SALKIA BUSINESSMEN'S ASSOCIATION AND ORS.versusHOWRAH MUNICIPAL CORPROATION AND ORS.

A             SALKIA BUSINESSMEN'S ASSOCIATION AND ORS.
                                           v.
               HOWRAH MUNICIPAL CORPROATION AND ORS.

                                 AUGUST 8, 2001

B            [S. RAJENDRA BABU AND DORAJSWAMY RAJU, JJ.]


          Constitution of India, 1950:

          Article 226-Writ petition-Disposal of-In terms of compromise-Terms
C   of compromise part and parcel of order-However, authorities failed to comply
    with its terms-Subsequent writ petition dismissed on the ground that the
    terms were matters of contract between the parties for which compensation
    was the remedy-Correctness of-Held: Courts are bound to honour and
    implement their own orders-Otherwise rule of law becomes a casualty-As
D   long as the earlier order stood, it is not permissible to go behind the same to
    ascertain its substance or nature ofcompliance-Hence, High Court not justified
    in dismissing the writ petition-Practice and Procedure.

          The appellant-Association apprehending displacement of the places of
    their business for construction of a Hy-over, filed a writ petition before the
E    High Court ·against the respondent-Corporation. The writ petition was
    disposed of in terms of a compromise, which became part and parcel of the
    order of the Court. However, the respondents did not comply with the terms
    of the order. Aggrieved, the appellant filed another writ petition before the
    High Court. Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the
    terms of the compromise were of the shape of a contract between the parties
F   for which the remedy was compensation - which remedy could not be available
    in writ jurisdiction. Division Bench of the High Court also rejected the
    appellant's claim. Hence this appeal.

         The following question arose before this Court:-

G         What is the efficacy of an order passed by the Court in terms of the
    memorandum of compromise or an agreement filed in a proceeding on the
    basis of which the Court proceedings came to be finally disposed of!

         Allowing the appeal, the Court
H                                        374
    SALKJA BUSINESSMEN'S ASSN. v. HOWRAH MUNICIPALCORPN. [RAJU, J.J 375

           HELD: t. If courts are not to honour and implement their own orders,          A
    and encourage party litigants-be they public authorities, to invent methods


-   of their own to short circuit and give a go-bye to the obligations and liabilities
    incurred by them under orders of the court-the rule of law will certainly
    become a casualty in the process-a costly consequence to be zealously averted
    by all and at any rate by the highest Courts in States in the country. The           l3
    memorandum and terms of the compromise in this case became part of the
    orders of the High Court itself when the earlier writ petition was finally
    disposed of notwithstanding that there was no verbatim reproduction of the
    same in the order. The orders passed in this regard admit of no doubt or give
    any scope for controversy. It could not have been viewed as a matter of mere
    contract between the parties and under that pretext absolve itself of the            C
    responsibility to enforce it, except by doing violence to the terms thereof in
    letter and spirit. As long as the earlier order stood, it was not permissible to


-   go behind the same to ascertain the substance of it or nature of compliance
    when the manner, mode and place.of compliance had already been stipulated
    with meticulous care and detail in the order itself. The said decision was also
    not made to depend upon any contingencies beyond the control of parties in
    the earlier proceedings. [377-G; 378-A, B, C, DJ
                                                                                         D


            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5183 of
    2001.

         From the Judgment and Order dated 16.3.2000 of.the Calcutta High                E
    Court in F.M.A.T. No. 3655 of 1996.

         Bhaskar P. Gupta, Ranjan Mukherjee and Subroto Bose for the
    Appellants.

            Tapas Ray and S.K. Bhattacharya for the Respondents.                         F
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

            RAJU, J. Leave granted.

            The simple as well as an important question arising in the appeal is as      G
    to what is the efficacy of an order passed by the Court in terms of the
    memorandum of compromise or an agreement, filed in a proceedings on the
    basis of which the Court proceedings came to be finally disposed of.

           Shorn of all unnecessary details, it would suffice if a reference is made
    to the order dated 13.2.1991 passed by a learned Single Judge of the Calcutta        H
      376                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. I S.C.R.

 A High Court in Civil Order No.14861 (W) of 1990. The said proceedings
     came to be initiated by the Appellant Association, the members of whom
     were carrying on business as Traders and businessmen on the Grand Trunk
     Road (North) in and around Salkia Chowrasta, apprehending displacement
     and demolition of the places of their business for the construction of a fly-
 B   over, against Howrah Municipal Corporation, Howrah Improvement Trust,
     their respective authorities as well as the State. In the said proceedings, an
     application for settling the disputes has been filed by the parties and the
     learned counsel appearing for the parties also submitted that the Writ Petition
     be disposed of in terms of the said application for settlement. The learned
     Judge, on noticing the above facts ordered, 'Let there be an order that the
 C   Writ Petition be disposed in terms of the settlement made by the parties.
     Xerox copy of the application for settlement and the order passed today be
     given to the parties. Let the Writ Petition be disposed of accordingly."

            The authorities, instead of abiding by the terms of the orders noticed
     supra, seem to have indicated that spaces would be allotted to the members
D    of the Association by way of alternate accommodation and that the same be
     accepted by them on ownership basis. It waS' also said that the alternative
     accommodation would be provided at No.24, 25, Doi Gobinda Singha Lane,
     where only the Municipal Corporation has made provision for'giving alternate
     accommodation. Aggrieved, the appellants moved the High Court by means
E    of another Writ Petition - Civil Order No.16348 (W) of 1996 seeking for
     directions to allot alternate accommodation in terms of the earlier orders of
     Court, binding between parties and not to flout the same. It may be noticed
     at this stage and as found adverted to by the learned Single Judge in the
     present proceedings - clause (viii) of the terms of compromise which became
     part and parcel of the order of the Court, read thus:-
F
            "(viii) The respondents-Authorities shall see that the displaced persons
            will get alternative permanent accommodation on G.T. Road between
            Khetra Mitra Lane and Sri Ram Dhanga Road, excepting owners of
            petrol pump and factories, if any. However, these persons will be
            rehabilitated appropriately by the Rehabilitation Committee of the
G           earliest in terms of paragraph 9 of this settlement."

        The learned Single Judge, by his order dated 11.10.96, dismissed the
  Writ Petition, in limine, as of no merits. The learned Judge seems to be of
  the view that the obligations arising out of the terms of the earlier settlement
  are of the "shape of a contract between the parties" by the joint petition and
H any purported breach thereof being one of terms of the contract between
SALKIA BUSINESSMEN'S ASSN. v. HOWRAH MUNICIPAL CORPN. [RAJU, J.] 377

parties, if at all, cannot be fruitfully remedied legally by enforcing the terms     A
of the contract between parties but the remedy would lie to seek for
compensation - which remedy, according to the learned Judge, cannot be
available in writ jurisdiction.

       The learned Single Judge further proceeded to observe that the proposals
said to have been made by the authorities over which, the appellants felt            B
aggrieved do not purport to alter the place of alternate accommodations and
the nature of settlement relating to such accommodation. In his view, the
basic purpose of entering into such an agreement was to provide alternative
accommodation to the members of the petitioners, in view of the project and
that the substantive terms of such settlement being one relating to alternative      C
accommodations, the appellants cannot demand a particular area or a particular
mode of such alternative accommodation and consequently no violation of
Article 14 or grievance of arbitrariness could be made out.

       Aggrieved, the appellants pursued the matter before a Division Bench
in F.M.A.T. No.3655of1996 and the Division Bench also by its order dated             D
16.3 .2000, concurred with the view of the learned Single Judge, by observing
that the claims of the appellants not only involved adjudication of disputed
facts but greater public interest can· for rejection of the appellants' claims.
Hence, this appeal. Shri Bhaskar P. Gupta, learned senior counsel for the
appellants and Shri Tapas Ray, learned senior counsel for the respondents,           E
were heard. The learned counsel on either side invited our attention to relevant
portions of the earlier orders as also those passed in the present proceedings
in support of their respective stand.

        We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned senior
counsel on either side. The learned Single Judge as well as the Division             F
Bench of the High Court have not only over simplified the matter but seem
to have gone on an errand, carried away by some need to balance hypothetical
public interest, when the real and only question to be considered was as to
whether the respondent-authorities are bound by the orders passed by the
Court on the basis of the compromise memorandum, and whether the proposed            G
move on their part did not constitute flagrant violation of the orders of Court
- very much binding on both parties. The High Court failed to do justice to
its own orders. If Courts are not to honour and implement their own orders,
and encourage party litigants - be they public authorities, to invent methods
of their own to short circuit and give a go-bye to the obligations and liabilities
incurred by them under orders of the court - the mle of law will certainly           H
    378                         SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A become a casualty in the process - a costly consequence to be jealously
     averted by all and at any rate by the highest Courts in States in the country.
     It does not, in our view, require any extraordinary exercise to hold that the
     memorandum and terms of the compromise in this case became part of the
    orders of the High Court itself when the earlier writ petition was finally
B   disposed of on 13.2.1991 in the terms noticed supra notwithstanding that
    there was no verbatim reproduction of the same in the order. The orders
    passed in this regard admits of no doubt or give any scope for controversy.
    While so, it is beyond ones comprehension as to how it could have been
    viewed as a matter of mere contract between parties and under that pretext
    absolve itself of the responsibility to enforce it, except by doing violence to
C   the terms thereof in letter and spirit. As long as the earlier order dated 13.2.91
    stood, it was not permissible to go behind the same to ascertain the substance
    of it or nature of compliance when the manner, mode and place of compliance
    had already been stipulated with meticulous care and detail in the order itself.
    The said decision was also not made to depend upon any contingencies
    beyond the control of parties in the earlier proceedings.
D
           The Divis.ion Bench of the High Court equally fell into the same error
    and went, in our view, aside and beside the real issue and point before them.
    The orders of the High Court under challenge are set aside. The respondents
    are obliged and as public-authorities are bound to comply with the orders
E   dated 13.2.91, particularly clause/paragraph (viii) of it, relating to the place
    or site of allotment of alternative sites and other stipulations, in letter and
    spirit giving the said order full effect. The appeal shall stand allowed,
    accordingly. No costs.

    V.S.S.                                                          Appeal allowed.
F