SAMARPAN VARISHTHA JAN PARISAR & ORS.versusRAJENDRA PRASAD AGARWAL & ORS.

                        [2022] 3 S.C.R. 625                              625


       SAMARPAN VARISHTHA JAN PARISAR & ORS.                             A
                                  v.
            RAJENDRA PRASAD AGARWAL & ORS.
                   (Civil Appeal No. 3520 of 2022)
                           MAY 06, 2022                                  B
  [HEMANT GUPTA AND V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]
      Easement Act, 1882: s. 52 – License under – Revocation of –
Inmates of the old age home – Legal status of – Held: Possession of
inmates in a room of an old age home is that of a licensee permitted
to enjoy possession, without creating any interest in the property –     C
Inmates have a legal right to stay in the room of the old age home
only so long as they comply with the terms and conditions of such
license – They are expected to maintain a minimum level of discipline
and good behaviour and not to cause disturbance to the fellow
inmates who are also senior citizens – On facts, behavior of
respondent-inmates not conducive to fellow inmates and staff, thus,      D
asked to vacate the room – As a licensee, the inmates cannot seek
an injunction to stay in the old age home as their possession is not
a legal possession but only a permissive possession – Thus, the
injunction granted by the High Court suffers from patent illegality.
       Supreme Court-Directions: Inmates in old age home –               E
Unfortunate situation that the parents cannot be taken care of by
their children and are abandoned to stay in old age homes –
Municipal Corporation or the Social Welfare Department to examine
the living conditions of the inmates in the old age home and provide
them as comfortable conditions as are possible at that age –
                                                                         F
Directions to State and District Legal Services Authority to visit the
old age home to find out the difficulties being faced by the inmates
and to take redressal steps.
      Allowing the appeal, the Court
      HELD: 1.1 Law recognizes three types of possession. One            G
as that of an owner, including co-owners; second as a tenant, when
a right is created in the property; and thirdly permissive
possession, the possession which otherwise would be illegal or
that of as a trespasser. In the instant appeal, the concern is with
the possession falling in third category. [Para 12][630-E-F]
                                                                         H
                                 625
626            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A            1.2 Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 - plaintiffs were permitted to
      stay in the old age home subject to certain payments to meet the
      necessary expenses of food and minor medical care. The
      possession of the respondent nos. 1 and 2 in a room of an old age
      home is that of a licensee permitted to enjoy the possession, but
      without creating any interest in the property. The appellants found
B
      the behavior of respondent nos. 1 and 2 not conducive to the
      fellow inmates and the staff of the old age home. This Court will
      not exercise a judicial review about the opinion of the appellants.
      On the legal issue, respondent Nos. 1 and 2, as licensees have a
      legal right to stay in the room of the old age home only so long as
C     they comply with the terms and conditions of such license. Since
      respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had no legal right to protect their
      possession without complying with the corresponding obligations,
      as their possession is not a legal possession but only a permissive
      possession, they cannot seek any injunction to restrain the
      management of the old age home not to dispossess them. [Para
D
      23][635-G-H; 636-A-C]
             1.3 It is an unfortunate situation when the parents cannot
      be taken care of by the children, but the fact remains that
      abandonment of parents by their children is now a hard fact of
      life. Parents do find it difficult to reconcile the situation that at
E     that age they have to stay in old age home. Therefore, one can
      understand the mental trauma which the parents face in the
      evening of their life but the agony suffered by a parent cannot be
      a cause of disturbance to the other inmates or to the organizers
      who have resolved to take care and run the old age home. The
F     inmates in the old age home are licensees and are expected to
      maintain a minimum level of discipline and good behaviour and
      not to cause disturbance to the fellow inmates who are also senior
      citizens. Therefore, if one parent is the cause of disruption of
      peace of other inmates in the old age home, the administration of
      the old age home is at liberty to terminate the license and ask
G     the inmate to vacate the room allotted to them. Even if the
      organizers of the old age home are not able to meet the
      expectation or requirements of the plaintiffs, that would not confer
      a cause to the plaintiffs to disturb the other inmates. As a licensee,
      the plaintiffs have no right to stay in the accommodation allotted
H     which is purely an approach to a human problem faced by the
      SAMARPAN VARISHTHA JAN PARISAR & ORS. v.                         627
         RAJENDRA PRASAD AGARWAL & ORS.

people in old age. The plaintiffs have even been offered alternative   A
accommodation as well. [Para 24][636-C-F]
      1.4 As a licensee, the plaintiffs cannot seek an injunction
to stay in the old age home unless they allow other inmates, a
peaceful co-existence. Therefore, the injunction granted by the
High Court suffers from patent illegality and is not warranted in      B
law. The appellant would arrange an alternative old age home for
respondent nos. 1 and 2, as one offered by the Social Welfare
Department. [Para 25, 26][636-G-H]
      Associated Hotels of India v. R.N. Kapoor AIR 1959
      SC 1262 : [1960] SCR 368; Sohan Lal Naraindas v.                 C
      Laxmidas Raghunath Gadit (1971) 1 SCC 276;
      Maganlal Radia v. State of Maharashtra 1971 Mh.L.J.
      57; Conrad Dias of Bombay v. Joseph Dias of Bombay
      1994 SCC OnLine Bom 528; Hyderabad Metropolitan
      Development Authority (HMDA) & Ors. v. M/s. Hotel
      Malligi Pvt. Ltd. 2017 SCC OnLine Hyd 1; General                 D
      Merchant Association rep. by Secretary and Treasurer
      & Ors. v. The Corporation of Chennai, rep. by its
      Commissioner, Chennai 1998 SCC OnLine Mad 848;
      Rame Gowda (Dead) by LRs. v. M. Varadappa Naidu
      (Dead) by LRs. & Anr. (2004) 1 SCC 769 : [2003] 6                E
      Suppl. SCR 850; Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes
      & Ors. v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira (Dead) through Lrs.
      (2012) 5 SCC 370 : [2012] 3 SCR 841; Behram Tejani
      & Ors. v. Azeem Jagani (2017) 2 SCC 759 : [2017] 1
      SCR 132.
                                                                       F
                      Case Law Reference
[1960] SCR 368                   referred to         Para 12
(1971) 1 SCC 276                 referred to         Para 13
[2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 850          referred to         Para 19
                                                                       G
[2012] 3 SCR 841                 referred to         Para 20
[2017] 1 SCR 132                 referred to         Para 22


                                                                       H
628             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A           CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3520
      of 2022.
             From the Judgment and Order dated 01.10.2021 of the High Court
      of Allahabad, Lucknow Bench at Lucknow in Misc. Single No. 20786 of
      2020.
B           Manoj Swarup, Sr. Adv., Shakti Kanta Pattanaik, Santosh Kumar,
      Rohit Verma, Navin Kumar, Rajiv Nayak, Advs. for the Appellants.
           Mukesh Verma, Pankaj K. Singh, Shashank Singh, Adarsh
      Upadhyay, Amit Singh, Praujal Sharma, Advs. for the Respondents.

C           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            HEMANT GUPTA, J.
             1. The challenge in the present appeal is to an order passed by the
      High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dated 01.10.2021 whereby the
      revision petition filed by the plaintiffs-respondents was allowed and interim
D     injunction was restored, as was granted by the learned Trial Court.
             2. The Municipal Corporation, Lucknow has constructed an old
      age home named Samarpan at Adil Nagar, Ring Road, Lucknow. In
      terms of the advertisement published on 05.12.2004, the appellant was
      granted lease for running such old age home initially for 15 years from
E     01.09.2005, but with a condition of renewal for a further period of 15
      years. One of the conditions in the lease was that an Advisory Board
      shall be constituted by the lessee i.e., the appellant. The appellant framed
      rules and regulations for grant of services at the old age home. Such
      rules and regulations contemplated that the cooperation fund deposited
      by the inmates shall be used for accommodation, food, bed and other
F
      essential services of living and general treatment but expensive medical
      treatment and expenditure was to be borne by the inmates themselves.
      It also provided that if any rules of the complex are violated by any
      inmate, the Administration has got full right to expel him and dismiss his
      membership by issuing him one month period’s notice. The relevant clause
G     reads thus:
            “21. If the Rules of the Complex are violated by any inmate person,
            the Administration has got full right to expel him and dismiss his
            membership by issuing him one month period’s advance notice.
            The Management reserves its right to do so.”
H
    SAMARPAN VARISHTHA JAN PARISAR v. RAJENDRA                                   629
        PRASAD AGARWAL [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

       3. It was on 23.04.2016, the plaintiffs-respondents filled up an          A
admission form to stay in the old age home giving the details about his
four children, one son and three daughters. Two of the daughters stay at
Lucknow and one son and one daughter are staying in Faizabad. The
plaintiffs had also executed affidavits to comply with the rules and
regulations as mentioned above.
                                                                                 B
       4. There is a dispute as to whether the plaintiff no.2 is a psychiatric
patient and misbehaves with the other inmates and staff, but without
going into that fact, the question required to be answered is that what is
the right of the inhabitant of an old age home to stay in such old age
home.
                                                                                 C
       5. It is stated that in terms of the conditions of the lease, the
Committee held its meeting on 26.10.2019. In the said meeting, the stand
of the plaintiffs was that if the administration has received any complaint
against them, then they may be pardoned and they ensured that no such
complaint would be received in the future. It was pointed that in difficult
time of old age, the approach of the appellant should be compassionate           D
with due generosity. It was decided by the Committee to allow one
month’s more time to the plaintiffs so as to observe their behaviour. If no
reforms were visible then, they would be told to leave the premises in
terms of Rule 21.
       6. Since no behavioral change was visible, the appellant cancelled        E
the membership of the plaintiffs on 22.11.2019. It is thereafter, the
plaintiffs filed a suit for injunction before the Civil Court, accompanied
by an application for ad-interim injunction. On such application for interim
injunction, the trial Court passed an order on 17.12.2019 that the plaintiffs
should not be dispossessed during the pendency of the suit. However, in          F
appeal, such order was vacated by the Court of Additional District Judge,
Lucknow, on 20.10.2020. In further revision preferred by the plaintiffs,
the order was set aside.
      7. The plaintiffs have filed a counter affidavit before this Court,
inter alia demanding an inquiry into the financial irregularities,               G
embezzlement, internal mis-management of old age home and their
miseries, extortion and torture. It is the stand of the plaintiffs-respondents
that they acted as a whistle blower to highlight the financial
misappropriations, misdeeds and inhumane attitude. The complaint was
made regarding quality of food, facilities or medical treatment, misuse of
donated vehicles etc.                                                            H
630               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A            8. In a separate affidavit filed by Shri Sunil Kumar Sharma, ACP
      Gazipur, it is stated that the plaintiffs are old-aged parents who have
      been abandoned by their own children. There are 24 other inmates but
      no such complaint has been made by them in the police station. It was
      also mentioned therein that as against security of Rs.25,000/-, the
      appellant has sought the deposit of Rs.75,000/-. It may be stated that
B
      Station House Officer was not a party to this suit but was impleaded by
      the plaintiffs before the High Court in the revision petition under Article
      227 of the Constitution.
             9. In a rejoinder affidavit filed by the appellant, the assertions
      made by Shri Sharma have been denied. It has been pointed out that two
C     daughters Shikha Agarwal and Ruchika Agarwal visit their parents and
      have given affidavits that they will act as guardian of their parents and
      will take care of their medical needs. It is also pointed that Shri Harpal
      Singh, the Supervisor of the District Social Welfare Department visited
      the old age home on 08.11.2020 and offered an alternative old age home
D     of Social Welfare Department free of cost to the plaintiffs.
             10. The learned counsel appearing for Municipal Corporation and
      the State submitted that they have nothing to add in the present appeal.
             11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and find that
      the issue required to be examined herein is that what is the status of the
E     inmates in the old age home, are they licensee and/or they have a right
      to stay in the old age home for the lifetime as a matter of right.
             12. Law recognizes three types of possession. One as that of an
      owner, including co-owners; second as a tenant, when a right is created
      in the property; and thirdly permissive possession, the possession which
F     otherwise would be illegal or that of as a trespasser. In the present
      appeal, we are concerned with the possession falling in third category.
      This Court in a judgment reported as Associated Hotels of India v.
      R.N. Kapoor1 has held that in case of a licensee, the legal possession
      continues with the owner as in terms of Section 52 of the Indian
G     Easements Act, 1882, grant of a mere right to do upon the property of
      another, something which would in the absence of such right be unlawful.
      Thus, this is the essential characteristic which distinguishes a license
      from a lease.

      1
H         AIR 1959 SC 1262
    SAMARPAN VARISHTHA JAN PARISAR v. RAJENDRA                                631
        PRASAD AGARWAL [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

       13. In Sohan Lal Naraindas v. Laxmidas Raghunath Gadit2,               A
it has been held that a lease creates an interest in the property whereas
a license creates no estate or interest in the immovable property of the
grantor. It was held as under:
      “8. A licence confers a right to do or continue to do something in
      or upon immovable property of grantor which but for the grant of        B
      the right may be unlawful, but it creates no estate or interest in
      the immovable property of the grantor. A lease on the other hand
      creates an interest in the property demised.”
       14. In Maganlal Radia v. State of Maharashtra3, a lessee filed
a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for the writ of Certiorari   C
to quash and set aside the orders passed by the Collector, Bombay calling
him to vacate a plot situated on the Chowpatty Foreshore. One of the
questions examined was whether the petitioner had a right to continue in
possession for as long as possible. It was held as under:
      “1. …As a matter of substantive law, therefore, the petitioner          D
      has no colour of right to remain in possession of the suit premises
      and has no answer to the respondents’ claim that he should vacate
      the land in question, and the present petition appears to have been
      filed merely for the purpose of gaining time and remaining in
      possession as long as possible.”
                                                                              E
       15. The High Court declined to entertain the petition on the ground
that the petitioner was merely a licencee. It was held that the injustice
that would have been caused if the present petition was entertained
would be greater in view of the fact that the licence was for a purely
temporary purpose.
                                                                              F
       16. In a later judgment reported as Conrad Dias of Bombay v.
Joseph Dias of Bombay4, the father filed a suit against his son for
injunction restraining the defendant from entering or remaining in the
suit premises. It was held that the son who is residing with the parents in
the house cannot claim any legal character much less, the character of
a licensee as defined in Section 52 of the Easements Act. He is residing      G
simpliciter as a member of the family and nothing more and nothing less.
It was also held that the son has not claimed either tenancy or a licence
2
  (1971) 1 SCC 276
3
  1971 Mh.L.J. 57
4
  1994 SCC OnLine Bom 528                                                     H
632               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A     and, thus, he has no legal character or status, except staying in the house
      as a member of the family. In view of the findings recorded, the appeal
      preferred by the son was dismissed.
              17. In Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority
      (HMDA) & Ors. v. M/s. Hotel Malligi Pvt. Ltd.5, the respondent was
B     granted a licence by the appellant over the land admeasuring 2500 square
      meters. The Court reiterated the principle that unlike a lessee, the legal
      incidence of a licence, in normal parlance, is that the licensee has no
      right to possession of the demised property as the legal possession always
      remains with the licensor. Thus, it was held as under:
C              “26. The concept of a licence, being wholly different from that of
               a lease, it is not open to the licensee to assert any leasehold rights
               over the licensed premises after expiry of the licence period and
               seek to prolong its occupation thereof. Its status upon expiry of
               the licence period is that of a trespasser. In any event, even if the
               licensee is in a position to establish that it was lawfully deprived
D              of the benefits of the licence during its subsistence, the only relief
               that it can seek is in the form of compensation/damages. There is
               no legal and tenable basis for a licensee to assert a right to continue
               in occupation of the licensed premises after expiry of the licence
               period. The Court below seems to have been unmindful of the
E              distinction between a licence and a lease, as is clear from the
               order dated 29.09.2016 passed in Arbitration O.P. No. 2229 of
               2016, where it used the terms licence and lease interchangeably.”
             18. The Division Bench of Madras High Court in a judgment
      reported as General Merchant Association rep. by Secretary and
F     Treasurer & Ors. v. The Corporation of Chennai, rep. by its
      Commissioner, Chennai6 held that appellants were allottees of a shop
      in the Corporation Fruit Market. The shopkeepers challenged the action
      of the Corporation terminating their licence and calling upon the licencees
      to vacate and surrender possession of the respective shops in their
      occupation. It was held, while dismissing the writ petitions, as under:
G
               “24. The entire case law on the subject revolves around the cardinal
               touch stone at which the relationship between the parties who
               claim to be licensors or licensees or lessors or lessees has to be

      5
          2017 SCC OnLine Hyd 1
H     6
          1998 SCC OnLine Mad 848
       SAMARPAN VARISHTHA JAN PARISAR v. RAJENDRA                                    633
           PRASAD AGARWAL [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

         decided is whether the grant creates an interest or estate in the           A
         property within the subject matter of the agreement. Delivery of
         exclusive possession, as has been held would not be conclusive to
         hold that the grant is a lease. The surrounding circumstances and
         the conduct of the parties as in the present case show that no
         interest in the property have not been created at any point of time
                                                                                     B
         in favour of the writ petitioners/licensees of the Municipal
         Corporation stalls and the claims of the petitioners that they are
         lessees is far-fetched and cannot be sustained.
                       xx             xx                 xx
         26. It is also equally well settled the position of a licensee after        C
         termination becomes unlawful and the licensee is not entitled to
         any injunction restraining the licensor from evicting him as unlike
         a tenant a licensee does not have judicial possession and the
         possession always remains with the licensor and what was granted
         is a privilege in terms of the licence, which in the absence of such
         a grant becomes unlawful.                                                   D

         27. The occupation of the writ petitioners with respect to the stalls/
         shops in public market is referable to the licence originally granted
         as their status is that of a licensee. Once such a licence is terminated,
         the possession of the stalls become unlawful as they have no right
         and the possession of such possession after termination is not              E
         protected by any statutory provision. In terms of Section 63 of the
         Easements Act 1982, where licence is revoked the licensee is
         entitled to reasonable time to leave the property for removing all
         his goods which he has been allowed to place. A person continuing
         in the premises after the termination of licence, his status is as          F
         already pointed out is unlawful and he has no semblance of any
         right to continue in the premises.”
       19. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in a judgment reported as
Rame Gowda (Dead) by LRs. v. M. Varadappa Naidu (Dead) by
LRs. & Anr.7 was considering the question of ad-interim injunction. It               G
was held that the person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his
possession and in order to protect such possession, he may even use
reasonable force to keep out a trespasser. It was further held that it is
the settled possession or effective possession of a person without title
7
    (2004) 1 SCC 769                                                                 H
634                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A     which would entitle him to protect his possession even as against the
      true owner. It was held as under:
               “9. …The “settled possession” must be (i) effective, (ii)
               undisturbed, and (iii) to the knowledge of the owner or without
               any attempt at concealment by the trespasser. The phrase “settled
B              possession” does not carry any special charm or magic in it; nor
               is it a ritualistic formula which can be confined in a straitjacket.
               An occupation of the property by a person as an agent or a servant
               acting at the instance of the owner will not amount to actual
               physical possession.”
C           20. Another three-Judge Bench in a judgment reported as Maria
      Margarida Sequeira Fernandes & Ors. v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira
      (Dead) through LRs8 was examining the question of injunction between
      the plaintiff – brother, who was given the property in question as a
      caretaker, the owner being sister of the plaintiff. An argument was raised
      before this Court that the possession of a caretaker can never be a
D     possession in one’s right and no suit for injunction under Section 6 of the
      Specific Relief Act was maintainable. It was held as under:
               “83. Grant or refusal of an injunction in a civil suit is the most
               important stage in the civil trial. Due care, caution, diligence and
               attention must be bestowed by the judicial officers and Judges
E              while granting or refusing injunction. In most cases, the fate of
               the case is decided by grant or refusal of an injunction. Experience
               has shown that once an injunction is granted, getting it vacated
               would become a nightmare for the defendant.
                             xx           xx                xx
F
               97. Principles of law which emerge in this case are crystallised as
               under:
               (1) No one acquires title to the property if he or she was allowed
               to stay in the premises gratuitously. Even by long possession of
               years or decades such person would not acquire any right or interest
G
               in the said property.
               (2) Caretaker, watchman or servant can never acquire interest in
               the property irrespective of his long possession. The caretaker or
               servant has to give possession forthwith on demand.
      8
H         (2012) 5 SCC 370
       SAMARPAN VARISHTHA JAN PARISAR v. RAJENDRA                                635
           PRASAD AGARWAL [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

         (3) The courts are not justified in protecting the possession of a      A
         caretaker, servant or any person who was allowed to live in the
         premises for some time either as a friend, relative, caretaker or
         as a servant.
         (4) The protection of the court can only be granted or extended to
         the person who has valid, subsisting rent agreement, lease              B
         agreement or licence agreement in his favour.
         (5) The caretaker or agent holds property of the principal only on
         behalf of the principal. He acquires no right or interest whatsoever
         for himself in such property irrespective of his long stay or
         possession.”                                                            C
       21. In view of such finding, the appeal was allowed and possession
of the suit premises was directed to be handed over to the appellant, the
owner.
       22. In another judgment reported as Behram Tejani & Ors. v.
Azeem Jagani9, the respondent in appeal filed a suit claiming injunction,        D
restraining the defendants from dispossession of the plaintiff from the
suit premises. This Court held as under:
         “14. Thus, a person holding the premises gratuitously or in the
         capacity as a caretaker or a servant would not acquire any right
         or interest in the property and even long possession in that capacity   E
         would be of no legal consequences. In the circumstances, the
         City Civil Court was right and justified in rejecting the prayer for
         interim injunction and that decision ought not to have been set
         aside by the High Court. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside
         the judgment under appeal and restore the order dated 29-4-2013         F
         passed by the Bombay City Civil Court in Notice of Motion No.
         344 of 2013 in Suit No. 408 of 2013.”
      23. Now, adverting to the facts of the present appeal, the
Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 – plaintiffs were permitted to stay in the old
age home subject to certain payments to meet the necessary expenses
                                                                                 G
of food and minor medical care. The possession of the respondent nos.
1 and 2 in a room of an old age home is that of a licensee permitted to
enjoy the possession, but without creating any interest in the property.
The appellants found the behavior of respondent nos. 1 and 2 not
9
    (2017) 2 SCC 759                                                             H
636             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A     conducive to the fellow inmates and the staff of the old age home. This
      Court will not exercise a judicial review about the opinion of the appellants.
      On the legal issue, respondent Nos. 1 and 2, as licensees have a legal
      right to stay in the room of the old age home only so long as they comply
      with the terms and conditions of such license. Since respondent Nos. 1
      and 2 had no legal right to protect their possession without complying
B
      with the corresponding obligations, as their possession is not a legal
      possession but only a permissive possession, they cannot seek any
      injunction to restrain the management of the old age home not to
      dispossess them.
              24. It is an unfortunate situation when the parents cannot be taken
C     care of by the children, but the fact remains that abandonment of parents
      by their children is now a hard fact of life. Parents do find it difficult to
      reconcile the situation that at that age they have to stay in old age home.
      Therefore, one can understand the mental trauma which the parents
      face in the evening of their life but the agony suffered by a parent cannot
D     be a cause of disturbance to the other inmates or to the organizers who
      have resolved to take care and run the old age home. The inmates in the
      old age home are licensees and are expected to maintain a minimum
      level of discipline and good behaviour and not to cause disturbance to
      the fellow inmates who are also senior citizens. Therefore, if one parent
      is the cause of disruption of peace of other inmates in the old age home,
E     the administration of the old age home is at liberty to terminate the license
      and ask the inmate to vacate the room allotted to them. Even if the
      organizers of the old age home are not able to meet the expectation or
      requirements of the plaintiffs, that would not confer a cause to the
      plaintiffs to disturb the other inmates. As a licensee, the plaintiffs have
F     no right to stay in the accommodation allotted which is purely an approach
      to a human problem faced by the people in old age. The plaintiffs have
      even been offered alternative accommodation as well.
             25. As a licensee, the plaintiffs cannot seek an injunction to stay
      in the old age home unless they allow other inmates, a peaceful co-
G     existence. Therefore, we find that the injunction granted by the High
      Court suffers from patent illegality. Therefore, the injunction granted by
      the High Court is not warranted in law.
           26. The appellant shall arrange an alternative old age home for
      respondent nos. 1 and 2, as one offered by the Social Welfare
H     Department.
    SAMARPAN VARISHTHA JAN PARISAR v. RAJENDRA                                  637
        PRASAD AGARWAL [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

      27. However, we observe that it is open to the Municipal                  A
Corporation or the Social Welfare Department to examine the living
conditions of the inmates in the old age home so that the inmates live in
as comfortable conditions as are possible at that age.
       28. We also direct the Uttar Pradesh State Legal Services Authority
to depute a para-legal volunteer to visit the old age home on such intervals    B
as is possible and the Member Secretary of the District Legal Services
Authority to visit the old age home at least once a month initially to find
out the difficulties being faced by the inmates and to take redressal
steps, including to provide legal aid if required by the inmates of the old
age home.
                                                                                C
       29. With the aforesaid directions and liberty, the present appeal is
allowed and ad-interim injunction sought by the plaintiffs–respondents
stand dismissed.

Nidhi Jain                                                    Appeal allowed.   D
(Assisted by : Shashwat Jain, LCRA)




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                                                                                G




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