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Supreme Court of India

SHARAD KUMAR SANGHIversusSANGITA RANE

Citation
2015 INSC 961
Decided
10 February 2015
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Holding

Criminal proceedings against a Managing Director cannot be sustained where the complaint merely alleges wrongdoing by the company and fails to specifically allege personal liability or name the company as a party; therefore, the proceedings must be quashed.

Summary

The appellant, Sharad Kumar Sanghi, Managing Director of Sanghi Brothers (Indore) Ltd., was charged under Section 420 IPC for allegedly cheating a buyer by delivering a vehicle with a replaced engine after an accident. The complaint, filed under Section 200 of the CrPC, primarily alleged wrongdoing by the company but did not name the company as an accused nor specifically allege personal liability of the Managing Director. The trial magistrate took cognizance and the appellant sought quash of the proceedings under Section 482, which the High Court rejected. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the allegations against the Managing Director were vague and essentially directed at the company, and that vicarious liability cannot be imposed without a specific allegation and without the company being a party. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court order and quashed the criminal proceedings, allowing the appeal.

Issues considered

  • Whether a complaint under Section 200 CrPC that alleges misconduct by a company but does not specifically allege personal liability of its Managing Director can sustain criminal proceedings against the Managing Director.
  • Whether vicarious liability of a Managing Director can be invoked in the absence of a specific allegation and without the company being named as an accused party.
  • Whether the High Court erred in refusing to exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceedings.

Legislation cited

Subjects

vicarious liabilitycriminal procedureSection 200 complaintSection 482 quashmanaging director liabilitycorporate criminal liabilitycheating under IPC 420complaint under CrPC

Judgment

                    [2015]2S.C.R.145


                SHARAD KUMAR SANGH I                           A
                            v.
                      SANGITA RANE
            (Criminal Appeal No. 1584 of 2007)
                   FEBRUARY 10, 2015
                                                               B
   [DIPAK MISRA AND ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, JJ.]

     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss.482, 200 -
Complaint uls. 200 alleging case of cheating against the
appellant-Managing Director of the Company- Cognizance
taken and summons issued - Magistrate holding that prima C
facie sufficient grounds exists for registration of complaint
against the accused Company - Application seeking
quashing of proceedings in criminal case, dismissed by High
Court - On appeal, held: Allegations which find place against
the Managing Director in his personal capacity are absolutely D
vague and principally the allegations are against the
company- When a complainant intends to proceed against
the Managing Director of a company, it is essential to make
requisite allegation to constitute the vicarious liability- When E
a company has not been arrayed as a party, no proceeding
can be initiated against it - Thus, criminal proceedings
initiated against the appellant quashed.

    Allowing the appeal, the Court
                                                                F
     HELD: The complainant's initial statement would
reflect, the allegations are against the company, but the
company has not been made arrayed as a party.
Therefore, the allegations have to be restricted to the
Managing Director. The allegations which find place G
against the Managing Director in his personal capacity
are absolutely vague and in fact, principally the
allegations are against the company. There is no specific

                             145                                H
146        SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2015] 2 S.C.R.



A allegation against the Managing Director. When a
  complainant intends to proceed against the Managing
  Director or any officer of a company, it is essential to
  make requisite allegation to constitute the vicarious
  liability. When a company has not been arrayed as a party,
B no proceeding can be initiated against it even where
  vicarious liability )s fastened on certain statutes. Such
  an order could not have been passed. The order passed
  by the High Court is sensitively vulnerable and is set
  aside and the criminal proc:eedings initiated by the
C respondent against the appellant are quashed. [Paras
  9, 11, 13] [149-G; 151-G; 152-A-B]
       Maksud Sajyad vs. State ofGujarat2007 (9) SCR 1113:
  (2008) 5 SCC 668; S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta
o Bhalla and Anr. 2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 371 : (2005) 8 SCC
  89; S.K. Alagh v. State of UP 2008 (2) SCR 1088: (2008) 5
  SCC 662; Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution
  Company Ltd. v. Datar Switchgear Ltd. 2010 (12) SCR 551:
  (2010) 10 SCC 479; GHCL Employees Stock Option Trust
E v. India lnfoline Ltd. 2013 (5) SCR 276: (2013) 4 SCC 505;
  Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Private Limited
      2012 (5) SCR 503: (2012) 5 SCC 661 - referred to.
                       Case Law Reference
F         2007 (9) SCR 1113         Referred to.   Para 9
          2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 371   Referred to.   Para 9
          2008 (2) SCR 1088         Referred to.   Para 10

G         2010 (12) SCR 551         Referred to.   Para 10
         2013 (5) SCR 276           Referred to.   Para 10
          2012 (5) SCR 503          Referred to.   Para 11
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal
H Appeal No. 1584 of 2007
      SHARAD KUMAR SANGH! v. SANGITARANE                      147



    From the Judgment and Order dated 30.11.2006 of the           A
High Court Madhya Pradesh, bench at Jabalpur in M. Cr. C.
No.1922 of 2002

     Sidharth Luthra, Buddy A. Ranganna Dhan,A. V. Rangam,
D. V. Raghu VamsyfortheAppellant.                                 B

    Akshat Shrivastava, Manjeet Kirpal for the Respondent.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. Calling in question the legal validity C
of the order dated 30.11.2006 passed by the learned Single
Judge of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in
M.Cr.C.No.1922 of 2002 whereby the learned Judge had
declined to exercise the power under Section 482 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) for quashing of the               D
proceedings in Criminal Case No.895 of 2001 pending in the
court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Betul which has been
registered under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code against
the appellant, the present appeal has been preferred by special
leave.
                                                                  E
     2. Bereft of unnecessary details, the facts which are
necessary to be stated are that the appellant is the Managing
Director M/s. Sanghi Brothers (Indore) Ltd., Indore which is a
registered company duly incorporated and registered under
the Companies Act, 1956 and is engaged in the business of F
automobile sale, finance and shipping etc. having branches
at various places including the city of Bhopal. The respondent-
complainant obtained a quotation from the Bhopal Branch for
purchase of a TATA Diesel vehicle model SFC 709/38 LB in
the month of April 1998 and the vehicle was delivered to the G
respondent on 01.05.1998 on payment of the price deposited
at Bhopal vide Bank Draft issued from the State Bank of India,
Sarni, Betul. The respondent faced difficulty with the vehicle
and eventually he came to know in the month of August 2000
that a different engine number was made in the invoice that H
148         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 2 S.C.R.


A was issued to him than the engine that was put in the chasis.
  On further enquiry, he found that there is a letter issued by Tata
  Engineering and Locomotive Company (TELCO) on
  7.11.2000 that in the course of transit from the company to
  Bhopal, the said vehicle had met with an accident as a result
B of which the engine was replaced by another engine. Coming
  to know of this, the respondent filed a complaint under Section
  200 of the Cr.P.C. alleging that M/s Sanghi Brothers (Indore)
  Ltd., Indore being represented by the Managing Director,
  Sharad Kumar Sanghi, had suppressed the information and
C deliberately cheated the respondent.
          3. The learned Magistrate, after following the procedure
      as contemplated under Section 202 of the Cr. P.C., took
      cognizance of the offence to which we shall advert to at a later
0     stage.
          4. After cognizance was taken and summons were issued,
      the appellant filed a revision before the learned Sessions
      Judge, Betul which was dismissed on 27.02.2002.
E       5. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, he preferred
   an application under Section 482 of the Cr.PC. beforethe High
   Court. It was contended before the High Court that the learned
   Magistrate had no territorial jurisdiction; that there was no deceit
   by the respondent; that the company was not made an accused
 F in the complaint and, therefore, the complaint was not
   maintainable; and that there was no mens rea. The High Court,
   as is manifest from the order impugned, repelled all the
   submissions and dismissed the application for quashment.
      6. We have heard Mr. Sidharth Luthra, learned senior
G counsel for the appellant and Mr. Akshat Shrivastava, learned
  counsel for the respondent.
      7. It is not in dispute that the vehicle was purchased by the
  respondent on 01.05.1998. The invoice contained a different
H engine number than the engine that was fitted into the vehicle.
         SHARAD KUMAR SANGH I v. SANGITA RANE                     149
                   [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

The respondent lodged the complaint on 08.05.2001. To satisfy A
ourselves whether there has been any specific allegation
against the appellant, we have carefully perused the complaint
filed under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. The English translation
of the complaint has been brought on record. The original
complaint which is in Hindi has also been filed. The allegations B
made against the appellant read as follows :
       "That the proprietor of Mis Sanghi Brothers Indore
       accused Sharad S/o Sohan Sanghi negligently
       prepare the accidental vehicle no.709 L.M. &
       projected the same as new to deliver the complainant        c
       causing gain to self and loss to the complainant which
       is punishable U/s 420 of the l.P.C."
     8. Barring the aforesaid allegation, there is no allegation
against him. In the initial statement made under Section 200 D
of the Cr.P.C., the complainant after narrating the facts, has
stated thus :
       "Sanghi Brothers Limited run by Mr. Sharad Sanghi
       committed cheating with the Applicant by delivering
       accidented vehicle in place of a new one and caused         .E
       gross financial loss. Applicant is operating the vehicle
       after borrowing loan from Bank and the vehicle is not
       worth operating at present due to said defects. I have
       filed the Photostat copies of the concerning
       documents in the case."                                      F
     9. The allegations which find place against the Managing
Director in his personal capacity, as we notice, are absolutely
vague. When a complainant intends to proceed against the
Managing Director or any officer of a company, it is essential G
to make requisite allegation to constitute the vicarious liability.
In Maksud Sajyad vs. State of Gujarat1, it has been held,
thus:

1
    (2008) s sec 668                                                H
150            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2015] 2 S.C.R.


A            "Where a jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint
             petition filed in terms of Section 156(3) or Section 200
             of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate is
             required to apply his mind. The Penal Code does not
             contain any provision for attaching vicarious liability
B            on the part of the Managing Director or the Directors
             of the Company when the accused is the Company.
             The learned Magistrate failed to pose unto himself the
             correct question viz. as to whether the complaint
             petition, even if given face value and taken to be correct
c            in its entirety, would lead to the conclusion that the
             respondents herein were personally liable for any
             offence. The Bank is a body corporate. Vicarious
             liability of the Managing Director and Director would
             arise provided any provision exists in that behalf in
D            the statute. Statutes indisputably must contain
             provision fixing such vicarious liabilities. Even for the
             said purpose, it is obligator on the part of the
             complainant to make requisite allegations which would
             attract the provisions constituting vicarious liability."
E
      In this regard, reference to a three-Judge Bench decision
  in S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla and
  Another would be apposite. While dealing with an offence
  under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881,
F the Court explaining the duty of a Magistrate while issuing
  process and his power to dismiss a complaint under Section
  203 without even issuing process observed thus:-
             ".... a complaint must contain material to enable the
             Magistrate to make up his mind for issuing process. If
G
             this were not the requirement, consequences could be
             far-reaching. If a Magistrate had to issue process in
             every case, the burden of work before the Magistrate
             as well as the harassment caused to the respondents
H     2
          (2005) a sec ag
      SHARAD KUMAR SANGH I v. SANGITA RANE                          151
                [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

    to whom process is issued would be tremendous. Even              A
    Section 204 of the Code starts with the words "if in the
    opinion of the Magistrate taking cognizance of an
    offence there is sufficient ground for proceeding". The
    words "sufficient ground for proceeding" again suggest
    that ground should be made out in the complaint for               B
    proceeding against the respondent. It is settled law
    that at the time of issuing of the process the Magistrate
    is required to see only the allegations in the complaint
    and where allegations in the complaint or the charge-
    sheet do not constitute an offence against a person,             c
    the complaint is liable to be dismissed."
     After so stating, the Court analysed Section 141 of the
Act and after referring to certain other authorities answered a
referent and relevant part of the answer reads as follows:-     D
    "lt is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint under
    Section 141 that at the time the offence was committed,
    the person accused was in charge of, and responsible
    for the conduct of business of the company. This
    averment is an essential requirement of Section 141         E
    and has to be made in a complaint. Without this
    averment being made in a complaint, the requirements
    of Section 141 cannot be said to be satisfied."
     10. The same principle has been reiterated in S.K. Alagh         F
v. State of UP3 ; Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution
Company Ltd. v. Datar Switchgear Ltd. 4 ; and GHCL
Employees Stock Option Trust v. India lnfoline Ltd. 5
    11. In the case at hand as the complainant's initial
statement would reflect, the allegations are against the G
company, but the company has not been made arrayed as a
                                                                •
3
 (2008) 5sec 662
4
 (2010) 10 SCC479
         sec
s (2013) 4    505                                                     H
152           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 2 S.C.R.


A party. Therefore, the allegations have to be restricted to the
  Managing Director. As we have noted earlier, allegations are
  vague and in fact, principally the allegations are against the
  company. There is no specific allegation against the Managing
  Director. When a company has not been arrayed as a party,
B no proceeding can be initiated against it even where vicarious
  liability is fastened on certain statutes. It has been so held by a
  three-Judge Bench in Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels
  and Tours Private Limited6 in the context of Negotiable
  lnstrumentsAct, 1881.
c
           12. At this juncture, it is interesting to note, as we have
      stated earlier, that the learned Magistrate while passing the
      order dated 22.10.2001, had opined, thus:-
            "It appears prima-facie from the complaint filed by the
D           complainant, documents, evidence and arguments that
            accused company has committed cheating with the
            complaint by delivering old and accidented vehicle to
            her at the cost of a new truck. Accordingly, prima-facie
            sufficient grounds exist for registration of a complaint
E           against the accused U/s. 420 of l.P.C. and is
            accordingly registered."
        13. When the company has not been arraigned as an
  accused, such an order could not have been passed. We have
F said so for the sake of completeness. In the ultimate analysis,
  we are of the considered opinion that the High Court should
  have been well advised to quash the criminal proceedings
  initiated against the appellant and that having not been done,
  the order is sensitively vulnerable and accordingly we set aside
G the same and quash the criminal proceedings initiated by the
  respondent against the appellant.
      • 14. The appeal stands allowed accordingly.
      Nidhi Jain                                          Appeal allowed

H     6
          (2012)5SCC661


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