Holding

Non‑compliance with the mandatory deposit and application requirements under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 cannot be condoned by invoking the Limitation Act, and the tenant is therefore ineligible for protection against eviction.

Summary

The tenant (appellant) occupied a flat in Kolkata and was served a summons for eviction on 29 September 2022. He filed applications under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, together with a Section 5 Limitation Act application, 17 days after the statutory 30‑day period for depositing rent and filing the rent‑determination application had expired. The Small Causes Court and the Calcutta High Court rejected the condonation, holding that the statutory period could not be extended by the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court examined the mandatory language ‘shall’ versus the discretionary ‘may’ in Section 7, the limited applicability of the Limitation Act under Section 40 of the WBPT Act, and the consequences of non‑compliance under Section 7(3). It concluded that the tenant’s failure to deposit rent and file the application within the prescribed period was a mandatory breach, disallowing any benefit of protection against eviction. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the lower courts' orders were affirmed.

Issues considered

The applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to extend the 30‑day period prescribed under Section 7 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997.
Whether the requirements of deposit of rent and filing of an application under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) are mandatory (shall) or directory (may).
The scope of the proviso to Section 7(2) and whether it can extend the time for compliance with the initial deposit/application requirement.
The consequences of non‑compliance with Sections 7(1) and 7(2) under Section 7(3) for the tenant’s protection against eviction.

Legislation cited

General Clauses Act
Limitation Act, 1963s. 5
West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997s. 40, s. 7

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether applications filed u/ss.7(1) and (2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 by the tenant without deposit of rent after lapse of statutory period of thirty days, along with an application u/s.5 of the Limitation Act, rejected by Court of Small confirmed by the High Court is justified. Headnotes† West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 (WBPT Act) – s.7 – When a tenant can get the benefit of protection against eviction – Limitation Act, 1963 – s.5 – General Clauses Act – Benefit of

Subjects

Section 7 West Bengal Premises Tenancy ActProtection against evictionLimitation Act 1963 applicabilityMandatory vs directory statutory languageExtension of time discretionDeposit of rent requirementSection 5 Limitation Act condonationTenant eviction jurisprudence

Judgment

[2025] 9 S.C.R. 156 : 2025 INSC 984

Seventh Day Adventist Senior Secondary School
v.
Ismat Ahmed and Others
(Civil Appeal No. 10649 of 2025)
13 August 2025
[J.K. Maheshwari* and Aravind Kumar, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether applications filed u/ss.7(1) and (2) of the West Bengal
Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 by the tenant without deposit of rent
after lapse of statutory period of thirty days, along with an application
u/s.5 of the Limitation Act, rejected by Court of Small Causes as
not entertainable, confirmed by the High Court is justified.

Headnotes†
West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 (WBPT Act) –
s.7 – When a tenant can get the benefit of protection against
eviction – Limitation Act, 1963 – s.5 – General Clauses Act –
Benefit of protection against eviction u/s.7, when not available:
Held: In general, the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963 is
permissible subject to limitation prescribed under the provisions
of the WBPT Act – If a lesser time period or limitation has been
specified for proceedings under the WBPT Act, then extension of
time applying the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot
be allowed – In the present case, neither the rent as specified
u/ss.7(1) and 7(2) was paid or deposited by the tenant, nor the
application for determination of rent was filed within the period of
30 days as prescribed – Therefore, in the absence of fulfilment of
these twin conditions, tenant cannot avail the benefit of protection
against eviction as envisaged u/s.7 – Due to non-compliance of
deposit and filing of an application within the prescribed period of
30 days, the consequence as specified in sub-section (3) of s.7
shall follow – The benefit of proviso w.r.t the extended time would
not be available to the appellant–tenant prior to rent determination
stage – The compliance as required to be done by the tenant in
s.7(1)(a)(b)(c) and first part of s.7(2) regarding deposit of rent
and filing an application within the same time is mandatory – In
default, they cannot avail the benefit of the proviso of sub-section
* Author
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 157

Seventh Day Adventist Senior Secondary School v.
Ismat Ahmed and Others

(2) which only relates to the payment of determined amount of rent
and whereby the Civil Judge may exercise the discretion to grant
extension of time – Appeal of the tenant fails – Order of the Small
Causes Court and the High Court maintained. [Paras 21, 34-36]
West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 – s.7 – When a
tenant can get the benefit of protection against eviction –
Interpretation. [Paras 12-17, 28, 29, 32, 33]
West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 – s.40 – Limitation
Act, 1963 – Applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963 vis à-vis
WBPT Act – Discussed. [Paras 19, 21]

West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 – ss.7(1)(a)(b)(c) and
7(2) and proviso thereto – ‘shall’; ‘may’ – Whether compliance
of the provisions of ss.7(1) and 7(2) so far as it relates to
payment or deposit of the rent and filing of application within
the time as specified is mandatory or directory:
Held: In view of the plain reading of the provisions specified in
ss.7(1)(a)(b)(c) and 7(2) and also the proviso thereto, it is clear that
for the purpose of payment or deposit of the arrears of rent or rent
admitted to be due within the time as specified and also for filing
of the application, the word ‘shall’ has been used – However, for
the purpose of extension of time, the word ‘may’ has been used
indicating discretion vested with the Court – The proviso to s.7(2)
can only be construed to permit extension in payment of amount
so specified in order of determination passed by the Civil Judge
as envisaged in the latter part of sub-section(2) of s.7 – Thus,
the word ‘may’ used in the proviso of s.7(2) would only relate to
extension of time, which is a discretion vested with the Civil Judge
and it would not construe any other meaning – Moreover, since
in sub section(3) of s.7, the consequence of non-compliance has
been specified, therefore, use of the word ‘shall’ in ss.7(1)(a),
7(1)(b) and 7(2) is a mandatory compliance for the tenant, failing
which, his defence against eviction shall be struck off. [Para 24]
West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 – s.7(3) –
Contingencies under – Explained. [Para 33]
Interpretation of Statutes – Principles of statutory interpretation –
West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 – s.7(1), (2) and
proviso thereto – ‘shall’; ‘may’ – Definition – ‘shall’; ‘may’
used in the same Section at different places – Purport –
158 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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Comparison between s.7(1) and first part of sub-section (2) of
s.7 – Proviso to s.7(2) – Interpretation – Words and Phrases.
[Paras 26, 28, 29]

Case Law Cited
Nasiruddin and Others v. Sita Ram Agarwal [2003] 1 SCR 634 :
(2003) 2 SCC 577; Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari and Anr. v. Lakshmi
Narayan Gupta [1985] 3 SCR 825 : 1985 3 SCC 53; Govindlal
Chhaganlal Patel v. The Agricultural Produce Market Committee,
Godhra and Others [1976] 1 SCR 451 : 1975 2 SCC 482; Khub
Chand and Others v. State of Rajasthan and Others [1967] 1 SCR
120 : AIR 1967 SC 1074 – relied on.
Debasish Paul and Another v. Amal Boral [2023] 14 SCR 511 :
(2024) 2 SCC 169; Bijay Kumar Singh and Others v. Amit Kumar
Chamariya and Another [2019] 13 SCR 1028 : (2019) 10 SCC
660 – referred to.

Books and Periodicals Cited
P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law Lexicon Pg. 3745 (3rd Edition,
2005); P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law Lexicon Pg. 4325
(3rd Edition, 2005); Justice G.P. Singh, Principles of Statutory
Interpretation Including the General Clauses Act, 1897 with Notes,
Pg. 453 (14th Edition, 2016).

List of Acts
West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997; Limitation Act, 1963;
General Clauses Act.

List of Keywords
Section 7 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997; Benefit
of protection against eviction under the West Bengal Premises
Tenancy Act, 1997; Tenant not entitled to the benefit of protection
against eviction; Limitation Act, 1963; Applicability of the Limitation
Act, 1963 vis à-vis West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997;
Deposit of rent and filing an application; Non-compliance of deposit
and filing of an application within the prescribed period of 30 days;
Mandatory; Directory; Discretion of Civil Judge to grant extension
of time; ‘Payment’ or ‘deposit’ of rent (disputed or undisputed);
‘shall’; ‘may’.
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 159

Seventh Day Adventist Senior Secondary School v.
Ismat Ahmed and Others

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 10649 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.03.2024 of the High Court
at Calcutta in CO No. 2783 of 2023

Appearances for Parties
Nidhesh Gupta, Sr. Adv. (Amicus Curiae), Ms. Japneet Kaur, Bikram
Dwivedi, Manu Bhardwaj.
Advs. for the Appellant:
Uday Gupta, Sr. Adv., Hiren Dasan, Ms. Shivani M. Lal, Safdar
Azam, Kripa Shankar Prasad, Ajay Sharma, Unmukt Gera,
Mahendra Mali, Deepanshu Rana.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Swarnendu Chatterjee, Amit Kumar Raidani, Ms. Deepakshi Garg,
Ms. Harshita Rawat.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

J.K. Maheshwari, J.

1. Leave granted.
2. Challenging the order impugned dated 20.03.20241 passed by High
Court at Calcutta, confirming the order dated 17.07.20232 of the Small
Causes Court, which rejected the application under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 filed by appellant–tenant seeking condonation
of delay in filing application under Section 7(1) of the West Bengal
Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 (in short ‘WBPT Act’), the present
appeal has been filed.
3. The appellant is a tenant in the suit premise being Flat No. 8, First
Floor, 44, Elliot Road, Kolkata, West Bengal, and the respondents
are the landlord. The relationship of landlord and the tenant is not in
dispute. The admitted monthly rent of the suit premise is Rs. 1090/-.

1 C.O. No. 2783 of 2023
2 Ejectment Suit No. 133 of 2019
160 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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The landlord instituted the ejectment suit on 11.06.2019 on the grounds
of arrears of rent, bona-fide need and sub-letting. On issuance of
notice, summons were served upon tenant on 29.09.2022. From
the next day and date, i.e., 30.09.2022 till 27.10.2022, the Courts
were closed because of Durga Puja vacation in Kolkata. Thereafter,
on 14.11.2022, the tenant filed the applications under Sections 7(1)
and 7(2) of the WBPT Act along with application under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act with the prayer to condone the delay of 17 days in
filing the application under Section 7(1) of the WBPT Act.
4. In the application filed under Section 7(1) of the WBPT Act, prayer
was made to deposit the ‘current rent’ for the month of November
2022 at the rate of Rs. 1090/- per month and to pass such order as
the Court may deem fit. Similarly, application under Section 7(2) of
the WBPT Act, was filed seeking determination of default period, if
any, and to refund the excess amount paid and to pass such order
as may deem fit.
5. Learned Small Causes Court by the impugned order rejected the
application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, inter-alia, observing
that the period to file an application as specified under Section 7(1)
of the WBPT Act is thirty days, which cannot be extended by aid
of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Aggrieved by the said order, the
tenant preferred the revision before the High Court, which was
dismissed maintaining the order of the learned Small Causes Court
with certain observations qua applicability of Sections 7(1) and (2)
of the WBPT Act. Hence, this appeal.
6. Mr. Uday Gupta, learned senior counsel for the appellant–tenant
has strenuously urged that the tenant was lawfully inducted by
the respondents and has regularly paid the rent by cheque to the
son-in-law of the landlord (respondent no. 1), details of which have
been specified in the application preferred under Section 7(1) and
7(2) of WBPT Act. It is urged that as per the details of the cheque
amount, a total sum of Rs. 2,80,500/- has been paid and as per
the averments made in the plaint, the rent due is from March 2017,
which comes to sixty eight months till date of filing of applications
under Section 7(1) and 7(2). As such the payment made is more
than the rent amount due, therefore, refund of the said amount was
sought for. It is urged that when amount of rent is paid in excess,
the applications under Section 7(1) and (2) of WBPT Act ought to
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 161

Seventh Day Adventist Senior Secondary School v.
Ismat Ahmed and Others

be considered on merits along with the application for condonation
of delay filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 by the tenant.
7. Learned senior counsel extensively referring Sections 7(1), 7(2),
7(3) and 7(4) of the WBPT Act, contended that proviso appended to
Section 7(2) would apply to Section 7(1) also, therefore, if there is
any delay in filing of the application under Section 7(1) and (2), the
same may be condoned at least once up to two months. In support of
the said contention, reliance has been placed on the judgment in the
case of Debasish Paul and Another vs. Amal Boral3, in particular
paragraph 17, and also urged that judgment in Bijay Kumar Singh
and Others vs. Amit Kumar Chamariya and Another4, does not
deal with the issue as involved in the present case as relied upon by
the High Court in the order impugned. In view of the foregoing, it is
submitted that by, condoning the delay, learned Small Causes Court
may be directed to consider the applications filed under Sections
7(1) and (2) of the WBPT Act on its own merit.
8. Per contra, Mr. Swarnendu Chatterjee, learned counsel representing
respondents–landlord has vehemently contended that applications
under Sections 7(1) and (2) of the WBPT Act have not been filed
within the prescribed statutory period of thirty days from the date
of receipt of summons, therefore, learned Small Causes Court was
right in rejecting the application filed under Section 5 of Limitation
Act, 1963, which is affirmed by the High Court. Learned counsel
placed reliance on the judgment of Bijay Kumar (supra) to support
that unless the deposit of the admitted amount of rent has been
made, the application under Section 7(1) and (2) of the WBPT Act
ought not to be entertained.
9. Mr. Nidhesh Gupta, learned senior counsel has appeared as amicus
curiae pursuant to our order dated 19.02.2025 and has ably assisted
the Court by placing his erudite submissions for consideration. His
propositions are twofold. Firstly, he has submitted that, proviso to
Section 7(2) of the WBPT Act applies to sub-section (1) of Section 7
also. Referring relevant provisions and emphasising the word ‘amount
of rent’, ‘payment’ and ‘deposit’ as referred at various places in
Section 7(1), 7(2) and 7(3) along with specification of time for such

3 (2024) 2 SCC 169
4 (2019) 10 SCC 660
162 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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payment and deposit after determination, he submitted that the proviso
deals with extension of ‘time’ as prescribed for ‘pay’ and ‘deposit’
in Sections 7(1) and (2) both. In case the first proposition does not
found favour, then the second proposition may be considered, i.e.,
since the proviso is textually located at the end of sub-section (2)
of Section 7 and per se does not refer to sub-section (1), but only
refers to time specified therein, it must be confined in its operation
to latter part of sub-section (2) of Section 7 alone.
10. After having heard the learned counsel for both the parties,
submissions of learned amicus, and on perusal of the facts and
material placed before us in the present case, the moot question
that falls for our consideration is ‘whether applications filed under
Sections 7(1) and (2) of the WBPT Act by the tenant without deposit
of rent after lapse of statutory period of thirty days, along with an
application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, rejected by Court
of Small Causes as not entertainable, confirmed by the High Court
is justified?’
11. For appreciating the question as posed in detail, the provisions of
Section 7 of the WBPT Act which are relevant for determination of
the same are required to be noted and examined and therefore, we
reproduce them hereinbelow:
“7. When a tenant can get the benefit of protection
against eviction.
(1) (a) On a suit being instituted by the landlord for eviction
on any of the grounds referred to in section 6, the tenant
shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of this
section, pay to the landlord or deposit with the Civil Judge
all arrears of rent, calculated at the rate at which it was
last paid and upto the end of the month previous to that
in which the payment is made together with interest at the
rate of ten per cent per annum.
(b) Such payment or deposit shall be made within one
month of the service of summons on the tenant or, where
he appears in the suit without the summons being served
upon him, within one month of his appearance.
(c) The tenant shall thereafter continue to pay to the
landlord or deposit with the Civil Judge month by month
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 163

Seventh Day Adventist Senior Secondary School v.
Ismat Ahmed and Others

by the 15th of each succeeding month, a sum equivalent
to the rent at that rate.
(2) If in any suit referred to in sub-section (1), there is
any dispute as to the amount of the rent payable by the
tenant, the tenant shall, within the time specified in that sub-
section, deposit with the Civil Judge the amount admitted
by him to be due from him together with an application for
determination of the rent payable. No such deposit shall
be accepted unless it is accompanied by an application
for determination of the rent payable. On receipt of the
application, the Civil Judge shall, having regard to the
rate at which rent was last paid and the period for which
default may have been made by the tenant, make, as soon
as possible within a period not exceeding one year, an
order specifying the amount, if any, due from the tenant
and, thereupon, the tenant shall, within one month of the
date of such order, pay to the landlord the amount so
specified in the order:
Provided that having regard to the circumstances of the
case, an extension of time may be granted by the Civil
Judge only once and the period of such extension shall
not exceed two months.
(3) If the tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount referred
to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) within the time
specified therein or within such extended time as may be
granted, the Civil Judge shall order the defence against
delivery of possession to be struck out and shall proceed
with the hearing of the suit.
(4) If the tenant makes deposit or payment as required by
sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), no order for delivery of
possession of the premises to the landlord on the ground
of default in payment of rent by the tenant, shall be made
by the Civil Judge, but he may allow such cost as he may
deem fit to the landlord:
Provided that the tenant shall not be entitled to any relief
under this sub-section if, having obtained such relief once
in respect of the premises, he again makes default in
164 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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payment of rent for four months within a period of twelve
months or for three successive rental periods where rent
is not payable monthly.
12. Bare reading of the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that as
per sub section (1) of Section 7, in a suit for eviction filed by the
landlord on any grounds as specified in Section 6 of the WBPT Act,
the tenant shall, subject to provisions of sub-section (2), pay to the
landlord or deposit in the Court, all arrears of rent calculated at the
rate at which it was last paid together with interest at the rate of
ten per cent per annum. As mandated by Section 7(1)(b), the said
payment or deposit shall be made within one month from the date
of service of the summons on tenant or from the date of appearance
in case the tenant appears without service of summons. The said
two provisions apply in a case where arrears of rent are admitted.
Thereafter, Section 7(1)(c) puts a further condition that after the
admitted arrears are paid, the tenant shall continue to pay or deposit
with the landlord or Civil Judge, as the case may be, a monthly sum
of rent at that rate on or before fifteenth day of consecutive month.
13. As per sub-section (2), if there is a dispute as to the amount of
rent payable by the tenant, he is required to deposit the admitted
amount due from him in the Court within the time as specified [one
month as per Section 7(1)(b)] ‘together’ with an application for
determination of the rent payable. It is emphasised that deposit of
rent shall not be accepted unless the said prayer is accompanied
with an application for determination of the rent. Meaning thereby, to
seek protection against eviction, the tenant is required to deposit the
admitted amount of rent within the time as specified, i.e., within one
month from the date of summons served or where tenant appears
in the suit without the summons being served upon him, along with
an application for determination of the rent so payable. As such, in
case where there is no dispute as to arrears of rent, it ought to be
paid within a month and, in case it is in dispute, even then, tenant
would be required to deposit within the same time coupled with an
application as discussed above.
14. To supplement the aforesaid, word ‘together’ used in Section 7(2)
preceding ‘with an application for determination of the rent payable’
emphasises that the deposit of admitted amount of rent within a
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 165

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Ismat Ahmed and Others

period of thirty days as specified must accompany the application
for determination of rent payable. At this stage, we can profitably
refer to ‘P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon’5 to understand
the meaning of ‘together’. According to the same, ‘together’ means
“in company” or “conjointly” or “simultaneously”. Accordingly, on
contextual application of the word ‘together’, it is clear that the
application for determination of rent must be filed within the same
period which is provided for ‘deposit’ or ‘pay’, i.e., thirty days.
15. On receiving such application, the Court having regard to the rate
of rent last paid and period of which default has been made by the
tenant shall make an order on such application not later than one
year and thereupon the tenant shall within the period of one month
of the date of such order, pay to the landlord the amount so specified
in the order. That is to say, the determination of the rent on the
parameters as specified in the latter part of sub-section (2) and on
such determination within one month of the date of the order, the
amount as specified in the order is to be paid. The proviso thereto
deals with the extension of time, which can only be once and not
beyond period of two months.
16. Having perused Section 7 of WBPT Act, it is apparent that sub-
section (1) is subject to sub-section (2). Further, sub-section (3)
specifies consequences of non-compliance of sub-sections (1) and
(2) by the tenant, leading to striking out of defence against delivery
of possession and the Court shall proceed with the hearing of the
suit. Sub-section (4) of Section 7 of WBPT Act makes it clear that
in a proceeding of eviction, no order for delivery of possession of
the premises to the landlord shall be passed by the Court on the
ground of default of payment if the tenant deposits the rent under
sub-sections (1) or (2), but the Court may allow such cost to the
landlord as deemed fit. As per proviso, it is clear that if tenant was
allowed the relief as indicated hereinabove, but later he makes default
in payment of rent for four months within one year or in case three
successive rental periods, where the rent is not payable monthly,
the relief of protection against eviction available under sub-section
(4) cannot be allowed granting benefit of protection against eviction
to the tenant.

5 P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law Lexicon Pg. 4707 (3rd Edition, 2005)
166 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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17. In view of the foregoing, while bringing the said Section, the
legislative intent was to provide protection to the tenant against
eviction, subject to compliance of deposit of arrears of rent if there
is no dispute as to amount of rent, within one month from the date
of service of summons, along with interest at the rate of ten per cent
per annum. The tenant is further required to deposit the regular rent
as prescribed in Section 7(1)(c). In case, there is a dispute of the
amount of rent payable, the tenant is required to deposit the amount
due as admitted by him within thirty days and file an application
conjointly for determination of rent within the same period. The said
application may possibly be entertained and decided by the Court
thereafter only. This Court in the case of Bijay Kumar (supra) had
an occasion to consider the scope of Section 7(2) of the WBPT Act
wherein the tenant had not deposited or paid the admitted rent while
moving an application seeking determination of rent. Trial Court while
allowing such application granted time to pay the admitted rent, but
High Court set-aside the order of the Trial Court. While confirming
the order of the High Court on the issue of deposit of rent admitted
by tenant under Section 7(2) on the application for determination of
rent, this Court observed as under –
“21. …the deposit of rent along with an application for
determination of dispute is a precondition to avoid eviction
on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent. In view
thereof, tenant will not be able to take recourse to Section
5 of the Limitation Act as it is not an application alone
which is required to be filed by the tenant but the tenant
has to deposit admitted arrears of rent as well.”
18. Thus, in case of disputed rent, this Court was of the view that to
avail the benefit of protection against eviction under the WBPT
Act, the tenant has to do the following to avoid eviction, first, to
deposit rent admitted by him to be due; second, an application for
determination of rent payable be filed along with. The tenant had
neither deposited, nor paid the admitted rent and had only filed the
application for determination of rent belatedly along with an application
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
19. On perusal of provisions of the WBPT Act, it appears that Section 40
prescribes the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963 in proceedings
and appeals. ‘Proceedings’ as defined in ‘P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 167

Seventh Day Adventist Senior Secondary School v.
Ismat Ahmed and Others

Advanced Law Lexicon’6 includes ‘any suit, appeal or application’.
Since the said provision is relevant, it is reproduced for ready
reference as under:-
“40. Application of the Limitation Act, 1963 to
proceedings and appeals.
Subject to the provisions of this Act relating to limitation,
the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, shall apply to
proceedings and appeals under this Act.”
Upon reading of the aforesaid, it is clear that the provisions of the
Limitation Act, 1963, would apply to the proceedings and appeals
subject to the provisions of the WBPT Act relating to limitation. Thus,
the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963 vis-à-vis WBPT Act is not
in general, but subject to the provisions of the limitation specified in
the WBPT Act itself.
20. In the said context, this Court in Debasish Paul (supra) referred to
the judgment in Bijay Kumar (supra) and in paragraph 16, while
examining the applicability of Section 5 application under Limitation
Act, 1963, observed as under:-
“16. We have no doubt over the proposition that though
generally the Limitation Act is applicable to the provisions
of the said Act in view of Section 40 of the said Act, if
there is a lesser time period specified as limitation in the
said Act, then the provisions of the Limitation Act cannot
be used to expand the same. It is in this context that in
Nasiruddin case [Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal, (2003) 2
SCC 577] , it has been mentioned that the real intention of
the legislation must be gathered from the language used.
Thus, the reasoning in Bijay Kumar Singh case [Bijay
Kumar Singh v. Amit Kumar Chamariya, (2019) 10 SCC
660 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 24] cannot be doubted more so
as the requirement is for a tenant to file an application,
but he has to deposit the admitted arrears of rent as well,
which has certainly not been done.”

6 P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law Lexicon Pg. 3745 (3rd Edition, 2005)
168 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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21. In view of the foregoing, it can safely be concluded that in general,
the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963 is permissible subject to
limitation prescribed under the provisions of the WBPT Act. In this
sense, this Court was right in observing that if a lesser time period
or limitation has been specified for proceedings under the WBPT
Act, then extension of time applying the provisions of the Limitation
Act, 1963 cannot be allowed. Be that as it may, in the present case,
neither the rent as specified under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) has been
paid or deposited by the tenant, nor the application for determination
of rent has been filed within the period of thirty days as prescribed.
Therefore, in the absence of fulfilment of these twin conditions, tenant
cannot avail the benefit of protection against eviction as envisaged
under Section 7 of WBPT Act.
22. Now reverting on the ancillary issue, whether compliance of the
provisions of Sections 7(1) and 7(2) so far as it relates to payment
or deposit of the rent and filing of application within the time as
specified is mandatory or directory? In order to understand whether
such compliance is mandatory or directory, it is essential to look
into the language as used in those provisions. After perusal of
Section 7(1)(a), it is clear that on institution of a suit, it is incumbent
on the tenant to deposit the rent, therefore, the word ‘tenant shall’
has been used with ‘pay to landlord or deposit’. Even in Section
7(1)(b), it is provided that such payment or deposit ‘shall’ be within
one month of the service of summons or within one month from the
date of appearance. Further, in Section 7(1)(c) it is provided that
after the payment or deposit has been made by the tenant in terms
of Section 7(1)(a), the tenant ‘shall’ continue to do the same by 15th
of each succeeding month.
23. Similarly, in Section 7(2) which deals with the situation of disputed
rent, the tenant within the time specified in that Section i.e., 7(1)
(b), ‘shall’ deposit the amount admitted by him to be due along with
application for determination of rent. The proviso appended therein
relates to extension of time only once and upto a maximum period
of two months. The proviso reads as ‘…an extension of time may
be granted…’
24. In view of the plain reading of the provisions specified in Sections
7(1)(a)(b)(c) and 7(2) and also the proviso thereto, it is clear that
for the purpose of payment or deposit of the arrears of rent or rent
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admitted to be due within the time as specified and also for filing
of the application, the word ‘shall’ has been used. However, for the
purpose of extension of time, the word ‘may’ has been used indicating
discretion vested with the Court.
25. In this regard, guidance may be taken from three-Judge Bench
judgment in the case of ‘Nasiruddin and Others Vs. Sita Ram
Agarwal’7 wherein this Court, inter-alia, interpreted the mandatory
or directory nature of expressions ‘shall’ and ‘may’ used in Section
13(4) of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950
(in short ‘1950 Act’) in the framework of rent deposit obligations qua
determination of provisional rent. How and for what purpose the word
shall has been used in this regard in Section 13(4) of 1950 Act is
referred which reads as thus:
“13. (4) The tenant shall deposit in court or pay to the
landlord the amount determined by the court under
sub-section (3) within fifteen days from the date of such
determination, or within such further time, not exceeding
three months, as may be extended by the court. The
tenant shall also continue to deposit in court or pay to the
landlord, month by month, the monthly rent subsequent
to the period up to which determination has been made,
by the fifteenth of each succeeding month or within such
further time not exceeding fifteen days, as may be extended
by the court, at the monthly rate at which the rent was
determined by the court under sub-section (3).”
While interpretating the said provisions some paragraphs of the
judgment which are relevant for our purposes are reproduced as
under:-
“37. The court’s jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be
invoked when the same is ambiguous. It is well known
that in a given case the court can iron out the fabric but it
cannot change the texture of the fabric. It cannot enlarge
the scope of legislation or intention when the language of
the provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or
subtract words to a statute or read something into it which

7 (2003) 2 SCC 577
170 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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is not there. It cannot rewrite or recast legislation. It is also
necessary to determine that there exists a presumption
that the legislature has not used any superfluous words. It
is well settled that the real intention of the legislation must
be gathered from the language used. It may be true that
use of the expression “shall or may” is not decisive for
arriving at a finding as to whether the statute is directory
or mandatory. But the intention of the legislature must be
found out from the scheme of the Act. It is also equally
well settled that when negative words are used the courts
will presume that the intention of the legislature was that
the provisions are mandatory in character.
38. Yet there is another aspect of the matter which cannot
be lost sight of. It is a well-settled principle that if an act
is required to be performed by a private person within a
specified time, the same would ordinarily be mandatory but
when a public functionary is required to perform a public
function within a time-frame, the same will be held to be
directory unless the consequences therefor are specified.
In Sutherland’s Statutory Construction, 3rd Edn., Vol. 3, at
p. 107 it is pointed out that a statutory direction to private
individuals should generally be considered as mandatory
and that the rule is just the opposite to that which obtains
with respect to public officers. Again, at p. 109, it is pointed
out that often the question as to whether a mandatory
or directory construction should be given to a statutory
provision may be determined by an expression in the
statute itself of the result that shall follow non-compliance
with the provision.”
In the context of the said case, the word ‘shall’ used in Section 13(4)
for deposit was treated as mandatory because of the consequence of
non-compliance was provided in Section 13(5), i.e., striking out the
defence against eviction. Moreover, the word ‘may’ has been used in
the context of power of the Court in extending the already prescribed
time period of fifteen days in depositing the determined rent.
26. In addition, as per ‘P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon’8,
the word ‘shall’ is defined as “in common parlance, a term which, it

8 P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law Lexicon Pg. 4325 (3rd Edition, 2005)
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is said, has always a compulsory meaning, and in its common and
ordinary usage, unless accompanied by qualifying words which show
a contrary intent, always refers to the future; but it may be used in a
sense of ‘must’ of which it is a synonym.”. Therefore, the said word
used in statute is generally mandatory. Similarly, ‘may’ is defined
as “In general, May is an auxiliary verb qualifying the meaning of
another verb by expressing the ability, contingency, possibility, or
probability…… As used in statute, in its ordinary sense the word is
permissive and not mandatory, merely importing permission, ability,
possibility, or contingency.” Simultaneously, in ‘Principles of Statutory
Interpretation’9, revised by Justice A.K. Patnaik, it is specifically said
that use of word ‘shall’ with respect to one matter and use of word
‘may’ with respect to another matter in the same section of statute
shall normally lead to the conclusion that the word ‘shall’ imposes an
obligation, whereas the word ‘may’ confers a discretionary power. In
this regard, guidance can be taken from the judgment of this Court
in the case of Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari and Anr. Vs. Lakshmi
Narayan Gupta10.
27. In the case of Govindlal Chhaganlal Patel Vs. The Agricultural
Produce Market Committee, Godhra and Others11, three-Judge
Bench of this Court while interpreting the words ‘shall’ and ‘may’
as referred in the Crawford on Statutory Construction (Ed. 1940,
Article 261 p.516), set out the following passage from an American
case approvingly:
“The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or
directory depends upon the intent of the legislature and
not upon the language in which the intent is clothed. The
meaning and intention of the legislature must govern, and
these are to be ascertained, not only from the phraseology
of the provision, but also by considering its nature, its
design, and the consequences which would follow from
construing it the one way or the other.”
As such, the governing factor is the meaning and intent of the
Legislature, which cannot merely be gathered from the words used

9 Justice G.P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation Including the General Clauses Act, 1897 with
Notes, Pg. 453 (14th Edition, 2016)
10 (1985) 3 SCC 53
11 (1975) 2 SCC 482
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in statute, but are based on variety of other circumstances and
considerations. In the judgment of ‘Khub Chand and Others Vs.
State of Rajasthan and Others12, this Court observed as under: -
“….The term “shall” in its ordinary significance is mandatory
and the court shall ordinarily give that interpretation to
that term unless such an interpretation leads to some
absurd or inconvenient consequence or be at variance
with the intent of the legislature, to be collected from other
parts of the Act. The construction of the said expression
depends on the provisions of a particular Act, the setting
in which the expression appears, the object for which
the direction is given, the consequences that would flow
from the infringement of the direction and such other
considerations.”
28. Hence, taking clue from the above referred judgments and principles
of the statutory interpretation, the intent of WBPT Act and the
circumstances wherein, the words ‘shall’ and ‘may’ have been used
in the same Section at different places, is required to be adverted.
As referred above in paragraphs 22, 23 and 24, it is apparent
that whenever the words ‘payment’ or ‘deposit’ of rent (disputed
or undisputed) have been used, the tenant has been cast with an
obligation to deposit such rent within the specified time by using
the word ‘shall’ therein. In case of disputed rent, the tenant is also
required to file an application along with such deposit. The legislative
intent behind using the word ‘shall’ is to ensure that in case the
tenant who is in occupation of premises defaults in payment of rent
due to some inadvertence or fault, on ground of which the eviction is
sought by the landlord, then on service of the summons, to prevent
his defence from getting struck-off, the tenant must comply with the
twin pre-requisites. Section 7(1) provides that the tenant shall pay to
landlord or deposit all arrears of rent, while the textual setup of first
part of sub-section (2) of Section 7 is that the tenant shall within the
time specified, ‘pay’ or ‘deposit’ the amount of rent as admitted as
due by him. Indeed, it is true that in the latter part of sub-section (2)
of Section 7, the word ‘shall’ has again been used in the context of
deciding the application for determination of the rent, stating therein

12 AIR 1967 SC 1074
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 173

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Ismat Ahmed and Others

that ‘tenant shall within one month of the date of such order, pay to
the landlord the amount so specified in the order’. Therefore, in the
latter part, the word ‘tenant shall’ would be referable for payment of
the amount to the landlord so specified in the order, and in the said
interpretive context, the extension of time is based on the discretion
of the Civil Judge only once, which may not exceed beyond two
months. Thus, the proviso appended therein would apply only to a
case where the amount specified in the order after determination was
not paid within the period as specified therein. Consequently, by virtue
of the proviso, in the latter part, the word ‘shall’ would intend only
to the time period prescribed in the order, and it would not include
the time period for initial period as specified under Section 7(1)(a)
and (b) and the former part of Section 7(2).
29. In addition, Section 7(1) and first part of sub-section (2) of Section
7 are comparable, both requiring deposit/pay admitted/undisputed
amount of rent. However, Section 7(2) casts an additional obligation
on the tenant to file an application for determination for rent along
with such deposit within the specified time frame. The Legislature in
its wisdom did not provide for any extension of time for payment or
deposit under Section 7(1), making it clear that no such extension
was intended in the corresponding part in Section 7(2). Since the
deposit and application are to be made together by the tenant
mandatorily within a specific time, in our considered view, extension
of time as given in proviso to Section 7(2) is not applicable to either.
Therefore, the proviso can only be construed to permit extension in
payment of amount so specified in order of determination passed
by the Civil Judge as envisaged in the latter part of sub-section (2)
of Section 7. Stated differently, the word ‘may’ used in the proviso
of Section 7(2) would only relate to extension of time, which is a
discretion vested with the Civil Judge and it would not construe
any other meaning. Moreover, it can be said that since in sub-
section (3) of Section 7, the consequence of non-compliance has
been specified, therefore, use of the word ‘shall’ in Sections 7(1)(a),
7(1)(b) and 7(2) is a mandatory compliance for the tenant, failing
which, his defence against eviction shall be struck off.
30. In the case of Debasish Paul (supra), the suit was filed for eviction
by landlord. On entering appearance, applications under Sections 7(1)
and 7(2) of the WBPT Act were filed with a delay of 10 months
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without any application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The
trial Court rejected the said applications because they were not
filed within the statutory time. In revision, the High Court set-aside
the order of the trial Court and granted liberty to the tenant for filing
applications along with application under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, 1963, explaining the sufficient cause. When the matter reached
this Court in appeal, this Court had specifically opined that if lessor
time period has been specified for limitation in the WBPT Act, then
the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be used to extend
the same and set-aside the order of High Court while sustaining the
order of the trial Court.
31. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant made a
strenuous attempt relying upon the observations made in paragraphs
17, 18 and 19 of the judgment rendered in Debasish Paul (supra),
wherein the Court has referred to the judgment of Bijay Kumar
(supra). In this regard, paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 are relevant and
are reproduced below as thus:-
“17. We are of the view that a combined reading of the
two statutes would suggest that while the Limitation Act
may be generally applicable to the proceedings under the
Tenancy Act, the restricted proviso under Section 7 of the
said Act, providing a time period beyond which no extension
can be granted, has to be applicable. The proviso is after
sub-section (2) of Section 7 but sub-section (2) of Section
7 in turn refers to sub-section (1) implying the application
of the proviso to sub-section (1) too.
18. There is also a larger context in this behalf as the
Tenancy Acts provide for certain protections to the tenants
beyond the contractual rights. Thus, the provisions must be
strictly adhered to. The proceedings initiated on account of
non- payment of rent have to be dealt with in that manner
as a tenant cannot occupy the premises and then not pay
for it. This is so even if there is a dispute about the rent.
The tenant is, thus, required to deposit all arrears of rent
where there is no dispute on the admitted amount of rent
and even in case of a dispute. The needful has to be done
within the time stipulated and actually should accompany
the application filed under sub- sections (1) &amp; (2) of
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Ismat Ahmed and Others

Section 7 of the said Act. The proviso only gives liberty to
extend the time once by period not exceeding two months.
19. The respondent neither paid the rent, nor deposited
the rent by moving the application nor deposited it within
the extended time as stipulated in the proviso. The mere
allegation of absence of correct legal advice cannot come
to the aid of the respondent as, if such a plea was to be
accepted it would give a complete licence to a tenant to
occupy premises without payment of rent and then claim
that he was not correctly advised. If the tenant engages
an advocate and abides by his advice, then the legal
consequences of not doing what is required to be done,
must flow.”
32. In the said context, if we see the intent of legislature as discussed
and relying upon two cases of three-Judge Bench of this Court,
we intend to explain that Section 7 of the WBPT Act prescribes
when a tenant can get the benefit of protection against eviction.
The opening word of sub-section (1) i.e., ‘on a suit being instituted
by the landlord for eviction’ makes it clear that in case the tenant
defaults in payment of rent and the suit is brought as specified in the
WBPT Act, then on deposit/payment of admitted rent, an opportunity
ought to be provided to get the benefit of protection against eviction.
Therefore, for availing such benefit, some pre-requisites are there,
which is of deposit of the rent, either disputed or undisputed as
admitted, within the specified time. In case, the rent is disputed,
the tenant has to mandatorily file an application, by virtue of word
‘shall’ used to such extent either in Section 7(1)(a)(b)(c) or first part
of Section 7(2). However, in the latter part of Section 7(2), which is
for payment of amount on determination by the Civil Judge within
the time as specified after compliance of the pre-deposit and on
filing an application for determination within the specified time, such
payment has to be made by the tenant within one month of date
of order passed by Civil Judge. The proviso refers to extension of
time with an intent to grant one more opportunity to the tenant after
determination of rent for deposit.
33. At this juncture, we also deem it relevant to refer sub-section (3)
of Section 7, wherein it is specified that if tenant fails to deposit or
pay any amount referred in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) within
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the time specified therein or within such extended time as may be
granted by the Court, his defence against delivery of possession
shall be struck out. So it deals with the following contingencies; first
is of Section 7(1)(a)(b)(c), second is of former part of Section 7(2)
and third is of latter part of Section 7(2) and in default of either of
the situations, the Judge shall order the defence against delivery of
possession to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of
the suit specifying the consequences of failure to do any of the three
situations. While using the word extended time in sub-section (3), the
word shall has been used, therefore, this would also be referable to
the provision which leads to the conclusion that in case the tenant
fails to deposit the determined amount within the time specified or
within the extended time. In that contingency the order of striking out
of defence be passed and suit be proceeded for hearing. As explained
from above discussion, we are constrained to say that the arguments
as advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant relying upon
the paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 of the judgment in Debasish Paul
(supra) are not germane, hence repelled.
34. After perusal of the facts of the case at hand, the summons were
served on appellant on 29.09.2022. From the next date, i.e.,
30.09.2022 to 27.10.2022, Durga Puja vacation in Kolkata started.
As per the provisions of the General Clauses Act, limitation period of
thirty days would start from the date of receiving of the summons and
it would complete on 28.10.2022, prior to completion of Durga Puja
vacation. Therefore, the rent was required to be deposited within thirty
days along with an application immediately on reopening of Courts, but
application was filed with a delay of 17 days on 14.11.2022. Therefore,
due to non-compliance of deposit and filing of an application within
the prescribed period of 30 days, the consequence as specified in
sub-section (3) of Section 7 shall follow. The benefit of proviso with
respect to the extended time would not be available to the appellant
prior to rent determination stage.
35. As concluded above, the applicability of Limitation Act is subject to
provisions of the WBPT Act. Meaning thereby, if the time limit has
been prescribed to do some act it cannot be extended by aid of
proviso of sub-section (2) of Section 7. As such, the inescapable
conclusion in the facts and the law as discussed hereinabove, is that
the compliance as required to be done by the tenant in Section 7(1)
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(a)(b)(c) and first part of Section 7(2) regarding deposit of rent and
filing an application within the same time is mandatory. In default, they
cannot avail the benefit of the proviso of sub-section (2) which only
relates to the payment of determined amount of rent and whereby the
Civil Judge may exercise the discretion to grant extension of time.
36. Accordingly, and in view of the above discussions, the present appeal
of the tenant fails and is dismissed while maintaining the order
passed by the learned Small Causes Court and the High Court in
above terms. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey