SATYAPAL SINGHversusSTATE OF M.P. AND ORS.

                   [2015) 11S.C.R.439


                    SATYA PAL SINGH                           A
                             v.
                STATE OF M.P. AND ORS.
            (Criminal Appeal No.1315 of 2015)
                                                              B
                   OCTOBER 06, 2015
      [T.S. THAKUR AND V. GOPALA GOWDA, JJ.]
      Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s1 372 proviso -
Appeal against acquittal- Victim or his relative, whether has c
statutory right to prefer an appeal to the High Court against
the acquittal under proviso to s. 372 without obtaining the
leave of the High Court as required under sub-section (3) to
s. 378 - Held: Right of questioning the correctness of the
acquittal order by preferring an appeal to the High Court is D
conferred upon the victim including the legal heir and others,
as defined uls. 2(wa), under proviso to s. 372- However, it is
of)/y after obtaining the leave of the High Court as required
under sub-section (3) to s. 378 - On facts, High Court in a
mechanical way dismissed the appeal by passing a cryptic E
order without examining as to whether the leave to file an
appeal filed by the appellant as provided under sub-section
(3) to s. 378 can be granted or not - High Court failed to
exercise its appellate jurisdiction properly in the appeal filed
by the appellant against the a<Jquittal order - Thus, order F
passed by the High Court set aside.

      Allowing the appeal, the Court      ·

     HELD: 1.1 The appellant, being the father of the G
deceased, has locus standi to prefer an appeal before
the High Court under proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C. as
he falls within the definition of victim as defined under
Section 2(wa) Cr.P.C. to question the correctness of the
                                                          H
                            439
440        SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2015) 11 S.C.R.


A judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court
  in favour of respondent nos. 2 to 6. [Para 9][446-B-C]

           1.2 The proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C. confers a
      statutory right upon the victim, as defined under Section
s     2(wa) Cr.P.C. to prefer an appeal against an order passed
      by the trial court either acquitting the accused or
      convicting him/her for a lesser offence or imposing
      inadequate compensation. [Para 10] [446-0]

c        1.3 The substantive provision of Section 372 Cr.P.C.
  clearly provides that no appeal shall lie from any
  judgment and order of a Criminal Court except as
  provided for by Cr.P.C. Further, sub-Section (3) to Section
  378 Cr.P.C. provides that for preferring an appeal to the
o High Court against an order of acquittal it is necessary
  to obtain its leave. On reference to the rules of
  interpretation of statutes to find out what is the effect of
  the proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C., it is well established
  that the proviso of a statute must be given an
E interpretation limited to the subject-matter of the
  enacting provision. It is abundantly clear that the proviso
  to Section 372 Cr.P.C. must be read along with its main
  enactment i.e., Section 372 itself and together with sub-
  Secti on (3) to Section 378 Cr.P.C. otherwise the
F substantive provision of Section 372 Cr.P.C. would be
  rendered nugatory, as it clearly states that no appeal shall
  lie from any judgment or order of a criminal court except
  as provided by Cr.P.C. [Para 11, 12] [448-D; 451-G-H]

G       1.4 As regards the issue "whether the appellant
   being the father of the deceased, has statutory right to
   prefer an appeal to the High Court against the order of
   acquittal under proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C. without
   obtaining the leave of the High Court as requi¥ed under
 H sub-Section (3) to Section 378 Cr.P.C.", the right of
     SATYA PAL SINGH v, STATE OF M.P. AND ORS.             .441


questioning the correctness of the judgment and order ·A
of acquittal by preferring an appeal to the High Court is
conferred upon the victim including the legal heir and
others, as defined under Section 2(wa) Cr.P.C., under
proviso to Section 372, but only after obtaining the leave
of the High Court as required under sub-Section (3) to B
Section 378 Cr.P.C. The High Court failed to deal with
this important legal aspect of the matter while passing
the impugned judgment and order. [Para 13] [452-A-D]

       1.5 It is clear from a perusal of the impugned C
judgment and order passed by the High Court that it has
dealt with the appeal in a very cursory and casual
manner, without adverting to the legal contentions and
evidence on record. The High Court in a very mechanical
way stated that after a perusal of the evidence on record D
it found no reason to interfere with the decision of the
trial court as the prosecution has failed to establish the
charges levelled againstthe accused beyond reasonable
doubt and it dismissed the appeal by passing a cryptic
order. The High Court, being the Appellate Court, has to E
exercise its appellate jurisdiction keeping in view the
serious nature of the charges levelled against the
accused. The High Court has failed to exercise its
appellate jurisdiction properly in the appeal filed by the F
appellant against the judgment and order of acquittal
passed by the trial court. [Para 14] [452-E-H; 453-A]

       1.6 The judgment of the High Cour.t is not
sustainable in law and set aside. The case is remanded
to the High Court to consider for grant of leave to file an G
appeal by the appellant as required under sub-section
(3) to Section 378 Cr.P.C. and thereafter hear the appellant
as the appellant is legal heir of the victim as defined
under Section 2(wa) of Cr.P.C. [Para 15, 16) [453-B-D]
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444         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 11 S.C.R.


A           Ram Phal v. State & Ors. 221 (2015) DLT 1 -
            Partly disapproved.

            Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf1976 (1) SCR
            277:(1976) 1SCC128; S. Sundaram Pilfaiv. V.R.
B           Pattabiraman 1985 (2) SCR 643:(1985) 1 SCC
            591 - referred to.

                             Case Law Reference

      221 (2015) DLT 1             partly disapproved.       Para 5
c
      1976 (1) SCR 277             referred to.             Para 11

      1985 (2) SCR 643             referred to.             Para 12

D         CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal
      Appeal No. 1315 of2015

           From the Judgment and Order dated 04:03.2014 of the .
      High Court of Madhya Pradesh bench at Gwalior in Criminal
      Appeal No. 547of2013
E
          Prashant Shukla, Anushree Mishra, Rani Kumari,
      Pashupathi Nath Razdan for the Appellant.

            C. D. Singh, Sakshi Kakkar, Santosh Narayan Singh,
F     R. S. Rathi, Kusum, Dr. Kailash Chand for the Respondents.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

           V. GOPALA GOWDA, J. 1. Leave granted.

G          2. This criminal appeal by special leave is directed
      against the impugned judgment and order dated 04.03.2014
      passed in Criminal Appeal No.547 of 2013 by the High Court
      of M.P. at Gwalior whereby !he High Court has upheld the
      decision of the Sessions Court, Bhind, M.P. (the trial court) in
H
      SATYA PAL SINGH v. STATE OF M.P. AND ORS.                 443
                [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

Sessions Case No. 293/2010 by acquitting all the accused        A
i.e. respondent nos. 2 to 6 herein.

       3. The appellant herein made a written complaint dated
19.07.2010 regarding the death of his daughter, Ranjana
(hereinafter referred to as "the deceased") to the Addi. B
Superintendent of Police, Bhind, M.P. The FIR was registered
on 27.07.2010. The trial court after the examination of evidence
on record passed the judgment and order dated 13.06.2013
acquitting all the accused of the charges levelled against them
for the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 3048 of C
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (forshort"IPC") and Section 4 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and alternatively for the offence
punishable under Section 302 of IPC. Being aggrieved of the
decision of the trial court, the appellant approached the High
Court against the order of acquittal of respondent nos. 2 to 6. D
The High Court vide its judgment and order dated 04.03.2014
has upheld the trial court's decision of acquittal of all the
accused persons. The impugned judgment and order of the
High Court is challenged in this appeal before this Court
questioning its correctness.                                     E

      4. Being aggrieved of the impugned judgment and order
the appellant being the legal heir of the deceased filed an
appeal before the High Court under proviso to Section 372 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short "the Cr.P.C."). F
The High Court, however, has mechanically disposed of the
appeal by passing a cryptic order without examining as to
whether the leave to file an appeal filed by the appellant as
provided under sub-Section (3) to Section 378 of Cr.P.C. can
be granted or not. The correctness of the same is questioned G
by the appellant in this appeal interalia urging various grounds.

     5. Mr. Prashant Shukla, th~ learned counsel on behalf of
the appellant placed strong reliance upon the judgment
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444           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 11 S.C.R.


A rendered by Delhi High Court in Ram Pha/ v. State & Ors. 1
  wherein the Full Bench, after interpreting the proviso to Section
  372 read with Section 2(wa) of the Cr.P.C., has held that the
  father of the victim has locus standito prefer an appeal, being
  a private party coming under the definition of victim under
B Section 2(wa) of the Cr.P.C. It was contended by him that in
  the instant case, the appellant, being father of the deceased,
  has locus standito file an appeal before the High Court against
  the order of acquittal under· proviso to Section 372 without
  seeking the leave of the High Court as required under sub-
C Section (3) of Section 378 of Cr.P.C. Thus, the appeal filed by
  the appellant was maintainable before the High Court of M. P.
  under the abovesaid provisions of Cr.P.C. He further urged
  that undoubtedly, the said legal aspect of the matter has not
  been dealt with by the High Court and the appeal was decided
0
  on merits but without examining as to whether the leave to file
  an appeal by the appellant is required to be granted or not
  under the above provisions of Cr.P.C.

         6. The learned counsel for the appellant drew the attention
E of this Court towards the decision rendered by Delhi High Court
  in the case referred to supra, wherein it has elaborately
  adverted to the definition of victim as defined under Section
  2(wa) of Cr.P.C. and proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C. and
F has examined them in the light of their legislative history. It has
  also adverted to 1541h Law Commission Report of 1996 in
  connection with the said legal provision of Cr.P.C. and has
  succinctly held that where the victim is unable to prefer an
  appeal then the appeal can be preferred by persons - such as
G relatives, foster children, guardians, fiance or live-in partners,
  etc. of the victim, who are in a position to do so in his/her behalf.
  He urged that in the instant case, there is no need for the
  appellant, being the father of the deceased, to seek leave of
  the High Court as provided under sub-Section (3) to Section
H     1
          221(2015)DLT1
      SATYAPALSINGH v. STATE OF M.P.AND ORS.                       445
              [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

378 of Cr.P.C. to maintain the appeal before it as it is his A
statutory right to prefer an appeal against the order of acquittal
of all accused persons in view of proviso to Section 372 of
Cr.P.C.

      7. It was further urged by him thatthe High Courtoughtto     B
have granted the leave to the appellant to file an appeal by the
appellant as required under sub-Section (3) of Section 378 of
Cr.P.C. and thereafter it ought to have examined and disposed
of the appeal on merits.
                                                                   c
       8. He further vehemently contended that the appeal before
the High Court was filed by the appellant challenging the
acquittal order passed by the trial court but the High Court has
concurred with the decision of the trial court mechanically
without re-appreciating the evidence on record. He further D
submitted that the decision of the High Court suffers from error
in law as the High Court, being the Appellate Court, was
required to re-appreciate the evidence on record to exercise
its appellate jurisdiction in the appeal filed by the appellant
with reference to the legal contentions urged in the E
memorandum of appeal but it has failed to do so. The High
Court in a very cursory and casual manner has held that after a
perusal of evidence on record it found no reason to interfere
with the decision of the trial court as the prosecution has failed
to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the charges levelled F
against all the accused are proved and it has dismissed the
appeal by passing a cryptic order, which amounts to non-
exercise of appellate jurisdiction properly by the High Court.
Thus, the impu~ned judgment and order of the High Court is
vitiated in law and therefore, the same is required to be set G
aside by this Court. He further requested this Court to remand
the matter to the High Court for re-appreciation of the evidence
on record and pass appropriate order on merits of the case
after hearing both the parties.
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446         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 11 S.C.R.


A           9. We have carefully examined the above mentioned
      provisions of Cr.PC. and the Full Bench decision of Delhi High
      Court referred to supra upon which strong reliance is placed
          '                      .
      by the learned counsel for the appellant. There is no doubt that
      the appellant, being the father of the deceased, has locus
 B    standito prefer an appeal before the High Court under proviso
      to Section 372 of Cr.P.C. as he falls within the definition of
      victim as defined under Section 2(wa) of Cr.P.C. to question
      the correctness of the judgment and order of acquittal passed
      by the trial court in favour of respondent nos. 2 to 6 in Sessions
C     Case No. 293/2010.

            10. The proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C. was amended
      by Act No.5 of 2009. The said proviso confers a statutory right
      upon the victim, as defined under Section 2(wa) of Cr.P.C. to
D     prefer an appeal against an order passed by the trial court
      either acquitting the accused or convicting him/her for a lesser
      offence or imposing inadequate compensation. In this regard,
      the Full Bench of Delhi High Court in the case referred to supra
      has elaborately dealt with the legislative history of insertion of
E     the proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C. by Act No. 5 of2009with
      effect from 31.12.2009. The relevant provision of Section 372
      of Cr.P.C. reads thus:

            "372. No appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a
F           Criminal Court except as provided for by this Code or by
            any other law for the time being in force:

           Provided that the victim shall have a right to prefer an
           appeal against any order passed by the Court acquitting
G          the accused or convicting for a lesser offence or imposing
           inadequate compensation, and such appeal shall lie to
           the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the
           order of conviction of such Court."

H          The said amendment to the provision of Section 372 of
      SATYA PAL SINGH v. STATE OF M.P. AND ORS.                     447
               [V. GOPALAGOVVDA, J.]

Cr.P.C. was prompted by 1541h Law Commission Report. The            A
said Law Commission Report has undertaken a
comprehensive review of Cr.P.C. and its recommendations
were found to be very appropriate in amending the Cr.P.C.
particularly in relation to provisions concerning arrest, custody
and remand, procedure to be followed in summons and                 B
warrant-cases, compounding of offences and special
protection in respect of women and inquiry and trial of persons
of unsound mind. Further, the Law Commission in its report
has noted the relevant aspect of the matter namely that the
victims are the worst sufferers in a crime and they do not have     C
much role in the Court proceedings. They need to be given
certain rights and compensation so that there is no distortion
of the criminal justice system. The said report of the Law
Commission has also taken note of the views of -the                 D
criminologist, penologist and reformers of criminal justice
system at length and has focused on victimology, control of
victimization and protection of the victims of crimes and the
issues of compensation to be awarded in favour of them.
Therefore, the Parliament on the basis of the aforesaid Report      E
of the Law Commission, which is victim oriented in approach,
has amended certain provisions of the Cr.P.C. and in that
amendmentthe proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C. was added
to confer the statutory right upon the victim to prefer an appeal
before the High Court against acquittal order, or an order          F
convicting the accused for the lesser offence or against the
order imposing inadequate compensation.

      11. The Full Ber:ich of the High Court of Delhi after
examining the relevant provisions under Section 2(wa) and G
proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C., in the light of their legislative
history has held that the right to prefer an appeal conferred
upon the victim or relatives of the victim by virtue of proviso to
Section 372 is an independent statutory right. Therefore, it has
held that there is no need for the victim in terms of definition H
448            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015) 11 S.C.R.


A     under Section '2(wa) of Cr.PC. to seek the leave of the High
      Court as required under sub-Section (3) of Section 378 of
      Cr.P.C. to prefer an appeal under proviso to Section 372 of
      Cr.P.C. The said view of the High Court is not legally correct
      for the reason that the substantive provision of Section 372 of
 B    Cr.P.C. clearly provides that no appeal shall lie from any
      judgment and order of a Criminal Court except as provided
      for by Cr.P.C. Further, sub-Section (3) to Section 378 of Cr.P.C.
      provides that for preferring an appeal to the High Court against
      an order of acquittal it is necessary to obtain its leave. We
C     have to refer to the rules of interpretation of statutes to find out
      what is the effect of the proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C., it is
      well established that the proviso of a statute must be given an
      interpretation limited to the subject-matter of the enacting
      provision. Reliance is placed on the decision of this Court
 0
      rendered by four Judge Bench in Dwarka Prasadv. Dwarka
      Das Saraf., the relevant para 18 of which reads thus:

              "18 .... A proviso must be limited to the subject-matter of
              the enacting clause. It is a settled rule of construction
E             that a proviso must prima facie be read and considered
              in relation to the principal matter to which it is a proviso.
              It is not a separate or independent enactment. "Words
              are dependent on the principal enacting words to which
              they are tacked as a proviso. They cannot be read as
 F
              divorced from their context" (Thompson v. Dibdin, 1912
              AC 533). If the rule of construction is that prima facie a
              proviso should be limited in its operation to the subject-
              matter of the enacting clause, the stand we have taken
G             is sound. To expand the enacting clause, inflated by the
              proviso, sins against the fundamental rule of construction
              that a proviso must be considered in relation to the
              principal matter to which it stands as a proviso. A proviso


H     2   (1976) 1 sec 128
      SATYA PAL SINGH v. STATE OF M. P. AND ORS.                     449
                [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

      ordinarily is but a proviso, although the golden rule is to    A
      read the whole section, inclusive of the proviso, in such
      manner that they mutually throw light on each other and
      result in a harmonious construction."

                                  (emphasis laid by this Court)      B

      12. Further, a three Judge Bench of this Court by majority
of2:1 in the case of S. Sundaram Pillaiv. V.R. Pattabiraman3
has elaborately examined the scope of proviso to the
substantive provision of the Section and rules of its                c
interpretation. The relevant paras are reproduced hereunder:

      "30. Sarathi in Interpretation of Statutes at pages 294-
      295 has collected the following principles in regard to a
      proviso:
                                                                     D
         (a) When one finds a proviso to a section the natural
         presumption is that, but for the proviso, the enacting
         part of the section would have included the subject-
         matter of the proviso.
                                                                     E
         (b}Aproviso must be construed with reference to the
         preceding parts of the clause to which it is appended.

         (c) Where the proviso is directly repugnant to a
         section, the proviso shall stand and be held a repeal       F
         of the section as the proviso speaks the latter intention
         of the makers.

         (d) Where the section is doubtful, a proviso may be
         used as a guide to its ·interpretation: but when it is G
         clear, a proviso cannot imply the existence of words
         of which there is no trace in the section.



' (1985) 1   sec 591                                                 H
450   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 11 S.C.R.


A        (e) The proviso is subordinate to the main section.

         (f) A proviso does not enlarge an enactment except
        for compelling reasons.

        (g) Sometimes an unnecessary proviso is inserted by
 B
        way of abundant caution.

         (h)Aconstruction placed upon a proviso which brings
         it into general harmony with the terms of section should
         prevail.
c
         (1) When a proviso is repugnant to the enacting part,
        the proviso will not prevail over the absolute terms of
        a later Act directed to be read as supplemental to the
        earlier one.
D
        (j) A proviso may sometimes contain a substantive
        provision.

      xxx            xxx           xxx
 E    32. In lshver/al Thakorelal Almaula v. Motibhai Nagjibhai
      it was held that the main object of a proviso is merely to
      qualify the main enactment. In Madras arid Southern
      Mahrata Railway Co. Ltd. v. Bezwada Municipality Lord
      Macmillan observed thus:
 F
        ''The proper function of a proviso is to except and deal
        with a case which would otherwise fall within the
        general language of the main enactment, and its effect
        is confined to that case."
G
      33. The above case was approved by this Court in CIT
      v. lndo Mercantile Bank Ltd. where Kapur, J. held that
      the proper function of a proviso was merely to qualify the
      generality of the marn enactment by providing an
 H
SATYA PAL SINGH v. STATE OF M.P. AND ORS.                    451
         [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

exception and taking out, as it were, from the main A
enactment a-portion which, but for the proviso, would fall
within the main enactment. In Shah Bhojraj_Kuverji Oil
Mills and Ginning Factory v. Subbash Chandra Yograj
Sinha Hidayatullah, J., as he then was, very aptly and
succinctly indicated the parameters of a proviso thus:     B

  "As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment
  to qualify or create an exception to what is in the
  enactment, and ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted
  as stating a general rule."                                C

xxx           xxx          . xxx
36. While interpreting a proviso care must be taken that
it is used to remove special cases from the general
enactment and provide for them separately.               D

37. In short, generally speaking, a proviso is intended to
limit the enacted provision so as to e?(cept so~ething
which would have otherwise been within it or In some
measure to modify the enacting clause. Sometimes a           E
proviso may be embedded in the main provision and
becomes an integral part of it so as to amount to a
substantive provision itself."

                                    (emphasis supplied)      F

Thus, from a reading of the abovesaid legal position laid
down by this Court in the cases referred to supra, it is
abundantly clear that the proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C.
must be read along with its main enactment i.e., Section G
372 itself and together with sub-Section (3) to Section
378 of Cr.P.C. otherwise the substantive provision of
Section 372 of Cr.P.C. will be rendered nugatory, as it
clearly states that no appeal shall lie from any judgment
or order of a Criminal Court except as provided by Cr.P.C. H
452       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 11 S.C.R.


A         13. Thus, to conclude on the legal issue:

                    "whether.the appellant herein, being the father
          of the deceased, has statutory right to prefer an appeal
          to the High Court against the order of acquittal under
 8        proviso to Section 372 of Cr.PC. without obtaining the
          leave of the High Court as required under sub-Section
          (3) to Section 378 of Cr.PC.", this Court is of the view
          that the right of questioning the correctness of the
          judgment and order of acquittal by preferring an appeal
c         to the High Court is conferred upon the victim including
          the legal heir and others, as defined under Section 2(wa)
          of Cr.P.C., under proviso to Section 372, but only after
        · obtaining the leave of the High Court as required under
          sub-Section (3) to Section 378 of Cr.PC. The High Court
D         of M.P. has failed to deal with this important legal aspect
          of the matter while passing the impugned judgment and
          order.

        14. Adverting to another contention of the learned counsel
 Eon behalf of the appellant regarding the failure on the part of
  the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence it is clear from a
  perusal of the impugned judgment and order passed by the
  High Court that it has dealt with the appeal in a very cursory
  and casual manner, without adverting to the legal contentions
F and evidence on record. The High Court in a very mechanical
  way has stated that after a perusal of the evidence on record it
  found no reason to interfere with the decision of the trial court
  as the prosecution has failed to establish the charges levelled
  against the accused beyond reasonab.le doubt and it has
G dismissed the appeal by passing a cryptic order. This Court is
  of the view that the High Court, being the Appellate Court, has
  to exercise its appellate jurisdiction keeping in view the serious
  nature of the charges levelled against the accused. The High
  Court has failed to exercise its appellate jurisdiction.properly
H
      SATYA PAL SINGH v. STATE OF M.P. AND ORS.                        453
                [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

in the appeal filed by the appellant against the judgment and          A
order of acquittal passed by the trial court.

      15. Hence, the impugned judgment and order of the High
Court is not sustainable in law and the same is liable to be set
aside by this Court and the cas~ is required to be remanded            B
to the High Court to consider for grant of leave to file an appeal
by the appellant as required under sub-Section (3) to Section
378 of Cr.P.C. and thereafter proceed in the matter

      16. For the reasons stated supra, this appeal is allowed         c
by setting aside the impugned judgment and order of the High
Court. The case is remanded to the High Court to hear the
appellant with regard to grant of leave to file an appeal as the
appellant is legal heir of the victim as defined under Section
2(wa) of Cr.P. C. and dispose of the appeal in accordance with         o
law in the light of observations made in this order as
expeditiously as possible.

Nidhi Jain                                          Ap.peal allowed.