Holding

Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 does not empower the High Court to re‑appreciate evidence; it may only examine the legality, regularity and propriety of the order, and thus the High Court exceeded its revisional jurisdiction.

Summary

The appellant, a landlady, sought eviction of the tenant on grounds of rent arrears and a claim to demolish the shed. After the Rent Controller ordered eviction only on rent default, the landlady obtained a reversal of the bona fide need finding on appeal, prompting the tenant to file revisions under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 and later under Section 115 of the CPC. The High Court, exercising revisional jurisdiction, re‑appreciated the evidence and set aside the eviction order, holding the landlady had not proved bona fide need. The Supreme Court held that, although Section 20 confers a wide revisional power to examine legality, regularity and propriety, it does not permit the High Court to act as a second appellate court by re‑appreciating evidence. Consequently, the High Court’s judgment was set aside and the matter remitted for reconsideration within the proper revisional limits. The appeal was allowed without any order as to costs.

Issues considered

The scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 vis‑à‑vis Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908.
Whether the High Court, in a revision, may re‑appreciate evidence and act as a second appellate court.
Whether a second revision is permissible under the Act and the CPC.

Legislation cited

Subjects

revisional jurisdictionSection 20 Kerala Buildings ActSection 115 CPCevictionbona fide needre‑appreciation of evidencesecond revisionlandlord‑tenant

Judgment

RUKMINI AMMA SARADAMMA A
v.
KALLYANI SULOCHANA AND ORS.

DECEMBER 16, 1992

[M.N. VENKATACHALIAH, S. MOHAN AND DR. AS. ANAND, JJ.] B

Kera/a Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965: Section
2o-Revisional Jurisdiction-Scope of-Wliether revisional court has jurisdic-
tion to reappreciate evidence-Second revision to the High Court under Sec-
tion 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908--Permissibility of. C
Civil Procedure Code, 1908: Section 115-'-Revisionallurisdiction-Ex-
ercise of-Whether High Court could reappreciate evidence.

The appellant-landlady filed a petition for eviction of the first
respondent-tenant froin the schedule premises, on the ground that the D
first respondent had committed default of rent and that she was entitled
to recover possession of the shed for demolition. The Rent Controller
directed eviction on the ground .of arrears of rent, but disallowed the
claim for recovery of building for ·demolition. .

On appeal by the landlady, the Appellate Court reversed the finding E
regarding bona fide need anci confirmed the eviction order on this ground
also. Thereupon, the first respondent filed a revision under.Section 20 of
the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 before the
District Court, who dismissed the same. The first respondent preferred a
further revision under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code before the F
High Court, which set aside the finding of the Appellate Court and the
Revisional Court and remitted the matter to the trial court.

Thereafter, the Rent Controller dismiss~ the petition filed by the
appellant. Hence, the appellant filed an appeal to the District Court,
which directed eviction of the firiit respondent on the ground of bona fide G
need under Section 11(3) of the Act. Aggrieved, the first respondent
preferred a revision. The Division Bench of the High Court set aside the
order of eviction, holding that the landlady was not snttessful in proving
her case of bone filll need. Hence the appeal, by special leave, by the
landlady. H
579
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the High Court
had misconceived the scope of revisional jurisdiction, and tha·t not-
withstanding the fact that Section 20 of the Act conferring revisional
jurisdiction of the High Court was widely worded, such a jurisdiction
cannot be converted into an appellate jurisdiction.
,- .
B On behalf of the first respondent it was urged that the revisional
jurisdiction conferred tinder Section 20 of the Act was wide in scope in
comparison to Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code and the revisional
court could consider the propriety of the order under revision.

C Allowing the appeal, this Court

HELD : 1. Unlike the jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil
Procedure Code, 1908, in Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and
Rent Control) Act, 1965, power is given to the revisional authority to
call for and examine the records relating to any order for the purposes
D of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order.
Even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High
Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise, the
distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get
obliterated. Hence, the High Court was not right in re-appreciating th~
entire evidence both oral or documentary in the light of the
E
Commissioner's report. The High Court had travelled far beyond the
revisional · jurisdiction. Even by the presence of the word 'propriety' it
cannot mean that there could be re-appreciation of evidence. Of course,
the revisional court can come to a different conclusion but not on a
re-appreciation of evidence; o~ the contrary, by confining itself to
·p legality, regularity and propriety of the order challenged before it. The
High Court was not right in its view that under Section 20 of the Act
though re-appreciation of the evidence as such was not callfd for, the
pleadings and evidence have to be examined to satisfy the legality,
regularity .of the order of the lower authorities. [584-G,H; 587-A-OJ
-a Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai, A.l.R. 1987 S.C. 203, inap-
plicable.

H. V. Mathai v. The Subordinate Judge, Kottayam and Ors., [1969]
2 S.C.C. 194; Rai Chand Jain v. Miss Chandra Kanta Khosla, (1991] 1
H S.C.C. 422 and Raman and Raman LU!. v. The State of Madras and Anr.,
RUKMINI AMMA v. KALL YANI SULOCHANA {MOHAN, J.] 581

(1956) S.C.R. 256, referred to. A
2. It is too late in the day to say that the earlier exercise of f'l.!visional
jurisdiction by the High Court was wrong. The appellant ought to have
raised it then and there. Having taken a chance after remit and pursued
the eviction petition, merely because the order of the High Court went
adverse to the appellant, it cannot be said that the order of remit in B
exercise of second revisional jurisdiction is wrong. Even otherwise, under
Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 the revisional powers could
be exercised. [583-F,G]

3. In the circumstances the matter is_ remitted to the High Court
for re-consideration, confining itself to the revisional jurisdiction.
c
[587-F]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5403 of
1992.
D
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.5.91 of the Kerala High
Court in C.R.P. No. 1752-of 1990-D.

G.Prakash for the Appellant:

G.Viswanatha Iyer and T.G.N. Nair for the Respondents. E
The Judgment of the Court was deiivered by

MOHAN, J. Leave granted.

This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment dated F
28.5.91 of the High Court of Kerala in C.R.P. No. 1752 of 1990-D.

The short facts leading to this appeal are as under:

· The petition schedule shed and the premises were obtained by the
appellant and the second respondent under a partition of the year 1959. G
The second respondent is the mother of the appellant. In 1969, the
premises was let out to the first respondent by the husband of the second
respondent on a monthly rent of Rs. 15. On 24.1.1969 a rent deed was
executed (Ex. Al). After the death of the husband of the second respon-
dent the first respondent paid rent upto September 1976. Thereafter she H
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A committed default in payment of rent. A notice was issued by the second
respondent terminating the tenancy with effect from 'lf.J.4.77 and demanded
vacant possession with arrears of rent.

On 14.2.78, the second respondent relinquished her entire right in
favour of the appellant. Thereupon, the appellant obtained absolute right
B over the property. She filed a petition for eviction on two grounds: (i) the
first respondent committed default in payment of rent and (ii) she will be
entitled to recover possession of the petition schedule shed for demolition.
By an order dated 28.6.82 the Rent Controller directed eviction on the
ground of arrears of rent. However, the claim for recovery of building for
C demolition was disallowed.

Aggrieved by the order of the Rent Controller, the appellant
preferred an appeal before the Appellate Court. By its order dated
14.12.83 the .findiiig of the trial court was reversed in so far as the bona
D fide need was concerned and the order of eviction was confirmed on this
ground as well. Thereupo~, the first respondent filed a revision under
Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965
(hereinafter referred to as the Act) before the District Court, Kollam. That
was dismissed on 24.6.85. The first respondent preferred a further revision
before the High Court under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code
E (hereinafter referred to as the Code). The High Court by its judgment
dated 21.8.86 set aside the finding of the Appellate Court and the
Revisional Court and the matter was remitted to the trial court.

On remit, the Rent Controller dismissed the petition filed by· the
F appellant. Hence, the appellant filed an appeal to the ·District Court. By
its order dated 30th of June, 1990 it directed eviction of the first respondent
on the ground of bona fide need under Section 11(3) of the Act. The first
respondent aggrieved by the order of eviction preferred a revision. The
Division Bench of the High Court set aside the order ef eviction holding
that the landlady was not successful in proving her case of bona fide need.
G It is under these circumstances, this appeal by special leave has come to
be preferred.

Learned counsel for the appellant would urge that the High Court
had misconceived the scope of revisional jurisdiction. Having held that
H under Section 20 of the Act, a re-appreciation of t.he evidence as such was
RU.KMINI AMMAv. KALLYANI SULOCHANA [MOHAN, J.] 583

not called for, yet the High Court went into the factual details and re-ap- A
preciated the entire evidence as though it was an Appellat.: Court.

Notwithstanding the fact that Section 20 of the Act conferring
revisional jurisdiction of the Hi~ Court is widely worded, such a jurisdic-
tion cannot be converted into an. appellate jurisdiction. This Court in Rai
Chand Jain v. Chandra Kanta Khosla, (1991] 1SCC423, has clearly pointed B
out the scope of such revisional jurisdiction and has held that it cannot act
as a second court of appeal. Therefore, the impugned order is liable to be
set aside. Without prejudice to the above, it is submitted that this Court in
Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai, AIR 1987 SC 203, has held that no
second revision is permissible to the High Court either under Section 115 C
of the Code or under Section 20 of the Act. The District Court has
exercised the revisional jurisdiction. Hence, the remit order in CRP No.
1719 of 1985 is void and is illegal. If that remit order goes, what remains
is only the revisional order of the District Court, Kollam, confirming the
appellate order directing revision on the ground of bona fide need. Hence,
the impguned order Calls for interference. D
In opposition to this, it is urged on behalf of the respondent that the
revisional jurisdiction conferred under Section 20 of the Act is wider in
scope in .comparison to Section 115 of the Code. Therefore, there is no
need to confine oneself to illegality alone. Further, the revisional court E
could consider the propriety of the order under revision. It is on this score
the High Court chose to interfere with the finding of the appellate
authority. In exercise of this jurisdiction it has correctly appreciated the
evidence and come to the right conclusion.

It is too late in the day to urge on behalf of the appellant that the F
earlier exercise· of second revisional jurisdiction by the High Court was
wrong. She ought to have raised it then and there. Having taken a chance
after remit and pursued the eviction petition, merely because the order of
the High Court went adverse to the appellant, it cannot be contended that
the order of remit in exercise ,of second revisional jurisdiction is wrong.
Even otherwise, under Section 115 of the Code the revisional powers could G
be exercised. Aundal Ammal's case (supra) has no application to this case
having regard to the peculiar circtlmstances.

We shall now proceed to consider the correctness of these submis- H
sions.
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

.A Firstly, as to the scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 20 of.
the Act. Section 20 reads as under:

"20. Revision:- (1) In cases where the appellate authority
empowered under Section 18 is a Subordinate Judge, the
District Court, and in other cases the High Court may, at '
B any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for
and examine the records relating to any order passed or
proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the
purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or
propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such
c order in reference thereto as it thinks fit.

{2) The costs of and incident to all proceedings before the
High Court of District Court under sub-section (1) shall
be in its discretion."

D Revision as seen from Black's Law Dictionary (Fifth Edition) at page
1187 denotes:

"A re-examination or careful reading over for correction
or improvement."

E Under Section 115 of the Code the revisional jurisdiction is exer-
cisable by the High Court in the following three cases:

(I) When the Subordinate Court appears to have exercised
a jurisdiction not vested iii it by law, or

F (2) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by
law, or

(3) to have acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or
with material irregularity.
G Unlike this jurisdiction, in Section 20 ,power .is given to the revisional
authority to call for and examine the records relating to any order for the
purposes oLsatisfying itself as to the legality regularity or propriety of such
order. As to the distinction between these two jurisdictions this Court had
occasion to consider in H. V. Mathai v. 1Jie Subordinate Judge, Kottayam
H and others, [1969] 2 sec 194 at 198, and held thus: '
RUKMINI AMMA v. KALLYANI SULOCHANA [MOHAN, J.] 585

"The words of Section 20 however are much wider than A
those in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under
Section 20(1) the District Court is empowered to call for
an examine the records relating to any order passed or
proceedings taken under the Act for the purpose of satis-
fying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such
order or proceedings, and pass such order in reference B
thereto as it thinks fit. On the words of this section we
cannot hold that a revision is limited to a mere question of
jurisdiction".

In Rai Chand Jain v. Miss Chandra Kanta Khosla, (1991] 1 SCC 422, . C
arising under E.P. Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (3 of 1949),
whereunder the revisional jurisdiction was conferred under Section 15(5)
of the said Act. At page 430 this Court held:

"It is appropriate to note in this connection the relevant
provision of Section 15(5) of the Act which specifically D
conferred jurisdiction on the High Court in an application
for revision against the order of the appellate authority to
satisfy itself as to the legality or propriety of the order made
by the appellate authority. On a plain reading of this
provision it is clear and transparent that the revisional E
jurisdiction conferred on the High Court is much wider
than the jurisdiction provided under Section 115 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. The High Court while exercising
this jurisdiction is competent not only to see the irregular
or illegal exercise of jurisdiction but also to see to the
legality or propriety of the order in question." F
Again at page 431 it was observed:

"The High Court in exercising its power under Section
15(5) of the said Act is within its jurisdiction to reverse the
findings of fact as the same were improper and also illegal. G
It is appropriate to refer in this connection to the decision
in the case of Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander, (1988] 3 SCC
131 where it has been held that Section 15(5) of the Act
enables the High Court to satisfy itself as to the "legality or
propriety" of the order under revision, which is, quite H
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A obviously; a much .wider jurisdiction. That jurisdiction
enables the Court. of revision, in appropriate cases, to
examine the correctness of the fmclir:gs of facts also, though
the revisional court is not 'a second court of first appeal'
(see Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate v. V.tha/rao
Marutirao Janagava~ (1975) 2 SCC 246.'
B
In an earlier ruling, the scope of revisional jurisdiction of the same
section i.e. section 15(5) of the said Act came up for consideration. In Smt.
Rajbir Kaur and Another v. Mis S. Chokesiri and Co., (1989] 1 SCC 19, the
Division Bench to which one of us {Venkatachaliah, J.) was a party held in
C paragraph 42 at page 37:

"The.. scope of the revisional jurisdiction depends on tbe
langUage of the ;tatute conferring the revisional jurisdic-·
tion. Revisional jurisdiction is only a part of the appellate
jurisdiction and cannot be equated with that of a full-
D fledged appeal Though the revisional power - depending
upon the language of the provision - might be wider than
. revisional power under Section 115 of the Code of Civil
. Procedure, yet, a revisional court is not a second or first
. appeal' •
E As far as the present Act is concerned Section 20 contains the word
'propriety' also. As to the meaning of the word "propriety' in Raman and
. Raman Ltd. v. The State of Madras and Another, (1956) SCR 256, at page
· 264 it was held thus:

F "The word 'propriety' has nowhere been defined in the Act.
and is capable of a. variety of meanings. In the Oxford
• English Dictionary {Vol VIII), it has been stated to mean
"fitness; appropriateness; aptitilde suitability; appropriate-
ness to the circumstances or conditions; conformity with
requirements, rule or principles; .rightness, ·correctness,
G justness, accura.cy"."

l Therefore, the question would be whether in the context of this
provision the High Court was right in re-appreciating the evidence and
coming to a different conclusion? In the impugned judgment in paragraph
H .1 the High Court observed:
.....·
. RUKMINI AMMA v. KALLYANI SULOCHANA [MOHAN, J.] 587

· "Under Section 20 of the Act though re-appreciation of the A
evidence as. such is not called for, the pleadings and
evidence have to be examined to satisfy the legality,
regularity of the order of the lower authorities."

We are afraid this approach of the High Court is wrong. Even the B
wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to
act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise the distinction between
appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. Hence, the High
Court was not right in re-appreciating the entire evidence both oral or
documentary in the light of the Commissioner's report (Ext. Cl and C2
mabazar}. In our considered view, the High Court bad travelled far beyond C
the revisional jurisdiction. Even by the _presence of the word "propriety" it
cannot mean that there could be a re-appreciation of evidence. Of course,
the revisional court can come to a different conclusion but not on a
re-appreciation of evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to legality,
regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. Therefore, we are D
unable to agree with the reasoning of the High Court with reference to the
exercise of revisional jurisdiction.

As to whether a second revision lay to the High Court this Court by
the judgment in Aundal Ammal's· case (supra) held that no such revision
lay. On this point the High Court referring to this very judgment held that E
the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is not taken away.
Therefore, the earlier order dated 21.8.86 passed in exercise of revisional
jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Act is not void. We need to pause to
consider this because this point ought to have been urged by the appellant
immediately after the order of remit was made. Pursuant to the order of F·
remit the appellant took a chance by participation in the proceedings
before the Rent Controller, taking up the matter in appeal. Thus, having
acquiesced in these proceedings she cannot question the first remit order.

For the foregoing reasons, we set aside the judgment of the High
Court and remit the matter to the High Court for re-consideration, confin- G
ing itself to the revisional jurisdiction as pointed out above. Accordingly,
the civil appeal will stand allowed. However, there shall be no order as to
costs.

N.P.V. Appeal allowed.