Holding

The NGT, though not bound by the CPC, must adhere to natural‑justice principles and cannot disturb rights affirmed by a final court decree; its orders based on an un‑heard draft map were set aside.

Summary

The National Green Tribunal (NGT) had ordered a halt to construction near the man‑made Teliya Talab in Mandsaur on the basis of a draft ‘trace’ map, disregarding earlier municipal approvals and a final court decree that upheld the Shramjeevi Cooperative Housing Society’s title to 1.4 hectares of land. The Society appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the NGT violated principles of natural justice and the doctrine of finality of judgments, while other appellants sought relief from the same NGT orders. The Court held that although the NGT is not bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, it is bound by natural‑justice principles and cannot disturb rights affirmed by a competent court’s final decree. Consequently, the NGT’s orders were set aside, the Society’s appeal was allowed, and the other appeals were also permitted with directions to re‑examine the precise boundaries of the talab through a duly constituted committee. The judgment reaffirmed that the doctrine of res judicata and finality apply to the NGT’s environmental adjudication.

Issues considered

The extent to which the NGT is bound by principles of natural justice despite not being bound by the Code of Civil Procedure.
Whether the NGT can disregard a final decree and the doctrine of res judicata in its environmental orders.
Whether the NGT’s reliance on a draft map without hearing affected parties violates procedural fairness.
Whether the NGT may review or alter its own orders without following the procedure prescribed under Section 19 of the NGT Act.

Legislation cited

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010s. 19, s. 22

Subjects

National Green Tribunalnatural justicedoctrine of finalityres judicataenvironmental lawland conversionsubmergence areaSection 19 NGT ActSection 22 NGT Actprocedural fairness

Judgment

[2023] 3 S.C.R. 1069 1069

SHRAMJEEVI COOPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. A
v.
DINESH JOSHI & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No(s). 5328-5329 of 2016)
MARCH 22, 2023 B
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND DIPANKAR DATTA, JJ.]
National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 –s.19 – Procedure and
Powers of Tribunal –Held: NGT though not bound by the Code of
Civil Procedure, is nevertheless bound by principles of natural
C
justice – It is a judicial tribunal exclusively tasked with the duty of
deciding environmental disputes and causes – In the present case,
the NGT had to take into consideration that the nature of its
directions meant that all those living or owning land near the Teliya
Talab, a man-made lake/reservoir in Mandsaur, who had obtained
sanctions from the Nagar Palika Parishad and the Town and Country D
Planning Department were condemned unheard–Also, the judgments
of the courts in favour of the appellant-Society reveal that the 1.4
hectares owned by it for which conversion (from agricultural to
non-agricultural use) was sanctioned, was sought to be cancelled
on the ground that the land fell within the submergence area – The
E
history of the previous litigation which the NGT was seized with
reveals that the land forming part of Khasra No. 1248, owned by
the Society was directly in issue in a litigation to which the State
was a party, and in which it lost – That decree was affirmed by all
the courts –However, NGT chose to ignore this fact–Thus, in C.A.
No. 5328-29/2016, the Society’s rights, title, and interest in respect F
of the land purchased by it for which construction permission was
granted and in respect of which the decree was ultimately confirmed
by the High Court shall not be disturbed or affected, in any manner
–In all other appeals, the NGT shall consider the question of precise
boundaries of the talab, after considering the report of a committee
G
in the pending proceedings– Further directions issued–Principles
of Natural Justice.
Doctrines/Principles –Principle of finality– Held: Parties are
bound by the principle of finality which results in a decree by a
competent court, acquiring a final and binding nature, especially
H
1069
1070 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 3 S.C.R.

A where it is confirmed concurrently and upheld by the highest court
of the land – Also, subsequent changes in law, cannot divest parties
of the benefit derived by them in a litigation that attained finality,
through a decree.
Pradeep Kumar Maskara v. State of West Bengal (2015)
B 2 SCC 653 : [2014] 13 SCR 540; Lekh Raj v. Ranjit
Singh (2018) 12 SCC 750 : [2017] 7 SCR 542;
Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham v. K.
Suresh Reddy (2003) 7 SCC 667 : [2003] Supp 2 SCR
698 State of Andhra Pradesh v. T. Yadagiri Reddy (2008)
16 SCC 299 : [2008] 16 SCR 792; Sulochana
C Chandrakant Galande v. Pune Municipal Transport
(2010) 8 SCC 467 : [2010] 9 SCR 476 – relied on.
Case Law Reference
[2014] 13 SCR 540 relied on Para 12
D [2017] 7 SCR 542 relied on Para 12
[2003] Supp 2 SCR 698 relied on Para 13
[2008] 16 SCR 792 relied on Para 13
[2010] 9 SCR 476 relied on Para 13
E CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 5328-
5329 of 2016.
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.02.2016 of the National
Green Tribunal, Central Zonal Bench at Bhopal in O.A. No.100 of 2015
and dated 19.04.2016 in Review Application No.03 of 2016.
F
With
Civil Appeal Nos.1877 of 2023, 409-410, 407-408, 2370-2371 of
2021 And 10239 of 2018.
Brijender Chahar, A.N.S. Nadkarni, P.C. Sen, Ms. Meenakshi
G Arora, Sr. Advs., Sumeer Sodhi, Prannoy Joe Sebastian, Pulkit Agarwal,
Azmat Hayat Amanullah, Ms. Pragati Neekhra, Vijay Assudani,
Himanshu Shekhar Tripathi, Ambuj Dixit, Ms. Ankeeta A., Chandratanay
Chaube, Advs. for the Appellant.
P.V. Yogeshwaran, A.A.G., Ms. Ankita Chaudhary, D.A.G.,
H Aakash Nandolia, Mrinal Gopal Elker, Sunny Choudhary, Nishan Awanat,
SHRAMJEEVI COOPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. v. 1071
DINESH JOSHI & ORS.

Nishant Awana, Yasharth Kant, Rahul Kaushik, Arjun Garg, Gopal Jha, A
Raghvendra Shukla, Shreyash Bhardwaj, Mishra Saurabh, Pulkit Agarwal,
Pashupathi Nath Razdan, Vikas Bansal, Astik Gupta, Rajul Shrivastav,
Mohit D. Ram, Ms. Monisha Handa, Anubhav Sharma, K. Krishna
Kumar, Pai Amit, Ms. Komal Mundhra, Saurabh Agrawal, Abhiyudaya
Vats, Ms. Pankhuri Bhardwaj, Advs. for the Respondents.
B
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
1. Special leave granted in SLP (C) No. 12945/2018. In all these
appeals, all respondents were served and had entered appearance. The
original applicant before the National Green Tribunal (hereafter ‘NGT’) C
too had been served; an affidavit was filed on his behalf. He was however,
not represented on the date of hearing. With consent of counsel for the
parties, all appeals were heard finally.
2. These appeals, under Section 22 of the National Green Tribunal
Act, 2010 (hereafter ‘NGT Act’) and appeals by special leave1, question D
various orders2 of the National Green Tribunal which directed that the
Nagar Palika Parishad, Mandsaur (hereafter ‘Parishad’), should desist
from granting sanction to develop and construct properties in the vicinity
of the “Teliya Talab” (hereafter ‘talab’), a man-made lake or reservoir
in the city of Mandsaur. E
3. The original applicant, Dinesh Joshi, preferred an application
before the Central Bench of NGT, seeking directions for protection and
conservation of the talab, alleging that construction permissions had
been granted by the authorities, i.e., the Parishad and the State, to various
private parties, and allowed construction upon a water body, resulting in F
depletion of the lake’s area, thus reducing availability of surface water.
It was also further alleged that untreated domestic waste and industrial
effluents were being discharged or dumped into the talab. The Parishad
and the Town and Country Planning Department (hereafter ‘TCD’) filed
replies, upon being issued notices.
G
4. The NGT, by its order dated 17.02.2016 (referred to hereafter
as ‘the main order’) took note of the Parishad’s reply, as well as that of
1
Against order dated 10.7.2018 in WP No. 3484/2018 (PIL) of the Madhya Pradesh
High Court
2
Dated 17.02.2016 in OA No. 100/2015; dated 19.04.2016 in RA No. 3/2016; dated
21.09.2020 in OA No. 17/2018; dated 18.11.2020 in RA No. 8 & 9/2020 and order
dated 25.11.2020 in MA Nos. 9, 11 & 14/2020 H
1072 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 3 S.C.R.

A the TCD and relied on a ‘revenue trace map’ to say that the “Maximum
Water Line” (hereafter ‘MWL’) had been shown and the land over
which construction permission was given, i.e., Khasra. No. 1238, fell
within the “Full Water Line” (hereafter ‘FWL’) as well as the MWL. It
was observed that if the water was allowed to reach the maximum
level, the lands would be submerged, as according to the NGT, they fell
B
within the catchment area.
5. The appellants (except the appellant in the appeal by special
leave) preferred review petitions, pointing to the fact that they had been
given permission by the Parishad much earlier, and also drawing to the
notice of the NGT that a Development Plan had been finally sanctioned
C in 2003, in terms of which a green area abutted the talab, beyond which
a public road had been sanctioned and built, and further that their lands
lay beyond this road. It was argued that in these circumstances, the
NGT should review its order, as they were not heard before the main
order was made.
D 6. The appellant in C.A. No. 5328-29/2016 (hereafter called ‘the
society’) additionally urged that the lands owned by it were allotted a
long time earlier to it, and that its use for construction of residential units
to its members (who were workers, belonging to the poorer segments of
society) became a subject matter of a previous litigation, whereby the
E state authorities had cancelled the conversion certificate, on the ground
that the lands fell in the submergence area. The society filed a suit,
which was decreed by the trial court3; the state’s appeal was dismissed4
and its second appeal before the Madhya Pradesh High Court, met the
same fate, i.e., dismissal5. It was also pointed out that the special leave
petition filed by the State too, was dismissed6 by this court.
F
7. The NGT, however, dismissed all the review petitions before it,
by the impugned orders. On the basis of certain representations and
letters, the Collector, District Mandsaur constituted a committee of seven
officials from the revenue department for the purposes of investigating
and submitting the latest report with respect to the boundaries of the
G
3
By order dated 24.12.1994 passed by the Civil Judge First Class, Mandsaur in CS No.
524A/88
4
By order dated 18.05.2001 passed by the Additional District Judge in RCA No. 80A/
2001
5
By order dated 23.06.2011 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in SA No. 415/2001
6
By order dated 08.02.2016 in SLP (CC) No. 2066/2016
H
SHRAMJEEVI COOPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. v. 1073
DINESH JOSHI & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

talab. Based upon the report received, the Collector issued an order on A
06.06.2017. The material portion of that order reads as follows:
“the aforesaid investigation team got the demarcation done
vide the Land Record District Mandsaur Letter Number 1316/
MP/2016 dated 18-05-2016 and from team comprising 21
officers/employees on 04-06-2016 and 06-06-2016 and B
punching, report and map were submitted. As per the
Panchnama, and Report and for clarifying of the facts/
removal of errors mentioned in the application concerned with
the Applicant regarding MWL of Telia Talab, situated at Kaba
Mandsaur the Demarcation team notified the MWL limits of
Telia talab to the employees of Municipal Council and Water C
Resources at the spot and permanent boundary signs were
established, which are mentioned in the map with Green ink.
After MWL signs, the colonies are not in submerged area.
The survey numbers mentioned above the green ink of the
map are recognised beyond the limits of MWL. After marking D
MWL signs, the permission of construction can be granted.
I examined the case and minutely perused the aforesaid
investigation report, Panchnama, and map submitted by the
Committee constituted by this Court. Being consented (sic
satisfied) with the report of investigation team and as per the E
Mandsaur Development Scheme 2001, the MWL. (Maximum
Water Level) Limit signs which are mentioned in Green ink
and the demarcation map of MWL limits of Telia Talab in the
report of Investigation Team, as the colonies situated outside
the Signs are not submerged and hence, construction
permission can be given to the colonies situated outside the F
signs. This map shall be a part of this order.”
8. The report submitted to the Collector and order made by him
became the subject matter of controversy before the NGT. An application
(No. 17/2018), objecting to the correction of the submergence area and
the MWL, was filed by the applicant who moved the earlier O.A. No. G
100/2015. The applicant’s grievance was that the NGT had prohibited
any construction in the water bound area and within limits of the MWL
and FWL of the talab. The argument made out was that the map prepared
subsequently and taken on record by the Collector’s order dated
06.06.2017, could not be sustained. The Madhya Pradesh Pollution H
1074 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 3 S.C.R.

A Control Board in its reply stated that the alteration of the boundaries of
the talab did not fall within its jurisdiction. It was stated, however, that
the Board had issued notice to the Parishad from time to time to comply
with provisions of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act
1974 (hereafter ‘Water Act’). This was recorded by the NGT in its
order. It was further recorded that the Collector’s team had inspected
B
the area and found that 10 colonies were existing within 3 kilometres
from the talab, and further that untreated sewage water was being
discharged in it. By its order dated 21.09.2020 (hereafter ‘second order’)
the NGT severely chastised the State, the Parishad, and district revenue
authorities, and directed them to immediately proceed to demarcate the
C water body and the area which was previously within the area of the
water body, to ensure that it was not reduced in any manner. The NGT
also prohibited grant of permission for construction without the
demarcation of the area of the water bodies, and up to the MWL. It
further directed that the entire Khasra No. 1238 should be protected
and that the water body should not be disturbed.
D
Contentions of counsel for the parties
9. Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned senior counsel appearing for
the society, argued that the NGT’s impugned orders are erroneous on
two counts. Firstly, that it did not consider or deal with the fact that the
E portions of KhasraNo.1238 was purchased by the society over four
decades ago, with the hard-earned money of its members, who were
lowly paid workers. They had faced litigation for over two and a half
decades, when the conversion certificate issued to them, was cancelled
on the ground that the lands fell within the submergence area
(Doobkshetra). The society was constrained to file a suit for perpetual
F injunction, where the state was impleaded; the state relied on the
deposition of an engineer from its irrigation department, who reiterated
its stand. However, he was unable to point to any document or material
in support of the state’s argument that the land fell within the submergence
area. The state’s appeal was rejected; the first appellate court noted the
G state’s stand, which was contradictory, i.e., that the lands fell in the
submergence area, and at the same time, that they were required for
some construction. The state’s second appeal, and special leave petition
were also rejected.
10. Ms. Arora urged, as the second limb of her submissions, that
H the doctrine of finality of judgement and res judicata applied to the
SHRAMJEEVI COOPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. v. 1075
DINESH JOSHI & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

facts of this case. The principle plays a vital role as it is based on a A
sound firm principle of public policy. The doctrine of finality has evolved
with the objective of preventing unnecessary litigation under the colour
and pretence of law. It also ensures an end to litigation, in public interest.
The state, and all its agencies were bound by the decree of the courts,
which had been confirmed up to this court. Learned counsel submitted
B
that the order dismissing the special leave petition also held that the
judgment of the High Court was justified.
11. Mr. A.N.S. Nadkarni and Mr. P.C. Sen, learned senior counsels,
Mr. Sumeer Sodhi, Ms. Pragati Neekhra, Mr. Amit Pai, and other counsel,
appeared for other appellants. Mr. Brijendra Chahar, learned senior
counsel, and Mr. Yogeshwaran, learned Additional Advocate General C
(AAG) for Madhya Pradesh, appeared for the TCD and the Parishad
respectively; and Mr. Saurabh Mishra, AAG, appeared for the state of
Madhya Pradesh. They supported the submissions on behalf of the society,
and urged that the NGT fell into serious error in not considering that the
TCD had published the Development/Master Plan in 2001, which was D
finally approved on 12.05.2003. This forms the basis for development of
Mandsaur. The existence of the talab, its boundaries, and the extent of
its catchment area, were made known. No one objected to the plan,
which designated a green area immediately adjoining the talab, after
which a road was permitted. The development of residences and colonies
was beyond this road. These facts were known to the general public. In E
this background, the applicant before the NGT persuaded it to issue
orders based on a “trace” map, which had not been finalised.
12. Learned counsel submitted that after much inter-departmental
correspondence between the Sub-Divisional Officer of Mandsaur, the
Parishad and the Water Resources Department, as well as the Collector, F
finally a letter was addressed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, to the
Collector, on 31.01.2022, which disclosed that the map shown to the
NGT, based on which, it made its orders was
“not originally a map, but a proposed map to depict a situation
if the FTL of Teliya Talab were to be increased by one feet G
and which only bore the signature of Shri. L.N. Badgotia, the
Sub-Divisional Officer of the Water Resources Department.
This Map does not bear the signatures of any authorized
Revenue Officer. The Map that was presented by Shri Santosh
Rathore along with his request letter is in two pages and H
1076 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 3 S.C.R.

A describes all categories of land under the submergence area
and which was presented to the then collector on 03.07.2021
and the factual description was presented to the then Collector.
The then Collector then put the issue up for discussion but he
was transferred and because of which the discussion could
not take place.
B
On the basis of the various communications exchanged
between the Chief Municipal Officer, Nagar Palika
Mandsaur, and the Water Resources Department, what emerges
clearly is that Map presented by Nagar Palika Parishad
before the Hon’ble National Green Tribunal (NGT) which was
C singed by Shri. L.N. Badgotia, Sub Divisional Officer, of the
Water Resources Department, is not the original Map but only
is descriptive of the proposal in the year 2002 to increase the
height of the dam by one feet. The Map presented to me on
30.07.2021 by the Water Resources Department bears the
D signatures of the Sub-Engineer, Water Resources Department,
Tehsildar, Revenue Inspector and Halka Patwari and this Map
also has a clear description of all of the areas that will come
under the FTL and MWL and hence this is the original map.”
13. It is pointed out that the relevant correspondence between the
E various authorities and bodies, relating to the map furnished to the NGT,
and its accuracy, as well as the instructions issued on it, have been placed
on record by affidavit dated 01.11.2022, sworn to by the Chief Officer
of the Parishad.
14. Learned counsel also submit that the very same issue, about
F the boundaries of the Teliya Talab is again the subject matter of another
litigation before the NGT (i.e., Abhay Kumar Akolkar v. State of MP,
O.A. No. 70/2022) in which the tribunal is cognizant of the present
appeals.
15. The contesting respondents (applicants in the original
G applications before NGT), i.e., Mr. Dinesh Joshi and Mr. Alok Sharma,
were not represented at the time of hearing. However, they had filed
replies and counter affidavits to some of the appeals. Their consistent
stand is that the NGT’s orders do not call for interference. It is urged by
them, the map of 1973-74, relied on by the NGT, was supplied by the
Parishad, which cannot now resile from its stand. It is also stated that
H
SHRAMJEEVI COOPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. v. 1077
DINESH JOSHI & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

the existence of the Development Plan, was a matter of record, and the A
NGT was aware of it. Moreover, it is pointed out that the Parishad did
not deny that untreated waste was being dumped into the talab.
Analysis and Conclusions
16. A plain reading of the main order by the NGT shows that it
went by the pleadings, and proceeded to pass orders on the basis of the B
trace map produced before it. The NGT was aware that the applicant
wished to interdict development in the vicinity of the talab, for which
sanction had been granted. Yet, it did not feel the necessity of seeking
particulars from the parties before it, and whether any parties were
likely to be affected by its orders. As a judicial tribunal, bound by principles C
of natural justice, it ought to have impleaded, or at least issued a public
notice, about the pendency of litigation, and sought intervention of those
likely to be adversely affected. Its omission to take this step, has resulted
in prejudice to all the appellants before this court, who were faced with
drastic and serious consequences, because the sanction for development
or construction upon the lands owned, purchased or developed by them, D
immediately became out of bounds.
17. Section 19 of the NGT Act pertinently provides as follows:
“19. Procedure and powers of Tribunal— (1) The Tribunal
shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code E
of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) but shall be guided by
the principles of natural justice.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Tribunal shall
have power to regulate its own procedure.
(3) The Tribunal shall also not be bound by the rules of F
evidence contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of
1872).
(4) The Tribunal shall have, for the purposes of discharging
its functions under this Act, the same powers as are vested in
a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of G
1908), while trying a suit, in respect of the following matters,
namely—
(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person
and examining him on oath;
H
1078 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 3 S.C.R.

A (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;
(c) receiving evidence on affidavits;
(d) subject to the provisions of Sections 123 and 124 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), requisitioning any
public record or document or copy of such record or document
B from any office;
(e) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or
documents;
(f) reviewing its decision;
C (g) dismissing an application for default or deciding it ex
parte;
(h) setting aside any order of dismissal of any application for
default or any order passed by it ex parte;
(i) pass an interim order (including granting an injunction or
D
stay) after providing the parties concerned an opportunity to
be heard, on any application made or appeal filed under this
Act;
(j) pass an order requiring any person to cease and desist
from committing or causing any violation of any enactment
E specified in Schedule I;
(k) any other matter which may be prescribed.
(5) All proceedings before the Tribunal shall be deemed to be
the judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193,
F 219 and 228 for the purposes of Section 196 of the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860) and the Tribunal shall be deemed to
be a civil court for the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter
XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).”
18. A plain reading of Section 19 clarifies that though not bound
G by the Code of Civil Procedure, the NGT is nevertheless bound by
principles of natural justice. It is a judicial tribunal, exclusively tasked
with the duty of deciding environmental disputes and causes; its remit
includes wide ranging powers. In these circumstances, the NGT had to
take into consideration that the nature of its directions meant that all
those living or owning land near the talab, who had obtained sanctions
H from the Parishad and the TCD, were condemned unheard.
SHRAMJEEVI COOPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. v. 1079
DINESH JOSHI & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

19. The second aspect is that when some of the appellants A
approached NGT, in review proceedings, those review petitions were
summarily rejected. Again, these orders cannot be sustained, because
they do not disclose any application of mind to the existence of the
Development Plan, which had permitted development of the disputed
areas; the orders in review also do not advert to or deal with the peculiar
B
circumstances, concerning the society’s plot, on which a previous litigation
had been fought, ending in a decree against the state. Before this court,
the Parishad has categorically deposed, and produced several documents,
in support of its stand that the map placed before, and considered by the
NGT, was only a draft, or proposal to increase the area of the talab.
20. It is too well settled that parties are bound by the principle of C
finality, which results in a decree by a competent court, acquiring a final
and binding nature, especially where it is confirmed concurrently and
upheld by the highest court of the land. In Pradeep Kumar Maskara v.
State of West Bengal7 this aspect was stated, in the following terms:
“24. At the very outset, we are of the view that the Tribunal D
has no jurisdiction to differ with the decision given by the
Calcutta High Court in the writ petition filed by the appellants.
The Tribunal further committed grave error in following the
decision in Ganga Dhar Singh case [Ganga Dhar
Singh v. State of W.B., (1997) 2 CHN 140] treating it to be a E
Division Bench judgment of the Calcutta High Court when
as a matter of fact the decision in Ganga Dhar Singh
case [Ganga Dhar Singh v. State of W.B., (1997) 2 CHN 140]
was decided by a Single Judge of the High Court. Even the
judgment passed [Pradip Kumar Maskara v. State of W.B.,
Civil Revision No. 3465 (W) of 1984, decided on 8-11-1992 F
(Cal)] in the appellant’s writ petition filed in 1984 was neither
considered nor distinguished.
25. In the background of these facts, in our considered
opinion, when the judgment rendered by the Calcutta High
Court in the case of the appellants and the said decision G
having not been quashed or set aside by a larger Bench of
the High Court or by this Court, the Tribunal ought not to
have refused to follow the order of the High Court.
7
(2015) 2 SCC 653: [2014] 13 SCR 540
H
1080 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 3 S.C.R.

A 26. It is well settled that even if the decision on a question of
law has been reversed or modified by subsequent decision of
a superior court in any other case it shall not be a ground for
review of such judgment merely because a subsequent
judgment of the Single Judge has taken contrary view. That
does not confer jurisdiction upon the Tribunal to ignore the
B
judgment and direction of the High Court given in the case
of the appellants.”
21. This court has also ruled, in Lekh Raj v. Ranjit Singh8 that
subsequent changes in law, cannot divest parties of the benefit derived
by them in a litigation that attained finality, through a decree:
C
“21. If the rights of the parties had already been crystallised
then, in our opinion, subsequent change in law would not
take away such rights which had attained finality due to lis
coming to an end inter se the parties prior to such change.”
D 22. In another judgment, pertinent to the facts of this case, the
state invoked its revisional power to nullify the effect of orders which
had attained finality and were inuring in favour of private parties. It was
held that such action was without authority of law in Ibrahimpatnam
Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy 9, where the
court considered the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area)
E Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950. The provision in Section 50-
B(4) empowered the statutory authority to exercise suo motu revisional
power at any time. The Court held that:
“9. … Use of the words ‘at any time’ in sub-section (4) of
Section 50-B of the Act only indicates that no specific period
F of limitation is prescribed within which the suo motu power
could be exercised reckoning or starting from a particular
date advisedly and contextually. Exercise of suo motu power
depended on facts and circumstances of each case. In cases
of fraud, this power could be exercised within a reasonable
G time from the date of detection or discovery of fraud. While
exercising such power, several factors need to be kept in mind
such as effect on the rights of the third parties over the
immovable property due to passage of considerable time,
8
(2018) 12 SCC 750: [2017] 7 SCR 542
9
(2003) 7 SCC 667: [2003] Supp 2 SCR 698
H
SHRAMJEEVI COOPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. v. 1081
DINESH JOSHI & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

change of hands by subsequent bona fide transfers, the orders A
attaining finality under the provisions of other Acts (such as
the Land Ceiling Act). … Use of the words ‘at any time’ in
sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act cannot be rigidly
read letter by letter. It must be read and construed contextually
and reasonably. If one has to simply proceed on the basis of
B
the dictionary meaning of the words ‘at any time’, the suo
motu power under sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act
could be exercised even after decades and then it would lead
to anomalous position leading to uncertainty and
complications seriously affecting the rights of the parties, that
too, over immovable properties. Orders attaining finality and C
certainty of the rights of the parties accrued in the light of
the orders passed must have sanctity. Exercise of suo motu
power ‘at any time’ only means that no specific period such
as days, months or years are not (sic) prescribed reckoning
from a particular date. But that does not mean that ‘at any
D
time’ should be unguided and arbitrary. In this view, ‘at any
time’ must be understood as within a reasonable time
depending on the facts and circumstances of each case in the
absence of prescribed period of limitation.”
The above judgment was followed in State of Andhra
Pradesh v. T. Yadagiri Reddy 10 and Sulochana Chandrakant E
Galande v. Pune Municipal Transport 11.
23. In view of the above, it is held that the argument of the society
(i.e., appellant in C.A. No. 5328-29/2016) is merited. The judgments of
the courts in its favour, clearly reveal that the 1.4 hectares owned by it,
for which conversion (from agricultural to non-agricultural use) was F
sanctioned, was sought to be cancelled, on the ground that the land, fell
within the submergence area. The history of the previous litigation –
which the NGT was seized with – reveals that the land forming part of
Khasra No. 1248, owned by the society, was directly in issue in a litigation
to which the state was a party, and in which it lost. That decree was G
affirmed by all the courts. When the NGT was made aware of this fact,
it chose to ignore it. Without a review, or any known process by which a
decree concerning the same facts could be re-opened, the NGT could
10
(2008) 16 SCC 299: [2008] 16 SCR 792
11
(2010) 8 SCC 467: [2010] 9 SCR 476
H
1082 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 3 S.C.R.

A not have rejected the society’s contentions. The society’s appeal,
therefore, requires to succeed.
24. As regards to the other appeals, this court notes that the NGT
did not advert to any facts, such as the existence of the Development/
Master Plan, or the green area, and the road, after which the plots were
B sought to be developed, although these were expressly brought to its
notice, in the review proceedings. Furthermore, this court has also been
appraised of the fact that the inquiry by the revenue authorities, after the
second order was made, has now resulted in awareness on the part of
the Collector, and the Parishad, that the map on which the NGT based
its main order, was only a proposal and not a final map. Moreover, a
C fresh litigation (O.A. No. 70/2022) is also pending. In these circumstances,
it would be appropriate that the other appeals too are allowed, and the
NGT considers the issue, afresh in O.A. No. 70/2022, and ensures that
the precise boundaries of the talab are ascertained by a properly
constituted committee.
D 25. In view of the above, the following directions are issued:
(a) C.A. No. 5328-29/2016 is allowed. The society’s rights, title,
and interest in respect of the land purchased by it, for which
construction permission was granted, and in respect of which
decree was made by the Civil Judge First Class, Mandsaur in
E C.S. No. 524A/88 dated 24.12.1994, ultimately confirmed by the
Madhya Pradesh High Court in S.A. No. 415/2001, by order dated
23.06.2011 shall not be disturbed or affected, in any manner.
(b) All other appeals are allowed with the direction that the NGT
shall consider the question of precise boundaries of the talab,
F after considering the report of a committee, in the pending
proceedings, i.e., O.A. No. 70/2022. The appellants in these
proceedings are at liberty to implead themselves in the said
proceeding before the NGT, which shall hear them, and consider
their submissions, before rendering a final order.
G (c) The committee referred to in (b) above shall consist of
competent officers nominated by
(i) the Collector, from the Revenue Department;
(ii) the Chief Officer/CEO/Chairman TCD;
H (iii) the Chairman/President of the Parishad; and
SHRAMJEEVI COOPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. v. 1083
DINESH JOSHI & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

(iv) by the competent official of the Department of Water A
Resources, nominated by the Principal Secretary.
(d) The above officials nominated by the respective named officers,
shall inspect the area, and also consider the record. On the basis
of the inspection and observation of the record, they shall submit
a report to the NGT; copies of such report shall be made available B
to all parties. The NGT shall thereafter hear all parties, and consider
their submissions, while rendering final order.
26. The appeals are allowed, and pending applications, if any, are
disposed of, in the above terms, without order on costs.
C
Divya Pandey Appeals allowed.
(Assisted by : Shevali Monga, LCRA)

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F

G

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