Supreme Court of India
SHAURABH KUMAR TRIPATHIversusVIDHI RAWAL
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 734
- Decided
- 18 May 2025
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- ABHAY S OKA
Holding
High Courts may exercise their inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC (or Section 528 of the BNSS) to quash proceedings arising from an application under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005, but only where there is gross illegality or abuse of process.
Summary
The appellants, relatives of the respondent Vidhi Rawal, sought to quash a domestic‑violence application filed by the respondent under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, by invoking the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (and Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023). The High Court had dismissed the quash petitions, holding that proceedings under Section 12 are civil in nature and not amenable to Section 482. The Supreme Court examined the nature of Section 12 proceedings, the statutory scheme of the DV Act, and the scope of the High Court's power to prevent abuse of process. It held that while the proceedings are predominantly civil, the High Court may still exercise its inherent jurisdiction under the second limb of Section 482 (or Section 528 BNSS) to quash them, but only in cases of gross illegality or injustice. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, restored the quash petitions to the High Court's file, and directed fresh consideration with appropriate caution.
Issues considered
- Whether the High Court can invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Section 528 of the BNSS to quash proceedings initiated under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005.
- Whether proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act are civil in nature and thus outside the ambit of Section 482.
- Scope and limits of the High Court's power to interfere with DV Act proceedings under its inherent jurisdiction.
Legislation cited
- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023s. 223, s. 528
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 200, s. 204, s. 29, s. 482
- Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005s. 12, s. 18, s. 19, s. 20, s. 21, s. 22, s. 23, s. 26, s. 27, s. 28, s. 31, s. 33
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court can invoke its inherent jurisdiction u/s.482, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 or s.528, Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 to quash proceedings initiated u/s.12, Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. Headnotes† Criminal Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – s.528 – Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) – s.12 – Exercise of power of High Court u/s.482, CrPC (s.528, BNSS) to quash proceedings u/s.12, DV Act – Permissibility: Held: High Courts can exercise power u/s.482,
Subjects
inherent jurisdictionsection 482section 528section 12domestic violence actquashing of proceedingscivil nature of DV proceedingshigh court powermagistrate jurisdictionprotective orders
Judgment
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 545 : 2025 INSC 734
Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi
v.
Vidhi Rawal
(Criminal Appeal No. 2688 of 2025)
19 May 2025
[Abhay S. Oka* and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court can invoke its inherent jurisdiction u/s.482,
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 or s.528, Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 to quash proceedings initiated u/s.12,
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
Headnotes†
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – s.482 – Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – s.528 – Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) – s.12 – Exercise of
power of High Court u/s.482, CrPC (s.528, BNSS) to quash
proceedings u/s.12, DV Act – Permissibility:
Held: High Courts can exercise power u/s.482, CrPC (s.528,
BNSS) for quashing the proceedings initiated u/s.12(1) of the DV
Act, 2005, pending before the Court of the Magistrate – However,
considering the object of the DV Act, 2005, the High Courts
should exercise caution and circumspection when dealing with an
application u/s.12(1) – Normally, interference u/s.482 is warranted
only in the case of gross illegality or injustice – View taken in the
impugned order of the High Court that a petition u/s.482, CrPC
for challenging the proceedings emanating from s.12(1), DV Act,
2005 is not maintainable, is not the correct view – Order passed
by High Court quashed – Petitions filed by the appellants u/s.482,
CrPC to quash the application u/s.12, DV Act restored to the file
of the High Court. [Para 39]
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV
Act) – ss.12, 28 – Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – s.200 –
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – s.223 – Scheme
of s.12 vis-a-vis s.200, CrPC or s.223, BNSS. [Paras 18, 21]
* Author
546 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV
Act) – s.12 – Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – s.482 – Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – s.528 – Nature of proceedings
u/s.12 – Quashing of proceedings u/s.12:
Held: Notwithstanding the penal provisions in the form of ss.31
and 33 of Chapter V, the proceedings before the Magistrate under
the DV Act are predominantly of a civil nature – Decisions of the
High Courts taking a view that the jurisdiction u/s.482, CrPC is
not available to quash proceedings of an application u/s.12(1), DV
Ac are primarily based on the premise that proceedings u/s.12(1)
are predominantly of a civil nature – Said view is not correct.
[Paras 28.1, 37]
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – s.482 – Protection of Women
from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) – s.12 – Two parts
of s.482 – Which part is applicable to proceedings u/s.12, DV
Act – Discussed. [Paras 31, 32]
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV
Act) – Object of – Discussed. [Para 12]
Case Law Cited
Kunapareddy alias Nookala Shanka Balaji v. Kunapareddy Swarna
Kumari and Another [2016] 2 SCR 608 : (2016) 11 SCC 774;
Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi [2022] 5 SCR 970 : (2022) 8
SCC 90 – referred to.
Devendra Agarwal and 3 Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
Another; Nandkishor Pralhad Vyawahare v. Mangala, Application
u/s 482 NO. -18994 OF 2024; Ram Lotan Vishwakarma and Ors. v.
State of U.P and Anr. 2025 AHC-LKO 7572 – referred to.
List of Acts
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023; Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
List of Keywords
Inherent jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482, Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 or Section 528, Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023; Quashing of proceedings initiated under Section
12, Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV
Act, 2005); Object of the DV Act, 2005.
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 547
Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
2688 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 09.05.2024 of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh at Indore in MCRC No. 52308 of 2022
With
Criminal Appeal No. 2689 of 2025
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Vinay Navare, Sr. Adv., Kuldeep Rai, Sandeep Chawla, Ranjan
Nikhil Dharnidhar, Karan Kapoor, Manik Kapoor, Ms. Srishti Singla,
Shrey Kapoor.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Anurag Tandon, Pankaj Thakkar, Manan Shah, Ms. Baani Khanna,
Robin Singh, Kapil Balwani, Ms. Tejal Nagauri, Ranjeet Singh
Chauhan, Yogesh Yadav, Ritesh Patil, Surya Pratap Deva.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Abhay S. Oka, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The main question involved in the appeals is whether the High Court
can invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 (for short, ‘the CrPC’) or Section 528 of the
Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, ‘the BNSS’) to
quash proceedings initiated under Section 12 of the Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short ‘the DV Act,
2005’).
FACTUAL ASPECTS
3. The two connected appeals involve a challenge to the common order
passed by the High Court rejecting the appellants’ prayer to quash
proceedings initiated under Section 12(1) of the DV Act, 2005. The
548 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
appellant in the Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP(Crl) 9493 of 2024,
Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi, is the respondent’s brother-in-law whereas
the appellants in the Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP(Crl) 13896
of 2024, Prateek Tripathi, Vivekanand Tiwari and Mira Tiwari, are the
respondent’s husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law respectively.
Prateek Tripathi married the Respondent, Vidhi Rawal, on 12th
December 2019 as per Hindu rites and rituals at Dewas. After two
years of marriage, on 8th December 2021, the respondent made a
complaint to the Station House Officer at the Police Station Women
Consultancy Centre, Dewas, against Prateek Tripathi, and Vivekanand
Tiwari alleging that dowry was demanded by them. On 7th January
2022, the respondent lodged FIR No.3 of 2022 at P.S Mahila Thana,
Dewas under Section 498A, 504, 506 and 34 of the IPC against the
appellants alleging mental and physical harassment on account of
non-payment of dowry. The respondent claimed that on her return
from work in Johannesburg, South Africa, the appellants tortured her,
demanding a sum of Rs. 20 Lakh cash and a top model SUV car.
4. Aggrieved by the threats, the respondent on 2nd March 2022 filed
an application against the appellants bearing MJCR No. 215/2022,
before the District and Sessions Judge, Dewas, Madhya Pradesh,
under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005. She claimed that Prateek
Tripathi would beat her and throw her out of the house while they were
abroad. The respondent prayed for reliefs provided under Sections
18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the DV Act, 2005. The appellants filed
two separate petitions under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash the
application under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005. By the impugned
judgment and order, the High Court dismissed the quashing of the
petitions on the ground that the proceedings under Section 12 of the
DV Act, 2005, being of a civil nature, cannot be quashed.
SUBMISSIONS
Appellants
5. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants submitted
that the learned Magistrate has been conferred jurisdiction to entertain
proceedings under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the
DV Act, 2005. The term Magistrate is defined under Section 2(i) of
the DV Act, 2005 to mean a Judicial Magistrate of first class or, as
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 549
Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal
the case may be, a Metropolitan Magistrate exercising jurisdiction
under the CrPC. Therefore, the Court of a Judicial or Metropolitan
Magistrate is a Criminal Court constituted under the provisions of
the CrPC.
6. The learned senior counsel further contended that, although remedies
under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22 can be availed of in a Civil
Court or Family Court as per Section 26, Section 26 cannot be read
to understand the scheme of the DV Act, 2005.
7. The learned senior counsel invited our attention to various provisions
under the CrPC where the nature of relief which can be granted by
the Courts is, in essence, a relief which can be granted by a Civil
Court. Similarly, certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the CPC’), were pointed out by him,
where the relief granted by a Civil Court can also be granted in criminal
proceedings. Therefore, the answer to the question which arises for
consideration is not dependent upon the nature of the proceedings
or the nature of the relief that can be granted in those proceedings.
8. The learned senior counsel relied upon a decision of the High Court
of Allahabad in the case of Devendra Agarwal and 3 Others v.
State of Uttar Pradesh and Another1 and a decision of the High
Court of Bombay in the case of Nandkishor Pralhad Vyawahare v.
Mangala2. In these cases, the High Courts held that an application
under Section 482 CrPC is maintainable against orders passed under
the DV Act, 2005 to prevent abuse of the process of Court and to
secure the ends of justice. It is relevant to point out that the case of
Devendra Agarwal and 3 Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
Another1 has been referred to a larger bench of the High Court
of Allahabad in the case of Ram Lotan Vishwakarma and Ors v.
State of U.P and Anr3.
9. The learned senior counsel submitted that because an application
under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005, is maintainable before a Criminal
Court under the CrPC, it is amenable to the inherent jurisdiction of
the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC.
1 Application u/s 482 NO. - 18994 OF 2024
2 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 923
3 2025 AHC-LKO 7572
550 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
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Respondent
10. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent submits that
proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005, cannot be quashed
under Section 482 of the CrPC. He contended that the High Court
rightly held that the proceedings under the DV Act, 2005, are civil in
nature. He relied upon the objects and reasons of the DV Act, 2005,
to submit that the Legislature intended the proceedings thereunder
to be civil in nature. The learned counsel relied upon the decision of
this Court in the case of Kunapareddy alias Nookala Shanka Balaji
v. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari and Another4, which held that
proceedings under the DV Act, 2005 are predominantly civil in nature.
11. The learned counsel argued that an application under section 12
of the DV Act, 2005, is not a “complaint” under section 2(d) of the
CrPC. Further, he argued that Sections 200 to 204 of the CrPC do
not apply to proceedings under the DV Act, 2005 and a Magistrate
cannot treat an application under the DV Act, 2005 as a complaint
under Section 200 of the CrPC. The notice issued to the respondent
on an application under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005 is not a
summons under Section 61 of the CrPC but is a notice set out in
Form VII of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules,
2006 (for short, ‘the DV Rules 2006’). He supported the view taken
by the High Court.
CONSIDERATIONS
The provision of the DV Act, 2005
12. The DV Act, 2005 was enacted with the object of providing more
effective protection to the rights of women guaranteed under the
Constitution who are the victims of violence of any kind occurring
within the family. The DV Act, 2005, has been enacted to tackle the
menace of domestic violence faced by women in our society. A very
wide meaning has been assigned to the term ‘domestic violence’ in
the DV Act, 2005. Section 3 of the DV Act, 2005 reads thus:
“3. Definition of domestic violence.—For the purposes of
this Act, any act, omission or commission or conduct of the
respondent shall constitute domestic violence in case it—
4 (2016) 11 SCC 774
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 551
Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal
(a) harms or injures or endangers the health,
safety, life, limb or well-being, whether mental
or physical, of the aggrieved person or tends
to do so and includes causing physical abuse,
sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and
economic abuse; or
(b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers the
aggrieved person with a view to coerce her or
any other person related to her to meet any
unlawful demand for any dowry or other property
or valuable security; or
(c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved
person or any person related to her by any
conduct mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b); or
(d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether
physical or mental, to the aggrieved person.
Explanation I—For the purposes of this
section,—
(i) “physical abuse” means any act or conduct
which is of such a nature as to cause bodily
pain, harm, or danger to life, limb, or health
or impair the health or development of the
aggrieved person and includes assault, criminal
intimidation and criminal force;
(ii) “sexual abuse” includes any conduct of a
sexual nature that abuses, humiliates, degrades
or otherwise violates the dignity of woman;
(iii) “verbal and emotional abuse” includes—
(a) insults, ridicule, humiliation, name calling
and insults or ridicule specially with regard to
not having a child or a male child; and
(b) repeated threats to cause physical pain to
any person in whom the aggrieved person is
interested.
(iv) “economic abuse” includes—
552 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
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(a) deprivation of all or any economic or financial
resources to which the aggrieved person is
entitled under any law or custom whether
payable under an order of a court or otherwise
or which the aggrieved person requires out
of necessity including, but not limited to,
household necessities for the aggrieved person
and her children, if any, stridhan, property,
jointly or separately owned by the aggrieved
person, payment of rental related to the shared
household and maintenance;
(b) disposal of household effects, any alienation
of assets whether movable or immovable,
valuables, shares, securities, bonds and the
like or other property in which the aggrieved
person has an interest or is entitled to use by
virtue of the domestic relationship or which
may be reasonably required by the aggrieved
person or her children or her stridhan or any
other property jointly or separately held by the
aggrieved person; and
(c) prohibition or restriction to continued access
to resources or facilities which the aggrieved
person is entitled to use or enjoy by virtue of
the domestic relationship including access to
the shared household.
Explanation II—For the purpose of determining
whether any act, omission, commission or
conduct of the respondent constitutes “domestic
violence” under this section, the overall facts
and circumstances of the case shall be taken
into consideration.”
13. Even ‘domestic relationship’ has been defined widely under clause (f)
of Section 2 of the DV Act, 2005, which reads thus:
“(f) “domestic relationship” means a relationship between
two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived
together in a shared household, when they are related by
consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship in the
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 553
Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal
nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living
together as a joint family”
13.1 An aggrieved person has been defined in clause (a) of Section
2, which reads thus:
“(a) aggrieved person” means any woman who is,
or has been, in a domestic relationship with the
respondent and who alleges to have been subjected
to any act of domestic violence by the respondent”
14. Chapter IV of the DV Act, 2005, lays down what kind of reliefs can
be granted to a person aggrieved who has been subjected to any
act of domestic violence. There are different categories of reliefs
which can be granted under the DV Act, 2005. These reliefs can be
sought either by making an application under Section 12 of the DV
Act, 2005 or by making an application in pending legal proceedings
affecting aggrieved person before a Civil Court, Family Court or a
Criminal Court. The reliefs are provided in Sections 17 to 22, which
read thus:
“17. Right to reside in a shared household.—(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the
time being in force, every woman in a domestic relationship
shall have the right to reside in the shared household,
whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest
in the same.
(2) The aggrieved person shall not be evicted or
excluded from the shared household or any part of it by
the respondent save in accordance with the procedure
established by law.
18. Protection orders.—The Magistrate may, after giving
the aggrieved person and the respondent an opportunity
of being heard and on being prima facie satisfied that
domestic violence has taken place or is likely to take
place, pass a protection order in favour of the aggrieved
person and prohibit the respondent from—
(a) committing any act of domestic violence;
(b) aiding or abetting in the commission of acts of domestic
violence;
554 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
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(c) entering the place of employment of the aggrieved
person or, if the person aggrieved is a child, its school
or any other place frequented by the aggrieved person;
(d) attempting to communicate in any form, whatsoever,
with the aggrieved person, including personal, oral or
written or electronic or telephonic contact;
(e) alienating any assets, operating bank lockers or bank
accounts used or held or enjoyed by both the parties, jointly
by the aggrieved person and the respondent or singly
by the respondent, including her stridhan or any other
property held either jointly by the parties or separately by
them without the leave of the Magistrate;
(f) causing violence to the dependants, other relatives or
any person who give the aggrieved person assistance
from domestic violence;
(g) committing any other act as specified in the protection
order.
19. Residence orders.—(1) While disposing of an
application under sub-section (1) of Section 12, the
Magistrate may, on being satisfied that domestic violence
has taken place, pass a residence order—
(a) restraining the respondent from dispossessing or in any
other manner disturbing the possession of the aggrieved
person from the shared household, whether or not the
respondent has a legal or equitable interest in the shared
household;
(b) directing the respondent to remove himself from the
shared household;
(c) restraining the respondent or any of his relatives from
entering any portion of the shared household in which the
aggrieved person resides;
(d) restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing
off the shared household or encumbering the same;
(e) restraining the respondent from renouncing his rights
in the shared household except with the leave of the
Magistrate; or
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 555
Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal
(f) directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate
accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by
her in the shared household or to pay rent for the same,
if the circumstances so require:
Provided that no order under clause (b) shall be passed
against any person who is a woman.
(2) The Magistrate may impose any additional conditions
or pass any other direction which he may deem reasonably
necessary to protect or to provide for the safety of the
aggrieved person or any child of such aggrieved person.
(3) The Magistrate may require from the respondent to
execute a bond, with or without sureties, for preventing
the commission of domestic violence.
(4) An order under sub-section (3) shall be deemed to be an
order under Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974) and shall be dealt with accordingly.
(5) While passing an order under sub-section (1), sub-
section (2) or sub-section (3), the court may also pass an
order directing the officer in-charge of the nearest police
station to give protection to the aggrieved person or to
assist her or the person making an application on her
behalf in the implementation of the order.
(6) While making an order under sub-section (1), the
Magistrate may impose on the respondent obligations
relating to the discharge of rent and other payments, having
regard to the financial needs and resources of the parties.
(7) The Magistrate may direct the officer in-charge of the
police station in whose jurisdiction the Magistrate has
been approached to assist in the implementation of the
protection order.
(8) The Magistrate may direct the respondent to return
to the possession of the aggrieved person her stridhan
or any other property or valuable security to which she
is entitled to.
20. Monetary reliefs.—(1) While disposing of an application
under sub-section (1) of Section 12, the Magistrate may
556 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
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direct the respondent to pay monetary relief to meet the
expenses incurred and losses suffered by the aggrieved
person and any child of the aggrieved person as a result
of the domestic violence and such relief may include, but
is not limited to,—
(a) the loss of earnings;
(b) the medical expenses;
(c) the loss caused due to the destruction, damage or
removal of any property from the control of the aggrieved
person; and
(d) the maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as
her children, if any, including an order under or in addition
to an order of maintenance under Section 125 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law
for the time being in force.
(2) The monetary relief granted under this section shall
be adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent with
the standard of living to which the aggrieved person is
accustomed.
(3) The Magistrate shall have the power to order an
appropriate lump sum payment or monthly payments of
maintenance, as the nature and circumstances of the
case may require.
(4) The Magistrate shall send a copy of the order for
monetary relief made under sub-section (1) to the parties
to the application and to the in-charge of the police station
within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the respondent
resides.
(5) The respondent shall pay the monetary relief granted
to the aggrieved person within the period specified in the
order under sub-section (1).
(6) Upon the failure on the part of the respondent to make
payment in terms of the order under sub-section (1), the
Magistrate may direct the employer or a debtor of the
respondent, to directly pay to the aggrieved person or to
deposit with the court a portion of the wages or salaries
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 557
Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal
or debt due to or accrued to the credit of the respondent,
which amount may be adjusted towards the monetary
relief payable by the respondent.
21. Custody orders.—Notwithstanding anything contained
in any other law for the time being in force, the Magistrate
may, at any stage of hearing of the application for protection
order or for any other relief under this Act grant temporary
custody of any child or children to the aggrieved person
or the person making an application on her behalf and
specify, if necessary, the arrangements for visit of such
child or children by the respondent:
Provided that if the Magistrate is of the opinion that any
visit of the respondent may be harmful to the interests of
the child or children, the Magistrate shall refuse to allow
such visit.
22. Compensation orders.—In addition to other reliefs
as may be granted under this Act, the Magistrate may on
an application being made by the aggrieved person, pass
an order directing the respondent to pay compensation
and damages for the injuries, including mental torture
and emotional distress, caused by the acts of domestic
violence committed by that respondent.”
Application under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005
15. Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005 reads thus:
“12. Application to Magistrate.—(1) An aggrieved person
or a Protection Officer or any other person on behalf of
the aggrieved person may present an application to the
Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs under this Act:
Provided that before passing any order on such application,
the Magistrate shall take into consideration any domestic
incident report received by him from the Protection Officer
or the service provider.
(2) The relief sought for under sub-section (1) may include a
relief for issuance of an order for payment of compensation
or damages without prejudice to the right of such person
558 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
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to institute a suit for compensation or damages for the
injuries caused by the acts of domestic violence committed
by the respondent:
Provided that where a decree for any amount as
compensation or damages has been passed by any
court in favour of the aggrieved person, the amount, if
any, paid or payable in pursuance of the order made by
the Magistrate under this Act shall be set off against the
amount payable under such decree and the decree shall,
notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), or any other law for the time
being in force, be executable for the balance amount, if
any, left after such set off.
(3) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be in such
form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed
or as nearly as possible thereto.
(4) The Magistrate shall fix the first date of hearing, which
shall not ordinarily be beyond three days from the date of
receipt of the application by the court.
(5) The Magistrate shall endeavour to dispose of every
application made under sub-section (1) within a period of
sixty days from the date of its first hearing.”
16. The term ‘Magistrate’ has been defined under Section 2(i) which is
as under:
“2(i) “Magistrate” means the Judicial Magistrate of the
first class, or as the case may be, the Metropolitan
Magistrate, exercising jurisdiction under the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) in the area where
the aggrieved person resides temporaily or otherwise or
the respondent resides or the domestic violence is alleged
to have taken place”
17. Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005 makes a provision enabling an
aggrieved person, a Protection Officer or any other person on
behalf of an aggrieved person to make an application to the learned
Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs provided in Chapter IV. In
exercise of the rule-making power under Section 37 of the DV Act,
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 559
Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal
2005, the DV Rules, 2006 have been framed. Rule 6(1) of the DV
Rules, 2006 provides that every application of the aggrieved person
made under Section 12 shall be in Form II appended to the Rules.
18. As can be seen from the scheme of the DV Act, 2005 and in particular
Section 12, it is not a complaint under Section 200 of CrPC or Section
223 of the BNSS. While dealing with a complaint under Section
200 of the CrPC, the learned Magistrate cannot mechanically take
cognizance of the offences alleged in the complaint. To ascertain
the truth about the allegations made in the complaint, the learned
Magistrate is required to examine the complainant and witnesses,
if any. Only after the learned Magistrate is satisfied that a case
is made out to proceed against the accused, a process is issued
and cognizance is taken. This is also true about a complaint under
Section 223 of the BNSS. However, Section 223(2) of the BNSS
takes it a step further. It provides that no cognizance of an offence
can be taken by the Magistrate without giving an opportunity of being
heard to the accused.
19. In case of an application under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005, as
provided in Sub-section (4) thereof, the learned Magistrate is duty-
bound to fix the first date of hearing, which shall not ordinarily be
beyond three days from the date of receipt of the application by the
Court. Section 13(1) provides that a notice of the date fixed in terms
of Sub-section (4) of Section 12 shall be served on the respondent
or any other person in the manner laid down therein. Rule 2 of the
DV Rules, 2006 lays down the methods and means of service of
notice issued under Section 13(1).
20. We may also note that under Sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the
DV Act, 2005, a power has been conferred on the learned Magistrate
to pass interim and ex-parte orders.
21. Therefore, an application under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005,
cannot be equated with a complaint within the meaning of Section
200 of the CrPC (Section 223 of the BNSS). As provided in Sub-
section (4) of Section 12, read with Sub-section (1) of Section 13,
the normal rule is that a notice of hearing must be issued on the
application. The scheme of Section 12 is completely different from
Section 200 of the CrPC or Section 223 of the BNSS.
22. Section 28 of the DV Act, 2005 reads thus:
560 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
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“28. Procedure.—(1) Save as otherwise provided in this
Act, all proceedings under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22
and 23 and offences under Section 31 shall be governed
by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(2 of 1974).
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall prevent the court from
laying down its own procedure for disposal of an application
under Section 12 or under sub-section (2) of Section 23.”
22.1 It is true that the proceedings of an application under Sections
12 and 23 are governed by the CrPC. However, Sub-section
(2) of Section 28 confers overriding power on the Court to lay
down its own procedure for the disposal of an application under
Section 12 or under Sub-section (2) of Section 23.
Jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 12
23. Now we come to the issue of jurisdiction of the Courts to entertain
applications under Section 12. Section 27 of the DV Act, 2005 deals
with jurisdiction, which reads thus:
“27. Jurisdiction.—(1) The court of Judicial Magistrate
of the first class or the Metropolitan Magistrate, as the
case may be, within the local limits of which—
(a) the person aggrieved permanently or temporarily
resides or carries on business or is employed; or
(b) the respondent resides or carries on business or
is employed; or
(c) the cause of action has arisen,
shall be the competent court to grant a protection order
and other orders under this Act and to try offences
under this Act.
(2) Any order made under this Act shall be enforceable
throughout India.”
(emphasis added)
23.1 So, the Court of the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class or the
Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, has jurisdiction
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 561
Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal
to entertain applications under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005
as can be seen from the provisions of Sections 12 and 27 read
with clause (i) of Section 2 of the DV Act, 2005.
24. There is one more provision of the DV Act which deals with the power
of other Courts (other than the Courts mentioned in Section 27) to
grant reliefs under the DV Act, i.e. Section 26 which reads thus:
“26. Relief in other suits and legal proceedings.—(1) Any
relief available under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 may
also be sought in any legal proceeding, before a civil court,
family court or a criminal court, affecting the aggrieved
person and the respondent whether such proceeding was
initiated before or after the commencement of this Act.
(2) Any relief referred to in sub-section (1) may be sought
for in addition to and along with any other relief that the
aggrieved person may seek in such suit or legal proceeding
before a civil or criminal court.
(3) In case any relief has been obtained by the aggrieved
person in any proceedings other than a proceeding under
this Act, she shall be bound to inform the Magistrate of
the grant of such relief.”
(emphasis added)
24.1 Therefore, in a given case, in any legal proceedings pending
before a Civil Court or Family Court affecting the aggrieved
person, the reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 can be sought.
Similarly, in a Criminal Court other than the Courts of Judicial
Magistrate of the First Class and Metropolitan Magistrate,
reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 can be sought. For example,
in proceedings before a Court of Session, such reliefs can be
sought provided the proceeding affects the aggrieved person.
We must note here that Section 26 does not confer jurisdiction
on Courts other than the Courts mentioned in Section 27 to
entertain an application under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005.
It only enables the Courts mentioned therein to grant the reliefs
under Sections 18 to 22 in the pending legal proceedings.
25. Before we proceed further, we must clarify that in these appeals, we
are confining our adjudication to the question whether the inherent
562 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
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jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of CrPC or Section
528 of the BNSS can be exercised to quash proceedings arising
out of an application under Section 12(1) filed before the learned
Magistrate in accordance with Section 27 of the DV Act, 2005. We
are not dealing with other legal proceedings in which reliefs under
Sections 18 to 22 are sought in the Courts referred to in Section
26 of the DV Act.
CRIMINAL COURTS
26. Under the CrPC, Chapter II deals with the constitution of Criminal
Courts and Offices. The Courts of Session, Judicial Magistrates of the
First Class and in any metropolitan area, Metropolitan Magistrates,
Judicial Magistrates of the Second Class and Executive Magistrates
are Criminal Courts as provided in Section 6 of the CrPC. Therefore,
the Courts of Metropolitan Magistrates and Judicial Magistrates of First
Class, which are empowered to entertain applications under Section
12 and to grant reliefs under the DV Act, 2005, are Criminal Courts.
Similarly, under the BNSS, Section 6 thereof provides that Courts of
Session, Judicial Magistrates of the First Class, Judicial Magistrates
of the Second Class and Executive Magistrates are Criminal Courts.
Under the BNSS, there is no category of Metropolitan Magistrates.
Therefore, the jurisdiction to entertain a complaint vests in a Criminal
Court under the CrPC.
The nature of proceedings under Section 12 of the D.V Act, 2005
27. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent tried to rely upon
the nature of proceedings under the DV Act, 2005. He invited our
attention to a decision of this Court in the case of Kunapareddy
alias Nookala Shanka Balaji v. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari
and Anr.4 He relied upon paragraphs 11 and 12 of the said decision
which read thus:
“11. We have already mentioned the prayers which
were made by Respondent 1 in the original petition
and Prayer A thereof relates to Section 9. However, in
Prayer B, Respondent 1 also sought relief of grant of
monthly maintenance to her as well as her children.
This prayer falls within the ambit of Section 20 of the
DV Act. In fact, Prayer A is covered by Section 18 which
empowers the Magistrate to grant such a protection
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 563
Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal
which is claimed by Respondent 1. Therefore, the
petition is essentially under Sections 18 and 20 of the
DV Act, though in the heading these provisions are not
mentioned. However, that may not make any difference
and, therefore, no issue was raised by the appellant
on this count. In respect of the petition filed under
Sections 18 and 20 of the DV Act, the proceedings
are to be governed by the Code, as provided under
Section 28 of the DV Act. At the same time, it cannot
be disputed that these proceedings are predominantly
of civil nature.
12. In fact, the very purpose of enacting the DV Act was
to provide for a remedy which is an amalgamation of civil
rights of the complainant i.e. aggrieved person. Intention
was to protect women against violence of any kind,
especially that occurring within the family as the civil law
does not address this phenomenon in its entirety. It is
treated as an offence under Section 498-A of the Penal
Code, 1860. The purpose of enacting the law was to
provide a remedy in the civil law for the protection
of women from being victims of domestic violence
and to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence
in the society.
.. .. .. .. …. .. .. .. ..”
(emphasis added)
28. Reliance is also placed by the respondent on a decision of this Court
in the case of Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi5 and in particular
paragraph 50 which reads thus:
“50. In our view, the DV Act is a piece of civil code which
is applicable to every woman in India irrespective of
her religious affiliation and/or social background for
a more effective protection of her rights guaranteed
under the Constitution and in order to protect women
victims of domestic violence occurring in a domestic
relationship. Therefore, the expression “joint family”
5 (2022) 8 SCC 90
564 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
cannot mean as understood in Hindu Law. Thus, the
expression “family members living together as a joint
family”, means the members living jointly as a family. In
such an interpretation, even a girl child/children who is/are
cared for as foster children also have a right to live in a
shared household and are conferred with the right under
sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the DV Act. When such
a girl child or woman becomes an aggrieved person, the
protection of sub-section (2) of Section 17 comes into play.”
(emphasis added)
28.1 Thus, there is no doubt that, notwithstanding the penal provisions
in the form of Sections 31 and 33 of Chapter V, the proceedings
before the Magistrate under the DV Act, 2005, are predominantly
of a civil nature.
The power of the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC
and Section 528 of the BNSS to quash proceedings under the
D.V Act,2005.
29. Under the scheme of the DV Act, 2005, the reliefs which are provided
in Sections 18 to 23 can be granted on an application made by an
aggrieved person or a Protection Officer or any other person on behalf
of the aggrieved person under Sub-section (1) of Section 12. Thus,
when the question of quashing proceedings under the DV Act, 2005
pending before the learned Magistrate arises, it is for quashing of
an application under Section 12(1) of the DV Act. We are examining
the issue of jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the
CrPC or Section 528 of the BNSS in the context of quashing the
proceedings initiated on an application made under Section 12(1).
We have already held that an application under Sub-section (1) of
Section 12 is completely different from a complaint under Section
200 of the CrPC (Section 223 of the BNSS).
30. Now, we turn to Section 482 of CrPC, which reads thus:
“482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.—Nothing
in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent
powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be
necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or
to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice.”
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 565
Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal
30.1 The word ‘Court’ referred to in Section 482 is obviously a Criminal
Court within the meaning of Section 6 of CrPC which includes
a Court of a Judicial Magistrate or Metropolitan Magistrate.
31. There are two parts of Section 482. Both parts save the inherent
powers of the High Court. The first part is applicable where the
power is exercised to make such orders as may be necessary to
give effect to any order under ‘this Code’. When a notice is issued
on an application under Section 12(1), the learned Magistrate does
not pass any order under the CrPC. When orders granting any of
the reliefs under Sections 18 to 23 are passed, the orders of the
learned Magistrate are not under the CrPC. Therefore, the first part
of Section 482 cannot apply to proceedings under Section 12(1) of
the DV Act, 2005.
32. The second part of Section 482 saves the inherent power of the High
Court to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice. Therefore, in a given case where a
learned Magistrate is dealing with an application under Section 12(1),
the High Court can exercise the power under the second part of
Section 482 to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to
secure the ends of justice. Hence, the High Court can exercise
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash proceedings of
an application under Section 12(1) or orders passed in accordance
with Sections 18 to 23 of the DV Act, 2005.
33. Now, the question is what is the scope of interference under Section
482 with the proceedings under the DV Act, 2005. We must make a
distinction between proceedings initiated on the basis of an application
under Section 12(1) of the DV Act, 2005, which are predominantly
of a civil nature and the proceedings before the Criminal Court for
prosecuting a person for any offence. Setting criminal law in motion
has very serious consequences affecting the liberty of a human
being, as the person against whom criminal law is set in motion can
be arrested and sentenced to undergo imprisonment.
34. We have already referred to the objects and reasons of the DV Act,
2005, which are reproduced in the decision of this Court in the case
of Kunapareddy alias Nookal a Shanka Balaji v. Kunapareddy
Swarna Kumari and Anr4. The basic object of the DV Act, 2005, is
to protect women from being victims of domestic violence and also
566 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in society. It seeks
to protect the right of women to reside in their matrimonial home
or shared household. Therefore, there is a provision for passing a
Residence Order under Section 19. Section 18 provides for granting
Protection Orders, which are essentially to prevent the commission
of acts of domestic violence against women. The orders which can
be passed under Section 20 are with the object of compensating
a woman for loss caused due to domestic violence. The custody
orders regarding children are also essentially to prevent domestic
violence. Even Section 22 provides for passing compensation orders
for the injuries, including mental torture and emotional distress,
caused by acts of domestic violence. If a complaint is entertained
under Section 12(1), the erring respondent cannot be punished as
is understood in criminal law. He can be subjected to various orders
as provided in Sections 18 to 23. A respondent in the application
can be prosecuted only if he commits a breach of a protection
order or an interim protection order. Therefore, the consequences
of entertaining an application under Section 12(1) are not as drastic
as the consequences of setting criminal law in motion. No doubt,
orders that can be passed under the DV Act, 2005, can also be very
drastic, but in proceedings under Section 12(1), a respondent cannot
be sentenced to suffer imprisonment or a fine as in a criminal trial.
35. When it comes to exercise of power under Section 482 of the CrPC
in relation to application under Section 12(1), the High Court has to
keep in mind the fact that the DV Act, 2005 is a welfare legislation
specially enacted to give justice to those women who suffer from
domestic violence and for preventing acts of domestic violence.
Therefore, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
CrPC for quashing proceedings under Section 12(1), the High Court
should be very slow and circumspect. Interference can be made
only when the case is clearly of gross illegality or gross abuse of
the process of law. Generally, the High Court must adopt a hands-
off approach while dealing with proceedings under Section 482 for
quashing an application under Section 12(1). Unless the High Courts
show restraint in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of
the CrPC while dealing with a prayer for quashing the proceedings
under the DV Act, 2005, the very object of enacting the DV Act,
2005, will be defeated.
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 567
Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal
36. We must also note here that against an order passed by a learned
Magistrate, there is an appeal provided under Section 29 to the
Court of Session. In contrast, generally, there is no remedy of appeal
available against an order taking cognisance of an offence or an
order issuing process. This is another reason why the High Court
should exercise caution when exercising its inherent jurisdiction to
quash proceedings under Section 12 of the D.V. Act, 2005.
37. There are decisions of the High Courts taking a view that the
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC is not available to quash
proceedings of an application under Section 12(1) of DV Act, 2005.
The decisions are primarily based on the premise that proceedings
under Section 12(1) are predominantly of a civil nature. The said
view is not correct for the reasons set out earlier.
38. Before we part with this Judgment, we must mention here that one
of us (Abhay S. Oka, J) is a party to a Judgment dated 27nd October,
2016 of the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition 2473 of 2016 in which
the view taken is that remedy under Section 482 of the CrPC is not
available for quashing the proceedings under Section 12(1) of the
DV Act,2005. This view was found to be incorrect by a full Bench of
the same High Court. As judges, we are duty-bound to correct our
mistakes in properly constituted proceedings. Even for Judges, the
learning process always continues.
39. To conclude, the view taken in the impugned order of the High Court
that a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC for challenging the
proceedings emanating from Section 12(1) of the DV Act, 2005 is not
maintainable, is not the correct view. We hold that High Courts can
exercise power under Section 482 of CrPC (Section 528 of the BNSS)
for quashing the proceedings emanating from the application under
Section 12(1) of the DV Act, 2005, pending before the Court of the
learned Magistrate. However, considering the object of the DV Act,
2005, the High Courts should exercise caution and circumspection
when dealing with an application under Section 12(1). Normally,
interference under Section 482 is warranted only in the case of
gross illegality or injustice.
40. Accordingly, we quash the order dated 9th May, 2024, passed by the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore in Miscellaneous Criminal
Case Nos. 52308 of 2022 and 3363 of 2023 and restore the said
568 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
petitions to the file of the High Court. The restored petitions shall be
heard afresh and disposed of by the High Court in the light of what
we have held in this Judgment.
41. The appeals are allowed accordingly.
Result of the case: Appeals allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey
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