Holding

The Supreme Court held that the denial of maintenance to the wife was legally untenable, that maintenance must be awarded from the date of filing of the petition, and that informal religious courts have no legal status.

Summary

Shahjahan, married under Islamic customs in a second marriage, filed a maintenance petition under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure after her husband obtained a divorce through informal religious courts. The Family Court awarded maintenance only to the two children, rejecting the wife's claim on the basis that she left the matrimonial home and that a second marriage precludes any dowry demand. The High Court upheld this decision. The Supreme Court held that the Family Court’s reasoning was unsustainable, that maintenance must be granted from the date of filing of the petition, and that decisions of bodies such as the Court of Kazi or Darul Kaja Kajiyat have no legal force. Consequently, the Court set aside both the Family Court and High Court orders and directed the husband to pay Rs 4,000 per month to the wife, with maintenance to the children also payable from the filing date. The appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

Whether the Family Court erred in denying maintenance to the wife on the ground that she left the matrimonial home and that a second marriage eliminates any dowry claim.
From which date maintenance under Section 125 CrPC should be payable – the date of filing of the application or the date of the order.
Whether decisions of informal religious courts such as the Court of Kazi, Court of (Darul Kaja) Kajiyat, or Sharia courts have any legal recognition or enforceability.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 125, s. 125(2)
Indian Majority Act, 1875

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Matter pertains to the correctness of the order passed by the High Court upholding the order passed by family court not awarding any maintenance to the appellant-wife. Headnotes† Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Maintenance – Appellant-wife married to respondent no.2-husband according to Islamic customs and had two children – Husband filed divorce suit against the appellant in the ‘Court of Kazi’ which came to be dismissed in terms of the compromise between the parties –

Subjects

Divorce under Islamic lawMaintenanceCourt of (Darul Kaja) KajiyatCourt of KaziUnknown to canons of lawMere conjecture and surmiseEx-facie unsustainableBeneficial piece of legislationDate of filing of maintenance petitionDecision valid inter-se partiesRevision petitionCompromiseFamily courtDemand of dowryMaintenance to be paid from the date of filing maintenance petitionInformal justice delivery systemSharia Court

Judgment

[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1845 : 2025 INSC 528

Shahjahan
v.
The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.
R1: The State of Uttar Pradesh
R2: Sri Gaffar Khan
(Criminal Appeal No. 2112 of 2025)
04 February 2025
[Sudhanshu Dhulia and Ahsanuddin Amanullah,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to the correctness of the order passed by the High
Court upholding the order passed by family court not awarding any
maintenance to the appellant-wife.

Headnotes†
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.125 – Maintenance –
Appellant-wife married to respondent no.2-husband according
to Islamic customs and had two children – Husband filed
divorce suit against the appellant in the ‘Court of Kazi’ which
came to be dismissed in terms of the compromise between
the parties – Three years later, husband filed for divorce in the
‘Court of (Darul Kaja) Kajiyat’ which was allowed – Thereafter,
appellant filed suit u/s.125 seeking maintenance for herself
and two children – Family court allowed the petition for
maintenance for the children, however rejected the appellant’s
claim for maintenance on the finding that husband did not
leave the appellant rather she left the matrimonial home –
Revision petition by the appellant – Dismissed by the High
Court – Correctness:
Held: Reasoning by the Family court that since it was the second
marriage of the parties, there is no possibility of demand of dowry
by husband, as he would be trying to rehabilitate his house is
unknown to the canons of law and is based on mere conjecture
and surmise – Family court could not have presumed that second
marriage for both parties would necessarily entail no dowry

* Author
1846 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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demand – Family court, taking note of the compromise deed,
opined that it was the appellant’s character and conduct which led
to the rift in the conjugal life of the parties based on the purported
fact that the appellant in the compromise deed had admitted to
her mistake, however in the compromise deed there was no such
admission – Very basis/reasoning for rejecting the appellant’s
claim for maintenance appears to be ex-facie unsustainable –
Maintenance could not have been denied to the appellant-wife
under the prevailing circumstances – Respondent no.2 to pay
Rs.4,000/- pm as maintenance to the appellant – Maintenance to
be paid from the date of filing of the maintenance petition before
the Family Court – Order of family court and impugned order set
aside. [Paras 14, 15]

Judicial fora – Informal justice delivery system – ‘Court of Kazi’,
‘Court of (Darul Kaja) Kajiyat’, ‘Sharia Court’ – Recognition
in law:
Held: ‘Court of Kazi’, ‘Court of (Darul Kaja) Kajiyat’, ‘Sharia Court’
etc. by whatever name styled have no recognition in law – Any
declaration/decision by such bodies, by whatever name labelled,
is not binding on anyone and is unenforceable by resort to any
coercive measure – Only way such declaration/decision can
withstand scrutiny in the eye of law could be when the affected
parties accept such declaration/decision by acting thereon or
accepting it and when such action does not conflict with any other
law – Even then, such declaration/decision, at best, would only be
valid inter-se the parties that choose to act upon/accept the same,
and not a third-party. [Para 23]

Case Law Cited
Rajnesh v. Neha [2020] 13 SCR 1093 : (2021) 2 SCC 324 –
relied on.
Nagarathinam v. State, through the Inspector of Police [2023]
4 SCR 1124 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 559; Vishwa Lochan
Madan v. Union of India [2014] 8 SCR 195 : (2014) 7 SCC
707 – referred to.

List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1847

Shahjahan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.

List of Keywords
Divorce under Islamic law; Maintenance; ‘Court of (Darul Kaja)
Kajiyat’; ‘Court of Kazi’; Unknown to canons of law; Mere conjecture
and surmise; Ex-facie unsustainable; Beneficial piece of legislation;
Date of filing of maintenance petition; Decision valid inter-se parties;
Revision petition; Compromise; Family court; Demand of dowry;
Maintenance to be paid from the date of filing of maintenance
petition before Family Court; Informal justice delivery system;
‘Court of (Darul Kaja) Kajiyat’; ‘Sharia Court’.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
2112 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 03.08.2018 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in CRR No. 2829 of 2010

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Sushil Kumar Dubey, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal.
Advs. for the Respondents:
A.K. Misra, Sr. Adv. / A.G., Arup Banerjee, Amitabh Poddar,
Priyanshu Raj, Harshita Raghuvanshi, Rajiv Agnihotri.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.

Leave granted.
2. The present appeal is directed against the Final Judgment and Order
dated 03.08.2018 in Criminal Revision No.2829/2010 (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘Impugned Order’)1 passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as the ‘High Court’),
whereby the revision petition filed by the appellant-wife was dismissed

1 2018 SCC OnLine All 7101 : (2018) 6 All LJ 55.
1848 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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and the Order dated 23.04.2010 in Petition No.335 of 2008 passed
by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Jhansi (hereinafter referred
to as the ‘Family Court’) not awarding any maintenance to the
appellant-wife, was upheld.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND:
3. The marriage of the appellant-wife was solemnized with the respondent
no. 2-husband on 24.09.2002 according to Islamic customs. This was
the second marriage of both. From their wedlock, the appellant gave
birth to two children, namely daughter Aatika (aged about 21 years
presently) and son Muzammil (aged about 16 years presently). In
2005, respondent no.2 filed ‘Divorce Suit No.325 of 2005’2 against
the appellant in the ‘Court of Kazi’,3 Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, which
came to be dismissed in terms of the compromise dated 22.11.2005
entered into between the two parties.
4. The appellant alleged that respondent no.2 used to beat her
demanding dowry and turned her out of the matrimonial home along
with her children in May, 2008. On 16.09.2008, respondent no.2 filed
‘Suit No.221 of 2008’4 in the ‘Court of (Darul Kaja) Kajiyat’,5 Bhopal
seeking divorce. Soon thereafter, on 13.10.2008, the appellant
filed Suit No.335/2008 under Section 1256 of the Code of Criminal

2 The usage of the apostrophe is deliberate; we will advert to this in the latter part of the Judgment.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 ‘125. Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents.—(1) If any person having sufficient
means neglects or refuses to maintain—
(a) his wife, unable to maintain herself, or
(b) his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself, or
(c) his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married daughter) who has attained majority,
where such child is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain
itself, or
(d) his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself,
a Magistrate of the first class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to
make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, at such
monthly rate, as such Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate
may from time to time direct:
Provided that the Magistrate may order the father of a minor female child referred to in clause (b) to
make such allowance, until she attains her majority, if the Magistrate is satisfied that the husband
of such minor female child, if married, is not possessed of sufficient means:
Provided further that the Magistrate may, during the pendency of the proceeding regarding monthly
allowance for the maintenance under this sub-section, order such person to make a monthly
allowance for the interim maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, and the expenses
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1849

Shahjahan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.

Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Code’) seeking
maintenance of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand) per month for
herself and Rs.1,000/- (Rupees One Thousand) per month for each
of the children. The ‘suit’ of respondent no.2 for divorce was allowed,
and, accordingly Talaqnama dated 22.01.2009 was prepared.
5. The Family Court vide Order dated 23.04.2010 partly allowed the petition
for maintenance and granted Rs.1,500/- (Rupees One Thousand Five
Hundred) per month to the daughter Aatika and Rs.1,000/- (Rupees
One Thousand) per month to the son Muzammil. The Family Court
dismissed the appellant’s claim for maintenance on the finding that
the respondent no.2-husband did not leave the appellant and rather,
she herself, due to her nature and conduct, was the main reason for
the dispute and her consequent departure from the matrimonial home.

of such proceeding which the Magistrate considers reasonable, and to pay the same to such
person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct:
Provided also that an application for the monthly allowance for the interim maintenance and
expenses for proceeding under the second proviso shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within
sixty days from the date of the service of notice of the application to such person.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this Chapter,—
(a) “minor” means a person who, under the provisions of the Indian Majority Act, 1875 (9 of 1875),
is deemed not to have attained his majority;
(b) “wife” includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, her
husband and has not remarried.
(2) Any such allowance for the maintenance or interim maintenance and expenses for proceeding
shall be payable from the date of the order, or, if so ordered, from the date of the application for
maintenance or interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case may be.
(3) If any person so ordered fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, any such
Magistrate may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in the
manner provided for levying fines, and may sentence such person, for the whole or any part of each
month’s allowance for the maintenance or the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding,
as the case may be, remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a
term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made:
Provided that no warrant shall be issued for the recovery of any amount due under this section
unless application be made to the Court to levy such amount within a period of one year from the
date on which it became due:
Provided further that if such person offers to maintain his wife on condition of her living with him,
and she refuses to live with him, such Magistrate may consider any grounds of refusal stated by
her, and may make an order under this section notwithstanding such offer, if he is satisfied that
there is just ground for so doing.
Explanation.—If a husband has contracted marriage with another woman or keeps a mistress, it
shall be considered to be just ground for his wife’s refusal to live with him.
(4) No wife shall be entitled to receive an allowance for the maintenance or the interim maintenance
and expenses of proceeding, as the case may be, from her husband under this section if she is
living in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband, or if they
are living separately by mutual consent.
(5) On proof that any wife in whose favour an order has been made under this section is living in
adultery, or that without sufficient reason she refuses to live with her husband, or that they are living
separately by mutual consent, the Magistrate shall cancel the order.’
1850 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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6. Aggrieved by the Order supra of the Family Court, the appellant-wife
approached the High Court by filing Criminal Revision No.2829/2010.
The High Court vide the Impugned Order dismissed the revision
petition noting that since the appellant is living separately from her
husband-respondent no.2 without sufficient reason, therefore, the
findings recorded by the Court below cannot be termed illegal or
perverse.

SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANT:
7. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Courts below
erred in not granting maintenance ignoring the fact that the appellant
is an illiterate lady having no source of income of her own and
totally dependent upon her father and other family members. It
was contended that there is nothing on the record to show that
respondent no.2 was willing and ready to keep the appellant with
him and the truth is that respondent no.2 had filed ‘divorce suits’
thrice before the ‘Sharia Court’.
8. It was further submitted that the Courts below erred in holding that
the appellant was living separately without any reason ignoring the
fact and evidence that she was turned out of the matrimonial house
by the respondent no.2. It was argued that the appellant tried her
best to live peacefully with the respondent no.2 and this fact is
established by the compromise dated 22.11.2005. Learned counsel
pointed out that the Courts below recorded a perverse finding that
the appellant had admitted her wrongdoing/misbehaviour in the
compromise dated 22.11.2005.
9. It was canvassed that the appellant categorically stated that she
was turned out from the house by the respondent no.2 after being
subjected to abuse, beating and cruelty to her, and the Courts below
erroneously held that she is living separately without reasonable
cause. The Courts below, submitted learned counsel, also fell in error
in finding that as it was the second marriage of both parties, there
was no possibility of dowry demand by respondent no.2, ignoring
the evidence on record.
10. It was argued that both children have grown up now and the meagre
amount of maintenance granted to them is insufficient today, while the
salary and other income(s) of respondent no.2 have increased. On
these grounds, learned counsel prayed for (a) allowing the appeal;
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1851

Shahjahan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.

(b) enhancing the maintenance to the children, and; (c) awarding
maintenance to the appellant-wife.

SUBMISSIONS BY THE RESPONDENT NO.1-STATE:
11. Learned counsel for the State argued that vide the Impugned Order,
maintenance was rightly allowed only to the children. Since the
appellant is living separately from her husband without having any
sufficient reason, therefore, findings recorded by the courts below
cannot be termed to be without any basis. It was submitted that
the appeal be dismissed.

RESPONDENT NO.2 IN ABSENTIA:
12. Despite finally being duly served,7 none appeared for the respondent
no.2-husband.

ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
13. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and respondent no.1
and carefully perused the material on record. The Family Court as
well as the High Court denied the appellant’s claim for maintenance
altogether and awarded a meagre sum totalling Rs.2,500/- (Rupees
Two Thousand Five Hundred) as maintenance for the two children.
Let us first examine the reason(s) assigned by the Courts below for
non-suiting the appellant.
14. In her application for maintenance filed under Section 125 of the
Code, the appellant contended that respondent no.2 had caused
cruelty to her as she was not able to fulfil his demand for a motorcycle
and Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand). On this aspect, the Family
Court noted that since it was their second marriage, there is no
possibility of demand of dowry by respondent no.2, as he would
be trying to rehabilitate his house. Such reasoning/observation by
the Family Court is unknown to the canons of law and is based
on mere conjecture and surmise. The Family Court will do well,
henceforth, to bear in mind the observation in Nagarathinam v
State, through the Inspector of Police, 2023 SCC OnLine SC
559 that the ‘…Court is not an institution to sermonise society on

7 Per the learned Registrar’s Order dated 15.05.2024.
1852 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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morality and ethics ...’. The Family Court could not have presumed
that a second marriage for both parties would necessarily entail no
dowry demand.
15. Further, the Family Court, taking note of the compromise deed dated
22.11.2005, opined that it was the appellant’s character and conduct
which led to the rift in the conjugal life of the parties. This reasoning
is based on the purported fact that the appellant in the compromise
deed had admitted to her mistake. However, from a bare perusal
of the compromise deed, it would become apparent that it records
no such admission. The first ‘divorce suit’ instituted by the husband
in 2005 was dismissed on the basis of this compromise, wherein
both parties decided to live together and agreed that they would
not give the other party any occasion to complain. Hence, the very
basis/reasoning for rejecting the appellant’s claim for maintenance
appears to be ex-facie unsustainable. The Impugned Order has
merely noted the findings returned by the Family Court with approval.
16. The appellant, in her application before the Family Court, had claimed
that the respondent no. 2 was serving on the post of Aarakshak in
the Border Security Force and receiving around Rs.20,000/- (Rupees
Twenty Thousand) per month as salary. The respondent no.2 on
the other hand admitted in his evidence to receiving Rs.15,000/-
(Rupees Fifteen Thousand) per month. It is to be borne in mind
that this was the situation in 2008-2009 (nearly 16 years ago) and
much water would have flown under the bridge since then. We are
of the view that maintenance could not have been denied to the
appellant-wife under the prevailing circumstances.
17. This brings us to the next question, i.e., from which date will the
maintenance be payable – the date of the application or the date of
the Order? The appellant has contested the direction of the Family
Court wherein it has made the maintenance payable from the date
of the order instead of the date of application. Of course, Section
125(2) of the Code empowers the Court to award maintenance
from the date of the order but the same has to be justified in the
background of the attendant facts and circumstances and should
not cause unnecessary hardship to the applicant. In our view,
Section 125 of the Code is a beneficial piece of legislation which
has been enacted to protect the wife and children from destitution
and vagrancy and, in the usual course, it would not be appropriate
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1853

Shahjahan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.

to disadvantage the applicant for the delay in the disposal of the
application by the judicial system. It would be beneficial to reproduce
the relevant discussion in Rajnesh v Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324,
which is extracted hereunder:
‘109. The judgments hereinabove reveal the divergent
views of different High Courts on the date from which
maintenance must be awarded. Even though a judicial
discretion is conferred upon the court to grant
maintenance either from the date of application or from
the date of the order in Section 125(2) CrPC, it would
be appropriate to grant maintenance from the date of
application in all cases, including Section 125 CrPC.
In the practical working of the provisions relating to
maintenance, we find that there is significant delay in
disposal of the applications for interim maintenance
for years on end. It would therefore be in the interests
of justice and fair play that maintenance is awarded
from the date of the application.
110. In Shail Kumari Devi v. Krishan Bhagwan Pathak
[Shail Kumari Devi v. Krishan Bhagwan Pathak, (2008)
9 SCC 632: (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 839], this Court held
that the entitlement of maintenance should not be
left to the uncertain date of disposal of the case. The
enormous delay in disposal of proceedings justifies the
award of maintenance from the date of application. In
Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena [Bhuwan Mohan Singh v.
Meena, (2015) 6 SCC 353: (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 321:
(2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 200], this Court held that repetitive
adjournments sought by the husband in that case resulted
in delay of 9 years in the adjudication of the case. The
delay in adjudication was not only against human rights,
but also against the basic embodiment of dignity of an
individual. The delay in the conduct of the proceedings
would require grant of maintenance to date back to the
date of application.
111. The rationale of granting maintenance from the
date of application finds its roots in the object of
enacting maintenance legislations, so as to enable the
1854 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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wife to overcome the financial crunch which occurs
on separation from the husband. Financial constraints
of a dependent spouse hamper their capacity to be
effectively represented before the court. In order to
prevent a dependant from being reduced to destitution,
it is necessary that maintenance is awarded from the
date on which the application for maintenance is filed
before the court concerned.
112. In Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse [Badshah v.
Urmila Badshah Godse, (2014) 1 SCC 188: (2014) 1
SCC (Civ) 51], the Supreme Court was considering
the interpretation of Section 125 CrPC. The Court held:
(SCC p. 196, para 13)
“13.3. … purposive interpretation needs to be
given to the provisions of Section 125 CrPC.
While dealing with the application of a
destitute wife or hapless children or parents
under this provision, the Court is dealing
with the marginalised sections of the society.
The purpose is to achieve “social justice”
which is the constitutional vision, enshrined
in the Preamble of the Constitution of India.
The Preamble to the Constitution of India clearly
signals that we have chosen the democratic
path under the rule of law to achieve the goal
of securing for all its citizens, justice, liberty,
equality and fraternity. It specifically highlights
achieving their social justice. Therefore, it
becomes the bounden duty of the courts
to advance the cause of social justice.
While giving interpretation to a particular
provision, the court is supposed to bridge
the gap between the law and society.”
(emphasis supplied)

113. It has therefore become necessary to issue directions
to bring about uniformity and consistency in the orders
passed by all courts, by directing that maintenance be
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1855

Shahjahan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.

awarded from the date on which the application was
made before the court concerned. The right to claim
maintenance must date back to the date of filing
the application, since the period during which the
maintenance proceedings remained pending is not
within the control of the applicant.’
(emphasis supplied by bolding; underlining reflects
emphasis supplied in original)

18. No doubt, Rajnesh (supra) was pronounced after the Family Court’s
Order and Impugned Order were passed, but its enunciation of the law
would entail that maintenance should be reckoned as awarded from
the date of filing of the application in this behalf. Having regard to the
totality of the facts and circumstances, we direct the respondent no.2
to pay Rs.4,000/- (Rupees Four Thousand) per month as maintenance
to the appellant, from the date of filing of the maintenance petition
before the Family Court. The maintenance awarded to the children
will also be payable from the date of filing of the maintenance
petition before the Family Court. We take judicial notice that during
the pendency of the appeal before this Court, the daughter Aatika
has attained majority. Having due regard to the scheme of Section
125 of the Code, it is clarified that the maintenance awarded in her
favour will only be payable up to the date of her attaining majority. The
entire amount of arrears shall be deposited by the respondent no.2
in the Family Court within four months from today, after adjustment
of amount(s), if any, already paid/deposited by him.
19. Accordingly, the Order of the Family Court as well as the Impugned
Order are set aside. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.8
20. No order as to costs.
21. I.A. No.164654/2018 is allowed; exemption sought for is granted.

POST-SCRIPT:
22. In the opening portions of this Judgment, we have noted ‘Court
of Kazi’, ‘Court of (Darul Kaja) Kajiyat’, ‘Sharia Court’ etcetera. In

8 Disposed of vide Order dated 04.02.2025. The present Judgment provides reasons for the same.
1856 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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Vishwa Lochan Madan v Union of India, (2014) 7 SCC 707, it
was observed:
‘12. From the pleadings of the parties there does not seem
to be any dispute that several Dar-ul-Qazas presided over
by the Qazis exist and they do issue fatwas. In the present
case, what we have been called upon to examine is as
to whether Dar-ul-Qaza is a parallel court and “fatwa”
has any legal status.
13. As it is well settled, the adjudication by a legal authority
sanctioned by law is enforceable and binding and meant
to be obeyed unless upset by an authority provided by law
itself. The power to adjudicate must flow from a validly
made law. A person deriving benefit from the adjudication
must have the right to enforce it and the person required
to make provision in terms of adjudication has to comply
that and on its failure consequences as provided in law
are to ensue. These are the fundamentals of any legal
judicial system. In our opinion, the decisions of Dar-ul-
Qaza or the fatwa do not satisfy any of these requirements.
Dar-ul-Qaza is neither created nor sanctioned by any law
made by the competent legislature. Therefore, the opinion
or the fatwa issued by Dar-ul-Qaza or for that matter
anybody is not adjudication of dispute by an authority
under a judicial system sanctioned by law. A Qazi or Mufti
has no authority or powers to impose his opinion and
enforce his fatwa on anyone by any coercive method. In
fact, whatever may be the status of fatwa during Mogul
or British Rule, it has no place in independent India under
our constitutional scheme. It has no legal sanction and
cannot be enforced by any legal process either by the
Dar-ul-Qaza issuing that or the person concerned or for
that matter anybody. The person or the body concerned
may ignore it and it will not be necessary for anybody
to challenge it before any court of law. It can simply be
ignored. In case any person or body tries to impose it,
their act would be illegal. Therefore, the grievance of
the petitioner that Dar-ul-Qazas and Nizam-e-Qaza are
running a parallel judicial system is misconceived.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1857

Shahjahan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.

14. As observed earlier, the fatwa has no legal status in
our constitutional scheme. Notwithstanding that it is an
admitted position that fatwas have been issued and are
being issued. The All India Muslim Personal Law Board
feels the “necessity of establishment of a network of judicial
system throughout the country and Muslims should be
made aware that they should get their disputes decided
by the Qazis”. According to the All India Muslim Personal
Law Board “this establishment may not have the police
powers but shall have the book of Allah in hand and sunnat
of the Rasool and all decisions should be according to
the book and the sunnat. This will bring the Muslims to
the Muslim courts. They will get justice”.
15. The object of establishment of such a court may be
laudable but we have no doubt in our mind that it has
no legal status. It is bereft of any legal pedigree and
has no sanction in laws of the land. They are not part
of the corpus juris of the State. A fatwa is an opinion,
only an expert is expected to give. It is not a decree, nor
binding on the court or the State or the individual. It is
not sanctioned under our constitutional scheme. But this
does not mean that existence of Dar-ul-Qaza or for that
matter practice of issuing fatwas are themselves illegal.
It is informal justice delivery system with an objective of
bringing about amicable settlement between the parties.
It is within the discretion of the persons concerned either
to accept, ignore or reject it. However, as the fatwa gets
strength from the religion; it causes serious psychological
impact on the person intending not to abide by that. As
projected by Respondent 10 “Godfearing Muslims obey
the fatwas”. In the words of Respondent 10 “it is for the
persons/parties who obtain fatwa to abide by it or not”.
He, however, emphasises that “the persons who are
Godfearing and believe that they are answerable to the
Almighty and have to face the consequences of their
doings/deeds, such are the persons, who submit to the
fatwa”. Imrana’s case is an eye-opener in this context.
Though she became the victim of lust of her father-in-law,
her marriage was declared unlawful and the innocent
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husband was restrained from keeping physical relationship
with her. In this way a declaratory decree for dissolution of
marriage and decree for perpetual injunction were passed.
Though neither the wife nor the husband had approached
for any opinion, an opinion was sought for and given at
the instance of a journalist, a total stranger. In this way,
the victim has been punished. A country governed by rule
of law cannot fathom it.
16. In our opinion, one may not object to issuance of fatwa
on a religious issue or any other issue so long it does not
infringe upon the rights of individuals guaranteed under the
law. Fatwa may be issued in respect of issues concerning
the community at large at the instance of a stranger but if
a fatwa is sought by a complete stranger on an issue not
concerning the community at large but individual, then the
Dar-ul-Qaza or for that matter anybody may consider the
desirability of giving any response and while considering
it should not be completely unmindful of the motivation
behind the fatwa. Having regard to the fact that a fatwa
has the potential of causing immense devastation, we
feel impelled to add a word of caution. We would like to
advise the Dar-ul-Qaza or for that matter anybody not to
give any response or issue fatwa concerning an individual,
unless asked for by the person involved or the person
having direct interest in the matter. However, in a case
the person involved or the person directly interested or
likely to be affected being incapacitated, by any person
having some interest in the matter. Issuance of fatwa
on rights, status and obligation of individual Muslims, in
our opinion, would not be permissible, unless asked for
by the person concerned or in case of incapacity, by the
person interested. Fatwas touching upon the rights of an
individual at the instance of rank strangers may cause
irreparable damage and therefore, would be absolutely
uncalled for. It shall be in violation of basic human rights.
It cannot be used to punish the innocent. No religion
including Islam punishes the innocent. Religion cannot
be allowed to be merciless to the victim. Faith cannot be
used as the dehumanising force.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1859

Shahjahan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.

17. In the light of what we have observed above, the
prayer made by the petitioner in the terms sought for
cannot be granted. However, we observe that no Dar-ul-
Qazas or for that matter, anybody or institution by any
name, shall give verdict or issue fatwa touching upon the
rights, status and obligation, of an individual unless such
an individual has asked for it. In the case of incapacity of
such an individual, any person interested in the welfare
of such person may be permitted to represent the cause
of individual concerned. In any event, the decision or the
fatwa issued by whatever body being not emanating from
any judicial system recognised by law, it is not binding on
anyone including the person, who had asked for it. Further,
such an adjudication or fatwa does not have a force of
law and, therefore, cannot be enforced by any process
using coercive method. Any person trying to enforce that
by any method shall be illegal and has to be dealt with
in accordance with law.’
(emphasis supplied)

23. ‘Court of Kazi’, ‘Court of (Darul Kaja) Kajiyat’, ‘Sharia Court’ etcetera
by whatever name styled have no recognition in law. As noted in
Vishwa Lochan Madan (supra), any declaration/decision by such
bodies, by whatever name labelled, is not binding on anyone and
is unenforceable by resort to any coercive measure. The only way
such declaration/decision can withstand scrutiny in the eye of law
could be when the affected parties accept such declaration/decision
by acting thereon or accepting it and when such action does not
conflict with any other law. Even then, such declaration/decision,
at best, would only be valid inter-se the parties that choose to act
upon/accept the same, and not a third-party.
24. The position in law stands clarified as above.

A SETTLEMENT THAT WASN’T:
25. It appears that the appellant and respondent no.2 had agreed to
a settlement before the District Legal Services Authority, Jhansi
as per its Secretary’s letter dated 11.07.2024. Although the letter
suggests that the prescribed settlement format was also signed by
1860 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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both parties, the Special Lok Adalat held in this Court on 31.07.2024
referred the matter back to Court recording ‘settlement seems not
possible’.
26. As such, we have disposed of the appeal on the basis of the
pleadings and arguments.

Result of the case: Appeal disposed of.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain