Supreme Court of India
SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD. & ORS.versusSHREE LAL MEENA
- Citation
- 2019 INSC 372
- Decided
- 26 November 2015
- Disposal
- Matter referred to larger bench
- Bench
- DIPAK MISRA
Holding
Rule 31 of the Life Insurance Corporation (Employees) Pension Rules, 1995 is not retrospective and resignation cannot be treated as voluntary retirement, so the employee is not eligible for pension under those Rules.
Summary
The employee, Shree Lal Meena, sent a resignation letter on 14 July 1990, which was accepted on 11 January 1991. After the Life Insurance Corporation (Employees) Pension Rules, 1995 were introduced with retrospective effect from 1 November 1993, he claimed pension on the ground that Rule 3 made the Rules applicable to him. The High Court allowed the claim, treating his resignation as voluntary retirement. The Corporation appealed, arguing that resignation is distinct from voluntary retirement and that Rule 31, which governs voluntary retirement, was not made retrospective. The Supreme Court held that Rule 31 is not retrospective, resignation cannot be equated with voluntary retirement, and therefore the employee is not entitled to pension under the 1995 Rules. Pending referral to a larger bench, the Court ordered the Corporation to continue paying 50% of the pension amount from 1 December 2015.
Issues considered
- The applicability of the 1995 Pension Rules to an employee who resigned before the Rules came into force.
- Whether resignation can be treated as voluntary retirement under Rule 31 of the 1995 Rules.
- Whether Rule 31 of the 1995 Rules has retrospective effect.
- The entitlement of the employee to pensionary benefits.
Legislation cited
- Income Tax Act, 1922s. Section 58-N
- Life Insurance Corporation (Employees) Pension Rules, 1995s. Rule 23, s. Rule 3, s. Rule 31, s. Rule 34
- Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. Section 2(s), s. Section 6-N
Subjects
pensionvoluntary retirementresignationretrospective effectservice lawLife Insurance Corporationpension rulesemployee benefits
Judgment
[2015] 12 S.C.R. 158
A SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, LIFE INSURANCE
CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD. & ORS.
v.
SHREE LAL MEENA
B (Civil Appeal No. 14739 of 2015)
(NOVEMBER-26, 2015)
[DIPAK MISRA AND PRAFULLA C. PANT, JJ.]
c Service Law:
Life Insurance Corporation (Employees) Pension
Rules, 1995- rr. 3, 31 - Retiral benefits- Grant of- Employee
seeking voluntary retirement- On 14.07.1990, the employee
sent letter of resignation to the Corporation - Resignation
0
accepted on 11.01.1991 - Thereafter, 1995 Rules coming
into force with retrospective effect from 01. 11.1993 -
Representation by employee for grant of pension on the
ground that Rules were applicable to him in terms of r. 3 as
E he was in service of the Corporation on 01.01.1986 and had
retired before 01. 11. 1993 - Corporation held that the
employee was not entitled to the grant of pension - Writ
Petition by employee, for grant of retiral benefits from the
Corporation - Allowed by the Single Judge and Division
F Bench of the High Court - On appeal, held: 1995 Rules are
not entirely retrospective - They have limited retrospectivity
- r. 31 expressly has not been made retrospective - It is
difficult to treat r. 31 as retrospective, in the absence of any
deemed clause that the employees who had earlier resigned
G shall be treated as employees as if they had voluntarily retired
- When r. 31 covers the field of voluntary retirement and does
not make it retrospective, there being a real difference
between resignation and retirement, it is not seemly to read
the amended regulations to the rules to make the same
H retrospective - View expressed in Asger Ibrahim Amin that
158
SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UC OF INDIA LTD. v. 159
SHREE LAL MEENA
retrospectivity has been given to r. 31 cannot be accepted - A
In view of the aforesaid, matter referred to larger Bench - Tiff
the matter is decided, the Corporation to continue paying
50% of the pensionary amount to employee, commencing
from 01.12.2015.
B
J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills
Company Ltd. v. State of UP and Ors. AIR 1990
SC 1808:1990 (3) SCR 523:(1990) 4 sec 27;
Jaipal Singh v. Sumitra Mahajan (Smt.) and
another 2004 (3) SCR 683 : 2004 (4) SCC 522; c
Padubidri Damodar Shenoy v. Indian Airlines
Limited and another 2009 (14) SCR 356:2009
(10) SCC 514; Reserve Bankoflndia and another
v. Cecil Dennis Solomon and another 2003 (6)
Suppl. SCR 465 : (2004) 9 SCC 461; UCO Bank D
and others v. Sanwar Mal 2004 (2) SCR
1125:(2004) 4 SCC 412; Sheelkumar Jain v. New
India Assurance Company Limited and others
2011 (9) SCR 574:(2011) 12 SCC 197; National
Insurance Company Limited and another v. Kirpal E
Singh 2014 (1 ) SCR 380:(2014) 5 sec 189;
Shashikala Devi v. Central Bank of India and
others (2014) 16 SCC 260; Sudhir Chandra
Sarkarv. T/SCO Ltd. 1984 (3) SCR 325: (1984)
3 SCC 369; Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari F
1995 (2) SCR 703 : (1995) 2 SCC 736; Asger
Ibrahim Amin v. Life Insurance Corporation of
India (2015) 9 JT 329:(2015) 10 SCALE 639;
Shyam Babu Verma v. Union of India 1994 (1)
G
SCR 700:(1994) 2 SCC 521; State of M.P v.
Yogendra Shrivastava 2009 (14) SCR
1137:(2010) 12 SCC 538; M.R. Prabhakar v.
Canara Bank 2012 (8) SCR1072:(2012) 9 SCC
671 - referred to. H
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 12 S.C.R.
A Case Law Reference
1990 (3) SCR 523 referred to. Para 5
2004 (3) SCR 683 referred to. Para 7
2009 (14) SCR 356 referred to. Para 7
·s
• 2003 (6) Suppl. SCR 465 referred to . Para 15
2004 (2) SCR 1125 referred to. Para 16
2011 (9) SCR 574 referred to. Para 17
c 2014 (1 ) SCR 380 referred to. Para 18
(2014) 1s sec 260 referred to. Para 19
1984 (3) SCR 325 referred to. Para 19
1995 (2) SCR 703 referred to. .Para 19
D
(2015) 9 JT 329 referred to. Para 20
1994 (1) SCR 700 referred to. Para 21
2009 (14) SCR 1137 referred to. Para 21
E 2012 (8) SCR 1072 referred to. Para 21
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
14739 of2015
From the Judgment and Order dated 16.08.2011 of the
F High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, in D.B.
Civil Special Appeal [Writ] No. 172 of 2008 in S. 8. Civil Writ
Petition No. 6026 of 1997
D. N. Goburdhan, Lal Ratimaman, AbhishekAggarwal
G for the Appellants.
Ansar Ahmad Choudhary for the Respondent.
The Order of the Court was delivered
H DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. Leave granted.
SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UC OF INDIALTD. v. 161
SHREE LAL MEENA [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
2. The present appeal, by special leave, is directed A
against the judgment and order dated 16.08.2011 passed by
the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur Bench
in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 172 of 2008 in S.B.
Civil Writ Petition No. 6026 of 1997 wherein the writ Court
had allowed the Writ Petition preferred by the respondent- B
employee, for grant of retiral benefits from the Life Insurance
Corporation of India Ltd. (for brevity, "the Corporation") on the
basis of the Life Insurance Corporation (Employees) Pension
Rules, 1995 (for short, "the 1995 Rules").
c
3. The facts, in nutshell, are that the respondent on
15. 06.1990 sent a letter to the competent authority of the
Corporation seeking voluntary retirement on the ground of
illness of his wife. As the said letter was not responded to, he
wrote another letter on 18.06.1990 to the Senior Divisional D
Manager of the Corporation, Jaipur reiterating his prayer for
voluntary retirement. The said letter was also not responded
to. Thereafter, the respondent on 14.07.1990, sentthe letter of
resignation from the services of the Corporation with immediate
effect. There was a prayer for waiver of notice in the said letter. E
The request of the respondent seeking resignation and also
waiver of the notice period was acceded to by the Corporation
vide letter dated 11.01.1991.
4. When the matter stood thus, in the year 1995, the F
Corporation brought into force the 1995 Rules with
retrospective effect from 01.11.1993, After the 1995 Rules
came into force, the respondent submitted a representation
for grant of pension under the 1995 Rules, stating therein that
the said Rules were applicable to him in terms of Rule 3 as he G
was in· service of the Corporation on the 1st day of January,.
1986 and had retired having sought voluntary retirement before
the 1st day of November, 1993. The said representation was
replied to by the Corporation vide letter dated 06.04.1996 H
162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 12 S.C.R.
A stating that the respondent had, in fact, resigned from service
of the Corporation and hence, he was not entitled to the grant
of pension as per the 1995 Rules.
5. After receipt of the said reply, the respondent entered
B into further communication with the Corporation asserting his
claim but as his request was not paid heed to, he preferred
the Writ Petition. As indicated earlier, the learned single Judge
vide order dated 08.09.2006 allowed the Writ Petition. It is
demonstrable from the order of the learned single Judge that
c he posed the question whether the resignation of the employee
could be treated as retirement. He placed reliance on J.K.
Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Company Ltd. v. State
of U.P. and Ors. 1 and on that basis, came to hold as follows:-
D "Here, in the instant case, voluntary retirement was sought
though it was considered as a resignation which was
accepted on 11.1.91. The Petitioner retired or his
resignation was accepted with effect from 14. 7.90 which
is admittedly prior to 1st day of November, 1993. Thus, it
E is crystal clear that the scheme is applicable to the
petitioner also."
6. Being of the said opinion, the learned single Judge
directed grant of retiral benefits to the respondent, as per the
F 1995 Rules with effect from the date of his resignation, that is,
12.07.1990 with 6% interest within a period of six months.
7. Being grieved by the aforesaid order, the Corporation
preferred an intra-court appeal wherein it was contended that
the 1995 Rules could not have been made applicable to the
G respondent, for the respondent had sought resignation which
was accepted, and therefore, he could not be equated with an
~ployee who had voluntari_ly retired. On behalf of the
respondent, it was urged before the Division_Benchthatregard
H 1
AIR 1990 sc 1808: (1990) 4 sec 27
SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UC OF INDIALTD. v. 163
SH REE LAL MEENA [DIPAK MISRA, J.}
being had to the fact that at the time of writing of letter dated A
14.07.1990, there was no specific provision for seeking
voluntary retirement under the Life Insurance Corporation of
India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 (for short, "the 1960
Regulations") and in that backdrop, the resignation has to be
treated as retirement. The principle s·tated in J.K. Cotton B
Spinning and Weaving Mills Company Ltd. case (supra)
was pressed into service. Stress was laid on the
pronouncements in Jaipal Singh v. Sumitra Mahajan (Smt)
and another and Padubidri Damodar Shenoy v. Indian
Airlines Limited and another. C
8. The Division Bench took note of the decision in J.K.
Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Company Ltd. case
(supra), adverted to the aspect that in 1990 there was no
provision for voluntary retirement, appreciated the ratio in D
Jaipal Singh's case (supra) wherein a difference had been
drawn between voluntary retirement and resignation, analysed
the language employed in Rule 3 of the 1995 Rules that deals
with application of the Rules and came to hold as follows:-
E
''Thus, the Pension Rules permit voluntary retirement and
entitlement to pen~ion on completion of 20 years of
qualifying service. Under Rule 19 of the Life Insurance
Corporation of India Regulations, 1960 speaks of
~esignation prior to the amendment in the year 1996 and F
even in the case of resignation the employee concerned
is supposed to give a notice of three months to the
employer-Corporation and it was only on the acceptance
of the resignation that the employee on the expiry of the
three months notice period could be allowed to leave on G
acceptance of resignation. The aforesaid provisions
which only spoke of resignation prior to 1996 on the
.,. touchstone of Jaipal Singh's case (supra) the so-called
.,, 2004 (4) sec 522
' 2009 (1 O) sec 514 H
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 12 S.C.R.
A resignation submitted by the petitioner-respondent
notwithstanding the fact that the regulations do not speak
of voluntary retirement, the petitioner sought permission
of the employer and requested for waiving three months
notice period. The conditions which have been
B enumerated hereinabove when applied to the facts of
the present case clearly show that notwithstanding the
fact that the term "voluntary retirement'.' in the Staff
Regulations of UC of 1960 prior to the amendment of
1996 had not been used, the use of word "resignation"
c in the Regulation 19 would on the touchstone of the
judgment of Jaipal Singh's case (supra) amount to
nothing but seeking voluntary retirement in the facts of
the present case."
D 9. Being of this view, the Division Bench dismissed the
appeal and affirmed the view expressed by the learned single
Judge.
10. We have heard Mr. D.N. Goburdhan, learned counsel
E for the appellants and Mr. Ansar Ahmad Chaudhary, learned
counsel for the respondent.
11. It is not in dispute that at the time of request made by
the respondent seeking voluntary retirement, the regulations
F in the field, that is, the 1960 Regulations, did not provide for
voluntary retirement. After the _1995 Rules came into force,
the concept of voluntary retirement was introduced for the first
time. The 1995 Rules were made applicable to the employees
who stood superannuated or had sought voluntary retirement
G after completing 20 years of qualifying service by giving notice
of 90 days. The relevant rules of 1995 Rules are Rule 3, Rule
31 and Rule 34. We have already mentioned that Rule 3'deals
with application of the Rules to the employees. It comes under
the heading "Application and Eligibility". Rule 31 and Rule 34
H come under the heading "Classes of Pension". To have a
SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UC OF INDIALTD. v. 165
SH REE LAL MEENA [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
proper appreciation of the controversy in issue, it is appropriate A
to reproduce relevant parts of Rule 3, Rule 31 and Rule 34 of
the 1995 Rules which read as under:-
"Rule 3. Application - These rules shall apply to
employees who,- s
(1) (a) were in the service of the Corporation on or after
the 1st day of January, 1986 but had retired before the
1st day of November, 1993; and
(b) exercise an option in writing within one hundred and c
twenty days from the notified date to become member
of the Fund; and
(c) refund within sixty days after the expiry of the said
period of one hundred and twenty days specified in
clause (b), the entire amount of the Corporation's · D
contribution to the Provident Fund including interest
accrued thereon together with a further simple interest
at the rate of six per cent per annum on the said amount
from the date of settlement of the Provident Fund account
till the cfate of refund of the aforesaid amount to the E
Corporation; or
(2) (a) have retired on or after the 1st day of November,
1993 but before the notified date; and
(b) exercise an option in writing within one hundred and F
twenty days from the notified date to become member
of the Fund; and
(c) refund within sixty days after the expiry of the said
· period of one hundred and twenty days specified in G
clause (b), the entire amount of the Corporation's
contribution to the Provident Fund and interest accrued
thereon together with a further simple interest at the rate
of twelve per cent per annum on the said amount from
the date of settlement of the Provident Fund account till ·H
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 12 S.C.R.
A the date of refund of the aforesaid amount to the
Corporation; or ....
x x x x x
Rule 31. Pension on voluntary retirement- (1 )At any
B time after an employee has completed twenty years of
qualifying service he may, by giving notice of not less
than ninety days, in writing, to the appointing authority,
retire from service:
Provided that this sub-rule shall not apply to an employee
c who is on deputation unless after having been transferred
or having returned to India he has resumed charge of the
post in India and has served for a period of not less than
one year:
D Provided further that this sub-rule shall not apply to an
employee who seeks retirement from service for being
absorbed permanently in an autonomous body or a public
sector undertaking to which he is on deputation at the
time of seeking voluntary retirement.
E
(2) The notice of voluntary retirement given under sub-
rule (1) shall require acceptance by the appointing
authority:
Provided that where the appointing authority does not
F refuse to grant the permission for retirement before the
expiry of the period specified in the said notice, the
retirement shall become effective from the date of expiry
of the said period.
(3) (a} An employee referred to in sub-rule (1) may make
G
a request in writing to the appointing authority to accept
notice of voluntary retirement of less than ninety days
giving reasons therefor;
(b) on receipt of a request under clause (a), the appointing
H authority may, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2),
SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UC OF INDIALTD. v. 167
SHREE LAL MEENA [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
consider such request for the curtailment of the period of A
notice of ninety days on merits and if it is satisfied that
the curtailment of the period of notice will not ca1:1se any
administrative inconvenience, the appointing authority
may relax the requirement of notice of ninety days on the
condition that the employee shall not apply for B
commutation of a part of his pension before the expiry of
the notice of ninety days.
(4) An employee, who has elected to retire under this
rule and has given necessary notice to that effect to the c
appointing authority, shall be precluded from withdrawing
his notice except with the specific approval of such
authority:
Provided that the request for such withdrawal shall be
made before the intended date of his retirement. D
(5) The qualifying service of an employee retiring
voluntarily under this rule shall be increased by a period
not exceeding five years, subject to the condition that
the total qualifying service rendered by such employee E
shall not in any case exceed thirty-three years and it does
not take him beyond the date of retirement.
(6) The pension of an employee retiring under this rule
shall be based on the average emoluments as defined
under clause (d) of rule 2 of these rules and the increase, F
not exceeding five years in his qualifying service, shall
not entitle him to any notional fixation of pay for the
purpose of calculating his pension.
x x x x x G
Rule 34. Payment of pension or family pension in
respect of employees who retired or died between
1.1.1986 and 31.10.1993-
(1) Employees who have retired from the service of the H
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 12 S.C.R.
A Corporation between the 1st day of January, 1986 and
the 31st day of October, 1993 shall be eligible for pension
with effect from the 1st.day of November, 1993.
(2) The family of a deceased employee governed by the
provisions contained in sub-rule (7) of rule 3 shall be
B
eligible for family pension with effect from the 1st day of
November, .1993."
12. It is submitted by Mr. Goburdhan, learned counsel
for the appellants that the 1995 Rules only cover the employees
C who had retired before the 1st of November, 1993 and the
concept of grant of pension on voluntary retirement has to be
prospective because in the year 1993 there was no provision
for voluntary retirement. Learned counsel would submit that if
all the Rules are read in a conjoint manner, a situation which
D
could not have been present in the past is not meant to be
brought within or covered. According to the learned counsel,
an employee would be entitled to get pension if he retired or
died between 01.01.1986 and 31.10.1993 and it would be
E inappropriate to construe the term resignation as voluntary
retirement.
13. Learned counsel for the respondent, per contra,
would contend that the Court has already interpreted the 1960
· Regulations and the 1995 Rules keeping in view the concept
F of beneficial legislation and, therefore, the controversy should
be allowed to rest and there is no justification to interfere with
the impugned order.
14. To appreciate the controversy in hand, we are
G required to understand the principles stated in J.K. Cotton
Spinning and Weaving Mills Company Ltd. (supra). In the
said case, the question posed by the Court was when the
service of an employee is terminated consequent upon the
employer accepting the resignation voluntarily tendered by the
H
SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UC OF INDIA LTD. v. 169
SH REE LAL MEENA [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
employee, does the termination so brought about amount to A
"retrenchment" within the meaning of Section 2(s) read with
Section 6-N of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(for short, "the State Act"). The High Court dealing with the
issue came to the conclusion that the termination of service of
the employee fell within the definition of "retrenchment" as B
enshrined in Section 2(s) of the State Act. The Court adverted
to the definition under Section 2(s) of the State Act which
defines "retrenchment" to mean the termination by the employer
of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever,
otherwise than punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action C
but did not include voluntary retirement of the workman or
retirement of the workman on reaching the age of
superannuation, if the contract of employment between the
employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation
0
in that behalf. The Court referred to Section 6-N of the
State Act which provided conditions precedent for
retrenchment of a workman. The two-Judge Bench observed
that provisions are pari materia with the 1947 Act. Be it noted,
the Court further posed a question whether an employee whose E
resignation has been accepted by the employer falls within
the first exclusion clause of the definition of the term
"retrenchment". The Court took note of the fact that the
employee had tendered his resignation voluntarily and the
termination of service was brought about by the acceptance F
of resignation. The Court referred to dictionary meaning of·
the term "resign" and the meaning of "retire". We think it
appropriate to reproduce the discussion from the said
judgment:-
G
"6 .... The meaning of the terms 'resign' and 'retire' in
different dictionaries is as under:
Name of the Meaning of 'Resign' Meaning of 'Retire'
Dictionary
Black's Law Formal To terminate H
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 12 S.C.R.
A Dictionary (5th renouncement or employment or
edn.) relinquishment of service upon
an office reaching retirement
age
B Shorter Oxford To relinquish, The act of retiring
English surrender, give up or withdrawing to or
Dictionary or hand over from a place or
(Revised edn. (something); esp., position
of 1973) an office, position,
c right, claim, etc. To
give up an office or
position; to retire.
The ·Random To give up an To withdraw from
D House office, position etc.; office, business or
Dictionary to relinquish (right, active life.
(College edn.) claim, agreement
etc.)
7. From the aforesaid dictionary meanings it becomes
E clear that when an employee resigns his office, he formally
relinquishes or withdraws from his office. It implies that he has
taken a mental decision to sever his relationship with his
employer and thereby put an end to the contract of service. As
F pointed out earlier just as an employer can terminate the
services of his employee under the contract, so also an
employee can inform his employer that he does not desire to
serve nim any more. Albeit, the employee would have to give
notice of his intention to snap the existing relationship to enable
G the employer to make alternative arrangements so that his work
does not suffer. The period of notice will depend on the period
prescribed by the terms of employment and if no such period
is prescribed, a reasonable time must be given before the
relationship is determined. If an employee is not permitted by
H the terms of his contract to detertnine the relationship of master
SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UC OF INDIALTD. v. 171
SH REE LAL MEENA [DIPAK MISRA, J .]
and servant, such an employment may be branded as bonded A
labour. That is why in Central Inland Water Transport
Corporation v. Brojo Nath Ganguly4 this Court observed as
under: (SCC p. 228, para 111) '
"By entering into a contract of employment a person does 8
not sign a bond of slavery and a permanent employee
cannot be deprived of his right to resign. A resignation
by an employee would, however, normally require to be
accepted by the employer in order to be effective".
8. In the present case the employee's request contain~d C
in the letter of resignation was accepted by the employer and
that brought an end to the contract of service. The meaning of
term 'resign' as found in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary includes
'retirement'. Therefore, when an employee voluntarily tenders
0
his resignation it is an act by which he volt,mtarily gives up his
job. We are, therefore, of the opinion that such a situation would
be covered by the expression 'voluntary retirement' within the
meaning of clause (1) of Section 2(s) of the State Act. In
Santosh Gupta V State Bank of Patiala 5 case Chinnappa E
Reddy, J. observed as under: (SCC p. 342, para 5)
"Voluntary retrenchment of a workman or the retrenchment
of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation
can hardly be described as termination, by the employer, F
of the service of a workman."
(Here the word 'retrenchment' has reference to
'retirement'.)
The above observation clearly supports the view which
commends itself to us. We are, therefore, of the opinion G
that the High Court was not right in concluding that
because the employer accepted the resignation offer
• (1986) 3 sec 156, 228
' (1980) 3 sec 340 H
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 12 S.C.R.
A voluntarily made by the employee, he terminated the
service of the employee and such termination, therefore,
fell within the expression 'retrenchment' rendering him
liable to compensate the employee under Section 6-N.
We are also of the view that this was a case of 'voluntary
B retirement' within the meaning of the first exception to
Section 2(s) and therefore the question of grant of
compensation under Section 6-N does not arise. We,
therefore, cannot allow the view of the High Court to
stand."
c
We have referred to the said decision in detail as the
High Court has placed heavy reliance on the same.
15. In Reserve Bank of India and another v. Cecil
0 Dennis Solomon and another', the Court while analysing
the Reserve Bank of India Pension Regulations, 1990,
observed thus:-
"10. In service jurisprudence, the expressions
"superannuation", "voluntary retirement", "compulsory
E retirement" and "resignation" convey different
connotations. Voluntary retirement and resignation involve
voluntary acts on the part of the employee to leave
service. Though both involve voluntary acts, they operate
differently. One of the basic distinctions is that in case of
F
resignation it can be tendered at any time, but in the case
of voluntary retirement. it can only be sought for after
rendering prescribed period of qualifying service. Other
fundamental distinction is that in case of the former,
G normally retiral benefits ·are denied but in case of the latter,
the same is not denied. In case of the former, permission
or notice is not mandated, while in case of the latter,
permission of the employer concerned is a requisite
condition. Though resignation is a bilateral concept, and
H '(2004) g sec 461
SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UC OF INDIALTD. v. 173
SHREE LAL MEENA [DIPAK MISRA, J.)
becomes effective on acceptance by the competent A
authority, yet the general rule can be displaced by express
provisions to the contrary. In Punjab National Bank v.
PK. Mitta/7 on interpretation of Regulation 20(2) of the
Punjab National Bank Regulations, it was held that
resignation would automatically take effect from the date B
specified in the notice as there was no provision for any
acceptance or rejection of the resignation by the
employer. In Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra 8 it
was held in the case of a judge of the High Court having
regard to Article 217 of the Constitution that he has a C
unilateral right or privilege to resign his office and his
resignation becomes effective from the date which he,
of his own volition, chooses. But where there is a provision
empowering the employer not to accept the resignation,
0
on certain circumstances e.g. pendency of disciplinary
proceedings, the employer can exercise the power.
11. On the contrary, as noted by this Court in Dinesh
Chandra Sangma v. State of Assam 9 while the
Government reserves its right to compulsorily retire a E
government servant, even against his wish, there is a
corresponding right of the government servant to
voluntarily retire from service. Voluntary retirement is a
condition of service created by statutory provision
whereas resignation is an implied term of any employer- F
employee relationship."
[emphasis added)
16. In UCO Bank and others v. Sanwar Ma/10 , a two-
Judge Bench referred to the decision in Cecil Dennis G
Solomon (supra) and opined thus:-
' 1989 supp. (2) sec 175
a (1978) 2 sec 301
9
(1977)4SCC441
10 (2004) 4 sec 412 H
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 12 S.C.R.
A "6. To sum up, the Pension Scheme embodied in the
regulation is a self-supporting scheme. It is a code by
itself. The Bank is a contributor to the pension fund. The
Bank ensures availability of funds with the trustees to
make due payments to th.e beneficiaries under the
B Regulations. The beneficiari~s are employees covered
by Regulation 3. It is in this light that one has to construe
Regulation 22 quoted above. Regulation 22 deals with
forfeiture of service. Regulation 22(1) states that
resignation, dismissal, removal or termination of an
c employee from the service of the Bank shall entail
forfeiture of his entire past service and consequently shall
not qualify for pensionary benefits. In other words, the
Pension Scheme disqualifies such dismissed
employees and employees who have resigned from
D
me.mbership of the fund. The reason is not far to seek. In
a self-financing scheme, a separate fund is earmarked
as the Scheme is not based on budgetary support. It is
essentially based on adequate contributions ~rom the
members of the fund. It is for this reason that under
E
Regulation 11, every· bank is required to cause an
investigation to be made by an actuary into the financial
condition of the fund from time to time and depending on
the deficits, the Bank is required to make annual
F contributions to the fund. Regulation 12 deals with
investment of the fund whereas Regulation 13 deals with
payment out of the fund. In the case of retirement,
voluntary or on superannuation, there is a nexus between
retirement and retiral benefits under the Provident Fund
G Rules. Retirement is allowed only on completion of
qualifying service which is not there in the case of
resignation. When such a retiree opts for self-financing
Pension Scheme, he brings in accumulated contribution
earned by him after completing qualifying number of years
H of service under the Provident Fund Rules whereas a
SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, LIC OF INDIA LTD. v. 175
SH REE LAL MEENA [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
person who resigns may not have adequate credit A .
balance to his provident fund account (i.e. bank's
contribution) and, therefore, Regulation 3 does not cover
employees who have resigned. Similarly, in the case of
a dismissed employee, there may be forfeiture of his ·
retiral benefits and consequently the framers of the B
Scheme have kept 'out the retirees (sic resigned) as well
as dismissed employees vide Regulation 22. Further,
the pension payable to the beneficiaries under the
Scheme would depend on income accruing on
investments and unless there is adequate corpus, the C
Scheme may not be workable and, therefore, Regulation
22 prescribes a disqualification to dismissed employees
and employees who have resigned. Lastly, as stated
above, the Scheme contemplated pension as the second D
retiral benefit in lieu of employers' contribution to
contributory providentfund. Therefore, the said Scheme
was not a continuation of the earlier scheme of provident
fund. As a new scheme, it was entitled to keep out
dismissed employees and employees who have E
resigned.
x x x x x
9 .... The words "resignation" and "retirement" carry
different meanings in common parlance. An employee
can resign at any point of time, even on the second day F
. of his appointment but in the case of retirement he retires
only after attaining the age of superannuation or in the
case of voluntary retirement on completion of qualifying
service. The effect of resignation and retirement to the G
extent that there is severance of employment (sic is the
same) but in service jurisprudence both the expressions
are understood differently. Under the Regulations, the
expressions "resignatign" and "retirement" have been
employed for different purpose and carry different H
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 12 S.C.R.
.A meanings. The Pension Scheme herein is based on
actuarial calculation; it is a self-financing scheme, which
does not depend upon budgetary support and
consequently it constitutes a complete code by itself. The
Scheme essentially covers retirees as the credit balance
B to their provident fund account is larger as compared to
employees who resigned from service. Moreover,
resignation brings about complete cessation of master-
and-servant relationship whereas voluntary retirement
maintains the relationship for the purposes of grant of
c retiral benefits, in view of the past service. Similarly,
acceptance of resignation is dependent upon discretion
of the employer whereas retirement is completion of
service in terms of regulations/rules framed by the Bank.
Resignation can be tendered irrespective of the length
D
of service whereas in the case of voluntary retirement,
the employee has to complete qualifying service for retiral
benefits. Further, there are different yardsticks and criteria
for submitting resignation vis-a-vis voluntary retirement
E and acceptance thereof. Since the Pension Regulations
disqualify an employee, who has resigned, from claiming
pension, the respondent cannot claim membership of the
fund. In our view, Regulation 22 provides for
disqualification of employees who have resigned from
F service and for those who have been dismissed or
removed from service. Hence, we do not find any merit
in the arguments advanced on behalf of the respondent
that Regulation 22 makes an arbitrary and unreasonable
classification repugnant to Article 14 of the Constitution
G by keeping out such class of employees .... "
17. In Sheelkumar Jain v. New India Assurance
Company Limited and others11 , the Court made a distinction
between effect of resignation and voluntary retirement while
H 11
(2011) 12 sec 191
SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UC OF INDIA LTD. v. 177
SH REE LAL MEENA [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
interpreting the General Insurance (Employees) Pension A
Scheme, 1995 and distinguished the decisions in Cecil
Dennis Solomon (supra) and Sanwar Mal (supra) while
observing thus:-
"ln these two decisions, Sanwar Mal (supra) and Cecil 8
Dennis Solomon (supra), the Courts were not called
upon to decide whether the termination of services of
the employee was by way of resignation or voluntary
retirement. In this case, on the other hand, we are called
upon to decide the issue whether the termination of the c
services of the appellant in 1991 amounted to resignation
or voluntary retirement."
Be it noted, in the said case it has also been stated that:-
''The aforesaid authorities would show that the court will D
have to construe the statutory provisions in each case to
find out whether the termination of service of an employee
was a termination by way of resignation or a termination
by way of voluntary retirement and while construing the
statutory provisions, the court will have to keep in mind E
the purposes of the statutory provisions."
18. In this regard, learned counsel for the respondent
has placed heavy reliance on the decision in National
Insurance Company Limited and another v. Kirpa/ Singh 12 F ·
wherein the Court observed that the question that fell for
determination was whether the respondents who opted for
voluntary retirement from service of the appellant companies
were entitled to claim pension under the General Insurance
(Employees) Pension Scheme, 1995. The Court took note of G
the definition of the terms "retirement", "superannuation
pension" and "pension on voluntary retirement" and in that
context, observed:-
12 (2014) 5 sec 1s9 H
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 12 S.C.R.
A ''.10. The only impediment in adopting that interpretation
lies in the use of the word "retirement" in Para 14 of the
Pension Scheme, 1995. A restricted meaning to that
expression may mean that Para 14 provides only for
retirements in terms of Paras (2){t)(1) to (iii) which includes
B voluntary retirement in accordance with the provisions
contained in Para 30 of the Pension Scheme. There is,
however, no reason why the expression "retirement"
should receive such a restricted meaning especially
when the context in which that expression is being
c examined by us would justify a more liberal interpretation;
not only because the provision for payment of pension is
a beneficial provision which oughtto be interpreted more
liberally to favour grant rather than refusal of the benefit
but also because the Voluntary Retirement Scheme itself
D
was intended to reduce surplus manpower by
encouraging, if not alluring employees to opt for
retirement by offering them benefits like ex gratia
payment and pension not otherwise admissible to the
E employees in the ordinary course. We are, therefore,
inclined to hold that the expression "retirement" appearing
in Para 14 of the Pension Scheme, 1995 should not only
apply to cases which fall under Para 30 of the said
Scheme but also to a case falling tinder the Special
F Voluntary Retirement Scheme of 2004. So interpreted,
those opting for voluntary retirement under the said
SVRS of 2004 would also qualify for payment of pension
as they had put in the qualifying service of ten years
stipulated under Para 14 of the Pension Scheme, 1995.
G x x x x x
17. In the case at hand Para 2 of the Pension Scheme,
1995 (extracted earlier) defines the expressions
appearing in the Scheme. But what is important is that
H such definitions are good only ifthe context also supports
SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UC OF INDIALTD. v. 179
SHREE LAL MEENA [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
the meaning assigned to the expressions defined by the A .
definition clause. The context in which the question
. whether pension is admissible to an employee who has
opted for voluntary retirement under the 2004 Scheme
assumes importance as Para 2 of the Scheme starts
with the words "In this Scheme, unless the context B
otherwise requires". There is nothing in the context of
the 1995 Scheme which would exclude its beneficial
provisions from application to employees who have
opted for voluntary retirement under the Special Scheme,
2004 or vice versa. The term retirement must in the C
context of the two schemes, and the admissibility of
pension to those retiring under the SVRS of 2004, include
retirement not only under Para 30 of the Pension Scheme,
1"995 but also those retiring under the Special Scheme
0
of 2004. That apart, any provision for payment of pension
is beneficial in nature which ought to receive a liberal
interpretation so as to serve the object underlying not
only of the Pension Scheme, 1995 but also any special
scheme under which employees have been given the E
option to seek voluntary retirement upon completion of
. the prescribed number of years of service and age."
19. In Shashikala Devi v. Central Bank of India and
others 13 , the issue was whether the bank was justified in
treating a letter of the employee as a letter of resignation from F
service. The Court referred to Regulation 29 of the Central
Bank of India (Employees) Pension Regulations, 1995 and
took note of the fact that the employee was entitled to take
voluntary retirement and, in that context observed whether or G
not a given communication is a letter of resignation simpliciter
or can as well be treated to be a request for voluntary retirement
will always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each
case and the provisions of the rules applicable. Elaborating
13 (2014) 15 sec 260 H
180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 12 S.C.R.
.A the said facet, the Court adverted to the concept of pension
and examined the true purport of the letter and came to hold
that the letter was to seek· voluntary retirement and not
resignation from employment. The Court placed reliance on
the pronouncements of Sudhir Chandra Sarkar v. TISCO
B Ltd. 14 and Union oflndia v. Pradeep Kumari15 .
20. Learned counsel for the respondent also placed
reliance on Asger Ibrahim Amin v. Life Insurance
Corporation of lndia 16 wherein the Court was interpreting the
C 1995 Rules with which we are concerned in this case. In the
said case, a contention was raised that the employee having
resigned from service was not eligible to claim pension under
the 1995 Rules. The Court referred to Rule 31 of the 1995
Rules which deals with voluntary retirement. The Court referred
D to the authority in Sheelkumar(supra) and thereafter referred
to paragraph 10 of Cecil Dermis Solomon case (supra) which
we have reproduced hereinbefore and opined thus:-
"The legal position deducible from the above
E observations further amplifies that the so-called
resignation tendered by the Appellant was after
satisfactorily serving the period of 20 years ordin.arily
qualifying or enabling voluntary retirement. Furthermore,
while there was no compulsion to do so, a waiver of the
F three months notice period was granted by the
Respondent Corporation. The State being a model
employer should construe the provisions of a beneficial
legislation in a way that extends the benefit to its
employees, instead of curtailing it." ·
G
21. It is noticeable that the two-Judge Bench distinguished
the authorities in Shyam Babu Verma v. Union of lndia 17 ,
1• (1984) 3 sec 369
" (1995) 2 sec
736
H 16
(2015) 9 JT 329: (2015) 10 SCALE 639
11 (1994) 2 sec 521
SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UC OF INDIALTD. v. 181
SH REE LAL MEENA [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
State of M. P. v. Yogendra Shrivastava 18, M.R. Prabhakar A
v. Canara Bank19 , Kirpal Singh (supra) and Sanwar Mal
(supra) and eventually ruled thus:-
"We thus hold that the termination of services of the
Appellant, in essence, was voluntary retirement within the 8
. ambit of Rule 31 of the Pension Rules of 1995. The
Appellant is entitled for pension, provided he fulfils the
condition of refunding of the entire amount of the
Corporation's contribution to the Provident Fund along
with interest accrued thereon as provided in the Pension c
Rules of 1995. Considering the huge delay, not explained
by proper reasons, on part of the Appellant in approaching
the Court, we limit the benefits of arrears of pension
payable to the Appellant to three years preceding the
date of the petition filed before the High Court. These D
arrears of pension should be paid to the Appellant in one
instalment within four weeks from the date of refund of
the entire amount payable by the Appellant in accordance
of the Pension Rules of 1995. In the alternative, the
Appellant may opt to get the amount of refund adjusted E
against the arrears of pension. In the latter case, if the
amount of arrear is more than the amount of refund·
required, then the remaining amount shall be paid withjn
two weeks from the date of such request made by the
Appellant. However, if the amount of arrears is less than F
the amount of refund required, then the pension shall be
payable on monthly basis after the date on which the
amount of refund is entirely adjusted."
22. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the G
appellants that though the authority in Asger Ibrahim Amin
(supra) deals with the 1995 Rules, it has really been guided by
the concept of "beneficial legislation" and distinguished the
" (201 oi 12 sec 538
H
,. (2012) 9 sec 67f
182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 12 S.C.R.
A authorities in similar situations and, therefore, the matter
requires to be considered by a larger Bench. Emphasis is
laid on the spinal issue that the resignation cannot be equated
with voluntary retirement, unless there is a deeming provision
to that effect.
B
23. The Court had referred to Section 3 of the 1960
Regulations which deals with "Termination" and contains
Regulation 18 and Regulation 19. The relevant part of
Regulation 18 reads as under:-
c "Regulation 18. Determination of Service:
(1 )An employee, other than an employee on probation
or an employee appointed on a temporary basis, shall
not leave or discontinue his service in the Corporation
D without first giving notice in writing to the competent
authority of his intention to leave or discontinue the
service. The period of notice required shall be-
(a) three months in the case of an employee belonging
to Class I
E
(b) one month in the case of other employees.
Provided that such notice may be waived in part or in full
. by the competent authority at its discretion.
F In case of breach by an employee of the provisions of
the sub-regulation, he shall be liable to pay the
Corporation as compensation a sum equal to his salary
for the period of notice required of him, which sum may
be deducted from any moneys due to him.
G
(2) The Chairman, the Executive Committee or the
Corporation may determine the service of any permanent
employee at any time on giving him-
(a) three month's notice or salary in lieu thereof if he is
H an employee in Class 1, and
SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UC OF INDIALTD. v. 183
SHREE LAL MEENA [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
(b) one month's notice or salary in lieu thereof if he is an A
employee in any other class
Provided however, that the period of notice will be
doubled in the case of employees who have served for
10 years or more.
B
Provided further that no order under this regulation shall
be made by an authority subordinate to the appointing
authority
(3) Nothing contained in this regulation shall affect the C
right of the appointing authority to retire, discharge,
remove or dismiss an employee without notice or salary
in lieu thereof in accordance with the provisions of
Regulation 39 or to terminate the services of any
employee belonging to Class II in accordance with the 0
provisions contained in Schedule Ill.
Explanations 1. The expression "month" used in this
regulation shall be reckoned according to the English
calendar and shall commence from the ?ay following that
~n which notice is received by the Corporation or the E
employee as the case may be.
x x x x x'
Relevant part of Regulation 19 is to the following effect-
F
"Regulation 19. Superannuation and Retirement: (1)
An employee belonging' to Class Ill or Class IV and a
transferred employee belonging to Class I or Class II shall
retire on completion of age 60; but the competent
authority may, if it is of the opinion that it is in the interest G
of the Corporation to do so, direct such employee to retire
on completion of 55 years of age or at any time thereafter,
on giving him three months notice or salary in lieu thereof.
Provided that an employee who is a member of any
approved superannuation fund as defined in clause (a) H
184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 12 S.C.R.
A of Section 58-N of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922 and
which has been recognised and allowed to be continued
by the Corporation, shall be permitteq upon request to
retire before the date of retirement specified in this sub-
regulation either (a) on completion of25 years of service
B or (b) or. completion of 20 years of service, provided he
has reached age 50 or (c) on completion of 20 years of
service if he is incapacitated for further active service.
(2)An employee belonging to Class I or Class II appointed
c to the service of the Corporation on or after 1st
September, 1956 shall retire on completion of 60 years
of age, but the competent authority may, if it is of the
opinion that it is in the interest of the Corporation to do
so, direct such employee to retire on completion of 50
D years of age or at any time thereafter on giving him three
months' notice or salary in lieu thereof.
x x .X x x'
24. The relevant part of Regulation 19(2A) which was
E notified on 16.02.1996 reads as follows:-
"Regulation 19(2A). (a) Notwithstanding what is stated
in sub-rules (1) and (2) above, an employee may be
permitted to retire at any time on completio11 of the age
55 after giving three months notice in writing to the
F
appointing authority of his irtention to retire.
(b) (i) Notwithstanding the provisions of Clause (a), an
employee governed by the Life Insurance Corporation
of India (Employees) Pension Rules, 1995 may be
G permitted to retire at any time after he has completed
twenty years of qualifying service, by giving notice of not
less than ninety days, in writing to the appointing authority.
Provided that this sub-clause shall not apply to an
H employee who is on deputation unless after having been
SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UC OF INDIALTD. v. 185
SH REE LAL MEENA [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
transferred or having returned to India, he has resumed A
charge on the post in India and has served for a period
of not less than one year.
Provided further that this sub-clause shall not apply to an
employee who seeks retirement from service for being
8
absorbed permanently in an autonomous body or a public
sector undertaking to which he is on deputation at the
time of seeking voluntary retirement.
(ii) The notice of voluntary retirement given under sub-
clause (i) of clause (b) shall require acceptance by the C
appointing authority.
Provided that where the appointing authority does not
refuse to grant the permission for retirement before the
expiry of the period specified in the said notice, the D
letirement shall become effective from the date of expiry
of the said period.
(iii) (A) An employee referred to in sub-clause ( 1) may
make a request in writing to the appointing authority to
accept notice of voluntary retirement of less than ninety E
. days giving reasons therefor;
(B) On receipt of such a request; the appointing authority
may, subject to the provisions of sub-clause (ii) of clause
(b ), consider such request forthe curtailment of the period F
of notice of ninety days on merits and if it is satisfied that
the curtailment of the period of notice will not cause any
administrative inconvenience, the appointing authority
may relax the requirement of such notice.
x x x x x' G
25. It is apposite to note here that in Asger Ibrahim.
Amin (supra), the two-Judge Bench has referred to the scheme
of the 1995 Rules and taken note of the voluntary retirement
as mentioned in the sub-rule (ii) of Rule 2(s). It has also referred H
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 12 S.C.R.
A to the relevant part of Rule 31 which we have already
reproduced hereinabove and considered the question
regarding interpretation of retrospective applicability of the
notification in the following manner:-
B "The Respondent Corporation has vehemently argued
that the termination of services is under Regulation 18
(supra) of the UC (Staff) Regulations, 1960 and is not
covered by the Pension Rules of 1995. Respondent
Corporation has controverted the plea of the Appellant
c that at the relevant date and time, viz. 28.1.1991 there
was no alternative for him except to tender his resignation,
pointing out that he could not have sought voluntary
retirement under Regulation 19(2A) of UC of India (Staff)
Regulations, 1960. If that be so, the Respondent being a
D model employer could and should have extended the
advantage of these Regulations to the Appellant thereby
safeguarding his pension entitlement. However, we find
no substance in the argument of the Respondent since
Regulation 19(2A) was. in fact, notified in the Gazette of
E India on 16.2.1996, that is after the pension scheme
came into existence with effect from 1.11.1993.
Otherwise there would have been no conceivable reason
for the Appellant not to have taken advantage of this
provision which would have protected his pensionary
F rights."
[Emphasis added]
26. As we find the aforesaid analysis has been made on
G the basis of the principles stated in Shee/kumars case
(supra). Submission of Mr. Goburdhan, learned counsel for
the appellants is that the analysis made in Asger Ibrahim Amin
(supra) in respect of the 1995 Rules is not correct. It is apt to
note here that 1995 Rules has been given retrospective effect
H on two scores, namely, the provisionswill apply retrospectively
SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, LIC OF INDIALTD. v. 187
SH REE LAL MEENA [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
with effect from the 1st day of November, 1993; and even A
employees who retired after the 1st day of January, 1986 and
before the 1st day of November, 1993 could be entitled to
exercise option to be covered under the pension scheme,
subject to stipulated pre-conditions. We have already referred
to Rule 3 of the 1995 Rules. As is demonstrable, the retiring B
employees who had been paid provident fund had to exercise
theit option and refund the amount paid with interest within the
requisite time frame. Appreciated in this manner, it is obvious
that the 1995 Rules do not postulate and do not give liberty/
right to the retiring employees covered by Rule 3 to exercise C
option at any time. The window period and pre-conditions
were specific and mandatory. It has been noted in Asger
Ibrahim Amin (supra) that there was no provision for voluntary
retirement before the enforcement of the 1995 Rules. Voluntary
0
retirement provision was introduced by the 1995 Rules under
. Rule 31 of the said Rules. Prior to enforcement of the aforesaid
Rules, there was no concept in the Corporation which
pertained to voluntary retirement. Section 2(s) of the 1995
Rules refers to voluntary retirement in accordance with the E
provisions contained in Rule 31 of the 1995 Rules. Rule 31
has not been given retrospective operation and effect. The
retrospective operation of the 1995 Rules in entirety is limited
to the employees, who had retired in normal course of
superannuation. Needless to say, resignation has the effect of F
termination of an employee. Voluntary retirement though has
the effect of termination of employee yet it has different
consequences. In the former case, the ex-employee could not
be entitled to pension, whereas in case of voluntary retirement,
the latter one, the employee would be entitled to pension G
depending upon the terms postulated in the regulations or rules
or the scheme. Rule 23 of the 1995 Rules specifically provides
that on resignation, dismissal, removal, termination or
compulsory retirement, the employee shall forfeit the entire
past service and he shall not qualify for pensionary benefit. H
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 12 S.C.R.
A Thus, resignation given under the 1995 Rules would not entitle
an employee to get pension.
27. We may further note here that whether an employee
can take voluntary retirement would depend upon the conditions
B of employment and the rules applicable to the scheme of
voluntary retirement. When Rule 31 was not in operation, the
question would arise whether the benefit can be given to an
employee who had retired from service. Be it noted that the
1995 Rules are not entirely retrospective. They have limited
C retrospectivity. Rule 31 expressly has not been made
retrospective. Retrospectivity creates a given fiction and,
therefore, unless there is express provision or it can be
impliedly inferred from the plain and unambiguous language
used, a provision should not be given retrospectivity. To arrive
D at the real meaning, it is always necessary to understand the
scope and object of the whole enactment or the rules. In the
said context, the relevant factors are general scope and
purview of the statute; remedy sought to be achieved; former
state of law and what was contemplated. Unless these
E conditions are satisfied, it is difficult to treat Rule 31 of the
1995 Rules as retrospective, in the absence of any deemed
clause that the employees who had earlier resigned shall be
treated as employees as if they had voluntarily retired. In fact,
F if such an interpretation is placed on the said Rule, it will be
travelling beyond the language employed therein. In Asger
Ibrahim Amin (supra), retrospectivity has been given to Rule
31, and for said purpose the amendment to the 1960
Regulations, specifically Regulation 19(2A) has been taken
G recourse to. In our view, when Rule 31 covers the field of
voluntary retirement and does not make it retrospective, there
being a real difference between resignation and retirement, it
is not seemly to read the amended regulations to the rules to
make the same retrospective. Therefore, we are unable to
H concur with the view expressed in Asger Ibrahim Amin (supra).
SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UC OF INDIALTD. v. 189
SHREE LAL MEENA [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
28. In view of the aforesaid analysis, let the matter be A
placed before Hon'ble Chief Justice.of India for constitution of
a larger Bench. Till the matter is decided, the Life Insurance
Corporation, the appellant herein, shall go on paying fifty per
cent of the pensionary amount to the respondent, commencing
from 1s1 December, 2015. B
Nidhi Jain Matter referred to larger Bench.
0
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