SHRI NASHIK PANCHAVATI PANJARPOL TRUST AND ORS.versusTHE CHAIRMAN AND ANR.

                  [2023] 11 S.C.R. 594 : 2023 INSC 750



                            CASE DETAILS

  SHRI NASHIK PANCHAVATI PANJARPOL TRUST AND ORS.
                                      v.
                     THE CHAIRMAN AND ANR.
                     (Civil Appeal No. 2857 of 2011)
                            AUGUST 22, 2023
       [BELA M. TRIVEDI AND DIPANKAR DATTA, JJ.]

                              HEADNOTES

     Issue for consideration: Award was passed by the Reference Court
determining the amount of additional compensation to be paid to the
appellant-trust. High Court whether justified in setting aside the award
and remanding the matter to decide as to whether the Reference made was
within the limitation as per s.18, Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and decide
the Reference afresh.
     Land Acquisition Act, 1894—s.18–Application made by the
appelant-trust seeking reference, if was beyond the period of limitation
prescribed u/s. 18 or not in consonance with the consent terms arrived
at between the parties:
      Held: In view of the proviso to s.18, every application to the Collector
seeking reference u/s.18 is required to be made within the time limit
prescribed in the proviso thereto – However, in the instant case, the parties
having entered into the consent terms on 20.10.1997 after the award u/s.11
was made on 12.01.1996, and the respondent having specifically agreed to
pay the compensation awarded u/s.11 and take over the vacant and peaceful
possession of the lands in question from the appellant as also having agreed
to make reference to the District Court for the determination of market
value of the said lands as on 17.12.1994, it did not lie in the mouth of the
respondent- Committee to say that the application made by the appellant-
trust seeking reference to the District Court was beyond the period of
limitation prescribed u/s.18 or was not in consonance with the consent
                                    594
       SHRI NASHIK PANCHAVATI PANJARPOL TRUST AND ORS. v. 595
                     THE CHAIRMAN AND ANR.


terms arrived at between the parties – Since the consent terms as well as the
directions contained in the order of High Court were silent as to within what
period the appellant should make application to the respondent-Collector
seeking Reference u/s.18, the respondent-Committee taking undue advantage
of such ambiguity in the consent terms, raised the issue of limitation before
the Reference Court – Reference Court rightly held that the Reference
was filed with the Collector within the period of limitation as per the
order passed by the High Court – High Court erred in interfering with
the said well-reasoned findings and in setting aside the entire award and
remanding the matter back to the Reference Court for deciding it afresh
– Impugned judgments passed by the High Court ex facie erroneous, set
aside.[Paras 7 and 9]
    Interpretat ion of Statutes – Doct rine of Harm onious
Construction:
     Held: As per the rules of doctrine of harmonious construction, the
document has to be read as a whole and in its totality – If there is any
ambiguity either patent or latent, in any of the clauses of the document,
the Courts should interpret such clause in such manner which is consistent
with the other clauses and with the purpose and intent of the parties
executing it.[Para 8]

        OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
               ORDER AND APPEARANCES

       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2857 of
2011
     From the Judgment and Order dated 23.09.2009 of the High Court
of Bombay in FA No. 1447 of 2006.
       With
       Civil Appeal No. 2858 of 2011.
       Appearances:
     B. H. Marlapalle, Sr. Adv., Anil Ahuja, Ajit Pravin Wagh, Avinish
Saurabh, Saurabh Kumar, Preshit Vilas Surshe, Advs. for the Appellants.
596          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2023] 11 S.C.R.


     Parag P. Tripathi, Sr. Adv., M. Y. Deshmukh, Ms. Manjeet Kirpal,
Ms. Adviteeya Sharma, Ms. Mishika Bajpai, Sachin Patil, Ms. Yugandhara
Pawar Jha, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Bharat
Bagla, Sourav Singh, Aditya Krishna, Advs. for the Respondents.

       JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
                               JUDGMENT
      BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.
      1. The Respondent no. 1- Market Committee had preferred two First
Appeals being Nos. 1447 of 2006 and 1490 of 2006 before the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay, challenging the award dated 07.03.2006 passed
by the II Adhoc Additional District Judge, Nashik (hereinafter referred to as
‘the Reference Court’) in Land Reference No. 525 of 1997. The High Court
vide the impugned judgment and order dated 23.09.2009 allowed the First
Appeal No. 1447 of 2006 and set aside the award dated 07.03.2006 passed
by the Reference Court, and remanded the matter to the Reference Court
to decide the question as to whether the Reference made to the Reference
Court was within the limitation as per Section 18 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) and decide the Reference
afresh. The High Court vide the separate order of the even date, disposed
of the First Appeal No. 1490 of 2006 observing that in view of the order
passed in First Appeal No. 1447 of 2006, the appeal had become infructuous.
The appellant- trust has preferred the instant appeals being aggrieved by the
judgments and orders passed in First Appeal Nos. 1447 of 2006 and 1490
of 2006 by the High Court.
     2. Though the case has a chequered history, the bare facts necessary for
the purpose of deciding the present appeals may be summarised as under:
      (i) The lands bearing Survey Nos. 74, 75, 76 and 29 situated at
          Nashik, Makhamalabad belonging to the appellant- trust were
          sought to be acquired by the respondent no. 2 for the respondent
          no. 1– Agricultural Produce Market Committee under Section 6 of
          the Land Acquisition Act read with Section 126 of the Maharashtra
          Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 vide the Notification dated
          17.06.1993.
SHRI NASHIK PANCHAVATI PANJARPOL TRUST AND ORS. v. 597
    THE CHAIRMAN AND ANR. [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]


(ii) In the said acquisition proceedings, an award was declared under
     Section 11 of the Act on 12.01.1996. The appellant- trust filed
     the Writ Petition being No. 607 of 1996 challenging the said
     proceedings on the ground that the award declared was beyond
     the statutory period of limitation. Initially the High Court granted
     an ad-interim injunction in favour of the appellant (the petitioner
     in the said petition) on 06.02.1996, against which the respondent
     had preferred a special leave petition before this Court. However,
     the SLP came to be dismissed by this Court.
(iii) Since by virtue of the said interim order passed in the said writ
      petition, the possession of the lands in question continued with the
      appellant- trust, and though an award was declared under Section
      11 of the Act, the amount awarded remained with respondent
      no. 2, considering the hardship caused to both the parties, the
      appellant (the petitioner in the said petition) and the respondent
      no. 1- Agricultural Produce Market Committee (the respondent no.
      4 in the said writ petition) arrived at a Settlement on 20.10.1997
      and requested the High Court to dispose of the said writ petition
      in terms of the consent terms arrived at between the parties.
(iv) The High Court disposed of the said Writ Petition No. 607 of 1996
     by passing the following order on 20th October, 1997: -
    “By consent of Parties Petition taken up for final hearing on
    board today. The consent terms between the petitioner and 4th
    Respondent taken on record.
    Perused the Consent Terms. The same are just, fair, and equitable
    and hence are accepted.
    In view of the above, this shall be an order in terms of Consent
    Terms and it is hereby directed as under:
    (a) It is directed that the relevant date for determining market
        value of suit land would be 1 & 1/2 year after the publication
        of (illegible) Notification under Section 6 i.e., 17.06.1993
        and consequently both parties agree and admit that Market
        Value be determined as on 17.12.1994 date.
598           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2023] 11 S.C.R.


          (b) It is further directed that the petitioner shall hand over vacant
              and peaceful possession to the 4th Respondent through 2nd
              respondent within 4 weeks from the date of this order and
              that the petitioner Trust shall be paid the amount determined
              under the Award under section 11 by the 2nd respondent at the
              time of handing over possession.
          (c) It is further directed that the Petitioner Trust shall within 4 weeks
              file an Application to 2nd respondent under section 18 of the
              Land Acquisition Act and that the 2nd Respondent is directed to
              send the reference to District Court, Nasik within 4 weeks from
              the date of receipt. It is further directed that the District Court
              after hearing the reference shall determine the Market Value as
              on 17.12.1994 dated as agreed between the parties hereto.
          (d) The parties are at liberty to challenge the decision regarding
              valuation given in Reference in the District Court, in accordance
              with law.
          (e) The compromise & decision so arrived finally, should not be
              treated as a precedent.
               In view of the above, petition shall stand disposed of. No order
               as to cost.”
      (v) Pursuant to the said order passed by the High Court, the payment
          was made to the appellant on 17.11.1997 and the possession of
          lands was handed over by the appellant. The appellant thereafter
          submitted an application on 03.12.1997 to respondent no. 2–
          Collector seeking reference to the District Court. The respondent
          No. 2– Collector accordingly referred the matter to the District
          Court on 18.12.1997.
      (vi) The Reference Court after considering the issue of limitation raised
           on behalf of the respondents in the said Reference, held that the
           Reference filed with the Collector was within the period of limitation
           as per the order of the High Court. The Reference Court further
           determined the amount of additional compensation to be paid to the
           appellant-trust vide the award dated 07.03.2006.
     SHRI NASHIK PANCHAVATI PANJARPOL TRUST AND ORS. v. 599
         THE CHAIRMAN AND ANR. [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]


     (vii) The respondent no. 1- Committee, being aggrieved by the said award
           preferred the First Appeals being 1447 of 2006 and 1490 of 2006
           before the High Court, which came to be allowed vide the impugned
           orders as stated herein above.
      3. The learned senior counsel Mr. B.H. Marlapalle appearing for the
appellant- trust submitted that findings arrived at by the High Court with
regard to the issue of limitation are ex facie erroneous. According to him,
though the consent terms, more particularly, clause (c) thereof was not
happily worded, the High Court while disposing of the Writ Petition vide
the order dated 20.10.1997 had specifically directed the Reference Court
to determine the market value of the lands in question as on 17.12.1994 as
agreed between the parties, and therefore, the respondents could not have
raised the issue of limitation contained in Section 18 of the Act. He further
submitted that both the parties had to act in terms of the order passed by
the High Court based on the consent terms, and therefore the respondent-
Committee could not have raised the issue of limitation under Section 18.
      4. Per Contra, the learned senior Counsel Mr. Parag Tripathi appearing
for respondent no. 1- Committee pressing into service clause (c) of the
consent terms vehemently submitted that there being no time limit mentioned
in the said clause, it was required to be construed that the appellant- trust
had to make an application to the second respondent under Section 18 of the
said Act within four weeks from the date of the order passed by the High
Court i.e. from 20.10.1997 and the appellant having made the application
seeking reference on 03.12.1997 i.e. after four weeks of the order dated
20.10.1997, such an application was clearly barred by limitation in view of
the consent terms as well as under Section 18 of the said Act.
      5. Having carefully gone through the order dated 20.10.1997 passed by
the High Court in Writ Petition No. 607 of 1996 based on the consent terms
arrived at between the appellant- trust and the respondent no. 1- Committee,
and the award passed by the Reference Court as also the impugned judgments
and orders passed by the High Court, we are of the opinion that the issue of
limitation raised by respondent- Committee before the Reference Court and
before the High Court was not only not tenable but was highly unreasonable
and improper. As discernible from the consent terms, the very purpose of
arriving at the said consent terms was to do away with the hardship caused
600           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2023] 11 S.C.R.


to both the parties because of the pendency of the Writ Petition. A monetary
loss was being caused to the appellant- trust as it was losing the interest on the
awarded amount under Section 11 of the said Act, and the respondent no. 1-
Committee though was in dire need of the land, was deprived of the possession
of the said lands under Acquisition. As per the said consent terms, both the
parties had agreed that the relevant date for determining the market value of the
lands in question would be 17.12.1994. It was further agreed that the appellant-
trust would hand over the vacant and peaceful possession to the respondent-
Committee and the appellant would be paid the amount determined under the
Award under Section 11 of the Act by the respondent- Committee within four
weeks from the date of the order passed by the Court. Lastly, it was agreed that
the appellant- trust shall within a period of four weeks file an application to
the respondent no. 2 under Section 18 of the Act and the respondent no. 2 shall
send the said reference for determination of value of the land as on 17.12.1994
to the District Court, Nashik. The High Court disposed of the said Writ Petition
giving directions in terms of the said consent terms.
      6. Now, since the consent terms as well as the directions contained in
the order of High Court were silent as to within what period the appellant
should make application to the respondent- Collector seeking Reference under
Section 18 of the Act, the respondent- Committee taking undue advantage of
such ambiguity in the consent terms, raised the issue of limitation before the
Reference Court. Such a plea raised after taking over the possession of lands in
question from the appellant was not only not in consonance with the tenor of the
consent terms but it smacked of ulterior motive on the part of the respondent.
The High Court while disposing of the Writ Petition No. 607 of 1996 had given
directions in terms of the consent terms, and both the parties were expected to
act accordingly. In view of said directions given by the High Court, the issue of
limitation contained in Section 18 of the Act had clearly paled into insignificance,
and the respondent could not have raised such a plea before the Reference Court
or before the High Court.
      7. There cannot be any disagreement to the legal proposition that in view
of the proviso to Section 18 of the said Act, every application to the Collector
seeking reference under Section 18 is required to be made within the time limit
prescribed in the proviso to Section 18. However, in the instant case, the parties
having entered into the consent terms on 20.10.1997 after the award under
      SHRI NASHIK PANCHAVATI PANJARPOL TRUST AND ORS. v. 601
          THE CHAIRMAN AND ANR. [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]


Section 11 was made on 12.01.1996, and the respondent having specifically
agreed to pay the compensation awarded under Section 11 and take over the
vacant and peaceful possession of the lands in question from the appellant as
also having agreed to make reference to the District Court, Nashik, for the
determination of market value of the said lands as on 17.12.1994, it did not lie
in the mouth of the respondent- Committee to say that the application made by
the appellant- trust seeking reference to the District Court, Nashik was beyond
the period of limitation prescribed under Section 18 or was not in consonance
with the consent terms arrived at between the parties. Since the market value
of the lands as on 17.12.1994 which was the reckonable date agreed by the
parties, was required to be determined by the District Court, Nashik, making
of an application to the Collector seeking a Reference under Section 18 was a
sheer procedural formality required to be followed by the appellant. Though
the consent terms and the directions of High Court were silent as to within
what period the appellant had to make such an application, it was required
to be construed that appellant had to make application after it received the
compensation awarded under Section 11 and after it handed over possession
of the lands, which it did.
      8. It cannot be gainsaid that as per the rules of doctrine of harmonious
construction, the document has to be read as a whole and in its totality. If there
is any ambiguity either patent or latent, in any of the clauses of the document,
the courts should interpret such clause in such manner which is consistent with
the other clauses and with the purpose and intent of the parties executing it.
      9. The Reference Court after considering all the legal and factual aspects
of the matter had rightly held that the Reference was filed with the Collector
within the period of limitation as per the order passed by the High Court. In
our opinion, the High Court had committed gross error in interfering with the
said well-reasoned findings recorded by the Reference Court, and in setting
aside the entire award and remanding the matter back to the Reference Court
for deciding it afresh. The impugned judgments and orders passed by the High
Court being ex facie erroneous, the same are set aside.
      10. In that view of the matter, both the appeals are allowed.


Headnotes prepared by:                                             Appeals allowed.
Divya Pandey