri Maini was principally discharging the duties C
of a manager or an administrator. But such case could not be established,
for good reasons indicated by the learned Judge of the Labour Court. The
Writ Petition therefore should have been dismissed by the High Court
without making any attempt to decide the fact by itself. He has, therefore,
submitted that the appeal should be allowed by this Court by setting aside D
the impugned decisions of the High Court in writ petition and in Letters
Patent Appeal and the award passed by the Labour Court in favour of the
appellant should be affirmed with cost.

Mr. Pai, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Company
however disputes the said contentions of Mr. Singh. He has submitted that E
although designation of an employee by itself is not the determining factor
but the true nature of the duties being performed by such employee, such
designation is not altogeti\er irrelevant or unimportant. The designation
often gives clue or indication as to the true nature of duties being per-
formed by the concerned employee. Mr. Pai has contended that it has been F
indicated by the High Court that the question as to whether or not the
concerned employee was a workman is a question on which the jurisdiction
of the Labour Court to entertain the Reference Case depended. It was,
therefore, necessary for the High Court to look into the records of the case
and to determine as to whether the jurisdictional fact had been properly G
determined by the Labour Court. Mr. Pai has contended that the learned
Judge of the High Court has referred to the principal duties and functions
being discharged by Shri Maini with reference to terms and conditions of
his service and on a proper analysis of such duties and functions the
learned Judge has come to the finding that Sri Maini had been discharging
principally the administrative and managerial works although on occasions H
I

342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 2 S.C.R.

A he had to discharge some clerical works. Mr. Pai has submitted that for
discharging a managerial work, it is not necessary that the manager will
have the power to dismiss other employees or to suspend such employees.
Such power may be exercised by another set of administrative officers. Mr.
Pai has contended that admittedly Shri Maini was the manager and In-
B charge of the said shop with the responsibility to open the said shop, to
close the same and to conduct the business of the shop. He was required
to manage the overall functioning in the shop with the aid of his subor-
dinates. Other employees working in the said shop had no power or
authority to do any work independently with the sanction or approval of
Sri Maini. Being Incharge of one of selling nnits of the Company, namely,
C of a shop, Shri Maini had to do some clerical works by keeping accounts
and filling up forms but works by themselves were not indicative of the fact
that the clerical functions were the main functions of Shri Maini. Mr .. Pai
has also contended that Shri Maini bad to sign the statutory forms under
the Punjab Shops and Commercial Establishment Act as an employer. Such
D fact only indicates that he was administratively managing the said shop
representing the company itself. Mr. Pai has referred to the decisions of
this Court in Vimal Kumar Jain v. Labour Court, AIR (1988) SC 384 and
Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distribution Company of India v. Burmah
Shell Management Staff Association and others, (1971) 2 SCR 758. Mr.Pai
has submitted that whether or not a particular employee has been discharg-
E ing managerial, administrative or supervisory work principally is essentially
a question of fact and must be determined with reference to the facts and
circumstances of the case. In the instant case from the admitted facts, and
with reference to terms and conditions of service of Shri Maini, the High
Court has come to the finding that the appellant was not a workman by
F indicating good reasons and such finding of fact concerning jurisdictional
question since upheld in Letters Patent Appeal should not be reversed by
this Court. Mr. Pai bas also submitted that even if the Company had
contended before the a Labour Court that the principal job of the appellant
was administrative or managerial, there was no bar in holding that the
nature of duties which had been performed by the appellant was of a
G supervisory character and not strictly managerial or administrative in char-
acter. Mr. Pai has submitted that even if it is held that the appellant had
in fact discharged principally supervisory duties and functions and not
managerial functions, still then the appellant would not be a workman
because at the relevant time be was drawing a salary for more th;m Rs. 500
H
\
S.K. MAIN! v. C.S.C. LTD. [G.N. RAY, J.J 343

per month. Mr. Pai has also contended that the question of prejudice is a A
question of fact. The High Court has rightly indicated that Shri Maini did
•' not raise any objection during the domestic enquiry that the Enquiring
Officer was biased because he used to be engaged as a co=el in legal
proceedings by the Company. Mr. Pai has also contended that simply
because the Enquiring Officer had a legal background, there was no B
requirement for getting the assistance of a lawyer in the domestic enquiry.
No intricate question of law was to be decided in such domestic enquiry
and the appellant being an educated person was quite competent to
represent his case in the domestic enquiry. Therefore, there was no oc-
casion of the Labour Court to hold that Shri Maini was denied reasonable
opportunity to defend his case in the domestic enquiry. Mr. Pai has also C
submitted that if the Labour Court was of the view that the domestic
enquiry had not been properly conducted for any reason whatsoever, it was
only desirable that the Company should have been given opportunity to
lead fresh evidence before the Labour Court to satisfy that the order of
termination was otherwise justified. He has submitted that the High Court D
has rightly held that the Labour Court had gone wrong in disallowing the
prayer of the Company to lead fresh evidence in support of the termination
order. Mr. Pai has, submitted that in the aforesaid facts there is no occa.sion
to interfere with the order of the High Court since upheld in the Letters
Patent Appeal and this appeal should be dismissed.
E
After giving our careful consideration to the facts and circumstances
of the case and the submissions made by the learned counsel for the
parties, it appears to us that whether or not an employee is a workman
under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act is required to be deter-
mined with reference to his principal nature of duties and functions. Such F
question is required to be determined with reference to the facts and
circumstances of the case and materials on record and it is not possible to
lay down any strait-jacket formula which can decide the dispute as to the
real nature of duties and functions being performed by an employee in all
cases. When an employee is employed to do the types of work enumerated
in the definition of workman under Section 2(s), there is hardly any G
difficulty in treating him as a workman under the appropriate classification
but in the complexity of industrial of commercial organisations quite a
large number of employees are often required to do more than one kind
-t of work. In such cases, it becomes necessarv to determine under which
classification the employee will fall for the purpose of deciding whether he H
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 2 S.C.R.

A comes within the definition of workman or goes out of it. In this connection,
reference may be made to the decision of this Court in Burmah Shell Oil
Storage and Distribution Company of India Ltd., v. Rurmah Shell Manage-
ment Staff Association, (1970) II L.L.J. 590 SC. In All India Reserve Bank
Employees Association v. Reserve Bank of India, (1965) II L.L.J. 175 SC, it
has been held by this Court that the word 'supervise' and its derivatives are
B not words of precise import and must often be construed in the light of
context, for unless controlled, they cover an easily simple oversight and
direction as manual work coupled with the power of inspection and super-
intendence of the manual work of others. It has been rightly contended by ....
.~

both the learned counsel that the designation of employee is not of much
c importance and what is important is the nature of duties being performed
by the employee. The determinative factor is the main duties of the
concerned employee and not some works incidentally done. In other words,
what is, in substance, the work which employee does or what in substance
he is employed to do. Viewed from this angle, if the employee is mainly
D doing supervisory work but incidentally or for a fraction of time also does
some manual or clerical work, the employee should be held to be doing
supervisory works. Conversely, if tlie main work is of manual, clerical or of
technical nature, the mere fact that some supervisory or other work is also·
done by the employee incidentally of only a small fraction of working time
devoted to some supervisory works, the employee will come within the
E purview of 'workman' as defined in section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes
Act.

In Mcleod and Co. v. Sixth Industrial Tribunal, West Benga~ AIR
(1958) Cal 273, P.B. Mukharji, J. of the Calcutta High Court as the learned
F Chief Justice then was, observed that whether a person was a workman
within the definition of the Industrial Disputes Act would be the very
foundation of the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal. The Court further
observed that in order to determine the categories of service indicated by
the use of different words like "supervisory "managerial", and nadministra-
1
,

tive", it was not necessary to hnport the notions of one into the interpreta-
G tion of the other. The words such as 'supervisory', 'managerial' and
'administrative' are advisedly loose expressions with no rigid frontiers and
too much subtlety should not be used in trying to precisely defme where
supervision ends and management begins of administration starts. For that
would be theoretical and not practical. It has to be broadly interpreted
H from a common sense point of view where tests will be simple both in
S.K. MAIN! v. C.S.C. LTD. (G.N. RAY, J.] 345

theory and in their application. The learned Judge further observed that a A
supervisor need not be a workman so long as he did not exceed the
monetary limitation indicated in the section and a supervisor irrespective
of his salary is not a workman who has 10 discharge function mainly of
managerial nature by reasons of the duties attached to his office or of the
powers vested in him. The aforesaid decision of the Calcutta High Court B·
was noted with approval by this Court in National Engineering Industries
Ltd. v, Shri Kishan Bhaveria and other, AIR (1988) SC 329.

- It may be noted in this connection that in view of the amendment of
Section 2(s) enlarging the ambit of the classification of various types of
workmen except managerial force, entire labour force has been included C
within the definition of workman under Section 2(s) as has been indicated
by this Court in S.K Verma v. Mahesh Chandra and another, [1983] 3 SCR
799. But if the principal function is of supervisory nature, the concerned
employee ~Mt be workman only if he draws a particular quantum of
salary at the relevant time as indicated in Section 2(s). In the instant case, D
it, however, appears to us that Shri Maini as Manager/Incharge of the shop
was made responsible and liable to make good such amount of credit
whether such sale on the credit had been made by him or by any other
member of the Staff in employment under him with or without his
knowledge. Under the terms and conditions of service, he was asked to
take charge of the shop to which his service was transferred. Mr. Maini, E
under the terms and conditions of service, was required to be held respon-
sible and liable for any loss suffered by the Company due to deterioration
of the quality of the stock or any part thereof and loss of any of the other
articles lying in the shop caused by reason of any act of negligence and/or
omission to take any precaution by the emoloyees. Mr. Maini was also F
required to notify to the Company by trunk .all and/or telegram not later
than three hours after the discovery in the said shop of any fire, theft,
burglary, loot or arson. He was required to investigate into the matter
immediately and get the cause and amount of loss established by local
authorities. Mr. Maini as Incharge of the Shop was required to keep and
maintain proper accounts as approved by the Company indicating the exact G
amount to be paid from the receipts from the respective staff. Under
Clause XIII of the terms and conditions of the service, Mr. Maini would
remain fully responsible to the Company for damages or loss caused by
acts or commission of the loss of the employees of the shop. Under Clause
XV of the terms and conditions of service, the shop incharge was required H
346 SUPREME COURTREPORTS [1994] 2 S.C.R.

A to keep himself fully converant with all the regulations in force which may
come into force from time to time with regard to Octroi, Sales Tax and
Shops and Commercial Establishment Act and/or any other local regula-
tion applicable to the shop. Clause XXI indicates that non-compliance with
any of the local or State Acts or Central Acts would be viewed seriously
B and manager would be held responsible for any fine/penalty imposed
and/or prosecution launched against the Company. It al'o appears that in
the event of a salesman being absent, the shop Incharge is empowered to
appoint temporary helper for the said period to work as acting salesman.
Similarly, in the event of helper being absent, the shop manager is also
empowered to appoint part-time sweeper and to entrust the work of a
C helper to a sweeper. Such functions, in our view, appear to be administra-
tive and managerial By virtue of his being Incharge of the shop, he was
the principal officer in charge of the management of the shop. We there-
fore ~d justification in the finding of the High Court that the principal
function of the appellant was of administrative and managerial nature. It
D is true that he himself was also required to do some works of clerical nature
but it appears to us that by and large Shri Maini being incharge of the
management of the shop had been principally discharging the administra- ,_•
tive and managerial work. A manager or an administrative officer is '
generally invested with the power of supervision in contradistinction to the
stereotype work of a clerk. This court in Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Pannalal
E Gupta, (1961) 1 LLJ 18 SC has indicated that a manager or administrator
generally occupies a position of command or decision and is authorised to
act in certain matters within the limits of his authority without the sanction
of is superior. In the instant case within the authority indicated in the terms
and conditions of his service, Shri Maini was authorised to take decision
F in the matter of temporary appointments and in taking all reasonable steps
incidental to the proper running of the shop. Precisely for Lite said reason;
Shri Maini had signed the statutory forms as and employer. It should be
borne in mind that an employee discharging man~gerial duties and func-
tions .may not, as a matter of course, be invested with the power of
appointment and discharge of other employees. It is not unlikely that in
G big set up such power is not invested to a local manager but such power
is given to some superior officers also in the management cadre at
divisional or regional level. The unit in a local shop may not be large but
management of such small unit may fulfil the requirements and incidences
of managerial functions. On a close scrutiny of the nature of duties and
H
\

5.K. MAIN! v. C.S.C. LTD. [G.N. RAY, J.] 347

functions of the Shop Manager with reference to the admitted terms and A
conditions of service of Shri Maini, it appears to us that the High Court
was _justified in holding that the appellant was not a workman under Section
2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In the aforesaid facts, it is not
necessary to go into the question as to whether or not domestic enquiry
had been properly conducted or the Enquiring Officer had acted with bias:
It is also not necessary to decide for the purpose of the disposal of the B
appeal as to whether or not the Company was entitled to lead fresh
evidence in support of the domestic enquiry before the Labour Court. The
appeal is, therefore, dismissed without, however, any order as to cost.

R.P. Appeal dismissed.