Holding

The Court held that the High Court was correct in quashing the acquisition because the Church Trust retained a preferential right to develop the SR area and the SRA failed to comply with the mandatory notice‑cum‑invitation under Section 13, and the 2018 Amendment did not abrogate this requirement.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined the validity of the acquisition of a 1,596.40 sq. m. parcel of land owned by the Basilica of Our Lady of the Mount (a public trust) under the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971. The High Court had set aside a public notice and an order approving the acquisition, holding that the trust possessed a preferential right to redevelop the slum rehabilitation area and that the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) failed to issue a separate notice under Section 13 before proceeding. The appellants argued that the 2018 amendment to the Act eliminated the need for such a notice and that the High Court’s intervention was premature. The Court held that the amendment did not alter the statutory requirement of a notice‑cum‑invitation to the landowner and that the trust’s right had not been extinguished, rendering the acquisition illegal and in bad faith. Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, dismissed the appeals, and directed the SRA to assist the trust in submitting a redevelopment scheme within 120 days.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court rightly rejected the preliminary objection raised by the cooperative housing society and set aside the public notice and acquisition order.
Whether the 2018 Amendment to the Maharashtra Slum Areas Act affects the statutory requirement of a notice under Section 13 as laid down in Indian Cork Mills and reiterated in Tarabai.
Whether the acquisition proceedings were valid in view of the preferential redevelopment right of the landowner and the procedural deficiencies of the SRA.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 226
Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971s. 13, s. 14, s. 3B, s. 3C(1)
Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) (Amendment) Act, 2017s. 13, s. 14, s. 3B, s. 3C(1)

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Issue arose as regards the validity of the acquisition of land under Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971; whether the High Court rightly rejected the Society’s preliminary objection; whether the 2018 Amendment impacts in Tarabai’s case; and whether the High Court rightly set aside the public notice and the order approving the acquisition proposal. Headnotes† Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) (Amendment) Act, 2017 – ss.3B, 3C(1) – Maharashtra Slum Areas

Subjects

Slum rehabilitationLand acquisitionPreferential redevelopment rightSection 13 notice requirementSection 14 acquisition powerBad faithPublic trustPlenary jurisdictionExecutive overreachCooperative housing society

Judgment

[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1379 : 2025 INSC 1016

Saldanha Real Estate Private Limited
v.
Bishop John Rodrigues and Others
(Civil Appeal No. 11008 of 2025)
22 August 2025
[Surya Kant* and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Issue arose as regards the validity of the acquisition of land
under Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and
Redevelopment) Act, 1971; whether the High Court rightly rejected
the Society’s preliminary objection; whether the 2018 Amendment
impacts the law laid down in Tarabai’s case; and whether the High
Court rightly set aside the public notice and the order approving
the acquisition proposal.

Headnotes†
Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and
Redevelopment) (Amendment) Act, 2017 – ss.3B, 3C(1) –
Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and
Redevelopment) Act, 1971 – s.14 – Declaration of a slum
rehabilitation area – Rights of landowners to redevelop a Slum
Rehabilitation Area – Certain land owned by the Church Trust,
a public trust – Subject land was part of the larger plot, and
the same was encroached upon by hutment dwellers, and
a section of it was thereupon declared a Slum Area – Over
time, the hutment area (Subject Slum) expanded, and the
notification was amended – In the intervening period, the
dwellers of the subject slum formed the Cooperative Housing
Society – Communication regarding the redevelopment of the
Subject Slum between the Church Trust and the Society –
Society also entered into an agreement with the developer
for the development of the Subject Slum – On the proposal of
the Society, the Subject Slum declared a Slum Rehabilitation
Area (SR Area) in 2020 – Developer and the Church trust
filed proposals for redevelopment of the subject slum – Slum
Rehabilitation Authority-SRA rejected the Church Trust’s
proposal for redevelopment – Society then submitted an
application for the acquisition of the Subject Land – SRA issued

* Author
1380 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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a public notice calling for objections from all interested parties
to the proposal for acquisition – Church Trust submitted its
objection, however acquisition proceedings were initiated –
Church Trust then filed writ petition seeking quashing of the
public notice – During pendency, the CEO, SRA approved the
acquisition proposal on the premise that the Church Trust
had not filed an SR Scheme within 120 days – Amended writ
petition filed by Church Trust seeking setting aside of the
order approving the acquisition proposal – High Court set
aside the public notice order and the acquisition proposal
approval order, declaring the acquisition void; and holding
that the Church Trust had a preferential right to develop the
subject land, directed the SRA to consider the proposal of
the landowner for redevelopment – Correctness:
Held: On facts and the colourable conduct of the appellants, the
acquisition proceedings cannot be allowed to sustain – High Court
rightly set aside these proceedings, protecting the statutory rights and
interests of the Church Trust over the Subject Land and preventing
the appellants from illegally grabbing it – Preliminary objection by the
Society that the public notice was merely an invitation for objections
to the acquisition proposal, and the approval order was simply a
recommendation to the State fails – Where the solitary object of
the notice and order, to acquire the Subject Land, the High Court
was justified to intervene at a preliminary stage, in exercise of its
plenary jurisdiction u/Art.226 – Not doing so would have invited
more complications on account of creation of third-party rights by
the private builder and consequential multiplicity of litigation – Notice
and the order are traceable to the statutory framework of the Slums
Act, and having been issued in purported exercise of statutory
power were amenable to judicial review – On a bare perusal of
the 2018 Amendment, it seems that no attempt has been made to
remove or dilute the preferential right of the landowner to redevelop
an SR Area – Tarabai’s case lead to only one conclusion, that the
owner has a primary right to undertake development, and none
of the provisions have been amended – s.3C(1) declaration is a
stage prior to redevelopment being initiated u/s.13, and issuance
of a notice u/s.3C is meant to accord hearing to a landowner and
invite objections, if any, against declaration as an SR Area – Thus,
it cannot be said that the new mechanism within s.3C no longer
necessitates a separate notice-cum-invitation on the landowner –
Claim of the appellants that the owner is expected to present an
SR Scheme within 120 days of the s.3C(1) Declaration without any
notice-cum-invitation wholly misconceived – On a conspectus of
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1381

Saldanha Real Estate Private Limited v.
Bishop John Rodrigues and Others

the 2018 Amendment and the perceived resultant variation on the
pre-amendment legislative policy, the holistic interpretation of the
Slums Act made in Tarabai’s case squarely applicable on post-2018
Amendment actions/events, barring the now legislatively stipulated
timeline within which a redevelopment scheme has to be submitted
by an interested landowner – As regards the validity of acquisition,
there vests a preferential right in favour of the Church Trust, over
and above the SRA, occupants, or other stakeholders, to develop
the Subject Land – Trust ought to have been invited by the SRA
to submit a proposal and undertake such redevelopment after
the declaration was issued – Thus, the SRA cannot proceed for
acquisition of the Subject Land unless such a notice-cum-invitation is
extended, and thereafter, the right of the Church Trust is extinguished
if it fails to submit a redevelopment scheme within the prescribed
period of 120 days – High Court rightly held that there was no
compliance of these preconditions by the SRA before initiating the
acquisition, and the entire process liable to be invalidated – High
Court also rightly found from the conduct of the appellants that the
acquisition proceedings arose from an exercise of power in bad
faith – Furthermore, no notice-cum-invitation for redevelopment
u/s.13 was issued to the Church Trust as such the Church Trust’s
preferential right to redevelop the Subject Land remains intact and
in the absence of a valid notice or opportunity, there existed no legal
basis to extinguish this right, thus, the acquisition was, vitiated in
law, falling afoul of the prescribed procedure – There was no waiver
of preferential right to develop SR area – Adverse inferences drawn
from the appellants’ disconcerting conduct throughout the acquisition
proceedings – Record reveals a concerted and motivated attempt by
the parties to acquire the Subject Land – SRA’s actions expose its
attempts to thwart any possibility of the Church Trust exercising its
preferential right – SRA and its CEO appear to have abandoned their
public duty to uphold the Rule of Law and protect the rights of the
landowner – On the contrary, the facts reveal a prejudiced attempt
by the SRA to undermine legislative and judicial efforts and hand
over the Subject Land and the benefits of its rehabilitation to the
developer – Such actions of a public authority, marred by collusion
and connivance and motivated by extraneous profit interests of
private builders, are highly depreciable and underline the possibility
of bureaucratic misuse of statutory provisions – Impugned judgement
of the High Court upheld – Church Trust to submit an SR Scheme
for the redevelopment of the Subject Slum, within a period of 120
days – SRA and the State to process the Church Trust’s proposal
within 60 days – Constitution of India – Art. 226. [Paras 17 - 53]
1382 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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Case Law Cited
Tarabai Nagar Co-op. Hog. Society (Proposed) v. The State of
Maharashtra and Others, SLP (C) 19774 of 2018 – relied on.
Indian Cork Mills (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2018 SCC
OnLine Bom 1214 – referred to.

List of Acts
Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and
Redevelopment) Act, 1971; Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement,
Clearance and Redevelopment) (Amendment) Act, 2017;
Constitution of India.

List of Keywords
Slum Areas; Acquisition; Church Trust; Preferential right; Owner
has a primary right; Bad faith; Public trust; Plenary jurisdiction;
Executive overreach; Issuance of notice; Declaration under section
3C(1); Hearing to landowners; Validity of acquisition; Declaration
of a slum rehabilitation area; Rights of landowners to redevelop a
Slum Rehabilitation Area; Hutment dwellers; Cooperative Housing
Society; Redevelopment of the Subject Slum; Slum Rehabilitation
Area (SR Area); Slum Rehabilitation Authority-SRA; Acquisition
proposal.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 11008
of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 11.06.2024 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in WP No. 1212 of 2022
With
Civil Appeal No(s). 11009 and 11010 of 2025

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Shyam Divan, Siddharth Bhatnagar, Sudhanshu S. Choudhari, Nikhil
Sakhardande, Sr. Advs., Sanjeev Singh, Arpit Rai, Sudipto Sircar,
Ms. Tushima, Aviral Kashyap, Amol Nirmalkumar Suryawanshi,
Ms. Gautami Yadav, Soura Subha Ghosh, Tavish Bhushan Prasad,
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1383

Saldanha Real Estate Private Limited v.
Bishop John Rodrigues and Others

Ms. Sanaya Patel, Shesh Raj Bharti, Soumya Dutta, Siddhant
Upmanyu, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Milind Sathe, Chander Uday Singh, Shyam Mehta, Shyam Divan,
Siddharth Bhatnagar, Sr. Advs., Ms. Neha Mehta, Bhushan
Deshmukh, Aditya Miskita, Ms. Harsh Lata, Umair Merchant, Ms.
Aayushi Gohil, Ms. Harsh Lata, Sunil Kumar Verma, Aman Raj
Gandhi, Parthasarathy Bose, Ms. Panchi Agarwal, Pranaya Goyal,,
Bharat Bagla, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande,
Varad Kilor, Sourav Singh, Aditya Krishna, Ms. Preet S. Phanse,
Adarsh Dubey, Sachin Patil, Ravi Tyagi, Mayank Mishra, Ms.
Manmilan Sidhu, Chirag Sharma, Ms. Sudiksha Saina, Ms. Saksha
Jha, Shikhar Misra, Ms. Bhumika Bhatnagar, Ms. Ria Chanda, P.
V. Yogeswaran, Amol Nirmalkumar Suryawanshi, Sanjeev Singh,
Arpit Rai, Sudipto Sircar, Ms. Tushima, Aviral Kashyap.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Surya Kant, J.

Leave granted.
2. The dispute under consideration in these Civil Appeals concerns
the validity of the acquisition of a portion of land located at CTS
No. B-960 in Village Bandra, Taluka Andheri, Mumbai, measuring
1,596.40 sq. m. (Subject Land) under the Maharashtra Slum Areas
(Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (Slums
Act). The High Court of Judicature at Bombay (High Court), vide
the Impugned Judgement dated 11.06.2024, has: (i) allowed the writ
petition filed by the landowner, declaring the acquisition void; and
(ii) directed the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) to consider the
proposal of the landowner for redevelopment. The instant appeals
have thus been preferred by the proposed housing society of slum
dwellers, the developer selected by the said society, and the SRA.
3. The instant appeals involve an in-depth analysis of the text as well as
the legislative policy behind Chapter I-A of the Slums Act, specifically
regarding the rights of landowners to redevelop a Slum Rehabilitation
Area (SR Area) and the corresponding duties of the SRA. At the
outset, we note that by a judgement of even date, titled Tarabai Nagar
1384 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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Co-Op. Hog. Society (Proposed) v. The State of Maharashtra and
others,1 a 2-Judge Bench of this Court, including one of us (Surya
Kant, J.), has dealt with a substantial part of the arguments raised
in these appeals. The Bench, therein, upheld the decision of another
Division Bench of the High Court in Indian Cork Mills (P) Ltd. v.
State of Maharashtra,2 laying down that: (i) the private owner of a
Slum Rehabilitation Area has a preferential right to develop it; (ii) as
part of this right, the owner must be notified and invited to undertake
such redevelopment; and (iii) without such notice being issued and
such right being extinguished, it would be untenable for the State or
the SRA to acquire the land under Section 14.
4. The legislative interpretation we are tasked with undertaking in
these appeals has largely been addressed by the Bench in Tarabai
(supra). Having previously examined the law regarding the questions
answered therein, this Court does not need to revisit the analysis of
the Slums Act. The only remaining issue for us to consider through this
judgement is the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance
and Redevelopment) (Amendment) Act, 2017 (2018 Amendment).

A. Legislative Scheme
5. The legislative scheme of the Slums Act prior to the 2018 Amendment
has already been detailed extensively in Tarabai (supra).3 However,
before delving into the facts of this case, it would be apposite to first
explore the impact of the said Amendment on the slum rehabilitation
framework envisaged in Chapter I-A of the Slums Act.
6. The Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and
Redevelopment) (Amendment) Act, 2017, which came into force on
26.04.2018, was enacted to improve the practical implementation
of the Slums Act and to expand the scope of slum rehabilitation. It
introduced various improvements, both significant and minor, into the
legislative framework for slum rehabilitation.
7. Section 3B is one of the key areas where such a change was
implemented.4

1 Supreme Court of India, Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 19774 of 2018,
judgement dated 22.08.2025.
2 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 1214.
3 See Paragraphs 5 to 38 of Tarabai (supra).
4 For pre-2018 Amendment version, see Paragraph 19 of Tarabai (supra).
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1385

Saldanha Real Estate Private Limited v.
Bishop John Rodrigues and Others

7.1. In sub-section (1), the Legislature introduced the ability for the
SRA to amend an already operative General Slum Rehabilitation
Scheme (General SR Scheme).
7.2. Further, the provisions which, prior to the Amendment, were
included in sub-section (4),5 namely, the matters which shall
be provided for in the General SR Scheme, have now been
relocated to sub-section (5). While the scheme itself and its
tenor remain unchanged, the scope of these matters has been
broadened. For example, provisions for compensation in lieu of
transit accommodation, as well as for the grant of tenements
to non-protected occupiers, were introduced. Most notably,
the Legislature has amended the stakeholders specified in
Clauses (c) and (g) (which correspond to Clauses (c) and (e),
respectively, before the 2018 Amendment) from ‘landholders
and occupants’ to ‘owners, landholders and occupants’. It is
worth noting that although the term ‘owner’ was already defined
in Section 2(f) of the Slums Act,6 it has been included in the
procedure for Slum Rehabilitation Schemes (SR Schemes)
only after the 2018 Amendment.
7.3. In its place, a new sub-section (4) has been added, stipulating
that the General SR Scheme shall be deemed to be ‘Development
Control Regulations’ under the Maharashtra Town Planning Act,
1966 for an SR Area and clarifying that the General SR Scheme
shall prevail over any other Development Control Regulations
in force, such as the Development Control and Promotion
Regulations for Greater Mumbai, 2034 (DCPR 2034).
7.4. For complete clarity, the relevant portion of the amended version
of Section 3B is reproduced below:
“3B. Slum Rehabilitation Schemes. – (1) The Slum
Rehabilitation Authority concerned, with the previous
sanction of the State Government, shall prepare or
amend the general Slum Rehabilitation Scheme
for the areas specified under sub-section (1) of
section 3A, for rehabilitation or relocation of protected

5 See Paragraph 19 of Tarabai (supra).
6 See Paragraph 7 of Tarabai (supra).
1386 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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occupiers and other occupiers of the building in such
areas.
[xxxx]
(4) The general Slum Rehabilitation Scheme published
under sub-section (3) shall be deemed Development
Control Regulations under the provisions of Chapter III
of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act,
1966 (Mah. XXXVII of 1966), for the said area and
the provisions of the general Slum Rehabilitation
Scheme shall prevail over the Development Control
Regulations, published under the Maharashtra
Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (Mah. XXXVII
of 1966).
(5) The Slum Rehabilitation Scheme so notified
under sub-section (3) shall, generally lay down the
parameters for declaration of any land as the Slum
Rehabilitation Area and indicate the manner in which
rehabilitation of the occupants of the area declared
as Slum Rehabilitation Area shall be carried out. In
particular, it shall provide for all or any of the following
matters, that is to say,-
[xxxx]
(c) provision for obligatory participation of the
owners, landholders and occupants of the land
declared as the Slum Rehabilitation Area under
the approved Slum Rehabilitation Scheme in the
implementation of such Scheme;
(d) provision relating to transit accommodation
or entitlement of compensation in lieu of transit
accommodation to the slum dwellers pending
development of the Slum Rehabilitation Area;
(e) provision relating to allotment of tenements
either in-situ or otherwise, on development free
of cost to the protected occupiers of the building
in such Slum Rehabilitation Area;
(f) provision relating to allotment of tenements
either in-situ or otherwise, on ownership or on
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1387

Saldanha Real Estate Private Limited v.
Bishop John Rodrigues and Others

rent, to the other non-protected occupiers up to
the 1st January 2011, subject to the availability
of tenements as per the terms and conditions
and guidelines so notified in the Official Gazette,
by the Chief Executive Officer with the prior
approval of the State Government;
(g) scheme for development of the Slum
Rehabilitation Areas under the Slum Rehabilitation
Scheme by the landholders and occupants by
themselves or through a developer and the
terms and conditions of such development; and
the option available to the Slum Rehabilitation
Authority for taking up such development in the
event of non-participation of the landholders or
occupants;
[xxxx] ”
8. The process for declaring land as an SR Area under Section 3C(1)
was also augmented.7 Following the amendment, the CEO must
provide the owners and other stakeholders a 30-day notice and
an opportunity to be heard before issuing a reasoned order. Only
then can the CEO declare the land an SR Area (Section 3C(1)
Declaration). However, the method of publication/publicity of the
Section 3C(1) Declaration remains unchanged. For reference, the
text of the amended Section 3C(1) is provided below.
“3C. Declaration of a slum rehabilitation area. –
(1) As soon as may be, after the publication of any Slum
Rehabilitation Scheme, the Chief Executive Officer on
being satisfied about the circumstances in respect of any
land, whether or not previously declared as slum area,
justifying its declaration as the Slum Rehabilitation Area
which may include community economic activity area, for
implementing the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme, shall after
giving the land owners, including any public authorities
or local bodies under the State Government constituted
under any law enacted by the State Legislature, thirty days
notice and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being
heard, by an order published in the Official Gazette, and

7 For pre-2018 Amendment version, see Paragraph 20 of Tarabai (supra).
1388 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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thereafter within forty-five days, declare such land to be a
“Slum Rehabilitation Area”. The order declaring the Slum
Rehabilitation Area (hereinafter referred to as “the slum
rehabilitation order”), shall also be given wide publicity in
such manner as may be specified by the Chief Executive
Officer of the Slum Rehabilitation Authority. Thereafter,
notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the
time being in force, in such Slum Rehabilitation Area, the
permission or the No Objection Certificate of the land
owning authority or agency shall not be required:
Provided that, only in respect of any land which is required
for Vital Public Project purpose, as per orders of the State
Government and where the State Government either
directly or through any public authority has undertaken
the responsibility of relocation and rehabilitation of the
protected and other occupiers of the building, then the
Chief Executive Officer shall, exclude the land required
for Vital Public Project from the Slum Rehabilitation Area
and issue an order to omit such land from the Slum
Rehabilitation Area. Where the State Government either
directly or through any public authority has undertaken
the responsibility of relocation and rehabilitation of the
protected and other occupiers of the building, such public
authority shall prepare the Scheme of such rehabilitation
or relocation and get it approved by the Chief Executive
Officer within the period specified in the Scheme which
shall not be more than ninety days.
(2) Any person aggrieved by the order of the Chief Executive
Officer may, within thirty days of the publication of such slum
rehabilitation order, prefer an appeal to the Apex Grievance
Redressal Committee. The decision of the Apex Grievance
Redressal Committee in such appeal shall be final.
(3) On the completion of the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme,
the Slum Rehabilitation Area shall cease to be such area.”
9. Substantial changes were also made to Section 3D, which, inter alia,
modifies Sections 13 and 14 for their applicability to Chapter I-A of
the Slums Act.8

8 For pre-2018 Amendment version, see Paragraphs 27 and 28 of Tarabai (supra).
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1389

Saldanha Real Estate Private Limited v.
Bishop John Rodrigues and Others

9.1. Sub-clause (iii) of Clause (c) of this Section describes the
applicability of Section 13 to an SR Area. Through the 2018
Amendment, significant changes have been made to the text of
the provision. For reference, Section 13, as it would apply under
Chapter I-A after the amendment, reads as follows:
“13. Power of Slum Rehabilitation Authority
to develop Slum Rehabilitation Area. –
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-
section (10) of section 12, the Chief Executive Officer
shall, after any land has been declared as the Slum
Rehabilitation Area, including community economic
activity area, if the owners, landholders or occupants
of such land do not come forward within a reasonable
time, which shall not be more than one hundred and
twenty days, required for relocation and rehabilitation
of protected and other occupiers justifying with the
Slum Rehabilitation Scheme for redevelopment of
such land, by order, determine to redevelop such land
by entrusting into any agency or other developer for
the purpose.
(2) Where on declaration of any land as Slum
Rehabilitation Area, the Chief Executive Officer is
satisfied that, the land in the Slum Rehabilitation
Area has been or is being developed by the
owners, landholders or occupants or developers in
contravention of the plans duly approved, or any
restrictions or conditions imposed under sub-section
(10) of section 12, or in contravention of any provision
of any Slum Rehabilitation Scheme or any condition
specified in the approval or has not been developed
within the time, as specified under such conditions
of approval, he may, by order, determine to develop
the land declared as Slum Rehabilitation Area by
entrusting it to any agency or the other developer
recognized by him for the purpose.
(3) The agency or the other developer so appointed
shall within a period of forty-five days of the order of
the Chief Executive Officer, be required to deposit
1390 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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an amount of compensation payable to the outgoing
landowners or occupants or developers, as the case
may be, for expenditure incurred by them on payment
made to any public authority, local bodies for receiving
approvals for the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme and
construction of rehabilitation tenements as determined
by the Chief Executive Officer:
Provided that, such compensation shall not be payable
by the agency appointed by the Chief Executive Officer,
for any expenditure incurred towards construction to
meet conditional obligations made to any third party by
the landowners or occupants or previous developers,
as the case may be. The Chief Executive Officer before
passing such order shall obtain report from approved
valuer independently appointed on his behalf and by
the concerned parties to the proceeding before the
Chief Executive Officer:
Provided further that, before passing such order by
the Chief Executive Officer, the concerned landowner
or occupant or developer, as the case may be, shall
be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard
and time which shall not be more than thirty days of
showing cause why the order should not be passed:
Provided also that, an appeal, if any, against the order
of the Chief Executive Officer shall be filed before the
Apex Grievance Redressal Committee and order of
the Apex Grievance Redressal Committee shall be
final and binding on all the parties.”
9.2. With this amendment, the notion of ‘reasonable time’ in sub-
section (1) has been qualified with the phrase, “which shall not
be more than one hundred and twenty days.” Previously, no
such qualification was provided for. Additionally, the pre-condition
under sub-section (1) has changed from ‘come forward …
with a scheme for redevelopment’ to ‘come forward … for
redevelopment of such land’.
9.3. Notably, when the 2018 Amendment was originally introduced, the
final proviso in Section 13 referred to the Grievance Redressal
Committee (GRC). However, in 2023, with a retrospective
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1391

Saldanha Real Estate Private Limited v.
Bishop John Rodrigues and Others

amendment, this body was renamed as the Apex Grievance
Redressal Committee (AGRC).9
9.4. Although the amendment has kept the procedure for land
acquisition under Chapter I-A untouched, it would be prudent
for us to reproduce Section 14, as it applies to the said Chapter:
“14. Power of State Government to acquire land. –
(1) Where on any representation from the Chief
Executive Officer it appears to the State Government
that, in order to enable the Slum Rehabilitation
Authority to carry out development under the Slum
Rehabilitation Scheme in any Slum Rehabilitation
Area it is necessary that such area, or any land within
adjoining or surrounded by any such area should be
acquired, the State Government may acquire the
land by publishing in the Official Gazette, a notice to
the effect that the State Government has decided to
acquire the land in pursuance of this section:
Provided that, before publishing such notice, the State
Government, or as the case may be, the Competent
Authority may call upon by notice the owner of, or
any other person who, in its or his opinion may be
interested in, such land to show cause in writing why
the land should not be acquired with reasons therefor,
to the Competent Authority within the period specified
in the notice; and the Competent Authority shall, with
all reasonable despatch, forward any objections so
submitted together with his report in respect thereof to
the State Government and on considering the report
and the objections, if any, the State Government may
pass such order as it deems fit.
Provided further that, the State Government may
delegate its powers under this sub-section to any
officer not below the rank of Commissioner.
(1A) The acquisition of land for any purpose
mentioned in sub-section (1) shall be deemed to be
a public purpose.

9 Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) (Amendment, Re-enactment of
Rules and Notification of Apex and other Grievance Redressal Committees and Validation) Act, 2023, s 4.
1392 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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(2) When a notice as aforesaid is published in the
Official Gazette, the land shall, on and from the date
on which the notice is so published, vest absolutely
in the State Government free from all encumbrances.”
10. As in Tarabai (supra), the instant case also pertains to an SR Area
under Chapter I-A. It is, thus, clarified that wherever the provisions of
Chapters IV and V are referred to in this Judgement, the reference
is to the modified provisions which are now encapsulated in
Section 3D.

B. Facts
11. Having considered the changes introduced through the 2018
Amendment, we now proceed to observe the facts in detail, as
portrayed below.
11.1. The plot bearing CTS No. B-960 in Village Bandra, Taluka
Andheri, Mumbai, admeasuring a total area of 9,371.30 sq. m.,
is owned by the Basilica of Our Lady of the Mount (Church
Trust), a Public Trust based in Mumbai. The Church Trust
operates the Mount Mary Church in Bandra, Mumbai, where,
at the relevant time, Bishop John Rodrigues served as the
Rector and the sole trustee. The Subject Land, measuring
1,596.40 sq. m., is part of this larger plot.
11.2. The Subject Land has reportedly been encroached upon by
hutment dwellers since the 1930s, and a section admeasuring
1,334 sq. m. was thereupon declared a Slum Area under
Section 4 of the Slums Act on 30.11.1978. Over time, the
hutment area (Subject Slum) expanded, and the notification
dated 30.11.1978 was accordingly amended on 12.06.2002,
increasing the declared Slum Area to 1,532 sq. m. Subsequently,
through further expansion, the Subject Slum extended into
an adjoining plot bearing CTS No. B-967, owned by the
Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC).
11.3. In the intervening period, the dwellers of the Subject Slum
formed the Shri Kadeshwari Cooperative Housing Society
Ltd. (Proposed) (Kadeshwari Society). It appears from the
records that there were 35 identified tenements in the Subject
Slum, prior to 01.01.2000, who are all members of Kadeshwari
Society.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1393

Saldanha Real Estate Private Limited v.
Bishop John Rodrigues and Others

11.4. Since 2012, Kadeshwari Society and the Church Trust (through
its sole trustee) have been in communication regarding the
redevelopment of the Subject Slum. The record indicates
that the parties had initially met for this purpose, but it was
subsequently identified that the land fell within the Coastal
Regulation Zone (CRZ), which impacted the feasibility of any
attempted redevelopment project.
11.5. In due course, however, the Government sought to relax
restrictions on the redevelopment of slums in CRZ areas,
making rehabilitation on the Subject Land feasible. This sparked
a fresh round of communication among the parties.
11.6. In this context, vide letter dated 13.06.2013, the Church Trust
called on Kadeshwari Society to: (i) submit written consent of
all the 35 slum dwellers eligible for rehabilitation; (ii) procure a
resolution passed by the General Body of Kadeshwari Society
authorising redevelopment; and (iii) to permit the Society’s
chosen developer to submit a tentative offer for redevelopment,
subject to the outcome of a tender process.
11.7. Kadeshwari Society initially appointed M/s Accord Estates as its
preferred developer and notified the Church Trust accordingly.
The Society also appears to have entered into development
agreements, individual agreements, and tripartite agreements
with this developer. However, no further steps were taken in
the following years until 2017.
11.8. Citing inaction on the part of M/s Accord Estates, Kadeshwari
Society terminated all agreements with this firm and its
promoter. It, instead, resolved to enter into an agreement with
another developer, namely, M/s Saldanha Real Estates Pvt.
Ltd. (Saldanha), for the redevelopment of the Subject Slum.
Consequently, on 28.12.2017, Kadeshwari Society entered
into a Development Agreement with and executed a Power of
Attorney in favour of Saldanha. The developer also entered into
individual Development Agreements with the slum dwellers.
11.9. Having crystallised this relationship, Kadeshwari Society then
besought the Church Trust to grant a No-Objection Certificate
to Saldanha, allowing it to redevelop the Subject Land and to
rehabilitate the slum dwellers on it.
1394 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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11.10. Meanwhile, Saldanha also approached the Church Trust with
a proposal to purchase the Subject Land on an ‘as-is-where-
is’ basis. Saldanha and the sole trustee of the Church Trust
deliberated on this issue on 21.03.2018, pursuant to which
the developer forwarded an offer of INR 2.5 crores for the
Subject Land. The offer was later revised to INR 3 crores,
but the parties did not proceed with this deal.
11.11. It is pertinent to highlight at this stage that the Church Trust
intended to develop the Subject Land along with the rest of
its land in CTS No. B-960, as well as some other adjoining
plots, totalling approximately 10,709 sq. m. in land area. The
plan was to redevelop ‘Nirmala Colony’, including the Subject
Land, as a contiguous project.
11.12. However, when this proposal was presented to the slum
dwellers, Kadeshwari Society sent a communication dated
04.02.2019 to the Church Trust, opposing a composite project
and requesting the Trust to allow independent redevelopment
of the Subject Land by Saldanha.
11.13. This was followed by a series of communications between
Kadeshwari Society and the Church Trust, where the former
sought an NOC for redevelopment by Saldanha, while the
latter attempted to obtain consent from the slum dwellers for
combined development.
11.14. In this backdrop, Kadeshwari Society submitted a proposal
dated 24.09.2019 before the SRA for the declaration of the
entire Subject Slum, now covering 1,976.60 sq. m. (1,596.40
sq. m. being the Subject Land and 380.20 sq. m. being BMC’s
land), as an SR Area under Section 3C(1).10
11.15. Parallelly, the Church Trust sent a letter dated 07.02.2020 to
the Chief Executive Officer of the SRA (CEO), informing that
it was in communication with the slum dwellers. It stated that
the representatives of the Trust had met with the members
of Kadeshwari Society, and the dwellers had accepted the
feasibility of the composite development. The Church Trust

10 Reproduced in Paragraph 8.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1395

Saldanha Real Estate Private Limited v.
Bishop John Rodrigues and Others

also submitted a feasibility report prepared by its architect
for the redevelopment of the area.
11.16. The SRA, however, disregarded the Church Trust’s
communication and, instead, acted on the proposal of the
Kadeshwari Society. It issued public notices as well as a
specific notice to the Trust on 30.09.2020, calling for objections
to the proposal for a Section 3C(1) Declaration.
11.17. The Church Trust filed its written objections and attended
the subsequent hearing on the proposal. It conveyed its
intention to redevelop the Subject Property on its own,
without the interference of a third-party. The Trust also
averred that the Subject Land was not densely populated,
and the structures thereon had sufficient ventilation, light,
sanitation, and facilities, considering which it should not be
designated as a slum.
11.18. The CEO after the hearing the parties, vide order dated
29.12.2020, rejected the objections of the Church Trust and
declared the Subject Slum as an SR Area. The Section 3C(1)
Declaration dated 29.12.2020 was published in the Official
Gazette on 31.12.2020, and the order and the declaration
were also forwarded by the SRA to the Church Trust on
05.01.2021.
11.19. Aggrieved, the Church Trust challenged the order dated
29.12.2020 through statutory appeal under Section 3C(2)11
bearing Application No. 20 of 2021 before the AGRC on
01.02.2021. The AGRC does not appear to have heard the
appeal even a single time, and it has remained pending to
date.
11.20. Following the declaration dated 29.12.2020, Saldanha
and the Church Trust filed their respective proposals for
redevelopment.
11.21. Saldanha filed its proposal dated 23.04.2021 in accordance
with SRA’s Circular No. 14412 and Regulation 33(10) of the

11 Reproduced in Paragraph 8.
12 See Paragraph 38 of Tarabai (supra).
1396 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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DCPR 203413 for redevelopment of the Subject Slum. This
proposal was filed with support from Kadeshwari Society.
11.22. On the other hand, the Church Trust filed its proposal through
a letter dated 04.05.2021, sent by its architect to the SRA.
It envisaged the rehabilitation of the Subject Slum through
the aforementioned composite development of the Nirmala
Colony and included relevant maps and design plans. It was
clarified in the communication that the proposal was made
without prejudice to and subject to the outcome of Application
No. 20 of 2021. The Church Trust also submitted its composite
proposal before the BMC.
11.23. The record reveals that the SRA only took steps to consider
Saldanha’s proposal, completing various internal processes
by July 2021. However, faced with the objection of the Church
Trust to this proposal, Kadeshwari Society submitted an
application on 09.09.2021 for the acquisition of the Subject
Land under Section 14.14
11.24. The SRA, in response to the above-stated application, issued
a public notice dated 29.10.2021, calling for objections from all
interested parties to the proposal for acquisition. The Church
Trust submitted its written objections, and in the course of
the acquisition proceedings, the representatives of the Trust
were also heard on 14.12.2021. Thereafter, another hearing
was set for 31.12.2021.
11.25. Before the second hearing could be conducted, the Executive
Engineer, SRA, vide order dated 22.12.2021, rejected the
Church Trust’s proposal dated 04.05.2021. The reasons
given in the order were that: (i) the proposal was not within
the prescribed format; (ii) it was not submitted to the correct
authority/officer; and (iii) the proposal filed by Saldanha was
already being processed.
11.26. After the second hearing on 31.12.2021, anticipating
irreversible consequences of the acquisition, the Church Trust
moved the AGRC for an urgent interim stay on the Section

13 See Paragraph 35 of Tarabai (supra).
14 Reproduced in Paragraph 9.4.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1397

Saldanha Real Estate Private Limited v.
Bishop John Rodrigues and Others

3C(1) Declaration dated 29.12.2020, but it was promptly
declined on 07.01.2022.
11.27. The Church Trust, thus, aggrieved by the initiation of
acquisition proceedings, approached the High Court through
Writ Petition No. 1212 of 2022, seeking quashing of the
notice dated 29.10.2021.
11.28. During the pendency of the Writ Petition, the SRA completed
the scrutiny of Saldanha’s SR Scheme and granted an in-
principle approval on 28.03.2022. This acceptance was,
however, restricted to that area of the Subject Slum which
was on the BMC’s land. It was clarified that consideration
for the proposal qua the Subject Land would be taken up
only after its acquisition was completed.
11.29. On the very next day, the CEO, vide order dated 29.03.2022,
approved the acquisition proposal on the premise that the
Church Trust had not filed an SR Scheme within 120 days.
The proposal for acquisition was, as such, directed to be
forwarded to the State Government for approval.
11.30. Consequently, the Church Trust sought to amend its Writ
Petition, which was allowed by the High Court, vide order
dated 08.04.2022, so as to enable the Church Trust to bring
these subsequent events on record. In the amended Writ
Petition, an additional prayer to set aside the order dated
29.03.2022 was also incorporated. The High Court, while
entertaining the amended Writ Petition, directed as an interim
measure that no further steps towards the acquisition would
be taken till the next date of hearing. That order remained
operative till the Writ Petition was finally decided.
11.31. The High Court vide the Impugned Judgement dated
11.06.2024, allowed the Writ Petition and, relying upon the
reasoning assigned in Indian Cork Mills (supra), held that
the Church Trust had a preferential right to develop the
Subject Land. It further held that: (i) the SRA neglected
this right of the Trust; (ii) the acquisition proceedings were
marred by the absence of any proper notice to the Trust; and
(iii) the questionable conduct of the SRA, Saldanha, and
Kadeshwari Society vitiated the entire acquisition. The High
1398 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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Court, consequently, set aside the notice dated 29.10.2021
and the order dated 29.03.2022, allowing the Church Trust
to proceed with development of the Subject Land.
11.32. Kadeshwari Society, Saldanha, and the SRA, being aggrieved,
have filed separate appeals challenging the Impugned
Judgement.

C. Contentions
12. Mr. Shyam Divan, learned Senior Counsel, representing Kadeshwari
Society, highlighted the alleged shortcomings in the Church Trust’s
development proposal. In this regard, he made the following
submissions:
(a) The High Court, even preliminarily, ought not to have entertained
the Church Trust’s Writ Petition. The notice dated 29.10.2021
and the order dated 29.03.2022 neither caused any prejudice
to the Trust nor created any rights in favour of a third-party.
The notice and the order were merely procedural and did not
merit interference, since no final decision had been taken on
the proposed acquisition.
(b) The mandatory notice and hearings before a Section 3C(1)
Declaration eliminate the need for another notice under
Section 13.15 The 120-day time limit further indicates a shift
in legislative policy, where the onus of submitting a proposal
is placed on the landowner. The provisions amended in 2018
render the judicial mandate for a specific notice to invite the
landowner for redevelopment incompatible.
(c) The Church Trust has acted lackadaisically towards the interests
of the slum dwellers as well as its own interests in the Subject
Land. It never exercised its right to develop the Subject Land since
1978, when part of it was declared as Slum Area. Even after the
Section 3C(1) Declaration, the Trust never submitted any SR
Scheme as per Regulation 33(10) of DCPR 2034.
(d) The Church Trust’s proposal dated 04.05.2021 is belated. The
period of 120 days prescribed under Section 1316 would start

15 Reproduced in Paragraph 9.1.
16 Reproduced in Paragraph 9.1.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1399

Saldanha Real Estate Private Limited v.
Bishop John Rodrigues and Others

from the publication of the Section 3C(1) Declaration in the
Official Gazette, viz., 31.12.2020. As such, the 120 days were
over on 30.04.2021, and the Trust was 5 days late in submitting
its proposal.
(e) Although this Court, through successive orders passed in Suo
Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3 of 2020 and connected matters,
has generally extended the period of limitation from 2020 till 2022
due to the then ongoing COVID-19 Pandemic, such extension
does not apply to the time limit in Section 13(1).17
(f) SR Schemes are to be submitted in the format prescribed by the
Guidelines for the Implementation of Slum Rehabilitation Policy in
Greater Mumbai, 199718 and Regulation 33(10) of the DCPR 2034.
As per SRA’s Circular No. 144, strict conformity with the format
is a prerequisite for consideration of the proposed SR Scheme.
The Church Trust’s proposal dated 04.05.2021 does not adhere
to any of these stipulations and was thus rightly rejected by the
SRA vide order dated 22.12.2021. The Trust has not challenged
this order before any forum, so it cannot rely on the said proposal
to claim that it has fulfilled its duty under Section 13.
(g) There was no procedural infirmity in or ulterior motive behind
the notice dated 29.10.2021 and order dated 29.03.2022. The
former was only to invite objections to the acquisition proposal, in
line with the first proviso to Section 14. The latter is a reasoned
order, passed after hearing all the parties, merely recommending
the acquisition of the Subject Land to the State Government.
13. Mr. Sudhanshu S. Choudhari, learned Senior Counsel on behalf
of the SRA, in response to a specific query, clarified that the SRA
was not intending to take any sides among the parties. The appeal
was filed to challenge the High Court’s interpretation of the owner’s
preferential right. His contentions, however, have already been
considered and negatived by this Court in Tarabai (supra).
14. Mr. Nikhil Sakhardande, learned Senior Counsel representing
Saldanha, apart from adopting the arguments made by Mr. Divan,
sought to impress upon this Court that the proposed acquisition was
not an attempt to grab the Church Trust’s land. Rather, it was a bona

17 Reproduced in Paragraph 9.1.
18 See Paragraph 36 of Tarabai (supra).
1400 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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fide effort to ensure redevelopment of the Subject Slum, motivated
by the incentive of reasonable profits.
15. Dr. Milind Sathe and Mr. Chander Uday Singh, learned Senior
Counsels appearing on behalf of the Church Trust, asserted the
correctness of the Impugned Judgement and underlined the attempted
breach of the Trust’s preferential rights through the acquisition. They
made the following averments:
(a) The time limit of 120 days in Section 1319 is only directory in
nature and not mandatory. Even if it is considered mandatory,
the period would only begin when a specific notice is received
by the owner. The Church Trust has submitted its proposal
within 120 days of 05.01.2021, when it was informed of the
Section 3C(1) Declaration.
(b) In any event, the directions of this Court in Cognizance for
Extension of Limitation, In re20 generally extending the period
of limitation from 2020 till 2022, would also apply to the limit of
120 days. Additionally, even as a matter of equity, the Church
Trust should not be deprived of its inherent ownership rights
due to an inconsequential delay of a few days.
(c) There is no legislative requirement to submit the proposal as per
Regulation 33(10) of the DCPR 2034. It is only applicable when
development incentives are sought under that Regulation, and
the landowner can choose not to invoke Regulation 33(10). As
such, the proposal of the Church Trust was wrongly disregarded
merely for alleged inconsonance with format requirements.
(d) The SRA or the private parties have shown no necessity to
acquire the land for redevelopment. The CEOs’ order dated
29.03.2022 only mentions that an acquisition is required because
120 days have passed and the owner has not submitted any
SR Scheme.
(e) Moreover, there is a mala-fide intention behind the acquisition,
i.e., Saldanha’s objective to grab the Subject Land. When the
developer’s original attempt to purchase the land fell through,

19 Reproduced in Paragraph 9.1.
20 (2022) 3 SCC 117.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1401

Saldanha Real Estate Private Limited v.
Bishop John Rodrigues and Others

it initiated the process to acquire it through Kadeshwari Society
and the SRA for a very low price.
(f) The SRA, for the reasons best known to it, exhibited a singular
focus towards opposing the Church Trust’s attempts to
redevelop, so as to pave the way for Saldanha’s SR Scheme.
The Trust’s proposal was discarded on hyper-technical grounds,
while Saldanha’s submission was processed despite its own
defects. It is in pursuance of this resolve of the SRA that the
acquisition process was initiated under Saldanha’s SR Scheme
without formally rejecting the Trust’s proposal.
(g) The decisions taken by Kadeshwari Society are highly suspect,
as only 7 out of 35 members are signatories to them. This
assertion is further fortified by the fact that the Society refuses
to accept the owner’s proposal for larger units with better
facilities as compared to the smaller units offered by Saldanha.
The Society has no justification for not accepting a composite
development. Kadeshwari Society cannot dictate the manner
of development; its members only have a right to rehabilitation
as per the law, not to a specific rehabilitation of their choice.

D. Issues
16. Having regard to the issues already adjudicated upon in Tarabai
(supra), we deem it appropriate to confine our analysis to the
following three questions:
I. Whether the High Court has rightly rejected Kadeshwari Society’s
preliminary objection?
II. Whether the 2018 Amendment impacts the law laid down in
Indian Cork Mills (supra) and as reiterated in Tarabai (supra)?
III. Whether, in the facts of the instant case, the High Court rightly
set aside the notice dated 29.10.2021 and the order dated
29.03.2022?

E. Analysis

E.1 Issue I: Preliminary Objection

17. It would be suitable, at the outset, to address the preliminary issue
raised by Mr. Divan on behalf of Kadeshwari Society. He argued that
1402 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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the notice dated 29.10.2021 was merely an invitation for objections
to the acquisition proposal, and the order dated 29.03.2022 was
simply a recommendation to the State. He further submitted that
these orders, at best, were a preliminary exercise for acquisition
of the Subject Land and therefore, it was premature for the High
Court to have interfered when no actual step causing prejudice to
the Church Trust had been taken.
18. Although the contention appears to be attractive at first blush, it is
liable to fall flat when a deeper analysis is undertaken. We say so for
the reason that the High Court, in exercise of its plenary jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution, can prevent or annul any
executive overreach, arbitrary decision-making process, action tainted
with mala fides, or colourable exercise of power. Where the solitary
object of the notice and order, namely, to acquire the Subject Land,
has not been disputed by the SRA, the High Court was justified to
intervene at a preliminary stage. Not doing so would have invited
more complications on account of creation of third-party rights by
the private builder and consequential multiplicity of litigation. Mere
absence of any direct impact on the entitlement of the Church Trust
does not take away from the administrative nature of the notice and
the order or the jurisdiction of the High Court to consider their validity.
19. Moreover, the notice and the order are traceable to the statutory
framework of the Slums Act, especially in Section 14,21 and the
same having been issued in purported exercise of statutory power
were amenable to judicial review. Therefore, these actions must be
taken strictly in accordance with the legislative framework, and any
challenge that raises questions about the legality and integrity of
such acts is maintainable under Article 226. This preliminary objection
raised by the Appellants, thus, would fail. The appeals must, instead,
be considered on their merits.

E.2 Issue II: The Impact of the 2018 Amendment on the Slums
Act
20. The learned Senior Counsels for the Appellants strenuously argued
that, as a consequence of the 2018 Amendment, there is no statutory
requirement to issue a separate notice for initiation of proceedings

21 Reproduced in Paragraph 9.4.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1403

Saldanha Real Estate Private Limited v.
Bishop John Rodrigues and Others

under Section 13 of the Slums Act.22 The reason attributed to this
inference was that such a notice already stands effected on a
landowner under Section 3C, as a rule of audi alteram partem within
the process of notifying the land as an SR Area. It was thus elaborated
that in view of the changed legislative policy, the precondition of a
separate notice under Section 13 as outlined in Indian Cork Mills
(supra) and upheld by this Court in Tarabai (supra) would no longer
be applicable. It was clarified that the cited decisions pertain to the
situation as it stood prior to the 2018 Amendment and are, thus,
distinguishable.
21. In this regard, a pointed reference was also made to the phrase,
‘which shall not be more than one hundred and twenty days’ in
Section 13,23 to buttress the submission that the onus has been shifted
onto the landowner to remain vigilant and submit the SR Scheme
within the stipulated period once the Section 3C(1) Declaration is
issued.
22. On a bare perusal of the 2018 Amendment, it seems to us that no
attempt has been made to remove or dilute the preferential right of
the landowner to redevelop an SR Area. All those provisions which
have been analysed in Tarabai (supra) lead to only one conclusion,
i.e., that the owner has a primary right to undertake development,
and none of the provisions have been amended. Rather, the owner’s
right is now further entrenched into the legislative scheme, with
the addition of the term ‘owner’ into the text of Section 3B(5) and
Section 13,24 along with the existing expressions of ‘landholders’ and
‘occupants’. The Legislature has, thus, expressly acknowledged the
distinct rights enjoyed by the owner or a landlord within Chapter I-A.
23. In order to address the Appellants’ contention, it is germane, firstly,
to observe that, under Chapter I-A, no occasion arises for any
stakeholder to develop an area unless it has been finally notified
as an SR Area. In other words, the Section 3C(1) Declaration is a
stage prior to redevelopment being initiated under Section 13.25 The

22 Reproduced in Paragraph 9.1.
23 Reproduced in Paragraph 9.1.
24 Reproduced in Paragraphs 7.4 and 9.1.
25 Reproduced in Paragraph 9.1.
1404 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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issuance of a notice under Section 3C26 is meant to accord hearing
to a landowner and invite objections, if any, against declaration as an
SR Area. By contrast, this Court, in Tarabai (supra), has expressly
held that the purpose of a specific notice under Section 13 is to
invite and enable the owner to initiate redevelopment. Keeping in
mind the fact that both the provisions operate in different directions
and for different purposes, what is deemed to be mandated under
Section 13 cannot be rendered moot by the stipulations in Section
3C. With this view of the matter, the plea of the Appellants that the
new mechanism within Section 3C no longer necessitates a separate
notice-cum-invitation on the landowner cannot be accepted.
24. Further, Tarabai (supra) outlines very cogent and critical reasons for
why the specific notice under Section 1327 is a mandatory requirement.
This Court, considering the practical realities of preparing an SR
Scheme as well as the potentially drastic consequences of not
submitting the same, held that it would not be feasible for the owner
to file the scheme without being invited to do so. The newly added
qualification of 120 days in Section 13 in no way impacts or has
any relation to such an invitation or the reasons behind its necessity.
The incorporation of this condition cannot lead to the conclusion
that the notice-cum-invitation is no longer required. Rather, the
stipulated time-limit would come into effect after the owner is notified
and invited to redevelop the SR Area, whereupon they must come
forward within the time-ceiling. The claim of the Appellants that the
owner is expected to present an SR Scheme within 120 days of the
Section 3C(1) Declaration without any notice-cum-invitation is wholly
misconceived and, thus, accordingly rejected.
25. On a conspectus of the 2018 Amendment and the perceived
resultant variation on the pre-amendment legislative policy, we are
satisfied that the holistic interpretation of the Slums Act made by this
Court in Tarabai (supra) is also squarely applicable on post-2018
Amendment actions/events, barring the now legislatively stipulated
timeline within which a redevelopment scheme has to be submitted
by an interested landowner. It, then, goes without saying that SRA’s
actions initiating the acquisition in the instant case must also be

26 Reproduced in Paragraph 8.
27 Reproduced in Paragraph 9.1.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1405

Saldanha Real Estate Private Limited v.
Bishop John Rodrigues and Others

tested against the same principles, which we shall now proceed to
assess in the following issue.

E.3 Issue III: Validity of Acquisition
26. This Court in Tarabai (supra) has unequivocally established that: (i)
the private owner of an SR Area has a preferential right to develop
it; (ii) the SRA must invite the landowner to come forward with a
redevelopment proposal and give them reasonable time to do so
before the said preferential right extinguishes; and (iii) the State or
the SRA cannot move to acquire the land before the preferential
right of the owner is extinguished. These principles will also apply
mutatis mutandis to the case in hand.
27. Consequently, there vests a preferential right in favour of the Church
Trust, over and above the SRA, occupants, or other stakeholders, to
develop the Subject Land. The Trust ought to have been invited by
the SRA to submit a proposal and undertake such redevelopment
after the declaration dated 29.12.2020 was issued. Thus, the SRA
cannot proceed for acquisition of the Subject Land unless (i) such
a notice-cum-invitation is extended, and (ii) thereafter, the right of
the Church Trust is extinguished if it fails to submit a redevelopment
scheme within the prescribed period of 120 days.
28. The High Court has held that there was no compliance of these
preconditions by the SRA before initiating the acquisition, and the
entire process was liable to be invalidated. The High Court has
further found from the conduct of the Appellants that the acquisition
proceedings arose from an exercise of power in bad faith. We,
therefore, now proceed to examine whether the High Court was right
in drawing such a conclusion.

E.3.1 Prerequisites for Acquisition
29. At the cost of repetition, it may be reiterated that Mr. Divan advanced
a two-pronged submission. First, he contended that all statutory
requirements for initiating acquisition, particularly the issuance of
notice to the Church Trust, had been duly complied with. Second,
he argued that the Church Trust, by failing to proactively develop
the Subject Land or submit a proposal in the prescribed format
under Regulation 33(10) of the DCPR 2034, had effectively waived
its preferential right. On this basis, he asserted that the acquisition
proceedings were valid and did not merit interference.
1406 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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E.3.1.1 No Notice-cum-Invitation for Redevelopment
30. Regarding the first strand of these claims, we hasten to observe at
the very outset that there is no notice or invitation under Section 13
on the record that was issued to the Church Trust.
31. The only communication relied upon by the Appellants is the Deputy
Collector, SRA forwarding the Section 3C(1) Declaration to the Church
Trust. We have already held that such notice does not amount to
compliance with the procedure contemplated under Section 13 of the
Slums Act.28
32. The inevitable consequence of the SRA’s omission to issue a separate
notice under Section 1329 is that the Church Trust’s preferential right
to redevelop the Subject Land remains intact. In the absence of a
valid notice or opportunity, there existed no legal basis to extinguish
this right. The acquisition was, therefore, vitiated in law, falling afoul
of the prescribed procedure.

E.3.1.2 No Waiver of Preferential Right
33. Having held so, we shall now consider whether the Church Trust
has, through its conduct, waived the preferential right to develop the
Subject Land. Since such right can extinguish only after the owner is
invited for redevelopment, the threshold for how such right may be
waived, even before an invitation is extended, is inevitably high. In
our view, if there is no clear and overt communication by the owner
that it does not wish to exercise its preferential right to develop the
SR Area, there cannot be an automatic waiver of the right.
34. The record demonstrates that the Church Trust has, since 2013,
consistently expressed its intent to redevelop the Subject Land.
Following the Section 3C(1) Declaration dated 29.12.2020, the Trust
reiterated its willingness to undertake redevelopment, including by
submitting a consolidated proposal to the SRA and BMC, which
addressed both, the slum dwellers’ entitlements and the utilisation
of its remaining land. During the pendency of the Writ Petition, it
also appointed a developer through a bidding process to implement
its development plan. In these circumstances, there is no basis to
infer any waiver of its preferential right.

28 Reproduced in Paragraph 9.1.
29 Reproduced in Paragraph 9.1.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1407

Saldanha Real Estate Private Limited v.
Bishop John Rodrigues and Others

35. Although some concerns were raised during the course of the hearing
regarding the permissibility of an amalgamated development, these
issues do not fall for adjudication in the instant appeals. As such,
we need not delve into the validity of the Church Trust’s proposal
in terms of the applicable Regulations. Suffice it to say that these
contentions do not undermine the Church Trust’s clear and consistent
intent to undertake the rehabilitation of the Subject Slum.
36. Given the above findings in respect of the invitation to the Church
Trust and its persistent effort to redevelop the Subject Land, the
prerequisites of initiating an acquisition under Section 14,30 as laid
out in Tarabai (supra), have not been fulfilled. The High Court has
thus made no error in holding that the acquisition ought to be ex
facie illegal.

E.3.2 Questionable Conduct of the Parties
37. We now turn to the second ground on which the High Court quashed
the acquisition. The High Court not only found the integrity and
objectivity of the acquisition process compromised but also cast
suspicion on the motives of the Appellants. Upon our own independent
scrutiny of the facts, we too are impelled to draw adverse inferences
from the Appellants’ disconcerting conduct throughout the acquisition
proceedings.
38. While the record reveals a concerted and motivated attempt by the
parties to acquire the Subject Land, we shall now proceed to examine,
in detail, the conduct of the private and official Appellants separately.

E.3.2.1 Conduct of Kadeshwari Society and Saldanha
39. The primary ground for doubting the bona fide of Kadeshwari Society
lies in its persistent resistance to the Church Trust’s efforts to redevelop
the Subject Slum. The Trust has overwhelmingly demonstrated that
the proposed redevelopment ensures all statutory entitlements to
slum dwellers, including allotment of units on the Subject Land itself.
These units exceed the minimum size mandated under Regulation
33(10) of the DCPR 2034, with all other entitlements either matching
or surpassing the regulatory requirements.

30 Reproduced in Paragraph 9.4.
1408 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

40. Despite the Church Trust’s proposal offering significantly
better benefits, Kadeshwari Society has persisted in pursuing
redevelopment exclusively through Saldanha. This choice inevitably
disadvantages the slum dwellers, who stand to receive smaller units
and reduced benefits. Meanwhile, Saldanha gains the opportunity
to commercially exploit the Subject Land, acquired at a fraction of
its market value, in one of Mumbai’s most land-constrained areas.
This stark divergence between the welfare of slum dwellers and
the Society’s perplexing allegiance to Saldanha compels us to
conclude that Saldanha is, in effect, orchestrating the Society’s
actions from behind the scenes.
41. Saldanha’s actions suggest a calculated attempt to wrest the
Subject Land from the Church Trust, along with over 380 sq. m. of
adjoining BMC land, by exploiting the markedly low acquisition rates
for commercial gain. This intent surfaces as early as its proposal to
privately purchase the land from the Church Trust. While seemingly a
bona-fide negotiation, the text of the correspondence reveals a veiled
threat aimed at pressuring the Trust into relinquishing its property.
This is particularly evident in Saldanha’s letter dated 03.04.2018,
addressed to Bishop John Rodrigues, the relevant portion of which
is reproduced hereafter:
“ [xxxx]
As you are already aware, the Pawar Chawl has been in
existence since 1935 and the members are in possession
and occupation of this portion of land admeasuring
approximately 1590 sq.mtrs of which 1532 sq.mtrs has
been declared as slum. The members of Pawar Chawl
have been paying the municipal taxes and water
bills since inception and are in a position to make
a claim that they are in adverse possession of the
land or even approach the CEO, SRA to acquire this
portion of land declared slum and occupied by them
under the SRA rules and regulations with regard to
acquisition as per the legal advice given to them. If
implemented, it would take a maximum time of three
months to acquire or claim adverse possession as
the structures of the slum are in a total dilapidated
condition.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1409

Saldanha Real Estate Private Limited v.
Bishop John Rodrigues and Others

Owing to the above, I request you to take a quick
decision to execute the matters in this regard and to
grant us the conveyance/perpetual lease in our favour.
We have already entered into a development
agreement with Shree Kadeshwari Society (Proposed)
for the redevelopment of their slum occupying
B/960 (pt) under SRA Scheme 33(10) and awaiting
your response so that we are able to execute go
ahead with the project. We will obtain all necessary
permissions including that of the Charity Commissioner
if at all necessary.
In case of any further queries, we will be happy to discuss
to take things further. We do hope you will consider our offer
favorably, assuring you of our best services at all times.
[xxxx] ”
[Sic] [Emphasis supplied]

42. Subsequently, upon realising that the Church Trust was unwilling
to part with the Subject Land, Saldanha initiated a driven attempt
to usurp it through the machinery of the SRA. Acting through
Kadeshwari Society as its proxy, it sought to effectuate what can
only be described as a land grab—one that aligns squarely with the
tenor of its earlier coercive communication. At every stage of the
Section 3C(1) Declaration and the ensuing acquisition proceedings,
the pattern of conduct exhibited by both Saldanha and Kadeshwari
Society points unmistakably to the former calling the shots, while
safely being in the shadows.
43. Such pervasive influence inevitably corrupts any action taken by
Kadeshwari Society as well as Saldanha and calls upon us to impute
patently dishonest intent on their conjoined attempt to take over
development of the Subject Land.

E.3.2.2 SRA’s Conduct
44. Considering the other side of the coin, we find the manner in which
the SRA and its functionaries have approached this case is even
more shocking. The record reveals a dire lack of application of mind
or any objective and coherent reasoning in the decisions of the SRA.
1410 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

45. Despite the judgement of the High Court in Indian Cork Mills
(supra) continuing to hold the field, the SRA’s actions expose its
attempts to thwart any possibility of the Church Trust exercising its
preferential right.
46. First, after the Subject Land was declared as an SR Area on
29.12.2020, the SRA never issued any specific notice to the Church
Trust. It blatantly chose to shrug off its duty to invite the owner to
come forward with a scheme for redevelopment. Instead, the SRA
merely forwarded the Section 3C(1) Declaration to the Trust, trying to
create an impression that it was completing all requisite processes,
while not actually fulfilling the basic requirement of specific notice.
47. Second, the SRA paid no heed to the Church Trust’s attempts for a
consolidated redevelopment. When the Trust’s proposal was forwarded
on 04.05.2021, the SRA made no attempt to act on it. Instead, while
it remained pending, the SRA proceeded to process and favourably
consider Saldanha’s proposal, including advancing the acquisition
process. Although the SRA conducted a hearing for the Church Trust, it
turned down the Trust’s proposal during the intervening period between
two acquisition hearing dates on the flimsy ground that it was not
submitted in the prescribed format or to the designated Head Clerk,
Engineering. Importantly, no attempt was made by the SRA to allow
the Church Trust to rectify the purported deficiencies in its proposal.
Instead, a mere general rejection of the proposal was conveyed.
48. Finally, the SRA did not consider that the Section 3C(1) Declaration
dated 29.12.2020 was itself under challenge in Application No. 20
of 2021 before the AGRC. By going on appeal, the Church Trust
has challenged the very status of the Subject Land as an SR Area.
Such status is a sine qua non for acquisition under Section 14.31
Given the irreversible consequences and third-party interests created
by it, the SRA ought not to have gone ahead with the proposal for
acquisition till the very foundation of the acquisition was confirmed in
the statutory appeal. Nevertheless, for some inexplicable reason and
with a sense of uncharacteristic urgency, which again speaks to the
invisible but pervading influence of the powerful private developer,
the SRA has forsaken the basic tenets of equity and recommended
the acquisition.

31 Reproduced in Paragraph 9.4.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1411

Saldanha Real Estate Private Limited v.
Bishop John Rodrigues and Others

49. Throughout this case, the SRA and its CEO appear to have abandoned
their public duty to uphold the Rule of Law and protect the rights
of the landowner. On the contrary, the facts reveal a prejudiced
attempt by the SRA to undermine legislative and judicial efforts and
hand over the Subject Land and the benefits of its rehabilitation to
Saldanha. Such actions of a public authority, marred by collusion
and connivance and motivated by extraneous profit interests of
private builders, are highly depreciable and underline the possibility
of bureaucratic misuse of statutory provisions.
50. The facts of the instant case compel us to infer that Saldanha’s
overreaching influence went beyond the slum-dwellers’ proposed
society. In its attempt to take over the Subject Land, the developer
appears to have gotten the typically slow-moving bureaucratic
wheels of the SRA to run at full speed. Moreover, Saldanha was
able to achieve this manoeuvre at a time when the entire country
was under lockdown and the machinery of governance was
overwhelmed by the unprecedented challenges of the COVID-19
pandemic.
51. These circumstances underpin the need for practical and actionable
safeguards in a legal system involving competing interests among
private parties. The Slums Act, while providing wholesome protection
to slum dwellers and their homes and livelihood, does not give
such express protection to the interests of the owner of the land.
The ensuing vacuum, as we have seen in these appeals, allows
opportunistic developers to swoop in, exploit the circumstances of
the poor slum dwellers, manipulate the hand-in-glove authorities,
and enrich themselves off the helpless owner’s land.
52. Keeping the facts of this case and the obviously colourable conduct
of the Appellants in mind, the acquisition proceedings cannot be
allowed to sustain. As such, the High Court has rightly nipped these
proceedings in the bud, protecting the statutory rights and interests of
the Church Trust over the Subject Land and preventing the Appellants
from illegally grabbing it.

F. Conclusion and Directions
53. For the reasons set out above, the instant appeals are dismissed.
The following conclusions and directions are accordingly issued:
1412 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

i. The Impugned Judgement of the High Court stands upheld;
ii. Liberty is granted to the Church Trust to submit, within a period
of 120 days, an SR Scheme for the redevelopment of the Subject
Slum, strictly in accordance with laws and regulations in force;
iii. The Church Trust shall be bound by the offer of the size of the
apartments as well as other benefits and entitlements already
made by it to the slum dwellers;
iv. The SRA shall offer full support to the Church Trust for surveys,
demarcation, etc., as per the applicable Regulations, to enable
it to submit an SR Scheme; and
v. The SRA and the State shall process the Church Trust’s proposal
as expeditiously as possible within the prescribed procedure,
within a period of 60 days from the date of the Trust’s submission.
54. All the matters and pending interlocutory applications, if any, stand
disposed of in the aforementioned terms and directions.
55. Ordered accordingly.

Result of the case: Appeals dismissed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain