Holding

The Supreme Court held that the respondent failed to establish readiness and willingness under Section 16(c), so specific performance was denied and the advance was to be refunded with interest.

Summary

The appellants (Shenbagam & Ors.) entered into a 1990 agreement to sell land to the respondent (KK Rathinavel) for Rs.1,25,000, with an advance of Rs.25,000 and a further Rs.10,000 for family expenses. The respondent failed to pay the balance within six months, the sellers rescinded the contract, and the respondent later sued for specific performance. The trial court and appellate courts granted specific performance, but the Supreme Court held that the respondent had not proved the statutory requirement of being "ready and willing" to perform under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Considering the three‑decade lapse, price escalation, and the respondent's inconsistent conduct, the Court declined to order specific performance and instead directed a refund of the advance with interest. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the lower courts' decree.

Issues considered

Whether the plaintiff satisfied Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act by proving readiness and willingness to perform the contract.
Whether specific performance is an appropriate equitable remedy given the conduct of the parties, the long lapse of time, and escalation of property value.
Whether time is of the essence in an agreement for sale of immovable property absent an express clause.
Whether the mortgage discharge condition affects the parties' obligations under the agreement.
Whether the decree of specific performance should be set aside and the consideration refunded with interest.

Legislation cited

Specific Relief Act, 1963s. 16, s. 20

Subjects

specific performanceSpecific Relief Actreadiness and willingnesssale of immovable propertyequitable relieftime not of essencemortgage dischargeprice escalationrefund of consideration

Judgment

346 [2022]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 1 S.C.R. 346 [2022] 1 S.C.R.

A SHENBAGAM & ORS.
v.
KK RATHINAVEL
(Civil Appeal No. 150 of 2022)
B JANUARY 20, 2022
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD AND A. S.
BOPANNA, JJ.]
Specific Relief Act: s.16 – Bars to the relief of specific
performance – Held: s.16 provides certain bars to the relief of
C
specific performance – These include, inter alia, a person who fails
to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ‘ready
and willing’ to perform the essential terms of the contract which are
to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which
has been prevented and waived by the defendant.
D
Specific performance: Conduct of the parties – Generally in
an agreement for sale of immovable property, time is not of the
essence – In deciding whether to grant the remedy of specific
performance, specifically in suits relating to sale of immovable
property, the courts must be cognizant of the conduct of the parties,
E the escalation of the price of the suit property, and whether one
party will unfairly benefit from the decree – The remedy provided
must not cause injustice to a party, specifically when they are not at
fault – In this case, three decades passed since the agreement to
sell was entered into between the parties – The price of the suit
property undoubtedly have escalated – In view of the blemished
F
conduct of the respondent-plaintiff in indicating his willingness to
perform the contract, grant of the remedy of specific performance
of the contract is declined – However, the consideration together
with interest at 6% per annum is ordered to be refunded.
Specific performance: Willingness to perform the contract –
G The foundation of a suit for specific performance lies in ascertaining
whether the plaintiff has come to the court with clean hands and
has, through his conduct, demonstrated that he has always been
willing to perform the contract – There is a conspicuous absence in
judgment of the trial court of any reference to evidence led by the
H respondent to indicate his willingness to perform the contract –
346
SHENBAGAM & ORS. v. KK RATHINAVEL 347

Trial court merely adverted to “document produced on behalf of A
the plaintiff” and concluded that he had sufficient means to purchase
the suit property – Apart from this observation, trial court did not
analyse the terms of the agreement, the obligations of the parties
and the conduct of the parties – Plaintiff withdrew the balance
consideration deposited by him before the trial court in 2001 – The
B
inconsistency in his conduct, lack of communication with the
defendants urging them to discharge the mortgage and in showing
his willingness to pay the balance consideration, and delay of about
three years from the date fixed for performance of the contract in
filing a suit, are all indicative of the plaintiff ’s lack of will to perform
the contract. C
Specific performance: Burden to prove readiness and
willingness to perform contract – Held: The terms of the agreement
stipulated that the plaintiff was to pay the balance consideration
within a period of six months and “on receipt of the balance
consideration”, the defendants were to execute the sale deed D
“pertaining to the property free from all encumbrances” – It is
evident that plaintiff was required to pay the remaining
consideration (or indicate his willingness to pay) and only then
could have sought specific performance of the contract – Plea of
plaintiff that an additional amount of Rs. 10,000 was paid to the
defendants to discharge the mortgage – However, the E
acknowledgment signed by the defendants indicated that the money
was to meet urgent family expenses – Since no further details have
been provided and no evidence has been adduced by the plaintiff,
it cannot be concluded that the money was for discharge of the
mortgage – Even assuming that the plaintiff is correct, the agreement F
still required the plaintiff to pay the balance consideration – The
agreement clearly provided that the balance consideration would
be paid and then the sale deed would be executed – How the
defendant chose to discharge the mortgage was for them to decide
– It is an established principle of law that the plaintiff must prove
that he is ready and willing to perform the contract – Burden lies on G
the plaintiff – Plaintiff has not led any evidence that he was ready
or willing to perform his obligations under the agreement.
Specific performance: In evaluating whether the respondent
was ready and willing to perform his obligations under the contract,
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348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 1 S.C.R.

A it is not only necessary to view whether he had the financial capacity
to pay the balance consideration, but also assess his conduct
throughout the transaction – Further, the payment of income tax by
itself does not show that the plaintiff had sufficient resources to
pay for the suit property.
B Specific Relief Act: s.20 – Equitable relief – Discretion on
court conferred under s.20 of the Act.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act provides
certain bars to the relief of specific performance. These include,
C inter alia, a person who fails to aver and prove that he has
performed or has always been ‘ready and willing’ to perform the
essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him,
other than terms the performance of which has been prevented
and waived by the defendant. [Para 14][358-F; 359-A-B]
D JP Builders v. A Ramadas Rao (2011) 1 SCC 429 :
[2010] 15 SCR 538; His Holiness Acharya Swami
Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar (1996) 4 SCC 526 :
[1996] 2 Suppl. SCR 111; Atma Ram v. Charanjit Singh
(2020) 3 SCC 311; P Meenakshisundaram v. P
E Vijayakumar (2018) 15 SCC 80 : [2018] 6 SCR 667 –
relied on.
2.1 In the present case, the respondent and the appellants
entered into an agreement to sell the suit property on 7 February
1990. Further, on 8 March 1990, the appellants issued a receipt
F for an additional sum of Rs. 10,000 as advance from the
respondent. The terms of the agreement indicate that the suit
property was to be sold for a total consideration of Rs. 1,25,000,
out of which the appellants had received Rs. 25,000 as advance.
On 8 March 1990, a further sum of Rs. 10,000 was given as
advance to the appellants “for [their] urgent family expenses”.
G The agreement stipulated that the respondent shall pay the balance
consideration within a period of six months, that is, by 7 August
1990 and shall bear the cost of stamp duty. On receipt of the
balance sale consideration, the appellants were required to
execute the sale deed free from all encumbrances. By 19
H
SHENBAGAM & ORS. v. KK RATHINAVEL 349

December 1990, the respondent did not pay the balance A
consideration to the appellant and thus, the appellant rescinded
the contract and forfeited the advance money. The respondent
sent a reply on 26 December 1990 demanding that the appellants
execute the sale deed free from encumbrances. The appellants
alleged that there was a mortgage of Rs. 6,000 on the suit property
B
that the respondent agreed to discharge from the sale
consideration. However, the respondent did not show any interest
in getting the sale deed executed. In 1991, the respondent filed
a suit for mandatory injunction. On 17 June 1992, the appellant
discharged the mortgage debt, and a year after that the respondent
instituted a suit for specific performance. [Paras 19-21][363-A, C
F, G-H; 364-A-C]
2.2 The trial court analysed the notice issued by the
appellants and held that the appellants made no demand from the
respondent to discharge the mortgage liability. Thus, the
appellants’ plea that the respondent-plaintiff had to pay the loan D
and only thereafter, could the appellants execute the sale deed
was rejected. The court also accepted the respondent’s argument
that the advance amount of Rs. 10,000 was paid to discharge the
mortgage. Further, the trial court observed that the documents
submitted by the respondent indicate that he had sufficient means
to purchase the suit property. The judgment of the trial court E
was upheld by the first appellate court and, in a second appeal, by
the High Court. [Para 24][365-A-C]
2.3 All the three courts, including the High Court, grossly
erred in the manner in which they have adjudicated upon this
dispute in a suit for specific performance. In the first instance, F
the trial court failed to frame an issue on whether the respondent-
plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his obligations under
the contract and instead assessed whether he is entitled to the
relief of specific performance. In doing so, the trial court viewed
the legal issue from an incorrect lens. The foundation of a suit for G
specific performance lies in ascertaining whether the plaintiff has
come to the court with clean hands and has, through his conduct,
demonstrated that he has always been willing to perform the
contract. There is a conspicuous absence in judgment of the trial
court of any reference to evidence led by the respondent to
H
350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 1 S.C.R.

A indicate his willingness to perform the contract. The trial court
merely adverted to “document produced on behalf of the plaintiff”
and concluded that he had sufficient means to purchase the suit
property. Apart from this observation, the judgment fails to
analyse the terms of the agreement, the obligations of the parties
and the conduct of the respondent or the appellant. In evaluating
B
whether the respondent was ready and willing to perform his
obligations under the contract, it is not only necessary to view
whether he had the financial capacity to pay the balance
consideration, but also assess his conduct throughout the
transaction. [Paras 25, 26][365-C-G]
C 3. The terms of the agreement stipulated that the
respondent was to pay the balance consideration within a period
of six months and “on receipt of the balance consideration”, the
appellants were to execute the sale deed “pertaining to the
property free from all encumbrances”. It is evident from the
D agreement that the liability to deliver the property free from any
encumbrance was on the appellants. However, this obligation is
prefaced by the condition that the appellants would be required
to execute the sale deed free from encumbrance on the receipt
of the balance consideration. Thus, the agreement did not specify
when the appellants should discharge their mortgage- before the
E expiry of six months, after receipt of the advance amount, or after
receipt of the balance consideration. It only obligated them to
ensure that after the balance consideration is received, the sale
deed executed should be free from encumbrances. Based on a
plain reading of the agreement, the respondent’s plea cannot be
F accepted that he was willing to perform his obligations under the
contract. It is evident that he was required to pay the remaining
consideration (or indicate his willingness to pay) and only then
could have sought specific performance of the contract. The
respondent has also urged that the additional amount of Rs.
10,000 was paid to the appellants to discharge the mortgage. The
G acknowledgment signed by the appellants indicates that the money
was to meet urgent family expenses. Since no further details have
been provided and no evidence has been adduced by the
respondent-plaintiff, it cannot be concluded that the money was

H
SHENBAGAM & ORS. v. KK RATHINAVEL 351

for discharge of the mortgage. Even assuming that the respondent A
is correct, the agreement still required the respondent to pay
the balance consideration. [Para 28][366-B-G]
4.1 The respondent has failed to provide any documents or
communication which would indicate that he called upon the
appellants to perform their obligations or discharge the mortgage B
within the time period stipulated in the contract. Even after the
expiry of the six months, the respondent did not reach out to the
appellants. It is only in response to the appellants’ legal notice
that the respondent demanded performance of their obligations.
Merely averring that he was waiting with the balance
consideration and believed that the appellants would clear the C
encumbrance is insufficient to prove that the respondent-plaintiff
was willing to perform his obligations under the contract.
[Para 29][367-A-C]
4.2 The respondent withdrew the balance consideration
deposited by him before the trial court in 2001. The inconsistency D
in the respondent’s conduct, the lack of communication with the
appellants urging them to discharge the mortgage and showing
his willingness to pay the balance consideration, and the delay of
about three years from the date fixed for performance of the
contract in filing a suit, are all indicative of the respondent’s lack E
of will to perform the contract. The ‘readiness’ of the respondent
to perform his obligations refers to whether he was financially
capable of paying the balance consideration. Both the trial court
and the first appellate court have observed that the respondent
was ready to pay the balance consideration as (i) he was paying
income tax since 1988 and (ii) his bank passbooks indicate that F
he had sufficient funds. The payment of income tax by itself does
not show that the respondent had sufficient resources to pay for
the suit property. Moreover, the bank passbooks submitted in
evidence by the respondent were for accounts opened after the
expiry of the period written in the contract. The first appellate G
court despite noting this, has chosen to hold that the respondent
was ready and willing to perform the agreement. The respondent
however did not lead any evidence to indicate that in the year
1990 he had the money to pay the balance consideration. The

H
352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 1 S.C.R.

A first appellate court shifted the burden on the appellants to prove
that the respondent-plaintiff was incapable of paying the balance
consideration. It is an established principle of law that the plaintiff
must prove that he is ready and willing to perform the contract.
The burden lies on the plaintiff. The respondent has not led any
evidence that he was ready or willing to perform his obligations
B
under the agreement. [Paras 30, 31][367-D-H; 368-A-C]
Zarina Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam (2015) 1 SCC 705 :
[2014] 14 SCR 456; Satya Jain v. Anis Ahmed Rushdie
(2013) 8 SCC 131 : [2013] 3 SCR 319; KS Vidyanadam
and others v. Vairavan (1997) 3 SCC 1 : [1997] 1 SCR
C 993 – relied on.
Nirmala Anand v. Advent Corporation (P.) Ltd. and
Others (2002) 8 SCC 146 : 2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 706 –
followed.

D 5. Generally speaking, time is not of the essence in an
agreement for the sale of immoveable property. In deciding
whether to grant the remedy of specific performance, specifically
in suits relating to sale of immovable property, the courts must
be cognizant of the conduct of the parties, the escalation of the
price of the suit property, and whether one party will unfairly
E benefit from the decree. The remedy provided must not cause
injustice to a party, specifically when they are not at fault. In the
present case, three decades have passed since the agreement to
sell was entered into between the parties. The price of the suit
property would undoubtedly have escalated. Given the blemished
F conduct of the plaintiff in indicating his willingness to perform
the contract, in any event grant of the remedy of specific
performance of the contract is declined. However, the
consideration together with interest at 6% per annum is ordered
to be refunded. [Para 36][372-A-D]

G Case Law Reference
[2010] 15 SCR 538 relied on Para 14
[1996] 2 Suppl. SCR 111 relied on Para 15
(2020) 3 SCC 311 relied on Para 17
H
SHENBAGAM & ORS. v. KK RATHINAVEL 353

[2018] 6 SCR 667 relied on Para 18 A
[2014] 14 SCR 456 relied on Para 32
[2013] 3 SCR 319 relied on Para 33
[2002] 2 Suppl. SCR 706 followed Para 34
[1997] 1 SCR 993 relied on Para 35 B
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.150 of
2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 07.01.2019 of the High Court
of Judicature at Madras in S.A. No.1438 of 1999.
C
Mrs. V. Mohana, Sr. Adv., B. Ragunath, Mrs. N. C. Kavitha,
Mrs. Ayushma, Vijay Kumar, Advs. for the Appellants.
Siddharth Naidu, V. Balachandran for M/s Ksn & Co., Advs. for
the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by D

DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.
A Factual Background.....................................................3*
B Submissions..............................................................7*
E
C Analysis...................................................................9*
D Conclusion..............................................................26*
A Factual Background
1. The appeal arises from a judgment and order dated 7 January
2019 of a Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Madras. The F
High Court dismissed the second appeal of the appellants, who are
defendants to the suit for specific performance. The High Court
confirmed the decree for specific performance, and affirmed the decision
of the first appellate court against the decree for specific performance.
2. The appellants are owners of a property located at Patta Nos. G
147, 240, 217, Madukkarai Village, Coimbatore Taluk, Coimbatore
measuring about 12.60 acres1. The first appellant and her spouse entered
into an agreement on 7 February 1990 with the respondent by which
Ed. Note - *denotes the actual pagination in the Original Judgment.
1
“suit property” H
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 1 S.C.R.

A they agreed to sell the suit property for a consideration of Rs. 1,25,000.
The respondent paid a sum of Rs. 25,000 as an advance and agreed to
pay the balance within six months, with the stamp duty. On the payment
of the balance, the appellants were required to execute a sale deed
conveying the property, free from all encumbrances. The terms of the
agreement also stipulated that the advance amount would be forfeited in
B
case the appellants failed to complete the sale. Further, in the event the
respondent was ready and willing to complete the sale but the appellants
delayed or refused, the respondent could proceed before the court to get
the sale completed and seek possession of the suit property under the
Specific Relief Act 19632. The suit property was also subject to a mortgage
C of Rs. 6,000 in favour of one Janaki Amma. The respondent-plaintiff
alleged that the appellants had received the advance sum to discharge
the mortgage over the suit property. On the contrary, the appellants alleged
that the respondent was aware of the mortgage over the suit property
and had agreed to discharge the mortgage from the sale consideration.
On 8 March 1990, the appellants received a further sum of Rs. 10,000
D
from the respondent as an advance under the sale agreement.
3. On 19 December 1990, the appellants sent a legal notice to the
respondent calling upon him to pay the balance consideration and perform
his obligations under the agreement to sell. The appellants rescinded the
contract on the ground that the respondent was not ready and willing to
E perform his obligations. In response, the respondent sent a reply dated
26 December 1990 calling upon the appellants to execute the sale free
from encumbrance.
4. In 1991, the respondent instituted a suit3 before the Principal
District Munsif, Coimbatore seeking a permanent injunction restraining
F the appellants from alienating or creating any encumbrance on the suit
property. The respondent obtained an ad interim injunction. In the
meantime, the appellants discharged the mortgage debt.
5. On 17 June 1993, the respondent instituted a suit4 for specific
performance before the Sub-Judge, Coimbatore seeking in the alternative,
G a refund of the advance of Rs. 35,000 with interest at 24% per annum
from the date of the suit till realization.
6. By its judgment dated 11 October 1996, the trial court decreed
the
2 suit in favour of the respondent and directed the respondent to deposit
“Specific Relief Act”
3
O.S No. 615 of 1991
H 4
O.S No. 850 of 1993
SHENBAGAM & ORS. v. KK RATHINAVEL 355
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

the balance consideration of Rs. 90,000 within a month. The appellants A
were directed to receive this amount and execute the sale deed in favour
of the respondent within a period of three months. The trial court held
that:
(i) The appellants had discharged the mortgage debt only on
17 June 1992, after which the respondent-plaintiff could B
get the sale deed executed; and
(ii) The suit was filed within three years from the date of
discharge of the mortgage and was not barred by limitation.
7. The appellant preferred an appeal5 against the order of the trial
court before the Principal District Judge, Coimbatore, which was C
dismissed by a judgment dated 24 February 1998. Following this, the
appellant filed a second appeal6 before the Madras High Court. While
the appeal was pending, the respondent moved an application to withdraw
the balance consideration of Rs. 90,000 which was deposited before the
trial court. The application was allowed by the High Court on 24 July D
2001. In the meantime, the spouse of the appellant passed away and his
legal heirs were substituted on record.
8. The Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the second appeal
and upheld the judgment of the trial court and the first appellate court.
The High Court held that: E
(i) The agreement to sell provides that the discharge of the
mortgage by the appellants was a condition precedent for
the completion of the sale transaction. Since the appellants
took no steps to discharge the mortgage, it cannot be
accepted that the respondent-plaintiff was not ready and F
willing to perform his part of the contract;
(ii) There is no clause in the agreement to sell that indicates
that time was of the essence to the contract. If time was of
the essence, then the appellants would have discharged the
mortgage before the expiry of the term mentioned in the
G
agreement;
(iii) The trial court did consider the bank passbook and income
tax returns of the respondent-plaintiff and rightly concluded
5
A.S No. 67 of 1997
6
Second Appeal No. 1438 of 1999 H
356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 1 S.C.R.

A that he was ready and willing to perform the agreement
and had sufficient resources to purchase the property;
(iv) The plea that the suit was barred by Order II Rule 2 of the
Code of Civil Procedure 19087 had not been raised in the
written statement and could not be taken for the first time
B in the second appeal; and
(v) The withdrawal of the balance of the sale consideration by
the respondent cannot disentitle him to the reliefs sought as
it was pursuant to an order of the High Court, after taking
into account that the amount in deposit was not earning any
C interest.
9. Against the judgment and order of the High Court, the appellants
filed a Special Leave Petition before this Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution.
B Submissions
D
10. Ms V Mohana, Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellants urged the following submissions:
(i) The trial court failed to frame an issue on whether the
respondent-plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his
part of the agreement to sell;
E
(ii) The trial court failed to consider any evidence or reach any
finding as to whether the respondent was ready to perform
the contract and merely noted that he had sufficient means
to purchase the suit property;
F (iii) After the legal notice was served on the respondent by the
appellant, the respondent filed a suit for permanent injunction
and not a suit for specific performance. This indicates that
he was not ready to perform the contract;
(iv) The finding that the respondent was ready to perform the
G contract as he had sufficient means to purchase the property
is erroneous as the passbooks produced by the respondent
were for the accounts opened on 11 March 1992 and 22
July 1994. Thus, the accounts were not contemporary to
the period of the contract;
7
H “CPC”
SHENBAGAM & ORS. v. KK RATHINAVEL 357
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

(v) Merely because the respondent was paying income tax since A
1988 does not indicate his willingness to perform the contract;
(vi) The respondent filed the suit for specific performance on
17 June 1993 and the remaining consideration of Rs. 90,000
was deposited on 15 November 1996. This amount was
then withdrawn in 2001. Thus, the conduct of the respondent B
does not indicate that he was ready and willing to perform
the contract;
(vii) Until the appellants issued a notice to the respondent
informing him about the rescission of the contract, there
was no communication from the respondent to seek C
performance of the agreement by the appellants. Thus,
merely filing a suit three years after the agreement does
not prove the readiness and willingness of the respondent;
(viii) The jurisdiction of courts under Section 20 of the Specific
Relief Act is discretionary and should not be exercised in D
the present case as the appellants would be dispossessed
of the suit property for a meagre sum that was arrived at
thirty years ago;
(ix) Clearing the mortgage over the property was not a condition
precedent of the agreement. In fact, the clause in the E
agreement stipulates that it was only on receipt of the
balance consideration that the appellants would be required
to execute the sale deed free from all encumbrances;
(x) The agreement clearly notes that the balance consideration
is to be paid within a period of six months. Thus, time was F
of essence of the agreement; and
(xi) The respondent’s suit for specific performance is barred
by Order II Rule 2 of the CPC as he had filed a suit for
permanent injunction in 1991 and relinquished his right to
seek the relief of specific performance.
G
11. Opposing these submissions, Mr Siddharth Naidu, counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondents, submitted that:
(i) The respondent-plaintiff in his reply dated 26 December
1990 specifically stated that he was ready and willing to
H
358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 1 S.C.R.

A pay the balance consideration and get the sale deed
executed, provided the mortgage is discharged;
(ii) The terms of the contract and the conduct of the parties
made it clear that time was not of the essence of the contract;
(iii) Under the agreement, it was the obligation of the appellants
B to discharge the mortgage, after which the respondent was
to pay the balance consideration. The appellants discharged
the mortgage on 17 June 1992, and thereafter, the respondent
filed a suit for specific performance of contract;
(iv) The respondent deposited the balance consideration before
C the trial court which was withdrawn in 2001 pursuant to
order of the High Court dated 24 July 2001; and
(v) The respondent had sufficient means to purchase the suit
property and was ready and willing to perform his part of
the contract.
D 12. We shall now consider the rival submissions.
C Analysis
13. The present appeal involves a suit for specific performance
of an agreement to sell the suit property between the appellants and
E respondent. The core of the dispute arising from the suit seeking the
relief of specific performance under the Specific Relief Act is whether
the respondent-plaintiff has performed or has always been ‘ready and
willing’ to perform his obligations under the contract.
14. Section 168 of the Specific Relief Act provides certain bars to
the relief of specific performance. These include, inter alia, a person
F
who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been
‘ready and willing’ to perform the essential terms of the contract which
8
“16. Personal bars to relief.- Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced
in favour of a person— [(a) who has obtained substituted performance of contract
under section 20; or]
G (b) who has become incapable of performing, or violates any essential term of, the
contract that on his part remains to be performed, or acts in fraud of the contract, or
wilfully acts at variance with, or in subversion of, the relation intended to be established
by the contract; or
(c) [who fails to prove] that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to
perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other
H than terms of the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant.
SHENBAGAM & ORS. v. KK RATHINAVEL 359
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which A
has been prevented and waived by the defendant. In JP Builders v. A
Ramadas Rao9, a two-judge Bench of this Court observed that Section
16(c) mandates ‘readiness and willingness’ of the plaintiff and is a
condition precedent to obtain the relief of specific performance. The
Court held:
B
“25. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 mandates
“readiness and willingness” on the part of the plaintiff and it is a
condition precedent for obtaining relief of grant of specific
performance. It is also clear that in a suit for specific
performance, the plaintiff must allege and prove a
continuous “readiness and willingness” to perform the C
contract on his part from the date of the contract. The onus
is on the plaintiff.
[…]
27. It is settled law that even in the absence of specific plea by D
the opposite party, it is the mandate of the statute that the
plaintiff has to comply with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief
Act and when there is non-compliance with this statutory
mandate, the court is not bound to grant specific
performance and is left with no other alternative but to
dismiss the suit. It is also clear that readiness to perform E
must be established throughout the relevant points of time.
“Readiness and willingness” to perform the part of the contract
has to be determined/ascertained from the conduct of the parties.”
(emphasis supplied)
F
The Court further observed that ‘readiness’ refers to the financial
capacity and ‘willingness’ refers to the conduct of the plaintiff wanting
the performance.

G
Explanation.—For the purposes of clause (c),—
(i) where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential for the plaintiff
to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in court any money except when so
directed by the court; (ii) the plaintiff [must prove] performance of, or readiness and
willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction.”
9
(2011) 1 SCC 429 H
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 1 S.C.R.

A 15. Similarly, in His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji
v. Sita Ram Thapar10, a two-judge Bench of this Court observed that
‘readiness’ means the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract
which would include the financial position to pay the purchase price. To
ascertain ‘willingness’, the conduct of the plaintiff has to be properly
scrutinised. The Court noted:
B
“2. There is a distinction between readiness to perform the contract
and willingness to perform the contract. By readiness may be
meant the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which
includes his financial position to pay the purchase price. For
determining his willingness to perform his part of the contract, the
C
conduct has to be properly scrutinised. […] The factum of
readiness and willingness to perform the plaintiff’s part of
the contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct
of the party and the attending circumstances. The court
may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the
D plaintiff was ready and was always ready and willing to
perform his part of the contract. The facts of this case would
amply demonstrate that the petitioner/plaintiff was not ready nor
had the capacity to perform his part of the contract as he had no
financial capacity to pay the consideration in cash as contracted
and intended to bide for the time which disentitles him as time is
E
of the essence of the contract.”
(emphasis supplied)
16. The precedents of this Court indicate that the plaintiff must
establish that he was ‘ready and willing’ to perform the contract. In this
F regard, the conduct of the plaintiff must be consistent.
17. In another decision in Atma Ram v. Charanjit Singh11, a
two-judge Bench of this Court dealt with a case where an agreement
for sale of immovable property was entered into between the petitioner
and respondent. The date for performance of the contract was fixed as
G 7 October 1996. A legal notice was issued by the petitioner on 12
November 1996 seeking performance of the contract by the respondent,
and thereafter a suit was filed. The plaintiff sought a mandatory injunction

10
(1996) 4 SCC 526
H 11
(2020) 3 SCC 311
SHENBAGAM & ORS. v. KK RATHINAVEL 361
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

to direct the respondent to execute documents for transfer of the property. A
However, the trial court chose to treat it as a suit for specific performance
of the contract. In declining the relief of specific performance, the Court
observed:
“9. Coming to the second aspect revolving around Section 16(c),
a look at the judgment of the trial court would show that no B
issue was framed on the question of readiness and
willingness on the part of the petitioner-plaintiff in terms of
Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The fact that
the petitioner chose to issue a legal notice dated 12-11-1996 and
the fact that the petitioner created an alibi in the form of an affidavit
executed before the Sub-Registrar on 7-10-1996 (marked as Ext. C
P-2) to show that he was present before the Sub-Registrar for
the purpose of completion of the transaction, within the time
stipulated for its performance, was not sufficient to conclude that
the petitioner continued to be ready and willing even after three
years, on 13-10-1999 when the plaint was presented. No D
explanation was forthcoming from the petitioner for the long
delay of three years, in filing the suit (on 13-10-1999) after
issuing a legal notice on 12-11-1996. The conduct of a
plaintiff is very crucial in a suit for specific performance. A
person who issues a legal notice on 12-11-1996 claiming
readiness and willingness, but who institutes a suit only on E
13-10-1999 and that too only with a prayer for a mandatory
injunction carrying a fixed court fee relatable only to the
said relief, will not be entitled to the discretionary relief of
specific performance.”
(emphasis supplied) F
In assessing the conduct of the plaintiff, the Court in Atma Ram
(supra) observed that the delay in filing a suit, specifically one for
mandatory injunction, indicates the inconsistent behaviour of the plaintiff.
The failure of the trial court to frame an issue relating to the readiness
and willingness of the plaintiff to perform the contract is also critical in G
declining the remedy of specific performance.
18. This Court in P Meenakshisundaram v. P Vijayakumar12,
dealt with a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale of an

12
(2018) 15 SCC 80 H
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 1 S.C.R.

A immovable property, which had a mortgage over it. In evaluating whether
the respondent-plaintiff had established that he was ‘ready and willing’
to perform the contract, the two-judge Bench, held:
“8. As regards suit for specific performance, the law is very
clear that the plaintiff must plead and prove his readiness
B and willingness to perform his part of the contract all through
i.e. right from the date of the contract till the date of hearing
of the suit. If Respondent 1 was well aware about the
encumbrance and the parties had chosen that the balance
consideration be paid to the appellant before 20-3-2001 so
that the sale deed could be registered without any
C encumbrance, it was for Respondent 1 to have taken
appropriate steps in that behalf for completion of
transaction. The facts on record disclose that the first step taken
by Respondent 1 after the suit agreement was well after four
months, when further amount of Rs 2 lakhs was paid on 21-1-
D 2001. Thereafter nothing was done till 20-3-2001 by which the
transaction had to be completed. The record is completely silent
about any communication sent around 20-3-2001 towards
completion of transaction. As a matter of fact the first step
thereafter was six months after the deadline, namely, on 22-9-
2001 when the communication (Ext. A-6) was sent along with
E amount of Rs 10 lakhs. The written submissions filed on behalf of
Respondent 1 also do not indicate any steps till this time so as to
say that he was all the while ready and willing to complete the
transaction.
9. The assertion made by Respondent 1 in Para 7 of the plaint is
F a mere assertion without any relevant details as to what exactly
he had done towards fulfilment of his obligations and completion
of the transaction.”
(emphasis supplied)

G In P.Meenakshisundaram (supra), the Court dealt with a similar
case in which the suit property was encumbered and the sale deed, free
from encumbrances, had to be executed after payment of the
consideration. The Court noted that there was no communication of the
plaintiff with the defendant till the date on which the transaction was to
be completed, showing his lack of willingness to perform the contract.
H
SHENBAGAM & ORS. v. KK RATHINAVEL 363
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

19. In the present case, the respondent and the appellants entered A
into an agreement to sell the suit property on 7 February 1990. The
relevant terms of the agreement are reproduced below:
“Whereas the SELLERS agreed to sell the property to the
PURCHASER for a sale consideration of Rs. 1,25,000/- (Rupees
One lakh and twenty five thousand only) and the PURCHASER B
also agreed to purchase the same.
Now this agreement witnesseth as follows:
The PURCHASER has paid a sum of Rs. 25,000/- as advance,
the receipt of which sum the SELLERS acknowledge
The PURCHASER agreed to pay the remaining sale consideration C
within a period of six months from this day of agreement to the
SELLERS and to bear the cost of stamp duty. On receipt of the
balance sale consideration, the SELLERS agreed to execute sale
deed pertaining to the property free from all encumbrances to the
PURCHASER or to his nominee.
D
If the SELLERS fail to complete the Sale, the advance amount
shall be forfeited.
If the PURCHASER is ready and willing to complete the Sale
and the SELLERS refuse or delay to execute Sale, the
PURCHASER is at liberty to proceed before the Court of law
and to get the sale completed and to get possession of the property E
through Court under the Specific Relief Act., holding the SELLERS
liable for the loss.”
Further, on 8 March 1990, the appellants issued a receipt for an
additional sum of Rs. 10,000 as advance from the respondent:
“On this day of 8th March 1990 we received a sum of F
Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten thousand only) from you in the presence
of the witnesses for our urgent family expenses in addition to the
advance amount received under the sale agreement dated
07.02.1990.”
20. The terms of the agreement indicate that the suit property G
was to be sold for a total consideration of Rs. 1,25,000, out of which the
appellants had received Rs. 25,000 as advance. On 8 March 1990, a
further sum of Rs. 10,000 was given as advance to the appellants “for
[their] urgent family expenses”. The agreement stipulated that the
respondent shall pay the balance consideration within a period of six
months, that is, by 7 August 1990 and shall bear the cost of stamp duty. H
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 1 S.C.R.

A On receipt of the balance sale consideration, the appellants were required
to execute the sale deed free from all encumbrances.
21. By 19 December 1990, the respondent did not pay the balance
consideration to the appellant and thus, the appellant rescinded the contract
and forfeited the advance money. The respondent sent a reply dated 26
B December 1990 demanding that the appellants execute the sale deed
free from encumbrances. The appellants alleged that there was a
mortgage of Rs. 6,000 on the suit property that the respondent agreed to
discharge from the sale consideration. However, the respondent did not
show any interest in getting the sale deed executed. In 1991, the
respondent filed a suit for mandatory injunction. On 17 June 1992, the
C appellant discharged the mortgage debt, and a year after that the
respondent instituted a suit for specific performance.
22. In the plaint, the respondent claimed that it was agreed between
the parties that the appellants should clear the title to the suit property
and execute the sale deed. The respondent further alleged that for this
D reason he had paid an additional amount of Rs. 10,000 on 8 March 1990.
In order to demonstrate his readiness and willingness to perform the
contract, the respondent alleged that:
(i) He was waiting with the balance consideration and believed
that the appellants would clear the encumbrance and
E produce all necessary documents;
(ii) He replied to their legal notice demanding the discharge of
the mortgage over the suit property;
(iii) After filing a suit for mandatory injunction, the respondent
approached the appellants and requested them to perform
F their obligations under the contract; and
(iv) He instituted a suit for specific performance when he
became aware of the discharge of mortgage by the
appellants.

G 23. The trial court decreed the suit for specific performance in
favour of the respondent. The trial court only framed the following two
issues:
“1. Whether the plaintiff [is entitled] for the relief of specific
performance?
H 2. To what other reliefs?”
SHENBAGAM & ORS. v. KK RATHINAVEL 365
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

24. No issue on readiness and willingness was framed by the trial A
court. The trial court analysed the notice issued by the appellants and
held that the appellants made no demand from the respondent to discharge
the mortgage liability. Thus, the appellants’ plea that the respondent-
plaintiff had to pay the loan and only thereafter, could the appellants
execute the sale deed was rejected. The court also accepted the
B
respondent’s argument that the advance amount of Rs. 10,000 was paid
to discharge the mortgage. Further, the trial court observed that the
documents submitted by the respondent indicate that he had sufficient
means to purchase the suit property. The judgment of the trial court was
upheld by the first appellate court and, in a second appeal, by the High
Court. C
25. All the three courts, including the High Court, grossly erred in
the manner in which they have adjudicated upon this dispute in a suit for
specific performance. In the first instance, the trial court failed to frame
an issue on whether the respondent-plaintiff was ready and willing to
perform his obligations under the contract and instead assessed whether D
he is entitled to the relief of specific performance. In doing so, the trial
court viewed the legal issue from an incorrect lens. The foundation of a
suit for specific performance lies in ascertaining whether the plaintiff
has come to the court with clean hands and has, through his conduct,
demonstrated that he has always been willing to perform the contract.
There is a conspicuous absence in judgment of the trial court of any E
reference to evidence led by the respondent to indicate his willingness to
perform the contract. The trial court merely adverted to “document
produced on behalf of the plaintiff” and concluded that he had sufficient
means to purchase the suit property. Apart from this observation, the
judgment fails to analyse the terms of the agreement, the obligations of F
the parties and the conduct of the respondent or the appellant.
26. In evaluating whether the respondent was ready and willing
to perform his obligations under the contract, it is not only necessary to
view whether he had the financial capacity to pay the balance
consideration, but also assess his conduct throughout the transaction. G
27. The respondent has alleged that he did not pay the balance
consideration as the appellants failed to remove the encumbrance on the
suit property. First of all, we note that the agreement to sell the suit
property did not specifically record the mortgage over the suit property.
However, neither has the appellant denied the existence of the mortgage H
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 1 S.C.R.

A nor has the respondent claimed that he was unaware of the encumbrance
over the suit property at the time of entering into the agreement. The
agreement did not expressly detail whose liability it is to discharge the
mortgage.
28. Having said that, the terms of the agreement stipulated that
B the respondent was to pay the balance consideration within a period of
six months and “on receipt of the balance consideration”, the
appellants were to execute the sale deed “pertaining to the property
free from all encumbrances”. It is evident from the agreement that the
liability to deliver the property free from any encumbrance was on the
appellants. However, this obligation is prefaced by the condition that the
C appellants would be required to execute the sale deed free from
encumbrance on the receipt of the balance consideration. Thus, the
agreement did not specify when the appellants should discharge their
mortgage- before the expiry of six months, after receipt of the advance
amount, or after receipt of the balance consideration. It only obligated
D them to ensure that after the balance consideration is received, the sale
deed executed should be free from encumbrances. Based on a plain
reading of the agreement, we are unable to accept the respondent’s plea
that he was willing to perform his obligations under the contract. It is
evident that he was required to pay the remaining consideration (or
indicate his willingness to pay) and only then could have sought specific
E performance of the contract. The respondent has also urged that the
additional amount of Rs. 10,000 was paid to the appellants to discharge
the mortgage. The acknowledgment signed by the appellants indicates
that the money was to meet urgent family expenses. Since no further
details have been provided and no evidence has been adduced by the
F respondent-plaintiff, we cannot conclude that the money was for discharge
of the mortgage. Even assuming that the respondent is correct, the
agreement still required the respondent to pay the balance consideration.
In this regard, the High Court, while holding in favour of the respondent,
has noted that the appellants were free to demand a further amount for
discharging the mortgage. This finding ignores the plain terms of the
G contract. The agreement clearly provided that the balance consideration
would be paid and then the sale deed would be executed. How the
appellants chose to discharge the mortgage was for them to decide. The
respondent had to prove his readiness and willingness to perform the
contract.
H
SHENBAGAM & ORS. v. KK RATHINAVEL 367
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

29. We shall now advert to the respondent’s conduct throughout A
the sale transaction. The respondent has failed to provide any documents
or communication which would indicate that he called upon the appellants
to perform their obligations or discharge the mortgage within the time
period stipulated in the contract. Even after the expiry of the six months,
the respondent did not reach out to the appellants. It is only in response
B
to the appellants’ legal notice that the respondent demanded performance
of their obligations. Merely averring that he was waiting with the balance
consideration and believed that the appellants would clear the
encumbrance is insufficient to prove that the respondent-plaintiff was
willing to perform his obligations under the contract.
30. Further, in 1991 the respondent instituted a suit for mandatory C
injunction for restraining the appellants from alienating the suit property.
He did not however, institute a suit for specific performance of the
contract until 17 June 1993. The respondent has taken the plea that he
was waiting for the appellants to discharge the mortgage to file a suit for
specific performance. We are unable to accept this submission. By D
extending the respondent’s argument, if the appellants had failed to
discharge the mortgage, the respondent would not have filed a suit for
specific performance of the contract at all. We also note that the
respondent has withdrawn the balance consideration deposited by him
before the trial court in 2001. The inconsistency in the respondent’s
conduct, the lack of communication with the appellants urging them to E
discharge the mortgage and showing his willingness to pay the balance
consideration, and the delay of about three years from the date fixed for
performance of the contract in filing a suit, are all indicative of the
respondent’s lack of will to perform the contract.
31. The ‘readiness’ of the respondent to perform his obligations F
refers to whether he was financially capable of paying the balance
consideration. Both the trial court and the first appellate court have
observed that the respondent was ready to pay the balance consideration
as (i) he was paying income tax since 1988 and (ii) his bank passbooks
indicate that he had sufficient funds. The payment of income tax by G
itself does not show that the respondent had sufficient resources to pay
for the suit property. Moreover, the bank passbooks submitted in evidence
by the respondent were for accounts opened on 11 March 1992 and 22
July 1994, that is, after the expiry of the period written in the contract.
The first appellate court despite noting this, has chosen to hold that the
H
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 1 S.C.R.

A respondent was ready and willing to perform the agreement. The
respondent however did not lead any evidence to indicate that in the
year 1990 he had the money to pay the balance consideration. The first
appellate court shifted the burden on the appellants to prove that the
respondent-plaintiff was incapable of paying the balance consideration.
It is an established principle of law that the plaintiff must prove that he is
B
ready and willing to perform the contract. The burden lies on the plaintiff.
The respondent has not led any evidence that he was ready or willing to
perform his obligations under the agreement.
32. Even assuming that the respondent was willing to perform his
obligations under the contract, we must decide whether it would be
C appropriate to direct the specific performance of the contract in this
case. In Zarina Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam13, a two-judge Bench of
this Court while dealing with a suit for specific performance of a contract
regarding the sale of immovable property observed that the remedy for
specific performance is an equitable remedy and Section 20 of the Specific
D Relief Act confers a discretion on the Court. The Court held:
“24. It is well settled that remedy for specific performance is an
equitable remedy. The court while granting decree of specific
performance exercises its discretionary jurisdiction. Section 20 of
the Specific Relief Act specifically provides that the Court’s
E discretion to grant decree of specific performance is discretionary
but not arbitrary. Discretion must be exercised in accordance with
sound and reasonable judicial principles.”
33. In the context of the discretion under Section 20 of the Specific
Relief Act, several decisions of this Court have considered whether it is
F appropriate to direct specific performance of a contract relating to the
transfer of immovable property, especially given the efflux of time and
the escalation of prices of property. In Satya Jain v. Anis Ahmed
Rushdie14, this Court held:
“39. The long efflux of time (over 40 years) that has
G occurred and the galloping value of real estate in the
meantime are the twin inhibiting factors in this regard. The
same, however, have to be balanced with the fact that the plaintiffs
are in no way responsible for the delay that has occurred and

13
(2015) 1 SCC 705
14
H (2013) 8 SCC 131
SHENBAGAM & ORS. v. KK RATHINAVEL 369
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

their keen participation in the proceedings till date show the live A
interest on the part of the plaintiffs to have the agreement enforced
in law.
40. The discretion to direct specific performance of an
agreement and that too after elapse of a long period of time,
undoubtedly, has to be exercised on sound, reasonable, B
rational and acceptable principles. The parameters for the
exercise of discretion vested by Section 20 of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963 cannot be entrapped within any precise
expression of language and the contours thereof will always
depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The
ultimate guiding test would be the principles of fairness and C
reasonableness as may be dictated by the peculiar facts of any
given case, which features the experienced judicial mind can
perceive without any real difficulty. It must however be emphasised
that efflux of time and escalation of price of property, by itself,
cannot be a valid ground to deny the relief of specific performance. D
[…]
41. The twin inhibiting factors identified above if are to be read as
a bar to the grant of a decree of specific performance would
amount to penalising the plaintiffs for no fault on their part; to
deny them the real fruits of a protracted litigation wherein the E
issues arising are being answered in their favour.”
(emphasis supplied)
In directing specific performance of the agreement, this Court in
Satya Jain (supra) held that sale deed must be executed for the current
market price of the suit property. F
34. In Nirmala Anand v. Advent Corporation (P.) Ltd. and
Others15, a three-judge Bench of this Court observed that in case of a
phenomenal increase in the price of the land, the Court may impose a
reasonable condition in the decree such as payment of an additional
amount by the purchaser. In decreeing the suit for specific performance, G
the Court observed:
“6. It is true that grant of decree of specific performance lies in
the discretion of the court and it is also well settled that it is not

15
(2002) 8 SCC 146 H
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 1 S.C.R.

A always necessary to grant specific performance simply for the
reason that it is legal to do so. It is further well settled that the
court in its discretion can impose any reasonable condition including
payment of an additional amount by one party to the other while
granting or refusing decree of specific performance. Whether
the purchaser shall be directed to pay an additional amount to the
B
seller or converse would depend upon the facts and circumstances
of a case. Ordinarily, the plaintiff is not to be denied the relief of
specific performance only on account of the phenomenal increase
of price during the pendency of litigation. That may be, in a given
case, one of the considerations besides many others to be taken
C into consideration for refusing the decree of specific performance.
As a general rule, it cannot be held that ordinarily the plaintiff
cannot be allowed to have, for her alone, the entire benefit of
phenomenal increase of the value of the property during the
pendency of the litigation. While balancing the equities, one
of the considerations to be kept in view is as to who is the
D
defaulting party. It is also to be borne in mind whether a
party is trying to take undue advantage over the other as
also the hardship that may be caused to the defendant by
directing specific performance. There may be other
circumstances on which parties may not have any control.
E The totality of the circumstances is required to be seen.”
(emphasis supplied)
35. In KS Vidyanadam and others v. Vairavan16, an agreement
to sell immovable property was entered into between the plaintiff-buyer
and the defendant-seller for a consideration of Rs. 60,000, where earnest
F money of Rs. 5,000 had been paid in advance. The agreement stipulated
that the plaintiff had to purchase stamp papers and pay the balance
amount within six months and call upon the defendants to execute the
sale deed. The plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance after a lapse
of two and a half years seeking performance of the contract. The Court
G held:
“10. It has been consistently held by the courts in India, following
certain early English decisions, that in the case of agreement of
sale relating to immovable property, time is not of the essence of
the contract unless specifically provided to that effect. The period
H 16
(1997) 3 SCC 1
SHENBAGAM & ORS. v. KK RATHINAVEL 371
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act for filing a suit is A
three years. From these two circumstances, it does not follow
that any and every suit for specific performance of the
agreement (which does not provide specifically that time is
of the essence of the contract) should be decreed provided
it is filed within the period of limitation notwithstanding the
B
time-limits stipulated in the agreement for doing one or
the other thing by one or the other party. That would amount
to saying that the time-limits prescribed by the parties in the
agreement have no significance or value and that they mean
nothing.
[…] C

In this case, the suit property is the house property situated in
Madurai, which is one of the major cities of Tamil Nadu. The suit
agreement was in December 1978 and the six months’ period
specified therein for completing the sale expired with 15-6-1979.
The suit notice was issued by the plaintiff only on 11-7-1981, i.e., D
more than two years after the expiry of six months’ period. The
question is what was the plaintiff doing in this interval of more
than two years? […] There is not a single letter or notice
from the plaintiff to the defendants calling upon them to
get the tenant vacated and get the sale deed executed until E
he issued the suit notice on 11-7-1981. It is not the plaintiff’s
case that within six months’, he purchased the stamp papers and
offered to pay the balance consideration.
[…]
13. In the case before us, it is not mere delay. It is a case of F
total inaction on the part of the plaintiff for 2 1/2 years in
clear violation of the terms of agreement which required
him to pay the balance, purchase the stamp papers and then
ask for execution of sale deed within six months. Further,
the delay is coupled with substantial rise in prices — G
according to the defendants, three times — between the
date of agreement and the date of suit notice. The delay
has brought about a situation where it would be inequitable
to give the relief of specific performance to the plaintiff.”
(emphasis supplied)
H
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 1 S.C.R.

A 36. True enough, generally speaking, time is not of the essence in
an agreement for the sale of immoveable property. In deciding whether
to grant the remedy of specific performance, specifically in suits relating
to sale of immovable property, the courts must be cognizant of the conduct
of the parties, the escalation of the price of the suit property, and whether
one party will unfairly benefit from the decree. The remedy provided
B
must not cause injustice to a party, specifically when they are not at
fault. In the present case, three decades have passed since the agreement
to sell was entered into between the parties. The price of the suit property
would undoubtedly have escalated. Given the blemished conduct of the
respondent-plaintiff in indicating his willingness to perform the contract,
C we decline in any event to grant the remedy of specific performance of
the contract. However, we order a refund of the consideration together
with interest at 6% per annum.
D Conclusion
37. For the above reasons, we allow the appeal and set aside the
D judgment dated 7 January 2019 of the High Court of Judicature at
Madras. The appellants are directed to refund the advance amount of
Rs. 35,000/- received from the respondent with interest at the rate of
6% per annum from the date of the filing of the suit for specific
performance by the respondent, till the payment of the refund.
E 38. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

Devika Gujral Appeal allowed.

F

G

H