SAMIR KUMAR MAJUMDERversusTHE UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

                 [2023] 12 S.C.R. 254 : 2023 INSC 836



                            CASE DETAILS

                    SAMIR KUMAR MAJUMDER
                                     v.
                   THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
                     (Civil Appeal No. 6027 of 2014)
                         SEPTEMBER 20, 2023
     [J. K. MAHESHWARI AND K. V. VISWANATHAN, JJ.]
                             HEADNOTES
     Issue for consideration: Whether the High Court was justified in
denying the absorption of appellant as an Assistant Teacher in the Higher
Secondary section and also rejecting his claim for continuity of service.
    Service Law – Claim for absorption as an Assistant Teacher in the
Higher Secondary section – Tenable or not:
       Held: The appellant was appointed as a substitute teacher in the
payscale of a primary teacher – When he filed the first round of proceedings
in O.A. No. 209 of 1991, no plea was raised that he worked as an Assistant
Teacher in the Higher Secondary Section – Before the Tribunal, the
argument was only about regularization – The Screening Committee having
considered him, pursuant to the orders of the Supreme Court, has thought
it fit to absorb him only as a primary teacher; the Screening Committee
itself was pursuant to the orders of the Supreme Court and based on the
Master Circular of 29.01.1991 wherein the claims of the candidates like
the appellant were examined; the records of his appointment as a substitute
teacher admittedly showed that he was only appointed as a substitute primary
teacher – Also, in the earlier round of proceedings culminating in the order
of the Supreme Court dated 15.02.1996, this issue was never raised – His
claim for absorption as an assistant teacher in the Higher Secondary Section
is clearly barred by constructive res judicata – Thus, the appellant’s claim
for absorption as Assistant Teacher in the Higher Secondary Section is not
tenable. [Paras 29, 31 and 32]



                                    254
                SAMIR KUMAR MAJUMDER v.                              255
                THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

     Service Law – Claim for continuity of service – Relief denied
by the High Court – Propriety:
      Held: The only reason given in the order denying continuity for
the appellant while granting continuity of the same for the others was
that, in the case of the appellant, the Supreme Court had not directed
any specific order regarding continuity of service – The authorities
are wrong in stating that in the case of the appellant, the Supreme
Court had not directed any specific order regarding continuity of
service – Nowhere in the said order in the appellant’s appeal had the
benefits available to the appellant under the Master Circular dated
29.01.1991 been taken away – In the case of Smt. Jayasree Deb Roy
(Dutta), by abundant caution, the Master Circular was referred to and
the rights granted therein were reiterated expressly – The appellant
being identically situated with the other absorbees in the order of
02.01.1998 could not have been discriminated and denied the benefit
of his service from 04.03.1990 to the date of his absorption – The
Tribunal and the High Court have grossly erred in denying the relief by
wrongly understanding the orders of the Supreme Court and the legal
position – Thus, the appellant should be extended the same benefits
as were extended to others, who were granted continuity by the letter
of 28.12.1998. [Paras 38, 41, 42, 43 and 44]
     Doctrines – Doctrine of constructive res judicata – discussed.
     Maxims – Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium – discussed.
       LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
     Maharashtra Vikrikar Karamchari Sangathan v. State of Maharashtra
and Another, (2000) 2 SCC 552 : [2000] 1 SCR 166 – relied on.
      Smt. Jayasree Deb Roy (Dutta) v. The Union of India & Ors. C.A. No.
9424 of 1995 arising out of O.A. No. 149(G) of 1989; M. Nagabhushana
vs. State of Karnataka and Others (2011) 3 SCC 408:[2011] 2 SCR 435 –
referred to.
     Henderson v. Henderson, (1843) 3 Hare, 100 – referred to.
256          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2023] 12 S.C.R.



       OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
              ORDER AND APPEARANCES

      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6027 of 2014.
     From the Judgment and Order dated 19.07.2011 of the High Court at
Calcutta in W.P.C.T. No.130 of 2009.
      Appearances:
     Ms. Uttara Babbar, Ms. Daisy Hannah, Madhav Maira, Ms. Sampriti
Baksi, Advs. for the Appellant.
     Ms. Nachiketa Joshi, Rajesh Kumar Singh, Ms. Priya Mishra, Rupesh
Kumar, Amrish Kumar, Srisatya Mohanty, Ms. Astha Sharma, Advs. for
the Respondents.

       JUDGMENT/ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
                               JUDGMENT
      K.V. VISWANATHAN, J.
     1. Samir Kumar Majumder (the appellant) was a school teacher at
the Railway Higher Secondary School, Alipurduar Junction. He taught
mathematics to the school children. Aggrieved by the judgment of the
High Court at Calcutta (hereinafter referred to as ‘the High Court’) dated
19.07.2011 in W.P.C.T. No. 130 of 2009, the appellant is before us in appeal.
By the said judgment, the High Court denied him absorption as an Assistant
Teacher in the Higher Secondary Section and also rejected his claim for
continuity of service.
      Relevant Facts:
      2. The appellant was initially appointed as a Substitute Teacher on
05.12.1989. According to him, artificial breaks were created in his service
by terminating him on the eve of the school vacations and thereafter
reappointing him. The appellant states that he was terminated first before
the summer vacations on 09.06.1990 and was re-engaged on 24.07.1990.
His further case is that he was again terminated on 22.09.1990, on the eve
of Puja Holidays. According to him, he was re-engaged on 01.11.1990.
           SAMIR KUMAR MAJUMDER v.                                         257
  THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS.[K.V.VISWANATHAN, J.]

      3. When the matter stood thus, the appellant, fearing further creation of
artificial breaks filed an application being O.A. No. 209 of 1990 before the
Central Administrative Tribunal (for short ‘the Tribunal’) Guwahati Bench.
He prayed for setting aside of the letters of termination dated 09.06.1990
and 19.09.1990 and also prayed for regularization of his service and for
salary during the period of breaks.
     4. The Tribunal passed an interim order on 03.12.1990 and it is an
admitted fact that he continued till 12.11.1994 when his services were again
terminated, after the Tribunal had dismissed his application on 31.10.1994.
      5. The Tribunal, while dismissing his application on 31.10.1994, solely
relied on another order of the same Tribunal, passed on the same day, in
O.A. No. 149(G) of 1989 in the case of Smt. Jayasree Deb Roy (Dutta)
vs. The Union of India & Ors. Para 4 of the order in the appellant’s case
is important, which we extract herein below:
     “4. We have examined the question of regularization of substitute
     teachers in detail in our order on O.A. No. 149(G) of 1989 passed
     today. We have come to the conclusion that the substitute teachers
     cannot claim regularization as a matter of right. We have also held that
     selection by the Railway Recruitment Board is essential for regular
     appointment. For the same reasons we hold that the applicant is not
     entitled to be granted any relief of regularization. More-over, in the
     instant case although the applicant had appeared before the Recruitment
     Board he was not selected. That does not entitled him to ask for any
     relief of regularization on the basis of his earlier service as substitute
     teacher.”
     6. O.A. No. 149(G) of 1989 was carried in Appeal to this Court by
way of Civil Appeal No. 9424 of 1995 along with the batch of matters of
similarly situated candidates, which was disposed of on 13.10.1995. The
operative portion of the said order reads as under:-
           “… The appellants were, therefore, entitled to the benefit
     conferred under para 5.1 of the circular (Circular R.B. No. 12/91 M.C.
     No. 20/91 E(NG)/90/SC/Master) dated January 29, 1991, and on that
     basis the appellants are entitled to absorption on regular basis through
     the process of screening by the screening committee in accordance
258           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 12 S.C.R.


      with the said provision and they are not re-quired to face selection by
      the Railway Recruitment Board for the purpose of regular absorption.
      The judgment of the Tribunal holding otherwise cannot, therefore, be
      upheld and has to be set aside.
           After the impugned Judgment of the Tribunal, the services of the
      appellants have been terminated.
            In case the appellants are found suitable for absorption by the
      Screening Committee, they should be appointed on regular basis on
      the post that was held by them and they would also be en-titled to
      continuity of service. The appeals are, therefore, allowed, the judgments
      of the Tribunal dated October 31,1994 in the applications filed by the
      appellants are set aside and the said applications are allowed with
      the direction that the appellants shall be considered for absorption
      on regular basis on the post of Assistant Teacher by the Screening
      Committee in accordance with para 5.1 of the master circular dated
      January 29, 1991, and in case the appellants are found suitable for such
      absorption by the Screening Committee, they shall be restored to the
      post held by them with continuity of service.
            The process of selection by the Screening Committee as per
      directions in this order shall be completed within a period of three
      months from the receipt of the copy of this order. A copy of this order
      be sent to the Chief Personnel Officer, North East Frontier Railway,
      Maligaon, Guwahati.
            By our order dated March 27, 1995, we had directed that
      appointment may not be made on six posts of school teachers. The
      said order shall continue till the Screening Committee completes the
      process of screening.”
     7. The appellant too carried the matter from the Tribunal to this Court.
His matter was disposed of on 15.02.1996 in the following terms:-
           “These appeals relate to regular absorption of the appellants who
      are working as substitute teachers in the Railways. In the impugned
      judgment the Central Administrative Tribunal has observed that the
      appellants should be given an opportunity to appear before the Selection
      Board if they are otherwise eligible as and when such selection is
           SAMIR KUMAR MAJUMDER v.                                      259
  THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS.[K.V.VISWANATHAN, J.]

     made and has expressed the hope that the respondents would try to
     accommodate them even on temporary basis if there happens to be any
     casual vacancy available from time to time and for that purpose they
     may be placed on waiting list of substitute teachers.
           The submission of Shri Puri, the learned counsel appearing for
     the appellants, is that the appellants who have crossed the age bar
     may not be eligible for such consideration. Having regard to the facts
     and circumstances of these cases, it is directed that if the appellants
     have crossed the prescribed maximum age, they may be considered
     for regular selection by giving relaxation in that regard. But such
     relaxation shall be confined to one opportunity for consideration for
     such selection. The appeals are disposed of accordingly. No order as
     to costs.”
      8. Even though textually, the orders may appear different, the
respondent-authorities rightly acted in terms of the true purport of the
order. They subjected the appellant also to the process of screening by the
Screening Committee in accordance with para 5.1 of the Master Circular
dated 29.01.1991 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Master Circular dated
29.01.1991’)
     9. After subjecting the appellant for screening, by an order of
02.01.1998, the appellant was appointed as Primary Teacher (Bengali
Medium) in the Railway Higher Secondary School, Alipurduar Junction
against an existing vacancy.
     10. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed Original Application
No. 978 of 1998 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta
Bench.
      11. The grievance was that firstly, the appellant should have been
absorbed in the post of Assistant Teacher instead of being absorbed as a
Primary Teacher with admissible continuity of service in the pay-scale
of Rs.5500-9000 and not Rs.4500-7000 that was now offered under the
02.01.1998 order; secondly, the appellant is entitled to the pay-scale and
allowance admissible to the post of Assistant Teacher Grade-I, namely,
Rs.1640-2900 from 05.12.1989 instead of the pay-scale of Rs.1200-2040
that was offered. Thirdly, that under the Master Circular dated 29.01.1991,
260          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2023] 12 S.C.R.


a Substitute School Teacher who acquires temporary status, after putting
in continuous service for three months, is entitled to continuity in service
as prescribed therein.
     12. At this stage, we can profitably refer the order dated 28.12.1998
passed on the aspect of continuity of service with regard to these teachers
who were currently absorbed. The order reads as under:
           “Sub:- Continuity of Service on regular absorption
           In compliance with Judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
      and CAT/Guwahati dated 13-10-95, 15-2-96. 2-1-96 and 7-10-96, the
      following substitute teachers are absorbed as Primary teacher (Bengali
      Medium) and posted in Railway Schools.
           1. Smt. Jayashree Deb Roy (Dutta)
           2. Smt. Ratna Roy.
           3. Shri Subal Chandra Chakraborty
           4. Smt. Anupama Bhowmick
           5. Shri Pijush Kanti Das
           6. Smt.Radha Chakraborty
           7. Shri S. K. Majumder.
            The past service rendered by (1) Smt. Jayashree Deb Roy (Dutta)
      (2) Smt. Ratna Roy (3) Shri Subal Chandra Chakraborty (4) Smt.
      Anupama Bhowmick and Shri Pijush Kanti Das as Substitute teacher
      in different spells may be taken into account for all purpose except
      Seniority from the date of acquiring of temporary status with treating
      breaks as Dies-non.
           However, the Hon’ble Court has not directed any specific order
      regarding Continuity of service in favour of Smt. Radha Chakraborty
      and Shri S.K. Majumder and as such the date of appointment will
      be the date of regular appointment after regularization by Screening
      Committee.
           This has the approval of Competent authority.”
           SAMIR KUMAR MAJUMDER v.                                        261
  THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS.[K.V.VISWANATHAN, J.]

      13. As will be seen from the penultimate paragraph of the letter dated
28.12.1998, extracted hereinabove, the only reason that the appellant was
denied continuity of service while others were granted was that this Court
had not made any order regarding continuity of service. All other teachers,
including Jayashree Deb Roy (Dutta) [applicant in O.A. No. 149(G) of
1989] were granted continuity of service and the past service rendered
by them as substitute Teacher in different spells was taken into account
for all purposes except seniority from the date of acquiring of temporary
status by treating breaks as dies non. (A day on which no legal business
is carried on).
     14. The respondent-authorities defended their orders before the
Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta Bench.
     Findings of the courts below:
      15. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta Bench, by its
judgment of 28.11.2008, held that the appellant had only been appointed
as a primary teacher on 05.12.1989 in the pay-scale of Rs.1200-2040; that
functioning as a mathematics teacher for Classes XI and XII, as a stop-
gap measure, would not entitle him the rights of a regular appointee to
the post of Post Graduate Teacher; that the orders of this Court did not, in
the appellant’s case, direct specifically regarding continuity of service, as
was done in the other cases and the appellant’s case being one of regular
absorption, no continuity of service can be given to him. Holding so, the
Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta Bench dismissed the application
of the appellant.
     16. The appellant filed a Writ Petition before the High Court at Calcutta.
The High Court once again, relying on the order of this Court, held that
the benefit of continuous service was specifically rejected in the case of
the appellant. So holding, the High Court upheld the order of the Central
Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta Bench.
     17. The appellant is before us in Appeal.
     Contentions:
     18. We have heard Ms. Uttara Babbar, learned counsel for the appellant
and Mr. Nachiketa Joshi, learned counsel for the Union of India. Both the
262           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 12 S.C.R.


learned counsel have painstakingly taken us through the records of the case
and presented their respective points of view very ably.
      19. Ms. Uttara Babbar, learned counsel for the appellant, contends
that under the Master Circular dated 29.01.1991, Clause 4.3, 5.1 and 6
would apply to the case of the appellant. According to her, on completion
of three months continuous service, the appellant acquired the temporary
status under Clause 4.3; that under Clause 5, Substitutes, who have acquired
temporary status were to be screened by a Screening Committee and not by
Selection Boards for the purpose of absorption, and under Clause 6, the date
of appointment of a substitute to be recorded in the service book against the
column “date of appointment” should be the date on which the substitute
attains a temporary status after continuous service of three months, if the
same is followed by his/her regular absorption. According to the learned
counsel, only for those who do not acquire temporary status and who are
regularly appointed, the date of appointment would be the date when they
are absorbed.
      20. According to the learned counsel, the appellant having completed
three months of continuous service as a substitute teacher is entitled to reckon
his date of appointment as 04.03.1990 (on completion of three months) since
he now stands duly absorbed by the order of 02.01.1998.
      21. According to the learned counsel, the appellant ought to have been
absorbed as Assistant Teacher since he worked as a substitute Assistant
Teacher and taught Classes XI and XII. Her further alternative case is if he
has to be only considered as absorbed under the category of Primary Teacher,
then he should be entitled to the benefit under the Master Circular dated
29.01.1991 and should be entitled to reckon his service under Clause 6 of
the said Circular from 04.03.1990. Learned counsel further contends that
the order of this Court in the case of the appellant dated 15.02.1996 should
be read in conjunction with the order of this Court dated 13.10.1995 in the
case of Smt. Jayasree Deb Roy (Dutta) - applicant in O.A. No. 149(G) of
1989. Learned counsel lays particular emphasis on the fact that the Tribunal
in the appellant’s case in O.A. No. 209 of 1990 had wholly relied on the
order in the case of O.A. No. 149(G) of 1989 (the case of Smt. Jayasree
Deb Roy (Dutta). Reiterating para 4 of the said order, learned counsel
contends that O.A. No. 209 of 1990 of the appellant was dismissed for the
           SAMIR KUMAR MAJUMDER v.                                          263
  THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS.[K.V.VISWANATHAN, J.]

same reasons that O.A. No. 149(G) of 1989 was dismissed. Learned counsel
further emphasizes the fact that in C.A. No. 9424 of 1995, by order dated
13.10.1995, this Court in the case of Smt. Jayasree Deb Roy (Dutta) had
specifically recorded that the judgment of the Tribunal in O.A. No. 149(G)
of 1989 was set aside.
      22. Learned counsel further contends that even the authorities so
understood the orders of this Court and it is for that reason that they subjected
the appellant also to a screening before the Screening Committee before the
absorption on 02.01.1998. Learned counsel contends that, having done so,
there was no plausible reason to discriminate the case of the appellant when it
came to the grant of relief regarding continuity of service on the ground that
this Court had not made any specific order regarding continuity of service.
     23. Learned counsel contends that the grant of age bar relaxation can
only be understood as a grant of additional relief and this cannot be read
to mean that there was denial of the relief of continuity of service, if the
appellants’ were found entitled for absorption which they ultimately were
found be entitled to.
      24. Mr. Nachiketa Joshi, learned counsel for the Union of India,
vehemently opposed the above submissions. Learned counsel, defending
the orders of the courts below would submit that the claim for absorption as
Assistant Teacher was totally unjustified. According to the learned counsel,
the appellant was appointed in 1989 only as a substitute primary teacher
in the pay-scale of the primary teacher and hence merely on the basis of
the claim that some stop-gap classes XI and XII were taken, no plea for
absorption as Assistant Teacher could be justified/made. He defended the
order of absorption dated 02.01.1998 and also contended that the authorities
were justified in passing the order of 28.12.1998 denying continuity of
service for the period before 02.01.1998, since there was a clear distinction
between the judgment of this Court in the case of Smt. Jayasree Deb Roy
(Dutta) and others in the case of the appellant.
      25. Drawing attention to the orders of this Court in the case of Smt.
Jayashree Deb Roy (Dutta) vs. Union of India and Ors. (C.A. No. 9424 of
1995) arising out of O.A. No. 149(G) of 1989, learned counsel contends that
in the case of Smt. Jayasree Deb Roy (Dutta) (supra), there was a specific
finding that the appellants in that case were entitled to continuity of service
264          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 12 S.C.R.


in accordance with para 5.1 of the Master Circular dated 29.01.1991 in the
event the Screening Committee found them fit for absorption.
      26. Contrasting this with the judgment of this Court in the appellant’s
case, learned counsel would contend that no such direction for granting
continuity of service in the event of absorption was given in the appellant’s
case.
      27. Learned counsel would contend that even factually the case of
the appellant was different from the case of Smt. Jayasree Deb Roy (Dutta)
inasmuch as Smt. Jayasree Deb Roy (Dutta) was in service on the date of
absorption, while the appellant was not. This submission is seriously disputed
by Ms. Uttara Babbar. Nothing much however turns on this last submission
of the counsel for the respondents.
      Reasons and Conclusion:
      28. We have considered the rival contentions and perused the records.
     Claim for absorption as Assistant Teacher – Higher Secondary
Section:
      29. We are of the view that the appellant’s claim for absorption as
Assistant Teacher in the Higher Secondary Section in the pay-scale of
Rs.5500-9000 is not tenable. The appellant was appointed as a substitute
teacher in the pay-scale of a primary teacher. In fact, when he filed the first
round of proceedings in O.A. No. 209 of 1991, no plea was raised that he
worked as an Assistant Teacher in the Higher Secondary Section. Even when
he obtained interim orders from the Tribunal on 03.12.1990, it was only
to the effect that the services of the appellant should not be dispensed with
without the leave of the Court. Even before the Tribunal, the argument was
only about regularization. Before this Court too, no claim for regularization
as Assistant Teacher in the Higher Secondary Section was made.
      30. The contention now raised in the present round of proceedings
(O.A. No. 978 of 1998) for absorption as Assistant Teacher in the Higher
Secondary Section is strongly refuted by the respondents by pointing out
that his engagement as a substitute teacher was only in the pay-scale of
Rs.1200-2040 which was the scale for the primary teacher. They contend that
his claim that he was allowed to take classes for XI and XII is unfounded.
           SAMIR KUMAR MAJUMDER v.                                        265
  THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS.[K.V.VISWANATHAN, J.]

No doubt, the Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta Bench has recorded
that the applicant had functioned as a mathematics teacher for Class XI and
XII as a stop-gap measure.
      31. This issue, however, need not detain the Court any longer as at
no point in the first round of proceedings, the appellant made such a claim;
the Screening Committee having considered him, pursuant to the orders of
this Court, has thought it fit to absorb him only as a primary teacher; the
Screening Committee itself was pursuant to the orders of this Court and based
on the Master Circular of 29.01.1991 wherein the claims of the candidates
like the appellant were examined; the records of his appointment as a
substitute teacher admittedly show that he was only appointed as a substitute
primary teacher; it is on the completion of three months as substitute primary
teacher that he acquired temporary status and on absorption now he became
entitled to certain benefits under the Circular which we have elaborated
herein above.
      32. In the earlier round of proceedings culminating in the order of this
Court dated 15.02.1996, this issue was never raised. His claim for absorption
as an assistant teacher in the Higher Secondary Section is clearly barred by
constructive res judicata.
     Law on Constructive Res Judicata:
     33. Almost two centuries ago, in Henderson vs. Henderson, (1843)
3 Hare, 100, the Vice-Chancellor Sir James Wigram felicitously puts the
principle thus:-
     “In trying this question I believe I state the rule of the Court correctly
     when I say that, where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation
     in, and of adjudication by, a Court of competent jurisdiction, the Court
     requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case,
     and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same
     parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which
     might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest,
     but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from
     negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case.
     The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to
     points upon which the Court was actually required by the parties to
266          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2023] 12 S.C.R.


      form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which
      properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties,
      exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the
      time. ….”
      34. This principle popularly known as the doctrine of constructive
res judicata, based on the might and ought theory, has been recognized by
this Court in several judgments. In Maharashtra Vikrikar Karamchari
Sangathan vs. State of Maharashtra and Another, (2000) 2 SCC 552, this
Court held as under:-
      “22. It was then contended on behalf of the appellants that neither
      the Recruitment Rules of 1971 nor the Seniority Rules of 1982
      provided for carrying forward the vacancies falling in either
      category. In the absence of such rules which specifically provide for
      carrying forward the vacancies falling in either category, no such
      carry-forward rule could be implied either in the Recruitment Rules
      or in the Seniority Rules. This contention need not detain us any
      longer because such a contention was available to the appellants in
      the earlier proceedings, namely, Transfer Application No. 822 of
      1991 and the same was not put in issue. That not having been done,
      it must follow that such a contention is barred by the principles
      of constructive res judicata. Neither the contesting respondents
      nor the appellants ever raised this contention at any stage of
      the proceedings in Transfer Petition No. 822 of 1991. It would,
      therefore, be too late to raise such a contention when the seniority
      list has been finalized pursuant to the judgment of MAT, Bombay
      Bench in Transfer Petition No. 822 of 1991.”
      Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium:
      35. The doctrine itself is based on public policy flowing from the age-
old legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium which means that in
the interest of the State there should be an end to litigation and no party
ought to be vexed twice in a litigation for one and the same cause (See
M. Nagabhushana vs. State of Karnataka and Others, (2011) 3 SCC 408.
      36. The contention raised on behalf of the appellant that he should at
least be paid the salary and allowances as paid to the Assistant Teachers in
           SAMIR KUMAR MAJUMDER v.                                      267
  THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS.[K.V.VISWANATHAN, J.]

the Higher Secondary Section for the time he functioned should also fail
for the reason as set out herein above.
     Claim for continuity of service:
      37. The appellant however cannot be denied continuity of service
under the Master Circular dated 29.01.1991 read with the orders of this
Court in Smt. Jayasree Deb Roy (Dutta) (supra) [C.A. No. 9424 of 1995]
and the order in the appellant’s own case i.e. C.A. No. 3557 of 1996 dated
15.02.1996. This is a fresh cause of action, which has arisen in view of
his absorption on 02.01.1998, subsequent to the culmination of the earlier
round of proceedings.
      38. The conduct of the authorities themselves in subjecting the
appellant to screening before the Screening Committee, like they did for
Smt. Jayasree Deb Roy (Dutta) and Others, also clearly indicates that
even they wanted to treat the appellant’s case on par with the case of Smt.
Jayasree Deb Roy (Dutta) and Others. It is on that basis that the appellant
was found fit for absorption as a primary teacher and he was so absorbed.
The only reason given in the order denying continuity for the appellant
while granting continuity of the same for the others is that, in the case
of the appellant, this Court had not directed any specific order regarding
continuity of service.
     Rights under the Master Circular:
     39. The appellant’s right first of all flows from the Master Circular
dated 29.01.1991, as has been rightly contended by learned counsel for
the appellant. For the sake of convenience, we extract herein below the
relevant clauses:-
     “4. BENEFITS.
     4.1. Substitutes engaged should be paid regular scales of pay and
     allowances admissible to the post against which they have been
     appointed irrespective of the nature of duration of the vacancy.
     4.2. They be allowed all the rights and privileges as are admissible to
     temporary railway employees on completion of four months continuous
     Service.
268             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 12 S.C.R.


      4.3. Substitute school teacher may, however, be afforded temporary
      status after they have put in continuous service of three months. Their
      service to be treated as continuous for all purposes except seniority on
      their eventual absorption against regular posts after selection.
      4.4 The conferment of temporary status after completion of four months
      continuous service in the case of others and three months continuous
      service in the case of substitute teachers mentioned in paras - 4.2 and
      3 above does not entitle them to automatics absorption/ appointment
      to Railway service unless they are selected in the approved manner
      for appointment or absorption to regular posts.
      4.5 Service of substitutes will count for Pensionary benefits from the
      date of completion of four months (3 months in the case of teachers)
      continuous service provided it is followed by absorption in regular
      Group-C’ (Class lll)/Group-’D’ (Class -IV) Service without break.”
      ... ...
      “5. Screening of the substitutes for their absorption in regular service:-
      5.1 Substitutes, who have acquired temporary status should be screened
      by screening Committees and not by Selection Boards, Constituted for
      this purpose be-fore being absorbed in regular Group -’C’ (Class-Ill)
      and Group-’D’ (Class-IV) posts.
           Such a screening Committee should consist of at least three
      members, one of whom should belong to the SC/ST Communities and
      another to minority communities.”
      … ...
      5. 11 Gaps which may occur in service of substitutes between two
      engagements should be ignored for the purpose of temporary status
      on completion of four months services and in case of teachers, on
      completion of 3 months service.”
      ……
      “6. Date of appointment.
      The date of appointment of a substitute to be recorded in the service
      book against the column “date of appointment” should be the date
           SAMIR KUMAR MAJUMDER v.                                         269
  THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS.[K.V.VISWANATHAN, J.]

     on which he /she attains temporary status after continuous service
     of four months if the same is followed by his/her regular absorption.
     Otherwise, it should be the date on which he/she is regularly appointed/
     absorbed.
     This applies to substitute teachers also who attain the temporary status
     after a continuous service of three months only.”
      40. A reading of the above clearly shows that on completion of three
months of continuous service as substitute teacher, the incumbent acquires
temporary status. It is also clear that substitutes who have acquired temporary
status should be screened by the Screening Committee and not by Selection
Board. It is also clear that under Clause 5.11, gaps which may occur in service
of substitutes between two engagements should be ignored for the purpose
of temporary status on completion of four months service and in case of
teachers, on completion of three months service. Further, it is clear that the
date of appointment should be the date on which they attained temporary
status in the event they are regularly absorbed. As is clear from the dates
mentioned hereinbelow that the appellant having acquired temporary status
on 04.03.1990 is entitled to count his service from 04.03.1990 in view of
his absorption in the service as a primary teacher on 02.01.1998.
      41. The authorities are wrong in stating that in the case of the appellant
this Court had not directed any specific order regarding continuity of
service. This Court’s order of 15.02.1996 has to be read with the order in
the case of Smt. Jayasree Deb Roy (Dutta) dated 13.10.1995. Nowhere in
the order of this Court in the appellant’s appeal had the benefits available
to the appellant under the Master Circular been taken away. In the case of
Smt. Jayasree Deb Roy (Dutta), by abundant caution, the Master Circular
was referred to and the rights granted therein were reiterated expressly in
this Court’s order. On the facts of the present case, we are not persuaded
to accept the contention of the respondent that the order of this Court in
the appellant’s case should be so read as having denied him the benefits of
Master Circular dated 29.01.1991.
      42. The appellant being identically situated with the other absorbees
in the order of 02.01.1998 could not have been discriminated and denied
the benefit of his service from 04.03.1990 to the date of his absorption.
270            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2023] 12 S.C.R.


      43. The Tribunal and the High Court have grossly erred in denying
the relief by wrongly understanding the orders of this Court and the legal
position.
      44. We direct that the appellant will be entitled to take into account the
past service rendered by him as substitute teacher in different spells, from
the date of obtaining temporary status (04.03.1990). The appellant should
be extended the same benefits as were extended to others, who were granted
continuity by the letter of 28.12.1998.
      45. The appellant has superannuated now. The pay of the appellant
shall be re-fixed after granting continuity of service with all consequential
benefits in accordance with Clause 6 of the Master Circular dated 29.01.1991.
All the necessary increments and allowances due on that basis also should
be granted. The retrial benefits also should be consequently reworked. The
unpaid arrears amount be paid to the appellant with six percent interest from
the respective dates the various amounts fell due. Let the payment be made
within eight weeks from today.
      46. Accordingly, the impugned order of the High Court dated
19.07.2011 passed in W.P.C.T. No. 130 of 2009 is set aside. The Appeal is
partly allowed in the above terms. There shall be no order as to costs.


Headnotes prepared by:                                      Appeal partly allowed.
Ankit Gyan