SATHEESH V.K.versusTHE FEDERAL BANK LTD.

               [2025] 9 S.C.R. 1255 : 2025 INSC 1140

                             Satheesh V.K.
                                  v.
                         The Federal Bank Ltd.
                (Civil Appeal No(s). 11752-11753 of 2025)
                            23 September 2025
           [Dipankar Datta* and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.]


                          Issue for Consideration
       Issue arose as regards the maintainability of the second SLP
       challenging the same order where the first SLP was withdrawn
       without leave to re-approach.

                                 Headnotes†
       Constitution of India – Art.136 – Maintainability of the second
       Special Leave Petition, when the first was withdrawn without
       liberty – Appellant defaulted in his obligation to repay loan
       to the respondent-Bank – Respondent classified the loan
       account as ‘Non-Performing Asset’ and initiated measures
       u/s.13(4) of the SARFAESI Act – Appellant filed writ petition,
       which was disposed of by the High Court requiring the
       appellant to pay Rs.2 crores by a stipulated date and the
       remaining amount in instalments – Appellant challenged this
       order in SLP before this Court and the SLP was dismissed
       as withdrawn – Appellant then filed a review petition in the
       High Court seeking review of the order passed by the High
       Court and the same was dismissed – Consequent thereupon,
       the appellant filed two civil appeals against the original High
       Court order and the order dismissing the review petition –
       Maintainability:
       Held: It is not a permissible practice to challenge the same
       order over again after withdrawing the special leave petition
       without obtaining permission of the court for withdrawing it with
       liberty to move for special leave again subsequently – Nature
       of power exercisable by this Court u/Art.136, would apply in the
       first round when a judgment and order is challenged and not
       when the challenge to the same judgment and order is withdrawn



* Author
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    in the first round and a second chance is attempted without
    having obtained the permission of the Court to re-approach it –
    Entertaining a special leave petition in a case of the present nature
    would be contrary to public policy and can even tantamount to
    sitting in appeal over the previous order of this Court which has
    attained finality – Maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it
    is for the public good that there be an end to litigation) would
    apply in all fours when it is found that proceedings challenging
    an order were not carried forward by withdrawing the special
    leave petition and the litigant has returned to the same court
    after some time mounting a challenge to the self-same order
    which was earlier under challenge and such challenge had
    not been pursued – This is a course of action which cannot be
    justified either in principle or precept – Preliminary objections to
    the maintainability of the appeals upheld – Securitisation and
    Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security
    Interest Act, 2002 – s.13(4) – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 –
    Ord.XLVII r.7(1). [Paras 26, 35]

                             Case Law Cited
    Upadhyay & Co. v. State of U.P. and Others [1998] Supp. 3 SCR
    234 : (1999) 1 SCC 81 – relied on.
    S. Narahari and Others v. S.R. Kumar and Others [2023] 10 SCR
    1010 : (2023) 7 SCC 740 – distinguished.
    N.F. Railway Vending and Catering Contractors Association
    Lumding Division v. Union of India & Ors., Special Leave Petition
    (C) No(s). 17501-17502/2024; Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v.
    Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal [1955] 1 SCR 941 : AIR
    1955 SC 65; Kunhayammed and Others v. State of Kerala & Another
    [2000] Supp. 1 SCR 538 : (2000) 6 SCC 359; Khoday Distilleries
    Limited (Now Known as Khoday India Limited) and Others v. Sri
    Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Limited, Kollegal
    (Under Liquidation) Represented by the Liquidator [2019] 3 SCR
    411 : (2019) 4 SCC 376; Vasantalata Kom Vimalanand Mirjankar
    Rep. by G.P.A. Holder v. Deepa Mavinkurve & Ors., Special Leave
    Petition (C) Diary No. 36933/2025 – held inapplicable.
    Vinod Kapoor v. State of Goa (2012) 12 SCC 383; Patel Narshi
    Thakershi and Ors. v. Shri Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji (1971)
    3 SCC 844; S. Nagaraj and Others v. State of Karnataka and
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                               1257

                    Satheesh V.K. v. The Federal Bank Ltd.


     Another [1993] Supp. 2 SCR 1 : (1993) Supp. 4 SCC 595; Lily
     Thomas and Others v. Union of India & Ors. [2000] 3 SCR 1081 :
     (2000) 6 SCC 224; Ramnik Vallabhdas Madhvani and Others v.
     Taraben Pravinlal Madhvani [2003] Supp. 5 SCR 230 : (2004)
     1 SCC 497; Union of India v. Amrit Lal Manchanda and Another
     [2004] 2 SCR 422 : (2004) 3 SCC 75; M/s Pro Knits v. The Board
     of Directors of Canara Bank & Ors. [2024] 8 SCR 140 : (2024)
     10 SCC 292; Shri Shri Swami Samarth Construction & Finance
     Solution and Another v. Board of Directors of NKGST Co-op. Bank
     Ltd and Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1566; Sandhya Educational
     Society v. Union of India (2014) 7 SCC 701 – referred to.

                                 List of Acts
     Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and
     Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002; Constitution of India;
     Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

                              List of Keywords
     Maintainability; Second SLP; First SLP withdrawn without leave
     to re-approach; Non-Performing Asset; Twelve equal monthly
     instalments; Review petition; Public policy; Maxim interest
     reipublicae ut sit finis litium-it is for the public good that there be
     an end to litigation; Preliminary objections.

                             Case Arising From
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No(s). 11752-
     11753 of 2025
     From the Judgment and Order dated 01.10.2024 and 05.12.2024
     of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in WP (C) No. 33280
     and RP No. 1294 of 2024, respectively.

                          Appearances for Parties
     Advs. for the Appellant:
     M. K. S. Menon, Ms. Usha Nandini V., Shashank Menon, John
     Thomas Arakal.
     Advs. for the Respondent:
     Aljo K. Joseph, Saket Jee, Santhosh Kumar Kolkundra, Rajesh
     Kumar, Vinay Kumar Puvvala, Ms. Ankita Kutthi.
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                      Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                           Judgment

      Dipankar Datta, J.

1.    Appellant, Satheesh V.K., is a borrower within the meaning of section
      2(f) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets
      and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 20021. Undisputedly, the
      appellant obtained financial assistance from the respondent-Federal
      Bank, a secured creditor within the meaning of section 2(zd) of the
      SARFAESI Act, by creating equitable mortgage over properties
      situated in Kozhikode. However, the appellant having defaulted in
      his obligation to repay the loan, the respondent classified the loan
      account as ‘Non-Performing Asset’ (NPA) and initiated measures
      under section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act.
2.    Aggrieved by the action taken by the respondent, the appellant invoked
      the jurisdiction of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam under Article
      226 of the Constitution by presenting a writ petition2. According to the
      respondent, the total outstanding amount was Rs.7,77,41,321/-. The
      order dated 1st October, 2024 passed by the High Court disposing
      of the writ petition required the appellant to pay Rs.2,00,00,000/- on
      or before 30th October, 2024 and the remaining amount along with
      future interest in 12 (twelve) equal monthly instalments. The first
      instalment was to be paid on or before 15th November, 2024 and the
      remaining eleven (11) instalments were to be paid on or before 15th
      day of each succeeding month. The impugned order further directed
      that in case of failure to make payment of Rs.2,00,00,000/- or any of
      the subsequent instalments, as directed, the respondent would be
      free to proceed against the appellant under the SARFAESI Act for
      realisation of the dues in accordance with law. Appellant was also
      granted liberty to approach the respondent for one time settlement
      after making payment of the initial sum of Rs.2,00,00,000/- on or
      before 30th October, 2024.
3.    The order dated 1st October, 2024 was challenged by the appellant in
      a special leave petition3 before this Court. Order dated 28th November,


1    SARFAESI Act
2    Writ Petition (C) No. 33280 of 2024
3    Special Leave Petition (C) No. 28259/2024
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                         1259

                       Satheesh V.K. v. The Federal Bank Ltd.


      2024 recorded on the said special leave petition by a co-ordinate
      Bench reads as follows:

                                      ORDER
      1.      After arguing for some time and on our expressing reservation in
              entertaining the present petition, the learned senior counsel for
              the petitioner seeks permission to withdraw the present petition.
      2.      Permission to withdraw is granted.
      3.      The Special Leave Petition is dismissed as withdrawn.
4.    Having been permitted to withdraw the special leave petition, the
      appellant next approached the High Court with a petition4 seeking
      review of the order dated 1st October, 2024. Such petition came to
      be dismissed vide order dated 5th December, 2024.
5.    Consequent upon such dismissal, these two civil appeals were
      presented by the appellant before this Court on 12th December,
      2024. The appeal5 registered prior in point of time is directed against
      the order dated 1st October, 2024 of disposal of the appellant’s writ
      petition, whereas the one6 subsequently registered is directed against
      the dismissal of the review petition.
6.    The alacrity with which the appellant moved from court to court
      between 1st October, 2024 (date of disposal of his writ petition) and
      12th December, 2024 (date of presenting the special leave petitions
      before this Court giving rise to these appeals) without showing
      semblance of an inclination to repay the dues of the respondent and
      to buy time by resorting to technicalities are certainly factors which
      we propose to bear in mind while deciding these appeals.
7.    Mr. Aljo K. Joseph, learned counsel appearing for the respondent,
      has vehemently objected to maintainability of the appeals. He has
      referred to the aforesaid order dated 28th November, 2024 passed
      on the appellant’s previous special leave petition and contended
      that no liberty having been sought and/or granted by this Court to
      present a fresh special leave petition to lay a challenge to the order


4    RP No. 1294 of 2024
5    Civil Appeal No. 11752/2025
6    Civil Appeal No. 11753/2025
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      dated 1st October, 2024, the appellant has no right in law to approach
      this Court once again after withdrawing the initial challenge. Also, in
      view of Order XLVII Rule 7 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 19087,
      there can be no appeal against an order refusing review.
8.    The objection to the maintainability of the appeal against the order
      dated 1st October, 2024 was sought to be countered by Mr. Menon,
      learned counsel for the appellant, by citing the decision of a co-
      ordinate Bench of this Court in S. Narahari and Others v. S.R.
      Kumar and Others8. It was pointed out that a reference was made for
      constitution of a larger Bench to deliberate and adjudicate the issue
      as to whether a second special leave petition would be maintainable
      against an order which was previously challenged in a special leave
      petition but the challenge had either been withdrawn or spurned. Our
      attention was further drawn by Mr. Menon to orders dated 29th July,
      2024 and 13th August, 2024 passed by another co-ordinate Bench
      of this Court [of which one of us (Dipankar Datta) was a member]
      in N.F. Railway Vending and Catering Contractors Association
      Lumding Division vs. Union of India & Ors.9 where, noticing S.
      Narahari (supra), the special leave petitions were adjourned till such
      time the reference is decided.
9.    Apart from referring to the aforesaid decisions, Mr. Menon relied on
      a compilation of precedents starting from Dhakeswari Cotton Mills
      Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal10. Reliance was
      placed on paragraph 8 of Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. (supra) on
      the extent of powers conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution,
      reading as follows:
              “8. … It is not possible to define with any precision the
              limitations on the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction
              vested in this Court by the constitutional provision made in
              Article 136. The limitations, whatever they be, are implicit
              in the nature and character of the power itself. It being an
              exceptional and overriding power, naturally it has to be
              exercised sparingly and with caution and only in special
              and extraordinary situations. Beyond that it is not possible


7    CPC
8    (2023) 7 SCC 740
9    Special Leave Petition (C) No(s). 17501-17502/2024
10   AIR 1955 SC 65
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                                  1261

                        Satheesh V.K. v. The Federal Bank Ltd.


             to fetter the exercise of this power by any set formula or
             rule. All that can be said is that the Constitution having
             trusted the wisdom and good sense of the Judges of this
             Court in this matter, that itself is a sufficient safeguard and
             guarantee that that power will only be used to advance the
             cause of justice, and that its exercise will be governed by
             well-established principles which govern the exercise of
             overriding constitutional powers. It is, however, plain that
             when the Court reaches the conclusion that a person has
             been dealt with arbitrarily or that a court or tribunal within the
             territory of India has not given a fair deal to a litigant, then
             no technical hurdles of any kind like the finality of finding
             of facts or otherwise can stand in the way of the exercise
             of this power because the whole intent and purpose of this
             Article is that it is the duty of this Court to see that injustice
             is not perpetuated or perpetrated by decisions of courts and
             tribunals because certain laws have made the decisions of
             these courts or tribunals final and conclusive. …”
10. According to Mr. Menon, the power conferred by Article 136 of the
    Constitution of India is an extra-ordinary power and such power must
    be exercised to advance the cause of justice and not to thwart it.
11. Other decisions relied on by Mr. Menon are Patel Narshi Thakershi
    and Ors. v. Shri Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji11, S. Nagaraj and
    Others v. State of Karnataka and Another12, Lily Thomas and
    Others v. Union of India & Ors.13, Kunhayammed and Others v.
    State of Kerala & Another14, Ramnik Vallabhdas Madhvani
    and Others v. Taraben Pravinlal Madhvani15, Union of India v.
    Amrit Lal Manchanda and Another16, and Khoday Distilleries
    Limited (Now Known as Khoday India Limited) and Others v. Sri
    Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Limited, Kollegal
    (Under Liquidation) Represented by the Liquidator17.


11   (1971) 3 SCC 844
12   (1993) Supp. 4 SCC 595
13   (2000) 6 SCC 224
14   (2000) 6 SCC 359
15   (2004) 1 SCC 497
16   (2004) 3 SCC 75
17   (2019) 4 SCC 376
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12. Of these decisions, Kunhayammed (supra) and Khoday Distilleries
    Limited (supra) have relevance and, therefore, we propose to
    consider the same in some detail for deciding the question arising
    before us at a later part of this judgment. The other decisions
    not being directly related to the point under consideration are not
    separately considered. Suffice to record, these decisions lay down
    general principles of law, inter alia, of what is a review, that power to
    review is not an inherent power and has to be statutorily conferred,
    whether res judicata is applicable in a case where there is inherent
    lack of jurisdiction, how to read precedents, and that law has to bend
    before justice in given circumstances.
13. On merits, Mr. Menon referred to the decision in M/s Pro Knits v. The
    Board of Directors of Canara Bank & Ors.18 and Shri Shri Swami
    Samarth Construction & Finance Solution and Another v. Board
    of Directors of NKGST Co-op. Bank Ltd and Others19 to contend
    that the appellant’s company being an unit which is an MSME, it is
    entitled to the benefits flowing from Notification dated 29th May, 2015
    issued by the Central Government in terms of Section 9 of the Micro
    Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 and that the
    respondent had acted illegally in not extending the benefit of such
    notification to the appellant.
14. Since the question of examining the merits of the appellant’s claim
    would arise if the objection to the maintainability were overcome,
    we proceed to examine the maintainability aspect first.
15. In course of hearing, we had invited Mr. Menon’s attention to the order
    of recent origin dated 1st September, 2025 of another co-ordinate
    Bench in Vasantalata Kom Vimalanand Mirjankar Rep. by G.P.A.
    Holder vs. Deepa Mavinkurve & Ors.20. Mr. Menon sought to
    distinguish Vasantalata (supra) by referring to the opening sentence
    of paragraph 7. It was submitted that this Court in Vasantalata (supra)
    had dealt with a case where a special leave petition was dismissed
    and not withdrawn, as in the present case; therefore, Vasantalata
    (supra) has no application here.



18   (2024) 10 SCC 292
19   2025 SCC OnLine SC 1566
20   Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No. 36933/2025
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                      1263

                        Satheesh V.K. v. The Federal Bank Ltd.


16. The question we are tasked to decide, though of frequent occurrence
    now-a-days, is not res integra. It is, whether a special leave petition
    (second in the series) would be maintainable against a judgment
    and order which was earlier challenged before this Court but such
    challenge turned out to be abortive because the special leave
    petition before this Court is either (i) withdrawn unconditionally, or
    (ii) dismissed on merits by a brief order not containing reasons, or
    (iii) withdrawn with liberty to apply for review but without the liberty
    to approach this Court once again, should the review too fail.
17. No doubt, the co-ordinate Bench in S. Narahari (supra) has referred
    the issue to a larger Bench for consideration. The facts therein may
    be noted now. The coordinate Bench in S. Narahari (supra) was
    seized of the question as to whether, upon dismissal of a special
    leave petition against the parent order as withdrawn with liberty to
    file a review before the high court but without liberty to approach this
    Court again against the parent order should the review fail, a fresh
    special leave petition filed against both the parent order and the
    review rejection order would be maintainable. The Bench pondered
    whether liberty granted by this Court to approach the high court in
    review automatically places the said matter in the “escalation matrix”,
    and makes the remedy of a special leave petition available again.
    The Bench traced the first line of cases, Vinod Kapoor v. State
    of Goa21 and Sandhya Educational Society v. Union of India22
    which ruled that when no liberty has been granted to approach the
    Supreme Court once again, a subsequent special leave petition is
    not maintainable. This was contrasted with the decision rendered
    in Khoday Distilleries (supra) wherein after placing reliance on
    Kunhayammed (supra), a three-Judge Bench came to the conclusion
    that even after dismissal of a special leave petition, a review before
    the high court is maintainable.
18. The Bench in S. Narahari (supra) while acknowledging that the
    question in the matter before it was different, was of the view that the
    logic employed by the larger Bench in Khoday Distilleries (supra)
    caused a crack in the reasoning of the first line of cases and came
    to the conclusion that Khoday Distilleries (supra) essentially ruled


21   (2012) 12 SCC 383
22   (2014) 7 SCC 701
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      that the doctrine of merger does not apply when a special leave
      petition is dismissed by way of a non-speaking order. If indeed that
      be so, the Bench in S. Narahari (supra) was concerned that such
      dismissal by way of a non-speaking order is not to be considered
      as law declared under Article 141 of the Constitution and then the
      same cannot be considered res judicata; therefore, in every such
      dismissal, the remedy of filing a special leave petition would still
      persist. Further, if a review is allowed to be filed after a special leave
      petition is dismissed, then a fresh special leave petition cannot be
      barred arbitrarily. Hence, the matter was referred to a larger Bench
      to put a quietus to the issue.
19. Having noticed S. Narahari (supra), a stark dissimilarity in facts is
    discernible. There, the unsuccessful petitioner at the time of dismissal
    of the special leave petition as withdrawn had prayed for and was
    granted leave to apply for a review. Upon the review being dismissed,
    the parent order was challenged once again. Before us, there is
    something very adverse to the appellant. He having sensed that the
    co-ordinate Bench was not inclined to entertain the special leave
    petition, did not invite an order of dismissal thereof on merits but
    went away content with permission to withdraw. Neither permission
    was sought to apply for review nor was any window kept open by this
    Court to permit the appellant to approach it once again mounting a
    challenge to the same order. This is a plain and simple case where
    the law laid down in the previous century by a co-ordinate Bench
    in its decision in Upadhyay & Co. v. State of U.P. and Others23
    would squarely apply.
20. As noted by the co-ordinate Bench in its order dated 13th August, 2024
    in N.F. Railway Vending and Catering Contractors Association
    (supra), relied on by Mr. Menon, the decision in Upadhyay & Co.
    (supra) was not placed for consideration of the co-ordinate Bench
    in S. Narahari (supra).
21. In Upadhyay & Co. (supra), it was held thus:
             “9. In the meanwhile, the petitioner challenged the order
             of the Allahabad High Court dated 3-5-1996 by filing SLP
             (C) No. 12673 of 1996 in this Court. But for reasons better


23   (1999) 1 SCC 81
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                             1265

                    Satheesh V.K. v. The Federal Bank Ltd.


           known to the petitioner he withdrew the SLP on 9-7-1996.
           Thereafter, he filed an application before the High Court for
           clarification of the order dated 3-5-1996, but the Division
           Bench did not find anything to be clarified about that order
           and hence dismissed the petition on 10-10-1997.
           10. The present special leave petitions are filed against
           the two orders of the High Court, one dated 3-5-1996 and
           the other dated 10-9-1997.
           11. We made a recapitulation of the events as above for
           the purpose of showing that the petitioner has absolutely
           no case in the present SLPs. He cannot, at any rate, now
           challenge the order of the High Court dated 3-5-1996
           over again having withdrawn the SLP which he filed in
           challenge of the same order. It is not a permissible practice
           to challenge the same order over again after withdrawing
           the special leave petition without obtaining permission of
           the court for withdrawing it with liberty to move for special
           leave again subsequently.
           12. The above principle has been incorporated as a rule
           in the realm of suits. Order 23 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil
           Procedure deals with withdrawal of suit or abandonment
           of part of the claim. Sub-rule (3) says that the court may
           in certain contingencies grant permission to withdraw from
           a suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the
           subject-matter of such suit. Sub-rule (4) reads thus:
                ‘1. (4) Where the plaintiff—
                (a) abandons any suit or part of a claim under sub-
                rule (1), or
                (b) withdraws from a suit or part of a claim without
                the permission referred to in sub-rule (3),
                he shall be liable for such costs as the court may
                award and shall be precluded from instituting any
                fresh suit in respect of such subject-matter or such
                part of the claim.’
           13. The aforesaid ban for filing a fresh suit is based on
           public policy. This Court has made the said rule of public
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        policy applicable to jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
        Constitution [Sarguja Transport Service v. STAT : (1987)
        1 SCC 5]. The reasoning for adopting it in writ jurisdiction
        is that very often it happens, when the petitioner or his
        counsel finds that the court is not likely to pass an order
        admitting the writ petition after it is heard for some time,
        that a request is made by the petitioner or his counsel to
        permit him to withdraw it without seeking permission to
        institute a fresh writ petition. A court which is unwilling to
        admit the petition would not ordinarily grant liberty to file a
        fresh petition while it may just agree to permit withdrawal of
        the petition. When once a writ petition filed in a High Court
        is withdrawn by the party concerned, he is precluded from
        filing an appeal against the order passed in the writ petition
        because he cannot be considered as a party aggrieved
        by the order passed by the High Court. If so, he cannot
        file a fresh petition for the same cause once again. The
        following observations of E.S. Venkataramiah, J. (as the
        learned Chief Justice then was) are to be quoted here:
             ‘[W]e are of the view that the principle underlying
             Rule 1 of Order 23 of the Code should be extended
             in the interests of administration of justice to cases
             of withdrawal of writ petition also, not on the ground
             of res judicata but on the ground of public policy as
             explained above. It would also discourage the litigant
             from indulging in bench-hunting tactics. In any event
             there is no justifiable reason in such a case to permit
             a petitioner to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of
             the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution
             once again. While the withdrawal of a writ petition
             filed in the High Court without permission to file a
             fresh writ petition may not bar other remedies like a
             suit or a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution
             of India since such withdrawal does not amount to
             res judicata, the remedy under Article 226 of the
             Constitution of India should be deemed to have
             been abandoned by the petitioner in respect of the
             cause of action relied on in the writ petition when he
             withdraws it without such permission.’
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                         1267

                    Satheesh V.K. v. The Federal Bank Ltd.


           14. ***
           15. We have no doubt that the above rule of public policy,
           for the very same reasoning, should apply to special leave
           petitions filed under Article 136 of the Constitution also.
           Even otherwise, the order passed by the Division Bench of
           the High Court on 3-5-1998 does not warrant interference
           on merits as the learned Judges of the High Court have
           taken into account all the relevant facts and come to the
           correct conclusion.”
                                                      (emphasis ours)

22. Upadhyay & Co. (supra), which precedes Kunhayammed (supra) in
    point of time, is still the law holding the field declaring in no certain
    terms that the principle flowing from Order XXIII Rule 1 of the CPC
    is also applicable to special leave petitions presented before this
    Court. Reading Upadhyay & Co. (supra) together with Sarguja
    Transport Service (supra), which had the occasion to deal with a
    subsequently filed writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
    of India after unconditional withdrawal of the first writ petition under
    the same article, the position in law seems to be this - a second
    special leave petition would not be maintainable at the instance of
    a party, who elects not to proceed with the challenge laid by him in
    an earlier special leave petition and withdraws such petition without
    obtaining leave to file a fresh special leave petition; if such party
    applies for a review before the court from whose order the special
    leave petition was initially carried and the review fails, then he can
    neither challenge the order rejecting the review nor the order of
    which review was sought.
23. That no appeal lies from an order rejecting a petition for review is
    clear from the plain language of Order XLVII Rule 7(1), CPC. We need
    not burden this judgment by referring to any authority on this point.
24. However, the principle underlying Order XLVII Rule 7(1), CPC may
    be understood. Whenever a party aggrieved by a decree or order
    seeks a review thereof based on parameters indicated in Section 114
    read with Order XLVII, CPC and the application ultimately fails, the
    decree or order under review does not suffer any change. It remains
    intact. In such an eventuality, there is no merger of the decree or
    order under review in the order of rejection of the review because
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      such rejection does not bring about any alteration or modification of
      the decree or order; rather, it results in an affirmance of the decree or
      order. Since there is no question of any merger, the party aggrieved
      by the rejection of the review petition has to challenge the decree
      or order, as the case may be, and not the order of rejection of the
      review petition. On the contrary, if the petition for review is allowed
      and the suit or proceedings is placed for rehearing, Rule 7(1) permits
      the party aggrieved to immediately object to the order allowing the
      review or in an appeal from the decree or order finally passed or
      made in the suit, i.e., after rehearing of the matter in dispute.
25. It is now time to consider the decisions relied upon by Mr. Menon.
26. The passage from the decision in Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd.
    (supra) referred to by Mr. Menon has no application on facts and in
    the circumstances of the present case. We are inclined to the view
    that the nature of power exercisable by this Court under Article 136,
    as elaborately laid down there, would apply in the first round when
    a judgment and order is challenged and not when the challenge to
    the same judgment and order is withdrawn in the first round and a
    second bite at the cherry is attempted without having obtained the
    permission of the Court to re-approach it.
27. Reliance placed by Mr. Menon on the decisions in Kunhayammed
    (supra) and Khoday Distilleries Limited (supra) also do not aid the
    appellant’s cause for the reasons that follow.
28. In Kunhayammed (supra), the facts were these. After the special
    leave petition of the State of Kerala which was directed against an
    appellate judgment and order of the High Court dated 17th December,
    1982 was dismissed on 18th July, 1983 by a single line order24, the
    State had invoked the review jurisdiction of the High Court in January,
    1982 seeking review of the said judgment and order dated 17th
    December, 1982. A preliminary objection to the maintainability of the
    review petition was raised before the High Court, which came to be
    overruled by an order dated 14th December, 1995. The said order also
    directed the review petition to be posted for hearing on merits. The
    order dated 14th December, 1995 overruling the preliminary objection
    was carried to this Court in a special leave petition, on which leave


24   “Special Leave Petition is dismissed on merits.”
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                             1269

                        Satheesh V.K. v. The Federal Bank Ltd.


      was granted on 16th September, 1996. By an order dated 14th March,
      2000, the matter was referred to a three-Judge Bench for decision.
29. Kunhayammed (supra) is considered an authority on the doctrine of
    merger. However, on the facts before the three-Judge Bench, it was
    held that since the judgment and order of the High Court dated 17th
    December, 1982 did not merge in the single line unreasoned order
    of dismissal of the special leave petition (dated 18th July, 1983), the
    petition for review was maintainable.
30. Turning to Khoday Distilleries (supra), two appeals were under
    consideration. It is found that in the lead appeal, a petition for
    review of the judgment and order dated 12th November, 2008 was
    not entertained by the High Court of Karnataka by its order dated 9th
    September, 2011 on the ground that a special leave petition against
    the said judgment and order dated 12th November, 2008 stood
    dismissed by a single line order25 of this Court dated 4th December,
    2009. The question of law arising for decision was noted in paragraph
    8, reading as follows:
              “8. The question of law which needs to be determined in
              the aforesaid circumstances is as to whether the review
              petition is maintainable before the High Court seeking
              review of a judgment against which the special leave
              petition has already been dismissed by this Court.”
31. After extensively referring to and/or relying on Kunhayammed
    (supra), the three-Judge Bench summed up the legal position in
    paragraph 26 as under:
              “26. From a cumulative reading of the various judgments,
              we sum up the legal position as under:
              26.1. The conclusions rendered by the three-Judge Bench
              of this Court in Kunhayammed and summed up in para
              44 are affirmed and reiterated.
              26.2. We reiterate the conclusions relevant for these cases
              as under : (Kunhayammed case, SCC p. 384)
                      ‘(iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may
                      be a non-speaking order or a speaking one. In either


25   “Delay condoned. Special leave petition is dismissed.”
1270                                                    [2025] 9 S.C.R.

                      Supreme Court Reports


             case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An
             order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand
             substituted in place of the order under challenge.
             All that it means is that the Court was not inclined
             to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal
             being filed.
             (v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking
             order i.e. gives reasons for refusing the grant of
             leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly,
             the statement of law contained in the order is a
             declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the
             meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly,
             other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated
             in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme
             Court which would bind the parties thereto and also
             the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings
             subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the
             Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country.
             But, this does not amount to saying that the order of
             the court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged
             in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the special
             leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court
             is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent
             proceedings between the parties.
             (vi) Once leave to appeal has been granted and
             appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has been
             invoked the order passed in appeal would attract the
             doctrine of merger; the order may be of reversal,
             modification or merely affirmation.
             (vii) On an appeal having been preferred or a petition
             seeking leave to appeal having been converted into
             an appeal before the Supreme Court the jurisdiction
             of the High Court to entertain a review petition is
             lost thereafter as provided by sub-rule (1) of Order
             47 Rule 1 CPC.’
        26.3. Once we hold that the law laid down in Kunhayammed
        is to be followed, it will not make any difference whether
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                         1271

                    Satheesh V.K. v. The Federal Bank Ltd.


           the review petition was filed before the filing of special
           leave petition or was filed after the dismissal of special
           leave petition. Such a situation is covered in para 37 of
           Kunhayammed case6.
           27. Applying the aforesaid principles, the outcome of these
           appeals would be as under.

           Civil appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil)
           No. 490 of 2012
           28. In the instant case, since special leave petition was
           dismissed in limine without giving any reasons, the review
           petition filed by the appellant in the High Court would be
           maintainable and should have been decided on merits.
           Order dated 12-11-2008 passed by the High Court is
           accordingly set aside and matter is remanded back to the
           High Court for deciding the review petition on merits. The
           civil appeal is disposed of accordingly.”
32. In Khoday Distilleries Limited (supra), the order under appeal
    was clearly in the teeth of the ratio laid down in Kunhayammed
    (supra) and it was only a matter of time for such erroneous order
    to be set aside.
33. Since the facts in Kunhayammed (supra) and Khoday Distilleries
    Limited (supra) were different, there is evidently no consideration
    of the decision in Upadhyay & Co. (supra) which clinches the issue
    and assists us in drawing the conclusion we do hereunder.
34. Insofar as the order dated 13th August, 2024 passed in N.F. Railway
    Vending and Catering Contractors Association Lumding Division
    (supra) is concerned, the order records developments having taken
    place subsequent to the order dated 29th July, 2024 which, in the
    opinion of the Bench, required a further consideration. The order
    dated 13th August, 2024, for such reason, recalled the earlier order
    dated 29th July, 2024 and issued notice on the special leave petition
    as well as on the application for stay together with interim protection.
    The order dated 13th August, 2024 recalled the order dated 29th July,
    2024 whereby hearing was adjourned sine die awaiting the reference
    made in S. Narahari (supra). No assistance can, thus, be drawn by
    the appellant from such order.
1272                                                     [2025] 9 S.C.R.

                             Supreme Court Reports


35. We have no doubt that entertaining a special leave petition in a
    case of the present nature would be contrary to public policy and
    can even tantamount to sitting in appeal over the previous order of
    this Court which has attained finality. The maxim interest reipublicae
    ut sit finis litium (it is for the public good that there be an end to
    litigation) would apply in all fours when it is found that proceedings
    challenging an order were not carried forward by withdrawing the
    special leave petition and the litigant has returned to the same
    court after some time mounting a challenge to the self-same order
    which was earlier under challenge and such challenge had not been
    pursued. This is a course of action which cannot be justified either
    in principle or precept.
36. For the foregoing reasons, the preliminary objections to the
    maintainability of the appeals raised by the respondent succeed.
37. The civil appeals are, consequently, dismissed. Connected
    applications, if any, stand closed.
38. If so advised, the appellant may pursue his remedy before the
    appropriate forum in accordance with law.

     Result of the case: Appeals dismissed.




     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain