Holding

The JMFC’s direction under Section 156(3) CrPC to refer the complaint for police investigation was justified as there was sufficient prima facie material indicating cognizable offences, and the High Court’s quashing of that order was erroneous.

Summary

The complainant, Sadiq B. Hanchinmani, filed a private criminal complaint alleging that the accused had forged an e‑stamp rent agreement to illegally occupy his property and had committed offences under Sections 120B, 201, 419, 471, 468 and 420 IPC. The Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC) referred the matter to the police under Section 156(3) CrPC, leading to the registration of an FIR. The accused challenged the JMFC’s order before the High Court, which quashed the direction and the FIR. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the JMFC had sufficient material to justify the investigation and whether the High Court’s interference was proper. Relying on precedents that a magistrate may direct police investigation when a prima facie case of cognizable offence exists, the Court held that the JMFC’s order was justified. Consequently, the High Court’s orders were set aside, the FIR was restored, and the police were directed to continue the investigation.

Issues considered

Whether the direction issued by the Judicial Magistrate First Class under Section 156(3) CrPC to refer the private complaint to the police was justified.
Whether the JMFC had sufficient material on record to warrant a police investigation, thereby justifying the FIR.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 151, s. 1513
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 156(3), s. 173(8), s. 190, s. 202, s. 460, s. 482
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120B, s. 201, s. 419, s. 420, s. 468, s. 471
Right to Information Act, 2005

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether the direction for investigation to the police issued by the JMFC-Judicial Magistrate First Class u/s.156(3) CrPC which was quashed by the impugned orders, justified; had sufficient material before it so as to justify the course of action of referring the matter for investigation to the police invoking power u/s.156(3) of the Code, resulting in the institution of the FIR. Headnotes† Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.156(3), 482 –

Subjects

Police InvestigationJudicial Magistrate First ClassPolice invoking power u/s.156(3) CrPCRent AgreementE-Stamp PaperUsage of the term ‘further’

Judgment

[2025] 11 S.C.R. 246 : 2025 INSC 1282

Sadiq B. Hanchinmani
v.
The State of Karnataka & Ors.
R1: The State of Karnataka
R2: Chndrumal
R3: Sanjay
R4: Nandkumar
R5: Vijay
(Criminal Appeal No. 4728 of 2025)
04 November 2025
[Pankaj Mithal and Ahsanuddin Amanullah,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Issue arose whether the direction for investigation to the police issued
by the JMFC-Judicial Magistrate First Class u/s.156(3) CrPC which
was quashed by the impugned orders, justified; and whether the
JMFC had sufficient material before it so as to justify the course of
action of referring the matter for investigation to the police invoking
power u/s.156(3) of the Code, resulting in the institution of the FIR.

Headnotes†
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.156(3), 482 –
Investigation – Private complaint by the appellant-complainant
before the JMFC-Judicial Magistrate First Class against the
accused-private respondents u/ss.120B, 201, 419, 471, 468 and
420 IPC – Appellant alleged that the accused persons executed
Rent Agreement and E-Stamp Paper which was fake to illegally
claim possession over certain property – Complaint filed before
the JMFC and JMFC referred the matter for investigation to the
Police Station – FIR was registered against accused persons
for offences punishable u/ss.120B, 201, 419, 471, 468 and 420
IPC, and investigation was undertaken – Accused persons
filed petitions u/s.482 CrPC to quash the Order passed by the
JMFC insofar as it related to the respective accused – High
Court allowed the same – Correctness:
Held: JMFC’s Order cannot be faulted – Enough material
available to justify a full-fledged investigation by the police – JMFC
rightly referred the matter for investigation to the police since a
* Author
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 247

Sadiq B. Hanchinmani v. The State of Karnataka & Ors.

prima facie case stood made out against the accused, in view of
the material that was available with the JMFC – High Court vide
the First Impugned Order, seems to have been unduly swayed by
the usage of the term ‘further’ by the JMFC – JMFC had referred
the matter to police u/s.156(3) of the Code, and the usage of
‘further’ was not in the context of s.173(8) CrPC, which fine
distinction the First Impugned Order has glossed over – Instant
case demonstrate material showing the commission of cognizable
offences, on the face of it, which would merit police investigation –
Thus, interdiction of the impugned orders necessitated – On an
overall circumspection of the facts and circumstances of the case,
the material on record, the First and Second impugned orders set
aside – FIR restored – Police to investigate the case expeditiously
in accordance with law. [Paras 38-43]

Case Law Cited
Priyanka Shrivastava v. State of U.P. [2015] 4 SCR 108 :
(2015) 6 SCC 287; Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State
of Maharashtra [2021] 4 SCR 1044 : (2021) 19 SCC 401;
Meena M. Dongare v. Sadiq S/O Bashirahmad Hanchanmani,
Special Leave Petitions (Civil) No. 1667-1668/2016; Samee
Khan v. Bindu Khan [1998] Supp. 1 SCR 244 : (1998) 7 SCC
59; Madhao v. State of Maharashtra [2013] 5 SCR 484 : (2013)
5 SCC 615; Ramdev Food Products Private Limited v. State of
Gujarat [2015] 5 SCR 283 : (2015) 6 SCC 439; Cardinal Mar
George Alencherry v. State of Kerala [2023] 2 SCR 1014 : (2023)
18 SCC 730 – referred to.

List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860; Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908; Right to Information Act, 2005.

List of Keywords
Police Investigation; Judicial Magistrate First Class; Police invoking
power u/s.156(3) CrPC; Rent Agreement; E-Stamp Paper; Usage
of the term ‘further’.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
4728 of 2025
248 [2025] 11 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

From the Judgment and Order dated 18.11.2021 of the High Court
of Karnataka Circuit Bench at Dharwad in CRLP No. 100651 of 2018
With
Criminal Appeal No. 4729 of 2025

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Shailesh Madiyal, Sr. Adv., Rohit Kumar Singh, Ms. Divija Mahajan,
Ms. Nishi Singh, Ms. Shweta Priyadarshini, Shikhar Gupta,
Shubham V. Gawande.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Prateek Chadha, A.A.G., D. L. Chidananda, N. D. B. Raju,
Mrs. Barathi Raju, Ms Vasundhara Raju, M. A. Chinnasamy, C
Raghavendren, Mrs. C Rubavathi.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.

Delay condoned.
2. Leave granted in both petitions.
3. The instant criminal appeals, at the instance of the complainant,
seek to assail the Final Judgments and Orders dated 18.11.2021
in CRLP No.100651/2018 [2021:KHC-D:90] (hereinafter referred to
as the ‘Second Impugned Order’) and dated 24.07.2019 in CRLP
No.100549/2018 [2019:KHC-D:5908] (hereinafter referred to as the
‘First Impugned Order’) passed by two learned Single Judges of the
High Court of Karnataka, Bench at Dharwad (hereinafter referred to
as the ‘High Court’), whereby the High Court allowed the accused-
private respondents’ petitions under Section 4821 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Code’),

1 ‘482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.—Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect
the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any
order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends
of justice.’
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 249

Sadiq B. Hanchinmani v. The State of Karnataka & Ors.

consequently quashing the Order dated 18.01.2018 passed by the
learned Judicial Magistrate First Class-III Court, Belagavi (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘JMFC’), insofar as it related to the respective
accused-private respondents.

BRIEF FACTS:
4. The appellant-complainant lodged a private complaint viz. PCR
No.1/2018 before the JMFC against the private respondents under
Sections 120B, 201, 419, 471, 468 and 420 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘IPC’).
5. The appellant-complainant had filed a suit being O.S. No.43/2009
before the learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Belagavi,
seeking a declaration that he is the owner in possession of the
suit property as per oral gift by his father and also to declare the
Sale Deed dated 03.02.2009 executed by his father Bashirahmad
in favour of accused no.1 as illegal, void and not binding on him.
It is relevant to note that Bashirahmad remained ex-parte since
he did not contest the suit. The matter was heard and the suit
came to be dismissed on 28.03.2013. Consequently, the appellant
preferred an appeal being R.F.A. No.4095/2013 before the High
Court. An interim application under Order XLI Rule 52 read with

2 ‘5. Stay by Appellate Court.—(1) An appeal shall not operate as a stay of proceedings under a decree
or order appealed from except so far as the Appellate Court may order, nor shall execution of a decree
be stayed by reason only of an appeal having been preferred from the decree; but the Appellate Court
may for sufficient cause order stay of execution of such decree.
Explanation.—An order by the Appellate Court for the stay of execution of the decree shall be effective
from the date of the communication of such order to the Court of first instance, but an affidavit sworn
by the appellant, based on his personal knowledge, stating that an order for the stay of execution of the
decree has been made by the Appellate Court shall, pending the receipt from the Appellate Court of the
order for the stay of execution or any order to the contrary, be acted upon by the Court of first instance.
(2) Stay by Court which passed the decree.—Where an application is made for stay of execution of an
appealable decree before the expiration of the time allowed for appealing therefrom, the Court which
passed the decree may on sufficient cause being shown order the execution to be stayed.
(3) No order for stay of execution shall be made under sub-rule (1) or sub-rule (2) unless the Court
making it is satisfied—
(a) that substantial loss may result to the party applying for stay of execution unless the order is
made;
(b) that the application has been made without unreasonable delay; and
(c) that security has been given by the applicant for the due performance of such decree or order as
may ultimately be binding upon him.
(4) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (3), the Court may make an ex parte order for stay of execution
pending the hearing of the application.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing sub-rules, where the appellant fails to make
the deposit or furnish the security specified in sub-rule (3) of Rule 1, the Court shall not make an order
staying the execution of the decree.’
250 [2025] 11 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Section 1513 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘CPC’) was filed seeking stay of the operation
of the Judgment and Decree dated 28.03.2013. Vide Order dated
03.06.2013, the High Court passed an interim order to maintain status
quo regarding title and possession of the suit property, which was
extended during the pendency of the appeal, but was subsequently
vacated.
6. During the pendency of the afore-noted appeal, the appellant came
to know that on 18.06.2015, Veena, (accused no.1) though in the
F.I.R. her name is mentioned as Meena and her husband, along
with others, broke open the lock put to the suit property without
permission and trespassed into the same and started renovation/
construction in the suit property. The appellant issued a Notice
calling upon them to stop the renovation/construction work. The
renovation/construction work was stopped. The appellant later came
to know that, on 18.10.2015, accused nos.1 and 2 and others again
broke open the lock put to the property and re-started the work. The
appellant then filed an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A4
read with Section 151 of the CPC, being I.A.No.1/2015 in R.F.A.
No.4095/2013, seeking initiation of contempt proceedings against
accused nos.1 and 4. Accused no.1 filed a reply to I.A.No.1 of 2015
and produced a document embossed as an E-Stamp Paper dated
20.05.2013, styled as a Rent Agreement and some rent receipts.
The said Rent Agreement was executed by accused no.1 in favour
of accused no.2.
7. The appellant filed an application before the Inspector General of
Registration and Commissioner of Stamps, Bengaluru, Department
of Stamps and Registration, Government of Karnataka, for getting

3 ‘151. Saving of inherent powers of Court.—Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise
affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice
or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.’
4 ‘2-A. Consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction.—(1) In the case of disobedience of any
injunction granted or other order made under Rule 1 or Rule 2 or breach of any of the terms on which the
injunction was granted or the order made, of the Court granting the injunction or making the order, or any
Court to which the suit or proceeding is transferred, may order the property of the person guilty of such
disobedience or breach to be attached, and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison
for a term not exceeding three months, unless in the meantime the Court directs his release.
(2) No attachment made under this rule shall remain in force for more than one year, at the end of
which time, if the disobedience or breach continues, the property attached may be sold and out of the
proceeds, the Court may award such compensation as it thinks fit to the injured party and shall pay the
balance, if any, to the party entitled thereto.’
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 251

Sadiq B. Hanchinmani v. The State of Karnataka & Ors.

a certified copy of the document, which was produced by the
contemnor/accused no.1 before the Court in the first appeal, styled
as a Rent Agreement. The appellant came to know that the said
E-Stamp Paper was fake, as he obtained certified copy(ies) of the
Stamp Paper bearing same serial number, which did not tally with
the Stamp Paper that was produced before the High Court.
8. The Rent Agreement was executed by accused no.1 in favour of
accused no.2, and the appellant alleges that it was ante-dated to
show that it came into existence prior to the date of the status quo
Order passed by the High Court.
9. It is contended that all the accused, in collusion with one another,
created and produced the forged, fabricated and manufactured
document to obtain a favourable order and to obtain the possession of
the suit property and have also concocted the rent receipts to justify
their possession over the property. A complaint was also lodged with
Khade Bazar Police Station, Belagavi to enquire about the forgery
and concoction of the document. Still, no steps were taken by the
police on the said complaint.
10. The appellant later filed a private complaint before the JMFC. The
JMFC vide Order dated 18.01.2018 felt that the matter was to be
referred for investigation under Section 156(3)5 of the Code. The JMFC
referred the case for investigation to the Khade Bazar Police Station.
Accordingly, a First Information Report was registered against accused
nos.1 to 7 as Crime No.12/2018 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘FIR’)
for offences punishable under Sections 120B, 201, 419, 471, 468
and 420 of the IPC, and investigation was undertaken. The learned
JMFC in the Order dated 18.01.2018 recorded ‘The complainant has
complied with the directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Priyanka Shrivastava vs. State of UP in (2015) 6 SCC 287.’ (sic)
11. The High Court, in the First Impugned Order, observed as under,
inter alia:
‘10. … Without mentioning anything the learned Magistrate
has passed the order for further investigation though no

5 ‘156.Police officer’s power to investigate cognizable case.—
(1)…
(2)…
(3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as abovementioned.’
252 [2025] 11 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

law contemplated the learned Magistrate to go for further
investigation. If at all any further investigation has to be
made that will be only after if any final report is filed by
the investigating agency and if there are any deficiencies
and if any request is made by the police under Section
173(8) Cr.P.C, then under such circumstances the Court
can exercise. But when the private complaint has been filed
and directly the court has passed for further investigation
without any justifiable reasons in that light, the said order
itself appears to be not justifiable since the court has not
applied its mind and it is not sustainable in the eye of law.’
(emphasis supplied)

12. The High Court, in the Second Impugned Order, recorded, inter
alia, as below:
‘24. … Even though, respondent No.2 filed a suit before the
civil court seeking declaration of his right over the property
claiming to be the owner of the property on the basis of the
oral gift deed and that the registered sale deed executed
by his father in favour of accused No.1 is not binding on
him, admittedly, the said suit filed in O.S.No.43/2009 came
to be dismissed and it is held that registered sale deed
is executed by the father of respondent No.2 conveying
the title over the property in favour of accused Nos.1,
and respondent No.2 is not entitled for the declaration as
sought for. Challenging the said judgment and decree,
RFA No.4095/2013 is filed before this court, which is still
pending for consideration. Even though status-quo order
was passed in respect of the title and possession of the
property, it is made clear by this court that it is only to
protect the title and possession of accused No.1, who is
held to be in possession over the schedule property. Even
though the said finding given by the trial court is under
challenge before this court, the fact remains that there are
no prima facie materials to contend that the possession
of the property was handed over in favour of respondent
No.2 by his father at any time. …
xxx
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 253

Sadiq B. Hanchinmani v. The State of Karnataka & Ors.

27. It is also pertinent to note that accused No.2 and 5
to 7 who are petitioners herein, are not parties either in
O.S.No.43/2009 or in RFA No.4095/2013 before this court.
Under such circumstances, respondent No.2 should have
made clear about the role played by these petitioners
in concocting the document as contented by him and
producing the same before the court to take advantage
of the same in the first information.’
(emphasis supplied)

THE APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS:
13. The primary contention of the appellant is that the Rent Agreement
produced by Chandrumal M. Parchani-respondent in collusion with
other respondents on an E-Stamp Paper is fake.
14. The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently submitted that
even the Inspector General of Registration and Commissioner of
Stamps, addressed a letter to the Registrar, High Court of Karnataka,
stating that on perusal of the reports submitted by the Area Manager
(E-Stamping) and the authorized signatory of the Karnataka State
Souharda Federal Co-operative Ltd., Bengaluru, prima facie, the
E-Stamp purchased by Chandrumal M. Parchani-respondent and
used for the Rent Agreement is a fake E-Stamp.
15. The learned counsel further stated that the District Registrar,
Belagavi, has directed that a police complaint be filed against
Chandrumal M. Parchani-respondent, the purchaser of the E-Stamp
Paper and Sri Gajanana Multipurpose Souharda Sahakari Niyamit,
Danegalli, Shahapur, Belagavi which sold the fake E-Stamp Paper
and a separate complaint has been filed qua the said Sri Gajanana
Multipurpose Souharda Sahakari Niyamit.
16. The learned counsel emphasised that when the appellant filed
an application before the Inspector General of Registration and
Commissioner of Stamps, Department of Stamps and Registration,
Government of Karnataka, for obtaining a Certified Copy of the
document, which was produced before the High Court styled as a
Rent Agreement, the appellant came to know that the said E-Stamp
Paper was fake, as he obtained cerified copy(ies) of Stamp Paper
bearing a same serial number, which did not tally with the Stamp
Paper that was produced before the High Court.
254 [2025] 11 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

17. Learned counsel urged that it is conspicuous from the facts of the
case that all the private respondents, in both appeals, in collusion
with each other, concocted, forged, fabricated and manufactured the
document and produced the same before the High Court with mala
fide intention to obtain a favourable order and gain possession of the
suit property. It was advanced that the private respondents played
fraud upon the Court and also caused obstacles in the stream of
the justice delivery system.
18. In addition, learned counsel canvassed that the possibility of a
conspiracy hatched by the accused cannot be ruled out since there
is prima facie material that substantiates the appellant’s claim that
the E-Stamp Paper is a forged document.
19. It is further submitted that the appellant wrote a letter to various
authorities, including the learned Chief Justice of the High Court. In
turn, the Secretary to the learned Chief Justice, vide Letter dated
14.09.2017, instructed to follow-up with the investigation on the
complaint filed against the purchaser of the fake E-Stamp Paper
and the Sri Gajanana Multipurpose Souharda Sahakari Niyamit, the
issuer of the fake E-Stamp Paper.
20. Learned counsel contended that the High Court overlooked Neeharika
Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC
401, holding that criminal proceedings should not be thwarted at
the initial stage and the police should be allowed to investigate into
the matter and to submit a Final Report, when there are prima facie
materials against the accused.
21. Learned counsel pointed towards the conduct of Veena-respondent.
It is stated that she has deliberately and intentionally concealed facts
regarding the filing of Special Leave Petitions (Civil) No.1667-
1668/2016 titled ‘Meena M. Dongare v Sadiq S/O Bashirahmad
Hanchanmani’ against the Order dated 07.12.2015 in IA No.1/2023
passed by the High Court. The same was taken up on 01.02.2016,
but withdrawn on the first date of listing as under:
‘Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner seeks
permission to withdraw the Special Leave Petitions with
liberty to approach the High Court.
In view thereof, the Special Leave Petitions are dismissed
as withdrawn with liberty to approach the High Court by
filing appropriate application for appropriate relief.’
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 255

Sadiq B. Hanchinmani v. The State of Karnataka & Ors.

22. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the High Court,
through the Impugned Orders, has turned a blind eye to the fake
E-Stamp Paper, despite discrepancies such as party names and the
amount of stamp duty.
23. The learned counsel wrapped up submissions by pointing out that
the investigation at the relevant point was at a nascent stage, and
the persons involved were on anticipatory bail, and no harm would
have been caused if the investigation was allowed to be completed.
24. Learned counsel submitted that the disputed document was first
produced before the High Court in R.F.A. No.4095 of 2013, and only
then did the existence of such document come to the knowledge
of the appellant. After obtaining a copy of the said document from
the department concerned and also after obtaining reports from the
Karnataka State Souharda Federal Co-Operative Ltd., Bengaluru,
it is evident that it was accused no.2 who had forged the E-Stamp
Paper and the document styled as a Lease/Rent Agreement before
the High Court. As such, an in-depth investigation was required. It
was prayed to allow the appeals.

SUBMISSIONS BY RESPONDENT NO.1-THE STATE OF
KARNATAKA:
25. The counsel for the State reiterated some submissions made by the
appellant but clarified and supplemented the same infra.
26. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the State that the main
ground urged by respondents no.2 to 5 (accused nos.2, 5, 6 and 7)
in Criminal Appeal No. of 2025 @ SLP(Crl.) No.11336 of 2022 as
reflected in the Second Impugned Order before the High Court
was that earlier, accused nos.1 and 3, against whom criminal
proceedings were initiated, had approached the High Court by
filing CRLP No.100549/2018 seeking the quashing of proceedings
initiated against them. The High Court, therein, concluded that the
JMFC, without application of judicial mind, had referred the matter
for investigation. Therefore, Criminal Petition No.100549/2018 was
allowed and proceedings against respondents no. 2 and 3 (accused
nos.1 and 3) in Criminal Appeal No. . of 2025 @ SLP(Crl.) No.
of 2025 @ Diary No.39619 of 2022 were quashed vide the First
Impugned Order.
256 [2025] 11 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

27. Learned counsel argued that accused nos.2, 5, 6 and 7 claimed
parity as they contended that they were also on similar footing. But
allegations against accused nos.1 and 3 are different from those
against accused nos.2, 5, 6 and 7. Therefore, parity should not be
extended to them.
28. Learned counsel submitted that applying the same principles, the
Second Impugned Order followed, but the learned Single Judges
ought to have remanded the matter as the JMFC’s Order dated
18.01.2018 referring the matter for investigation to the police was
a curable defect, hit by Section 4606 of the Code, as it would fall
under irregularities which do not vitiate proceedings.
29. Learned counsel submitted that the Second Impugned Order
opined that the appellant had not made clear the role played by the
accused nos.2, 5, 6 and 7 in concocting and forging the document
and concluded that their role, against anybody, including the Court,
was unclear, but based on the documents on record, it was evident
that the forged E-stamp Paper was purchased by accused no.2.
Prayer was made to pass appropriate Order/Judgment, factoring in
the submissions noted supra.

SUBMISSIONS BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS:
30. It is pertinent to note that learned counsel for the accused-private
respondents entered appearance but the private respondents did not
file any Counter-Affidavit. Learned counsel supported the Impugned
Orders and urged that no good ground was made out to upset the
views taken therein.

6 ‘460. Irregularities which do not vitiate proceedings.—If any Magistrate not empowered by law to do
any of the following things, namely:—
(a) to issue a search-warrant under Section 94;
(b) to order, under Section 155, the police to investigate an offence;
(c) to hold an inquest under Section 176;
(d) to issue process under Section 187, for the apprehension of a person within his local jurisdiction who
has committed an offence outside the limits of such jurisdiction;
(e) to take cognizance of an offence under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 190;
(f) to make over a case under sub-section (2) of Section 192;
(g) to tender a pardon under Section 306;
(h) to recall a case and try it himself under Section 410; or
(i) to sell property under Section 458 or Section 459,
erroneously in good faith does that thing, his proceedings shall not be set aside merely on the ground of
his not being so empowered.’
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 257

Sadiq B. Hanchinmani v. The State of Karnataka & Ors.

31. Learned counsel submitted that vide Order dated 28.03.2016
in I.A. No.3/2016, the High Court vacated the status quo Order
dated 03.06.2013, qua the suit property and the keys of premises
were handed over to accused no.1 during the pendency of R.F.A.
No.4095/2013.
32. It was also submitted that the appellant harboured ulterior motive
against the private respondents, which is why he had chosen to
register the private complaint i.e., PCR No.1/2018.
33. Learned counsel argued that as R.F.A. No.4095/2013, concerning
the suit property, was decided ultimately in favour of the private
respondents concerned, therefore, no criminal liability could be
hoisted on them.

ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
34. The questions for consideration may be summed up as: (i) whether
the direction for investigation to the police issued by the JMFC under
Section 156(3) of the Code, which was quashed by the Impugned
Orders, is justified based on the facts and circumstances of the cases,
and; (ii) whether the JMFC had sufficient material before it so as to
justify the course of action of referring the matter for investigation to
the police invoking power under Section 156(3) of the Code, resulting
in the institution of the FIR.
35. The relevant and undisputed facts are that in R.F.A. No.4095/2013
before the High Court, an interim application under Order XLI Rule
5 read with Section 151 of the CPC was filed seeking stay of the
operation of the Judgment and Decree dated 28.03.2013. Vide
Order dated 03.06.2013, the High Court passed an interim order to
maintain status quo regarding title and possession of the suit property,
which was extended during the pendency of the appeal, but was
subsequently vacated. During the pendency of R.F.A. No.4095/2013,
the appellant came to know that on 18.06.2015, accused no.1 and
her husband, along with others, had broken open the lock put to the
suit property without permission and trespassed into the same and
started renovation/construction in the suit property. The appellant
issued a Notice calling upon them to stop the renovation/construction
work. The renovation/construction work was stopped. The appellant
later came to know that, on 18.10.2015, accused nos.1 and 2 and
others again broke open the lock put to the property and re-started
258 [2025] 11 S.C.R.

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the work. Thereafter, the appellant filed an application under Order
XXXIX Rule 2-A read with Section 151 of the CPC i.e. I.A.No.1/2015
in R.F.A. No.4095/2013, seeking initiation of contempt proceedings
against accused nos.1 and 4. Accused no.1 filed a reply to I.A.No.1
of 2015 and produced a document embossed as an E-Stamp Paper
dated 20.05.2013, styled as a Rent Agreement and some rent
receipts. This Rent Agreement was executed by accused no.1 in
favour of accused no.2. The defence taken in the reply to I.A.No.1
of 2015 was that prior to the passing of the status quo order on
03.06.2013, the suit property had already been let out to accused
no.2 on 20.05.2013 on rent basis, with a copy of the Rent Agreement
also annexed therewith. Further, rent receipts for a monthly rental of
Rs.3,000/- (Rupees Three Thousand) were also enclosed. We may
pause here since this will be a turning point in the present cases.
The Rent Agreement by accused no.1 in favour of accused no.2
is said to have been executed on 20.05.2013. However, the Rent
Agreement which was produced shows it was executed on E-Stamp
Paper bearing no.IN-KA82473995873571L dated 20.05.2013. This
document upon verification by the appellant, under the Right to
Information Act, 2005 from the Inspector General of Registration and
Commissioner of Stamps, Bengaluru, Department of Stamps and
Registration, Government of Karnataka reveals that the said E-Stamp
Paper Number with the same date of registration related to a Sale
Agreement between one J.D. Duradundi and one S.B. Janagouda.
Thus, it is clear that the Rent Agreement produced before the High
Court was shown on the E-Stamp Paper was used by the aforesaid
persons for a Sale Agreement, unconnected to accused nos.1 and
2 or to any Rent Agreement.
36. The accused no.1 has also stated that the tenant i.e., accused no.2
might have renovated and cleaned the suit property on 18.10.2015.
This is where the Court finds the truth coming out. In the copy of the
Rent/Lease Agreement which has been brought on record before
the High Court by accused no.1 herself, it is clearly stipulated that
accused no.2 will not change the nature of the premises and should
not carry out any repairs to the said premises without the written
consent of accused no.1. It is not the case of accused no.1 that
accused no.2 had sought any permission. Arguendo, assuming that
accused no.2 might have made some renovations, the same by itself
would not serve to absolve accused no.1 of the responsibility cast by
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 259

Sadiq B. Hanchinmani v. The State of Karnataka & Ors.

the Order dated 03.06.2013 to maintain status quo; further, if she was
aware that accused no.2 was violating the terms of the Rent/Lease
Agreement, inaction on her part to take appropriate action or steps
against/in respect of accused no.2 would make her responsible for
any violation of the Order dated 03.06.2013, which she concedes
might have been done by accused no.2 on 18.10.2015, i.e., during the
period of subsistence of the Order dated 03.06.2013, as the status quo
came to be vacated only on 28.03.2016. Examined, additionally, from
another lens, even if an injunction order is subsequently set aside,
consequences for breach/violation of the same when it subsisted,
could still befall upon the violator, as held in Samee Khan v Bindu
Khan, (1998) 7 SCC 59.7
37. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer to the position of law
enunciated in Madhao v State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 615,
wherein it was held that:
‘18. When a Magistrate receives a complaint he is not
bound to take cognizance if the facts alleged in the
complaint disclose the commission of an offence. The
Magistrate has discretion in the matter. If on a reading of
the complaint, he finds that the allegations therein disclose
a cognizable offence and the forwarding of the complaint
to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) will
be conducive to justice and save the valuable time of the
Magistrate from being wasted in enquiring into a matter
which was primarily the duty of the police to investigate,
he will be justified in adopting that course as an alternative
to taking cognizance of the offence itself. As said earlier,
in the case of a complaint regarding the commission of
cognizable offence, the power under Section 156(3) can be
invoked by the Magistrate before he takes cognizance of
the offence under Section 190(1)(a). However, if he once
takes such cognizance and embarks upon the procedure
embodied in Chapter XV, he is not competent to revert back
to the pre-cognizance stage and avail of Section 156(3).’
(emphasis supplied)

7 This position of law was recently reiterated in Lavanya C v Vittal Gurudas Pai, 2025 SCC OnLine SC
499, where one of us (P. Mithal, J.) was part of the coram.
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38. In the background of the factual position, the JMFC’s Order dated
18.01.2018 cannot be faulted. Enough material is available to justify
a full-fledged investigation by the police. The JMFC, to our mind,
had rightly referred the matter for investigation to the police since
a prima facie case stood made out against the accused, in view of
the material that was available with the JMFC. In Ramdev Food
Products Private Limited v State of Gujarat, (2015) 6 SCC 439,
three learned Judges of this Court opined:
‘13. We may first deal with the question as to whether the
Magistrate ought to have proceeded under Section 156(3)
or was justified in proceeding under Section 202(1) and
what are the parameters for exercise of power under the
two provisions.
xxx
22. Thus, we answer the first question by holding that:
22.1. The direction under Section 156(3) is to be issued,
only after application of mind by the Magistrate. When the
Magistrate does not take cognizance and does not find it
necessary to postpone the issuance of process and finds
a case made out to proceed forthwith, direction under the
said provision is issued. In other words, where on account of
credibility of information available, or weighing the interest
of justice it is considered appropriate to straightaway direct
investigation, such a direction is issued.
22.2. The cases where Magistrate takes cognizance and
postpones issuance of process are cases where the
Magistrate has yet to determine “existence of sufficient
ground to proceed”. Category of cases falling under para
120.6 in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2
SCC 1: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] may fall under Section 202.
22.3. Subject to these broad guidelines available from
the scheme of the Code, exercise of discretion by the
Magistrate is guided by interest of justice from case to case.
xxx
38. In Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana
Reddy [(1976) 3 SCC 252: 1976 SCC (Cri) 380], National
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 261

Sadiq B. Hanchinmani v. The State of Karnataka & Ors.

Bank of Oman v. Barakara Abdul Aziz [(2013) 2 SCC 488:
(2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 731], Madhao v. State of Maharashtra
[(2013) 5 SCC 615: (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 141], Rameshbhai
Pandurao Hedau v. State of Gujarat [(2010) 4 SCC 185:
(2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 801], the scheme of Sections 156(3)
and 202 has been discussed. It was observed that power
under Section 156(3) can be invoked by the Magistrate
before taking cognizance and was in the nature of pre-
emptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise
its plenary power of investigation beginning with Section
156 and ending with report or charge-sheet under Section
173. On the other hand, Section 202 applies at post-
cognizance stage and the direction for investigation was
for the purpose of deciding whether there was sufficient
ground to proceed.’
(emphasis supplied)

39. Ramdev (supra) was noticed in Cardinal Mar George Alencherry
v State of Kerala, (2023) 18 SCC 730. The High Court, especially
vide the First Impugned Order, seems to have been unduly swayed
by the usage of the term ‘further’ by the JMFC. The relevant extract
from the First Impugned Order has already been quoted hereinabove.
It would be in the fitness of things to note the JMFC’s Order dated
18.01.2018:
‘…
On perusal of the private complaint, it is noticed that the
aforesaid case needs to be further investigated by the
police. Hence, this Court feels that the aforesaid case
needs to be referred under Sec.156(3) of Cr.P.C.
Hence, the above matter is referred to Khade Bazar P.S.
for investigation under Sec.156(3) of Cr.P.C.
…’
(emphasis supplied)

40. The afore-extract leaves no room of doubt that the JMFC had referred
the matter to police under Section 156(3) of the Code, and the usage
of ‘further’ was not in the context of Section 173(8) of the Code,
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which fine distinction the First Impugned Order has glossed over.
The case(s) at hand, in our considered view, demonstrate material
showing the commission of cognizable offence(s), on the face of it,
which would merit police investigation. Therefore, interdiction of the
Impugned Orders is necessitated.
41. This Court in a composition of three learned Judges observed in
Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. (supra) as follows:
‘16. In a given case, there may be allegations of abuse of
process of law by converting a civil dispute into a criminal
dispute, only with a view to pressurise the accused.
Similarly, in a given case the complaint itself on the face
of it can be said to be barred by law. The allegations in
the FIR/complaint may not at all disclose the commission
of a cognizable offence. In such cases and in exceptional
cases with circumspection, the High Court may stay the
further investigation. However, at the same time, there may
be genuine complaints/FIRs and the police/investigating
agency has a statutory obligation/right/duty to enquire into
the cognizable offences. Therefore, a balance has to be
struck between the rights of the genuine complainants and
the FIRs disclosing commission of a cognizable offence and
the statutory obligation/duty of the investigating agency to
investigate into the cognizable offences on the one hand
and those innocent persons against whom the criminal
proceedings are initiated which may be in a given case abuse
of process of law and the process. However, if the facts are
hazy and the investigation has just begun, the High Court
would be circumspect in exercising such powers and the
High Court must permit the investigating agency to proceed
further with the investigation in exercise of its statutory duty
under the provisions of the Code. Even in such a case the
High Court has to give/assign brief reasons why at this
stage the further investigation is required to be stayed.
The High Court must appreciate that speedy investigation
is the requirement in the criminal administration of justice.’
42. It was further highlighted:
‘33.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by
the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 263

Sadiq B. Hanchinmani v. The State of Karnataka & Ors.

power under Section 482 CrPC, only has to consider
whether the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission
of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required
to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the
allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court
has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate
the allegations in the FIR.’
(emphasis supplied)

43. Thus, on an overall circumspection of the facts and circumstances
of the case, the material on record and the submissions made by
learned counsel for the parties, the First and Second Impugned
Orders dated 24.07.2019 and 18.11.2021 are set aside. FIR Crime
No.12 of 2018, Khade Bazar Police Station stands restored. The
police is directed to investigate the case expeditiously in accordance
with law. It goes without saying that the private parties shall be
at liberty to produce material to indicate their defence(s)/position
during the police investigation as also before the Court concerned,
in accordance with law, at the appropriate stage.
44. Before parting, it is made clear that the observations made in this
Judgment are only for the purposes of considering the issue(s) before
us and shall neither prejudice nor aid the parties in any proceedings
pending inter-se. The appeals stand allowed as indicated above.
Pending applications stand closed. In the circumstances, however,
we propose no order as to costs.

Result of the case: Appeals allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain