Holding

Withdrawal from acquisition under Section 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act can be effected only by a gazette notification; a ministerial note is not a decision, and the Government’s refusal to de‑notify the land is not arbitrary or violative of Article 14.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined whether a ministerial note dated 8 June 1999 could be treated as a decision under Section 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to withdraw from the acquisition of land occupied by Shanti Sports Club, and whether the Government’s refusal to de‑notify the land (letter dated 9 June 2000) was arbitrary or violative of Article 14. The Court held that withdrawal under Section 48(1) must be effected by a gazette notification; a mere note in a file is not a governmental decision. It further found that the Government’s decision not to de‑notify the land, despite the club’s constructions, was not discriminatory or arbitrary. The constructions were deemed unauthorized under the Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972, and the club could not claim equity to protect them. The appeals were dismissed, and the related contempt petitions were also dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the note recorded by the Minister on 8 June 1999 constitutes a decision under Section 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to withdraw from acquisition.
Whether the Government’s decision not to de‑notify the land (letter dated 9 June 2000) is arbitrary, discriminatory, or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
Whether constructions on the acquired land are unauthorized under the Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972.
Whether equity can be invoked to protect unauthorized constructions on acquired land.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. 14, s. 166(1), s. 166(2), s. 77(1), s. 77(2)
Delhi Development Authority Act, 1957s. 11(A)
Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972s. 3
General Clauses Act, 1897s. 21
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 4, s. 42, s. 48(1), s. 6

Subjects

Land acquisitionSection 48(1) withdrawalGazette notificationArticle 14 equalityUnauthorized constructionDelhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) ActPublic purposeAdministrative lawEquity

Judgment

[2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 710

A SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. ~
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 8500-8501 of 2001)

AUGUST 25, 2009
B
[B.N. AGRAWAL AND G.S. SINGHVI, JJ.]

/Land Acquisition Act, 1894: ,.+ '
c s. 48(1) - Withdrawal from acquisition of land - HELD:
Can be done only by issuing a notification in the official
Gazette - Note recorded by Minister in the file cannot be
relied upon to plead before Court that the Government had
taken decision to withdraw from acquisition - Even if the
D competent authority records its opinion in the file on merits
of the matter under consideration, the same cannot be termed /T
as a decision of the Government unless it is sanctified and
acted upon by issuing an order under Articles 77(1) and (2)
or Articles 166(1) and (2) of the Constitution - Government's
subsequent decision not to withdraw from a,cquisition of the
E land in question as communicated to the parties concerned
does not suffer from vice of discrimination/arbitrary exercise
of power/non-application of mind- Constitution of India, 1950
- Articles 14, 77(1) and (2) and 166(1) and (2) -
Administrative Law - Opinion of competent authority in the file,
-->--
F requirements to term if as decision of Government.

Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972:

s. 3 - Prohibition against transfer of acquired lands - _.,.
Land acquired in terms of Land Acquisition Act transferred by
G
land owners after completion of acquisition proceedings -
Constructions raised thereon - HELD: Even if any sale Jr-
transactions did take place, the same will have to be treated
.
as void in view of express prohibition contained in s. 3 - Equity
H 710
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 711
& ORS.

cannot be pleaded on ground of huge expenditure incurred A
~
on construction, to seek court's intervention for protection of
unauthorized construction raised on acquired lands - Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 - Equity.

Urban Development: B
~

Town planning - Transfer of acquired land and
constructions raised thereon in violation of statutory provisions
-+.- - HELD: Object of planned development can be achieved by
rigorous enforcement of master plans - It is high time that
executive and political apparatus of State take serious view c
of the menace of illegal and unauthorized constructions by
affluent class of builders and others.
.~·
•.,.:'"4
Large tracts of lands were acquired in terms of
Notifications u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 D
\( issued between 13.11.1959 and 23.1.1965 for planned
development of Delhi. The acquisition was upheld by the
Supreme Court1. In respect of the land in question,
notification u/s 4 of the Act was issued on 23.1.1965, the
declaration u/s 6 was published on 23.12.1968, and the E
award was made on 22.12.1982. Meanwhile, the lands
were transferred by sale-deed dated 31.1.1969 and
constructions raised thereon. In the writ petitions
challenging other notifications as also the notification
~
with regard to the lands in question, the Full Bench of the
F
High Court2 declined to interfere, but observed that the
petitioners would be at liberty to make representation to
the authorities concerned for release of the land. On
appeal, the Supreme Court3 held the constructions raised
by the writ petitioners as unauthorized. The Court also
recorded the statement of the counsel for the State that G
the Government would consider each of the structures
""" . 1. Roshnara Begum vs. Union of India AIR 1996 Delhi 206.
2. Aflatoon vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi 1975 (1) SCR 802.
3. Murari v. Union of India 1996 (8) Suppl. SCR 313. H
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A . and take a decision thereon. .~·

Appellant No. 2 who came to be in possession of the
lands in question through some arrangements with the
transferees of sale deed dated 31.1.1969, between 1990
and 1993, got appellant no. 1 Club registered under the
8
Societies Registration Act and constructed a complex """"'
over the acquired lands in the name of appellant no. 1
Club, contrary to the provisions of s. 3 of the Delhi Land
(Restrictions on Transfers) Act, 1972 and without making
C any application for sanction of the building plans. After
the decision of the Full Bench of the High Court and the
Supreme Court, appellant no. 2 filed representations for
release of the land u/s 48 (1) of the Act on the ground that
several parcels of acquired lands had already been
released. The representations ultimately were placed
D before the then Minister for Urban Development, who on
8.6.1999 noted, "in accordance with the settled policy, no --
.(.

demolition can or will be ordered ... " and left the matter
to be considered by the successor, who finally by his
order dated 14.7.1999 decided that the land covered by
E sports complex could not be released. The decision was
communicated to the appellants by letter dated 9.6.2000.
This was unsuccessfully challenged by the appellants.

In the instant appeals, the questions for +
F consideration before the Court were: (i) whether the note
dated 8.6.1999 recorded by the then Minister for Urban
Development could be treated as a decision of the
Government to withdraw from acquisition of the land in
question in terms of s.48(1) of the Act; and (ii) whether
G the decision contained in letter dated 9.6.2000 is liable to
be nullified on the ground of arbitrariness and violation
of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. '>-
Dismissing the appeals, the Court

H
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 713
& ORS.

~- HELD: 1.1. Although, the plain language of s.48(1) of A
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 does not give ~ny
indication of the manner or mode in which the power/
discretion to withdraw from the acquisition of any land
is required to be exercised, having regard to the scheme
of Parts II and VII of the Act, which postulates publication B
of notification u/s 4(1), declaration u/s 6 and agreement
u/s 42 in the official gazette as a condition for valid
--+-.- acquisition of the land for any public purpose or for a
company, it is reasonable to take the view that withdrawal
from the acquisition, which may adversely affect the c
public purpose for which or the company on whose
behalf the acquisition is proposed, can be done only by
issuing a notification in the official gazette. As a
necessary concomitant, it must be held that the exercise
of power by the government u/s 48(1) of the Act must be· D
~t
made known to the public at large so that those
interested in accomplishment of the public purpose for
which the land is acquired or the company concerned
may question such withdrawal by making representation
to the higher authorities or by seeking court's
intervention. The requirement of issuing a notification for
E
exercise of power u/s 48(1) of the Act to withdraw from
the acquisition of the lar:wd can also be inferred from the
judgments of this Court.* [Para 27 and 28) [741-G-H; 742-
+. A-8, F-G; 743-8-C]
F
* Municipal Committee, Bhatinda v. Land Acquisition
Collector and others (1993) 3 SCC 24; U.P. State Sugar
Corporation Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Others (1995) Supp 3
SCC 538; State of Maharashtra and another v. Umashankar
Rajabhau and others (1996) 1 sec 299; and State of T.N. G
and others v.L. Krishnan and others (1996) 7 sec 450;
--..s Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat and others (1998) 4
sec 387, relied on.
1.2. A noting recorded in the file by an officer of the
H
\\
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

·A Government or even the Minister is merely a noting 4· '
simpliciter and nothing more. It merely represents
expression of opinion by the particular individual. By no ..
'
stretch of imagination, such noting can be treated as a
decision of the Government. Even if the competent
....
B authority records its opinion in the file on merits of the t-
matter under consideration, the same cannot be termed
as a decision of the Go~ernment unless it is sanctified
and acted upon by issuing an order in accordance with ~~
Article 77(1) and (2) or 166(1) and (2) of the Constitution
c of India. The noting in the file or even a decision gets
culminated into an order affecting right of the parties only
when it is expressed in the name of the President or the
Governor, as the case may be, and authenticated in the
manner provided in Article 77(2) or Article 166(2). [Para ,I

29] [7 46-D-G]
D J'r
1.3. A noting or even a decision recorded in the file
can always be reviewed/reversed~overruled or overturned
and the court cannot take cognizance of th.e/earlier noting
or decision for exercise of the power of judicial review.
E The· notings and/or decisions recorded in the file do not
confer any right or adversely affect the right of any
person and the same can neither be challenged in a court
nor made basis for seeking relief. [Para 29] [746-G-H]
.+-
F State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh AIR 1961 SC
4~~ Bachhittar Singh v. The State of Punjab (1962) Supp.
3 SCR 713; State of Bihar and others v. Kripalu Shankar and
others (1987) 3 SCC 34; Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri
Kishan (1993) 2 SCC 84; Sethi Auto Service Station and . -'
another v. Delhi Development Authority and others (2009) 1
G
sec
180, relied on.
>-
1.4. In the instant case, representation made on
• behalf of appellant No.1 was examined by different
functionaries of the Government and ODA. The note
H
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 715
& ORS.

dated 8.6.1999, recorded by the then Minister for Urban A
Development in the file was· never translated into an order
nor the same was published in the official gazette in the
form of a notification. It was not even communicated to
the appellants or ODA. The Minister had himself left the
matter for consideration and detision by his successor, B
who finally decided on 14.7.1999 that the appellants'
request for de-notification of the land could not be
+. accepted because the development was carried out after
its acquisition and also because the land is req~ired for
a public purpose, i.e, Vasant Kunj Residential Project, c
which was held up due to prolonged litigation. Thus, the
appellants cannot rely upon the note recorded by the
then Minister on 8.6.1999 for pleading before the Court
that the Government had taken decision to withdraw from
acquisition of the land in question in terms of s.48(1) of
D
\"t the Act. [Para 38] [754-G-H; 755-A-D]
Chandra Bansi Singh v. State of Bihar (1984) 4 SCC
316, referred to.
2.1. As regards appellants' plea of discrimination and E
violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the
Government's decision not to withdraw from the
acquisition of land in question or de-notify the acquired
.J.:. land, as contained in the letter dated 9.6.2000, does not
suffer from the vice of discrimination/arbitrary exercise of F
power/non-application of mind. No evidence was
produced before the High Court and none has been
produced before this Court to show that the land in
question is identically placed qua the lands released from
acquisition. The burden to prove the charge of
G
discrimination and violation of Article 14 was on the
·appellants. It was for them to produce concrete evidence
before the court to show that their case was identical to
other persons whose land had been released from
acquisition and the reasons given by the Government for
H
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 {ADDL.) S.C.R.

A refusing to release their land are irrelevant or extraneous.
Vague and bald assertions made in the writ petition
cannot be made basis for recording a finding that the
appellants have been subjected to invidious or hostile
discrimination. That apart, the concept of equality
B enshrined in that Article is a positive concept. Thus,
Article 14 cannot be invoked for perpetuating
irregularities or illegalities. [Para 42 and 50] [758-E; 766-
·c-E; 767-B] .,+
2.2. The observations contained in the last part of
C paragraph 182 of the judgment of the Full Bench of the
High Court suggesting that the petitioner/applicant can
make representation for release of the land and the
concerned authorities can examine whether the sports
complex could serve the purpose of acquiring the land
D for the particular scheme or the scheme can be modified
or amended in respect of the 1aod in question were
nothing more than pious hope and right!y not responded
to by the Government becaus.e in the same paragraph the
Full Bench unequivocally ruled that the land was required
E for residential scheme of Vasant Kunj and the sports
complex built by the applica'nt was not in consonance
with the public· purpose for which the land was
earmarked in the scheme. [Para 42] [758-F-H; 759-A] ~

F Roshanara Begum v. Union of India, AIR 1996 Delhi 206,
referred to.
2.3. The statement made by the counsel representing
the State before this Court which finds mention in
paragraph 21 of the judgment in Murari's case** not
G amount to a commitment on behalf of the Government
that representations made for release of land will receive
favourable consideration. In any case, once this Court
had made it clear in Murari's case that in a matter involving
acquisition of thousands of acres of land, it would not be
H proper to leave out some small portions here and there
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 717
& ORS.

over which some construction may have been made, the A
decision of the Government not to withdraw from the
acquisition of the land in question cannot be faulted.
[Para 42] [759-A-C]

**Murai v. Union of India (1999) 1 SCC 15, referred to. B

3.1. As regards the appellants' plea for de-notification
of the land covered by the sports complex constructed
~ • by spending crores, admittedly, the appellants came in
possession of the land between more than 10 years ~fter
finalization of the acquisition proceedings. Thus, the C
appellants cannot plead equity and seek court's
intervention for protection of the unauthorised
constructions raised by them. Once the land is acquired
by following due process of law, the same cannot be
transferred by the land owner to another person and any D
such transfer is void and is not binding on the State. A
transferee of the -acquired land can, at best, step into the
shoes of the land-owner and lodge claim for
compensation. [Para 43] [759-G-H; 760-A-B]
E
Gian Chand v. Gopala and others (1995) 2 SCC 528;
Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur v. Dau/at
Mal Jain and others (1997) 1 SCC 37, Yadu Nandan Garg v.
State of Rajasthan and others JT (1995) 8 S.C. 179 and .l;aipur
Development Authority v. Mahavir Housing Coop. Society,
F
·• Jaipur and others (1996) 11 sec 229, referred· to

3.2. Further, s.3 of the Delhi Lands (Restrictions on
Transfer) Act, 1972 contains prohibition against transfer
of the acquired land. The land owners and the purchaser
must have been aware of the prohibition on transfer of G
the acquired land, but by taking advantage of the stay
order passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No.1753/
1980, they appear to have entered into some clandestine
transaction pursuant to which, the purchaser acquired
H
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A possession of the land and proceeded to build the sports
complex and commercial facilities thereon. The -r
appellants are conspicuously silent as to how the
purchaser came in possession of land in question after
35 years of initiation of the acquisition proceedings and
B 10 years of finalization thereof. In any case, even if any
sale transaction did take place, the same will have to be
treated as void in view of the express prohibition
contained in s.3 of the 1972 Act. [Para 44 and 46) [760-D;
761-E-H; 762-A-B] ,.+
c 3.3. It is pertinent to note that after having secured
some sort of transfer of the acquired land in stark
violation of the prohibition contained in s. ·3 of the 1972
Act, the appellants could raise massive structure
comprising cricket ground, tennis stadium, badminton
D courts, swimming pool, table tennis room, squash court,
etc. and cottages with modern facilities without even )'t··
submitting building plans for sanction by any competent
authority and without being noticed by any of the
authorities entrusted with the duty of checking illegal/
E unauthorised construction. Such illegal constructions
cannot be protected by the court by nullifying the
decision taken by the Government not to withdraw from
the acquisition of the land in question. The records
clearly reveal that the cottages at the club and its lawns
F are being used for commercial and rental purposes. [Para
47) [762-C-H]

Chandigarh Administration v. Jagjit Singh (1995) 1 SCC
745; Narain Das v. Improvement Trust, Amritsar (1973) 2
G SCC 265; Gursharan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal
Committee (1996) 2SCC 459; State of Haryana v. Ram
Kumar Mann (1997) 3 SCC 321, Faridabad CT. Scan Centre
v. D. G. Health Services (1997) 7 SCC 752; Style (Dress land)
v. Union Territory, Chandigarh (1999) 7 SCC 89; State of
H Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh (2000) 9 SCC 94; Union
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 719
& ORS.

.... of India v. International Trading Co. (2003) 5 SCC 437, Ekta A
Sakthi Foundation v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi (2006) 10 SCC ·
337, Sanjay Kumar Munjal v. Chairman, UPSC (2006) 8
SCC 42, K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P. and others (2006) 3 SCC
581, Nationallnstitute of Technology v. Chandra Sekhar
Chaudhary (2007) 1 SCC 93; Vice Chancellor, M.D. B
University, Rohtak v. Jahan Singh (2007) 5 SCC 77; State
of Kera/a and others v. K. Prasad and another (2007) 7 SCC
*~ 140; Punjab State Electricity Board and others v..Gurmail
Singh (2008) 7 SCC 245 and Panchi Devi v. State of
Rajasthan and others (2009) 2 sec 589, relied on c
3.4. The object of planned development can be
achieved by rigorous enforcement of master plans
prepared after careful study of complex issues, scientific
~ research and rationalisation of laws. This Court has, from
-'t. time to time, taken cognizance of buildings constructed D
in violation of municipal and other laws and emphasized
that no compromise should be made with the town
planning scheme and no relief should be given to the
violator of the town planning scheme etc. on the ground
that he has spent substantial amount on construction of E
the buildings etc. [Para 52] [770-E; 771-H; 772-A-B]

K. Ramdas Shenoy v. Chief Officers, Town Municipal
.J.. Council, Udipi 1974 (2) SCC 506; Dr. G.N. Khajuria v. Delhi
Development Authority 1995 (5) SCC 762; M./. Builders Pvt. F
Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu 1999 (6) SCC 464; Friends
Colony Development Committee v. State of Orissa 2004 (8)
SCC 733; M.C. Mehta v. Union of India 2006 (3) SCC 399;
and S.N. Chandrasekhar v. State of Kamataka 2006 (3) SCC
208, relied on. G
-'(. 3.5. Despite repeated judgments by the this Court
and High Courts, the builders and other affluent people
are engaged in unauthorized construction activities and

H
• 1'C

~.,.--

720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A over the years shown scant respect for regulatory
mechanism envisaged in the municipal and other similar
laws either by issuing administrative orders or enacting
laws for regularization of such illegal and unauthorized
constructions in the name of compassion and hardship.
B Such actions have done irreparable harm to the concept
'
of planned development of the cities and urban areas. It
is high time that the executive and political apparatus of
the State take serious view of the menace of illegal and .~
unauthorized constructions and stop their support to the
c lobbies of affluent class of builders and others, else even
the rural areas of the country will soon witness similar
chaotic conditions. [Para 53] [772-D-H]

D
(1999) 1 sec 1s
Case Law Reference:
AIR 1996 Delhi 206 referred to
referred to
para 5
para 5
J'-
..
(1993) 3 sec 24 relied on para 28 ~ ....

(1995) Supp 3 sec 538 relied on para 28
E
(1996) 1 sec 299 relied on para 28
(1996) 7 sec 450 relied on para 28
~·
(1998) 4 sec 387 relied on para 28
F AIR 1961 SC 493 relied on para 30 ....,.}
(1962) Supp. 3 SCR 713 relied on para 31
(1987) 3 sec 34 relied on para 32
~'
·,-'
G (1993) 2 sec 84 relied on para 33
(2009) 1 sec 180 relied on para 34 ' ')---
(1984) 4 sec 316 referred to para 39

H
..
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 721
& ORS.

(1995) 2 sec 528 relied on para 43 A

(1997) 1 sec 37 relied on para 43
JT (1995) 8 S.C. 179 relied on para 43
(1996) 11 sec 229 referred to para 43 B
(1995) 1 sec 745 relied on para 50
:(1973) 2 sec 265 relied on para 51
~~
(1996) 2SCC 459 · relied on para 51
c
(1997) 3 sec 321 relied on para 51
(1997) 1 sec 752 relied on para 51

., (1999) 1 sec 89 relied on para 51
(2000) 9 sec 94 relied on para 51 D
~
(2003) 5 sec 437 relied on para 51
(2006) 1o sec 337 relied on para 51
(2006) 8 sec 42 relied on para 51 E
(2006) 3 sec 581 relied on para 51
(2007) 1 sec 93 relied on para 51
1"
(2007) 5 sec 11 relied on para 51
F
(2001) 1 sec 140 relied on para 51
(2008) 1 sec 245 relied on para 51
(2009) 2 sec 589 relied on para 52
G
1914 (2) sec 506 relied on para 52
-(
1995 (5) sec 762 relied on para 52
1999 (6) sec 464 relied on para 52
2004 (8) sec 733 relied on para 52 H
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A 2006 (3) sec 399 relied on para 52
2006 (3) sec 20s relied on para 52
CIVIL AP PELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.
8500-8501 of 2001.
B ~

From the Judgment & Order dated 21.8.2201 of the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Civil Writ Petition No. 4777/93
and 3277 of 2000. ,j.
WITH
c
Conte.Pet. (C) 252-253 of 2001 in C.A.Nos. 8500-8501
of 2001.

Indra Jai Singh, A. Sharan, ASG, Mukul Rohtagi, .Shyam
r-
D Divan, Geeta Luthra, Jayashree Wad, Ashish Wad, Yashraj
Deora, Chirag Dave (for J.S. Wad and Co.) Indra Sawhney, )4
Binu Tamta, Sushma Suri, S.W.A. Qadri, Rahul Kaushik, Anil
Katiyar, D.S. Mahra, V.B. Sahary (for Saharya & Co.), Prabal
Bagchi, D.N. Goburdhan, Sanjeev Sahay, Shreekant N. Terdal,
M.P. Jha Ram Ekbal Roy, Harsh~ardhan Jha for appearing
-
E parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

G.S. SINGHVI, J. 1. These appeals filed against order dated ~

F 21.8.2001 of the Division Bench of Delhi High Court whereby
it refused to interfere with the Central Government's decision :-
not to exercise discretion under Section 48(1) of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short 'the Act') to withdraw from the
acquisition of land comprised in khasra Nos.35, 369/36, 37,
38, 367/21 and 365/33 of Village Masudpur, Tehsil Mehrauli,
G
Delhi are illustrative of how the litigants use the courts process
for frustrating the acquisition of land for a public purpose for
years together and seek equity after. raising illegal construction
over the acquired land under the cloak of interim order(s)
passed by one or the other court.
H
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 723
& ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
...... Background Facts: A

2. In the aftermath of partition of the country, lakhs of
people were forced to leave their habitat, properties, trade,
business, etc. in the territory which became Pakistan. Most of
them came and settled in northern parts of the country,
B
particularly Punjab and Delhi. Out of sheer compulsion, they
constructed houses, etc. without proper layouts and planning.
~~ Initially, the Government did not pay much attention to the
haphazard construction of houses and the growth of unplanned
colonies, but with rapid increase in population of the city on
account of influx of thousands of people from other parts of the
c
country, it was realized that planned development of the capital
city is sine qua non for its healthy growth. Keeping this in mind,
.... the Central Government created Delhi Development Authority
(ODA) and also set up Town Planning Organization, which was
~ entrusted with the task of giving advice on all matters pertaining D
to planning in the territory of Delhi.
.... 3. The master plan of Delhi was notified in 1962. It
envisaged development of Delhi in different segments, i.e.,
residential, commercial, institutional, industrial etc. in a scientific E
and modern way. For implementing the concept of planned
development in accordance with the notified master plan, large
~ tracts of land were acquired vide notifications dated
13.11.1959, 24.10.1961, 4.4.1964, 16.4.1964 and 23.1.1965
issued under Section 4(1) of the Act. Writ petitions filed by F
those affected by the first notification were dismissed by the
High Court and their appeals were dismissed by this Court in
the case titled Aflatoon vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1975) 4 SCC
285, with a categorical finding that the planned development
of Delhi is a public purpose for which large tracts of land could
G
·1' be acquired.

4. The acquisitions made in furtherance of other
notifications were also challenged by the land holders and other
affected persons. C.W.P. No.963/1980 filed by one Ved
Prakash was dismissed by the High Court. However, the H
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADOL.) S.C.R.

A special leave petition was entertained by this Court and leav~
was granted. ~

5. During the pendency of the civil appeal arising out of
the special leave petition filed by Ved Prakash and some writ
petitions which were directly entertained by this Court, a
B
Division Bench of the High Court made a reference to the Full
Bench for considering the questions whether the acquisition
proceeding should be treated as having been abandoned on
account of delay in making the awards and whether more than ,,-j..
one award can be passed in respect of the land covered by
c the same notification. The Full Bench dismissed all the writ
petitions and related miscellaneous applications vide judgment
titled Roshanara Begum v. Union of India, AIR 1996 Delhi 206.
Appeals filed against the judgment of Full Bench were
dismissed by this Court - Murar{ v. Union of India (1997) 1
D sec 15.

6. The land which is subject matter of these appeals was
."-1-
-
acquired vide notification dated 23~ 1.1965. Declaration under
Section 6 was published on 23.12.1968, notices under Sections
E 9 and 10 were issued in 1976 and the award was made on
22.12.1980.

7. Shri Amrit Lal Khanna, who is said to have purchased
26 big has of land comprised in khasra Nos.35, 369/36 and 37
in Village Masudpur, Tehsil Mehrauli, Delhi along with three . }-.
F others, namely, S/Shri Srivastava, Naresh Kumar and Gopal
Kishan from Shri Parmeshwar Lal vide sale deed dated
31.1.1969 challenged notification dated 23.1.1965 in W.P.
No.1753/1980. He also filed an application for interim relief. By
an order dated 9.12.1980, the High Court restrained the
G respondents in the writ petition from dispossessing the
petitioner. The writ petition was finally dismissed by the Full
Bench along with other cases. )--·

8. While the writ petition filed by Shri Amrit Lal Khanna
H was pending, Shri Satish Khosla (appellant No.2 in one of the
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 725
& ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
appeals) got registered a company in the name and style of A
-.. Shanti India Private Limited under the Companies Act, 1956
and a society in the name of Shanti Sports Club under the
Societies Registration Act, 1860. Between 1990-1993, Shri
Satish Khosla appears to have entered into some
arrangemenUagreement with Shri Amrit Lal Khanna and other B
land owners and got possession of land bearing khasra Nos.35,
369/36, 37, 38, 367/21 and 365/33 of Village Masudpur, Tehsil
Mehrauli, Delhi which had already been acquired by the Central
~-.
Government. Thereafter, he got constructed complex over the
acquired land in the name of appellant No.1 without even making c
an application to the competent authority for sanction of the
building plan. He did so because he knew that if an application
for sanction of the building plan was to be made, the same
would be rejected in view of the prohibition contained in Section
3 of the Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972 (for D
short 'the 1972 Act') against transfer of the acquired land and
~
the concerned authorities may stall the clandestine construction
activities.

9. With a view to protect his possession of the acquired
land and illegal construction raised over it, Shri Satish Khosla E
filed W.P. No.4777/1993 in the name of Shanti Sports Club of
which he himself was described as President and Shri Sunil
Nagar, Member Secretary of the Club for issue of a mandamus
-J to the Central Government to release the land under Section
48(1) of the Act. In that petition, it was claimed that with the F
construction of a sports complex, the purpose of acquisition,
i.e., planned development of the area has already been served.

10. At this stage, it is appropriate to note that before filing
W.P. No.4777/1993, Shri Satish Khosla got filed two suits for
G
injunction. The first suit bearing No.3318/1991 was filed on
29.10.1991 in the name of Shanti India Private Limited with the
prayer that DOA be restrained from digging the land or
constructing gates on the road leading to Shanti Garden. In that
suit, it was pleaded that the plaintiff is a company registered
H
'-.

726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) $.C.R.

A under the Companies Act, 1956; that it purchased 38 bighas r-
13 biswas of land comprising in khasra Nos.35, 369/36, 37,
38, 367/21 and 365/33 situated in Village Masudpur, Tehsil
Mehrauli, Delhi and floated Shanti Sports Club of India which
formed a cricket academy with a view to provide cricketing ;

B facility for its members. It was then averred that on 28.10, 1991,
DOA started digging a road, which runs from Andheria Modh
to Airport with a view to raise a wall for blocking the entire road
~ -J._
and rendering the suit property inaccessible. Along with the suit,
the plaintiff filed an application for temporary injunction. By order
c dated 4.1.1992, the Court permitted ODA to raise the wall
without obstructing the plaintiffs access to the suit property. In
the second suit bearing No.1544/1993 which was filed on
13.7.1993, appellant No.2 herein joined S/Shri Atma Ram and
Amrit Lal Khanna as plaintiffs and prayed that ODA be
restrained from dispossessing them or interfering with their
D .'f.
possession or demolishing or sealing any part of existing
structure. The subject matter of second suit was identical to the
one for which earlier suit had been instituted. In the plaint, all
the plaintiffs were described as owners of the property
measuring 38 bighas 13 biswas and it was pleaded that a
E sports club in the name of Shanti Sports Club of India was built
by plaintiff No.3, Shri Satish Khosla. It was alleged that officers
of the DOA have demolished certain structures in Village
Kishangarh on 29.6.1993 and threatened to demolish the suit }-

property. In the second suit also an order of Injunction was
F passed on 15.7.1993.

11. After filing Writ Petition No.4777/1993, Shri Satish
Khosla instituted third suit bearing No.2865/1995 in his own
name and thart>f Shri Amrit Lal Khanna claiming that they were
G Bhumidars of khasra Nos.35, 369/36 and 37 of Village
Masudpur, Tehsil Mehrauli, Delhi, total measuring 26 bighas 6 )"
biswas; that the suit property was surrounded by a boundary
wall with an iron gate; that plaintiff No.1-Satish Khosla floated
the Shanti Sports Club which runs a cricket academy for its
H
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 727
& ORS. [G:S. SINGHVI, J.]

, -
., members and that the officers of the DOA have threatened to
demolish the boundary wall and take forcible possession of an
A

area of about 250 sq. yds. on the pretext that it formed part of
.I
khasra Nos.460, 368 and 36, which was earmarked for
construction o(a dispensary. In the third suit, the court passed
l an order of temporary injunction on 12.12.1995 restraining DOA B
from disppssessing the plaintiffs or demolishing the boundary
wall.
_.}-, _
12. By filing Writ Petition No.4777/1993, Shri Satish Khosla
had hoped that he will be able to convince the High Court to
ignore the gro.ss irregularities and illegalities committed by him
c
in securing possession of the acquired land and raising
construction o.ver it and pass an order for protection of the
existing structure and also direct the Central Government to
release the land from acquisition on which sports complex ha~
already been constructed, but his hopes were belied because D
.){
the High Court did not entertain the prayer for interim relief.
Undeterred by this unexpected adverse result, Shri Satish
Khosla got filed C.~. No.8269/1993 in Writ Petition No.1753/
1980 with the prayer that the government be directed to release
the land from acquisition because the same has already been E
developed. The Full B.ench of the High Court considered similar
prayer made on behalf of other land owners, referred to the
judgment of this Court 'In Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti
.,( - Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan (1993) 2 SCC 662 and held:
F
" . . . . . . So, even if some land has been developed by the
land owner according to his own notions and may be the
construction raised by him on the said land is also serving /--
some public purpose, still that cannot be a substitute for ,,,....
planned development of Delhi which object is visualiwd-
G
by the authorities. If the public object for wh,i,ch t'fie -land is
/
sought to be acquired by the authorit~es is justified, it
cannot be frustrated because the; land owner has
developed the land and is utilising lhe land for some other
public purpose. So, this contention also does not survive
H
/
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A in view of the law held down by the Supreme Court."

""'"
..
13. The Full Bench separately dealt with Writ Petition
No.1753/1980 and C.M. No.8269/1993 and dismissed the
same by recording the following observations:
B "181. Most of the points raised in this writ petition are
common with the main points already discussed by us.
However, Mr. G. L. Sanghi, Senior Advocate, who ,...._
appeared for the applicant in C.M. 8269/93 has urged that
the land in question has been developed into a sports
c complex and modern amenities have been provided and
it would be national waste. in allowing such constructions
to be demolished.

182. It is urged that the applicant has acquired this land
D in 1969 before coming into· force of the Delhi Land
(Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972 and thus, there was 'f-
no bar in the transferee raising constructions. However,
it is the admitted fact that all these constructions have
been raised after issuance of the notification under
Section 4 of the Act. These constructions have been
E
raised obviously with complete knowledge of the fact that
this land is liable to be acquired for public purpose. It is
true that transferee of the land such as the applicant is
entitled to same benefits and rights as the transferor (See . )...
Smt. Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee, Bhatinda,
·F AIR 1970 SC 802). However, unless and until it is shown
'.
that public purpose for which the land was sought to be
acquired by issuing a notification under Section 4 and
-~ declaration under Section 6 has elapsed, it would not be
-...... Qossible for this Court to hold that mere fact that land has
G .
·~.been de,veloped by the petitioner/applicant should lead
to the co;Jc~~on that pu?lic purpose for whi9h the lan_d r
was sought to·-1,J__e acqwred has been achte_ved. It ts
pointed out to us th;Jt this particular land is required for
' .
'\.

H '
/

/
/
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 729
& ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

the residential scheme of Vasant Kunj. So, it cannot be A
said that the sports complex built up by the applicant in
the land in question is in consonance with the public
purpose for which the land has been earmarked in the
scheme of the Government. Thus, we do not think that
'f',. the petitioner/applicant can legally get the notification B
quashed on any valid grounds in the present matter.
However, the petitioner/ applicant is at liberty to make any
-+. representation to the authorities for getting the land
released and it is for the authorities to examine whether
in view of the modern sports complex having been brought c
into existence in the land in question could it serve the
public purpose of acquiring this land for that particular
scheme or the scheme is liable to be modified or amended
in respect of the land in question. However, the acquisition
proceedings are not liable to be quashed on any such
D
.I( plea."

[Emphasis added]

14. In the appeals preferred against the judgment of the
Full Bench, the land owners reiterated the prayer for issue of E
direction to the Government to release their land by asserting
that the same has already been developed by constructing
factories, workshops, godowns, schools, residential houses/
quarters, farm houses with modern facilities and sports
complex. This Court opined that the constructions raised by the F
appellants would be regarded as unauthorized because no
sanction or permission is shown to have been obtained from
the competent authority. The Court then referred to an earlier
judgment in State of U.P. v. Pista Devi (1986) 4 SCC 251 and
rejected the prayer for release of land by making the following
G
observations:-

"Some of the learned counsel for the appellants also
submitted that even the land shown in green colour in the
master plan which has been sought to be acquired but it
is not understood as to for what purpose the said land is H
730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.} S.C.R.

A being acquired. It was also submitted that there are a large
number of structures and complexes raised on the land --- ~

sought to be acquired in which schools, sports and other
recreational activities are going on. Shri G.L. Sanghi,
learned counsel appearing for the appellants in Ctvil
B Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 5771 of 1996 and Civil
Appeal arising out of SLP (C) 'No. 740 of 1996 as well as
other advocates appearing for some other appellants
submitted that there exist factories, workshops, godowns ~+-
and MCD school besides residential houses and quarters
c over the land belonging to the appellant Partap Singh
situated at Roshanara Road, Sabzi Mandi, Delhi which has
been acquired and that there exists modern and well-
developed farmhouse with modern facilities in the land
belonging to the appellant Roshanara Begum, where there
are a good number of other structures and fruit-bearing
D
trees. Consequently these areas do not require further
development as they are already developed and, therefore, . "'
the said land should be released from acquisition. Mr
Sanghi, learned counsel appearing for some of the
appellants urged that the appellant concerned had
E developed a sports complex providing modern amenities
therein and if the same is demolished it would be a great
national waste. It was, therefore, urged that such complexes
and built-up areas should be deleted from the acquisition. }.
It may be pointed out that in the master plan the land
F indicated in green colour is reserved for recreational
facilities. The recreational facilities are also part of the
planned development of Delhi and it cannot be disputed
that recreational amenities are also part of the life of the
people and an important feature of a developed society. -;

G Therefore, no legitimate objection can be made in the
acquisition of such land which is shown in green colour. ·~
So far as the structures and constructions made on the
land are concerned there is no material to show that they
were made before the issuance of notification under
H
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 731
& ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

Section 4 of the Act. It is also not clear whether such A
consttubtions were raised with or without necessary
sanction/approval of the competent authority. No
grievance therefore can legitimately be raised in that
behalf as the same would be regarded as unauthorised
and made at the risk of the landowners. Here a reference B
of a decision of this Court in the case of State of U.P. v.
Pista Devi may be made with advantage, para 7 of which
reads as under: (SCC p. 258, para 7)

"It was next contended that in the large extent of land C
acquired which was about 412 acres there were some
buildings here and there and so the acquisition of these
parts of the land on which buildings were situated was
unjustified since those portions were not either waste or
arable lands which could be dealt with under Section 17(1)
of the Act. This contention has not been considered by the D
High Court. We do not, however, find any substance in it.
The Government was not acquiring any property which was
substantially covered by buildings. It acquired about 412
acres of land on the outskirts of Meerut city which was
described as arable land by the Collector. It may be true E
that here and there there were a few super-structures. In a
case of this nature where a large extent of land is being
acquired for planned development of the urban area it
would not be proper to leave the small portions over which
some superstructures have been constructed out of the F
development scheme. In such a situation where there is
real urgency it would be difficult to apply Section 5-A of ·
the Act in the case of few bits of land on which some
structures are standing and to exempt the rest of the
property from its application." G

In the present case also a large extent of land measuring
thousands of acres has been acquired and, therefore, it
would not be proper to leave out some small portions here
and there over which some structures are said to be H
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

.A constructed out of the planned development of Delhi. We .,,
may, however, add here that during the course of the
arguments Shri Goswami, learned counsel appearing for
the respondents-State made a statement that the
Government will consider each of the structures and take
B a deCision in that respect. We, therefore, leave this issue
to the discretion of the respondent. n

[Emphasis added] -~
15. By taking cue from the observations made by the.High
c Court in last portion of paragraph 182 of its judgment and the
statement made by the State's counsel before this Court, which
finds mention in the last part of para 21 of the judgment reported
in (1999) 1 sec 15, a representation was made on behalf of
appellant no.1 on 3.10.1997 to various functionaries of the
D Government and DOA for release of the land under Section
48(1) of the Act on the ground that several parcels of the
acquired land have already been released in favour of Hamdard
Public School, St. Xavier School, Sahabad State Extension
Welfare Association, Village Put Pehlad Ten Mehrauli and
E Sahabad Daulatpur. Another representation was made on
3.6.1999 for release of the land covered by the sports complex.
These representations were considered in the meeting held in
the office of the then Minister for Urban Development which was
attended among others by the President of Shanti Sports Club ).

F and Vice Chairman of DOA and a decision is said to have
been taken to de-notify the land in question and for
regularization thereof in favour of appellant No.1. The President
of appellant No.1 is said to have been asked to discuss the
matter with the official of the ODA for working out the terms of
regularization. On 8.6.1999, the Private Secretary to the then
G
Urban Development Minister sought a report from the
Commissioner of Planning, Delhi Development Authority in
order to enable the Hon'ble Minister to take appropriate
decision. On the same day, the concerned Minister recorded
the following note in the file:-
H
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 733
& ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

"Extensive construction has taken place. This must be with A
full cooperation of the public servants concerned.

In accordance with the settled policy, no demolition can or
will be ordered. At the last meeting, I indicated that suitable
terms of regularization be settled by negotiations. I would 8
leave this now to my successor."

16. The issue was then considered by the successor
+. Minister in the Urban Development Department, who finally
decided on 14.7.1999 that the land covered by the sports
complex cannot be released because the development on the C
land was made after completion of the acquisition proceedings
and making of the award and also because the land was
needed for 'Vasant Kunj Residential Project'. This decision was
communicated to the appellants vide letter dated 9.6.2000,
which reads as under:- D
"No.J-13039/1/95/DDIB, Vol-II
Government of India,
Ministry of Urban Development & Poverty Alleviation,
(Delhi Division)
Nirman Bhawan, New Delhi. E
Dated 9th June, 2000

To
Shri Satish Khosla,
F
President,
Shanti Sports Club,
Shanti Sports Complex,
Vasant Kung,
New Delhi-110 070.
" G
Sub: De-notification of Shanti Sports Club land
comprising 50 bighas 12 biswas in respect of land
bearing Khasra No. 367/21(1-10), 32 (8-05), 355/
33 (3-07), 35 (5-19), 369/36 (11-14), 37 (8-13), 38
min (7-0) and 354/33 (4-04).
H
734 SUPREME COURT"'REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A Sir,
~

I am directe:d to refer to your representation dated
3.6.99 submitted to this Ministry & representation dated
8.6.99 enclosed as Annexure to the Writ Petition on the
above mentioned subject and to say that the matter has
B ·z-
been examined in consultation with ODA. The
Development on the land has taken place after the
acquisition of land was completed and award was
declared. The land has been acquired for the Vasant Kunj - -+ l
Residential Project which has been held up due to
c prolonged litigation. Apart from these the Hon'ble High ~-

Court in CWP No. 1753/80 filed by Shri Amrit,Lal Khanna
and subsequently the Hon'ble Supreme Court have upheld
the acquisition proceedings in favour of the Government.
r
0 2. Therefore, it has been decided that your request to
denotify the above land cannot be acceded as the land is ~
I
required for public purpose. This is for your information.
l
t-
3. This issues with approval of the competent authority.
~
I
E Yours faithfully,
Sd/- t

~,,
(R.C. Nayak)
Under Secretary (DDVA)"
).
17. The appellants challenged the aforementioned decision
F of the Government in Writ Petition No.3277/2000 mainly on the I·
following grounds:

1. That on 8th June, 1999, the then Minister for Urban
Development had taken final decision for de-
c,;_
G notification of the land and regularization thereof in
~·
favour of appellant No.1 and his successor could
not have overturned that decision. )-

2. The decision contained in letter dated June 9, 2000
is totally devoid of reasons inasmuch as while
H refusing to release the land in question in favour of
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA & 735
ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

...- appellant No.1, the Government did not take into
account the fact that a huge sports complex had
A

been built by spending substantial amount and
demolition thereof would be injurious to vast section
of the people which was benefited by the facilities
available in the sports complex. B

3. That similar representations made for release of
land were entertained and accepted by the
+. Government, but without any rhyme and reason, the
appellants were discriminated and in this manner,
their right to equality guaranteed under Article 14
c
of the Constitution has been violated.

18. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of
India, it was averred that the alleged transfer of land in favour
of the petitioners is contrary to the provisions of the 1972 Act D
~ and is, therefore, void; that no decision was taken by the then
-Minister on 8.6.1999 for release of land covered by the sports
complex and that the representation was finally rejected on
14. 7 .1999 because the land was required for public purpose,
namely, the 'Vasant Kunj Residential Project'. On the issue of E
·-·release of other parcels of land, it was pleaded that each case
is decided on its merits depending on the use to which the land

. is to be put and various other factors and release of some land
under Section 48(1) of Act does not create a right in favour of
other land owners to seek a direction for release of their land. F
19. In a separate counter affidavit filed on behalf of DDA,
details of various litigious ventures undertaken by the writ
petitioners, Amrit Lal Khanna and Atma Ram were given and
1
it was pleaded that the petitioners are not entitled for relief
because they appear to have entered into some transaction G
-~
with the land owners in violation of the negative mandate
contained in Section 3 of the 1972 Act against transfer of the
acquired land and also because by taking advantage of interim
order passed in Writ Petition No.1753/1980, they raised illegal
construction. In para 5 of the counter affidavit it was averred H
736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A that the construction was made in clear violation of the existing "
master plan. It was further averred that even in the master plan
.....
of 2001, the permitted use of the land in question is partly
residential and partly rural; that residential portion of the land
is to be used for Vasant Kunj Residential Scheme of ODA,
B which was held up due to protective orders of injunction passed
by different courts and that in the rural zone, only rural centre,
public and semi public facilities, orchards, plants, nurseries,
wireless and transmission, forest and extractive industries and ___,.
LNP are permitted.
c 20. The Division Bench of the High Court heard Writ
Petition No.4777 of 1993 along with Writ Petition No.3277 of
2000 and dismissed both the writ petitions after threadbare
consideration of various issues raised by the parties. The
Division Bench referred to the notings recorded in the file in
D the context of representations made by the appellants including
note dated 8.6.1999 recorded by the then Minister for Urban
,..
Development leaving the matter to his successor and observed:

" ...........We fail to appreciate the argument advanced on
E behalf of the petitioners that the then Minister had taken a
final decision to regularise and denotify the land in favour
of the petitioners. Assuming for the sake of argument that
on June 3, 1999 and June 8, 1999 a decision to denotify
and regularize the land was taken by the then Minister for ~
Urban Development, it seems to us that such a decision
F
will be of no consequence and will have no existence in v

the eye of law. This is so because the terms for
denotification and regularization were not settled.
Settlement, if any, was left for the future. In the event of the
parties failing to reach a settlement there would be no
G
occasion to withdraw from acquisition of the land and to
regularize the same in favour of the petitioners. We also ~-
fail to appreciate as to how it can be argued that though
the terms for regularization were still to be settled, the
decision to regularise the land in favour of the first
H
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 737
& ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

-,1--- petitioner was taken by Sh. Ram Jethmalani. The argument A
advanced on behalf of the petitioners, therefore, is
fallacious and is hereby rejected. Besides, the withdrawal
from acquisition of any land of which possession has not
been taken is governed by section 48 of the Act.
Undoubtedly, section 48 vests power in the Government B
to withdraw from acquisition except in the case provided
for in section 36 thereof. But withdrawal from acquisition
+. must necessarily be by a notification under sub-section (1)
of section 48 of the Act published in the official gazette."

21. The Division Bench held that the construction made
c
over the acquired land has to be treated as unauthorised
because the same was raised in violation of various statutory
provisions. The Division Bench then referred to master plan,
' 2001 in which land use of the area in question was shown partly
residential and partly rural and observed that use of the land D
--(
by the petitioner-club for recreational purposes is unauthorized.
The Division Bench observed that if the land is regularised in
favour of the petitioner-club, then the land use will have to be
first changed from rural to recreational and for that purpose
master plan would require amendment in accordance with E
Section 11 (A) of the Delhi Development Act, 1957, which
provides for issuance of a notice inviting objections and
suggestions with respect to the proposed modification and
consideration thereof by ODA and Central Government.
F
22. The Division Bench also considered the argument that
as per the lay out plan of the Vasant Kunj, only 11 bighas 14
biswas was required for the housing scheme and the
petitioners are prepared to part with that portion of the land and
rejected the same by recording the following observations:-
G

--t " .......... Respondent no.5 in his counter affidavit dated
August 5, 2000 has clearly stated that the land is required
for development schemes of the DOA It is pointed out that
because of the illegal construction made by the petitions
H
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A during the operation of the restraint orders the housing -i,•
scheme of the ODA has been held up resulting in loss to
the public. The affidavit also alludes to the fact that the land
for peripheral road in Sector D-7 and land meant for
primary school and dispensary has been encroached upon
B by the petitions. According to the affidavit, the permitted
land use in the area is as follows:-

(1) Partly residential.
.-+
(2) Partly for rural use.
c
The affidavit goes on to state that the Technical Committee
of the ODA has mooted a proposal for change of land use
from rural use to 'residential use', keeping in view the need
of lakhs of applicants who are on the waiting list for
allotment of flats. The recommendation of the Technical /

D
Committee is stated to have been accepted by the DOA ,... "'
and a resolution has been passed recommending change
of user of 23.08 hectares of land behind D-6, Vasant Kunj .
~

from rural to residential use. In view of the categorical stand '

of the DOA that the land is needed for housing project, the
E
argument of the petitioners that only 11 bighas and 14
biswas was required for residential use fails. It has been
noticed by the Supreme Court in Murari vs. Union of India
(supra) that there is inflow of more than one lakh people
every year to the city. It is also noted that Delhi is an ever
F expanding cosmopolitan, commercial and industrial city
where millions of multifarious, national and international
activities take place. The Supreme Court also noticed that
the city is confronted with serious housing problems. As a
sequitur, it was found that planned development of Delhi
G is a continuous and unending process. Therefore, we
cannot find fault with the decision of the Government
't-
declining to release the land from acquisition."

23. In the concluding part of its order, the Division Bench
H
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 739
& ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
took cognizance of written statement filed by Satish Khosla, A
~
.. President of Club in Suit No.3064/1996 titled as Mis Eli Lilly
Ranbaxy Limited and others v. Satish Khos/a wherein, the
plaintiff had sought a decree of permanent injunction,
restraining the defendant from letting out garden for functions
,. and parties during the currency of lease agreement entered by 8
and between M/s Eli Lilly Ranbaxy Limited and Shri Satish
Khosla in respect of cottage No.6. The Division Bench noted
that in paragraphs 4, 6 and 11 ·of the written statement, the
+. defendant had unequivocally given out that the premises are
being used not only for sporting activities but for wedding
parties, birthday parties and other festive occasions and
c
cottages constructed in the premises wsre being given to the
affluent parties like the plaintiff, several diplomats including
Deputy High Commissioner of Pakistan, Ambassador of
Kazakastan, that huge rent and other charges were being
D
...,... collected by the defendant from the plaintiff which ran into lacs
of rupees and opined that the claim of the petitioner that the
complex was being used for recreation of the members only
was fallacious.

24. On the issue of discrimination, the Division Bench held E
that even if some other lands have been de-notified under
Section 48(1 ), the same would be contrary to the purpose of
acquisition and one wrong cannot justify another wrong.
~
25. Shri Mukul Rohtagi, learned senior counsel appearing
F
for the appellants argued with his usual vehemence that the
decision taken by the then Minister for Urban Development on
8.6.1999 for regularization of the construction made on the land
in question was final and his successor was not justified in

' reviewing/reversing the same. He submitted that the
Government is bound to respect the decision taken by the then G
-t Minister in favour of the appellant and mere change of portfolio
or absence of formal notification under Section 48( 1) of the Act
cannot denude the earlier decision of its sanctity. Shri Rohtagi
emphasized that if the decision taken by one Minister is
H
740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A overruled or overturned by his successor, the credibility of the
Government will become questionable. Learned senior counsel
further argued that even if the note recorded in the file by the
then Minister for Urban Development on 8.6.1999 is not treated
as a decision taken by the Government under Section 48(1) of
8 the Act, rejection of the appellants representations is liable to
be quashed on the ground of arbitrariness and non-application
of mind. Shri Rohtagi made a pointed reference to the
observations contained in para 182 of the judgment of the Full
Bench in Roshanara Begum v. Union of India (supra) and the
C statement made by the counsel appearing on behalf of the
, .State before this Court in Murari v. Union of India (supra) that
'·the Government will consider each of the structure and take a
decision in that respect and argued that the appellants prayer
for withdrawal from acquisition could not have been rejected
on the specious grounds that development has been carried
D out after acquisition of the land or that the same is required for
Vasant Kunj Residential Project, more so, when power under
that section had already been exercised in favour of Hamdard
Public School, St. Xavier School, Shahbad Estate Extension
Welfare Association, Scindia Potteries and others. Learned
E counsel pointed out that the sports complex constructed at the
site has a cricket ground, tennis stadium, badminton courts,
swimming pool, table tennis room, squash court where the
people can play different games and sports under the watchful
eyes of expert coaches. He submitted that the facilities ).. I

F avaffable at the sports complex are of international standard,
which can be used for various purposes including the
impending Commonwealth Games and nobody is going to be
benefitc;d by demolition of the complex. Shri Rohtagi also
referred to the guidelines issued by the Government of India,
G Ministry of Urban Affairs & Employment, Department of Urban
Development vide letter No.K-13011/17/96-DDIB dated
5.3.1989 and submitted that on the one hand the Government
is encouraging public private cooperation in development of the
land for activities like construction of schools, shopping
H
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INOIA 741
& ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

complexes, community centers, ration shops, hospitals and A
.>- dispensaries, the sports complex constructed by the appellants
by spending crores of rupees is sought to be demolished after
a gap of more than 25 years. Learned counsel submitted that
there is no sports club in Vasant Kunj and the appellants are
willing to pay market price or offer half of the land for B
accomplishment of the residential project for which the land is
sought to be acquired .
.... 26. Ms. Indira Jaising, learned Additional Solicitor General
and Shri A. Sharan, learned senior advocate, appearing for the
ODA emphatically submitted that this Court should not grant any
c
indulgence to the appellants because they constructed the so
called sports complex knowing fully well that the land in question
had already been acquired. Ms. Jaising submitted that the
appellants had no business to raise construction on the
acquired land because they do not have any title over it. She D
referred to Section 3 of the 1972 Act and argued that in the
face of unequivocal prohibition against transfer of the acquired
land, the appellants could not have constructed the building and
that too without obtaining sanction or permission from any
competent authority. E

27. -In the light of the submissions made by the learned
counsel for the parties, we shall now consider whether note
... dated 8.6.1999 recorded by the then Minister for Urban
'· Development can be treated as a decision of the Government F
to withdraw from the acquisition of land in question in terms of
Section 48( 1) of the Act, which lays down that except in the case
provided for in Section 36, the Government shall be at liberty
to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which
,,.,,
possession has not been taken. Although, the plain language
G
of Section 48(1) does not give any indication of the manner or
mode in which the power/discretion to withdraw from the
acquisition of any land is required to be exercised, having
regard to the scheme of Parts II and VII of the 1894 Act, which
postulates publication of notification under Section 4(1 ),
H
742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A declaration under Section 6 and agreement under Section 42
in the official gazette as a condition for valid acquisition of the
land for any public purpose or for la company, it is reasonable
I

to take the view that withdrawal fro'm the acquisition, which may
adversely affect the public purpose for which, or the company
B on whose behalf the acquisition is proposed, can be done only
by issuing a notification in the official gazette. The decision to
acquire the land for a public purpose is preceded by
consideration of the matter at various levels of the Government.
The revenue authorities conduct survey for determining the
,+
c location and status of the land and feasibility of its acquisition
for a public purpose. The final decision taken by the competent
authority is then published in the official gazette in the form of
a notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act. Likewise,
declaration made under Section 6 of the Act is published in the
official gazette. The publication of notifications under Section
D
4(1) has two-fold objectives. In the first place, it enables the land
owner(s) to lodge objections against the proposed acquisition.

E
Secondly, it forewarns the owners and other interested persons
not to change the character of the land and, at the same time,
make them aware that if they enter into any transaction with
respect to the land proposed to be acquired, they will do so at,
-
their own peril. When the land is acquired on behalf of a
company, consent of the appropriate government is a must. The
company is also required to execute an agreement in terms of
~
Section 41 of the Act which is then published in the official ~
F gazette in terms of Section 42 thereof. As a necessary
concomitant, it must be held that the exercise of power by the
government under Section 48(1) of the Act must be made
known to the public at large so that those interested in
accomplishment of the public purpose for which the land is - ~'-

G acquired or the concerned company may question such
withdrawal by making representation to the higher authorities
or by seeking courts intervention. If the decision of the
Government to withdraw from the acquisition of land is kept
secret and is not published in the official gazette, there is every
H
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 743
& ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
likelihood that unscrupulous land owners, their agents and A
wheeler-dealers may pull strings in the power corridors and
clandestinely get the land released from acquisition and thereby
defeat the public purpose for which the land is acquired.
Similarly, the company on whose behalf the land is acquired
may suffer incalculable harm by unpublished decision of the 8
Government to withdraw from the acquisition.

28. The requirement of issuing a notification for exercise
"4- . of power under Section 48(1) of the Act to withdraw from the
acquisition of the land can also be inferred from the judgments
of this Court in Municipal Committee, Bhatinda v. Land c
Acquisition Collector and others (1993) 3 SCC 24 (para 8),
U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. v. State of U.P. and others
=\
( (1995) Supp 3 SCC 538 (para 3), State of Maharashtra and
another v. Umashankar Rajabhau and others (1996) 1 SCC
299 (para 3) and State of T.N. and others v. L. Krishnan and D
-< others (1996) 7 SCC 450 (para 7). In Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v.
State of Gujarat and others (1998) 4 SCC 387, the Court
considered the question whether the power under Section 48(1)
of the Act can be exercised by the Government without notifying
the factum of withdrawal to the beneficiary of the acquisition. It E
· was argued that in contrast to Sections 4 and 6, Section 48(1)
of the Act does not contemplate is.sue of any notification and
withdrawal from the acquisition can be done by an order
~ simpliciter. It was further argued that power under Section 21
of the General Clauses Act can be exercised for withdrawing F
notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6. While rejecting the
argument, the Court observed:

". . .. . When Sections 4 and 6 notifications are issued,
'\ much has been done towards the acquisition process and
that process cannot be reversed merely by rescinding G
those notifications. Rather it is Section 48 under which,
after withdrawal from acquisition is made, compensation
due for any damage suffered by the owner during the
course of acquisition proceedings is determined and
H
744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A given to him. It is, therefore, implicit that withdrawal from ,--4.,
acquisition has to be notified.

31. Principles of law are, therefore, well settled. A
notification in the Official Gazette is required to be issued
if the State Government decides to withdraw from the
8 acquisition under Section 48 of the Act of any land of
which possession has not been taken. An owner need not
be given any notice of the intention of the State
,~"
Government to withdraw from the acquisition and the State
Government is at liberty to do so. Rights of the owner are
c well protected by sub-section (2) of Section 48 of the Act
and if he suffered any damage in consequence of the
acquisition proceeding~ _he is to be compensated and
sub-section (3)of Section 48 provides as to how such
compensation is to be determined. There is, therefore, no
D difficulty when it is the owner whose land is withdrawn from
acquisition is concerned. However, in the case of a
company, opportunity has to be given to it to show cause
against any order which the State Government proposes
.
>.

to make withdrawing from the acquisition. Reasons for this
E are not far to seek. After notification under Section 4 is
issued, when it appears to the State Government that the
land in any locality is needed for a company, any person
interested in such land which has been notified can file
objections under Section 5-A(1) of the Act. Such objections ~

F are to be made to the Collector in writing and who after
giving the objector an opportunity of being heard and after
hearing of such objections and after making such further
enquiry, if any, as the Collector thinks necessary, is to
make a report to the State Government for its decision. I
Then the decision of the State Government on the
G
objections is final. Before the applicability of other
provisions in the process of acquisition, in the case of a
-,....
company, previous consent of the State Government is
required under Section 39 of the Act nor (sic) unless the
company shall have executed the agreement as provided
H
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 745
& ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

in Section 41 of the Act. Before giving such consent, A
Section 40 contemplates a previous enquiry. Then
compliance with Rules 3 and 4 of the Land Acquisition
(Company) Rules, 1963 is mandatorily required. After the
stage of Sections 40 and 41 is reached, the agreement
so entered into by the company with the State Government B
is to be published in the Official Gazette. This is Section
42 of the Act which provides that the agreement on its
publication would have the same effect as if it had formed
part of the Act. After having done all this, the State
Government cannot unilaterally and without notice to the c
company withdraw from acquisition. Opportunity has to be
given to the company to show cause against the proposed
action of the State Government to withdraw from
acquisition. A declaration under Section 6 of the Act is
made by notification only after formalities under Part VII of
0
-·{ the Act which contains Sections 39 to 42 have been
complied and the report of the Collector under Section 5-
A(2) of the Act is before the State Government who
consents to acquire the land on its satisfaction that it is
needed for the company. A valuable right, thus, accrues E
to the company to oppose the proposed decision of the
State Government withdrawing from acquisition. The State
Government may have sound reasons to withdraw from
acquisition but those must be made known to the
company which may have equally sound reasons or
perhaps more, which might persuade the State F
Government to reverse its decision withdrawing from
acquisition. In this view of the matter it has to be held that

-· Yadi (memo) dated 11-4-1991 and Yadi (memo) dated 3-
5-1991 were issued without notice to the appellant (L&T
Ltd.) and are, thus, not legal."

(emphasis added)
G

· 29. The issue deserves to be considered from another
angle. All executive actions of the Government of India and the
H
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL) S.C.R.

A Government of a State are required to be taken in the name of ~
the President or the Governor of the concerned State, as the
case may be [Articles 77(1) and 166(1)]. Orders and other
instruments made and executed in the name of the President
or the Governor of a State, as the case may be, are required
B to be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in
rules to be made by the President or the Governor, as the case
may be [Articles 77(2) and 166(2)]. Article 77(3) lays down that
the President shall
\
make rules for more convenient transaction A-
of the business
.
oNhe
' Government of India, and for the allocation
c among Ministers of the said business. Likewise, Article 166(3)
lays down that the Governor shall make rules for the more
convenient transaction of the business of the Government of the
State, and for the allocation among Ministers of the said
business insofar as it is not business with respect to which the
Governor is by or under this Constitution required to act in his
D
discretion. This means that unless an order is expressed in the )-
name of the President or the Governor and is authenticated in
the manner prescribed by the rules, the same cannot be treated
as an order on behalf of the Government. A noting recorded in "
the file is merely a noting simpliciter and nothing more. It merely
E
represents ~xpression of opinion by the particular individual. By
no stretch of imagination, such noting can be treated as a
decision of the Government. Even if the competent authority
records its opinion in the file on the merits of the matter under
consideration, the same cannot be termed as a decision of the
+
F Government unless it is sanctified and acted upon by issuing
an order in accordance with Article 77(1) and (2) or Article
166(1) and (2). The noting in the file or even a decision gets
--
culminated into an order affecting right of the parties only when
it is expressed in the name of the President or the Governor, ·~
G as the case may be, and authenticated in the manner provided
in Article 77(2) or Article 166(2). A noting or even a decision
recorded in the file can always be reviewed/reversed/overruled
or overturned and the court cannot take cognizance of the
earlier noting or decision for exercise of the power of judicial
H review.
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 747
& ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

30. In State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh AIR 1961 A
SC 493, this Court considered the question whether a
provisional decision taken by the Council of Ministers to
reinstate an employee could be made basis for filing an action
for issue of a mandamus for reinstatement and held:
B
".......... We are unable to understand this argument. Even
if the Council of Ministers had provisionally decided to
reinstate the respondent that would not prevent the Council
from reconsidering the matter and coming to a contrary
conclusion later on, until a final decision is reached by them C
and is communicated to the Rajpramukh in the form of
advice and acted upon by him by issuing an order in that
behalf to the respondent."

31. A somewhat similar question was considered by the
Constitution Bench in Bachhittar Singh v. The State of Punjab D
(1962) Supp. 3 SCR 713, in the backdrop of the argument that
once the Revenue Minister of PEPSU had recorded a note in
the file that the punishment imposed on the respondent be
reduced from dismissal to that of reversion, the same could not
be changed/reviewed/overruled by the Chief Minister. This E
Court proceeded on the assumption that the note recorded by
the Revenue Minister of PEPSU in the file was an order,
referred to the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution and
held:

- "Merely writing something on the file does not amount to
an order. Before something amounts to an order of the
State Government two things are necessary. The order
F

has to be expressed in the name of the Governor as
...,, . required by clause (1) of Art.166 and then it has to be
communicated. As already indicated, no formal order G
modifying the decision of the Revenue Secretary was ever
made. Until such an order is drawn up the State
Government cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as bound
by what was stated in the file. As along as the matter
rested with him the Revenue Minister could well score out H
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

. !
A his remarks or minutes on the file and write fresh ones. -~

The business of State is a complicated one and has
necessarily to be conducted through the agency of a large
numb-er of officials and authorities. The constitution, ~
~c
therefore, requires and so did the Rules of Business
8
framed by the Rajpramukh of PEPSU provide, that the
action must be taken by the authority concerned in the
name of the Rajpramukh. It is not till this formality is
observed that the action can be regarded as that of the -~
State or here, by the Rajpramukh. We may further observe
c that, constitutionally speaking, the Minister is no more than
an adviser and that the head of the State, the Governor or
Rajpramukh (Till the abolition of that office by the
Amendment of the Constitution in 1956), is to act with the
aid and advice of his Council of Ministers. Therefore, until
D such advice is accepted by the Governor whatever the
Minister or the Council of Ministers may say in regard to
r
a particular matter does not become the action of the State
until the advice of the Council of Ministers is accepted or
deemed to be accepted by the Head of the State. Indeed,
E it is possible that after expressing one opinion about a
particular matter at a particular stage a Minister or the
Council of Ministers may express quite a different opinion,
one which may be completely opposed to the earlier
opinion. Which of them can be regarded as the 'order' of .....

-
~

F the State Government ? Therefore to make the opinion
amount to a decision of the Government it must be
communicated to the person concerned. In this connection
we may quote the following from the judgment of this Court

G
in the State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh. . ...
"Mr. Gopal Singh attempted to argue that before the
final order was passed the Council of Ministers had
decided to accept the respondent's representation
and to reinstate him, and that, according to him, the
respondent seeks to prove by calling the two
H
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 749
& ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
original orders. We are unable to understand this A
argument. Even if the Council of Ministers had
provisionally decided to reinstate the respondent
that would not prevent the Council from
reconsidering the matter and coming to a contrary
conclusion later on, until a final decision is reached B
by them and is communicated to the Rajpramukh
in the form of advice and acted upon by him by
~ issuing an order in that behalf to the respondent."

Thus it is of the essence that the order has to be
communicated to the person who would be affected. by that
c
order before the State and that person can be bound by
that order. For, until the order is communicated to the
person affected by it, it would be open to the Council of
~ Ministers to consider the matter over and over again
and, therefore, till its communication the order cannot be D
'-"I\"
regarded as anything more than provisional in character.

We are, therefore, of the opinion that the remarks or the
order of the Revenue Minister, PEPSU-are of no avail to
the appellant." E
[emphasis added]

32. In State of Bihar and others v. Kripalu Shankar and
others (1987) 3 SCC 34, a two-Judge Bench while considering
the question whether notings recorded in the file would F
constitute civil ol\criminal contempt within the meaning of
Section 2(b) and (c) of the Contempt of Courts Act observed
as under:-

"14. Now, the functioning of Government,,.in a State is G
governed by Article 166 of the Constitution, which lays
·-+ down that there shall be a council of ministers with the
Chief Minister at the head, to aid and advise the Governor
in the exercise of his functions except where he is required
to exercise his functions under the Constitution, in his
H
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 {ADDL.) S.C.R.

A discretion. Article 166 provides for the conduct of
---..(;
Government business. It is useful to quote this article:

166 (1) All executive action of the government of a
State shall be expressed to be taken in the name
of the Governor.
B
(2) Orders and other instruments made and
executed in the name of the Governor shall be
authenticated in such manner as may be specified
in rules to be made by the Governor, and the validity
>-
c of an order or instrument which is so authenticated
shall not be called in question on the ground that it
is not an order or instrument made or executed by
the Governor.

D (3) The Governor shall make rules for the more
convenient transaction. of the business of the
~
government of the State, and for the allocation
among Ministers of the said business insofar as it
is not business with respect to which the Governor
is by or under this Constitution required to act in his
E
discretion.

15. Article 166(1) requires that all executive action of the
State Government shall be expressed to be taken in th~
name of the Governor. This clause relates to cases where -.,...
F the executive action has to be expressed in the shape of
a formal order or notification. It prescribes the mode in
which an executive action has to be expressed. Noting by
an official in the departmental file will not, therefore, come
within this article nor even noting by a Minister. Every
G executive decision need not be as laid down under Article
166( 1) but when it takes the form of an order it has to
comply with Article 166(1). Article 166(2) states that orders
and other instruments made and executed under Article
166(1), shall be authenticated in the manner prescribed.
H
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF.INDIA 751
& ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

While clause (1) relates to the mode of expression, clause A
~
(2) lays down the manner in which the order is to be
authenticated and clause (3) relates to the making of the
rules by the Governor for the more convenient transaction
of the business of the Government. A study of this article,
therefore, makes it clear that the notings in a file get B
culminated into an order affecting right of parties only when
it reaches the head of the department and is expressed
~
in the name of the Governor, authenticated in the manner
provided in Article 166(2)."

33. In Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri Kishan (1993) 2 c
SCC 84, this Court made a detailed reference to the records
and affidavit filed on behalf of the Rajasthan Housing Board and
held:
...- "From the above material, it is clear that there was no final D
~ decision at any time to de-notify the said lands. A tentative
decision was no doubt taken in February 1990 but before
it could be implemented the Government thought it
necessary to ascertain in views of the Housing Board and
to find c;>ut as to what the Board had done upon the land, E
what structures it had raised and what amount it had spent
so that the Board could be compensated while delivering
the possession back to the Housing Society. Before this
could be done there was a change in the Government and
the said tentative decision was reversed. In this view of the F
matter, it is not necessary for us to go into the question
whether there was a communication of the 'decision' of the
Government to the petitioner. The communication must be
of a final decision and not of a provisional or tentative
decision."
G
34. The issue was recently considered in Sethi Auto
Service Station and another v. Delhi Development Authority
and others (2009) 1 sec 180. In that case, the appellant had
claimed relocation of two petrol pumps which had become non-
H
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A profitable on account of construction of 8 lane express highway
-!;
between Delhi and Gurgaon. The appellants relied on the
notings recorded by the technical committee headed by the
Vice Chairman, ODA. It was urged that the technical committee
had recommended relocation of the petrol pumps, it was not
B open to DOA to do a volte face and reject the representation
of the appellants. On behalf of the respondents, it was urged
that mere notings and proposal recorded in the files of DOA
did not create any right in favour of the appellants and the final
j,.
decision taken by DOA against relocation of petrol pumps was
c consistent with the policy in vogue. This Court approved the
High Court's refusal to interfere with DDA's decision and
·Observed:

"It is trite to state that notings in a departmental file do not
have the sanction of law to be an effective order. A noting
D by an officer is an expression of his viewpoint on the ""'-'
subject. It is no more than an opinion by an officer for ·~

internal use and consideration of the other officials of the
department and for the benefit of the final decision-making
authority. Needless to add that internal notings are not
E meant for outside exposure. Notings in the file culminate
into an executable order, affecting the rights of the parties,
only when it reaches the final decision-making authority in
the department, get$ his approval and the final order is
communicated to the person concerned." -..,..
F
35. In C.W.P. No.325/1982 - Ram Phal v. Union of India,
which was decided by the Full Bench of the High Court along
with other cases, vide Roshanara Begum v. Union of India,
an application was moved by the petitioners with the prayer that
the acquisition proceedings may be quashed because the
G
Central Government has issued an order under Section 48(1)
of the Act for withdrawal of the acquisition proceedings in ~-
respect of the land which was subject matter of the writ petition.
On behalf of the Central Government, it was urged that no order
has been made by the Central Government for withdrawing from
H
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 753
& ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
'~ acquisition of the land in question and communication regarding A
withdrawal was sent due to misreading of orders made in the
file. Counsel representing the Union of India went to the extent
of arguing that if the court was to infer that any such order has
been made by the Central Government, then the same be
treated as non est and declared as illegal and void because B
the land was being acquired for planned development of Delhi.
It was argued that before an order under Section 48 could come
~
into play, the same is required to be published in the official
gazette in the same manner in which notification under Section
4 and declaration under Section 6, are published. The Full c
Bench adverted to Section 48(1) of the Act and observed:
"Section 48 of the Act lays down that Government shall be
at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of
which possession has not been taken. The original record
" -;1f- in which the Minister concerned had made the order was D
produced before us which we have perused and as a
matter of fact, the learned counsel for the petitioner has
·placed on record the photocopies of the notings on which
·-~the order of the Minister has been accorded. It is evident
that if this Court is to come to the conclusion on reading E
the said record that in fact no order has been made by the
Minister concerned which amounts to withdrawing from
~
acquisition, mere communication of the misconstrued
order by the officials would not have the effect of an order
of the Government withdrawing from the acquisition." F

36. The Full Bench then examined the notings in the file,
referred to Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and
concluded:

"157. Section 48 by itself does not require publication of G
such an order in the Official Gazette. As a matter of fact,
there is no repugnancy between the provisions of Section
48 of the Act as read with Section 21 of the General
Clauses Act. The purpose of issuance of publication of
notifications and declarations under Sections 4 and 6 of H
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 13 (ADDL.) S.C,R.

A the Act in Official Gazette are that public at large should -o4:\
become aware of the factum that the land so notified \s to
be acquired for public purpose so that peopte at· large
should not suffer any monetary loss or any other
inconveniences in entering into any deals in respect of
B such land, subject-matter of compulsory acq~i~jtion. As an
analogy of the purpose enshrined in notification issued
under Section 4 and declaration issued under Section 6
for their: publication in Official Gazette is also, in our view, ..}....

linked to the order which is made undefSection 48 of the
c Act for withdrawing from such acquisition and unless the
same is also published in the manner as the original
notifications, the said object could not be ach.ieved i.e. of
giving public notice to the public at large."

37. As a result of the above discussion, we hold that the
D noting recorded in the official files by the officers of the-
~
""
Government at different levels and even the Ministers do not
become decision of the Government unless the same is
sanctified and acted upon by issuing an·orc;fer in the name of
the President or Governor, as the case may, authenticated in
E the manner provided in Articles 77(2) and 166(2) and is
communicated to the affected persons. The notings and/or
dec,isions recorded in the file do not confer any right or
adversely affect the right of any person and the same can
neither be challenged in a court nor made basis for seeking
F relief. Even if the competent authority records noting in the file,
which indicates that some decision has been taken by the
concerned authority, the same can always be reviewed by the
same authority or reversed or over-turned or overruled by higher
functionary/authority in the Government.
G
38. Reverting to the case in hand, we find that
representation made on behalf of appellant No.1 was
examined by different functionaries of the Government and
DOA. On 8.6. t999, the then Minister for Urban Development
recorded a note in the file that extensive construction has taken
H
SHANTI. SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 755
& ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
place and this must have been possible with the cooperation A
of the concerned officers and. opined that no demolition can or
will be ordered as per the policy. He then recorded that suitable
terms for regular\zation be settled by negotiations and left the
matter there for consideration by his successor. That noting was
never translated into an order nor the same was published in B
the official gazette in the form of a notification. It was not even
communicated to the appellants or DOA. The reason for this
is not far to seek. The Minister had himself left the matter for
consideration and decision by his successor. The latter finally
decided on. 14.7.1999 that the appellants request for de- c
notification of the land cannot be accepted because the
development was carried out after its acquisition and also
because the land is required for a public purpose, i.e, Vasant
Kunj Residential Project, which was held up due to prolonged
litigation. This being the position, the appellants cannot rely
0
upon t~e note recorded by the then Minister on 8.6.1999 for
pleading before the Court that the Government had taken
decision to withdraw from the acquisition of land in question in
terms of Section 48( 1) of the Act.

39. Before leaving this part of the discussion, we consider E
it necessary to observe that there have been several cases of
exercise of power under Section 48(1) of the Act for extraneous
considerations defeating the very purpose of acquisition. Two
such instances have been considered by this Court in Chandra
Bansi Singh v. State of Bihar (1984) 4 SCC 316 and F
Rajasthan Housing Board v. Sri Kishan (supra). The facts of
Chandra Bansi Singh's case were that on 19.8.1974, the
Government of Bihar issued notification under Section 4 for
acquisition of 1034.94 acres of land in village Digha for the
purpose of construction of houses by the Bihar State Housing G
Board. After consideration of objections, declaration under
Section 6 was issued and published on 20.2.1976. On
8.11.1976, a representation was made by one Mr. Ram Avtar
Shastri, Member of Parliament for withdrawing the acquisition
proceedings. The same was rejected in December, 1976. H
756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A However, before compensation could be disbursed to the land
--4r\
owners, general elections were announced and, therefore, the
matter was deferred and put in cold storage. On 24.5.1980,
4.03 acres land belonging to Pandey families was released
from acquisition. In the same year, a writ petition was filed in
B the High Court challenging release of land in favour of Pandey
families but the same was withdrawn. In May 1981, another writ
petition was filed on the same subject and it was pleaded that
release of land in favour of Pandey families is violative of Article
~
14 of the Constitution. The State Government supported the
release of land in favour of Pandey families by asserting that
c they had put up buildings with boundary walls in the entire area
covered by 4.03 acres and that it would have been difficult for
government to demolish the construction. This was controverted
by the petitioner, who produced several photographs to show
that no huge buildings or houses were constructed and only _.
0 small hutment had been put up on the land. After considering }.

r-
the entire record, this Court ruled that release of land in favour
of Pandey families was pure and simple act of favouritism
without there being any legal or constitutional justification for the
same and declared the action of the State Government to be
E violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court also
declared that the entire acquisition will be deemed to be valid
and the land released to Pandey families would form part of
the acquisition \nitiated vide notification dated 19.8.1974.

F 40. The facts of Sri Kishan's case were that 2570 bighas
of land (approximately equal to 1580 crores) was acquired for
the benefit of the Rajasthan Housing Board by publication of
notification under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(4) of the
Act. The learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the
G writ petitions involving challenge to the acquisition proceedings.
On appeals filed by the land owners, Judges constituting the
Division Bench expressed divergent opinions. Thereupon, the
matter was referred to the larger Bench. By a majority judgment,
the larger Bench quashed the notification issued under Section
H 17(4) and declaration issued under Section 6. During the
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 757
& ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

-,. pendency of appeals before this Court, a writ petition was filed A
by New Pink City Grah Nirman Sahkari Sangh. Therein it was
pleaded that by virtue of the decision of the Minister-in-charge,
Urban Development Department and the Chief Minister, the , ....
State Government must be deemed to have withdrawn from the L' ~·,
acquisition within the meaning of Section 48(1) of the Act. This B
Court noted that the society, which claims to have purchased
525 bighas of land from khatedars, represented the Government
-( to de-notify the land. The then Minister-in-charge, Urban
Development Department recorded a decision in the file on
July 20, 1984 that the lands be released, but his decision was c
overruled by the Chief Minister. After about five years, the
society again represented for de-notification of the land. The
Minister for Urban Development made recommendation in
favour of the society. This time, the Chief Minister agreed with
". the Minister by ob.serving that the land of the society was D
. .._.,,._, regularised according to the decision of the Cabinet. Thereafter,
Deputy Secretary, Urban Development and Housing
Department wrote a letter to the Secretary of the Housing Board
that the Government has decided to release the land of the
society. A copy of the letter was marked to the society. During
E
the pendency of writ petition before this Court, an additional
affidavit of the Secretary, Rajasthan Housing Board was filed
with a categorical assertion that at no point of time any
notification was issued withdrawing from the acquisition and the
-t" Beri Commission, which was constituted to look into the
illegalities and irregularities committed by functionaries and F
officials of the previous Government, recorded a categorical
finding that the decision to de-acquire the land of the petitioner
- society was in contravention of the earlier decision of the
Cabinet and was also contrary to law and- against public
interest. This Court held that the notings recorded by the G
Minister and Chief Minister for release of land in favour of the
society, were totally unjustified.

41. The next question which needs consideration is
whether the decision contained in letter dated 9.6.2000 is liable H
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A to be nullified on the ground of arbitrariness and violation of ·4'
Article 14 of the Constitution. The plea of the appellants is that
even though the. construction of the sports complex and other
buildings may not be in conformity with law, the Government is
duty-bound to treat them at par with others like Hamdard Public
8 School, St. Xavier School, Shahbad Estate Extension Welfare
Association, Scindia Potteries etc., whose land was released
from acquisition despite the fact that constructions were made
after issue of notification under Section 4(1) and declaration J..
under Section 6 of the Act and, in some cases, even after the
c award was made. Their further plea is that in view of the
observations contained in· the last part of para 182 of the
judgment of the Full Bench in Roshanara Bgum v. Union of
India (supra) and statement made by the counsel appearing
on behalf of the State, which finds mention in para 21 of the
judgment of this Court in Murari v. Union of India {supra), the
·.
D
representations made by them for release of the land couid not ~
(

have been rejected on the grounds that the construction has
been raised after the acquisition of land and the acquired land
is needed for Vasant Kunj Housing Project.

E 42. In our opinion, the Government's decision not to
withdraw from the acquisition of land in question or de-notify
the acquired land, does not suffer from the vice of discrimination
or arbitrary exercise of power or non application of mind. With
due deference to the Full Bench of the High Court which -+-
F disposed. of the batch of writ petitions and miscellaneous
applications, the observations contained in the last part of
paragraph 182 of the judgment suggesting that the petitioner/
applicant can make representation for release of the land and
the concerned authorities can examine whether the sports
G 'complex could serve the purpose of acquiring the land for the
particular scheme or the scheme can be modified or amended
in respect of the land in question were nothing more than pious
hope and the Government rightly did not take them seriously
because in the same paragraph the Full Bench unequivocally
H ruled that the ·1and is required for residential scheme of Vasant
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 759
& ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

.,. Kunj and the sports complex built by the applicant was not in A
consonance with the public purpose for which the land was
earmarked in the scheme. The statement made by the counsel
representing the State before this Court which finds mention
in paragraph 21 of the judgment in Murari v. Union of India
(supra) was neither here nor there. It did not amount to a B·
commitment on behalf of the Government that representations
made for release of land will receive favourable consideration.
...... In any case, once this Court had made it clear in Murari v.
Union of India (supra) that in a matter involving acquisition of
thousands of acres of land, it would not be proper to leave out c
some small portions here and there over which some
construction may have been made, the decision of the
Government not to withdraw from the acquisition of the land in
question cannot be faulted.
-
- 43. The appellants' plea that the Government ought to have
de-notified the land covered by the sports complex because the
same has been built by spending crores of rupees and is being
D

used by a large section of people sounds attractive, but, after
having given serious thought to the entire matter, we are
convinced that the Government rightly refused to exercise E
discretion under Section 48(1) of the Act for de-notifying the
acquired land and the High Court did not commit any error
whatsoever by refusing to fall in the trap of alluring argument
~
that demolition of the sports complex built by spending
substantial amount will be a waste of national wealth and F
nobody will be benefited by it. The appellants have not denied
the fact that the land on which the sports complex has been
constructed was acquired by the Government by issuing
notification dated 23.1.1965 under Section 4( 1) of the Act,
which culminated in the making of award dated 22.12.1980. It G
is also not their case that the construction activity was started
----' prior to initiation of acquisition proceedings. Rather, their
admitted stance is that" they came in possession of the land
between 1990-1993, i.e., more than 10 years after finalization
of the acquisition proceedings. This being the position, the H
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.} S.C.R. .
A appellants cannot plead equity and seek court's intervention for ~'
protection of the unauthorised constructions raised by them. It
is trite to say that once the land is acquired by following due
process of law, the same cannot be transferred by the land
owner to another person and that any such transfer is void and
B is not binding on the State. A transferee of the acquired land
can, at best, step into the shoes of the land-owner and· 1odge
claim for compensation - Gian Chand v. Gopala and others
(1995) 2 SCC 528, Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority, .>
Jaipur v. Dau/at Mal Jain and others (1997) 1 SCC 37, Yadu
c Nandan Garg v. State of Rajasthan and others JT (1995) 8
S.C. 179 and Jaipur Development Authority v. Mahavir
Housing Coop. Society, Jaipur and others (1996) 11 SCC
229.

44. The appellants have another unsurmountable hurdle in \-

D the form of Section 3 of the 1972 Act, which contains prohibition -r:-
against transfer of the acquired land. That section reads as
under:-

"Prohibition on transfer of lands acquired by Central
E Government.- No person shall purport to transfer by sale,
mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any land or part thereof
situated in the Union territory of Delhi, which has been
acquired by the Central Government under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1984 or under any other law providing for -+
F acquisition of land for a public purpose." /

Section 4 which contains provision for regulation of transfer of
lands which are under acquisition also reads as under:-
"Regulation on transfer of lands in relation to which
G acquisition proceedings have been initiated. - No person
shall, except with the previous permission in writing of the
competent authority, transfer or purport to transfer by sale,
mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any land or part thereof
situated in the Union territory of Delhi, which· is proposed
H
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 761
& ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
to be acquired in connection with the Scheme and in A

"" relation to which a declaration to the effect that such land
or part thereof is needed for a public purpose having been
made by the Central Government under section 6 of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (1 of 1894) the Central
Government has not withdrawn form the acquisition under 8
section 48 of that Act."

45. The distinction between the above reproduced two
-f.-' provisions is that while Section 3 contains an absolute
prohibition on transfer of the acquired land by sale, mortgage,
gift, lease or otherwise, Section 4 declares that no person shall,
c
except with the previous permission in writing of the competent
authority, transfer or purport to transfer by sale etc. of any land
or part thereof, which is proposed to be acquired in connection
with the scheme and in relation to which a declaration to the
r-' effect that such land or part thereof is needed for a public D
~ urpose has been made by the Central Government and the
Central Government has not withdrawn from the acquisition
under Section 48(1).

46. The present case falls within the ambit of Section 3 of E
the 1972 Act. The land owners and Shri Satish Khosla must
have been aware of the prohibition on transfer of the acquired
land, but by taking advantage of the stay order passed by the
High Court in Writ Petition No.1753/1980, they appear to have
entered into some clandestine transaction pursuant to which F
Shri Satish Khosla acquired possession of the land and
proceeded to build the sports complex and commercial
facilities to which reference has been made in the order of the
Division Bench. We have described the transaction as
clandestine because the appellants are conspicuously silent as
G
to how Shri Satish Khosla came in possession of land in
· question after 35 years of initiation of the acquisition
proceedings and 1O years of finalization thereof. During the
course of hearing, Shri Mukul Rohtagi, learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellants did make a statement that his
H
I

762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A client were put in possession in furtherance of an agreement
of sale, but no document has been produced in support of this
......
statement. Therefore, it is not possible to take cognizance of
the so-called agreement of sale. In any case, even if such a
transaction did take place, the same will have to be treated as
B void in view of the express prohibition contained in Section 3 . "'
of the 1972 Act.

47. Although, the then Minister for Urban Development,
_.+..
who recorded note dated 8.6.1999, was extremely
magnanimous to the appellants when he wrote that the
c extensive construction must have been made with full
cooperation of public servants concerned, but having carefully
examined the entire record, we have no hesitation to observe
that the construction of this magnitude could not have been
possible, but for the active connivance of the concerned public '-{
D servants who turned blind eye to the huge structure being built
. -:r:--
on the acquired land without any sanctioned plan. We are
amazed to note that after having secured some sort of transfer
of the acquired land in stark violation of the prohibition
contained in Section 3 of the 1972 Act, the appellants could
E raise massive structure comprising cricket ground, tennis
stadium, badminton courts, swimming pool, table tennis room,
squash court, etc. and cottages with modern facilities without
even submitting building plans for sanction by any competent
authority and without being noticed by any of the authorities i-
F entrusted with the duty of checking illegal/unauthorised
construction. This mystery may perhaps never be solved
because the officers responsible for ignoring the blatant
violation of Section 3 of the 1972 Act, Delhi Development
Authority Act and Building Rules, Regulations and By.:taws must
G have either retired or moved to higher positions in the
administration where they will be able to block any inquiry in
the matter. Be that as it may, such illegal constructions cannot :)----.

be protected by the court by nullifying the decision taken by the
Government not to withdraw from the acquisition of the land in
H question.
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB ~ ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 763
& ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

..,... 48. At this stage, we may also take cognizance of the A
commercial activities being undertaken in what has been
described by the appellants as sports complex simpliciter. The
nature and magnitude of the commercial activities may never
have been revealed but for the fact that the officer representing
the respondents could bring to the High Court's notice the B
written statement filed by Shri Satish Khosla in Suit No. 3064/
1996- M/s. Eli Lilly Ranbaxy Ltd. and others v. Satish Khosla.
In that suit, the plaintiff had sought a decree of permanent
.... injunction restraining the defendant from. letting out the garden
for parties and functions during the currency of lease agreement c
in respect of cottage no. 6. The contents of paras 4, 6 and 11
of the written statement, which have been extracted in the
impugned order of the Division Bench of the High Court, read
as under:-

"4. Para no. 4 is denied. It is pertinent to note that the D
-~ Cottage in question is situated in the Sha'nti Sports Club
and is one of the 7 cottages in the said Sports Club. Shanti
Sports Club, of which the defendant is the Chairman,
came into existence in 1989 and the sports facilities of the
said Club are being utilized by its members as well as E
others. The said Club has amongst others a cricket
ground, six tennis courts, swimming pool, squash courts,
billiards rooms and a host of other facilities for use for its
...,.. members. The Club has large beautifully manicured lawn
appealing to the eye. Since the very inception of the Club, F
its beautiful lawns are hired for wedding parties, birth-day
parties and for other festive occasions. These wedding
parties have been held on the lawns of the Club since
1991, and are the very life and soul of the Club apart from
its sports activities. In fact, the aforementioned wedding G
parties and other functions which are held on the lawns are
the major source of revenue for the Club. The club has
more than 1500 members and about 200-300 frequent the
club every day.
H
I

'
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R. r
A 6. Para 6 is denied. The contents of this para are ......-;·
absolutely false to the knowledge of the plaintiffs inasmuch
as the plaintiffs all along knew that the garden in between
the two Cottages was let out on hire for marriage and other
private parties. The defendant denies any verbal
B assurance was given to the plaintiffs that the garden was
to be used for the families residing in two cottages and r
not for any other purpose. The lawn/garden in question in
between the two cottages is of more than 3000 sq. yards .....
in size and it was not hired out to the plaintiff.
c 11. The averments made in para 11 are denied. It is
submitted that the plaintiffs have filed the present suit only
to harass the defendant. It is pertinent to note that in the
other Cottages in the Club several Diplomats including
r
Deputy High Commissioner of Pakistan, Ambassador of ...__,.
D Kazakastan and other dignitaries are staying for several ~
\.years without any complaint. It is denied that the plaintiffs
are entitled to a decree of permanent injunction restraining
the defendant from hiring out the garden for functions and
parties during the tenure of the alleged lease agreement.
E The r~venue generated from hiring out the garden for
functions and parties is significant revenue and is
necessary for the proper and efficient running of the Club
and these functions and parties are the very life and soul
of the Club. -1-
F
Ti 1e aforesaid avennents made in the written statement filed
by Shri Satish Khosla in the above noted suit clearly reveal
that the cottages at the club and its lawn~ are being used
for commercial and rental purposes. In respect of cottage
No. 6 alone the club was charging large amounts as per
G
below under various agreements. These details are as
follows:- +-·
1. According to the lease agreement by and between the
club and Mis.Eli Lilly Ranbaxy Ltd. the latter was required
H
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 765
& ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

to pay a rental of Rs.60,0001- p.m. to the former during the A
first year of the lease.

2. The rent was liable to be increased by 5% after the first
years, 10% over the last rent paid after second year and
every year thereafter. B
3. Agreement stipulated payment of advance rent in the
sum of Rs.4,50,0001- by Mis. Eli Lilly Ranbaxy Ltd. to the
.... Club .

4. Under maintenance and service agreement in respect c
of the said premises Mis. Eli Lilly Ranbaxy Ltd. were
required to pay Rs.40,0001- p.m. to the Club.

5. The maintenance charges of the premises were liable

-
~~
to be increased by 5% over the last charge paid after the
first year, and increase of 10% over the last charge paid
after the second year and every year thereafter.
D

6. Under an agreement for security services, for the same
cottage, the aforesaid lessee was required to pay
Rs.30,0001- to the club and these charges were liable to E
be increased by 5% after first year and 10% after the
second year and every year thereafter.

7. Under an agreement styled ~s 'hire agreement', the
~ lessee was required to pay to the club a sum of Rs. 70,0001
F
- p.m. for the use of the fittings and fixtures installed in the
cottage.

8. The lessee was also liable to pay to the club hire
charges of Rs.7,50,0001- as advance for the fittings and
fixtures installed in the cottage." G

-+ 49. From what we have noted above, it is crystal clear that
the appellants have been undertaking large scale commercial
activities in the complex and their so-called love for sports has
substantial flavor of commerce. H
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A 50. The plea of discrimination and violation of Article 14
of the Constitution put forward by the appellants is totally devoid ~

of substance because they did not produce any evidence
before the High Court and none has been produced before this
Court to show that their land is identically placed qua the lands
B on which Hamdard Public School, St. Xavier Schoo.I, Scindia
Potteries, etc. exist. In the representations made to different
functionaries of the Government and DOA, the appellants did
claim that other parcels of the land have been de-notified and
before the High Court a copy of notification dated 6.9.1996 -+-
c issued under Section 48(1) was produced, but the said
assertion and notification were not sufficient for recording a
finding that their case is identical to those whose land had been
denotified. The burden to prove the charge of discrimination
and violation of Article 14 was on the appellants. It was for them
D
to produce concrete evidence before the court to show that their
case was identical to other persons whose land had been
...
-y-;.
released from acquisition and the reasons given by the
.Government for refusing to release their land are irrelevant or
extraneous. Vague and bald assertions made in the writ :..

petition cannot be made basis for recording a finding that the
E appellants have been subjected to invidious or hostile
discrimination. That apart, we are prima facie of the view that
the Government's decision to withdraw from the acquisition of
some parcels of land in favour of some individuals was not in
public interest. Such decisions had, to some extent, resulted ~
F in defeating the object of planned development of Delhi on
which considerable emphasis has been laid by the Full Bench
of the High Court and this Court. This being the position, Article
14 cannot be invoked by the appellants for seeking a direction
to the respondents to withdraw from the acquisition of the land
G in question. Article 14 of the Constitution declares that the State
shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal
protection of the laws within the territory of India. The concept
of equality enshrined in that Article is a positive con_cept. The
Court can command the State to give equal treatment to
H similarly situated persons, but cannot issue a mandate that the
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 767
& ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

State should commit illegality or pass wrong order because in A
""'-
... another case such an illegality has been committed or wrong
order has been passed. If any illegality or irregularity has been
committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals,
others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court or of this
:• Court and seek a direction that the same irregularity or illegality B
be committed in their favour by the State or its agencies/
instrumentalities. In other words, Article 14 cannot be invoked
for perpetuating irregularities or illegalities. In Chandigarh
-+ Administration v. Jagjit Singh (1995) 1 SCC 745, this Court
made a lucid exposition of law on this subject. The facts of that c
case were that the respondents, who had given the highest bid
for 338 sq. yds. Plot in Section 31A, Chandigarh defaulted in
paying the price in accordance with the terms and conditions

-· ~·~
of allotment. After giving him opportunity of showing cause, the
Estate Officer cancelled the lease df the plot. The appeal and
the revision filed by him were dismissed by the Chief
D
Administrator an~ Chief Commissioner, Chandigarh

- respectively. Thereafter, the respondent applied for refund of
the amount deposited by him. His request was accepted and
the entire amount paid by him was refunded. He then filed a
petition for review of the order passed by the Chief E
Commissioner, which was dismissed. However, the officer
concerned entertained the second review and directed that the
plot be restored to the respondent. The latter did not avail
~
benefit of this unusual order ~nd started litigation by filing writ
... petition in the High Court, which was dismissed on March 18, F
1991. Thereafter, the respondent again approached the Estate
Officer with the request to settle his case in accordance with
the policy of the Government to restore the plots to the defaulters
by charging forfeiture amount of 5%. His request was rejected
by the Estate Officer. He then filed another writ petition before G
the High Court, which was allowed only on the ground that in
..... another case pertaining to Smt. Prakash Rani, the
Administrator had restored the plot despite dismissal of the writ
petition filed by her. While reversing the order of the High Court,
H
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A this Court observed as under:-
"We are of the opinion that the basis or the principle, ifit
can be called one, on which the writ petition has been
·~
..
allowed by the High Court is unsustainable in law· and
indefensible in principle. Since we have come across
B )>.,
many such instances, we think it necessary to deal with I

such pleas at a little length. Generally speaking, the mere
fact that the respondent-authority has passed a particular
order in the case of another person similarly situated can +
never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the
c petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in
favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it
might not be. That has to be investigated first before it

--
can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner.
If the order in favour of the other person is found to be
D contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and
circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal ....,..-.
or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing
a writ compelling the respondent-authority to repeat the ~

illegality or to pass another unwarranted order. The
E extraordinary and discretionary power of the High Court
cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because
the respondent-authority has passed one i/legall
unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to
compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again
F and again. The illegal/unwarranted action must be
+
corrected, if it can be done according to law - indeed, ......
wherever it is possible, the Court should direct the
appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in
accordance with law- but even if it cannoTbe corrected,
G it is difficult to see how it can be made a basis for its
repetition. By refusing to dirE;!ct the respondent-authority to
repeat the illegality, the Court is not condoning the earlier +-
illegal acUorder nor can such illegal order constitute the
basis for a legitimate complaint of discrimination. Giving
H
SHANTI SPORTS ctLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 769
& ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
,)i.,_
effect to such pleas would be prejudicial tr the interests A
of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest.
It will be a negation of law and the rule of law. Of course,
if in case the order in favour of the other person is found
to be a lawful and justified one it \can be followed and a
similar relief can be given to the petitioner if it is found that B
the petitioners' case is similar to the other persons' case.
But then why examine-another person's case in his
absence rather than-examining the case of the petitioner
· who is present before the Court and seeking the relief. Is
it not more appropriate and convenient to examine the c
entitlement of the petitioner before the Court to the relief
asked for in the facts and circumstances of his case than
to enquire into the correctnes~ of the order made or action
,.....-
\ taken in another person's case, which other person is not
before the case nor is his case. In our considered opinion, D
,-,,.-
such a course - barring exceptional situations - would
~ neither be advisable nor desirable. In other words, the High
....... Court cannot ignore the law and the well-accepted norms
governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one
case a particular order has been passed or a particular
E
action has been taken, the same must be repeated
irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is
contrary to law or otherwise. Each case must be decided
-}- on its own merits, factual and legal, in accordance with
relevant legal principles. The orders and actions of the
• authorities cannot be equated to the judgments of the F
Supreme Court and High Courts nor can they be elevated
to the level of the precedents, as understood in the judicial
world."
[emphasis added] G
-t 51. Similar is the ratio of the judgments in Narain Das v.
Improvement Trust, Amritsar (1973) 2 SCC 265, Gursharan
Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee (1996) 2 SCC 459,
Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority v. Dau/at Mal Jain
H
770 SUPREME COtJRT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A (supra), Yadu Nandan Garg v. State of Rajasthan and others )(,..._
(supra), State Qf Haryana v. Ram Kumar Mann [(1997) 3 SCC
321, Faridabad CT. Scan Centre v. D.G. Health Services
[(1997) 7 SCC 752), Style (Dress land) v. Union Territory,
Chandigarh [(1999) 7 SCC 89), State of Bihar v. Kameshwar
B Prasad Singh (2000) 9 SCC 94, Union of India v. International
Trading Co. (2003) 5 SCC 437, Ekta Sakthi Foundation v.
Govt. of NCT of Delhi (2006) 10 SCC 337, Sanjay Kumar
Munja/ v. Chairman, UPSC (2006) 8 SCC 42, K.K. Bhalla v.
State of M.P. and others (2006) 3 SCC 581, Nation~/ Institute
c of Technology v. Chandra Sekhar Chaudhary (2007) 1 SCC
*
93, Vice Chancellor, M.D. University, Rohtak v. Jahan Singh
(2007) 5 SCC 77, -State of Kera/a and others v. K. Prasad and
another (2007) 7 SCC 140, Punjab State Electricity Board and
others v. Gurmail Singh (2008) 7 SCC 245 and Panchi Devi
D
v. State of Rajasthan and others (2009) 2 SCC 589.
-y-,
--
52. Before concluding, we consid~r it necessary to enter
a caveat. In all developed countries, great emphasis has been
laid on the planned development of cities and urban areas. The
object of planned development has ,been achieved by rigorous
E enforcement of master plans prepared after careful study . of
I -
complex issues, scientifici,research and rationalisation of laws.
The people of those countries have greatly contributed to the
concepf of planned develbpment of cities by strictly adhering
to the plarining laws, -the master plan etc. They respect the laws ~-
, /
-

F enacted by the legislature for regulating planned development
of the cities and seldom there is a complaint of violation of
master plan etc. in the construction of buildings, residential,
institutional or con;imercial. In contrast, scenario in the
developing countries-like ours is substantially different. Though,
G the competent legislatures have, from time to time, enacted
laws for ensuring planned development of the cities and urban
areas, enforcement thereof has been extremely poor ana the
people have violated the master plans, zoning plans and
building regulations and bye-laws with impunity. In last four
H decades, almost all cities, big or small, have seen unplanned

--..
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 771
& ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.)
_;.)'._
growth. In the 21st century, the menace of illegal and A
" unauthorized constructions and encroachments has acquired
monstrous proportions and everyone has been paying heavy
price for the same. Economically affluent 'people and those
having support of the political and executive apparatus of the
State have constructed buildings, commercial complexes, B
multiplexes, malls etc. in blatant violation of the municipal and
town planning laws, master plans, zonal development plans and
4- even the sanctioned building plans. In most of the cases of illegal
or unauthorized constructions, the officers of the municipal and
other regulatory bodies turn blind eye either due to the influence c
of higher functionaries of the State or other extraneous reasons.
Those who construct buildings in violation of the relevant
statutory provisions, master plan etc. and those who directly or
...... indirectly abet such violations are totally unmindful of the grave
consequences of their actio.ns and/or omissions on the present D
I "lf'
as well as future generations of the country which will be forced
to live in unplanned cities and urban areas. The people
4 belonging to this class do not realize that the constructions
made in violation of the relevant laws, master plan or zonal
development plan or sanctioned building plan or the building
is used for a purpose other than the one specified in the E
relevant statute or the master plan etc., such constructions put
unbearable burden on the public facilities I amenities like water,
->- electricity, sewerage etc. apart from creating chaos on the
roads. The pollution caused due to traffic congestion affects the
health of the road users. The pedestrians and people belonging F
to weaker sections of the society, who cannot afford the luxury
of air-conditioned cars, are the worst victims of pollution. They
suffer from skin diseases of different types, asthma, allergies
and even more dreaded diseases like cancer. It can only be a
matter of imagination how much the government has to spend G
~--i on the treatment of such persons and also for controlling
pollution and adverse impact on the environment due to traffic
congestion on the roads and chaotic conditions created due
to illegal and unauthorized constructions. This Court has, from
time to time, taken cognizance of buildings constructed in H
772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A violation of municipal and other laws and emphasized that no Ji.,,.._

compromise should be made with the town planning scheme
and no relief should be given to the violator of the town planning
scheme etc. on the ground that he has spent substantial amount
on construction of the buildings etc. - K. Ramdas Shenoy v.
B Chief Officers, Town Municipal Council, Udipi 1974.(2) SCC
506, Dr. G.N. Khajuria v. Delhi Development Authority 1995
(5) SCC 762, M.I. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu
1999 (6) SCC 464, Friends Colony Development Committee ~
v. State of Orissa 2004 (8) SCC 733, M. C. Mehta v. Union of
c India 2006 (3) SCC 399 and S.N. Chandrasekhar v. State of
Kamataka 2006 (3) SCC 208.
53. Unfortunately, despite repeated judgments by the this
Court and High Courts, the builders and other affluent people
engaged in the construction activities, who have, over the years
D shown scant respect for regulatory mechanism envisaged in the ~
-
municipal and other similar laws, as also the master plans,
zonal development plans, sanctioned plans etc., have received·
encouragement and support from the State apparatus. As and
when the courts have passed orders or the officers of local and
E other bodies have taken action for ensuring rigorous
compliance of laws relating to planned development of the cities
and urban areas and issued directions for demolition of the
illegal/unauthorized constructions, those in power have come
~'
forward to protect the wrong doers either by issuing
F administrative orders or enacting laws for regularization of
illegal and unauthorized constructions in the name of
compassion and hardship. Such actions have done irreparable
harm to the concept of planned development of the cities and
urban areas. It is high time that the executive and political
G apparatus of the State take serious view of the menace of
illegal and unauthorized constructions and stop their support to
the lobbies of affluent class of builders and others, else even
the rural areas of the country will soon witness similar chaotic
conditions.
H .. .
~~
~
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 773
& ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
_. 54. In the result, the appeals are dismissed. However, by A
taking note of the submission made by Shri Mukul Rohtagi that
some time may be given to his clients to vacate the land, we
deem it proper to grant thee months' time to the appellants to
handover possession of the land to the concerned authority of
DDA. This will be subject to the condition that within two weeks B
from today an affidavit is filed on behalf of the appellants by an
authorised person that possession of the land will be handed
over to DDA by 30th November, 2009 and during this period
no encumbrances whatsoever will be created by the appellants
or their agents and that no compensation will be claimed for c
the construction already made. Needless to say that if the
required undertaking is not filed, the concerned authorities of
DDA shall be entitled to take possession of the land and, if
~
necessary, take police help for that purpose.
,~ Contempt Petition Nos. 252-253 of 2001 D

..... ~5. We have dismissed the civil appeals by the above
order. Hence, the contempt petitions are dismissed.
R.P. Appeals dismissed. E