Holding

An Industrial Tribunal may grant relief retroactively, provided the facts justify it; there is no statutory limitation restricting relief to the date of dispute filing.

Summary

The Sarva Shramik Sangh, a labour union, sought dearness allowance for daily‑rated workers at the same rate as monthly‑rated workers, retrospectively from 15 November 1965. After failed conciliation in 1965‑67, the union reiterated the demand in a 26 April 1968 memorandum, leading to a government reference to the Industrial Tribunal, which was later set aside by the Bombay High Court. The union raised the same demand again on 19 March 1973, prompting a fresh reference; the Tribunal awarded the allowance effective from 1 January 1968, not the earlier date claimed. The High Court Division Bench held that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to grant relief prior to the date the dispute was raised, limiting the award to 19 March 1973. The Supreme Court held that an Industrial Tribunal is a substitute for a civil court, not bound by procedural technicalities, and may grant relief retroactively if justified by the facts, rejecting the lower court’s restriction. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, setting aside the Division Bench’s decision and dismissing the employer’s writ petition.

Issues considered

The Industrial Tribunal's power to award relief with effect from a date anterior to the date on which the industrial dispute was raised

Legislation cited

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 11, s. 17-A(4)

Subjects

Industrial Disputes Actdearness allowanceretroactive awardindustrial tribunal jurisdictionlabour unionconciliationaward datelabour law

Judgment

--( •
A SAR VA SHRAMIK SANGH, BOMBAY •
~
v.
INDIAN HUME PIPE CO. LTD. AND ANR.

~ •·
•
I
FEBRUARY 12, 1993

B [KULDIP SINGH AND B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, JJ.j

Labour Law:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 : Sections 11 and 17-A(4)-lndustrial
•
c Courts/Tribunals-Not bound by technical mies of procedure-Award grant-. )<
ing relief from a date anterior lo date of raising dispute-Power of-Exercise
of such power-Co"ectness of-To be decided in the facts and circumstances
of each case.

The appellant Unio!l demanded payment of dearness allowance to
-
D the daily-rated workmen employed in the factory of the respondent at the \ll
same rate as was being paid to the monthly-rated employees with effect
from 1.1.1964. The matter was placed before the Conciliation Officer on
'(
1;
15.11.1965 and thereafter before the Conciliation Board. On 15,3.1967 the
Conciliation Board submitted its failure report. On 26.4.1968 the appel· ~

E !ant-Union submitted a Memorandum to the Government reiterating the t·
I

said demand and claiming the benefit from 15.11.1965. The Government ~
referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal. I"
y
The Respondent-employer filed a Writ Petition challenging the
validity of the order of reference and the High Court set aside the order
I
F of reference by consent without prejudice to the rights of the Government _j
for making a fresh reference.

On March 19, 1973 the appellant-Union submitted a demand claim· ;

ing the same relief with effect from 15.11.1965. The Government made a )..
reference accordingly to the Industrial Tribunal on 26.3,1973. By its
G Award dated 3.1.1977 the Tribunal directed the Respondent-employer to
~
make payment of D.A. at the rate of 15% of the revised textile rate with
effect from 1.1.1968.

The Respondent filed a Writ Petition before the High Court cha!· '~
•
H lenging the Tribunal's Award. Unable to succeed before a Single Judge,
1050 "'
SHRAMIK SANGH v. HUME PIPE CO. 1051

__ . Respondent-preferred an appeal and the Division Bench held that the
Tribunal had no jurisdiction to award relief to the workmen with effect
from a date prior to the date on which the dispute was raised. Being
A

aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellant-union preferred the present
appeal.

On behalf of the appellant-Union it was contended that since it has B
been agitating for grant of D.A. of daily-rated workmen right from Nov.
1965, the Tribunal was J"ustified in awarding the same with effect from

"" 1.4.1%8.
The Respondent contended that the demand dated 26.4 ! 968 was c
-- never subn1itted to the fvlanagement, but was n1ad(' rlirect to the Govern~
n1ent which n1ade a rfference and the same \\'as set aside by the High
Court; and that a fresh dispute was raised on 19.3.73 and so the relief was
rightly restricted by the High Court to be effective only from that date viz.
y 19.3.73.
D
Allowing the appeal, this Court,

. HELD : 1. The Industrial TribunaVLabonr Court is supposed to be
a substitute forum to the Civil Court. Broadly speaking, the relief which
the Civil Court could grant in an industrial dispute can be granted by the E
Y Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court. Indeed the Industrial Tribunal/Labour
Court is not bound by the Technical rule. of procedure which bind the

-- Civil Court. Therefore it cannot be said that the Industrial Tribunal - or
for that matter a Labour Court - has no jurisdiction to grant relief from
a date anterior to the date on \Vhich the dispute is raised. It is oue thing
to say that the Tribuna) has no power to grant such relief" and it is an F
altogether different thing to say that in a given case it ought not to grant
such relier. \\11ether in a given case relier should be granted with effect
from a date anterior to the date of raising the dispute is a matter for the
Tribunal to decide in the facts and circumstances of' that case.
[1055H; 1056A-D] G
J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills v. L.A. Tribunal, (1963) 2
;.._ L.LJ. 436 - AIR 1964 SC 737, relied on.

2. The demand raised on 19.3.73 was not a fresh demand. It was
rci_teratiofL..6f' the den1and raised as far back as Nove1nher 1965. It is not H
1052 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 1 S.C.R.

A suggested that the demand raised in November 1965 was not raised before,
or submitted to the Management. Even otherwise, the demand raised on
19.3.73 - assuming that it was a fresh demand - was for extending the said ~
benefit with effect from an anterior date namely, 15.11.1965. It was the said
demand which was referred by the Government to the Tribunal. There is
•
no reason why the Tribunal could not have awarded relief from the date jf'

B
earlier than 1973 if it found that ~uch a demand was justified and war-
ranted in the facts of that case. Actually the Tribunal granted the benefit
\\ith effect from 1.1.1968 only and not mth effect from 15.11.1965 as
demanded by the workmen. (10590; 1060A-C]

C Jliagrakhand Collieries (Private) Ltd. and another v. Central Govem-
ment Industrial Tribuanl, Dhanbad and others, 1960 (2) Labour Law Jour-
nal 71; Workmen ·New Egerton Woollen Mills v. New Egerton Woollen
Mills and others, 1969 (2) LW 782 and Workme11 of Natio11al Tobacco Co.
- I
of India Ltd. v. Messers National Tobacco Co. of India Ltd. (Civil Appeal)
No. 852 of 1966 disposed of on 18.10.1968 by S.C., distinguished.
D
3. The High Court's order setting aside the earlier reference does
nOt say that the fresh dispute. that n1ay be raised should claim the benefit
only from the date or raising the fresh dispute. The orcler indeed says that
the fresh dispute to be raised was to be "in respect or the same demand,"
E Now the words "same deinands" mean the very san1e dl·1u~11ul \YLilO was
being raised by the workmen f'ron1 No\·c1nhcr t 965 onnard~. The said "r,..
order of the High Court can11ot h(• r~ad as in1posing or in1plying any
restriction upon thf il'urkrncn tu limit the benefit clain1cd by them only
from th" <i"tc of raising of the fresh demand. It was perfectly open to them --
to raise a demand, subsequent to the said order, claiming the benefit mth
l·
effect from a date anteri.or to the date of raising the demand. [1060F-G]

The Sindhu Resettleme1.1t Corporation Ltd. v. The I11dustrial Tribunal )..
of Gujarat & Ors., (1968] 1 SCR 515, distinguished.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3715
G
(NL) of 1984.

From the Judgment and Order dated 1.9.1982 of the Bombay High '
A.
Court in Appeal No. 247 of 1977 in Misc. Petition No. 627 of 1977.

H V.J. Francis, V. Subramanian and P. Padma Kumar for the Appel·
SHRAMIK SANGH v. HUME PIPE CO. [JEEVAN REDDY, J.] 1053 -,

~ A
Y G.B. Pai, P. Ramaswami and H.S. Parihar for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J. This appeal is preferred by the Labour B
Union, Sarva Shramik Sangh, Bombay against the judgment of the Division
Bench of Bombay High Court allowing Writ Appeal No. 247-of 1977. The
>( appeal was preferred by the respondent-employer. The Indi.an Hume Pipe
Company Limited, against the Judgment of a learned Single Judge dismiss- _
ing the Writ Petition preferred by it (Management) against the Award of C
the Industrial Tribunal, Bombay. The main question-arising for decision in
this appeal pertains to the power of the Industrial Tribunal to award relief
with effect from a date anterior to the date of raising the dispute by the
Labour Union.

On 2.11.65 the appellant-Union submitted a demand for payment of D
dearness allowance to the daily-rated workmen employed at the respon-
dents Wadala Factory at the same rate as_ is paid to the monthly-rated
employ~es, with effect from 1.1.1964. On 15.11.1965 these demands were
placed before the Conciliation Officer and thereafter before !_he Concilia-
tion Board. On 15.3.1967 the Conciliation Board submitted its failnre
y report. It appears that the recommendations of the Central Wage Board E
were awaited at that time and the compnay agreed to implement the final
recommendations of the said Board as accepted by the Central Govern-

- ment. On 26.4.1968 the appellant-Union submitted a memorandum before
the Government reiterating the said demand. They claimed the said benefit
with effect from 15.11.1965. On 5.7.1968 the Government referred the said F
dispute to the Industrial Tribunal. In November, 1968 the respondent-com-
,,(_ pany filed a Writ. Petition in the Bombay High Court challenging the
validity of the order of reference. On 27.2.1973 the High Court disposed
of the Writ Petition in the following terms: 'By consent the o~der Exhibit-C
dated 5.7.1968 is set aside without prejudice to the rights of the respon- G
dents to refer fresh dispute in respect of the same demands according io
law."

_On 193.1973 the appellant submitted a demand to the management
claiming the very same relief with effect from 15.11.1965. On the basis of
the said demand, the Government made a reference to the Industrial H
~:
'\
1054 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] 1 S.C.R.

A Tribunal, Bombay, on 26.3.1973. The dispute referred reads as follows:
y
"All the daily rated workman from Wadala factory of the
company should be paid dearness allowance. at the same
scale that is given to monthly rated staff of the factory with
retrospective effect from 15th November 1965 i.e. at the
B rate given below.
Slab Salary D.A. index 311 Variation for
to 320 10 points ').'.
Up to Rs. 100 65% of basic salary or
revised textile scale Jor~_- 5%
c all days of month whi-
,...
Rs. 101 to 200
chever is higher.
30% 2%
..,.
Rs. 201 to 300 15% 1%
Rs. 310 and above 10% 1%" '(
D
On 3.1.1977 the Tribunal made its award. It directed that "all the
daily-rated workmen from Wadala Factory of the Company should be paid
dearness allowance at the rate of 15% of the revised textile rate with effect
from Isl January, 1968. The Company is rurther directed to pay all the
arrears to these workmen within two months from the date of the publica-
E tion of the award. Award accordingly. No order as to costs." )--

-
The Management questioned the validity of the said award by way
of a writ petition in the Bombay High Court (Miscellaneous Petition No.
627 of 1977). On 15.6.1977 a learned Single Judge dismissed "the Writ
F Petition holding that the error, if any, in the award of the Tribunal is not
an error of jurisdiction calling for interference under Article 226 of the
Constitution. The respondent company preferred an appeal which was
disposed of by the Division Bench under its Judgment and Order dated
1.9.1992, impugned herein. The Division Bench affirmed the award except
with respect to the date from which the relief was granted by the Tribunal.
G The Division Bench was of the opinion that the Tribunal had no jurisdic-
tion to award relief to the workmen \vith effect from a date prior to the
date on which the dispute was raised. Inasmuch as the dispute which was
referred by the Government to the'Industrial Tribunal and which resulted
in the award in question was raised on 19.3.1973, the Division Bench held
H that the relief can be granted only frum 19.3.73 but not from an anterior
,..,-
SHRAMIK SANGH v. HUME PIPE CO. [JEEVAN REDDY, J.j .1055

date. The Division Bench was of the opinion that this restriction on the A
power of the Industrial Tribunal flows from the decisions of this Court, to
y which we shall refer presently. The correctness of the said view is ques-
tioned in this appeal.

Mr. V.J. Francis, the learned counsel for the appellant-Union sub-
milted that inasmuch as the appellant-Union had been agitating for grant
B
of D.A. to the daily-rated workmen at Wadala Factory at the same rate at
which it i' paid to monthly-rated workmen, right from November, 1965, the
~ Tribunal was justified in awarding the relief from 1.4.1968. The restriction
p~rceived by the Division Bench is neither sanctioned by law nor does it
flow from the decisions referred to by the Division Bench. On the other c
hand, Shri G.B.Pai, the learned counsel for the respondent-company sup-
;>orted the reasoning and conclusion of the Division Bench. Learned
counsel submitted that an industrial dispute arises only when the workmen
raise a particular dispute before the Management. No Industrial dispute
y can be said to arise when a dispute is raised by workmen not before the
D
Management but before the. Government. The learned counsel contended
• on the above basis that the so-called dispute which was referred by the
Government on the earlier occasion (on 15.7.1968) was not an industrial
dispute, inasmuch as the basis of the said reference, namely the demand
of workmen dated 26.4.1968, was never submitted before the Management,
it was submitted directly to the Government and Government alone. The E
'i said reference was, therefore, questioned by the Management in the Born-
bay High Court and it was agreed by both the parties before the High

- Court that the order of reference be set aside and the Union be left free
to raise a fresh dispute. Accordingly the Union raised a fresh dispute on
19.3.1973. No doubt this demand was for payment of the said D.A. with
F
effect from 15.11.1965, even so the Tribunal's power is limited to granl of
---(. relief only from the date of raising of industrial dispute. The learned
counsel submitted that more than one decision of this Court has affirmed
the said view.

We find it diflicult to agree with Shri Pai. In principle we find no G
basis for the said contention. The Industrial Disputes Act does not provide
. for any such limitation. The definition of the expression "industrial dispute"
>. in Clause (K) of Section-2 of the Act does not contain any such limitation.
We are unable to see on what basis can such restriction be inferred ur
implied. It m"ust be remembered that the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court H
1056 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) 1 S.C.R.

A is supposed to be a substitute forum to the Civil Court. Broadly speaking,
the relief which the Civil Court could grant in an industrial dispute can be
granted by the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court. Indeed the Industrial
. Tribunal/Labour Court is not bound by technicaf rules of procedure which
bind the Civil Court. (See J.K Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills v. LA.
Tribunal, 1963 (2) L.L.J. 436/444 - AIR 1964 SC 737) In such circumstances
B
w.e see no justification for holding that the Industrial Tribunal - or for that
matter a Labour Court - has rto jurisdiction to grant relief from a date
anterio; to the date on which the dispute is raised. Take a case where the ).!
Labour Union raises a dispute on a particular date but says that the said
relief should.be granted from an anterior date. We see no reason why the
c Industrial Tribunal should be held to have no power to grant relief with
effect from such anterior date if it is found to be warranted by the facts
and circumstances of the case. Here it is necessary to emphasize the
distinction between the existence of power and its exercise. It is one thing
to say that the Tribunal has no power to grant such relief and it is an
D altogether different thing to say that in a given case it ought not to grant
such relief. We are only emphasizing the aspect of power. Whether in a
given case relief should be granted with effect from a date anterior to the
dale of raising the dispute is a matter for the Tribunal to decide in the
facts and circumstances of that case.

E Now let us examine whether any decision of this Court supports Mr. y
Pai's contention. The first decision relied upon by him is in !hagrakhand
Collieries (Private)· Ltd. and another v. Central Government Industrial
Tribunal. Dhanbad and others, 1960 (2) Labour Law Journal 71. The
observations relied upon are at page 77 of the Report which read thus: -
F
"Besides, the Appellate Tribunal has failed to consider the
fact that the present demand was made for the first time
in September 1952. The industrial tribunal had considered
this question and had definitely found that notwithstanding
the suggestion by the respondents to the contrary there was
G no reliable evidence to show that this demand had been
specifically and clearly made prior to 27 September 1952.

·"''-
Now, if the respondents did not make a specific claim until
September 1952 it would not be fair or just to allow them
the benefit of the present increase directed by the award
H even prior to the date of the demand."
~
!

SHRAMIK SANGH v. HUME PIPE CO. [JEEVAN REDDY, J.] 1057

We do not think that the above observations can be read as imposing A
'y a limitation, of the nature contended for Mr. Pai, upon the power of the
tribunal. All that is said by this Court in the said case is that inasmuch as
the demand itself was raised in September 1952 and no such demand was
ever made prior to September 1952, it was not "fair or just" to grant relief
with effect from a date anterior to September 1952.
B
The ne>.t decision relied upon is in Workmen of New Eqerton Woollen
~ Mills v. New Eqerton Woollen Mills and others; 1969 2 LLJ 782. The passage
relied upon from this decision is at page 791. It reads:

c
- "As regards the date on which the award should come into
force, industrial tribunals have treated the date of demand
and the date of the award as two extreme points. The
tribunals, however, have discretion to fix any intermediate
date depending upon the circumstances of each case. As
has been said more than once, this Court would be reluc- D
tant to interfere with the date fixed by the tribunal if it has
been done in the proper exercise of its discretion. In the
present case the tribunal felt that in fairness to both the
parties the intermediate date, namely 1 November 1963,
When it passed its interim award was the proper date from
y which the award should come into operation. The ground E
for selecting this date was that according to the tribunal
the prices of commodities began to rise steeply in this
region from that date. That ground has not been con-
troverted by any material to the contrary. There can, there-
forc 1 barely be any ground for our interference. 11 F
~ The said passage can not be unuerstood as imposing a limitation
upon the power and jurisdiction of the Tribunal nor can it be understood
as holding that the Tribunal has no power to grant relief with effect from
the date earlier than the date of demand. The observations aforesaid must
be understood in the facts and circumstances of that case. The question G
raised now was not raised or considered by this Court in the said decision.
).., It does not appear that the workmen had claimed a particular benefit with
effect from a date earlier to the date of raising the dispute nor does it
appear that the Government had referred any such claim for adjudication
bv the Tribunal. In this case, it may be remembered, not only the demand H
1058 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] l S.C.R.

A raised on 19.3.73 was fo: extending ~he said benefit with effect from
15.11.1965, the reference by government was also in the same terms. In the
circumstances, the reference to the practice of Industrial Tribunals can not 'Y
be understood as a legal proposition that the Tribunal has no power or
jurisdiction to grant relief with effect from a date earlier to the date of
demand even where such demand is raised and referred to it by govern-
B ment. It needs no emphasis that(! Judgment should be understood in the.

J
light of the facts of that case and no more should be read into it than what
it actually says.

The third decision relied upon is an unreported decision of this
C Court in Wmkmen of National Tobacco Co. of India ltd. v. Messrs National
Tobacco Co. of India Ltd. (Civil Appeal No. 852 of 1966 disposed of on
18.10.1968). The Judgment was delivered by Bhargava, J. on behalf of J.M. -
Shelat, J. himself and C.A. Vaidialingam. J. The observations relied upon
occur towards the end of the judgment and read thus:

D
"Apart from these points forming the subjcct-mallcr of
various issues, a general point argued on behalf of the
Union was that the Tribunal should have made the award
enforceable retrospectively at least with effect from the
date of the reference of the dispute by the Government to
E the Tribunal. This Court has, in a number of cases, consis-
tently held that the question of making an award retrospec-
tive is in the discretion of a Tribunal, with the limitation
that a Tribunal will be committing an error if it makes the
award effective from a date earlier than the date of demand
F on the basis of which the industrial dispute is referred to
the Tribunal. This Court does not interfere with the dis-
cretion exercised unreasonably or arbitrarily. In the present
case, considering the circumstance that there will be a
considerable increase in the burden of expenditure on the
Company as a result of the revision of wage scales and the
G rates of dearness allowance, the Tribunal has decided that
the award should be effective with effect from the usual
date when it comes into force, i.e., one month after the date
of its publication by the Government. As we have just
indicated, the Tribunal g>ive this direction because of the
H increased burden on the Company which would become
SHRAMIK SANGH v. HUME PIPE CO. [JEEVAN REDDY, J.] 1059

unbearably heavy if the Company is directed to make A
payments for a number of past years for which accounts
y have already been closed by making the award retrospec-
tive from the date of reference. The discretion exercised
by the Tribunal cannot be said to be arbitrary or un-
reasonable, so that we find no ground for interfering with
B
the award on this point."

The learned judge says in the first instance that "the question of making
... an award retrospective is in the discretion of the Tribunal" but then qualifies
it by saying that "the Tribunal will be committing an mor if it makes t11e award
effective from a date earlier than the date of demand on the basis of which the c
- Industrial dispute is referred to the Tribunal". No provision of law or any
principle is cited in support of the said observation. Be. that as it may, it is
significant to notice that the question which arises in the case before us did
not orise consideration before the said Bench. The argument for the Labour
.,,.. Union in that case was that "the Tribunal should have made the award
D
enforceable retrospectively at least with effect from the date of the reference
ofthc dispute by the Government to the Tribunal". No contention was urged
that the award should be made effective from a date anterior to the date of
raising the dispute nor does it appear that that was a case where the demand
raised by the workmen was for extending the benefit with effect from an
anterior date. Therefore, there was no occasion for this Court to consider the E
~ question now raised. When the issue relating to the power of the Tribunal to
grant a relief or benefit with effect from a date anterior to the date of raising
the dispute was not at all raised or consider.ed by the Court, it would not be
proper lo read the said observations as negativing the said contention. We
are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the observations aforesaid do
F
not support the contention urged by Shri Pai.

~- So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, it must be
remembered that the Labour Union had raised this dispute with the
Management as far back as 2.11.1965. Conciliation was taken up by Con-
ciliation Officer and the Conciliation Board. The Board had reported G
fail •re as far back as 15.3.1967. It is the said demand which was raised by
the Union in its Memorandum dated 26.4.1968 on the basis of which a
> reference was made by the Government to the Industrial Tribunal on
5.7.1968. Even when a fresh demand was raised on 19.3.1973 the demand
was that the daily-rated workmen should be given the benefit claimed by H
1060 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) l S.C.R.

A them with effect from 15.11.1965. Thus the demand rnised on 19.3.73 was
not a fresh demand. It was reiteration of the demand raised as far back as
v
November 1965. It is not suggested that the demand raised in November
1965 was not raised before or submitted to the Management. Even other-
wise, the demand raised on 19.3.73 - assuming ihat it was a fresh demand
- was. for extending the said benefit with effect from an anterior date
B
namely, 15.11.1965. It was the said demand which was referred by the
Government to the Tribunal. We see no reason why the Tribunal could not
have awarded relief from the date earlier than 1973 if it found that such a
demand was justified and warranted in the facts of the case Actually the
Tribunal granted the benefit with effect from 1.1.1968 only and not with
C effect from 15.11.1965 as demanded by the Workmen.

Mr. Pai then contended that the order of reference to Industrial
Tribunal made on 5.7.1968 was questioned by the Management by way of
a Writ Petition in the Bombay High Court and that the said Writ Petition
was allowed under a consent order, whereunder the workmen agreed to '<(
D raise a fresh dispute. He submits that a fresh dispute means a dispute
claiming benefit only from the date on which the dispute is raised. We see
no basis for such restricted understanding. The order of the Court in Writ
Petition 708 of 1968 reads as follows:

E "Order dated 5.7.1968 is set aside without prejudice to the
rights of the respondents to refer fresh dispute in respect
of the same demands according to Law."

Firstly, it may be noticed that the order does not say that the fresh
dispute that may be raised should claim the benefit only from the date of
F raising the fresh dispute. Secondly, and more importantly, the order says that
t.he fresh dispute lo be raised was to be "in respect of the same demands".
Now the words 11 same demands 11 mean the very same demand \Yhich was being
raised by the workmen from November 1965 onwards. We are, therefore,
unable to read the said order of the High Court as imposing or implying any
G restriction upon the workmen to limit the benefit claimed by them only from
the date of the raising of the feesh demand. It was perfectly open to them to
raise a demand, subsequent to the said order, claiming the benefit with effect
from a date anterior to the date of raising the demand.

Mr. Pai then submitted that the demand raised by the workmen on
H 26.4.1968 cannot be said to raise an industrial dispute inasmuch as an in-
SHRAMIK SANGH v. HUME PIPE CO. [JEEVAN REDDY, J.] 1061

dustrial dispute arises only when the demand is submitted to the Manage- A
ment. A demand by workmen addressed to the Government can never
constitute an industrial dispute, he submits. He, therefore, says that the
Tribunal had no jurisdiction to award the benefit with effect from 1.4.1968.
Reliance is placed upon the decision of this Court in The Sindhu Resettlement
Corporation Ltd. v. .The Industrial Tribunal of Gujarat & Ors., [1968] 1 SCR
515. In that case the contention urged by the Management was that inasmuch
B
as the workmen did not raise any dispute with respect to reinstatement and
because the disput;: raised by them related only to payment of retrenchment
compensation, the Government had no power or justification for making a
reference relating to reinstatement. It is in that connection that the following
observations, relied upon by Shri Pai, were made. c
"If no dispute at all was raised by the respondents with the .
management, any request sent by them to the Government
would only be a demand by them and not an industrial
dispute between them and their employer. Ai. industrial D
dispute, as defined, must be a dispute between employers
and employers, employers and workmen, and workmen
and \Vorkmen. A mere demand to a Government, with()ut
a dispute being raised by the workmen with their employer,
cannot become an industrial dispute. Consequently the
material before the Tribunal, clearly showed that no such E
industrial dispute, as was purported to be referred by the
State Government to the Tribunal, had ever existed be-
tween the appellant Corpn. and the respondents and the
State Government in making a reference, obviously com-
mitted an error in basing its opinion on material \vhich was F
not relevant to the formation of opinion. The Government
.J.... ha1 to come an opinion that an industrial dispute did exist
and that opinion could only be formed on the basis that
there was a dispute between the appellant and the respon-
dents relating to reinstatement. Such material could not
possibly exist when, as early as March and July, 1958, G
respondent No. 3 and respondent No. 2 respectively had
confined their demands to the management to retrench-
n1ent co111pensation only and did not n1ake any deJiland for
reinstatement. On these facts, it is clear that the reference
made by the Government was not competent. The only H
1062 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 1 S.C.R.

A reference that the Government could have made had to be
related to payment of retrenchment compensation which
was the only subject matter of dispute between the appel- v
lant and the respondents."

It is evident from a. reading of the above para that the only dispute
B raised by the workmen before the Management related to retrenchment
compensation, which means that the industrial dispute thus arising was
confined only to the payment of retrenchment compensation. The Workmen
had never demanded reinstatement before the Management They, however,
made a demand for reinstatement in their representation/demand made
c before the Government and the Government referred the dispute relating lo
reinstatement to the Tribunal. It is in the above circumstances that the said
observations were made. In this cast., however, the demand in question was
raised by the workmen before the Management as far back as November
1965. Conciliation was attempted but failed. It is then that the workmen
submitted a demand before the Government and the Government made a
D reference on 5.7.1968. That reference was no doubt set aside by the High
Court but we do not know the basis of the said decision. Be that as it may, the
fact remains that the workmen were left free to raise a fresh dispute with
reference to the "same demands", which they actually did on 19.3.1973. They
expressly claimed the benefit retrospe~tively from 15.11.1965. We are, there-
E fore, unable to see how the ')bservations in Sindlzu help the Management in
this case.

For the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the Division Bench
was not right in holding that the Industrial Tribunal had no power to grant the
relief claimed by the Workmen with effect from a date anterior to 19.3.1973
F
(the date on which the fresh demand was raised) notwithstanding the fact
that the said demand specifically claimed the benefit from an anterior date
i.e. 15.11.1965, an<' which demand was referred to it by the Government.

For the above reasons, the appeal is al!owed and the Judgment and
G Order of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in appeal No. 247
of 1977 dated 1.9.1992 is set aside. The Writ Petition filed by the Manage-
ment in the Bombay High Court questioning the award dated 3.1.1977 is
dismissed. There shall be no orders as to costs.

G.N. Appeal allowed.