Supreme Court of India
RITU MAHESHWARIversusM/S. PROMOTIONAL CLUB
- Citation
- 2022 INSC 513
- Decided
- 5 May 2022
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- UDAY UMESH LALIT
Holding
A lawfully terminated scheme does not confer a vested right on applicants to be considered under it, and relief must be sought under the current scheme; nondisclosure of material facts defeats equitable relief.
Summary
The Supreme Court examined a dispute between the Noida Authority and M/s. Promotional Club concerning the termination of an industrial plot allotment scheme (the 2010 "old scheme"). The club claimed that Noida arbitrarily failed to interview its representatives and thus ignored its application, seeking relief under the old scheme. The Court held that once a scheme is lawfully closed, applicants have no vested right to be considered under it, and any claim must be pursued under the prevailing scheme unless the new scheme expressly preserves rights under the old one. The club’s failure to disclose that it had already been allotted a plot under a later scheme was deemed material, depriving it of equitable relief. Consequently, the High Court’s direction to consider the club’s applications under the old scheme was erroneous, and the contempt proceedings against Noida were unwarranted. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgments and allowed Noida’s appeal.
Issues considered
- When does the termination of a scheme extinguish applicants' right to be considered under that scheme?
- Whether the High Court’s order to consider the club’s applications "in accordance with law" required adherence to the old scheme or the new prevailing scheme.
- Whether the club’s nondisclosure of an earlier allotment under a later scheme bars it from obtaining equitable relief.
- Whether the club’s grievance of arbitrariness is maintainable given the scheme’s lawful closure.
- Whether contempt proceedings against Noida for not complying with the High Court order were justified.
Subjects
administrative lawscheme terminationindustrial plot allotmentequitable reliefdisclosure of material factsvested rightcontempt proceedingsArticle 226public authority
Judgment
[2022] 3 S.C.R. 597 597
RITU MAHESHWARI A
v.
M/S. PROMOTIONAL CLUB
(Civil Appeal Nos. 3616-3618 of 2022)
MAY 05, 2022 B
[UDAY UMESH LALIT, CJI, S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND
PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, JJ.]
Administrative law: Scheme of allotment of plot – Termination
of – When regulations or schemes, or policies change, applicants C
for their benefits have no inherent right to be considered under the
old policy; rather the consideration has to be under the new regime,
unless the latter contains an express stipulation to the contrary –
Writ petitioner-club did not challenge the closure of the scheme of
allotment in which it was applicant; rather its case was that Noida’s
omission to consider its application for allotment was arbitrary – D
Once the club accepted the closure of the scheme and did not
challenge it, there was no question of its agitating any right or
grievance regarding non-consideration of its application – The club
does not deny that there were other registrants, similarly
circumstanced, who did not secure any allotment – They presumably E
were treated in the same manner as the club was – In the
circumstance, the club could not without establishing any
discrimination, merely on the strength of closure of the scheme, allege
arbitrariness.
Equity: Failure to disclose relevant facts before court – F
Entitlement to equitable relief – Held: The club was allotted a plot
in 2014 in new scheme – The club, had an obligation to disclose it,
during the pendency of writ proceedings in which club had
challenged termination of old scheme – This fact was material, given
that the jurisdiction invoked was equitable and discretionary –
Whether the grievance was justified and well founded, given that G
state agencies develop and allot such industrial units at prices which
are reasonable, and that an applicant subsequently succeeded in
securing a plot, are relevant facts, which a court should be appraised
of – The failure by the club, to do so, disentitled it to any relief.
H
597
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.
A Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. The club’s grievance was that its application was
not considered – its representatives were not interviewed. Noida
pointed out that it closed or terminated the scheme. In the writ
proceeding, the club did not challenge the closure of the scheme;
B rather its case was that Noida’s omission to consider its
application for allotment was arbitrary. Once the club accepted
the closure of the scheme and did not challenge it, there was no
question of its agitating any right or grievance regarding non-
consideration of its application. The club does not deny that there
were other registrants, similarly circumstanced, who did not
C secure any allotment. They presumably were treated in the same
manner as the club was. In the circumstance, the club could not
without establishing any discrimination, merely on the strength
of closure of the scheme, allege arbitrariness. It is well established
that when a policy decision like the closure or termination of a
D benefit available to a class of persons, is not challenged, the
consequence of such closure (which is the impact on the pendency
of those wishing to be considered) cannot ordinarily be subject
matter of a grievance. What the club had was a right to be
considered for allotment of the plots its applied for, so long as
the old scheme subsisted. An applicant or registrant of a scheme
E has no right to insist that they should be provided allotment under
a scheme. In the absence of any ambiguity- in the law, and the
scheme, the writ petitioner club could not have insisted that after
the closure of the old scheme (which went unchallenged by it),
nevertheless, it had a right to allotment. In holding otherwise,
F and proceeding to direct Noida to consider the club’s applications
the impugned judgment erred in law. [Paras 17, 18, 19][606-G-
H; 607-A-C, C-D; 608-B-D]
Delhi Development Authority v. Pushpendra Kumar
Jain [1994] Suppl. 3 SCR 770; The Bihar State Housing
G Board & Ors. v. Radha Ballabh Health Care and
Research Institute (P) Ltd. (2019) 10 SCC483 : [2019]
12 SCR 444 – relied on.
2. The High Court had directed that the club’s applications
should be considered “in accordance with law”. Noida proceeded
H to comply with that direction, and reinstate those applications-
RITU MAHESHWARI v. M/S. PROMOTIONAL CLUB 599
and, furthermore, consider them in accordance with the existing A
scheme. The High Court, in contempt proceedings, has taken
exception to this course of action in an entirely unnecessary and
unwarranted manner. Once the legality of closure of the old
scheme was undisputed, there was no manner of right inhering
with the club, to insist that its claim for any plot had to be
B
considered. If at all, it ought to have applied under subsequent
schemes, and waited like other applicants (of that scheme),
Noida’s interpretation of the High Court’s judgment (to consider)
in this context, was quite correct. Neither did Noida, in its
announcement while closing the old scheme nor in any condition
of the 2013 or later scheme, stipulate that old scheme applicants C
would be dealt with according to the terms of that (i.e. 2010)
scheme. This meant that Noida had to consider the club’s
applications, in accordance with terms of the prevailing scheme.
It did so, and incurred – quite unjustifiably- the wrath of the High
Court in contempt proceedings. When regulations or schemes,
D
or policies change, applicants for their benefits have no inherent
right to be considered under the old policy; rather the
consideration has to be under the new regime, unless the latter
contains an express stipulation to the contrary. [Para 20][608-
D-H]
Usman Gani Khatri of Bombay v. Cantonment Board E
[1992] 3 SCR 1; Howrah Municipal Corpn. & Ors. v.
Ganges Rope Co. Ltd. & Ors. [2003] Suppl. 6 SCR
1212 – relied on.
3. The club could not have claimed that its application had
to be dealt with in terms of the old scheme, which had ended in F
2012. The direction of the High Court, could only have meant
that the applications had to be revived, and dealt with the scheme
prevailing as on the date of its consideration, i.e. after 31.07.2019.
The interpretation placed by the High Court, that there were
existing plots, which could have been dealt with under the old G
scheme is entirely misplaced. In such events, given that the
legality of closure of the old scheme attained finality, there was
no question of any land or plot being attached or belonging as it
were to an old scheme. If any land or plot, or industrial unit were
in fact “left-over” it was always up to the development authority
H
600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.
A or agency (here Noida) to determine how they are to be dealt
with. The directions issued in contempt proceedings, which are
subject matter of another appeal, are accordingly held erroneous.
[Para 21][610-B-E]
4. The club was allotted a plot, in 2014; it paid substantial
B amounts. The area of that plot is 4000 square metres. Now, while
it is true that this fact could not have been disclosed to the High
Court, when filing the writ petition (in 2013), the club, had an
obligation to disclose it, during the pendency of writ proceedings.
This fact was material, given that the jurisdiction invoked is
equitable and discretionary. Furthermore, whether the grievance
C was justified and well founded, given that state agencies develop
and allot such industrial units at prices which are reasonable, and
that an applicant subsequently succeeded in securing a plot, are
relevant facts, which a court should be appraised of. The failure by
the club, to do so, disentitled it to any relief. [Para 22][610-E-G]
D Case Law Reference
[1994] 6 Suppl. SCR 770 relied on Para 18
[2019] 12 SCR 444 relied on Para 18
[1992] 3 SCR 1 relied on Para 21
E
[2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 1212 relied on Para 21
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 3616-
3618 of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.02.2020. 24.08.2020 and
F 28.08.2020 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Contempt
Application (Civil) No. 8214 of 2019.
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 3619-3620 of 2022.
G K. V. Viswanathan, Sr. Adv., Anil Kaushik, Ms. Shashi Sharma,
Ms. Arunima Dwivedi, Advs. for the Appellant.
Salman Khurshid, Sr. Adv., Utkarsh Sharma, Ms. Lubna Naaz,
Kunal Beri, Advs. for the Respondent.
H
RITU MAHESHWARI v. M/S. PROMOTIONAL CLUB 601
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
1. Special leave granted, in both petitions. With consent of counsel
for parties, the appeals were heard finally. The two appeals arise out of
judgments of the Allahabad High Court. The first is dated 31.07.2019 1;
the same appeal impugns an order dismissing the review petition filed B
against the first impugned judgment, dated 13.04.2021. The second appeal
is directed against three orders (dated 12.02.2020, 24.08.2020 and
28.08.2020) issued in contempt proceedings2, initiated by the respondent,
against the appellant.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the appellant (hereafter C
referred to as “Noida”), published a scheme in 2010 (hereafter “the old
scheme”) for allotment of industrial plots larger than 2000 sq. meters, in
Phases II and III of the industrial area in Noida. The scheme was
advertised. Application forms for registration of the available plots were
available with a designated bank upon payment of ` 5,000/. The indicative D
price for plots measuring up to 4000sq. mtr. in Phase II was ` 5550/- per
sq. mtr. and in Phase III for ` 5750/- per sq mtr. Under the terms of the
scheme as spelt out by the brochure, apart from individuals, partnership
firms were also eligible to apply for allotment. The applicants were to
submit a processing fee of ` 20,000/- and registration money of ` 8
lakhs for Phase II plots and ` 10 lakhs for Phase III plots. Apart from E
these conditions, applicants had to furnish a project report, background
detail of promoters, audited accounts and balance sheets and other
relevant details. Allotment was to be made (per clause 2 (h) (i)) on the
basis of interviews of registered applicants, by a screening committee,
about the details of the project. The scheme was expressly open ended; F
therefore, under clause 2(i) in Appendix 1 to the scheme Noida could
close it any time.
3. It is the common case of the parties that the club applied to the
Noida Authority for two plots. Apparently, Noida decided to terminate
the scheme, based upon its assessment of the feasibility of the scheme, G
in its meeting on 05.07.2012. This decision was published and made
known to all concerned including the club through the public domain on
12.07.2012. Thereafter, Noida sought to refund the amount deposited by
the club to it.
1
In Writ-C No.-56046 of 2013
2
Contempt Application (Civil) No. 8214 of 2019 H
602 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.
A 4. The club was aggrieved and approached the Allahabad High
Court by filing the writ petition 3 contending that according to its
information, Noida received 95 applications of which 65 were rejected
and 15 allotments were made. The club urged that it fulfilled all
requirements of the scheme and paid processing fee, registration amount,
had lodged documents required to be furnished. Therefore, it claimed
B
that its application deserved to be considered. It also contended that the
club was an export house and operating from rented premises, sorely in
need of a large facility and was unable to afford commercial rental
spaces. It was urged that the Noida disregarded the terms and conditions
of its scheme for allotment in that the non-consideration in respect of the
C plots under the scheme so far as the petitioner club was concerned was
utterly arbitrary. The club claimed several directions including direction
to cancel allotments already made and a mandatory direction to consider
the petitioner club’s application for allotment.
5. Noida had resisted the petition, arguing that once the scheme
D was discontinued, the club had no basis to claim allotment. It was also
urged that the club was aware of the fact that the scheme could be
discontinued at any time, a power which Noida had resorted to, validly.
Therefore, it was urged that even if some plots were available, the writ
petitioner could not lay claim for allotment of any of them.
E 6. During the pendency of writ petition before the High Court,
Noida, launched another scheme (Scheme Code : NOIDA/IP/2013-14/
OES/01 – hereafter called “the 2013 Scheme”) the club applied under
this scheme as well on 9th November, 2013. This matured into an allotment
on 17.07.2014- when Noida allotted a plot of 4000 sq. mtr, (tentatively
sized plot) @ Rs. 8060/- per sq. mtr. The total premium claimed by
F Noida was ` 3,46,58,000/-. The club had, by 01.12.2016 deposited
` 1,91,83,700/- towards this allotment; it sought by letter dated 04.09.2016
of change in the allotment to M/s. Maria Exim Pvt. Ltd. This request
was followed up with the affidavit dated 27.12.2016. This subsequent
allotment of a plot under the later scheme was however, not disclosed to
G the High Court, before which the complaint of arbitrary non-allotment
under the old scheme was pending.
7. The High Court by its first impugned judgment4 was of the
opinion that Noida’s failure to call the club’s representative for interview,
3
Writ-C No.-56046 of 2013
H 4
Dated 31.07.2019 in Writ-C No. 56046 of 2013
RITU MAHESHWARI v. M/S. PROMOTIONAL CLUB 603
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J. ]
was not supported by any reason and that its candidature was never A
considered for allotment. In support of this conclusion the High Court
reasoned that candidature or the applications which were registered and
were complete in all manner could not have been ignored. In view of
this reasoning, the Noida was directed to consider the petitioner’s two
applications under the scheme by permitting the club to re-deposit the
B
registration amount of ` 8 lakhs each in respect of its two applications
with Noida within a period of one month and on deposit of such registration
amount, the two applications (Application Nos. 284 and 285) were to
revive. Noida was directed to consider those applications in accordance
with law for the purposes of allotment of the un-allotted remaining plots
in Phase – II and III. The High Court held in its judgment that Noida did C
not dispute that some plots remained unallotted in the scheme. According
to the High Court, there were total of 12 such plots.
8. Noida first filed an application for clarification contending that
no plots were available under the old scheme and that 27 plots were
available under the old scheme, under which 15 were initially allotted. D
Later all plots were allotted by the end of 2014 under the 2013 scheme.
That application (Civil Misc. Modification/Clarification Application No.
17/2020) was dismissed on 01.10.2020. Noida therefore preferred a
review proceeding. The High Court by its second impugned order dated
13.04.2021 rejected the Review Petition. The original impugned order
dated 31.07.2019 and the rejection of the Review Petition by judgment E
and order dated 13.04.2021 are the subject matter of a common appeal
arising from one Special Leave Petition.5
9. The club complained of non-compliance with the original
judgment and initiated contempt proceedings. In the contempt
proceedings, notice was issued and on 12.02.2020 the High Court F
recorded that the club’s application was deemed eligible and was taken
on record. By order dated 12.02.2020 the High Court clarified that in
case the main judgment was not complied in the letter and spirit the
“opposite party” i.e. the Chief Executive Officer of Noida was to be
present in Court. Accordingly, on the next date when the said official G
was present (i.e. on 24.08.2020) the Court noted that the writ petitioner
was supplied a list of plots for exercising his option regarding two plots
pursuant to the two applications filed by the petitioner and which were
covered by the new scheme issued in January, 2020. Furthermore, the
5
C. A. No. 3619-3620 of 2022 H
604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.
A Court recorded that the new plots were allotted only in accordance with
the new scheme and that two other applicants had been allotted those
plots. The court therefore expressed its dissatisfaction and stated that
third party rights was being sought to be created to complicate the issue
to suit Noida’s purposes. These two orders i.e. 12.02.2020 and 24.08.2020
as well as the subsequent order dated 28.08.2020 (which had partly
B
corrected the earlier order of 24.08.2020) are the subject matter of the
civil appeal arising out of another common Special Leave Petition,6 by
the Chief Executive Officer of Noida on its behalf.
Contentions of parties
C 10. It is urged by Mr. K.V. Vishwanathan, learned senior counsel,
that the impugned judgment dated 31.07.2019 was passed on the basis
of a wrong factual statement by one Shri N.K. Singh, an Officer on
Special Duty (OSD) of NOIDA in his affidavit dated 10.03.2019 to the
effect that eight plots remained unallotted in the earlier scheme, which
statement has caused grave prejudice to NOIDA. It is contended that
D this officer not only made misleading statements on affidavit, but also
facilitated the transfer of the plot, allotted to the club, to another entity.
Learned senior counsel for Noida contended that these acts were
unauthorized. It was urged that Noida, had before the High Court
specifically stated that a show-cause notice dated 12.06.2020 was issued
E against the concerned employee i.e. OSD Shri N.K. Singh for making
the incorrect statement in his affidavit & recommended disciplinary action
against the concerned employee to the Government of Uttar Pradesh.
Counsel urged that the High Court erred in observing that it is evident
that the affidavit filed in support of the review application lacked necessary
pleadings in respect of the exercise of due diligence by NOIDA. It was
F further urged that Noida had specifically stated that of 15 allotments
were made, by the time the impugned judgment was delivered, there
were in fact no plots under the old scheme. Counsel submitted that
whenever a scheme is discontinued, the land available with Noida is
never kept aside but is utilized in other, newer schemes. Therefore, there
G were in fact no unallotted plots; they had been utilized in subsequent
schemes. It is submitted that NOIDA keeps on carving new plots and
subsequently allots them under different schemes. It had furnished the
list of new plots available and not the plots which were available initially
and all the 27 plots were allotted by 2014 in different schemes.
H 6
SLP (C) No. 12866-68 of 2020
RITU MAHESHWARI v. M/S. PROMOTIONAL CLUB 605
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J. ]
11. It was argued that the club did not challenge the closure of the A
2009-2010 scheme. It rather claimed that Noida acted arbitrarily in not
calling its representative for interview, and possible allotment. In fact all
registrants were aware that Noida could, in terms of the said scheme,
terminate it and refund the amounts received, for any reason. That option
was in fact exercised. Counsel highlighted that the scheme was in force
B
barely for two years and very few people were interviewed and granted
plots. Since the writ petitioner could not lay claim for a plot, but only a
right to be considered, in an extant scheme, the first impugned judgment
is erroneous as it proceeds to hold that the club had some right to allotment
of a plot.
12. It was urged that the operative direction of the High Court, C
was only to reinstate the club’s applications, and consider them for
allotment in accordance with law. Since the cancellation of the old scheme
or its closure was not adversely commented, the only manner in which
the directions could reasonably be complied with, was to consider the
applications under the subsequent- extant scheme. In the scheme – D
framed in 2020, no applicant can expect allotment on the basis of
interview. Allotment of plots is based on the result of draw of lots. The
club was considered, but was unsuccessful in the draw of lots. Therefore,
the High Court went wrong in holding that the club was entitled to be
considered in accordance with the old scheme which was not in existence.
E
13. Learned senior counsel argued that the club was disentitled to
discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution, because it did
not disclose the full and true facts. It was contended that the club was
allotted a 4000 square meter plot, in 2014, for which it made part payments
as well. However, this fact was suppressed from the High Court. Counsel
contended that Noida, at the time of conducting its due diligence, recently F
discovered this fact. Furthermore, it was submitted that this suppression
was intentional, and appears to have been facilitated by the said Mr.
N.K. Singh.
14. Mr. Salman Khurshid, learned senior counsel for the club,
urged that the impugned judgment as well as the judgment of the High G
Court in review should not be disturbed. It was submitted that NOIDA
gave no reason for the closure of the scheme; its affidavit before the
High Court did not provide any reason why the club’s application was
overlooked or why its representative was not called for interview like in
the case of other applicants. This was arbitrary conduct which called H
606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.
A for an adverse order. To this extent, the High Court’s order is
unexceptionable.
15. It was urged on behalf of the club that the charge of the
pressing information, is unwarranted. Learned counsel urged that Noida
did not point to any rule or guideline which required the club to disclose
B that it had applied under any other scheme before, it applied and was
allotted a plot in the scheme framed in 2013-14. In the circumstances,
the question of denying relief to it under Article 226 did not arise. It was
further argued that the impugned judgment dated 31.07.2019, had to be
and was understood by the High Court in contempt proceedings, to mean
that the club’s application had to be processed in accordance with the
C scheme as it existed, in 2009-10 when in fact an application had been
made and entertained. In other words, the club’s application had to be
treated and considered in accordance with the old scheme. This meant
naturally that its representative had been called for interview and the
application evaluated accordingly. Instead, the Noida chose to unilaterally
D treat the application as one under the extant policy of 2020. In terms of
the latter, allotment is to be made not on the basis of interview but on the
basis of the draw of lots. Mr. Khurshid submitted that this was not the
intent or tenor of the impugned judgment. In the circumstances, the
contempt proceedings drawn for willful non-compliance were maintainable
and the directions issued by the High Court, completely justified.
E
Analysis and Conclusions
16. The terms of the old scheme were noticed in an earlier part of
the judgment. Other terms included stipulated that rates indicated were
subject to change by Noida [clause 2 (d)]; the area of the plot could be
F varied [clause 2 (e)]. Clause 2 (i) read as follows:
“This scheme is an open-ended scheme. However, NOIDA
reserves the right to close the scheme at any point of time
without any notice and without assigning any reasons.”
17. The club’s grievance was that its application was not considered
G – its representatives were not interviewed. Noida pointed out that it
closed or terminated the scheme. In the writ proceeding, the club did not
challenge the closure of the scheme; rather its case was that Noida’s
omission to consider its application for allotment was arbitrary. Once the
club accepted the closure of the scheme and did not challenge it, there
was no question of its agitating any right or grievance regarding non-
H
RITU MAHESHWARI v. M/S. PROMOTIONAL CLUB 607
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J. ]
consideration of its application. The club does not deny that there were A
other registrants, similarly circumstanced, who did not secure any
allotment. They presumably were treated in the same manner as the
club was. In the circumstance, the club could not without establishing
any discrimination, merely on the strength of closure of the scheme,
allege arbitrariness. It is well established that when a policy decision like
B
the closure or termination of a benefit available to a class of persons, is
not challenged, the consequence of such closure (which is the impact on
the pendency of those wishing to be considered) cannot ordinarily be
subject matter of a grievance. What the club had was a right to be
considered for allotment of the plots its applied for, so long as the
old scheme subsisted. C
18. In the opinion of this court, an applicant or registrant of a
scheme has no right to insist that they should be provided allotment under
a scheme. Much depends on the terms of the scheme. In Delhi
Development Authority vs. Pushpendra Kumar Jain7 this court had
enunciated the applicable principle as follows: D
“8. Now coming to the other ground, we are unable to find
any legal basis for holding that the respondent obtained a
vested right to allotment on the drawl of lots. Since D.D.A. is
a public authority and because the number of applicants are
always more than the number of flats available, the system of E
drawing of lots is being resorted to with a view to identify the
allottee. It is only a mode, a method, a process to identify the
allottee, i.e., it is a process of selection. It is not allotment by
itself. Mere identification or selection of the allottee does not
clothe the person selected with a legal right to allotment at
the price prevailing on the date of drawl of lots. The scheme F
evolved by the appellant does not say so either expressly or
by necessary implication. On the contrary, Clause (14) thereof
says that “the estimated prices mentioned in the brochure are
illustrative and are subject to revision/modification depending
upon the exigencies of lay out, cost of construction etc.” G
In The Bihar State Housing Board & Ors. v Radha Ballabh
Health Care and Research Institute (P) Ltd8 this court again reiterated
the same position:
7
1994 (Supp3) SCR 770
8
2019 (10) SCC483 H
608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.
A ‘‘…the Respondent does not get any right of allotment of a
plot merely because it has applied for allotment earlier. The
response to an advertisement does not lead to any obligation
on the Appellant to allot any plot. Admittedly, there was no
allotment in pursuance of the offer submitted by the
Respondent. Mere fact that the Respondent had applied for
B
allotment of a plot does not confer any legal or equitable
right to seek allotment of any plot.”
19. In the absence of any ambiguity- in the law, and the scheme,
the writ petitioner club, in this court’s opinion could not have insisted that
C after the closure of the old scheme (which went unchallenged by it),
nevertheless, it had a right to allotment. In holding otherwise, and
proceeding to direct Noida to consider the club’s applications the impugned
judgment erred in law.
20. The High Court had directed that the club’s applications should
D be considered “in accordance with law”. Noida proceeded to comply
with that direction, and reinstate those applications- and, furthermore,
consider them in accordance with the existing scheme. The High Court,
in contempt proceedings, has taken exception to this course of action- in
this court’s opinion, in an entirely unnecessary and unwarranted manner.
E As held earlier, once the legality of closure of the old scheme was
undisputed, there was no manner of right inhering with the club, to insist
that its claim for any plot had to be considered. If at all, it ought to have
applied under subsequent schemes, and waited like other applicants (of
that scheme), Noida’s interpretation of the High Court’s judgment (to
consider) in this context, was quite correct. Neither did Noida, in its
F announcement while closing the old scheme nor in any condition of the
2013 or later scheme, stipulate that old scheme applicants would be
dealt with according to the terms of that (i.e. 2010) scheme. This meant
that Noida had to consider the club’s applications, in accordance with
terms of the prevailing scheme. It did so, and incurred – quite unjustifiably-
G the wrath of the High Court in contempt proceedings. There is authority
for the proposition that when regulations or schemes, or policies change,
applicants for their benefits have no inherent right to be considered under
the old policy; rather the consideration has to be under the new regime,
unless the latter contains an express stipulation to the contrary.
H
RITU MAHESHWARI v. M/S. PROMOTIONAL CLUB 609
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J. ]
21. In Usman Gani Khatri of Bombay v Cantonment Board9 A
this court affirmed the decision of the High Court, which held that old
rules could not be applied, and that new rules were applicable, for
considering applications for sanction of buildings. It was held that
“In any case, the High Court is right in taking the view that
the building plan can only be sanctioned according to the B
building regulations prevailing at the time of sanctioning of
such building plans. At present the statutory bye-laws
published on 30.4.1988 are in force and the fresh building
plans to be submitted by the petitioners, if any, shall now be
governed by these bye-laws and not by any other bye-laws
or schemes which are no longer in force now. C
If we consider a reverse case where building regulations are
amended more favourably to the builders before sanctioning
of building plans already submitted, the builders would
certainly claim and get advantage of the regulations amended
to their benefit.” D
Likewise, in Howrah Municipal Corpn. & Ors. v Ganges Rope
Co. Ltd. & Ors 10. a similar question arose for consideration. The
municipal corporation was required to decide an application for sanction,
in a time bound manner, by the court. The applicable rules changed. The
corporation decided the application in the light of the amended rules. E
This court, negativing the applicant’s contention that it had a right to be
considered under the old rules, held as follows:
“20. The provisions of the Act, therefore, contemplate an
express sanction to be granted by the Corporation before any
person can be allowed to construct or erect a building. Thus, F
in ordinary course, merely by submission of application for
sanction for construction, no vested right is created in favour
of any party by statutory operation of the provisions.
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G
In our considered opinion, by the order of the Court
dated 23.12.1993 observing that the petitioner is ‘not
prevented from applying’ for further sanction of additional
floors above fourth floor and the ‘expectation’ expressed in
9
1992 (3) SCR 1
10
[2003] Supp (6) SCR1212 H
610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.
A the subsequent order of the Court dated 24.6.1994, from the
Corporation to decide the pending application for sanction
within four weeks, no vested right in favour of the respondent
- company can be said to have been created to obtain sanction
on the unamended rules, as they existed on the date of their
second application.”
B
In the light of the above position in law, it is clear that the club
could not have claimed that its application had to be dealt with in terms
of the old scheme, which had ended in 2012. The direction of the High
Court, could only have meant that the applications had to be revived, and
dealt with the scheme prevailing as on the date of its consideration, i.e.
C after 31.07.2019. The interpretation placed by the High Court, that there
were existing plots, which could have been dealt with under the old
scheme is entirely misplaced. In such events, given that the legality of
closure of the old scheme attained finality, there was no question of any
land or plot being attached or belonging as it were to an old scheme. If
D any land or plot, or industrial unit were in fact “left-over” it was always
up to the development authority or agency (here Noida) to determine
how they are to be dealt with. The directions issued in contempt
proceedings, which are subject matter of another appeal, are accordingly
held erroneous.
E 22. As noticed earlier, the club was allotted a plot, in 2014; it paid
substantial amounts. The area of that plot is 4000 square metres. Now,
while it is true that this fact could not have been disclosed to the High
Court, when filing the writ petition (in 2013), the club, in this court’s
opinion, had an obligation to disclose it, during the pendency of writ
proceedings. This fact was material, given that the jurisdiction invoked
F is equitable and discretionary. Furthermore, whether the grievance was
justified and well founded, given that state agencies develop and allot
such industrial units at prices which are reasonable, and that an applicant
subsequently succeeded in securing a plot, are relevant facts, which a
court should be appraised of. The failure by the club, to do so, in this
G court’s opinion, disentitled it to any relief.
23. For the foregoing reasons, Noida’s appeals are allowed; the
impugned judgment and orders of the High Court are hereby set aside.
There shall be no order on costs.
H Devika Gujral Appeals allowed.
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