Holding

Maize starch is covered by Taxation Entry No.61 ('starch of any kind') and is not exempt under Exemption Entry No.8.

Summary

Santosh Maize & Industries Ltd, a dealer in maize starch, challenged the classification of its product under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, arguing that it should enjoy exemption under Exemption Entry No.8 (products of millets) as per a 1970 exemption notification. The State contended that maize starch falls within Taxation Entry No.61 ('sago and starch of any kind') introduced by subsequent amendments and is therefore taxable at 4%. The Supreme Court examined the statutory language, the effect of the omission of the word 'like' in the 1994 amendment, and the principle that specific provisions prevail over general ones. It held that maize starch is a processed product, not a millet product, and is covered by the specific taxation entry, not the exemption entry. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the tax liability on maize starch.

Issues considered

The classification of maize starch under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act: whether it is exempt under Exemption Entry No.8 or taxable under Taxation Entry No.61.
The effect of the omission of the word 'like' in Exemption Entry No.8 on the scope of exemption.
The validity and retrospective effect of the Commissioner’s circular dated 8 October 1998 issued under Section 28‑A.
The interpretative rule that a specific statutory provision overrides a general one.

Legislation cited

Subjects

tax exemptionmaize starchinterpretation of statutesspecific vs general provisionSection 28-ATamil Nadu General Sales TaxSchedule ISchedule IIIany kindlikeretrospective clarification

Judgment

[2023] 10 S.C.R. 101 : 2023 INSC 590 101

SANTHOSH MAIZE & INDUSTRIES LIMITED A
v.
THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 5731 of 2009)
JULY 04, 2023 B
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND DIPANKAR DATTA, JJ.]
Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 – TNGST (Amendment)
Act, 1993 (Act No. 24 of 1993) – TNGST (Second Amendment) Act,
1996 (Act No.37 of 1996) – Taxation Entry No.61 – TNGST
C
(Amendment) Act, 1994 (Act No.32 of 1994) – Exemption Entry No.8
– The appellant dealt in maize starch – The State through an
Exemption Notification exempted the products of millets including
maize from the tax – State Legislature imposed tax on ‘sago and
starch of any kind’ (Taxation Entry No.61) – Same caused concerns
among maize starch dealers – High Court concluded that maize D
starch will not be entitled to the benefit of exemption and upheld
the validity of the circular which classified maize starch under Entry
No.61 subject to 4% tax – Held: Maize is entitled to exemption in
terms of Exemption Entry No.8 – Maize starch being a product of
maize derived through mechanical process, it cannot be read as
E
“like maize”, the “like” having been excluded by Act No. 32 of
1994 – Maize starch being a kind of starch, it is covered by Taxation
Entry No. 61 as introduced by Act No.37 of 1996 which is to the
effect “… starch of any kind” – Looking at the specific (Taxation
Entry No.61) in contradistinction with the general (Exemption Entry
No.8), there can be no manner of doubt that maize starch would be F
covered by the taxation entry and not by the exemption entry.
Interpretation of Statutes – Law is well settled that if in any
statutory rule or statutory notification two expressions are used -
one in general words and the other in special terms - under the
rules of interpretation, it has to be understood that the special terms G
were not meant to be included in the general expression;
alternatively, it can be said that where a statute contains both a
general provision as well as a specific provision, the latter must
prevail.
H
101
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. When Act No.32 of 1994 amended Schedule III
of the Act, Exemption Entry No.8 did not include the word ‘like’
which was hitherto there in the Exemption Notification [No. 88
of 1970 dated 14th March, 1970]. According to English grammar,
B the word “like” can be used as a verb, as a noun as well as a
preposition depending upon its setting. It had been used in the
Exemption Notification as a ‘noun”. Once it becomes clear from
Exemption Entry No.8, as introduced by Act No.32 of 1994, that
(i) it does not include the noun “like” as the first word within
brackets and (ii) that maize is only included along with rice, flour,
C etc. (and not maize starch), it is only those items within the
brackets which, for the purposes of exemption, qualify as products
of millets. It is, therefore, those products of millets specifically
indicated, which are entitled to exemption under Section 8 of the
Act read with Schedule III as per Exemption Entry No.8. [Para
D 17][113-F-H; 114-A]
2. Can maize starch be considered a millet product, as in
Exemption Entry No.8, for the present purpose? This Court does
not think so. Maize is the raw product, whereas maize starch is a
processed product. While we are bound to hold that maize is
E entitled to exemption in terms of Exemption Entry No.8 as it
stood prior to the relevant assessment year, maize starch being
a product of maize derived through mechanical process, it cannot
be read as “like maize”, the “like” having been excluded by Act
No. 32 of 1994. Maize starch being a kind of starch, it is covered
by Taxation Entry No. 61 as introduced by Act No.37 of 1996
F which is to the effect “… starch of any kind”. The dictionary
meaning of the word “any” is “one or same or all”. In Black’s
Law Dictionary, it is explained that the word ‘any’ has diverse
meaning and may be employed to indicate ‘all’ or ‘every’ as well
as ‘same’ or ‘one’ and its meaning in a given statute depends
G upon the context and subject matter of the statute. Had the
legislature intended to exclude any starch, including maize starch,
a specific provision excluding it would have been made. [Para
18][114-B-D]
3. Trite to say, the Legislature may not have intended two
H entries for the self- same commodity, one under the exempted
SANTHOSH MAIZE & INDUSTRIES LIMITED v. THE STATE 103
OF TAMIL NADU & ANR.

category and the other under the taxable entry. Therefore, maize A
starch has to be either covered by Taxation Entry No.61 or
Exemption Entry No.8. Taxation Entry No.61 provides a more
specific description and maize starch undoubtedly being a ‘kind
of starch’ would, therefore, be comprehended in it. This is more
so because what is covered by Exemption Entry No.8 is maize,
B
which is a product of millet. The position would have been
otherwise if Exemption Entry No.8 or any other entry in Schedule
III carried the description of product of maize instead of ‘product
of millet’. [Para 23][115-B-D]
State of Tamil Nadu vs. Lakshmi Starch (1990) SCC
OnLine Mad 777; State of Tamil Nadu vs. TVL. Indras C
Agencies (P) Ltd. T.C.(R) 902/1999 – held inapplicable.
Reliance Trading Company, Kerala vs. State of Kerala
(2011) 15 SCC 762; Associated Cement Company Ltd.
vs. Commissioner of Customs (2001) 4 SCC 593 : [2001]
1 SCR 608; Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 D
SCC 398 : [1985] 2 Suppl. SCR 131; B. Shankara Rao
Badami vs. the State of Mysore (1969) 1 SCC 1 : [1969]
3 SCR 1; M/s. Associated Indem Mechanical (P) Limited
vs. West Bengal Small Industries Development
Corporation (2007) 3 SCC 607 : [2007] 1 SCR 174 – E
referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2001] 1 SCR 608 referred to Para 6 (a)
[1985] 2 Suppl. SCR 131 referred to Para 6 (c) F
[1969] 3 SCR 1 referred to Para 6 (c)
[2007] 1 SCR 174 referred to Para 20
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5731
of 2009.
G
From the Judgment and Order dated 08.09.2008 of the High Court
of Madras in WP No. 14283 of 1999.
With
Civil Appeal No. 5732 of 2009.
H
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A Ms. T. Archana, Rajeev Gupta, Vinay Rajput, Ms. Subasri
Jaganathan, K. K. Mani, Advs. for the Appellant.
C. Kranti Kumar, Vishnu Unnikrishnan, Shivani Jena, Naman
Dwivedi, P. Shankar, Danish Saifi, Sabarish Subramanian, M. Yogesh
Kanna, Advs. for the Respondents.
B The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
THE CHALLENGE
The present appeals before us, by special leave, have been carried
C by the appellant from orders passed by a Division Bench of the Madras
High Court (“High Court”, hereafter). While the judgment and order
dated 8th September, 2008 dismissing the writ petition1 instituted by the
appellant is challenged in C.A. No. 5731 of 2009, the order dated 10 th
February, 2009 dismissing a review application2 seeking a review of the
aforesaid judgment and order is under challenge in C.A. No. 5732 of
D
2009.
RELEVANT FACTS
2. The relevant facts, leading to institution of the present appeals,
are noticed hereunder:
E a) The appellant, registered under the Tamil Nadu General
Sales Tax Act, 1959 (“the Act”, hereafter), deals in maize
starch since 1975. The classification of maize starch under
the Act is the subject of dispute in the first of the two appeals.
b) The Government of Tamil Nadu, vide a Notification3
F (“Exemption Notification”, hereafter) exempted the
products of millets including maize from tax payable under
the Act. The relevant extract of the Exemption Notification
reads asunder:
“[…] the Governor of Tamil Nadu hereby exempts,
G with effect on and from the 1st April 1970, all sales
of products of millets (like rice, flour, brokens and
bran of cholam, cumbu, ragi, thinai, varagu, samai,
1
Writ Petition No. 14283 of 1999
2
Review Application No. 135 of 2008 in W.P. No. 14283 of 1999
H 3
No. 89 of 1970dated 14 th March, 1970
SANTHOSH MAIZE & INDUSTRIES LIMITED v. THE STATE 105
OF TAMIL NADU & ANR.

kudiraivali, milo and maize) from the tax payable A
under the said Act.”
c) The Legislative Assembly of Tamil Nadu (“Legislature”,
hereafter) amended4 Schedule I to the Act, adding Part C
and including Entry No. 53 therein, which imposed a 5%
tax on ‘sago and starch of any kind’ w.e.f. 12th March, B
1993. Later, through another amendment5, ‘sago and starch
of any kind’ was moved to Entry No. 61 of Part B of
Schedule I (“Taxation Entry No. 61”, hereafter) and the
tax rate was reduced to 4% effective from 17th July, 1996.
d) The aforesaid amendment dated 12th March, 1993 sparked C
concerns among maize starch dealers. One of them, M/s
Lakshmi Starch, sought a clarification from the Special
Commissioner and Commissioner of Commercial Taxes
(“Commissioner”, hereafter). Vide Circular dated 14th
December, 1993,the Commissioner clarified that the
D
exemption would remain in effect—a specific notification
will prevail over a general entry in the Schedule. It was
further stated that the process of obtaining maize starch
from maize involves simple processing; therefore, maize
starch will be classified as ‘maize products’ and covered
by the Exemption Notification. E
e) The Legislature next amended6 the Act w.e.f. 1st April, 1994.
Entry No. 8 of Part B of Schedule III (“Exemption Entry
No. 8”, hereafter) was inserted exempting “products of
millets (rice, flour, brokens and bran of cholam, cumbu,
ragi, thinai, varagu, samai, kudiraivali, milo and maize)” F
from taxation under the Act. The amendment retained the
language of the Exemption Notification except that the word
‘like’ was omitted. Although, in effect, the Exemption
Notification lost force with the amendment of the Schedule,
nevertheless, the exemption on maize starch remained G
unchanged based on subsequent clarifications issued by the
Commissioner on 31st December, 1996 and 6th May, 1997.

4
The TNGST (Amendment) Act, 1993(Act No. 24 of 1993)
5
The TNGST (Second Amendment) Act, 1996 (Act No. 37 of 1996)
6
The TNGST (Amendment) Act, 1994(Act No. 32 of 1994) H
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A f) However, this position was followed by two subsequent
developments - the latter being crucial for the present
purpose. Firstly, Section 28-A was inserted w.e.f. 6 th
November, 1997 by way of an amendment7 to the Act which
empowered, by way of a statutory provision, the
Commissioner to issue clarifications concerning the rate of
B
tax under the Act. Secondly, after the insertion of Section
28-A, the Commissioner issued a Circular dated 23rd June,
1998, clarifying that Exemption Entry No. 8 does not
encompass maize starch; the said entry only applies to
products listed within the brackets and excludes maize starch
C which is distinct from maize flour and not commonly
understood as such by ordinary people or even dealers.
Being covered by Entry 67 of Part D of Schedule I, it will
be taxed at 11%. However, a request having been received
from the appellant for withdrawal of the Circular dated 23 rd
D June, 1998, the Commissioner vide a subsequent Circular
dated 8th October, 1998 cancelled the earlier Circular dated
23rd June, 1998 and clarified that maize starch is taxable
from 1st April, 1994, since Item 8 of Part B of Schedule III
does not include maize starch. In view of specific Entry
No. 61 of Part D of Schedule I, i.e., “sago and starch of
E any kind”, it covers maize starch also, subject to a 4% tax
to be levied w.e.f. 17th July, 1996 and not tax at 11%.
g) Questioning the aforesaid clarification, the appellant made
a representation before the Commissioner which came to
be rejected on 28th June, 1999. The appellant was served
F with notices8 for recovery of general sales tax to the tune
of Rs 7,69,729/- for FY 1998-1999, followed by a provisional
assessment notice9 issued by the Commissioner. This
triggered litigation between the parties.
THE HISTORY OF LITIGATION
G
3. The judicial trajectory of the case leading to the present stage
is set out hereunder:

7
The TNGST (Amendment) Act, 1997 (Act No. 60 of 1997)
8
Dated 25 th June, 1999 and 6 th July, 1999
9
H Dated 27 th July, 1999
SANTHOSH MAIZE & INDUSTRIES LIMITED v. THE STATE 107
OF TAMIL NADU & ANR. [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]

a) Assessment proceedings having been initiated, the appellant A
approached the Tamil Nadu Taxation Special Tribunal
(“Tribunal”, hereafter) questioning the provisional
assessment notices and challenging the validity of the
Circular dated 8th October, 1998. The petitions10 came to
be dismissed, vide judgment dated 29th July, 1999, with the
B
observation that it was not proper for the appellant to
independently challenge the said Circular and also contest
the assessment proceedings at the same time; the questions
regarding the validity of the Circular, therefore, could be
contested in the assessment proceedings.
C
b) It was, at this stage, that the appellant resorted to the writ
jurisdiction of the High Court seeking quashing of the order
of the Tribunal dated 29th July, 1999 as well as praying that
the Circular dated 08th October, 1998 be declared as ultra
vires Section 28-A, Exemption Entry No. 8, and Articles
14, 19(1)(g) and 265 of the Constitution of India; alternatively, D
it was prayed that the said Circular should only apply
prospectively from 08th October, 1998 rather than retroactively
from 17th July, 1996.
c) The Division Bench of the High Court initially dismissed
the appellant’s writ petition on 25th August, 1999, stating E
that the appellant could agitate all the points before the
assessing authority, who would proceed according to law.
Dissatisfied with this ruling, the appellant approached this
Court11. By an order dated 3rd November, 2000, the appeal
was allowed, and the writ petition restored to file to be F
decided by the High Court. This Court directed that since
the validity of the Circular dated 8th October, 1998 issued
under Section 28A was under challenge, it would be more
appropriate for the High Court to decide this legal point
rather than remanding the case to the lower authorities.
G
d) Upon hearing the parties, the Division Bench of the High
Court dismissed the writ petition on merits vide judgment
dated 8th September, 2008. The High Court was of the view

10
Original Petition Nos. 881 and 883 of 1999
11
Civil Appeal Nos. 6176 of 2000 H
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A that the Exemption Notification and subsequent circulars
issued by the Commissioner, which sought to exempt maize
starch from taxation, do not hold binding authority as they
lack statutory backing. This is because Section 28-A, which
empowers the Commissioner to issue clarifications, only
became effective from 6th November, 1997. Circular dated
B
8th October, 1998 carries legal validity as it was issued
subsequent to the insertion of Section 28-A. Having
concluded that maize starch will not be entitled to the benefit
of exemption, the High Court upheld the validity of the
Circular dated 8th October, 1998 which classified maize
C starch under Entry No. 61 subject to a 4% tax.
e) Aggrieved by the decision, the appellant preferred a review
application. Observing that no case for interference had
been set up by the appellant, the High Court dismissed the
review application vide its order dated 10th February, 2009.
D SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
4. Appearing on behalf of the appellant, Mr. K.K. Mani, learned
counsel, advanced the following submissions:
a) The High Court failed to consider the correct entry pertaining
E to the assessment year 1998-99. Exemption Entry No. 8
clearly outlined an exemption in favour of products of millet,
including maize, because maize starch is in the form of flour,
though the flour is not obtained by mere grinding of the
grains, but rather through the treatment of maize by soaking
it in water, subjecting it to various processes, and ultimately
F obtaining starch, which is sold as flour, and this process
would certainly result in the sole product of millet retaining
the flour form. This is distinct from Taxation Entry No. 61,
which pertains to ‘sago and starch of any kind’ and sago
being derived from tapioca, a combined interpretation of
G the phrase ‘sago and starch of any kind’ would exclude
maize starch and encompass only tapioca starch.
b) The decision in Reliance Trading Company, Kerala vs.
State of Kerala 12 was referred to in support of the

12
H (2011) 15 SCC 762
SANTHOSH MAIZE & INDUSTRIES LIMITED v. THE STATE 109
OF TAMIL NADU & ANR. [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]

contention that an exemption will only arise when there is a A
liability to pay tax. Section 3(2) read with Schedule I creates
a tax liability on ‘sago and starch of any kind’. However,
Section 8 read with Schedule III creates an exemption in
favour of maize starch, Exemption Entry No. 8 will,
therefore, over ride Taxation Entry No. 61.
B
c) The decisions of the High Court in State of Tamil Nadu
vs. Lakshmi Starch13 and State of Tamil Nadu vs. TVL.
Indras Agencies (P) Ltd.14 were also placed to support
the contention that Exemption Entry No. 8 derives its origin
from the Exemption Notification, the validity of which was
upheld in the aforesaid former judgment and maize starch C
was accordingly exempted from tax. Exemption Entry No.
8, therefore, is nothing but a re-enactment of the language
of the Exemption Notification in the form of a statutory
provision and reflects the intention of the Legislature to
exempt maize starch from tax. D
d) As regards the omission of the word ‘like’, it was contended
that the amendment having retained the language of the
Exemption Notification, the omission of the word ‘like’
would, therefore, not make any difference to the scope of
the entry in the light of the consistent practice to exempt E
maize starch from taxation under Exemption Entry No. 8.
e) It was also contended that the High Court made an
erroneous assessment in both the writ petition and the review
application by considering Entry No. 44 of Part B of
Schedule III for the assessment year 1998-1999 which, as F
per the Court, excludes maize. However, the aforesaid entry
was introduced only in 2002 vide an amendment15, wherein
the reference to maize was explicitly removed. Prior to that
amendment, Exemption Entry No. 8 which included maize
was applicable.
G
f) It is settled law that the power under Section 28-A of the
Act cannot be exercised contrary to the statutory scheme

13
(1990) SCC OnLine Mad 777
14
T.C.(R) 902/1999
15
The TNGST (Fourth Amendment) Act, 2002 H
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A of the Act, more particularly when the issue of classification
has been settled by a court of law. This is evident from the
State’s consistent practice to treat maize starch as exempt
from tax, as confirmed by way of a series of circulars issued
over time categorically exempting maize starch from tax
liability. Having regard to the clarifications issued in favour
B
of exemption, the Circular dated 8th October, 1998 requiring
the recovery of taxes retrospectively is a mere change of
opinion without cogent reason and, therefore, is liable to be
quashed.
g) In any event, the aforesaid Circular cannot have a
C retrospective effect and will take effect only from the date
of issue, i.e., on and from 8th October, 1998.
5. Finally, submitting that for the assessment year 1998-1999 the
appellant is entitled to exemption from tax on maize starch in accordance
with Exemption Entry No. 8, Mr. Mani prayed that the orders under
D challenge be set aside by declaring the appellant’s entitlement to
exemption; consequently, the appeals be allowed.
6. Mr. C. Kranthi Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the
respondents while supporting the impugned judgment, contended as
follows:
E a) Firstly, in the Assessment Year 1998-1999, maize starch
will fall under Taxation Entry No. 61, categorized as ‘sago
and starch of any kind’, and will be subject to a 4% tax
rate. The term ‘starch of any kind’, encompasses all types
of starch, including maize starch. The decision in
F Associated Cement Company Ltd. vs. Commissioner
of Customs16 was relied on to support the contention that
the words ‘any kind’ ought to be interpreted in an inclusive
manner to include all kinds of goods within its ambit.
b) Secondly, the Exemption Notification gained statutory support
starting only from 1st April, 1994, through an amendment
G
that introduced Exemption Entry No. 8 exempting products
of millets. However, Taxation Entry ‘sago and starch of
any kind’ had already existed since 1993 and hence, was
the applicable entry.

H 16
(2001) 4 SCC 593
SANTHOSH MAIZE & INDUSTRIES LIMITED v. THE STATE 111
OF TAMIL NADU & ANR. [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]

c) Thirdly, Exemption Entry No.8 modified the exempting A
provision as provided under the Notification and omitted
the word ‘like’ which restricted the benefit of the
exemption only to the items specified therein. The decisions
of this Court in Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel17 and
B. Shankara Rao Badami vs. the State of Mysore18
B
were placed in support of the maxim expressum facit
cessare tacitum. The contention put forth is that when
specific matters are expressly mentioned, anything not
mentioned should be deemed to have been excluded.
d) Fourthly, Exemption Entry No. 8 envisages maize which is
a raw product and not maize starch which is a processed C
product. This proposition is further emphasized by the
mention of items like ‘flour’ and ‘bran of cholam’ in the
exempting entry which are processed products.
e) Finally, the legislative intent is clearly discernible from the
2002 amendment, wherein Exemption Entry No. 8 was D
repositioned as Entry No. 44, and the specific reference to
‘maize’ was eliminated, thereby denying exemption to all
the maize products.
7. Mr. Kumar, thus, submitted that the appeals being devoid of
any merit are liable to be dismissed. Heprayed for an order to that effect. E
STATUTORY SCHEME UNDER THE ACT
8. The entries under Schedule I are taxed under Section 3(2) of
the Act while the entries under Schedule III are exempted under Section
8 thereof.
F
9. Exemption Notification dated 14th March, 1970 held the field in
excess of two decades. While the Exemption Notification was in force,
the Act was amended by Act No.24 of 1993. The existing Schedule I
was replaced with a new Schedule, and ‘sago and starch of any kind’
came to be inserted at Entry 53 of Part C of Schedule I with tax rate of
5%. G

10. Act No. 32 of 1994, i.e., the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax
(Amendment) Act, 1994, further amended the Act. Entry 8 in Part B of

17
(1985) 3 SCC 398
18
(1969) 1 SCC 1 H
112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A Schedule III included the item which was hitherto covered by the
Exemption Notification and, thus, the same ceased to be operative with
such amendment.
11. By Act No. 37 of 1996, the rate of tax was reduced from 5%
to 4% in respect of ‘sago and starch of any kind’.
B 12. Considering that the statutory scheme as regards the
classification of ‘maize’ underwent several changes over time, we deem
it appropriate to provide a comprehensive overview of the applicable
taxing and exempting entries at relevant time periods. To facilitate clarity,
the following table enumerates the applicability of these entries:
C

D

E

F

G

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
13. We have considered the submissions advanced by learned
counsel for the parties and have also perused the materials on record.
H
SANTHOSH MAIZE & INDUSTRIES LIMITED v. THE STATE 113
OF TAMIL NADU & ANR. [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]

14. While we are not ad idem with all the reasons assigned by the A
High Court in the impugned judgment, we see no reason to differ with
the ultimate conclusion reached by it. We would, therefore, proceed to
assign our own reasons for agreeing with the High Court that the appellant
is not entitled to any relief.
15. The Exemption Notification was erroneously held by the High B
Court not to have statutory backing. Recital thereof shows the source of
power. Exercise of power was in terms of Section 17 of the Act, which
appears to be the repository of the State Government’s power to exempt
payment of tax. However, nothing really turns on it in view of the several
Amendment Acts by which the Schedules were amended from time to
time. Decision on C.A. No.5731 of 2009 has to be rendered not based C
on the Exemption Notification but on the terms of the Act read with the
Schedules thereto as it stood on 17th July, 1996, when Act No.37 of
1996, i.e., the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax (Second Amendment) Act,
1996 came into force. Indeed, the Act was amended further with effect
from 27th March, 2002 by Act No.18 of 2002, i.e., the Tamil Nadu General D
Sales Tax (Fourth Amendment) Act, 2002, but the same being a post-
millennium event is admittedly beyond the period under consideration,
i.e., 1998-99; hence, we need not be too concerned with the latter
amendment.
16. It would appear from the conspectus of the statutory provisions E
as delineated above that there were two entries in the field at or about
the period of the relevant assessment year, i.e., “sago and starch of any
kind” in Schedule I, referred by us as Taxation Entry No.61, and “products
of millets (rice, flour, brokens and brans of cholam, cumbu, ragi, thinai,
varagu, samai, kudiraivali, milo and maize)” in Schedule III which we
are referring to as Exemption Entry No.8. F

17. When Act No.32 of 1994 amended Schedule III of the Act,
Exemption Entry No.8 did not include the word ‘like’ which was hitherto
there in the Exemption Notification [No. 88 of 1970 dated 14 th March,
1970]. According to English grammar, the word “like” can be used as a
verb, as a noun as well as a preposition depending upon its setting. It had G
been used in the Exemption Notification as a ‘noun”. Once it becomes
clear from Exemption Entry No.8, as introduced by Act No.32 of 1994,
that (i) it does not include the noun “like” as the first word within brackets
and (ii) that maize is only included along with rice, flour, etc. (and not
maize starch), it is only those items within the brackets which, for the H
114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A purposes of exemption, qualify as products of millets. It is, therefore,
those products of millets specifically indicated, which are entitled to
exemption under Section 8 of the Act read with Schedule III as per
Exemption Entry No.8.
18. Can maize starch be considered a millet product, as in
B Exemption Entry No.8, for the present purpose? We do not think so.
Maize is the raw product, whereas maize starch is a processed product.
While we are bound to hold that maize is entitled to exemption in terms
of Exemption Entry No.8 as it stood prior to the relevant assessment
year, maize starch being a product of maize derived through mechanical
process, it cannot be read as “like maize”, the “like” having been excluded
C by Act No. 32 of 1994. Maize starch being a kind of starch, it is covered
by Taxation Entry No. 61 as introduced by Act No.37 of 1996which is to
the effect “… starch of any kind”. The dictionary meaning of the word
“any” is “one or same or all”. In Black’s Law Dictionary, it is explained
that the word ‘any’ has diverse meaning and may be employed to indicate
D ‘all’ or ‘every’ as well as ‘same’ or ‘one’ and its meaning in a given
statute depends upon the context and subject matter of the statute. Had
the legislature intended to exclude any starch, including maize starch, a
specific provision excluding it would have been made.
19. The decision in Associated Cement Company Ltd. (supra)
E has taken the view that the words ‘any other kind of moveable property’
in clause (e) of Section 2(22) of the Customs Act defining ‘goods’ would
include all tangible movable articles as goods for the purposes thereof.
20. We may also in this connection refer to the decision in M/s.
Associated Indem Mechanical (P) Limited vs. West Bengal Small
F Industries Development Corporation19 where, while construing ‘any
premises’ contained in the provisions of the West Bengal Premises
Tenancy Act, 1956, it has been held by this Court that ‘any’ is a word of
very wide meaning and prima facie the use of it excludes limitation.
21. We hold that ‘any kind’ in the context the same has been used
G in the taxation entry clearly indicates that it has been used in a wide
sense extending from one to all and admits of no exception.
22. That in Taxation Entry No.61 ‘starch of any kind’ is preceded
by ‘sago’ does not, in our opinion, make any material difference. Sago is
a starch extracted from the pith, or spongy core tissue of various tropical
H 19
(2007) 3 SCC 607
SANTHOSH MAIZE & INDUSTRIES LIMITED v. THE STATE 115
OF TAMIL NADU & ANR. [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]

palm stems. Therefore, what is taxable under Taxation Entry No.61 is A
‘sago’, which itself is a starch, as well as starch of any kind which
would obviously include maize starch.
23. Trite to say, the Legislature may not have intended two entries
for the self-same commodity, one under the exempted category and the
other under the taxable entry. Therefore, maize starch has to be either B
covered by Taxation EntryNo.61 or Exemption Entry No.8. For the
purpose of ascertaining which of the two is the applicable entry, we
need not labour much having regard to the language in which the two
entries are expressed. Taxation Entry No.61 provides a more specific
description and maize starch undoubtedly being a ‘kind of starch’ would,
therefore, be comprehended in it. This is more so because what is covered C
by Exemption Entry No.8 is maize, which is a product of millet. The
position would have been otherwise if Exemption Entry No.8 or any
other entry in Schedule III carried the description of product of maize
instead of ‘product of millet’.
24. Law is well settled that if in any statutory rule or statutory D
notification two expressions are used - one in general words and the
other in special terms - under the rules of interpretation, it has to be
understood that the special terms were not meant to be included in the
general expression; alternatively, it can be said that where a statute
contains both a general provision as well as a specific provision, the E
latter must prevail.
25. What emerges from the above discussion is that Taxation
Entry No.61 is relatable to ‘starch’ of any kind whereas Exemption Entry
No.8 relates to products of ‘millet’.
26. Looking at the specific (Taxation Entry No.61) in F
contradistinction with the general (Exemption Entry No.8), there can be
no manner of doubt that maize starch would be covered by the taxation
entry and not by the exemption entry.
27. The contention advanced on behalf of the appellant that
clarification provided by the Commissioner could not have been made G
applicable with retrospective effect is, in our considered opinion, without
substance. The clarification vide Circular dated 8th October, 1998 was
issued in exercise of power conferred by the statute (i.e., Section 28-A
of the Act). Whenever a clarification pursuant to an application made by
a registered dealer as to the applicable rate of tax is issued under sub-
H
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A section (1), or the Commissioner on his own clarifies any point concerning
the rate of tax under the Act, or the procedure relating to assessment
and collection of tax as provided for under the Act is issued under sub-
section (2), the object is to make the rate of tax explicit what is otherwise
implicit. The contention as raised, if accepted, would defeat the object
of issuing the clarification unless it were construed to have retrospective
B
effect. What the clarification provided by the Commissioner does is to
clear the meaning of the two entries which was already implicit but had
given rise to a confusion. A clarification of this nature, therefore, is bound
to be retrospective.
28. Also, having regard to the nature of clarification issued, we
C hold that Circular dated 8th October, 1998 does not run counter to the
provisions of the Act.
29. We have considered the decisions cited by Mr. Mani in
Lakshmi Starch Limited (supra) and TVL. Indras Agencies (P)
Limited (supra). For the reasons that we have assigned above, we hold
D that the said decisions do not aid the petitioner.
CONCLUSIONS
30. The impugned judgment is upheld albeit for reasons not assigned
by the High Court. Finding no merit in the appeals, we dismiss the same.
E Parties shall, however, bear their own costs.

Ankit Gyan Appeals dismissed.
(Assisted by : Mahendra Yadav, LCRA)

F

G

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