Holding

Vicarious liability of directors cannot be imposed under the Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900 absent a specific statutory provision, and the complaint failed to allege personal involvement, warranting its quashment.

Summary

The Range Forest Officer alleged that the directors and office bearers of a company illegally uprooted trees using a JCB, violating Section 4 of the Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900, and sought prosecution under Section 19. The Special Environment Court took cognizance of the complaint and issued process against the three appellants. The appellants contended that only the company, not the individual directors, could be liable, arguing the absence of any statutory provision for vicarious liability. The Supreme Court held that the Act does not impose vicarious liability on directors unless the statute expressly provides for it and that the complaint lacked specific averments linking the appellants personally to the offence. Consequently, the Court quashed the complaint and allowed the appeal, directing that any action against the company itself must be pursued separately.

Issues considered

Whether the complaint under the Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900 discloses a prima facie case of offence against the individual directors and office bearers.
Whether vicarious liability can be attached to directors of a company for offences committed by the company’s employees under the Act.
Whether the statute provides for vicarious liability of officers of a company in criminal prosecutions.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 156(3), s. 200
Indian Forest Act, 1927
Indian Penal Code, 1860
Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900s. 19, s. 4
Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972

Subjects

Vicarious LiabilityDirectorsPersonal CapacityWrongful act of employeesCriminal Liability of officer of companySpecific Provision in StatuteCriminal IntentSpecific Act

Judgment

[2025] 1 S.C.R. 446 : 2025 INSC 34

Sanjay Dutt & Ors.
v.
The State of Haryana & Anr.
(Criminal Appeal No. 11 of 2025)
02 January 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
According to the Range Forest Officer, the appellants (director and
office bearers of the company) had illegally uprooted trees with
JCB, destroyed them, and violated the section 4 of the Punjab Land
Preservation Act, 1900. The question that arises for consideration
is whether vicarious liability that can be attached to any of the
directors or any office bearers of the company.

Headnotes†
Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900 – s.4 r/w. s.19 –
A license/necessary permission for development of the land
in the specified area was granted in favour of a company –
Complaint lodged by the Range Forest Officer – It was
alleged that the appellants (director and office bearers of the
company) had illegally uprooted trees and violated provisions
of the Act, 1900 – The Presiding officer-cum-JMIC, Special
Environment Court took cognizance of the complaint and
issued process for the offence punishable u/s.19 of the
Act, 1900 – Correctness:
Held: In the Scheme of the Act, 1900, there is no vicarious
liability that can be attached to any of the directors or any
office bearers of the company – It is the individual liability or
the act that would make the person concerned liable for being
prosecuted for the offence punishable u/s.19 of the Act, 1900 –
Having regard to the nature of the allegations, it is difficult to
take the view that the appellants herein are responsible for
the alleged offence – There are no allegations worth the name
in the complaint that the three appellants herein are directly
responsible for uprooting of the trees with the aid of Bulldozers
or JCB machines or causing damage to the environment – The
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 447

Sanjay Dutt & Ors. v. The State of Haryana & Anr.

persons who were actually found at the site felling the trees
have not been arrayed as accused in the complaint – Although
the license/necessary permission for development of the land in
the specified area had been granted in favour of the company,
yet for the reasons best known to the complainant the company
has not been arrayed as an accused in the complaint – While
a company may be held liable for the wrongful acts of its
employees, the liability of its directors is not automatic – It
depends on specific circumstances, particularly the interplay
between the director’s personal actions and the company’s
responsibilities – A director may be vicariously liable only if the
company itself is liable in the first place and if such director
personally acted in a manner that directly connects their conduct
to the company’s liability – Mere authorization of an act at the
behest of the company or the exercise of a supervisory role
over certain actions or activities of the company is not enough
to render a director vicariously liable – In the instant case, the
allegations which find place against the appellants herein in their
personal capacity are absolutely vague – No case could be said
to have been made out for putting the three appellants to trial
for the alleged offence – The Court concerned could not have
issued process for the alleged offence – Thus, the impugned
complaint and order taking cognizance of the said complaint is
hereby quashed. [Paras 10, 11, 18]

Principle – Vicarious Liability – Provision in statute –
Requirement of:
Held: It is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there
is no vicarious liability unless the statute specifically provides
so – Thus, an individual who has perpetrated the commission
of an offence on behalf of a company can be made an accused,
if the statute provides for such liability and if there is sufficient
evidence of his active role coupled with criminal intent – The
primary responsibility is on the complainant to make specific
averments as are required under the law in the complaint so as
to make the accused vicariously liable – For fastening criminal
liability on an officer of a company, there is no presumption
that every officer of a company knows about the transaction in
question. [Para 13]
448 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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Case Law Cited
Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited
and Anr. v. Datar Switchgear Limited and Ors. [2018] 1 SCR 733 :
(2010) 10 SCC 479 – referred to.

List of Acts
Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900; Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973.

List of Keywords
Vicarious Liability; Directors; Personal Capacity; Wrongful act
of employees; Criminal Liability of officer of company; Specific
Provision in Statute; Criminal Intent; Specific Act.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 11 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 08.12.2022 of the High Court
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRMM No. 55268 of 2022

Appearances for Parties
Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Sr. Adv., Sumesh Malhotra, Vikas Singh,
Pawan Bhardwaj, Jayesh Yadav, Yashvi, Ms. Russai Sidhu,
Ms. Chitra Singh, Lokesh Kumar Choudhary, Advs. for the Appellants.
Akshay Amritanshu, Ms. Drishti Saraf, Ms. Pragya Upadhyay,
Ms. Swati Mishra, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Order

1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises from the judgment and order passed
by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dated
08-12-2022 in CRMM No.55268 of 2022 by which the High
Court rejected the petition filed by the appellants herein invoking
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the purpose of
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 449

Sanjay Dutt & Ors. v. The State of Haryana & Anr.

quashing of complaint no. 41 of 2022 lodged by the Range Forest
Officer for the alleged offence under Section 4 of the Punjab Land
Preservation Act, 1900 (for short “the Act, 1900”) punishable under
Section 19 of the Act, 1900.
3. We have heard Ms. Meenakshi Arora, the learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellants and Mr. Akshay Amritanshu, the learned
counsel appearing for the respondents.
4. The short point that falls for our consideration is whether the plain
reading of the complaint lodged by the Range Forest Officer discloses
commission of any offence alleged to have been committed under
Section 4 read with Section 19 of the Act, 1900.
5. The complaint reads thus:-
“PC No.1G/2022-23
Case No.41/22
7-9-22
IN THE COURT OF HON’BLE PRESIDING OFFICER
SPECIAL ENVIRONMENT COURT, FARIDABAD
IN THE MATTER OF
Range Forest Officer Gurugram …….Applicants
Vs.
(1) Satpal Singh Project Manager
(2) Kamal Sehgal General Manager
(3) Sanjay Dutt Director, Sec-113
Bajgera Gurugram
…….Respondents
INDEX

S.No. Particular Page No.
1. Report of Forest etc. 1-2
2. Notice issued to Forest Criminals 3-4
3. Form No.21 5-6
450 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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4. Form No.22 7-8
5. Notification 9-10
6. Statement of Forest Guard 11-12
7. Statement of Forest Inspector 13-14
8. Site plan of Forest crime scene 15-16
9. Reply of forest criminal 17-19

xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

Sd/-
Range Forest Officer,
Gurugram
Forest Crime Report
Forest Department, Government of Haryana
FOR Book No.0495 FOR No.079

Forest Division Gurugram

Range/Bloc/Beat Gurugram/Mullanpur/Jhadsa

Reach/Name of the place Sec-113-Gate vida GGM

FOR No. (Date, Day & 079/10495-02/09/2021
Time)

Name of the report issuing Hansraj
officer

Source of information about Self patrolling/informer/complaint
the crime

Date/Day/Time of the
commission of the crime

Name and designation of Sh. Virender Kumar Sr. Inspector
the Investigating Officer

Description of the crime/ No/If yes then No.
incident

Act violated Section

Indian Forest Act, 1927
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 451

Sanjay Dutt & Ors. v. The State of Haryana & Anr.

Wild Life (Protection) Act,
1972

Punjab Land Conservation Sec-4
Act, 1900

Indian Penal Code

Description of Name Father’s Age Caste Address
criminal Name

(1) Project Sec-113, Gate Vida Bajgeda
Satpal Manager Gurugram
Singh

(2) General
Kamal Manager
Sehgal

(3) Director
Sanjay
Dutt

Description of confiscated articles

Details of Type Type/ Numbers Dead Compensation
confiscated Size amount
forest produce
(1) Kikkar =7 (iv) (3) ________small plants = 62

(2) Kikkar = 5 (iv) (4) _________ (iv) = 46

(5) ,, ,, (v) = 72

(6) Misc. (u/s) = 126

Details of Type Regd. Color Model Manufacture
vehicle seized No. date

xxxxx Total=ABSTRFC

xxxxxx U/s V IV Total

-- 7 5 12

126 72 46 244

Total 126 79 51 256

Tools/ Weapons xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxx xxxxxx

Others, if any xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxx xxxxxx

Mark the correct xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxx xxxxxx
452 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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Signature of Informer/ Beat Incharge
Complainant/ Witness
Sd/-
Sd/-

Signature/Thumb Impression of F.R.O.
accused
Name

Rank

Dated

PC No.1G/2022-23
Notice No.219.G
Dated: 2/9/2021
Notice
Indian Forest Act, 1900 Sec-4

Name : (1) Satpal Singh Project Manager
Address: (2) Kamal Sehgal General Manager
(3) Sanjay Dutt Director,
Sec-113, Gate Vida
Bajgera Gurugram

Forest Damage Report No.079/495 has been received
against you. Due to the forest crime committed by you,
the environment has been harmed. According to damage
report you have illegally uprooted trees situated in the area
of Sec-113 Gate Vida, Gurugram, with JCB, destroyed
them, and have violated the Sec-4 of the Indian Forest Act
PLPA, 1900. You are hereby informed through this notice
that you should appear before the undersigned on or before
7-9-2021 and explain your position that why a complaint
should not be filed against you in the Environment Court,
Faridabad as per the above said Indian Forest Act.
Forest Block Officer
Forest Area: Sultanpur
Range: Gurugram
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 453

Sanjay Dutt & Ors. v. The State of Haryana & Anr.

PC No.1G/2022-23

Case No…… Description of incident Range…. Police
Station….District

1 2 3

Name and Regarding which Description of
address of matter statement, which
witnesses the witnesses
have hope for.
Hansaraj Sr. I According to (1) Forest Guard
I/C Gurugram FOR No.79/495, will depose
and Jhadsa the accused according to FOR
Beat have committed
(2) Forest
violation of
Virender Singh Inspector will
Section 4 of the
I/C Sultanpur depose according
PLPA, 1900 by
Block to FOR
uprooting 256
Forest Officer trees of Kikkar- (3) Forest Officer
I/C Gurugram and xxxx and 62 will depose
Range plants of xxxxx according to FOR
with JCB from
Sec-113, Gate
Vida, Gurugram.
No.I Description of case, which is to be written on all
Sd/-
Sd/-

Notification issued under Section 4 of the Act, 1900
Government of Haryana
Forest Department
Order
Dated, January 4, 2013
No.S.O.8/P.A.2/1900/S.4/2013-Whereas the Governor
of Haryana is satisfied after due inquiry, that for the
purpose of giving effect to the provisions of the Punjab
Land Preservation Act, 1900 (Punjab Act 2 of 1900), the
regulations, the conditions and the prohibition set out
hereinafter are necessary.
454 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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Therefore, now, in exercise of the powers conferred under
Section 4 of the above said Act, the Governor of Haryana,
hereby in the Schedule given below, specifically prohibits
the following works in the specified areas, for a period
of fifteen years from the date of publication of this Order
in the Official Gazette, which has been notified under
Section 3 of the above said rule by the Government of
Haryana, Forest Department vide Notification No. S.O.81/
P.A.2/1900/S.3/2012 dated 19th December, 2012.
a. The cutting of trees or timber other than Safeda,
Popular, Bacain, Bass, Toot and Alanthak, and the
collection or removal of flowers, fruits and any produce
of different forest, except for the actual domestic or any
manufacturing process. Provided that the land owner
may sell trees or timber after obtaining a permit from
the concerned Divisional Officer before doing so. Such
permit shall prescribe such conditions for any sale as
may be deemed necessary from time to time in the
interest of forest conservation and 11 state farmers
will be free to sell their trees to any person/Agency/
Haryana and Development Corporation Limited at
their will. So as to enable them to get remunerative
price for their produce, provided that the land owner
may sell their trees after obtaining permission to do
so from the concerned Divisional Forest Officer.
P.C. No.1G/2022-23
FOR No.79/495
Dated 2-9-2021
Statement of Forest Guard
Sir,
The spot was inspected. The accused has uprooted the
tress standing on the inspected spot through JCB, the dt.
of which has been recorded.
Sd/-
Sd/-
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 455

Sanjay Dutt & Ors. v. The State of Haryana & Anr.

Certified to be true translation
Advocate
P.C. No.1G/2022-23
FOR No.79/495
Dated 2-9-2021
Statement of Forest Inspector
Sir,
I do hereby solemnly affirm that upon receiving FOR
No.79/495 dated 2-9-2021, the spot was inspected.
Wherein on the spot at Sec-113, Gate Vida, Bajgera,
Kikkar and different types of trees were found to be
uprooted with the JCB and small plants of different types
were destroyed. According to FOR, the damage is found
to be correct. The accused were issued notice for violating
Section 4 of the PLPA, 1900. But the accused did not give
any satisfactory answer. In this FOR, after preparing PC
case of the accused, the same was given to Forest Range
Office, Gurugram for presenting before the Environment
Court, Faridabad. This is my statement
Sd/-
6. It appears from the materials on record that the Presiding Officer-
cum-JMIC, Special Environment Court Faridabad took cognizance of
the complaint, referred to above and issued process for the offence
punishable under Section 19 of the Act, 1900. The order issuing
process reads: -
“DFO Vs Satpal etc
Present Sh Gordhan Das, Forester; Gurugram on behalf
of the complainant
Heard on the point of summoning of accused In the challan
and the documents attached thereto, it is alleged by the
complainant that on 02.09.2021, in the area of sector 113
Gate Vida Gurugram, (this area has been notified under the
Forest Act, so, same belongs to the Forest Department),
the accused destroyed 256 trees using JCB It is also
456 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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claimed by the complainant that the illegal act committed
by the above named accused, has caused a loss to the
tune of Rs 90580/- (Rupees Ninty Thousand Five Hundred
Eighty Only) to the Forest Department.
In view of the allegations leveled against the accused in
the challan and perusal of original documents appended
herewith, this court is of the opinion that a prima-facie
case is made out against the accused for indulging in said
illegal activity which led to the commission of an offence,
punishable u/s 19 of the Punjab Land Preservation Act,
1900.
Accordingly, accused is hereby ordered to be summoned
on 07.09.2022 and same is directed to appear in person
in the court.
(Seema)
PO Spl Env Court,
Faridabad UID HR0387
02.05.2022”
7. We are informed that the aforesaid complaint bearing CIS
No.COMA-134-2024 has now been transferred to the district Court
of Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Gurugram.
8. It is not in dispute that so far as the appellant no.1 is concerned he
is the Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer of a company
namely TATA Realty and Infrastructure Limited and Tata Housing
Development Co. Ltd. So far as the appellant no.2 is concerned,
he at the relevant point of time was the General Manager and is
currently the Assistant Vice President of Tata Realty and Infrastructure
Limited in its Corporate Relations Group and so far as the appellant
no.3 is concerned he at the relevant point of time was the erstwhile
employee/Senior Manager of the company namely ‘Sector 113
Gatevida Developers Private Limited’ (formerly known as Lemon
Tree and Developers Private).

Relevant Provisions of Law:
9. Section 4 of the Act, 1900 reads thus:-
“4. Power to regulate, restrict or prohibit, by general or
special order, within notified areas, certain matters.— In
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 457

Sanjay Dutt & Ors. v. The State of Haryana & Anr.

respect of areas notified under section 3 generally or
the whole or any part of any such area, the Provincial
Government] may, by general or special order temporarily
regulate, restrict or prohibit—
(a) the clearing or breaking up or cultivating of land not
ordinarily under cultivation prior to the publication of the
notification under section 3;
(b) the quarrying of stone or the burning of lime at places
where such stone or lime had not ordinarily been so
quarried or burnt prior to the publication of the notification
under section 3;
(c) the cutting of trees or timber, or the collection or removal
or subjection to any manufacturing process, otherwise than
as described in clause (b) of this sub-section of any forest-
produce other than grass, save for bonafide domestic or
agricultural purposes [of rightholder in such area];
(d) the setting on fire of trees, timber or forest produce;
(e) the admission, herding, pasturing or retention of
sheep,[goats or camels];
(f) the examination of forest-produce passing out of any
such area; and
(g) the granting of permits to the inhabitants of towns and
villages situate within the limits or in the vicinity of any
such area, to take any tree, timber or forest produce for
their own use therefrom, or to pasture sheep,[goats or
camels] or to cultivate or erect buildings therein and the
production and return of such permits by such persons.”
Section 19 of the Act, 1900 reads thus:-
“19. Penalty for offences.— Any person who, within the
limits of any area notified under section 3, commits any
breach of any regulation made, [restriction or prohibition
imposed, order passed or requisition made under sections
4, 5, 5-A, or 7-A] shall be punished with imprisonment
for a term which may extend to one month, or with a fine
which may extend to one hundred rupees, or with both”
458 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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10. We take notice of the fact that having regard to the Scheme of
the Act, 1900, there is no vicarious liability that can be attached to
any of the directors or any office bearers of the company. It is the
individual liability or the act that would make the person concerned
liable for being prosecuted for the offence punishable under Section
19 of the Act, 1900. Having regard to the nature of the allegations,
it is difficult for us to take the view that the appellants herein are
responsible for the alleged offence. There are no allegations worth
the name in the complaint that the three appellants before us are
directly responsible for uprooting of the trees with the aid of Bulldozers
or JCB machines or causing damage to the environment. The
persons who were actually found at the site felling the trees have
not been arrayed as accused in the complaint. Although the license
/ necessary permission for development of the land in the specified
area had been granted in favour of the company, yet for the reasons
best known to the complainant the company has not been arrayed
as an accused in the complaint.
11. It appears that the Courts below proceeded on the erroneous
assumption that the three appellants herein being responsible officers
of the company are liable for the alleged offence. While a company
may be held liable for the wrongful acts of its employees, the liability
of its directors is not automatic. It depends on specific circumstances,
particularly the interplay between the director’s personal actions
and the company’s responsibilities. A director may be vicariously
liable only if the company itself is liable in the first place and if such
director personally acted in a manner that directly connects their
conduct to the company’s liability. Mere authorization of an act at
the behest of the company or the exercise of a supervisory role
over certain actions or activities of the company is not enough to
render a director vicariously liable. There must exist something to
show that such actions of the director stemmed from their personal
involvement and arose from actions or conduct falling outside the
scope of its routine corporate duties. Thus, where the company is
the offender, vicarious liability of the Directors cannot be imputed
automatically, in the absence of any statutory provision to this effect.
There has to be a specific act attributed to the director or any other
person allegedly in control and management of the company, to the
effect that such a person was responsible for the acts committed by
or on behalf of the company.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 459

Sanjay Dutt & Ors. v. The State of Haryana & Anr.

12. At the same time, wherever by a legal fiction the principle of vicarious
liability is attracted and a person who is otherwise not personally
involved in the commission of an offence is made liable for the same,
it has to be specifically provided in the statute concerned. When it
comes to penal provisions, vicarious liability of the managing director
and director would arise provided any provision exists in that behalf
in the statute. Even where such provision for fastening vicarious
liability exists, it does not mean that any and all directors of the
company would be automatically liable for any contravention of such
statute. Vicarious Liability would arise only if there are specific and
substantiated allegations attributing a particular role or conduct to
such director, sufficient enough to attract the provisions constituting
vicarious liability and by extension the offence itself.
13. It is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is no
vicarious liability unless the statute specifically provides so. Thus,
an individual who has perpetrated the commission of an offence on
behalf of a company can be made an accused, if the statute provides
for such liability and if there is sufficient evidence of his active role
coupled with criminal intent. The primary responsibility is on the
complainant to make specific averments as are required under the
law in the complaint so as to make the accused vicariously liable.
For fastening criminal liability on an officer of a company, there is
no presumption that every officer of a company knows about the
transaction in question.
14. The allegations which find place against the appellants herein
in their personal capacity seem to be absolutely vague. When a
complainant intends to rope in a Managing Director or any officer of
a company, it is essential to make requisite allegations to constitute
the vicarious liability.
15. When jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint petition filed in terms
of Section 156(3) or Section 200 of the CrPC, the Court concerned
should remain vigilant & apply its mind carefully before taking
cognizance of a complaint of the present nature.
16. The High Court failed to pose unto itself the correct question i.e.,
as to whether the complaint even if given face value and taken
to be correct in its entirety would lead to the conclusion that the
appellants herein were personally liable for the offence under
460 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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Section 4 of the Act, 1900 made punishable under Section 19 of
the Act, 1900.
17. In Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited and
Anr., v. Datar Switchgear Limited and Ors., as reported in (2010) 10
SCC 479, wherein, the Chairman of the Maharashtra State Electricity
Board was made an accused for the offence under Sections 192
and 199 respectively read with Section 34 of the IPC, this Court
observed thus:
“30. It is trite law that wherever by a legal fiction the
principle of vicarious liability is attracted and a person who
is otherwise not personally involved in the commission
of an offence is made liable for the same, it has to be
specifically provided in the statute concerned. In our
opinion, neither Section 192 IPC nor Section 199 IPC
incorporate the principle of vicarious liability, and therefore,
it was incumbent on the complainant to specifically aver
the role of each of the accused in the complaint. It would
be profitable to extract the following observations made
in S.K. Alagh: (SCC p.667, para 19)
“19. As, admittedly, drafts were drawn in the name of
the company, even if the appellant was its Managing
Director, he cannot be said to have committed an
offence under Section 406 of the Penal Code. If and
when a statute contemplates creation of such a legal
fiction, it provides specifically therefor. In absence of
any provision laid down under the statute, a Director
of a company or an employee cannot be held to be
vicariously liable for any offence committed by the
company itself.”
(Emphasis supplied)
18. In such circumstances, referred to above, no case could be said to
have been made out for putting the three appellants to trial for the
alleged offence. The Court concerned could not have issued process
for the alleged offence.
19. In view of the aforesaid, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed.
The impugned complaint and order taking cognizance of the said
complaint is hereby quashed.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 461

Sanjay Dutt & Ors. v. The State of Haryana & Anr.

20. We clarify that if it is the case of the department that the company
has committed any breach or violation of any of the conditions
imposed at the time of grant of license, then it is always open for
authority concerned to proceed against the company for violation of
such terms and conditions.
21. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan