Holding

An employer’s right to adduce additional evidence under s.10 or s.33 of the Industrial Disputes Act must be claimed at the earliest stage; a belated application cannot be entertained, and the Enquiry Officer was also the disciplinary authority, so the dismissal was valid.

Summary

Shambhu Nath Goyal, a clerk of Bank of Baroda, was dismissed after a departmental enquiry in 1965 conducted by Sen Gupta, who was appointed as Enquiry Officer. Goyal challenged the dismissal, alleging bias and procedural irregularities; the dispute was deemed industrial and referred to an Industrial Tribunal, which set aside the dismissal on the ground that the enquiry was vitiated and ordered reinstatement with back wages. The High Court quashed the Tribunal's award, remitting the matter to the Tribunal to allow the Bank to adduce fresh evidence, despite the Bank's application for such evidence being filed fourteen years after the dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the employer's right to introduce additional evidence under s.10 or s.33 of the Industrial Disputes Act must be exercised at the earliest stage and cannot be permitted at a belated stage, and that Sen Gupta, as Enquiry Officer, also functioned as the disciplinary authority, rendering the dismissal valid. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court order, and restored the Tribunal's award of reinstatement with full back wages.

Issues considered

The Enquiry Officer, Sen Gupta, possessed the authority to impose dismissal as the disciplinary authority.
Whether the High Court was justified in remitting the matter to the Tribunal to permit the employer to adduce further evidence at a late stage.
Whether the employer’s right to introduce additional evidence under the Industrial Disputes Act can be exercised after a substantial delay.

Legislation cited

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 10, s. 3, s. 33, s. 33A, s. 33B(i), s. 8

Subjects

industrial disputedomestic enquirydisciplinary authorityadditional evidenceIndustrial Disputes Actreinstatementback wagesnatural justicebelated application

Judgment

SHAMBU NATH GOYAL
A
v.

BANK: OF BARODA AND OTHERS

September 27, 1983
B
(0. A. DBSAI, 0. CHINNAPPA RBDDY AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.

Industrial Disputes 'Act, 1947-Secs. _10 and 33~Proceedings under-
Employer's right to adduce additional evidence before Labour Court/Industrial
Tribunal-Not an independent right-Application for that purpose must be made
at the earliest stage. Labour Court may consider a11d refuse such a request if c
made at a late stage.

The appellant was working as a clerk in a branch of the first respondent
Bank. He was issued a notice· by Jhe Deputy General Manager of the Bank
informing him about the decision to hold departmental enquiry against him
and also that one Sen Gupta, Agent of another branch of the Bank had been D
appointed as the Enquiry Officer and that any appeal rising out of his Order
could be made to the Chief Agent of the Bank at Delhi. The Enquiry Officer
held an enquiry. found the appellant guilty of the .,charges and proposed to
award the punshment of dismissal. The a'ppellant protested against the proposed
punisthment and stated that the enquiry was arbitrary, biased and improper.
The Enquiry Officer diSmissed the appellant. An appeal filed by the appellant
was dismissed by the appellate authority. On behalf of the appellant the E
'Union raisCd an industrial dispute and the Central GoVernment ultimately
made a reference to the Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the dispute ·
was not an industrial dispute. In appellant's appeal by special leave this
court held that the dispute was an industrial dispute and remanded the
matter to the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the doll)estic - enquiry
was vitiated 'and not in accordance with the principles of riatural justice. The
Tribunal further held. that Sen Gupta was not clothed with an.Y authority to
F
award the punishment of dismissal as disciplinary authority and that no useful
purpose would, therefore, be served ·by allowing the management to lead fresh
evidence in the enquiry be,fore it as requested by the management in its appli ..
cation. The Tribunal set aside the disn1issal and ordered reinstatement of the
appeUant with full back wages. The High Court took the view that Sen Gupta
was also the disciplinary authority as per the notice of enquiry arid quashed the G
Tribunal's Award and remitted the Cnquiry to the Tribunal for affording an
opportunity to the management for letting in further evidence to support the
charges before the Tribunal. In this appeal the appellant submitted that the
Enquiry Officer was nOt the appointing autbority and that the order of
dismiss~l passed by him is invalid in law.
H
Allowing the app~al,
"86 • SUPRllMB COURT REPORT~ (1984) 1 s.c.R.

HELD : It is diffi.Cult to say that the order of dismissal suffers from \
A any lack of authority of Sen Gupta to award that punishment. The 1nanage-
ment's reqi.Iest for giving an Opportunity to lead further evidence tO support
th~ charges before the Tribunal made at that late stage cann,ot be allowed.
[99 H; 103 DJ

From the fact that Sen Gupta has been appointed as the Enquiry Officer
B in the notice.of enquiry dated 23-7-1965 and that it has been stated in that
notice that any appeal from his order could be made to Majumdar, Chief
Agent of the Bank at Delhi, it could be inferred tl:iat Sen' Gl,lpta had been
constituted also as the 'disciplinary· authority as otherwise it would not have
becri stated in that notice that any appeal against his order which cOuld
naturally include an order in1posing punishment pursuant to any finding,,
recorded in the. domestic enquiry conducted by him should be presented before·
c the Chief Agent of the Bank at Delhi. The workman also understood Sen
Gupta to be functioning also as the disciplinary authority in the enquiry when .,
he did not question his authority to award the punishn1ent but 1nerely stated
that the enquiry was·arbitrary, biased and improper. It would appear from
para 521(12) of the Sa~tri Award which has been bodily incorporated in para
18.20(12) of the Desai Award that.it is not necessary that only the appointing
authority or any authority superior to that authority can be the disciplinary
D auttority in regard to·employees of a ban~ and, that on the oth~r hand the .
bank should d.ecide .which officer shall be empowered (Q take disciplinary
actiOn in the case of each office or establishment and that it should also make
Provision for appeals.against orders passed in disciplinary matters to an officer
or body not lower in status than the Manager. But what is required by that
para in the Awards is that the names of the officer or body··· competent to pass
E the original ofders or bear appeals shall from time to .time be published on
the Bank's notiCe boards. In the instant case, the workman has not contended
anywhere ·inclu.ding in the course of arguments advanced on his behalf even
' before us' that there" was no )uch publication jn the notice board in regard .to
the Jullunder Branch of the Ba!Jk where he was employed at the time of his
suspension. [98 C·F; 99 B-DJ

, - The rights which the employer has in_ law to adduce additional evidence
in a proceeding before the Labour Court of Industrial Tribunal either under
s. 10 or s. 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act questioning the legatity of the
order terminaiing the service· must be availed of by the employer by making .a
proper request at the time when it files its stateni.ent of claim or written state·_
m~nt or makes an application seeking either permission to take cert<1;in action
G · or Seeking approval.of: the action taken by it. If an application is filed by the
ri\anagement under s. 3~· of the Act the management is made aware of the work-
man's contention regarding the .defect in the domestic enquiry. by the written
statement of defence filed by him. Then, if the management chooses to exercise
its right it must make up its mind at the earliest stage· and file the applica~ion
for that purpose without any unreasonable delay. But when the question
arises in a reference under s. 10 of the Act arter the w·Orkman had been punish-·
ed pursuant to a finding of guilt recorded against him in the domestic enquiry
there is no question of the management filing any application for permission
to lead further evidence in support of the charge or charges framed against the
S.N. GOYAL V. BANK OF BAROD<' 87
workman, for the defeCt in the domestic enqUiry is pointed out by the work·
man in his written claim statement filed in the- Labo.ur· Court or lndustfial
Tribunal after the reference had been received and the management ·haS the
opportunity to look into that sta'tement before it files its written statement of
defence in the enquiry befoie the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal and
could make the request for the opportunity in the Written statement itself. If
it does not choose to do so at that stage it cannot be allowed to do_ it at any
later stage of the proceedings by filirig any application for the purpOse which
may result in delay which may lead to wrecking the morale of the workman B
compel him to surrender which he n1ay not otherwise do. ·
[IOI C·D; G·H; 1_?2 A.DJ

In the Present case an application seeking further opportunity to lead
evidence before the Tribunal for substantiating the charges frarlled in 1965
was made by the management on 8.2.1979 for the first time when -the matter
was before the Tribunal for the. second time after it had been re~anded by
c
this Court on 2-2-1978 after rejecting the management's contention that the
dispute is ·not an indusLrial dispute. That was done by the management
nearly 14 years after the workma~ had been suspended pn 20-7-1965 and nearly
13 years after the workman had been found· guilty in the domestic enquiry and
• diSmissed frorp. service on 28-12~1965. The man3.gement is thus seen to have
been taking steps periodically to see that the dispute is not disposed of at an
D
early date one way or the other·. [102 E-H)

Work1n2tt of ;\,foJipurSugar Factory (Private) Limited v. Molipur Sugar
Factory, [1965] 3 S.C.R. 588 and ShankiJr Chakravarti v.. Britannia Biscuit Co.
Ltd. & Anr., [1979] 3 S.C.R. 1165 referred to. E
(Per Desai J.)

That statement in Sliankar Chlikravartl v. Britannia Biscuit Co. Ltd. &:
Anr •.that if an application for giving an opportunity to adduce additional
evidence in a proceeding. before the Labour Court or Jndllstrial Trihunal·is
made during the Pendency of the proceedings d0es not mean that so_~e indepen;. F
dent righ~ to make an application at any time is _conferred on the employer.
Ordinarily, where a party claims relief, it. must pleaci for the same. The
pleading can be incorporated in a statement of claim or a writtt"n statement
of defence. It was not for a moment suggested that an application at any
stage of the proceedillgs without explainillg why the relief was not claimed in
. tJle original pleading has· to be granted. If a separate appliCation is made, i~
would be ope!n to the L1bour Courtflndustrial Tribunal to examine· the q~es G
tion whethCr. it should be granted Or not depending upon the stage when it iS
made the omission tO claim the relief in the initial pleading, the delay and
the rh~tivation for such delayed action? Without beit;tg specific, it 'c'an' be
said that such an application has to be examined as if it is an application ·for·
a'mendment.oforiginal pleadings keeping in view all the aforementioned_ con~
sideration.s and if it does not appear to ·be bona fide or 1ias been made after a
long unexplained dela~ or the explanation for the omission to. claim the relief
in the·initial pl~iding is un ;onvincing, the. Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal
would be perfectly justified in rejecting the same. · [91 A-El
,
88 SbPREME COURT REPORTS {1984) i s.c.&.

Shankar Chakravartl v. Britannia Biscuit Co. Ltd. & Anr., [1979] 3 S.C.R. ,
A · 1165 explained.

Bharat Sugar Miiis Ltd. v. Shri Jai Singh & Ors. [1962) 3 S.C,R. 684 and
Cooper Engineering Ltd. v. P. P. Mundhe, [1976] 1 $.C.R. 361.referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2414 (NL)
B -0f 1980.

Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
the 16th September, 1980 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ
Petition No. 1407 of 1979.

c P.P. Rao, S.L. Aneja, Mr. C.P. Gupta and R. Venkataramni,
for the Appellant.

F.s: Damailia, S.S. Shroff, SA. Shroff and V. V. Joshi for the
Respondent.
D
The following Judgments were delivered
\

. '
DESAI, J. There is no dissent from the judgment prepared by
my learned_ brother Varadarajan, J. 'and I concur in the same. This
short spilogne is provoked by one statement made in the judgment
E in Sliankar Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co. Ltd. & Anr.(I) which
was relied upon by Mr. Damania, learned counsel for the respondents
to support the decision of the High Court. The statement relied upon
by Mr. D'amania may be properly understood so that in future the
meaning cif the statement may not remain •obscure resluting in 'a
fresh round of litigation commencing from Bharat Sugar Mills Ltd. v.
Shri Jai Singh & O;s,(') and ending w.ith a decision in Shankar
. Chakravarti's case.

At the outset it is necessary to extract the passage relied upon
by Mr. Damania in support of his submission that if the employer
G
makes an application to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal that
in the event the domestic enquiry is found to be either··improper,
invalid or vitiated, the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal should
accept the application of the employer and give it an opportunity to
substantiate the charges imputing m.isconduct and leading to the
H I
.>._
(I) (1979] 3 S.C.R. 1165.
(2) (19621 3 S.C.R. 684,
sN. GOYAL il.. BANK OF BARODA (besai, i.) 89
termination of the service of the workman. The passage reads as
under: A
"Therefore, it is crystal clear that the rights which
the employer has in law to adduce additional evidence in
a proceeding before the Labour Court or Industrial
Tribunal either under s. I 0 or s. 33 of the Act questioning ·
the legality of the order terminating service must be avai- B
led of by the employer by making a.proper request at ,the
time when it fiies its statement of claim or written state-
ment or makes an application seeking either permission
to take a certain action or seeking approval of the . action
, taken by it. If such a request is made in the statement of
claim, application or written statemel)t, the Labour Court
c
or the Industrial/Tribunal must give such an opportunity.
If the request is made before the proceedings are con·
cluded the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal should
ordinarily grant the opportunity to adduce evide.nce.
But if no such request is made at any stage of the procee- D
dings, there is no duty in law cast on the Labour Court
or the Industrial Tribunal to give such an opportunity
and if there is no such obligatory duty in law failure to
give any such opportunity cannot and would not vitiate
the proceedings." E
If this pas.sage is examined divorced from the context in which it
was drawn-up, we may feel that the contention of Mr. _Damania
deserves to be accepted. But the journey through the courts of the
point involved in dispute if kept in view, the passage explains itself.
Most of the decisions bearing on the subject were examined in ·F
Shankar Chakravarti's case, but firm reliance was placed in that case
by the employer on the decision of this Court fn Cooper Engineering
Ltd. v. P.P. Mundhe(') and especially the following passage
therein :
G
"We are, there~ore, clearly of opinion that when a case
of dismissal or discharge of an employee is referred for
industrial adjudication the labour court should first decide
as a preliminary issue whether the domestic enquiry has
violated the principles of natural justice. When there is H
no domesti_c enquiry or defective enquiry is admitted by

(I) [1976] 2 S.C.R. 361.
90 SUPREME COURT UPORTs [1984) i s.c .. R.

' the employer, there will be no difficulty. But when the
A matter is in. controversy between the parties· that question -
must be decided as a preliminary issue. On that decisio'n
bejng pronounced it Will be for the management to decide
whether it will
adduce any evidence before the labour
court. If it chooses not to ~dduce any evidence, it will
B not be thereafter permissible in any proceeding to raise
·the issue:" ·
I
Relying on this stateme-nt of la;,, in Cooper Engineefing Ltd. case(I},
it' was contended in Shankar Chakravarti's case( 1) that it is the
c obligatory duty of the Labour Courtilndustrial Tri.burial to frame
a preliminary i§SUe whether the domestic enquiry is valid or vitiated ?
After answering the issue, one way or the other, if it is held that
the domestic enquiry was vitiated, tlie employer has to be given an
opportunity to lead evidence _to substantiate the charge of
misconduct. And that is how the extracted passage was interpreted
D by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Shankar
Chakravarti's i:ase. It was further contended that it is the obligatory
duty of the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal after deciding the
preliminary issue in favour of the workman and agjlinst the
management to call upon the employer to lead his .evidence to
E substantiate the ·charge of misconduct. It is in this context
that this Court observed that ·the employer must plead in the
statement· of defence filed before the Labour Court/Industrial
Tribunal th~t in t!ie event domestic enquiry which led to the
termination of service is held to be vitiated or invalid, he must be
given opportunity to lead evidence to sub;tantiate the charge of
F misconduct. Explaining how the pleading can be raised this Court
observed that if such a relief is claimed in· the statement or" claim,
application for approval of its action or written statement of defence,
the Labour_ Court/Industrial Tribuna.l must give such an opportunity.
The Court further observed that if the request is made before the
G proceedings are concluded, the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal
should ordinarily grant the opportunity to adduce evidence. , It .was
further observed that 'if such a pleading is raised and an opportunity
is sought, it is to be given, but if th.ere is no such pleading either. in
the original application or in the staiement of claim or written state-
H ment or by way of an applicatio_n during the pende~cy of. the
proceedings, there is no duty cast fo law· or by the rules of justice,
reason and fair play that· a quasi-judicial Tribunal like the Industrial
Tribunal or the Labour Court should adopi an advisory role by
S.N. GoYAL v. BANK OF BAllODA (Varadarajan, i.) 9f
informing the employer of its rights.• The statement that if an
application is made during the pendency of the prooeedings docs not A'
mean that some independent right to make an application at any time
is conferred on the employer. Ordinarily, where a party claims
relief, it must plead for the same. The pleading can be incorporated
in a' statemen! of claim or a written statement of defence. . It was
not 'for a moment suggested that an application at any stage of the
· proceedings without explaining w!ly the relief was not claimed in the
B
original pleading has to be granted. If a separate 'a pplication is made,
.it would be open to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal to examine-
.the question whether it should be granted or not depending upon
the stage when it is made, the omission to daim the relief in the
initial pleading,, the delay and the motivation for such delayed C·
action ? Without being specific, it can be said that such an appli·
• cation has to be examined as if it is an application for amendment
of original pleadings keeping in view all the aforemtntioned consi-
derations and if it does not appear to be bona·fide or has been made
after .a long unexplained delay or the explanation for the omission of
claill)ing the relief in the inital pleading is unconvincing, the Labour . D
Court/Industrial Tribunal would be perfectly justified in rejecting the
same. The observation was not made to lay down a proposition of
law that as and when it suits the convenience of the employer at any
stage of the proceedings, it may make ·an application seeking such
opportunity and the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal wa~ obliged
to grant the same.
E

In the. facts of the present case, th.ere is hardly any. explan~tion
for the delay in making 'the application and therefore, the .High
Court was in · error in remitting the case to the Labour Court.
Accor~ingly this appeal must succeed and therefore, I c<?ncur in tlie F
final order proposed by my learned brother Varadarajan. J. ·

VARADARAJAN, i. This appeal by special leave is by a workman .
of the first respondent Bink · of India. He was respondent No. 3
G
. in W.P. 1407 of 1979 which was filed by t~e first respondent Bank
for quashing the award dated 18.7.1979 of the .Central Government .
Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Delhi, whereby the work· ·
man Shambhu Nath Goel was ordered to be reinstated with f~tl back
1
wag\:s to th-e position· .held by him when he was ·suspended on ·-
20. 7.1965. Ori the date of his suspension Shambhu Nath Goel was
H
working as . a Clerk in the Civil Lines Brancl). of the Bank ~t
Jullunder. The Bank's Deputy General Manager issued a notice
92 SUPREME COURT RilPoRTS [i984) i. s.c.i..
dated 23.7.1965 informing the workman that it has been decided to
A hold a departmental enquiry against him and one Sen Gupta,. Agent
of the Bank at Ludhiana is appointed as the Enquiry Officer and
that any a·ppeal arising 'out of his order can be made to. S.M.
Majumdar, Chief Agent of the Bank at Delhi, within 45·days . of the
communication of the ord~r in writing to the workman.
- .

B The charges framed against the work~an were :

(1) _. Riotous and ,disorderly behaviour in the premi~es o(
the Bank which is gross misconduct under para 521
, (4) (c) of the Sastri award; as confi~med by para
C 18.28 of the Desai award; · ·

(2) Causing wilful damage to property of the Bank which
is gross mis-conduct under para 521 (4) (d) of the
Sastri award as confirmed by para 18.28 of the Desai •
award;
D
(3) Doing an act subversive of discipline, prejudicial to
the interest of the Bank which is gross mis-conduct
under para 521 (4) (j) of the Sastri award as con-
- E firmed by para 18.28 or the Desai award; and

(4) Failing . to show proper ' consideration to other
a
employees of the Bank which is minor. mis-conduct
under para 521 (6) (i) of the Sastri award as
confirmed by para 18 (2) (8) of the Desai award.
,

The workman filed his written statement of defence, contending
inter a/ia that the enquiry has been instituted under the pressure of \-.- i
the majority Union from which he broke .away due · to acute
differences of opinion °on matters of policy. At the stage of defence
evidence after the management's evidence· had been recorded two
application<> were filed by the workman. One of those applications
w·as for the management being directed to produce three letters dated

H
2.8.1964, 15.3.1965 and 24.5.1965 which were stated to be very
material for the workman's defence. It was stated in that application
that if the documents were not produced by the management, three
named persons may be caused to be produced for being examined
as his-witnesses at the enquiry. The Enquiry Officer who did not allow
' .
. __;...._

tµat application received written ~rguments from both sides and on
0

l.N. GOYAL v. BANK OF llARODA (Varadar,ajan, J.) 93

the conclusion of the enquiry recorded his findings holding the
workman guilty of all the charges. On 29.12.1965 he proposed' to A
award the punishment of dismissal to the workman and heard
{ the workman who protested .against the p 0nishment and stated
that the enquiry was arbitrary, biased and improper. The workman
was dismissed on the same day and his appeal was dismissed' by the
Appellate Authority on 26.11.1966.
B
.The Union rafaed an industrial dispute which was opposed by
the managtment ~ut ultimately a reference was made by the Central
Government to the Industrial Tribunal, Chandigarh on 11.5.1970.
The management filed a written ;tatement on 12.8.1970 conteding
'interalia· that the dispute was not an industrial dispute. That conten- c
tion found favour with the Tribunal. The workman came up in appeal
by special leave to this Court which allowed the appeal on 2.2.1978
holding that it is an industrial dispute and remanded the matter to_
the Tribunal for expeditious disposal. The matter was subsequently
taken up by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour D
Court, Delfii at the instance of the Central Government as the
Tribunal' at Chandigarh had ceased to function meanwhile. The
Tribunal framed two issues on the questions as to whether there was
a fair and proper enquiry by .the Domestic Tribunal and whether the
dismissal of the workman was justified. On the first question it was
held by the Tribunal that the enquiry was vitiated and not in accor- E
dance with the principles of natural justice on the ground that the
three letters or the witnesses required by _the .workman to be
produced for proving his defence were not made available to him
though they · were relevant and vital to prove his defence. The
management moved an application on 8.2.1979 for an opportunity F
being given to it to lead evidence in support of the charges framed
· against the workman in the event of the Tribunal holding against it
on the first question relating to the_ conduct of the domestic enquiry.
.>- The Tribunal held that Sen Gupta had been appointed ·onl~ as
Enquiry Officer and was flOt entrusted with any authority to award
the punishment of dismissal as Disciplinary Authority and that no G
useful purpose would, therefore, be served by allowing the management
to lead fresh evidence in the enquiry before it. The dismissal was
held to be not justified and was set aside by the Tribunal and the
workman was ordered to be reinstated with full back wages to the
·position held by him on the date of his suspension as mentioned H
\\hove by the awar<l dated 18. 7.1979,
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [1984) I S.C.. R

· The management sought the quashing of the Tribunal's award
A by the ~elhi High Court in the Writ Petition filed on several grou'!dS. )
The first ground was that the transfer of the dispute to the Tribunal
at Delhi after the matter was remanded by this Court to the Tribunal ).
at Chandigarh was not valid and that the only course open to· the
Central Government was to act under s.8 of the Industrial Pisputes
Act, and no resort could be had to s. 33 B of that Act. Tiu: High
B Court had no difficulty in rightly rejecting this contention in view of
t~e provisions of s. 33 B(I) of the Act which reads, thus : ·

' "33B. (i) The appropriate _Government may, by
order in writing and for' reasons·. to be stated therein,
·c withdraw any proceeding under this Act pending before .
a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the ·
case.may be, for the disposal of the proceedi.ng and the·
Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal to which
the proceeding is so transferred may, subject to special
directions in the order of transfer; proceed either -de novo
D or from the stage. at which it was so transferred :
.
Provided that where a proceeding under s. 33 or
s. ·33A is pending before a Tribunal or National Tribunal,
the. proceeding· may also be transferred· to a Labour
E Court."

· The Industrial Tribunal, Chandigarh ceased to exist before the
matter could be taken ·np after the remand by this Court and
therefore, there was no question of the Central Government takin~
.. action under s..8 of the Industrial Disputes .Act for filling up any
F vacancy.· There is no need to say anything more about this objection
which was not rightly raised before us by . the learned counsel for
the management-'

·The second contention urged before !be learned Jndge of the·
G High Court was that the Tribunal's finding that Sen Gupta was not
c~mpetent to dismiss the workman as Disciplinary Authority is
unsustainable. Before the High Court it . was admitted· by both
parties that the conditions of service of the employees ·of the· Bank ·
are mainly and largely governed by the Desai award, para 18.20 (12)
B whereof states that it is ·necess~ry that a bank should "decide wliieh
officer shall be empowered .to take disciplinary action in the case
of each office or establishment and that it should also ,make provision
s.N. GOYAL v. BANE! OF BARODA (Varadarajcm, J.) 95
/'
f for appeals against orders passed in disciplinary matters to an officer
or body not lower in status than the manager. In the notiee of A
enquiry dated 23.7.1965 referred to above Sen Gupta had been
named as tbe Enquiry Officer and it was stated that any appeal
against the order of that Enquiry Officer can be made to Majumdar,
Chief Agent, Delhi. The High Court held. that the order referred
to in that notice ·of enquiry could be the final order imposing penalty
at the conclusion of the domestic enquiry and that the workman
B
understood that Sen Gupta was also Disciplinary Authority when he
protested against the propsed punishment without questioning the
jurisdiction of Sen Gupta to award it to him and that the Tribunal's
view that Sen Gupta was not the Disciplinary Authority is not
correct. Relying upon this Court's decision in Tata (Ji/ · Mills c
Company Ltd. v. The Workman,(') the learned Judge of the High
Court held that the Enquiry Officer holding a domestic enquiry
cannot take any effective steps to compel the attendance of witnesses
and consequently the Enquiry Officer in the present case could not
be stated to· have committed any procedural irregularity in not
causing the production of the three witnesses required by the work"
D
man to be examined as his witnesses at the euquiry. This position
was not disputed by the learned counsel for the workman before
.. the learned J11dge of the High Court; The workman's application
for production of the three documents which were in the custody of
one or the other branch of the Bank could have been allowed as E
they were considered by the workman to be necessary to prove his
case that the charge-sheet had been issued io him under the pressure
of the majority1Jnion from which he broke away. They were not
caused to be produced before the enquiry Officer inspite of the
workman's application dated 29.11.1965. They were· .not produced
even before the Appellate Authority though the workman applied
for their production once again by a letter dated. 3.8.1966. The
learned Judge of the High Court found that though the three
documents may or may not have supported the stand taken by the
·workman that the charge-sheet was issued to him under the pressure
of the rival majority Union there was mateyial on record to show G
that those documents were relevant and he observed that the non-
production of those documents has caused prejudice to the workman.
In this view the. learned Judge agreed with· the Tribunal that the
· ·domestic enquiry was vitiated because of_the non-production of those
B
(I) [1964] 20 L.L.J. 113,
96 SVPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] I s.c.11..

documents. Having held so the learned Judge adverted to the ·
A management's application dated 8.2.1979 made before the Tribunal
by which an opportunity to lead evidence in support. of the charges -~
in the event of the Tribunal ·h_olding that the domestic enquiry was
defective for any reason whatsoever was prayed for. The Tribunal
has stated as follows in its award in regard to th~t request of the
B management :

"Ordinarily I would have been inclined to 'hold
enquiry myself but in the circumstances of the case I do
. not think much purpose would be served by holding of
enquiry by this Tribunal in view of the fact that order
c of termination is not sustainable on the face of it, having
been passed by a person not competent to pass it. In·
this behalf I would like to refer to the order of appoint-
ment of the Enquiry Officer. From the perusal of the
said order I find that the Enquiry Officer' had been
D appointed only to enquire into the charges and report
•... . .. .. . .. The order appointing the Enquiry Officer
does not travel beyond that. It does not empower Sen
Gupta to award the punishment as well. It is not that
l
Sen Gupta is the Appointing Authority and as such
can also constitute himself as the Punishing Authority
E ......."....... The order of appointment of Enquiry Officer
cannot be held to impliedly contain the power .of
punishment ..... ; .... ,; .. The order of punishment is
patently without any ·authority and jurisdiction and. as
such cannot be sustained ... .. .... .. .. . . It is for this reason
F that I Shall not consider it proper for myself to hold a
·fresh enquiry because the enquiry would be of no avail
since the order of punishment itself is not passed by . any
competent authority".

The learned Judge of the High Court appears to have disagreed
G with this view of the Tribunal in view of his conclusion that Sen
Gupta was also the Disciplinary. Authority as per the notice of
enquiry dated 23.7.1965 read with para 18.20 (12) of the Desai
award, which is word for word para 521( 12) of the Sastri award.
This is one of the reasons for the learned Judge to quash the
B
Tribunal's award dated 18.7.1979 and remit the enquiry to the
Tribunal for affording an opportunity to the management asked for
by the application d~ted 8.i.1979 for letting in further evidence to
S.N. GOYAL v. BANK OF BARODA (Varatfarajan, J.) 97
support the charges before the Tribunal. The workman had claimed
before the Tribunal in addition to reinstatement full back wages and A
other benefits from the date of his suspension. The management
contended in its written statement of defence before the Tribunal
that it is a well established rule that the workman should do hia
best for minimizing the damages by seeking service . elsewhere and
that there is nothing in the workman's claim statement to suggest 8
that he remained une_mployed during the intervening period and,
therefore. the workman's demand for back wages 9annot be consi•
dered by the Tribunal. The learned Judge of ihe High Court held
that the Tribunal should have framed an issue .on that question and
allowed the parties opportunity to estabfoh their respective cases and
he g~ve the necessary direction. This is the second reason for the c
·.learned Judge to remit the matter to the Tribunal for further enriuiry.
The workman has filed this appeal by special leave, feeling aggrieved
by the order of the learned Judge of the High Court.

Before us arguments were advanced by Mr. P.P. Rao, Senior D
Advocate and Mr. F.D. Damania, Advocate appearing for the
workman and management respectively. Only two questions were
raised before ·us, uamely, whether or not Sen Gupta who held the
domestic enquiry and passed the order of dismissal of the workman
was Discfplinary Authority competent to award the punishment and
w~ether the learned Judge of the High Court was or was not justi- E
fied in remitting the matter to the Tribunal for the management
• having an opportunity to adduce futher evidence in support of ·the
charges and also .to consider the question whether the workman was
or was not gainfully employed in the intervening period. It i~ not dis-
puted that no additional statements we~e filed and no further evidence F
was let in by the parties after this Court held that the dispute is an
industrial dispute and remanded the matter to the Tribunal for fresh
·disposal in accordance·witb law. · ~

Mr. Rao drew our attention to the notice of enquiry dated
23 7.1965 and submitted that it does not specifically clothe Sen Gupta
G
who had been constituted as the Enquiry Officer, with the powers
of a Disciplinary Authority without the workman disclosing either in
the claim statement filed before the Tribunal or in the arguments be-
fore the learned Judge of the High Court or even before us as to who
H
the appointing Authority in relation to the workman was. Mr. Rao
submitted that Sen Gupta who was Agent of the Ludhiana Branch· of
the Bank which was different from the J\lll11nder Branch'. in which the
(
98 SUPREME COURT REPoRTS [!9S4] 1 s.c.R.

workman was employed as a Clerk at the time of his suspension was
A not the Appointing Authority and that the order of dismissal passed
by him pursuant to bis· finding recorded against the workman in the
.domestic enquiry is therefore invalid in law. Mr. Damania also could
not say who the Appointing Authority was in regard to the workman.
But he submitted that the Enquiry Officer and disciplinary· Authority
B were constituted as per the directions given in para 521(12) of the
Sastri award, and para 18,20 (12) of the Desai award and, therefore,
the question as to who the Appointing Authority was is not material.
He further submitted that the fact as to who was the Disciplinary
Authority is clear from the notice of equiry dated 23.7.1965 and the
conduct of the workman. We think Mr. Damania is right in bis sub-
c mission, As observed by the learned Judge of the High Court from the
fact that Sen Gupta bas been appointed as the Enquiry Officer in the
notice of enquiry dated 23.7.1965 and that it bas been stated in that
notice that any appeal from his order could be made to Majumdar,
Chief Agent of the Bank at Delhi, it could be inferred that Sen
· Gupta has been constituted also as the Discipiinary Authority as
D
otherwise it would not have been stated in that notice that any
appeal against bis order which could naturally include an order
imposing punishment pursuant ·to any finding recorded in the
domestic enquiry conducted by him should be presented before the ~· .,
,

Chief Agent Qf the Bank at Delhi. The workman also understood
E Sen Gupta to be functioning also as the Disciplinary Authority in
the equiry when he did not question his authority to award the
punishment but merely stated that the enquiry was arbitrary, biased
and improper. Para 521 (12)' of the Sastri a ward which bas been
bodily incorporated in para 18.20(12) of the Desai award reads
thus:
F
"18.20(12) It also seems io us necessary that a
bank should decide. which officer shall _be empowered to
take disciplinary action in the case of each office. or
G establishment and that it should also make provision for
appeals against orders passed in disciplinary matters to
an officer or a body not lower in status than the manager,
who shall if the employee concerned so desires in a
case of dismissal .hear him or his representative before
disposing of the appeal. - We direct accordingly and
H further direct that the names of the officers or the body
who are empowered to pass the original orders or hear
the.appe~ls shall from time to time be published on th~
. ,

S.N. GOYAL v. BANK OF BARODA (Varadarojan, J.) 99

bank's notice boards, that an appeal shall be disposed
of as early as possible, and that the period within which A
an appeal can be referred shall be forty-five days from
the date on which the original order has been communi-
cated_in writing to the employee concerned."

It would appear from this portion of the awards that it is not B
necessary·that only the Appointing Authority or any authority
superior to that authority can be the Displinary Authority in regard
to employees of a Bank and that on the other hand the Bank should
decide which officer >hall be empowered to take disciplinary action
in the case of each office or establishment and that it should also
make provision for appeals against orders passed in disciplinary
. /
c
matters to an officer or body not lower m status than the Manager.
But what is required by that para in the awards is that the names of
the officer or body competent to pass the original orders or hear the
appeals shall from time to time be published on the Bank's notice
boards. The workman has not contended anywhere including in
D
the course of arguments advanced on his behalf even before us that
there was no such publication in (he notice board in regard to the
Juli under Branch of the Bank where he was employed at the time of
his suspension. In these circumstances we are unable to accept the
argument of Mr. Rao that the order of dismissal suffers from any
Jack of authority of Sen Gupta to award that punishment. E

Regarding the other main question of opportunity being afford-
ed to the management to substantiate the charges before the
Tribunal, Mr. Damania invited our attention to two decisions of
this Court in Workmen of Motipur Sugar Factory (Private) Limited F
v. Motipur Sugar Factory(') and Shankar Ghakravarti v. Britannia
Biscuit Co. Ltd. and Anr.('), to the latter of which one of us was a
party. In the first of those decisions it is observed as follows :

. "Then w'> come to the question whether it was open
G
to the tribunal when there was no enquiry whatsoever by
the respondent to bold an enquiry itself into the question·
of go-slow. It was urged on behalf of die • appellants that
not only there was no enquiry in the present case but
there was no charge either. We do not agree that H
(1) [1965) 3 S.C.R. 588.
(2) {1979) 3 S.C.R. 11~5.
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984) 1 S.C.R.
I
was no charge by· the .respondent '.against the workmen
A concerned. The first part of the notice of December
15, 1960 which was served on each 'individual workman
was certainly a charge by the respondent telling the
workmen concerned that they were· guilty of go-slow for
"' the period between November 27 and December 15, 1960.
B It is true that the notice was not headed_ as a charge and
it did not specify that an enquiry would follow, which is
the usual, procedure when a formal charge is given.
Even-so,' there can be no doubt that the ·workman con-
cerned knew what was the charge against theni which
'was reaUy responsible for their discharge from December
c . 18, 19601

It is now well-settled by a number of decisions of
. this Court that where an employer has failed to make
an enquiry before dismissing or discharging a workman
D it is open to him to justify the action before the Tribunal_
by leading all relevant e\'idence before it. In such a case
· the employer would not have the benefit which he had
in cases where domestic inquiries have been held. The
entire matter would be open before the tribunal which
will have jurisdiction not only to go into the limited
E questions open to a· tribunal where domestic inquiry has ·
been properly held ((see Indian Iron & Steel Co. v. Their
w'arkmen-[1958 S.C.R. 667] but also to satisfy itself on
the facts adduced before it by the employer whether the
dismissal or discharge ,was_ ju_stificd ................ : .. .A
defective enquiry in our opinion stands on the same
F·
footing as no enquiry and in either case the tribunal
would have jurisdiction to go into the facts and the
employer would have to satisfy the tribunal that on
facts the order of dismissal or discharge was proper."

G
'In the second decision it is observed as follows :-
/

"Earlier clear cut pronouncements of the Court in
R. K. Jain's case. and Delhi Cloth & General. Mills Co.
H case that this right to adduce additional evidence is a
ri(lht .of the management or the employer and it is to be
s.N. GOYAL v. BANK OF BARODA (Varadarajan, J.) toi
availed of.by a req~est at appropriate stage and there is
no duty in law cast on the Industrial Tribunal or the A

, Labour ~ourt to give such an opportunity_ notwith-
standing the fact that none was ever asked for or not
eveu departed from. When we examine the matter on
principle '!'e would point out that a quasi-judicial Tribu-
nal is under no such obligation to acquaint parties
appearing before it about their rights more so in an
B
adversary system which these quasi-judicial Tribunals
have adopted. Therefore, it is crystal clear that the
rights which the employer bas in law to adduce.addi-
tional evidence in a proceeding before the Labour Court
or Industrial Tribunal either under s. JO or s. 33 of the c
Act questioning the legality of the order terminating
service must be avail~d of by the employer by 1making a
proper request at the time when it files its statement of
claim or written st~tement or . make~ an appl~ation
seeking either permission to take certain action or seeking
approval of the action taken by it. If s11cb a request is D
made in the statement of claim, application or written
statement, the Labour Co~rt or the Industrial Tribunal
must give such an opportunity. ff the request is made
before the proceedings are concluded the Labour Court
or the Industrial Tribunal sboujd ordinarily grant the E
·opportunity to adduce evidence. But if no such request
is made at any stage of the proceedings, there is no duty
in law cast on the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribu-
nal to give such an opportunity and if there is no such
obligatory duty in law failure 'to give any such opportu-
nity cannot and would not vitiate the proceedings". F

We think that th_e application of the management to seek the
permission of the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal for availing
the right to adduce further evidence to substantiate the charge or G
charges framed against the workman referred to in the above
passage in the application which may be. filed by the management·'
during the pendency of its application made before the Labour
Court or Industrial Tribunal seeking its permiss_ion under s. 33 of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to take a certain action ·or grant H
approval of the action taken. by it. The management i,s made aware
of the workman's contention regarding the defeat in the domestic
enquiry by the written statement 9f defence filed by him in the
SUPREME COURT REPORTS

application filed by the ma11agement under s. 33 of the Act. Then,
if the management chooses to exercise its right it must make up its
mind at the earliest stage and file the application for that purpose
without any unreasonable delay. But when the question arises in a
reference under s. 10 of the Act after the workman had been punish·
ed pursuant to a findir.g of guilt recorded against him ;n the domestic l
enquiry there is no question of the management filing any appli·
B
cation for permission to lead further evidence in support of the
charge or charges framed against the workman, for the defeat in the
domestic enquiry is pointed out by the workman in his written claim
stat~ment filed in the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal after the
reference had been received and the management has the opportu·
c nity to look into that statement before it files its written statement
,of defence in the ·enquiry before the Labour Court or Industrial
Tribunal and could make the request for the opportunity in the
written statement itself. If it does not choose to do so at that stage
. '
·it cannot be allowed to·do it at any later stage .of the proceedings by
filing any application for the purrose which may result in delay
D 'which ~"Y lead to wrecking the morale of the workman and compel
.
him to surrel).der w,hich he may not otherwise do.
'

It is true that in the present case an application way made by
the management on 8.2. l 979 when the matter was ,before the Tribu.
nal for the second time after it had been remanded by this Court on
2.2.1978 after rejecting the management's contention that the dispute
is nQt an industrial dispute. That was done by the management
nearly 14 years after the workman had been suspended· on 20.7.1965
and nearly 13 years after the workman had been 'found guilty in the
F domestic enquiry and dismissed from service on 28.12.1965. The
management took the preliminary objection which found favowr
with the Tribunal in the first instance on 25.10.1970 that the dispute
is not an industrial dispute .. That objection, which was upheld by
the Tribunal, forced the workman to seek his remedy in this Court
which rejected the objection on 2.2.'1978. It is only thereafter that
G the management filed the application dated 8.2.1979 for the first
time seeking further opportunity to lead evidence before the Tribunal
for substantiating the charges framed in 1965. The management is
thus seen to have been taking steps periodically . to see· that the
dispute is' not disposed of at an early date one way or the other.
The blame for not framing an issue on the question whether or not
the workman was gainfully employed in ·the intervening period
cannot be laid on the Tribunal alone. It was equally the duty .of
S.N. GOYAL V. BAN.I<! OF BARODA (Varadarajan, iJ.) 103
the management to have got that issue framed by the Tribunal and
adduce the necessary evidence unless the object was to nake up that A
question at some later stage to the disadvantage . of the workman as
in fact it has been done. The management appears to have come

I
forward with the grievance for the-first time only in the High Court.
There is no. material on record to show that the workman was gain•
fully employed anywhere. The management has not furnished any
B
·particulars in this regard even before this Court after such a long
lapse of time. The workman could have been asked to furnish the
necessary information at the earliest. stage. The management has
not reso.rted to that course. The workman was not expected to
prove the negative. In these circumst.ances, we do not think that it
would be in the interest of justice to prolong any further the agony c
of the workman whose power to endure the suffering of being out
of employment for such a long time and to oppose the management
Bank, a nationalised undertaking with all the money power at its
disposal in this prolonged litigation is very limited by allowing the
Bank to have the advantage belatedly sought in the application
dated 8.2.1979 in an industrial. dispute which arose to early as in
D
1965. For the reasons stated above we are of the opinion tl\at the
order oftbe High Court could not be sustained under the facts and
circumstances of the case.· The appeal is accordingly allowed with
costs of the workman quantijjed at Rs. 5,000. The High Court's
judgment is set aside and the Tribul)al's award directing reinstate- E
ment of the workman with full back wages and other benefits from
the date of his suspension is restored. The amounts paid to the
workman under this Court's orders dated 20.2.1980, 8.4.1980 and
27.10.1980 shall be taken into account in computing the wo~kmaµ's
claim for full back wages and other benefits from the date of
suspension to the date of his reinstatement. F

N.V.K. Appeal allowed.