SHAMIMA FAROOQUIversusSHAHID KHAN

                      [2015] 4 S.C.R. 137



                     SHAMI MA FAROOQUI                                A

                                v.

                        SHAHID KHAN

            (Criminal Appeal No. 564-565 of2015)                      B

                        APRIL 06, 2015

     [DIPAK MISRA AND PRAFULLA C. PANT, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:
                                                                      c
s.125- Maintenance under- Claim of, by divorced Muslim
women - Family Court fixed Rs. 2, 5001- as monthly
maintenance from the date of application till the date of order
and Rs.4, 0001- per month from the date of order till the date        D
of remarriage - High Court upheld grant of Rs. 2, 5001- as
monthly maintenance from.the date of application till the date
of order- However, reduced the maintenance from Rs. 4, 0001
- to Rs. 2,0001- from the date of order till the date of remarriage   E
- On appeal, held: High Court rightly upheld the view of the
Family Judge - However, reduction of maintenance from Rs.
4, 0001- to Rs. 2, 0001- not sustainable - High Court showed
immense sympathy to the husband by reducing the amount
after his retirement - Solely because the husband retired,            F
there was no justification to reduce the maintenance by 50%
- Court cannot be oblivious of the asseverations made by
the appellant- It is the obligation of the husband to maintain
his wife - He cannot be permitted to plead that he is unable
to maintain the wife due to financial constraints as tong as          G
he is capable of earning - High Court while reducing the
amount became oblivious of the fact that the wife has to stay
on her own - Sustenance does not mean and can never allow
to mean a mere survival - Maintenance uls. 125, has to be             H
                               137
138         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 4 S.C.R.


A     adequate so that she can live with dignity as she would have
      lived in her matrimonial home - She cannot be compelled
      to become a destitute or a beggar- Thus, order passed by
      the High Court is set aside and that of the Family Court is
      restored.
B
          s. 125 - Object and principle - Held: Principle behind
  s. 125 is for amelioration of the financial state of affairs as
  well as mental agony and anguish that woman suffers when
  she is compelled to leave her matrimonial home - When
C wife is held entitled to grant of maintenance within the
  parameters of s. 125, it has to be adequate so that she can
  live with dignity as she would have lived in her matrimonial
  home - She cannot be compelled to become a destitute or
  a beggar- Order uls. 125 can be passed if a person despite
0
  having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain the
  wife - If the husband is healthy, able bodied and is in a
  position to support himself, he is under the legal obligation
                                                    '
  to support his wife, for wife's right to receive maintenance uls.
E 125 uhless disqualified, is absolute right.

          Judicial deprecation: Application u/s. 125 CrPC for
   grant of maintenance filed but not decided for 14 years -
   Held: It is distressing am; shocking that there was no order
F for grant of interim maintenance - Application for grant of
   maintenance has to be disposed of at the earliest - Family
   courts established to deal with the matrimonial disputes,
   including application uls. 125 CrPC, have become absolutely
   apathetic to the same - Delay occurs either due to the
G uncontrolled design of the parties or the lethargy and apathy
   shown by the judges- There should be a proactive approach
  and the said approach should be instilled in the family court
  judges by the Judicial Academies functioning under the High
   Courts.
H
     SHAMIMA FAROOQUI v. SHAHID KHAN                      139


Anita Rani v. Rakeshpal Singh 1991 (2) Crimes 725          A
(All); Dharmendra Kumar Gupta v. Chander Prabha
Devi 1990 Cr.L.J. 1884; Rakesh Kumar Dikshit v.
Jayanti Devi 1999 (2) JIC, 323 (ACC); Ashutosh Tripathi
v. State of UP i999 (2) 763, Allahabad J.l.C; Paras
Nath Kurmi v. The Session Judge 1999 (2) JIC 522           B
All; Sartaj v. State of UP and others 2000 (2) JIC 967
All; Shamim Bano v. Asraf Khan 2014 (4)
SCR 844 (2014) 12 SCC 636; Danial Latifi v. Union of
India 2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 419: (2001) 7 sec 740;
                                                           c
Khatoon Nisa v. State of UP (2014) 12 SCC 646;
Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena and Ors. AIR 2014 SC
2875; Jabsir Kaur Sehgal v. District Judge Dehradun
& Ors. 1997 (3) Suppl. SCR 529: (1997) 7 SCC 7;
Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai 2007 (12) SCR 577: (2008) 2         D
SCC 316; Chander Prakash Bodhraj v. Shila Rani
Chander Prakash AIR 1968 Delhi 174 - referred to.

                Case Law Reference
                                                           E
1991 (2) Crimes 725 (All)     Referred to     Para 7

1990 Cr.L.J.1884              Referred to     Para 7

1999 (2) JIC, 323 (ACC)       Referred to     Para 7
                                                           F
1999(2)763, Allahabad J.l.C Referred to       Para 7

1999 (2) JIC 522 All          Referred to     Para 7

2000 (2) JIC 967 All          Referred to     Para 7
                                                           G
2014 (4) SCR 844              Referred to     Para 10

2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 419       Referred to     Para 10

(2014) 12 sec 646             Referred to     Para 10
                                                           H
140        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 4 S.C.R.



A          AIR 2014 SC 2875            Referred to      Para 12

           1997 (3) Suppl. SCR 529 Referred to          Para 15

           2007 (12) SCR 577           Referred to      Para 16
B          AIR 1968 Delhi 174          Referred to      Para 17

            CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal
      Appeal Nos. 564-565 of 2015

c            From the Judgment and Order dated 17.09.2013 and
      26.03.2014 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in
      Criminal Revision No. 134 of 2012 and CMA No.106544 of
      2013 in Criminal Revision No. 134 of2012

D           Dr. J. N. Dubey,Anurag Dubey,Anu Sawhney, Meenesh
      Dubey, S. R. Setia for the Appellant.

            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

            DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. Leave granted.
E
          2. When centuries old obstructions are removed, age
  old shackles are either burnt or lost their force, the chains
  g~t rusted, and the human endowments and virtues are not
  indifferently treated and emphasis is laid on "free identity"
F and not on "annexed identity", and the women of today can
  gracefully and boldly assert their legal rights and refu::.t: to be
  tied down to the obscurant conservatism, and further
  determined to ostracize the "principle of commodity", and
G the "barter system" to devoutly engage themselves in
  learning, criticizing and professing certain principles with
  committed sensibility and participating in all pertinent and
  concerned issues, there is no warrant or justification or need
  to pave the innovative multi-avenues which the law does not
H countenance or give its stamp of approval. Chivalry, a
        SHAMIMA FAROOQUI v. SHAHID KHAN                         141
                [DIPAK MISRA, J.)

perverse sense of human egotism, and clutching of feudal A
megalomaniac. ideas or for that matter, any kind of
condescending attitude have no room. They are bound to be
sent to the ancient woods, and in the new horizon people
should proclaim their own ideas and authority. They should
be able to say that they are the persons of modern age and B
they have the ideas of today's "Bharat". Any other idea floated
or any song sung in the invocation of male chauvinism is the
proposition of an alien, a total stranger- an outsider. That is
the truth in essentiality.
                                                                 c
        3. The facts which are requisite to be stated for
adjudication of these appeals are that the appellant filed an
application under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (CrPC) contending, inter alia, that she married
                                                                 0
Shahid Khan, the respondent herein, on 26.4.1992 and
during her stay at the matrimonial home she was prohibited
from talking to others, and the husband not only demanded a
car from the family but also started harassing her. A time
came when he sent her to the parental home where she was         E
compelled to stay for almost three months. The indifferent
husband did not come to take her back to the matrimonial
home, but she returned with the fond and firm hope that the
bond of wedlock would be sustained and cemented with
love and peace but as the misfortune would have it, the          F
demand for the vehicle continued and the harassment was
used as a weapon for fulfilment of the demand. In due course
she came to learn that the husband had illicit relationship
with another woman and he wanted to marry her. Usual to
sense of human curiosity and wife's right when she asked him     G
she was assaulted. The situation gradually worsened and
it became unbearable for her to stay at the matrimonial home.
At that juncture, she sought help of her parents who came
and took her to the parental home at Lucknow where she           H
142         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 4 S.C.R.


A     availed treatment. Being deserted and ill-treated and, in a
      way, suffering from fear psychosis she took shelter in the
      house of her parents and when all her hopes got shattered for
      reunion, she filed an application for grant of maintenance at
      the rate of Rs.4000/- per month on the foundation that husband
B     was working on the post of Nayak in the Army and getting a
      salary of Rs.10,000/- approximately apart from other perks.

         4. The application for grant of maintenance was
  resisted with immense vigour by the husband disputing all
C the averments pertaining to demand of dowry and harassment
  and further alleging that he had already given divorce to her
  on 18.6.1997 and has also paid the Mehar to her.

        5. A reply was filed to the same by wife asserting that
D she had neither the knowledge of divorce nor had she received
  an amount of Mehar.

           6. During the proceeding before the learned Family
   Judge the wife- appellant examined herself and another, and
E. the respondent-husband examined four witnesses, including
   himself. The learned Family Judge, Family Court, Lucknow
   while dealing with the application forming the subject
   matter Criminal Case No. 1120 of 1998 did not accept the
   primary objection as regards the maintainability under Section
F 125 CrPC as the applicant was a Muslim woman and came
   to hold even after the divorce the application of the wife under
   Section 125 CrPC was maintainable in the family court.
   Thereafter, the learned Family Judge appreciating the
G evidence brought on record came to opine that the marriage
   between the parties had taken place on 26.4.1992; that the
   husband had given divorce on 18.6.1997; that she was ill
   treated at her matrimonial home; and that she had come
   back to her parental house and staying there; that the
H husband had not made any provision for grant of
            SHAMIMA FAROOQUI v. SHAHID KHAN                        143
                    [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

maintenance; that the wife did not have any source of income A
to support her, and the plea advanced by the husband that she
had means to sustain her had not been proved; that as the
husband was getting at the time of disposal of the application
as per the salary certificate Rs.17654/- and accordingly
directed that a sum of Rs.2500/- should be paid as monthly B
maintenance allowance from the date of submission of
application till the date of judgment and thereafter Rs.4000/-
per month from the date of judgment till the date of remarriage.

        7. The aforesaid order passed by the learned Family         C
Judge came to be assailed before the High Court in Criminal
Revision wherein, the High Court after adumbrating the facts
referred to the decisions in Anita Rani v. Rakeshpal
Singf1l11, Dharmendra Kumar Gupta v. Chander Prabha
Dev121, Rakesh Kumar Dikshit v. Jayanti Dev131, Ashutosh            D
Tripathi v. State of U.P.£41, Paras Nath Kurmi v. The
Session Judgef51 and Sartaj v. State of U.P. and othersf61
and came to hold that though the learned principal Judge,
Family Court had not ascribed any reason for grant of               E
maintenance from the date of application, yet when the case
for maintenance was filed in the year 1998 decided on
17.2.2012 and there was no order for interim maintenance,
the grant of Rs.2500/- as monthly maintenance from the date
of application was neither illegal nor excessive. The High Court    F
took note of the fact thatthe husband had retired on 1.4.2012
and consequently reduced the maintenance allowance to
Rs.2000/-from 1.4.2012 till remarriage of the appellant herein.
Being of this view the learned Single Judge modified the order
passed by the Family Court. Hence, the present appeal by            G
[1]   1991 (2) Crimes 725 (All)
[2]   1990 Cr.L.J. 1884
[3]   1999 (2) JIC, 323 (ACC)
[4]   1999 (2) 763, Allahabad J.l.C                                 H
[5]   1999 (2) JIC 522 All
[6]   2000 (2) JIC 967 All
    144          SUPREME COURT REP0RTS                   [2015] 4 S.C.R.


    A     special leave, at the instance of the wife.

                8. We have heard Dr. J.N. Dubey, learned senior
          counsel for the appellant. Despite service of notice, none
          has appeared for the respondent.
    B
              9. It is submitted by Dr. Dubey, learned senior counsel
      that Section 125 CrPC is applicable to the Muslim women
      and the Family Court has jurisdiction to decide the issue. It
      is urged by him that the High Court has fallen into error by
    c opining that the grant of maintenance at the rate of Rs.4,000/
      - per month is excessive and hence, it should be reduced to
      Rs.2000/- per month from the date of retirement of the
      husband i.e. 1.4.2012 till her re-marriage. It is also contended
      that the High Court failed to appreciate the plight of the
    D appellaht and reduced the amount and hence, the impugned
      order is not supportable in law.

              10. First of all, we intend to deal with the applicability of
      Section 125 CrPC to a Muslim woman who has been divorced.
    E In Shamim Ba no v. Asraf Kl1ar111, this Court after referring
      to the Constitution Bench decisions in Danial Latifi v. Union
      of lndiaf8I and Khatoon Nisa v. State of U.P.£91 had opined
•     as follows:-

    F         "13. The aforesaid principle clearly lays down that
              even after an application has been filed under the
              provisions of the Act, the Magistrate under the Act has
              the power to grant maintenance in favour of a divorced
              Muslim woman and the parameters and t~e
    G         considerations are the same as stipulated in Section
              125 of the Code. We may note that while taking note of
              the factual score to the effect that the plea of divorce
              was not accepted by the Magistrate which was upheld
    H (7)      (2014) 12 sec 636
        1a1    c2001) 7 sec 740
        (91    (20!~4) 12   sec 646
        SHAMIMA FAROOQUI v. SHAHID KHAN                          145
                [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

  by the· High ~ourt, the Constitution Bench opined that          A
  as the Magistrate could exercise power under Section
  125 of the Code for grant of maintenance in favour of a
  divorced Muslim woman under the Act, the order did
  riot warrant any interference. Thus, the emphasis was
  laid on the retention of the power by the Magistrate under      B
  Section 125 of the Code and the effect of ultimate
  consequence.

  14. Slightly recently, in Shabana Bano v. lmran Khari 101,
  a two-Judge Bench, placing reliance on Danial Latifi -          C
  (supra), has ruled that:-

     "21. The appellant's petition under Section 125 CrPC
     would be maintainable before the Family Court as
     long as the appellant does not remarr}i. The amount          D
     of maintenance to be awarded under Section 125
     CrPC cannot be restricted for the iddat period only."

  Though the aforesaid decision was rendered interpreting
  Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, yet the               E
  principle stated therein would be applicable, for the
  same is in 'consonance with the principle stated by the
  Constitution Bench in Khatoon Nisa (supra)."

       In view of the aforesaid dictum, there can be no shadow    F
of doubt that Section 125 CrPC has been rightly held to be
applicable by the learned Family Judge.

        11. On a perusal of the order passed by the Family Court,
it is manifest that it has taken note of the fact that the salary G
of the husband was Rs.17,654/- in May, 2009. It had fixed
Rs.2,500/- as monthly maintenance from the date of
submission of application till the date of order i.e. 17.2.2012
and from the date of order, atthe rate of Rs.4,000/- per month
[101 c201 O) 1 sec 666                                            H
146             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 4 S.C.R.


A till the date of remarriage. The High Court has opined that
  while granting maintenance from the date of application,
  judicial discretion has to be appropriately exercised, for the
  High Court has noted that the grant of maintenance at the.
  rate of Rs.2,500/- per month from the date of application
B till date of order, did not call for modification.
           12. The aforesaid finding of the High Court, affirming
  the view of the learned Family Judge is absolutely correct.
  But what is disturbing is that though the application for grant
C of maintenance was filed in the year 1998, it was not decided
  till 17.2.2012. It is also shocking to note that there was no
  order for grant of interim maintenance. It needs no special
  emphasis to state that when an application for grant of
  maintenance is filed by the wife the delay in disposal of the
0
  application, to say the least, is an unacceptable situation.
  It is, in fact, a distressing phenomenon. An application for
  grant of maintenance has to be disposed of at the earliest.
  The family courts, which have been established to deal with
E the matrimonial disputes, which include application under
  Section 125 CrPC, have become absolutely apathetic to
  the same. The concern and anguish that was expressed by
  this Court in Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena and Ors.£1 11,
  is to the following effect:-
F
             "13. The Family Courts have been established for
             adopting and facilitating the conciliation procedure and
             to deal with family disputes in a speedy and expeditious
             manner. A three-Judge Bench in K.A. Abdul Jaleel v.
G            T.A. Shahida[121, while highlighting on the purpose of
             bringing in the Family Courts Act by the legislature,
             opined thus:-

               "The Family Courts Act was enacted to provide
H              for the establishment of Family Courts with a view
      (11)    AIR 2014 SC 2875
    ' 1121 c2003) 4 sec 166
       SHAMIMA FAROOQUI v. SHAHID KHAN                              147
               [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

   to promote conciliation in, and secure speedy                     A
   settlement of, disputes relating to marriage and
   family affairs and for matters connected therewith."

14. The purpose of highlighting this aspect is that in the
case at hand the proceeding before the Family Court                  B
was conducted without being alive to the objects and
reasons of the Act and the spirit of the provisions
Under Section 125 of the Code. It is unfortunate that the
case continued for nine years before the Family Court. It
has come to the notice of the Court that on certain                  c
occasions the Family Courts have been granting
adjournments in a routine manner as a consequence of
which both the parties suffer or, on certain occasions,
the wife becomes the worst victim. When such a situation
                                                                     D
occurs, the purpose of the law gets totally atrophied. The
Family Judge is expected to be sensitive to the issues,
for he is dealing with extremely delicate and sensitive
issues pertaining to the marriage and issues ancillary
thereto. When we say this. we do not mean thatthe Family             E
Courts should show undue haste or impatience, but there
is a distinction between impatience and to be wisely
anxious and conscious about dealing with a situation.
A Family Court Judge should remember that the
procrastination is the greatest assassin of the lis before           F
it. It not only gives rise to more family problems but
also gradually builds unthinkable and Everestine
bitterness. It leads to the cold refrigeration of the hidden
feelings, if still left. The delineation of the lis by the Family
Judge must reveal the awareness and balance. Dilatory                G
tactics by any of the parties has to be sternly dealt
with, for the Family Court Judge has to be alive to the
fact that the lis before him pertains to emotional
fragmentation and delay can feed it to grow. We hope
                                                                     H
148       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 4 S.C.R.

A      and trust that the Family Court Judges shall remain
       alert to this and decide the matters as expeditiously as
       possible keeping in view the objects and reasons of
       the Act and the scheme of various provisions pertaining
       to grant of maintenance, divorce, custody of child,
B      property disputes, etc."

                                           [emphasis supplied)

             13. When the aforesaid anguish was expressed, the
c   predicament was riot expected to be removed with any kind
    of magic. However, the fact remains, these litigations can
    really corrode the human relationship not only today but will
    also have the impact for years to come and has the potentiality
    to take a toll on the society. It occurs either due to the
D   uncontrolled design of the parties or the lethargy and apathy
    shown by the Judges who man the Family Courts. As far as
    the first aspect is concerned, it is the duty of the Courts to
    curtail them. There need not be hurry but procrastination
    should not be manifest, reflecting the attitude of the Court.
E   As regards the second facet, it is the duty of the Court to
    have the complete control over the proceeding and not permit
    the lis to swim the unpredictable grand river of time without
    knowing when shall it land on the shores or take shelter in a
F   corner tree that stands "still" on some unknown bank of the
    river. It cannot allow it to sing the song of the brook. "Men
    may come and men may go, but I go on for ever." This would
    be the greatest tragedy that can happen to the adjudicating
    system which is required to deal with most sensitive matters
G   between the man and wife or other family members relating
    to matrimonial and domestic affairs. There has to be a pro-
    active approach :n this regard and the said approach
    should be instilled in the Family Court Judges by the Judicial
    Academies functioning under the High Courts. For the
H
         SHAMIMA FAROOQUI v. SHAHID KHAN                       149
                 [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

present, we say no more.                                        A

        14. Coming to the reduction of quantum by the High
Court, it is noticed that the High Court has shown immense
sympathy to the husband by reducing the amount after his
retirement. It has come on record that the husband was          B
getting a monthly salary of Rs.17 ,654/-.

        15. The High Court, without indicating any reason,
has reduced the monthly maintenance allowance to
Rs.2,000/-.     In today's world, it is extremely difficult to c
conceive that a woman of her status would be in a position
to manage within Rs.2,000/- per month. It can never be
forgotten that the inherent and fundamental principle behind
Section 125 CrPC is for amelioration of the financial state of
affairs as well as mental agony and anguish that woman D
suffers when she is compelled to leave her matrimonial home.
The statute commands there has to be some acceptable
arrangements so that she can sustain herself. The principle
of sustenance gets more heightened when the children are
with her. Be it clarified that sustenance does not mean and E
can never allow to mean a mere survival. A woman, who is
constrained to leave the marital home, should not be allowed
to feel that she has fallen from grace and move hither and
thither arranging for sustenance. As per law, she is entitled to F
lead a life in the similar manner as she would have lived in
the house of her husband. And that is where the status and
strata of the husband comes into play and that is where the
legal obligation of the husband becomes a prominent one. As
long as the wife is held entitled to grant of maintenance within G
the parameters of Section 125 CrPC, it has to be adequate
so that she can live with dignity as she would have lived in
her matrimonial home. She cannot be compelled to become
a destitute or a beggar. There can be no shadow of doubt
                                                                H
150           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 4 S.C.R.


A that an order under Section 125 CrPC can be passed if a
  person despite having sufficient means neglects or refuses to
  maintain the wife. Sometimes, a plea is advanced by the
  husband that he does not have the means to pay, for he
  does not have a job or his business is not doing well. These
B are only bald excuses and, in fact, they have no acceptability
  in law. If the husband is healthy, able bodied and is in a
  position to support himself, he is under the legal obligation to
  support his wife, for wife's right to receive maintenance
C under Section 125 CrPC, unless disqualified, is an absolute
  right. While determining the quantum of maintenance, this
  Court in Jabsir Kaur Sehgal v. District Judge Dehradun
  & Ors.£131 has held as follows:-

         "The court has to consider the status of the parties,
D
         their respective needs, the capacity of the husband to
         pay having regard to his reasonable expenses for his
         own maintenance and of those he is obliged under the
         law and statutory but involuntary payments or
E        deductions. The amount of maintenance fixed for the
         wife should be such as she can live in reasonable comfort
         considering her status and the mode of life she was used
         to when she lived with her husband and also that she
         does not feel handicapped in the prosecution of her
F        case. At the same time, the amount so fixed cannot be
         excessive or extortionate."

          16. Grant of maintenance to wife has been perceived
  as a measure of social justice by this Court. In Chaturbhuj
G v. Sita Ba11141, it has been ruled that:-

         "Section 125 CrPC is a measure of social justice and
         is specially enacted to protect women and children and
      (131   (1997) 7 sec 7
H     (141   (ZOOB) 2 sec 316
           SHAMIMA FAROOQUI v. SHAHID KHAN                            151
                   [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

   as noted by this Court in Captain Ramesh Chander                    A
   Kaushal v. Veena Kausha11151falls within constitutional
   sweep of Article 15(3) reinforced by Article 39 of the
   Constitution of India. It is meant to achieve a social
   purpose. The object is to prevent vagrancy and
   destitution. It provides a speedy remedy for the supply             B
   of food, clothing and shelter to the deserted wife. It gives
   effect to fundamental rights and natural duties of a man
   to maintain his wife, children and parents when they
   are unable to maintain themselves. The aforesaid
   position was highlighted in Savitaben Somabhai
                                                                       c
   Bhatiya v. State of Gujaratl161."

    This being the position in law, it is the obligation of the
husband to maintain his wife. He cannot be permitted to plead
that he is unable to maintain the wife due to financial constraints    D
as long as he is ~apable of earning.

      17. In this context, we may profitably quote a passage
from the judgment rendered by the High Court of Delhi in E
Chander Prakash Bodhraj v. Shila Rani Chander
Prakashl17lwherein it has been opined thus:-

   "An able-bodied young man has to be presumed to be
   capable of earning sufficient money so as to be able
   reasonably to maintain his wife and child and he,cannot             F
   be heard to say that he is not in a position to earn enough
   to be able to maintain them according to the family
   standard. It is for such able-bodies person to show to
   the Court cogent grounds for holding that he is unable
                                                                      G
   to reasons beyond his control, to earn enough to
   discharge his legal obligation of maintaining his wife and
[151 (1978) 4 sec 10
(161 c2005) 3 sec 636
(17]   AIR 1968 Delhi 174                                             H
•
    152         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 4 S.C.R.



    A       child. When the husband does not disclose to the Court
            the exact amount of his income, the presumption will be
            easily permissible against him."

                 18. From the aforesaid enunciation of law it is
    B     limpid that the obligation of the husband is on a higher
          pedestal when the question of maintenance of wife and
          children arises. When the woman leaves the matrimonial
          home, the situation is quite different. She is deprived of
          many a comfort. Sometimes the faith in life reduces.
    C     Sometimes, she feels she has lostthe tenderest friend. There
          may be a feeling that her fearless courage has brought her
          the misfortune. At this stage, the only comfort that the law
          can impose is that the husband is bound to give monetary
          comfort. That is the only soothing legal balm, for she cannot
    0
          be allowed to resign to destiny. Therefore, the lawful imposition
          for grant of maintenance allowance.

              19. In the instant case, as is seen, the High Court
      has reduced the amount of maintenance from Rs.4,000/- to
    E Rs.2,000/-. As is manifest, the High Court has become
      oblivious of the factthat she has to stay on her own. Needless
      to say, the order of the learned Family Judge is not
      manifestly perverse. There is nothing perceptible which would
    F show that order is a sanctuary of errors. In fact, when the
      order is based on proper appreciation of evidence on record,
      no revisional court should have interfered with the reason on
      the base that it would have arrived at a different or another
      conclusion. When substantial justice has been done, there
    G was no reason to interfere. There may be a shelter over her
      head in the parental house, but other real expenses cannot
      be ignored. Solelybecause the husband had retired, there
      was no justification to reduce the maintenance by 50%. It is
      not a huge fortune that was showered on the wife that it
    H
             SHAMIMA FAROOQUI v. SHAHID KHAN                      153
                     [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

deserved reduction. It only reflects the non-application of A
mind and, therefore, we are unable to sustain the said order.

         20. Having stated the principle, we would have
proceeded to record our consequential conclusion. But, a
significant one, we cannot be oblivious of the asseverations B
made by the appellant. It has been asserted that the
respondent had taken voluntary retirement after the
judgment dated 17 .2.2012 with the purpose of escaping the
liability to pay the maintenance amount as directed to the
petitioner; that the last drawn salary of respondent taken C
into account by the learned Family Judge was Rs.17,564/-
as per salary slip of May, 2009 and after deduction of AFPP
Fund and AGI, the salary of the respondent was Rs.12,564/-
and hence, even on the basis of the last basic pay (i.e.
                                                             0
Rs. 9, 830/-) of the respondent the total pension would come
to Rs.14,611/-and if40% of commutation is taken into account
then the pension of the respondent amounts to Rs.11,535/-;
and that the respondent, in addition to his pension, hand
received encashment of commutation to the extent of 40% E
i.e. Rs.3,84,500/- and other retiral dues i.e. AFPP, AFGI,
Gratuity and leave encashmentto the tune of Rs.16,01,455/-.

       21. The aforesaid aspects have gone uncontroverted
as the respondent- husband has not appeared and contested          F
the matter. Therefore, we are disposed to accept the
assertions. This exposition of facts further impels us to set
aside the order of the High Court.

       22. Consequently, the appeals are allowed, the orders G
passed by the High Court are set aside and that of the Family
Court is restored. There shall be no order as to costs.

Nidhi Jain                                     Appeals allowed.

                                                                   H