S. RUKMINI MADEGOWDAversusTHE STATE ELECTION COMMISSION & ORS

                         [2022] 12 S.C.R. 1                             1


                  S. RUKMINI MADEGOWDA                                  A
                                 v.
         THE STATE ELECTION COMMISSION & ORS.
                  (Civil Appeal No. 6576 of 2022)
                      SEPTEMBER 14, 2022                                B
   [UDAY UMESH LALIT, CJI, INDIRA BANERJEE AND
               AJAY RASTOGI, JJ.]
       Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 – ss.27, 33-
35, 39 – Karnataka Municipal Corporation (Election) Rules, 1979
                                                                        C
– Representation of People Act, 1951 – s.123(2) – Conduct of
Elections Rules, 1961 – Election Petition filed by respondent no.4
was allowed, election of the appellant to the Mysore Municipal
Corporation as Councillor was set aside – On appeal, held: A false
declaration w.r.t the assets of a candidate, his/her spouse or
dependents, constitutes corrupt practice irrespective of the impact     D
of such a false declaration on the election of the candidate – It is
undisputed that the appellant suppressed information w.r.t the assets
of her husband – Corrupt Practices have been defined in s.39(2),
KMC Act to include ‘undue influence’ as defined in s.123(2), 1951
RP Act – s.123(2) of the 1951 RP Act came up for interpretation by
                                                                        E
this Court in Lok Prahari case, wherein it was held that the non-
disclosure would amount to ‘undue influence’ as defined under the
1951 RP Act – Definition of ‘undue influence’ as used in s.123(2)
of 1951 RP Act is also adopted by s.39(2) of the KMC Act –
Therefore, the non-disclosure of assets in the municipal elections
would also amount to ‘undue influence’ and consequently to ‘corrupt     F
practice’– Further, the notifications issued by the State Election
Commission were not questioned by the appellant– Rather, she
accepted them as binding on her, and accordingly filed an affidavit–
Thus, the appellant is estopped from questioning the validity of the
notifications or the power of the State Election Commission to issue
                                                                        G
the same – Also, there is no legal or normative impediment for the
State Election Commission to issue directions requiring disclosure
of assets of the candidate, his/her spouse and dependent associates
by way of affidavit – In issuing the notification, the Election
Commission has not encroached into the legislative domain of the
Karnataka State Legislature– No ground to interfere with the            H
                                  1
2            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2022] 12 S.C.R.


A   judgment of the High Court affirming the order setting aside the
    election of appellant.
          Constitution of India – Article 243-ZA(1), 324(1) – Held: The
    language and tenor of Article 243-ZA(1) is in pari materia with Article
    324(1) – Interpretation of Article 324(1) to confer wide powers on
B   the Election Commission to issue directions in respect of elections
    to Parliament and State legislatures would apply to Article 243-
    ZA(1) which has to be construed to confer powers on the State
    Election Commission to issue directions related to superintendence,
    direction and control of the preparation of electoral roles or for
    conduct of elections to municipalities – State Election Commission
C   has the same powers u/Article 243-K and 243-ZA(1) as the Election
    Commission has u/Article 324(1).
          Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 – Karnataka
    Municipal Corporation (Election) Rules, 1979 – Representation of
    People Act, 1951 – Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961 – Held: A
D   hypertechnical view of the omission to incorporate any specific
    provision in the KMC Election Rules, similar to the 1961 Rules,
    expressly requiring disclosure of assets, to condone dishonesty and
    corrupt practice would be against the spirit of the Constitution and
    public interest.
E        Precedent – Held: A judgment is a precedent for the issue of
    law raised and decided – Judgment has to be construed in the
    backdrop of the facts and circumstances in which it has been
    rendered.
          Dismissing the appeal, the Court
F
          HELD: 1.1 The election of the Appellant is governed by
    the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976, and the
    Karnataka Municipal Corporation (Election) Rules, 1979 framed
    thereunder. A false declaration with regard to the assets of a
    candidate, his/her spouse or dependents, constitutes corrupt
G   practice irrespective of the impact of such a false declaration on
    the election of the candidate. It may be presumed that a false
    declaration impacts the election. [Para 16, 38][10-E-F; 17-A-B]
          1.2 A judgment is a precedent for the issue of law that is
    raised and decided. The judgment has to be construed in the
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    S. RUKMINI MADEGOWDA v. THE STATE ELECTION                          3
                 COMMISSION & ORS.

backdrop of the facts and circumstances in which the judgment           A
has been rendered. Words, phrases and sentences in a judgment,
cannot be read out of context. Nor is a judgment to be read and
interpreted in the manner of a statute. It is only the law as
interpreted by Court in an earlier judgment, which constitutes a
binding precedent, and not everything that the Judges say. [Para
                                                                        B
41][18-B-D]
      State of M. P. v. Centre for Environment Protection
      Research & Development (2020) 9 SCC 781 : 2020
      (8) JT 353 – distinguished.
      1.3 Under Section 39 of the KMC Act, corrupt practices            C
include undue influence. The definition of undue influence in
Clause 2 of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act
1951, (“the 1951 RP Act”) has been incorporated in Section 39(2)
of the KMC Act. Under Section 27 of the KMC Act corrupt
practices defined in Section 39(2) which includes “undue
influence’ entails disqualification from being a Councillor, for six    D
years. [Para 45, 47][22-D-E; 23-D]
      1.4 Corrupt Practices have been defined in Section 39(2)
of the KMC Act to include ‘undue influence’ as defined in Section
123(2) of the 1951 RP Act. Section 123(2) of the 1951 RP Act
came up for interpretation by this Court in Lok Prahari, where          E
this Court held that the non-disclosure would amount to ‘undue
influence’ as defined under the Representation of People Act.
The definition of ‘undue influence’ as used in Section 123(2) of
1951 RP Act is also adopted by Section 39(2) of the KMC Act.
Therefore, the non- disclosure of assets in the municipal elections     F
would also amount to ‘undue influence’ and consequently to
‘corrupt practice’. As argued, the notifications dated 14th July
2003 and 19th June 2018 issued by the State Election Commission,
have never been questioned by the Appellant. Rather, the
Petitioner accepted the notifications as binding on her, and
accordingly filed an affidavit. The Appellant is, therefore, estopped   G
from questioning the validity of the notifications or the power of
the State Election Commission to issue the same. That non-
disclosure of assets would amount to ‘corrupt practices’, entailing
disqualification, is evident from Sections 35 and 39(ii) of the KMC
Act, read with Section 123(2) of the Representation of People           H
4            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2022] 12 S.C.R.


A   Act 1951, as interpreted by this Court in Lok Prahari. It is not in
    dispute that the Appellant had suppressed information with regard
    to the assets of her husband. Section 35(1)(b) of the KMC Act
    provides that if the Court is of the opinion that a party has
    committed a ‘corrupt practice’, that would result in the election
    being declared void. Section 35 of the KMC Act enumerates the
B
    grounds on which Courts could declare the election of the
    returned candidate to be void. Section 35(1)(b) mentions corrupt
    practice by a returned candidate or his election agent or by any
    other person, either with the consent of a returned candidate or
    his election agent, as one of the grounds for declaring the election
C   to be void. Section 39 of the KMC Act enumerates the acts/
    practices, which are to be deemed to be corrupt practices. Corrupt
    practices include ‘undue influence’. This is specified in Section
    39(2) of the KMC Act. The definition of undue influence in Section
    123(2) of the 1951 RP Act has expressly been incorporated in
    the definition of undue influence in Section 39(2) of the KMC
D
    Act. Further, having regard to the tenor of Section 39(3) of the
    KMC Act, any false statement relating to a candidate would be
    corrupt practice. At the cost of repetition, it is emphasized that
    KMC Act incorporates the definition of undue influence in Section
    123(2) of the 1951 RP Act. The judgments of this Court
E   interpreting ‘undue influence’ in Section 123(2) of the 1951, RP
    Act, would squarely apply to the interpretation of undue influence
    under Section 39(2) of the KMC Act. Section 123(2) of the
    Representation of People Act, 1951 had been interpreted by this
    Court in Lok Prahari where this Court held that non-disclosure
    would amount to ‘undue influence’ as defined in the
F
    Representation of People Act, 1951. The non-disclosure of assets
    would therefore, also amount to ‘undue influence’ and
    consequently to ‘corrupt practices’ under the KMC Act. Mr. Patil
    argued that the Notifications dated 14th July 2003 and in particular
    19th June 2018 issued by the State Election Commission made it
G   mandatory for the candidates to file affidavits, disclosing the assets
    of their spouses. [Paras 55-62][24-H; 25-A-B, C, F-H; 26-A-G]
          Lok Prahari v. Union of India (2018) 4 SCC 699 : [2018]
          2 SCR 892 – relied on.

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    S. RUKMINI MADEGOWDA v. THE STATE ELECTION                        5
                 COMMISSION & ORS.

       1.5 The question of whether the Election Commission had        A
power to issue directions to the candidates to file affidavits
disclosing the assets of their spouses, in the absence of any
specific provision under the KMC Act or the Rules framed
thereunder is no longer res integra. The question is squarely
covered by the law laid down by this Court in Union of India v.
                                                                      B
Association for Democratic Reforms and Ors., where this Court
had directed the Election Commission to secure to voters, inter
alia, information pertaining to assets not only of the candidates
but also of their spouse and dependents. The Election Commission
has to act within the four corners of law made by the Parliament
and/or the concerned State legislature, as the case may be. The       C
notification dated 14th July 2003 was issued pursuant to the
judgment of this Court in Association for Democratic Reforms,
where this Court held that “the Constitution has made
comprehensive provision under Article 324 to take care of
surprise situations and it operates in areas left unoccupied by
                                                                      D
legislation.” The interpretation given by this Court of Article 324
of the Constitution of India is binding on all courts. [Paras 63-
65][26-G-H; 27-A-C]
      Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms
      (2002) 5 SCC 294 : [2002] 3 SCR 696 – relied on.
                                                                      E
      1.6 The language and tenor of Article 243-ZA(1) is in pari
materia with Article 324(1) of the Constitution. The language and
tenor of Section 243-ZA(1) is identical to that of Article 324(1).
This Court has interpreted Article 324(1) to confer wide powers
on the Election Commission relating to superintendence,
direction and control of preparation of electoral roles and/or the    F
conduct of elections to Parliament and to the legislature of every
State provided, of course, that the directions are not contrary to
law. The interpretation of Article 324(1) to confer wide powers
on the Election Commission to issue directions in respect of
elections to Parliament and State legislatures would apply to         G
Article 243-ZA(1). Article 243-ZA(1) has to be construed to confer
powers on the State Election Commission to issue directions
related to superintendence, direction and control of the
preparation of electoral roles or for conduct of elections to
municipalities. The Election Commission has wide powers under
                                                                      H
6            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2022] 12 S.C.R.


A   Article 324(1) of the Constitution of India to issue directions
    necessary for conducting free and fair elections, subject to the
    contours of law. The power of the Election Commission includes
    the power to issue directions where the law is silent. The State
    Election Commission has the same powers under Article 243-K
    and 243-ZA(1) as the Election Commission of India has under
B
    Article 324(1) of the Constitution of India. In Association for
    Democratic Reforms and in Lok Prahari, this Court held that for
    effective exercise of his fundamental right under Article 19(1)((a),
    the voter is entitled to have all relevant information about
    candidates at an election which would include criminal
C   antecedents, if any, of the candidate, his/her assets and liabilities,
    educational qualifications, etc. It may be true that amendment of
    the 1951 RP Act is within the exclusive domain of the Union
    Parliament as observed in Lok Prahari and amendment of the
    KMC Act is exclusively within the domain of the Karnataka State
    Legislature. However, in light of the law declared by this Court
D
    in Association for Democratic Reforms, there is no legal or
    normative impediment for the State Election Commission to issue
    directions requiring disclosure of assets of the candidate, his/
    her spouse and dependent associates by way of affidavit. In issuing
    the notification dated 14th July 2003, the Election Commission
E   has not encroached into the legislative domain of the Karnataka
    State Legislature. The direction, as contained in the notification
    dated 14th July 2003 had been accepted by the Appellant. Having
    affirmed a false affidavit, it does not lie in the mouth of the
    Appellant to contend that her election should not be set aside on
    the ground of corrupt practice under Section 35(1) of the KMC
F
    Act. [Paras 66-70][27-C-D, G-H; 28-A-G]
          1.7 The Election Commission has issued the notification
    dated 14th July 2003 within the contours of law. Purity of election
    at all levels, be it election to the Union Parliament or a State
    Legislature or a Municipal Corporation or a Panchayat is a matter
G   of national importance in which a uniform policy is desirable in
    the interest of all the States. A hypertechnical view of the omission
    to incorporate any specific provision in the KMC Election Rules,
    similar to the 1961 Rules, expressly requiring disclosure of
    assets, to condone dishonesty and corrupt practice would be
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    S. RUKMINI MADEGOWDA v. THE STATE ELECTION                      7
                 COMMISSION & ORS.

against the spirit of the Constitution and public interest. There   A
are no grounds to interfere with or set aside the impugned
judgment and order of the High Court, affirming the judgment
and order of the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Mysuru,
allowing Election Petition and setting aside the election of the
Appellant. [Paras 72, 74 and 75][29-C, F-G; 30-A-B]
                                                                    B
     Shrikant v. Vasantrao and Others (2006) 2 SCC 682 :
     [2006] 1 SCR 496; Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal (1982) 1
     SCC 691 : [1982] 3 SCR 318 – distinguished.
     Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar & Ors. (2015) 3 SCC
     467 : [2015] 4 SCR 987; State Bank of India v. Santosh         C
     Gupta (2017) 2 SCC 538 : [2016] 9 SCR 985; State of
     West Bengal v. Union of India AIR 1963 SC 1963 –
     relied on.
     Srikant v. Vasant Rao and Others; Shailesh Manubhai
     Parmar v. Election Commission of India (2018) 9 SCC            D
     100 : [2018] 10 SCR 76; Tolaram Relumal and Another
     v. State of Bombay [1955] 1 SCR 158; Bipinchandra
     Parshottamdas Patel v. State of Gujarat (2003) 4 SCC
     642: [2003] 3 SCR 533 – referred to.
                     Case Law Reference                             E
[2002] 3 SCR 696                relied on           Para 9
[2018] 2 SCR 892                relied on           Para 9
[2006] 1 SCR 496                distinguished       Para 19
[1982] 3 SCR 318                distinguished       Para 19         F
[2018] 10 SCR 76                referred to         Para 25
[2003] 3 SCR 533                referred to         Para 43
[2015] 4 SCR 987                relied on           Para 57
[2016] 9 SCR 985                relied on           Para 73         G
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6576
of 2022.
      From the Judgment and Orders dated 26.05.2021 of the High
Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in M.F.A. No.49 of 2021.
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8            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 12 S.C.R.


A         Shyam Diwan, Sr. Adv., Darpan KM., Hemanth Raj, Rajit
    Jonathan Shaw, Ms. Amrita Sharma, Ms. Rashi Bansal, Advs. for the
    Appellant.
          Basava Prabhu S. Patil. Sr. Adv., Shailesh Madiyal, Manmohan
    P.N., Sudhanshu Prakash, Geet Ahuja, Ms. Rakhi M., Advs. for the
B   Respondents.
          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
          INDIRA BANERJEE, J.
          Leave granted.
C          2. This Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution
    of India is against a judgment and order dated 26th May 2021 passed by
    the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru, upholding the
    judgment and order dated 14th December 2020 of the Principal District
    and Sessions Judge, Mysuru, allowing Election Petition No.4 of 2018
D   and setting aside the election of the Appellant to the Mysore Municipal
    Corporation as Councillor from Ward No.36-Yeraganahalli, Karnataka.
           3. Sometime in 2018, the Appellant filed her nomination for election
    to the Mysore Municipal Corporation, as Councillor from Ward No.36-
    Yeraganahalli in Karnataka, which was reserved for Backward Class-
    B (Women), along with a declaration by way of an affidavit, furnishing
E
    details of the movable and immovable properties held by the Appellant
    as well as her spouse and dependents, which is hereinafter referred to
    as the “Affidavit of Assets”.
          4. In August 2018, elections to the Mysore Municipal Corporation
    were held. On 3rd September 2018, the results of said elections were
F
    declared. The Appellant was declared as successfully elected Councillor
    from the said Ward No.36, that is Yeraganahalli.
           5. The Respondent No.4, an unsuccessful candidate, filed Election
    Petition No.4 of 2018 in the Court of Principal District and Sessions
    Judge, Mysuru under Sections 33 and 34 of the Karnataka Municipal
G   Corporations Act, 1976, hereinafter referred to as the “KMC Act”.
           6. In the said Election Petition, the Respondent No.4 alleged that
    the Appellant had, in her Affidavit of Assets, falsely declared that her
    husband did not possess any immovable property, and that by giving
    such false declaration, the Appellant had indulged in corrupt practices to
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        S. RUKMINI MADEGOWDA v. THE STATE ELECTION                             9
            COMMISSION & ORS. [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]

get the benefit of reservation under the Category of Backward Class-B          A
(Women).
       7. By a judgment and order dated 16th April 2019, the Principal
District and Sessions Judge, Mysuru (Trial Court) rejected the said
Election Petition No.4 of 2018 filed by the Respondent No.4.
       8. The Respondent No.4 filed an appeal being Miscellaneous First        B
Appeal No.4023 of 2019 in the High Court of Karnataka, challenging
the said judgment and order dated 16th April 2019 passed by the Trial
Court.
        9. By an order dated 28th April 2020, the High Court remanded
Election Petition No.4 of 2018 back to the Trial Court, for reconsideration,   C
in the light of the judgments of this Court in Union of India v. Association
for Democratic Reforms1 and in Lok Prahari v. Union of India2. The
High Court observed:
         “…This Court is of the considered opinion that for complete
         adjudication of the lis the trial court should have considered        D
         such question with reference to the relevant provisions of the
         KMC Act and the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
         Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms People’s
         Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) and another vs Union of
         India and in Lok Prahari Vs. Union of India and Others.”              E
                                                              th
       10. Thereafter, by a judgment and order dated 14 December
2020, the Trial Court allowed the Election Petition No.4 of 2018 and set
aside the election of the Appellant.
       11. On or about 23rd December 2020, the Appellant filed an appeal
in the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru, under Section 38 of the           F
KMC Act, which was admitted and registered as MFA No.49 of 2021.
The High Court has dismissed the Appeal, being MFA No.49 of 2021 by
the judgment and order dated 26th May 2021, impugned in this appeal.
      12. Mr. Shyam Diwan, appearing on behalf of the Appellant,
submitted that the Appellant was successful in the Municipal election          G
for Ward No.36, Yeraganahalli in the Mysore City Corporation, and was
accordingly chosen as the Mayor of the Mysore City Corporation and
she continues to be the sitting Mayor.
1
    (2002) 5 SCC 294
2
    (2018) 4 SCC 699                                                           H
10             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 12 S.C.R.


A           13. Mr. Diwan argued that while the Respondent No.4 secured
     2902 votes, the Appellant secured 3295 votes. Mr. Diwan emphasized
     on the fact that the Election Petition had initially been dismissed, but the
     High Court had, by an order dated 28th April 2020 in appeal, remanded
     the matter back for reconsideration of the learned Trial Court.
B          14. Mr. Diwan submitted that the High Court had erred in law, in
     passing the impugned order dated 26th May 2021, upholding the order
     dated 14th December 2020 of the Trial Court in Election Petition No.4 of
     2018, setting aside the election of the Appellant as Councillor for Ward
     No.36-Yeraganahalli, Karnataka.
C          15. Mr. Diwan raised the following questions of law for
     consideration of this Court:-
           (i) Whether a duly elected candidate, serving as the Mayor,
               Mysore City Corporation after election, could be unseated, in
               the absence of any statutory provision requiring disclosure of
D              assets in the affidavit filed with the nomination form?
           (ii) Whether non-disclosure of assets would constitute corrupt
                practice, in the absence of any statutory provision requiring
                disclosure of assets?
           16. The election of the Appellant is governed by the Karnataka
E    Municipal Corporation Act, 1976, hereinafter referred to as the “KMC
     Act”, and the Karnataka Municipal Corporation (Election) Rules, 1979
     framed thereunder, which is hereinafter referred to as the “KMC Election
     Rules”.
            17. Mr. Diwan emphatically argued that there was no requirement
F    of any disclosure under the KMC Act or under the KMC Election Rules.
     Having recognized and proceeded on the basis that elections were being
     held in terms of the KMC Act read with the KMC Election Rules, the
     High Court should not have dismissed the Appeal of the Appellant.
            18. Mr. Diwan submitted that the Election Law which governs
G    the election, is a self-contained statutory law which has to be strictly
     adhered to. In the absence of any specific provision in the law, which
     requires a candidate to disclose, by way of affidavit, the assets of his/
     her spouse, a candidate intending to contest an election cannot be
     compelled to make such disclosure by adoption of a policy decision or
     through action at common law.
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        S. RUKMINI MADEGOWDA v. THE STATE ELECTION                            11
            COMMISSION & ORS. [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]

      19. In support of his submission, Mr. Diwan cited Shrikant v.           A
Vasantrao and Others3, where this Court quoted with approval its earlier
decision in Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal4 and held:-
         “…Outside of statute, there is no right to elect, no right to be
         elected and no right to dispute an election. Statutory creations
         they are, and therefore, subject to statutory limitation. An         B
         election petition is not an action at common law, nor in equity.
         It is a statutory proceeding to which neither the common law
         nor the principles of equity apply but only those rules which
         the statute makes and applies. It is a special jurisdiction, and
         a special jurisdiction has always to be exercised in accordance
         with the statute creating it. Concepts familiar to common law        C
         and equity must remain strangers to election law unless
         statutorily embodied. A court has no right to resort to them
         on considerations of alleged policy because policy in such
         matters as those, relating to the trial of election disputes, is
         what the statute lays down. In the trial of election disputes,       D
         court is put in a straitjacket.”
         20. In Srikant v. Vasant Rao & Others (supra) this Court held :-
         “11. A person cannot, therefore, be disqualified unless he
         suffers a disqualification laid down in Article 191 of the
         Constitution or under Sections 8, 8-A, 9, 9-A, 10 or 10-A of         E
         the Act. It is not possible to add to or subtract from the
         disqualifications, either on the ground of convenience, or on
         the grounds of equity or logic or perceived legislative intention.
         A combined reading of Article 191 of the Constitution of India
         and Chapter III of the Representation of the People Act, 1951        F
         makes it clear that a person can be held to be disqualified
         for being chosen as, and for being, a Member of the
         Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State only
         on the following, and no other, grounds :
         Disqualifications under the Constitution of India :                  G
         ...............
         ...............

3
    (2006) 2 SCC 682
4
    (1982) 1 SCC 691                                                          H
12                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2022] 12 S.C.R.


A                (viii) if he is a person having a subsisting contract with the
                 State Government for the supply of goods to or for the
                 execution of any works undertaken by that Government, vide
                 section 9-A of the Act; …”
            21. The judgment of this Court in Srikant v. Vasant Rao and
B    Others, was rendered in the context of Chapter III of the Representation
     of the People Act 1951, in terms whereof a person could be held to be
     disqualified from being a Member of the Legislative Assembly only on
     the grounds stipulated, and no other, which included a person having a
     subsisting contract with the State Government for supply of goods.
C           22. This Court found on facts that the concerned candidate did
     not have any subsisting contracts with the State Government, but with
     entities under the control of the State Government. This Court, thus
     observed and held that the State Government was different from legal
     or other authorities under its control.
D           23. The proposition of law noted by this Court in Jyoti Basu v.
     Debi Ghosal (supra) that except in accordance with Statute, there is no
     right to elect, be elected or to dispute an election, as approved and
     reiterated in Srikant v. Vasant Rao & Others (supra) is well settled. An
     Election Petition is indisputably a statutory proceeding governed by the
     statute under which the Election Petition is filed, or the Statutory Rules
E    framed under that statute.
            24. The observations of this Court in Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal
     (supra), referred to above have been made in the context of the issue of
     whether the appellant could be impleaded in an election petition and held
     guilty of corrupt practice, when he was not a candidate contesting the
F    election, which had been challenged. The judgments in Srikant v. Vasant
     Rao & Others (supra) and Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal (supra) are
     distinguishable on facts.
           25. In Shailesh Manubhai Parmar v. Election Commission of
             5
     India , also cited by Mr. Diwan, this Court held, in effect, that even
G    though Article 324 of the Constitution confers wide powers on the Election
     Commission to take action with a view to ensure a free and fair election,
     even by assuming the role of an adviser, the power to make law vests in
     the Parliament under Article 327 of the Constitution. The Parliament is

     5
H        (2018) 9 SCC 100
     S. RUKMINI MADEGOWDA v. THE STATE ELECTION                                  13
         COMMISSION & ORS. [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]

supreme and, therefore, not bound by any advice of the Election                  A
Commission.
       26. This Court held:-
       “26. Interpreting the said Article, the Constitution Bench in Kuldip
       Nayar [Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India, (2006) 7 SCC 1] held
       : (SCC p. 139, para 427)                                                  B

          “427. In this context, we would say that where the law on
          the subject is silent, Article 324 is a reservoir of power for
          the Election Commission to act for the avowed purpose of
          pursuing the goal of a free and fair election, and in this
          view it also assumes the role of an adviser. But the power             C
          to make law under Article 327 vests in Parliament, which
          is supreme and so, not bound by such advice. We would
          reject the argument by referring to what this Court has
          already said in Mohinder Singh Gill [Mohinder Singh
          Gill v. Chief Election Commr., (1978) 1 SCC 405] and what              D
          bears reiteration here is that the limitations on the exercise
          of “plenary character” of the Election Commission include
          one to the effect that ‘when Parliament or any State
          Legislature has made valid law relating to or in connection
          with elections, the Commission, shall act in conformity with,
          not in violation of, such provisions’ [SCC p. 452, para                E
          92(2)(b)].”
       27. Relying on Shailesh Manubhai Parmar (supra), Mr. Diwan
argued that the Election Commission has to act within the four corners
of law made by Parliament. That apart, if any direction is issued by this
Court, interpreting a provision for furtherance of purity of election, it will   F
be obligatory on the part of the Commission to act in accordance with
the same. The Commission cannot introduce concepts or ideas or
dimensions which would not fit into the legal framework. There can be
no dispute with the aforesaid proposition.
       28. Mr. Diwan questioned the authority of the Election Commission         G
to issue the notification dated 14th July 2003 requiring candidates
contesting elections to disclose their assets and the assets of their spouses
and dependents by filing an affidavit. He argued that there was no vacuum
in the KMC Act, which was required to be filled up by issuance of a
notification.
                                                                                 H
14            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 12 S.C.R.


A          29. The notification dated 14th July 2003, was issued pursuant to
     the judgment of this Court in Union of India v. Association for
     Democratic Reforms (supra). The relevant part of the judgment is
     extracted hereinbelow:-
           “48. The Election Commission is directed to call for
B          information on affidavit by issuing necessary order in exercise
           of its power under Article 324 of the Constitution of India
           from each candidate seeking election to Parliament or a State
           Legislature as a necessary part of his nomination paper,
           furnishing therein, information on the following aspects in
           relation to his/her candidature:
C
              (1) Whether the candidate is convicted/acquitted/
              discharged of any criminal offence in the past — if any,
              whether he is punished with imprisonment or fine.
              (2) Prior to six months of filing of nomination, whether the
D             candidate is accused in any pending case, of any offence
              punishable with imprisonment for two years or more, and
              in which charge is framed or cognizance is taken by the
              court of law. If so, the details thereof.
              (3) The assets (immovable, movable, bank balance, etc.)
E             of a candidate and of his/her spouse and that of
              dependants.
              (4) Liabilities, if any, particularly whether there are any
              overdues of any public financial institution or government
              dues.
F             (5) The educational qualifications of the candidate.”
           30. In Lok Prahari (supra), this Court held:-
           “68. In the light of the law declared by this Court in ADR
           case [Union of India v. Assn. for Democratic Reforms, (2002)
           5 SCC 294 : AIR 2002 SC 2112] and PUCL case [PUCL v.
G          Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 399 : AIR 2003 SC 2363], we
           do not see any legal or normative impediment nor has any
           tenable legal objection been raised before us by any one of
           the respondents, for issuance of the direction relating to the
           changes in Form 26 (declaration by the candidates). On the
H          other hand, the 2nd respondent in his counter stated:
    S. RUKMINI MADEGOWDA v. THE STATE ELECTION                              15
        COMMISSION & ORS. [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]

         “7. It is submitted that so far as the first prayer in the         A
         captioned writ petition is concerned, the information about
         source(s) of income of candidates, their spouses and
         dependants will be a step in the direction of enhancing
         transparency and should form part of the declaration in
         Col. (9) of Form 26. The Answering Respondent
                                                                            B
         Commission vide its Letter No. 3/4/ECI/LET/FUNC/JUD/
         SDR/Vol.I/2016 dated 7-9-2016 has already requested the
         Ministry of Law and Justice to consider the proposed
         amendments made in Column (3) and Column (9) of Form
         26 and in total affirmation with the prayer made by the
         petitioner.”                                                       C
      Therefore, we are of the opinion that Prayer 1(1) should be
      granted and is accordingly granted. We direct that Rule 4-A
      of the Rules and Form 26 appended to the Rules shall be
      suitably amended, requiring candidates and their associates
      to declare their sources of income.”                                  D
       31. Mr. Diwan argued that in Lok Prahari (supra), this Court
directed that Rule 4A and Form 26 appended to the Conduct of Elections
Rules, 1961, hereinafter referred to as the “1961 Rules” framed under
the Representation of People Act shall be suitably amended requiring
candidates and their associates to declare their sources of income. This    E
Court further observed:
      “81. For the very same logic as adopted by this Court
      in Krishnamoorthy [Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar, (2015) 3
      SCC 467 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 359 : AIR 2015 SC 1921] , we
      are also of the opinion that the non-disclosure of assets and         F
      sources of income of the candidates and their associates
      would constitute a corrupt practice falling under heading
      “undue influence” as defined under Section 123(2) of the
      1951 RP Act. We, therefore, allow Prayer 2.”
       32. Mr. Diwan argued that, in this case, the elections were being    G
held under the KMC Act read with the KMC Rules. Neither the KMC
Act, nor any Rules framed thereunder require disclosure of the assets
of a candidate intending to contest elections or his/her spouse. The High
Court has in its impugned order recorded that the statutory Form No. 2
under the KMC Rules does not require a candidate to file any affidavit
of assets and liabilities of the candidate or the candidate’s spouse.       H
16             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 12 S.C.R.


A           33. Mr. Diwan emphasized on the difference between elections
     conducted by the Election Commission of India and an election governed
     by the KMC Act and/or the KMC Rules. He argued that the elections
     conducted by the Election Commission of India are governed by the
     Representation of People Act, 1951 and the 1961 Rules. Mr. Diwan
     submitted that there is a statutory form and express statutory requirement
B
     in terms of Rule 4A of the 1961 Rules mandating disclosures. The form
     of affidavit which is required to be filed in respect of elections conducted
     by the Election Commission of India, must contain details of spouse’s
     income, property etc. However, the requirement to make disclosures
     cannot be imported into the KMC Rules, without an appropriate
C    amendment of the said rules as also the statutory form thereunder.
            34. Mr. Diwan submitted that the High Court erred in placing
     reliance on the order of the State Election Commission dated 14 th July
     2003. Mr. Diwan argued that the absence of statutory requirement could
     not be overcome by an order of the State Commission. The operative
D    order of the Notification dated 14th July 2003 cannot amount to amending
     provisions of the KMC Act or any rules framed thereunder.
            35. Mr. Diwan argued that it is the duty of the Election Commission
     to conduct fair elections in accordance with the statutory provisions. It
     is not for the Election Commission to legislate. Furthermore, if an
E    administrative direction as the one issued by the State Election
     Commission by the Notification dated 14th July 2003 were adequate,
     there would be no need to amend the Central Rules for the conduct of
     elections.
            36. Mr. Diwan submitted that the High Court erred in arriving at
F    the finding that the Appellant had indulged in corrupt practices. The
     consequences of such finding is that the Appellant stands disqualified
     from being a Councillor for a period of six years in terms of Section 27
     of the KMC Act. At the highest, the action impugned would amount to
     improper acceptance of nomination under Section 35(1)(d)(i).

G           37. Mr. Diwan submitted that the election could, at best, have
     been set aside under Section 35(1)(d)(i) and not on the ground of corrupt
     practices. The High Court has not arrived at any specific finding with
     regard to material impact of improper acceptance of the Appellant’s
     nomination or election, to constitute corrupt practice.

H
        S. RUKMINI MADEGOWDA v. THE STATE ELECTION                           17
            COMMISSION & ORS. [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]

       38. In our considered view, a false declaration with regard to the    A
assets of a candidate, his/her spouse or dependents, constitutes corrupt
practice irrespective of the impact of such a false declaration on the
election of the candidate. It may be presumed that a false declaration
impacts the election.
       39. Mr. Diwan finally argued that penal measures can only be          B
imposed in accordance with statutory provisions and/or rules. In the
context of his submission, Mr. Diwan cited State of M. P. v. Centre for
Environment Protection Research & Development6, authored by one
of us (Indira Banerjee, J.), where this Court held:-
         “54. It is well settled that when a statute or statutory rules      C
         prescribed a penalty for any act or omission, no other penalty
         not contemplated in the statute or statutory rules can be
         imposed. It is well settled that when statute requires a thing to
         be done in a particular manner, it is to be done only in that
         manner.
                                                                             D
         55. There can be no doubt that strong measures must be taken
         to protect the environment and improve the air quality
         whenever there is contravention of statutory rules causing
         environmental pollution. Stringent action has to be taken, but
         in accordance with law.
                                                                             E
         56. Stoppage of supply of fuel to vehicles not complying with
         the requirement to have and/or display a valid PUC certificate
         is not contemplated either in the 1989 Rules or in the NGT
         Act. Motor vehicles not complying with the requirement of
         possessing and/or displaying a valid PUC certificate cannot
         be debarred from being supplied fuel.                               F
         …
         58. This Court is, therefore, constrained to hold that the
         learned Tribunal had no power and/or authority and/or
         jurisdiction to pass orders directing the appellant State
                                                                             G
         Government to issue orders, instructions or directions on
         dealers, outlets and petrol pumps not to supply fuel to vehicles
         without PUC certificate. The first two questions are answered
         accordingly.”
6
    (2020) 9 SCC 781                                                         H
18                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2022] 12 S.C.R.


A           40. As submitted by Mr. Diwan candidly, the aforesaid order of
     this Court was passed in the context of an order of the National Green
     Tribunal, directing that supply of fuel to vehicles be stopped for non-
     compliance with the requirement to display a valid PUC (Pollution Under
     Control) Certificate, even though there were specific provisions in the
     statute for dealing with the contravention. The observations of this Court
B
     extracted above were made in an altogether different context, where
     penalty not contemplated by statute had been imposed.
            41. It is well settled that, a judgment is a precedent for the issue
     of law that is raised and decided. The judgment has to be construed in
     the backdrop of the facts and circumstances in which the judgment has
C    been rendered. Words, phrases and sentences in a judgment, cannot be
     read out of context. Nor is a judgment to be read and interpreted in the
     manner of a statute. It is only the law as interpreted by Court in an
     earlier judgment, which constitutes a binding precedent, and not
     everything that the Judges say.
D          42. Emphasizing on the well settled principle of strict construction
     of penal statutes, Mr. Diwan submitted that the impugned judgment and
     order was incorrect. In the context of his submission, Mr. Diwan cited a
     five-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Tolaram Relumal and
     Another v. State of Bombay7, where this Court dealing with the penal
E    provision in the Bombay Rent Restriction Act, 1947, held:-
              “ … It may be here observed that the provisions of Section
              18(1) are penal in nature and it is a well-settled rule of
              construction of penal statutes that if two possible and
              reasonable constructions can be put upon a penal provision,
F             the court must lean towards that construction which exempts
              the subject from penalty rather than the one which imposes
              penalty. It is not competent to the court to stretch the meaning
              of an expression used by the legislature in order to carry out
              the intention of the legislature. As pointed out by Lord
              Macmillan in London and North Eastern Railway
G             Co. v. Berriman [1946 AC 278, 295] “where penalties for
              infringement are imposed it is not legitimate to stretch the
              language of a rule, however, beneficent its intention, beyond
              the fair and ordinary meaning of its language”.

H    7
         (1955) 1 SCR 158
        S. RUKMINI MADEGOWDA v. THE STATE ELECTION                           19
            COMMISSION & ORS. [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]

       43. In Bipinchandra Parshottamdas Patel v. State of Gujarat8,         A
cited by Mr. Diwan, this Court held:-
         “31. It is trite that a law leading to disqualification to hold
         an office should be clear and unambiguous like a penal law.
         In the event a statute is not clear, recourse to strict
         interpretation must be made for construction thereof. In his        B
         classic work The Interpretation and Application of
         Statutes Read Dickerson states:
         “(1) The court will not extend the law beyond its meaning to
         take care of a broader legislative purpose. Here ‘strict’ means
         merely that the court will refrain from exercising its creative     C
         function to apply the rule announced in the statute to situations
         not covered by it, even though such an extension would help
         to advance the manifest ulterior purpose of the statute. Here,
         strictness relates not to the meaning of the statute but to using
         the statute as a basis for judicial law-making by analogy with
         it.                                                                 D

         (2) The court will resolve an evenly balanced uncertainty of
         meaning in favour of a criminal defendant, the common law,
         the ‘common right’, a taxpayer, or sovereignty.
         (3) The court will so resolve a significant uncertainty of          E
         meaning even against the weight of probability.
         (4) The court will adhere closely to the literal meaning of the
         statute and infer nothing that would extend its reach.
         (5) Where the manifest purpose of the statute, as collaterally
         revealed, is narrower than its express meaning, the court will      F
         restrict application of the statute to its narrower purpose. This
         differs from the Riggs situation in that the narrow purpose is
         revealed by sources outside the statute and its proper context.”
      44. The relevant provisions of the Karnataka Municipal
Corporations Act, 1976, governing the election of the Appellant are set      G
out herein below for convenience.
         “27. Corrupt practices entailing disqualification.—The
         Corrupt practices specified in section 39 shall entail

8
    (2003) 4 SCC 642                                                         H
20       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2022] 12 S.C.R.


A    disqualification for being a councillor for a period of six
     years counting from the date on which the finding of the court
     as to such practice takes effect under this Act.
     …
     33. Election petition.—(1) No election of a councillor shall
B    be called in question except by an election petition presented
     for adjudication to the District Court having jurisdiction,
     within thirty days from the date of the publication of the result
     of election under section 32.
     (2) An election petition may be presented on one or more of
C    the grounds specified in Section 35,—
     (a) by any candidate at such election; or
     (b) by any voter of the ward concerned.
     (3) A petitioner shall join as respondents to his petition all
D    the candidates at the election………………
     34. Relief that may be claimed by the petitioner.- A petitioner
     may, in addition to claiming a declaration that the election of
     all or any of the 368 Municipal Corporations 1977: KAR.
     ACT 14] returned candidates is void, claim a further
E    declaration that he himself or any other candidate has been
     duly elected.
     35. Grounds for declaring elections to be void.—(1) Subject
     to the provisions of sub-section (2), if the court is of opinion,—
     (a) that on the date of his election a returned candidate was
F    not qualified or was disqualified, to be chosen as a councillor
     under this Act, or
     (b) that any corrupt practice has been committed by a returned
     candidate or his election agent or by any other person with
     the consent of a returned candidate or his election agent, or
G
     (c) that any nomination has been improperly rejected, or
     (d) that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns a
     returned candidate, has been materially affected,—
     (i) by the improper acceptance of any nomination; or
H
S. RUKMINI MADEGOWDA v. THE STATE ELECTION                         21
    COMMISSION & ORS. [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]

 (ii) by any corrupt practice committed in the interests of the    A
 returned candidate by an agent other than his election agent;
 or
 (iii) by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any
 vote or the reception of any vote which is void; or
 (iv) by any non-compliance with the provisions of this Act or     B
 of any rules or orders made thereunder, the court shall declare
 the election of the returned candidate to be void.
 (2) If in the opinion of the court, a returned candidate has
 been guilty, by a person other than his election agent, of any
 corrupt practice, but the court is satisfied,—                    C

 (a) that no such corrupt practice was committed at the election
 by the candidate or his election agent and every such corrupt
 practice was committed contrary to the orders and without
 the consent of the candidate or his election agent;
                                                                   D
 (b) that the candidate and his election agent took all
 reasonable means for preventing the commission of corrupt
 practices at the election; and
 (c) that in all other respects the election was free from any
 corrupt practice on the part of the candidate or any of his
                                                                   E
 agents, then the court may decide that the election of the
 returned candidate is not void
 37. Decision of the court.—(1) At the conclusion of the trial
 of an election petition, the court shall make an order,—
 (a) dismissing the election petition; or                          F
 (b) declaring the election of all or any of the returned
 candidates to be void; or
 (c) declaring the election of all or any of the returned
 candidates to be void and the petitioner or any other candidate
 to have been duly elected.                                        G

 …
 38. Appeal.—An appeal shall lie to the High Court from an
 order of the District Court under section 37 within a period
                                                                   H
22            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 12 S.C.R.


A          of thirty days from the date of the order of the court excluding
           the time required for obtaining a copy of the order:
           Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after
           the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that
           the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal
B          within the said period.
           39. Corrupt practices.—The following shall be deemed to be
           corrupt practices for the purposes of this Act, namely:—
           (1) ‘bribery’ as defined in clause (1) of section 123 of the
           Representation of the People Act, 1951 (Central Act 43 of
C          1951) for the time being in force;
           (2) ‘undue influence’ as defined in clause (2) of the said
           section for the time being in force;
           …”
D           45. Under Section 39 of the KMC Act, corrupt practices include
     undue influence. The definition of undue influence in Clause 2 of Section
     123 of the Representation of the People Act 1951, (hereinafter referred
     to as “the 1951 RP Act”) has been incorporated in Section 39(2) of the
     KMC Act.
E          46. Section 123 (2) of the 1951 RP Act provides :-
           “123. Corrupt practices - The following shall be deemed to
           be corrupt practices for the purposes of this Act:—
           (1) ...
F          (2) Undue influence, that is to say, any direct or indirect
           interference or attempt to interfere on the part of the candidate
           or his agent, or of any other person with the consent of the
           candidate or his election agent, with the free exercise of any
           electoral right:

G             Provided that—
           (a) without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of
           this clause any such person as is referred to therein who—
           (i) threatens any candidate or any elector, or any person in
               whom a candidate or an elector is interested, with injury
H
     S. RUKMINI MADEGOWDA v. THE STATE ELECTION                              23
         COMMISSION & ORS. [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]

           of any kind including social ostracism and                        A
           excommunication or expulsion from any caste or
           community; or
      (ii) induces or attempts to induce a candidate or an elector
           to believe that he, or any person in whom he is interested,
           will become or will be rendered an object of divine               B
           displeasure or spiritual censure,
      shall be deemed to interfere with the free exercise of the
      electoral right of such candidate or elector within the meaning
      of this clause;
      (b) a declaration of public policy, or a promise of public action,     C
      or the mere exercise of a legal right without intent to interfere
      with an electoral right, shall not be deemed to be interference
      within the meaning of this clause.”
       47. Under Section 27 of the KMC Act corrupt practices defined
in Section 39(2) which includes “undue influence’ entails disqualification   D
from being a Councillor, for six years.
       48. Mr. Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel appearing
on behalf of the Respondent No.4, submitted that the election in question
was conducted within the legal framework of the KMC Act, the
Notification dated 14th July 2003 issued by the Karnataka State Election     E
Commission in exercise of its powers under Articles 243K & 243ZA of
the Constitution of India, as also the addendum dated 19th June 2018 to
the Notification dated 14th July 2003, which required candidates
participating in elections to submit an affidavit disclosing assets owned
by the candidates, their spouses and dependents.                             F
        49. In compliance with the requirements of the said Notifications
dated 14th July 2003 and 19th June 2018, the Appellant filed an affidavit.
It is admitted by the Appellant that she has made incorrect statements in
the said affidavit in that (i) she falsely stated that her husband’s name
was ‘Nanjegowda’ instead of stating his real name ‘Madegowda’, (ii)
                                                                             G
she has stated that her husband did not own any movable or immovable
properties although he owned large number of movable properties.
      50. After the results of the election were declared on 3rd September
2018 and thereafter the false statements made in her affidavit were
discovered, the Respondent No.4 filed the Election Petition No.4/2018.
                                                                             H
24            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 12 S.C.R.


A           51. In the reply given by the Appellant to the Election Petition she
     stated:-
           “4. Regarding the averments made in the Paragraph 4 of the
           petition, the 4th respondent humbly submits that as a matter of
           fact, by oversight the name of the son (i.e. Nanje Gowda) of
B          the 4th respondent has been mentioned in that column instead
           of the name of her husband (i.e., S. Made Gowda). In fact, at
           the beginning of that affidavit, the name of the 4th respondent’s
           husband has been correctly mentioned.
           5. Regarding the averments made in the paragraph 5 of the
C          petition, the 4th respondent humbly submits that she had no
           knowledge about her husband having the properties
           mentioned in the said paragraph at the time of swearing to
           that affidavit and hence she has not mentioned the same in
           her said affidavits. The non-mentioning of the said properties
           in the said affidavit is unintentional and for the said bona
D          fide reason”.
           52. Mr. Patil submitted that the Trial Court had initially erred in
     dismissing the Election Petition notwithstanding the admission of the
     Appellant that she had not given the correct name of her husband and
     had suppressed the fact that her husband had owned properties.
E
            53. Mr. Patil submitted that on remand the Election Petition was
     rightly allowed. The non-disclosure by the Appellant of her husband’s
     assets would amount to corrupt practices and is therefore, violative of
     the KMC Act as well as Section 123 of the 1951 RP Act. The Trial
     Court therefore, set aside the election of the Appellant and declared the
F    Respondent No.4 as elected.
            54. Mr. Patil argued that the High Court had rightly come to the
     conclusion that the election of the Appellant was vitiated by corrupt
     practice adopted by her in view of the fact that she had filed a false
     affidavit filed and had not disclosed her husband’s assets. Mr. Patil
G    submitted that Section 35(1)(d) of the KMC Act provides that if the
     Court is of the opinion that a party has committed a ‘corrupt practice’
     that would result in the election being declared void.
         55. Corrupt Practices have been defined in Section 39(2) of the
     KMC Act to include ‘undue influence’ as defined in Section 123(2) of
H
        S. RUKMINI MADEGOWDA v. THE STATE ELECTION                             25
            COMMISSION & ORS. [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]

the 1951 RP Act. Section 123(2) of the 1951 RP Act came up for                 A
interpretation by this Court in Lok Prahari (supra), where this Court
held that the non-disclosure would amount to ‘undue influence’ as defined
under the Representation of People Act. The definition of ‘undue
influence’ as used in Section 123(2) of 1951 RP Act is also adopted by
Section 39(2) of the KMC Act. Therefore, the non-disclosure of assets
                                                                               B
in the municipal elections would also amount to ‘undue influence’ and
consequently to ‘corrupt practice’.
       56. Rebutting the argument on behalf of the Appellant that the
State Election Commission did not have the power to issue the
Notifications dated 14th July 2003 and 19th June 2018, making it mandatory
for candidates to file affidavits disclosing the assets of their spouses,      C
since there was no such requirement in the KMC Act, Mr. Patil argued,
and in our view, rightly, that the issue is squarely covered by the decision
of this Court in the Association for Democratic Reforms and Ors.
(supra).
        57. In Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar & Ors.9, cited by Mr.               D
Patil, this Court upheld a notification of the Tamil Nadu State Election
Commission requiring that every candidate contesting elections to a local
body, should disclose whether there was any criminal case pending against
him. In the aforesaid case, the election of the appellant as the President
of the Panchayat had been declared null and void for not disclosing the        E
information required in terms of the notification issued by the Tamil Nadu
State Election Commission.
       58. As argued by Mr. Patil, the notifications dated 14th July 2003
and 19th June 2018 issued by the State Election Commission, have never
been questioned by the Appellant. Rather, the Petitioner accepted the          F
notifications as binding on her, and accordingly filed an affidavit. The
Appellant is, therefore, estopped from questioning the validity of the
notifications or the power of the State Election Commission to issue the
same. That non-disclosure of assets would amount to ‘corrupt practices’,
entailing disqualification, is evident from Sections 35 and 39(ii) of the
KMC Act, read with Section 123(2) of the Representation of People              G
Act 1951, as interpreted by this Court in Lok Prahari (supra).
      59. It is not in dispute that the Appellant had suppressed information
with regard to the assets of her husband. Section 35(1)(b) of the KMC
9
    (2015) 3 SCC 467                                                           H
26             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 12 S.C.R.


A    Act provides that if the Court is of the opinion that a party has committed
     a ‘corrupt practice’, that would result in the election being declared void.
            60. Section 35 of the KMC Act enumerates the grounds on which
     Courts could declare the election of the returned candidate to be void.
     Section 35(1)(b) mentions corrupt practice by a returned candidate or
B    his election agent or by any other person, either with the consent of a
     returned candidate or his election agent, as one of the grounds for declaring
     the election to be void. Section 39 of the KMC Act enumerates the acts/
     practices, which are to be deemed to be corrupt practices. Corrupt
     practices include ‘undue influence’. This is specified in Section 39(2) of
     the KMC Act.
C
            61. The definition of undue influence in Section 123(2) of the
     1951 RP Act has expressly been incorporated in the definition of undue
     influence in Section 39(2) of the KMC Act. Further, having regard to the
     tenor of Section 39(3) of the KMC Act, any false statement relating to a
     candidate would be corrupt practice. At the cost of repetition, it is
D    emphasized that KMC Act incorporates the definition of undue influence
     in Section 123(2) of the 1951 RP Act. The judgments of this Court
     interpreting ‘undue influence’ in Section 123(2) of the 1951, RP Act,
     would squarely apply to the interpretation of undue influence under
     Section 39(2) of the KMC Act.
E           62. Mr. Patil rightly argued that Section 123(2) of the Representation
     of People Act, 1951 had been interpreted by this Court in Lok Prahari
     (supra) where this Court held that non-disclosure would amount to ‘undue
     influence’ as defined in the Representation of People Act, 1951. The
     non-disclosure of assets would therefore, also amount to ‘undue influence’
F    and consequently to ‘corrupt practices’ under the KMC Act. Mr. Patil
     argued that the Notifications dated 14th July 2003 and in particular 19th
     June 2018 issued by the State Election Commission made it mandatory
     for the candidates to file affidavits, disclosing the assets of their spouses.
            63. The question of whether the Election Commission had power
G    to issue directions to the candidates to file affidavits disclosing the assets
     of their spouses, in the absence of any specific provision under the KMC
     Act or the Rules framed thereunder is no longer res integra. The question
     is squarely covered by the law laid down by this Court in Union of
     India v. Association for Democratic Reforms and Ors. (supra), where
     this Court had directed the Election Commission to secure to voters,
H
     S. RUKMINI MADEGOWDA v. THE STATE ELECTION                               27
         COMMISSION & ORS. [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]

inter alia, information pertaining to assets not only of the candidates but   A
also of their spouse and dependents.
      64. The Election Commission has to act within the four corners of
law made by the Parliament and/or the concerned State legislature, as
the case may be, as argued by Mr. Diwan.
       65. The notification dated 14th July 2003 was issued pursuant to       B
the judgment of this Court in Association for Democratic Reforms
(supra), where this Court held that “the Constitution has made
comprehensive provision under Article 324 to take care of surprise
situations and it operates in areas left unoccupied by legislation.”
The interpretation given by this Court of Article 324 of the Constitution     C
of India is binding on all courts.
       66. It would be pertinent to note that the language and tenor of
Article 243-ZA(1) is in pari materia with Article 324(1) of the
Constitution. The language and tenor of Section 243-ZA(1) is identical
to that of Article 324(1). Articles 243-ZA(1) and Article 324(1) are set      D
out hereinbelow for convenience :-
      “243-ZA. Elections to the Municipalities.—(1) The
      superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of
      electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to the
      Municipalities shall be vested in the State Election Commission         E
      referred to in Article 243-K.
                 xxx              xxx               xxx
      324. Superintendence, direction and control of elections to be
      vested in an Election Commission.—(1) The superintendence,
      direction and control of the preparation of the electoral rolls         F
      for, and the conduct of, all elections to Parliament and to the
      Legislature of every State and of elections to the offices of
      President and Vice-President held under this Constitution shall
      be vested in a Commission (referred to in this Constitution as
      the Election Commission).”
                                                                              G
       67. This Court has interpreted Article 324(1) to confer wide powers
on the Election Commission relating to superintendence, direction and
control of preparation of electoral roles and/or the conduct of elections
to Parliament and to the legislature of every State provided, of course,
that the directions are not contrary to law. The interpretation of Article
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28             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 12 S.C.R.


A    324(1) to confer wide powers on the Election Commission to issue
     directions in respect of elections to Parliament and State legislatures
     would apply to Article 243-ZA(1). Article 243-ZA(1) has to be construed
     to confer powers on the State Election Commission to issue directions
     related to superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of
     electoral roles or for conduct of elections to municipalities.
B
            68. The Election Commission has wide powers under Article
     324(1) of the Constitution of India to issue directions necessary for
     conducting free and fair elections, subject to the contours of law. The
     power of the Election Commission includes the power to issue directions
     where the law is silent. The State Election Commission has the same
C    powers under Article 243-K and 243-ZA(1) as the Election Commission
     of India has under Article 324(1) of the Constitution of India.
           69. In Association for Democratic Reforms (supra) and in Lok
     Prahari (supra), this Court held that for effective exercise of his
     fundamental right under Article 19(1)((a), the voter is entitled to have all
D    relevant information about candidates at an election which would include
     criminal antecedents, if any, of the candidate, his/her assets and liabilities,
     educational qualifications, etc. It may be true that amendment of the
     1951 RP Act is within the exclusive domain of the Union Parliament as
     observed in Lok Prahari (supra) and amendment of the KMC Act is
E    exclusively within the domain of the Karnataka State Legislature.
            70. However, in light of the law declared by this Court in
     Association for Democratic Reforms (supra), we do not see any legal
     or normative impediment for the State Election Commission to issue
     directions requiring disclosure of assets of the candidate, his/her spouse
F    and dependent associates by way of affidavit. In issuing the notification
     dated 14th July 2003, the Election Commission has not encroached into
     the legislative domain of the Karnataka State Legislature. The direction,
     as contained in the notification dated 14th July 2003 had been accepted
     by the Appellant. Having affirmed a false affidavit, it does not lie in the
     mouth of the Appellant to contend that her election should not be set
G    aside on the ground of corrupt practice under Section 35(1) of the KMC
     Act.
           71. India is a quasi-federal State. Article 1 of the Constitution
     describes India as a “Union of States”. Every State is an integral and
     inseverable part of India. The Indian polity combines the features of a
H    federal Government with certain features of a unitary Constitution. While
        S. RUKMINI MADEGOWDA v. THE STATE ELECTION                             29
            COMMISSION & ORS. [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]

the division of powers between the Union Government and the State              A
Governments is an essential feature of federalism, in matters of national
importance, a uniform policy is essential in the interest of all the states,
without disturbing the clear division of powers, so that the Union and the
States legislate within their respective spheres. The Constitution is the
supreme law for the Union and for the States supported by an independent
                                                                               B
judiciary which acts as the guardian of the Constitution.
       72. There can be no doubt that the Parliament and the respective
State legislatures are supreme and not bound by any advice of the Election
Commission. It is equally true that the Election Commission has to act
within the four corners of law made by the Parliament and/or the
concerned State Legislature, as the case may be. However, in our               C
considered opinion, the Election Commission has issued the notification
dated 14th July 2003 within the contours of law.
       73. In State Bank of India v. Santosh Gupta10, Rohinton Fali
Nariman, J. speaking for the Bench relied upon decision of this Court in
State of West Bengal v. Union of India11 and, inter-alia, reiterated           D
the following characteristic of Indian Federalism –
          “…
          (c) Distribution of powers between the Union and the regional
          units each in its sphere coordinate and independent of the           E
          other. The basis of such distribution of power is that in matters
          of national importance in which a uniform policy is desirable
          in the interest of the units, authority is entrusted to the Union,
          and matters of local concern remain with the State.
          …”                                                                   F
       74. Purity of election at all levels, be it election to the Union
Parliament or a State Legislature or a Municipal Corporation or a
Panchayat is a matter of national importance in which a uniform policy
is desirable in the interest of all the States. A hypertechnical view of the
omission to incorporate any specific provision in the KMC Election Rules,
                                                                               G
similar to the 1961 Rules, expressly requiring disclosure of assets, to
condone dishonesty and corrupt practice would be against the spirit of
the Constitution and public interest.

10
     (2017) 2 SCC 538 (para 10)
11
     AIR 1963 SC 1963                                                          H
30             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 12 S.C.R.


A           75. This Court is of the view that there are no grounds to interfere
     with or set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court,
     affirming the judgment and order of the Principal District and Sessions
     Judge, Mysuru, allowing Election Petition No. 4 of 2018 and setting aside
     the election of the Appellant.
B           76. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. All pending applications
     are, accordingly, disposed of.

     Divya Pandey                                                Appeal dismissed.
     (Assisted by : Deepak Panwar, LCRA)

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