RAVISHANKAR TANDONversusSTATE OF CHHATTISGARH

                 [2024] 4 S.C.R. 558 : 2024 INSC 299

                          Ravishankar Tandon
                                    v.
                          State of Chhattisgarh
                    (Criminal Appeal No. 3869 of 2023)
                                 10 April 2024
               [B.R. Gavai* and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.]

                           Issue for Consideration
       In a case based on circumstantial evidence wherein the appellants-
       accused persons were convicted u/s.302 r/w s.34, ss.120B and 201,
       s.302 r/w ss.34 and 120B, IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for
       life, whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable
       doubt that the recovery of the dead body of the deceased from the
       pond was on the basis of the information given by the appellants
       in the statement recorded u/s.27, Evidence Act, 1872.

                                  Headnotes
       Evidence Act, 1872 – s.27 – Prosecution relied on the
       memorandum of the appellants-accused u/s.27 and the
       subsequent recovery of the dead body of the deceased from
       the pond at Bhatgaon – Correctness:
       Held: For bringing the case u/s.27, it will be necessary for the
       prosecution to establish that, based on the information given by
       the accused while in police custody, it had led to the discovery of
       the fact, which was distinctly within the knowledge of the maker
       of the said statement – It will have to establish that before the
       information given by the accused persons on the basis of which
       the dead body was recovered, nobody had the knowledge about
       the existence of the dead body at the place from where it was
       recovered – Insofar as the memorandum u/s.27 is concerned, the
       prosecution relied on the depositions of PW-5 (brother-in-law of
       the deceased) and PW-18 (another witness of the memorandum)
       – Evidence of PW-2 (brother of the deceased) read with that of
       PW-5 revealed that the police as well as these witnesses knew
       about the death of the deceased occurring and the dead body
       being found at village Bhatgaon prior to the statements of the
       accused persons being recorded u/s.27 – All the statements were
       recorded after 10:00 am whereas PW-2 stated that at around
       08:00 am, police informed him about the accused persons killing
* Author
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                              559

              Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh


     the deceased and thereafter they going to Bhatgaon – PW-5
     admitted that he arrived at village Kunda and on his arrival, he
     was informed by his brother-in-law and nephew (PW-2) about
     the murder of the deceased – His evidence showed that though
     his statement was taken at Kunda police station, it was signed
     at Bhatgaon – As such, the possibility of these documents being
     created to rope in the accused persons cannot be ruled out – PW-
     18 also admitted that he had signed the papers without reading
     them and that too on the instructions of the police – Furthermore,
     insofar as the statement of accused No.3 is concerned, even the
     statement recorded u/s.27 was not at all related to the discovery of
     the dead body of the deceased – Prosecution failed to prove that
     the discovery of the dead body of the deceased from the pond at
     Bhatgaon was only on the basis of the disclosure statement made
     by the accused persons u/s.27 and that nobody knew about the
     same before that – It utterly failed to prove any of the incriminating
     circumstances against the appellants – Chain of circumstances not
     so complete leading to no other conclusion than the guilt of the
     accused persons – Impugned judgment as well as the judgment
     of the trial court, quashed and set aside – Appellants acquitted.
     [Paras13-15, 21-23, 26, 27]
     Evidence – Circumstantial evidence – Law as regards
     conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence – Discussed.

                              Case Law Cited
           Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra
           [1985] 1 SCR 88 : (1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1984 INSC
           121; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu alias Afsan
           Guru [2003] Supp. 1 SCR 130 : (2005) 11 SCC 600 :
           2005 INSC 333; Asar Mohammad and Others v. State
           of Uttar Pradesh [2018] 13 SCR 248 : (2019) 12 SCC
           253 : 2018 INSC 985; Boby v. State of Kerala [2023] 1
           SCR 335 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 50 : 2023 INSC 23.

                                 List of Acts
     Evidence Act, 1872; Penal Code, 1860.

                              List of Keywords
     Circumstantial evidence; Beyond reasonable doubt; Disclosure
     statement made by accused persons; Subsequent recovery of
     dead body; Information given by accused while in police custody;
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       Discovery of fact distinctly within the knowledge of the maker of
       the statement; Documents created to rope in accused persons;
       Incriminating circumstances not proved; Chain of circumstances
       not complete.

                              Case Arising From
       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 3869
       of 2023
       From the Judgment and Order dated 02.01.2023 of the High Court
       of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in CRLA No. 194 of 2013
       With
       Criminal Appeal No. 2740 of 2023 and Criminal Appeal Nos. 2046
       And 2047 of 2024
                           Appearances for Parties
       Manish Kumar Saran, Ms. Ananya Tyagi, Chandrika Prasad Mishra,
       Ms. Nishi Prabha Singh, Ms. Prashasti Singh, Ms. Swati Surbhi,
       Upendra Narayan Mishra, Ms. Aswathi M.K., Prashant Kumar Umrao,
       V. Ramasubbu, Rishesh Sikarwar, Advs. for the Appellant.
       Praneet Pranav, Dy. A.G., Prashant Singh, Advs. for the Respondent.
                  Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
                                  Judgment
       B.R. Gavai, J.
1.     Leave granted in SLP (Criminal) Nos. 837 and 1174 of 2024.
2.     These appeals challenge the judgment and order dated 2nd January,
       2023 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Chhattisgarh
       at Bilaspur in Criminal Appeal Nos. 194, 232 and 277 of 2013 wherein
       the Division Bench dismissed the criminal appeals preferred by the
       appellants, namely Ravishankar Tandon (accused No.1), Umend
       Prasad Dhrutlahre (accused No.2), Dinesh Chandrakar (accused
       No.3) and Satyendra Kumar Patre (accused No.4) and upheld the
       order of conviction and sentence dated 5th February, 2013 as recorded
       by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Mungeli (hereinafter
       referred to as the ‘trial court’) in Sessions Trial No. 10 of 2012.
3.     Shorn of details, the facts leading to the present appeals are as under:-
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                       561

              Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh


     3.1 On 2nd December 2011, Ramavtar (PW-1) lodged a missing
         person report being Missing Person Serial No. 10/11 at Police
         Station Kunda after his son Dharmendra Satnami (deceased)
         went missing. While an extensive search was being conducted,
         on the basis of suspicion, the police interrogated the appellants.
         During the interrogation, the appellants disclosed that they
         had strangulated the deceased to death on the Bhatgaon
         Canal Road and had thereafter thrown his body into a pond at
         Village Bhatgaon. Thereafter, on 3rd December 2011, the police
         recorded the memorandum statements of accused Nos.1 to
         3 at about 10:00 am, 10:30 am and 11:00 am, respectively,
         whereas the memorandum statement of accused No.4 came to
         be recorded on 6th December 2011 at 07:00 pm. On the basis
         of the aforesaid memorandum statements, the police recovered
         the dead body of the deceased from the pond at Bhatgaon on
         3rd December 2011 at about 04:05 pm and the dead body was
         identified. Thereafter, on the very same day, a First Information
         Report (‘FIR’ for short) being No. 402 of 2011 was registered at
         Police Station Mungeli, District Bilaspur wherein it is recorded
         that the aforesaid offences were committed between the days
         of 30th November 2011 and 3rd December 2011. According to
         the Post-Mortem Report (Ext. P-22), the cause of death of the
         deceased was asphyxia due to strangulation and the nature
         of death was homicidal.
     3.2 The prosecution case stems from the memorandum statements
         of the appellants wherein the appellants had admitted that
         Dinesh Chandrakar (accused No.3) had instructed Ravishankar
         Tandon (accused No.1) and Satyendra Kumar Patre (accused
         No.4) to murder the deceased in exchange for Rs.90,000/-,
         which was to be paid upon the execution of the said murder.
         Upon receiving the aforesaid instruction, Ravishankar Tandon
         (accused No.1) and Satyendra Kumar Patre (accused No.4)
         along with Umend Prasad Dhritalhare (accused No.2) hatched
         a criminal conspiracy to kill the deceased and worked out a
         plan to execute the same. Accordingly, the aforesaid three
         accused persons called the deceased to Mungeli on 30th
         November 2011 under the ruse of purchasing silver. While
         Umend Prasad Dhritalhare (accused No. 2) and Satyendra
         Kumar Patre (accused No.4) reached Datgaon which fell
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            within the ambit of Police Station Mungeli, on a motorcycle
            belonging to a relative of Satyendra Kumar Patre (accused
            No.4), Ravishankar Tandon (accused No.1) and the deceased
            reached Datgaon by a bus. Thereafter, the three accused
            persons along with the deceased went to visit the house of
            the brother-in-law of Satyendra Kumar Patre (accused No.4),
            namely, Sunil. On that same night, after taking the dinner, they
            left Sunil’s house on the pretext of returning to their homes.
            However, when they reached near Bhatgaon, Ravishankar
            Tandon (accused No.1), Umend Prasad Dhritalhare (accused
            No.2) and Satyendra Kumar Patre (accused No.4) strangulated
            the deceased to death and in order to screen themselves from
            the said act of murder, the accused persons tied the dead body
            of the deceased with his own clothes and stuffed it into a jute
            sack which had been procured from Sunil’s house. Thereafter,
            the appellants transported the dead body of the deceased to
            a pond at Village Bhatgaon, on the motorcycle of Satyendra
            Kumar Patre (accused No.4), and threw the dead body into
            the said pond, wherefrom it was subsequently recovered.
       3.3 Upon the conclusion of the investigation, a charge-sheet came
           to be filed before the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate,
           Mungeli, Chhattisgarh, wherein accused Nos. 1, 2 and 4 had
           been charged for the offences punishable under Sections 302
           read with 34, Sections 120B and 201 of the Indian Penal Code,
           1860 (‘IPC’ for short) whereas accused No.3 had been charged
           for the offences punishable under Sections 302 read with 34
           and 120B of the IPC. Since the case was exclusively triable
           by the Sessions Court, the same came to be committed to the
           Sessions Court.
       3.4 Charges came to be framed by the trial court for the aforesaid
           offences. The accused/appellants pleaded not guilty and claimed
           to be tried.
       3.5 The prosecution examined 18 witnesses and exhibited 37
           documents to bring home the guilt of the accused/appellants.
           The defence, on the other hand, did not examine any witness
           or exhibit any document.
       3.6 At the conclusion of the trial, the trial Court found that the
           prosecution had proved the case against the appellants beyond
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                        563

              Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh


           reasonable doubt and accordingly convicted accused Nos. 1, 2
           and 3 for the offences punishable under Sections 302 read with
           34, Sections 120B and 201 of the IPC and convicted accused
           No. 4 for the offences punishable under Sections 302 read with
           34 and 120B of the IPC and sentenced all of them to undergo
           imprisonment for life along with fine.
     3.7 Being aggrieved thereby, the appellants preferred three
         Criminal Appeals before the High Court. The High Court vide
         the impugned judgment dismissed the Criminal Appeals and
         affirmed the order of conviction and sentence awarded by the
         trial Court.
4.   Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeals.
5.   We have heard Shri Manish Kumar Saran, learned counsel appearing
     on behalf of the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 3869 of 2023, Shri
     Chandrika Prasad Mishra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
     appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 2740 of 2023, appeals arising out of
     SLP (Criminal) Nos. 837 and 1174 of 2024, and Shri Praneet Pranav,
     learned Deputy Advocate General (‘Dy. AG’ for short) appearing on
     behalf of the respondent-State at length.
6.   Shri Saran and Shri Mishra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
     the appellants, submitted that the present case rests on circumstantial
     evidence. It is submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove any
     of the incriminating circumstances beyond reasonable doubt. It is
     submitted that, in any case, the prosecution has failed to establish
     the chain of proven circumstances which leads to no other conclusion
     than the guilt of the accused persons. They therefore submitted that
     the appeals deserve to be allowed and the judgments and orders of
     conviction need to be quashed and set aside.
7.   Shri Pranav, learned Dy. AG appearing on behalf of the respondent-
     State, on the contrary, submitted that both the High Court and
     the trial court have concurrently held that the prosecution has
     proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. He submitted that
     the findings of the trial court and the High Court are based upon
     cogent appreciation of evidence and as such, no interference is
     warranted.
8.   Undoubtedly, the prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence.
     The law with regard to conviction on the basis of circumstantial
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       evidence has very well been crystalized in the judgment of this Court
       in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra1,
       wherein this Court held thus:
            “152. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the High
            Court we would like to cite a few decisions on the nature,
            character and essential proof required in a criminal case
            which rests on circumstantial evidence alone. The most
            fundamental and basic decision of this Court is Hanumant
            v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(1952) 2 SCC 71 : AIR 1952
            SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129]. This case
            has been uniformly followed and applied by this Court in
            a large number of later decisions up-to-date, for instance,
            the cases of Tufail (Alias) Simmi v. State of Uttar Pradesh
            [(1969) 3 SCC 198 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 55] and Ramgopal v.
            State of Maharashtra [(1972) 4 SCC 625 : AIR 1972 SC
            656]. It may be useful to extract what Mahajan, J. has laid
            down in Hanumant case [(1952) 2 SCC 71 : AIR 1952 SC
            343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129] :
                    “It is well to remember that in cases where
                    the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the
                    circumstances from which the conclusion of
                    guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance
                    be fully established, and all the facts so
                    established should be consistent only with the
                    hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again,
                    the circumstances should be of a conclusive
                    nature and tendency and they should be such
                    as to exclude every hypothesis but the one
                    proposed to be proved. In other words, there
                    must be a chain of evidence so far complete
                    as not to leave any reasonable ground for a
                    conclusion consistent with the innocence of the
                    accused and it must be such as to show that
                    within all human probability the act must have
                    been done by the accused.”



1   [1985] 1 SCR 88 : (1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1984 INSC 121
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                          565

              Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh


           153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the
           following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against
           an accused can be said to be fully established:
                (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion
                of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.
           It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the
           circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may
           be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal
           distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should
           be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao
           Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973
           SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the observations
           were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047]
                “Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused
                must be and not merely may be guilty before
                a court can convict and the mental distance
                between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and
                divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.”
                (2) the facts so established should be consistent
                only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
                accused, that is to say, they should not be
                explainable on any other hypothesis except that
                the accused is guilty,
                (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive
                nature and tendency,
                (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis
                except the one to be proved, and
                (5) there must be a chain of evidence so
                complete as not to leave any reasonable ground
                for the conclusion consistent with the innocence
                of the accused and must show that in all human
                probability the act must have been done by the
                accused.
           154. These five golden principles, if we may say so,
           constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based
           on circumstantial evidence.”
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9.     It can thus clearly be seen that it is necessary for the prosecution
       that the circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to be
       drawn should be fully established. The Court held that it is a primary
       principle that the accused ‘must be’ and not merely ‘may be’ proved
       guilty before a court can convict the accused. It has been held that
       there is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between ‘may
       be proved’ and ‘must be or should be proved’. It has been held that
       the facts so established should be consistent only with the guilt of
       the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any
       other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. It has further been
       held that the circumstances should be such that they exclude every
       possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. It has been held that
       there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any
       reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence
       of the accused and must show that in all human probabilities the act
       must have been done by the accused.
10. It is settled law that suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take
    the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An accused cannot be
    convicted on the ground of suspicion, no matter how strong it is. An
    accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond a
    reasonable doubt.
11. In the light of these guiding principles, we will have to examine the
    present case.
12. The prosecution case basically relies on the circumstance of the
    memorandum of the accused under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence
    Act, 1872 (for short “Evidence Act”) and the subsequent recovery of
    the dead body from the pond at Bhatgaon. The learned Judges of the
    High Court have relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of
    State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu alias Afsan Guru2. The High
    Court has relied on the following observations of the said judgment:
             “121. The first requisite condition for utilising Section 27
             in support of the prosecution case is that the investigating
             police officer should depose that he discovered a fact in
             consequence of the information received from an accused
             person in police custody. Thus, there must be a discovery



2    [2003] Supp. 1 SCR 130 : (2005) 11 SCC 600 : 2005 INSC 333
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                             567

              Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh


           of fact not within the knowledge of police officer as a
           consequence of information received. Of course, it is
           axiomatic that the information or disclosure should be free
           from any element of compulsion. The next component of
           Section 27 relates to the nature and extent of information
           that can be proved. It is only so much of the information
           as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered that
           can be proved and nothing more. It is explicitly clarified in
           the section that there is no taboo against receiving such
           information in evidence merely because it amounts to a
           confession. At the same time, the last clause makes it
           clear that it is not the confessional part that is admissible
           but it is only such information or part of it, which relates
           distinctly to the fact discovered by means of the information
           furnished. Thus, the information conveyed in the statement
           to the police ought to be dissected if necessary so as to
           admit only the information of the nature mentioned in the
           section. The rationale behind this provision is that, if a fact
           is actually discovered in consequence of the information
           supplied, it affords some guarantee that the information is
           true and can therefore be safely allowed to be admitted in
           evidence as an incriminating factor against the accused. As
           pointed out by the Privy Council in Kottaya case [AIR 1947
           PC 67 : 48 Cri LJ 533 : 74 IA 65] : (AIR p. 70, para 10)
                “clearly the extent of the information admissible
                must depend on the exact nature of the fact
                discovered”
           and the information must distinctly relate to that fact.
           Elucidating the scope of this section, the Privy Council
           speaking through Sir John Beaumont said: (AIR p. 70,
           para 10)
                “Normally the section is brought into operation
                when a person in police custody produces from
                some place of concealment some object, such
                as a dead body, a weapon, or ornaments, said
                to be connected with the crime of which the
                informant is accused.”
                                             (emphasis supplied)
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       We have emphasised the word “normally” because the
       illustrations given by the learned Judge are not exhaustive.
       The next point to be noted is that the Privy Council rejected
       the argument of the counsel appearing for the Crown that
       the fact discovered is the physical object produced and
       that any and every information which relates distinctly to
       that object can be proved. Upon this view, the information
       given by a person that the weapon produced is the one
       used by him in the commission of the murder will be
       admissible in its entirety. Such contention of the Crown’s
       counsel was emphatically rejected with the following words:
       (AIR p. 70, para 10)
            “If this be the effect of Section 27, little
            substance would remain in the ban imposed
            by the two preceding sections on confessions
            made to the police, or by persons in police
            custody. That ban was presumably inspired by
            the fear of the legislature that a person under
            police influence might be induced to confess
            by the exercise of undue pressure. But if all
            that is required to lift the ban be the inclusion
            in the confession of information relating to
            an object subsequently produced, it seems
            reasonable to suppose that the persuasive
            powers of the police will prove equal to the
            occasion, and that in practice the ban will
            lose its effect.”
       Then, Their Lordships proceeded to give a lucid exposition
       of the expression “fact discovered” in the following passage,
       which is quoted time and again by this Court: (AIR p. 70,
       para 10)
            “In Their Lordships’ view it is fallacious to
            treat the ‘fact discovered’ within the section
            as equivalent to the object produced; the fact
            discovered embraces the place from which the
            object is produced and the knowledge of the
            accused as to this, and the information given
            must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                         569

              Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh


                to past user, or the past history, of the object
                produced is not related to its discovery in the
                setting in which it is discovered. Information
                supplied by a person in custody that ‘I will
                produce a knife concealed in the roof of my
                house’ does not lead to the discovery of a knife;
                knives were discovered many years ago. It
                leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is
                concealed in the house of the informant to his
                knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have
                been used in the commission of the offence,
                the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to
                the statement the words be added ‘with which
                I stabbed A’ these words are inadmissible since
                they do not relate to the discovery of the knife
                in the house of the informant.”
                                            (emphasis supplied)
           128. So also in Udai Bhan v. State of U.P. [1962 Supp (2)
           SCR 830 : AIR 1962 SC 1116 : (1962) 2 Cri LJ 251] J.L.
           Kapur, J. after referring to Kottaya case [AIR 1947 PC
           67 : 48 Cri LJ 533 : 74 IA 65] stated the legal position as
           follows: (SCR p. 837)
                “A discovery of a fact includes the object found,
                the place from which it is produced and the
                knowledge of the accused as to its existence.”
           The above statement of law does not run counter to the
           contention of Mr. Ram Jethmalani, that the factum of
           discovery combines both the physical object as well as
           the mental consciousness of the informant accused in
           relation thereto. However, what would be the position if
           the physical object was not recovered at the instance of
           the accused was not discussed in any of these cases.”
13. As such, for bringing the case under Section 27 of the Evidence
    Act, it will be necessary for the prosecution to establish that, based
    on the information given by the accused while in police custody, it
    had led to the discovery of the fact, which was distinctly within the
    knowledge of the maker of the said statement. It is only so much of
    the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered
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       would be admissible. It has been held that the rationale behind this
       provision is that, if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of the
       information supplied, it affords some guarantee that the information is
       true and it can therefore be safely allowed to be admitted in evidence
       as an incriminating factor against the accused.
14. We will have to therefore examine as to whether the prosecution
    has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the recovery of the
    dead body was on the basis of the information given by the
    accused persons in the statement recorded under Section 27
    of the Evidence Act. The prosecution will have to establish that,
    before the information given by the accused persons on the basis
    of which the dead body was recovered, nobody had the knowledge
    about the existence of the dead body at the place from where it
    was recovered.
15. The prosecution, insofar as the memorandum under Section 27 of the
    Evidence Act is concerned, has relied on the depositions of Ramkumar
    (PW-5) and Ajab Singh (PW-18). According to the prosecution, the
    statement of Ravishankar Tandon (accused No. 1) was recorded on
    3rd December 2011 at 10:00 am. On the same day, the statement of
    Umend Prasad Dhritalhare (accused No. 2) was recorded at 10:30
    am, and that of Dinesh Chandrakar (accused No. 3) at 11:00 am.
    Whereas the statement of Satyendra Kumar Patre (accused No. 4)
    was recorded on 6th December 2011 at 07:00 pm. It will be relevant
    to refer to the relevant part of the evidence of Ramkumar (PW-5),
    which reads thus:
            “2. In front of me, accused Ravishankar have told to the
            police that at the behest of accused Dinesh, they have
            killed Dharmender for Rs. 90,000 and made a plan and
            Ravishankar called Dharmender called him to buy silver
            and killed him in Bhatgaon stuffed his dead body in a sack
            and threw it in the pond. On being shown the memorandum
            statement of Exhibit P- l0 have told to be his signature
            on Part A to A.
            3. Umed had also told the police in front of me that Sattu
            along with Ravi Shankar had killed Dharmendra and threw
            him in Bhatagaon’s lake on the advice of Dinesh. Witness
            Memo statement is Exhibit P-11 and accepts his signature
            on part A to A.
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                            571

              Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh


           4. Dinesh had told in front of me that 6 months back
           he had made a deal with Ravishankar and sattu to kill
           Dharmender for 90 thousand rupees. Dinesh also told
           that Shankar had said that the work is done, give him the
           money. On being shown Exhibit P-12, accepted to have
           his signature on Part A to A. Witness states that it was
           seized from the pond in front of me.
           5. Village Kunda is 16 km away from my village. It is
           correct that Dharmendra had come to know about the
           murder on 3rd. Witness states that it was informed by
           the police. On that other morning, at about 7 -8 o’clock
           in the morning, it is correct that on my arrival in village
           Kunda, my brother-in-law and nephew Narendra had told
           me about the murder which was done by the accused. By
           that time we did not reach the spot that’s why whether it
           was Dharmender’s body or not I cannot.”
           6. I went from Kunda to Bhatgaon on 2nd with the police,
           then he says that at that time it was about two and a half
           o’clock in the evening. It is correct that when I reached
           Bhatgaon there were many people of the village. It is correct
           that because of dead body there were many people there.
           It is correct to say that police have brought the dead body
           to Mungeli police station where PM was done.
           7. It is correct that accused were brought to Mungeli police
           station. It is incorrect that I had taken the signature of
           accused at Mungeli police station. Accused have given
           the statement at Kunda police station, in front of me. Apart
           from the accused we were 5-6 other family members in
           the Police station Kunda. The police took the statement
           at around 12 o’clock.
           …………..
           14. We have reached Bhatgaon at 4.30-5. And reached
           Mungeli before sunset. It is incorrect to· say that the police
           have taken my signature Witness itself states that I have
           signed in Bhatgaon. It is incorrect to say that I did not
           read the papers before signing them. Witness says that
           the I have read the main part. It is incorrect to say that I
572                                                          [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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          am seeing accused for the first time today. It is incorrect
          to say that I know accused by name only, witness states
          that I know him by face also. It is incorrect to say that the
          name of the accused was revealed by my brother-in-:law
          and Narendra it was told by the police.”
16. It is to be noted that Ramkumar (PW-5) is the brother-in-law of the
    deceased. A perusal of his evidence would reveal that he has admitted
    that, on his arrival in village Kunda, he was informed by his brother-
    in-law and nephew Narendra Kumar (PW-2) about the murder of the
    deceased which was done by the accused persons. He stated that,
    by that time they had not reached the spot and that is why they were
    not aware as to whether it was the body of Dharmendra or not. He
    further admitted that when they reached Bhatgaon, many people of
    the village were there. He has also admitted that because of the
    dead body, many people were there. He has further admitted that the
    accused persons had given their statements at Kunda police station.
    He has further admitted that they had reached Bhatgaon at around
    04:30 pm to 05:00 pm and had reached Mungeli before sunset. He
    has also stated that he had signed the panchnama at Bhatgaon.
17. It could thus be seen that, according to this witness (PW-5), though
    the statement was taken at Kunda, it was signed at Bhatgaon.
18. Ajab Singh (PW-18) is another witness on the memorandum recorded
    under Section 27 of the Evidence Act and the subsequent recovery
    of the dead body. He states that Ravishankar informed the police
    that Dharmendra had been killed and thrown into the pond. However,
    he states in examination-in-chief that Umend and Dinesh did not tell
    anything to the police in front of him. It will be relevant to refer to
    his cross-examination, which reads thus:
          “4. It is true that I used to work as Kotwari. It is true that
          I did not have read the paper. It is true that I had signed
          3-4 papers on the instructions of the police. It is true that
          due to being Kotwar had to visit police station regularly. It
          is true that I signed on documents on the instructions of
          the police. It is wrong to say that I signed in police station,
          Kunda. Witnesses say that it was signed in Dandaon.”
19. It could thus be seen that Ajab Singh (PW-18) has clearly admitted
    that he did not read the papers before putting his signature on them.
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                       573

              Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh


     He has admitted that he had signed 3-4 papers on the instructions
     of the police. He has also stated that he had signed the statement
     at Dandaon.
20. Narendra Kumar (PW-2) is the brother of the deceased. He has stated
    that, after his brother went missing; on the next day at around 08:00
    o’clock in the morning, the police came to his place and informed that
    his brother Dharmendra had been killed by Ravishankar, Satnami,
    Umend and Satyendra. After that, they went to Bhatgaon with the
    police. The extract of the evidence of Narendra Kumar (PW-2) is
    as under:
           “3. At around 8 in morning the police came to my place
           and informed that my brother Dharmendra was killed by
           Ravishankar, Satnami, Umend and Satyendra. After that
           we went to Bhatgaon with the police. Ramkumar, Krishna,
           Banshee had gone with me.”
21. A perusal of the evidence of Narendra Kumar (PW-2) read with that
    of Ramkumar (PW-5) would clearly reveal that the police as well
    as these witnesses knew about the death of Dharmendra Satnami
    occurring and the dead body being found at Bhatgaon prior to the
    statements of the accused persons being recorded under Section 27
    of the Evidence Act. All the statements are recorded after 10:00 am
    whereas Ramkumar (PW-2) stated that at around 08:00 am, police
    informed him about the accused persons killing the deceased and
    thereafter they going to Bhatgaon. Ramkumar (PW-5) also admitted
    that he arrived at village Kunda and on his arrival, he was informed
    by his brother-in-law and nephew about the murder which was done
    by the accused persons.
22. We therefore find that the prosecution has utterly failed to prove that
    the discovery of the dead body of the deceased from the pond at
    Bhatgaon was only on the basis of the disclosure statement made by
    the accused persons under Section 27 of the Evidence Act and that
    nobody knew about the same before that. It is further to be noted that
    Ajab Singh (PW-18) has clearly admitted that he had signed the papers
    without reading them and that too on the instructions of the police.
23. The evidence of Ramkumar (PW-5) would show that though his
    statement was taken at Kunda police station, it was signed at
    Bhatgaon. As such, the possibility of these documents being created
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                          Digital Supreme Court Reports


       to rope in the accused persons cannot be ruled out. In any case,
       insofar as the statement of Dinesh Chandrakar (accused No. 3) is
       concerned, even the statement recorded under Section 27 of the
       Evidence Act is not at all related to the discovery of the dead body of
       the deceased. As a matter of fact, nothing in his statement recorded
       under Section 27 of the Evidence Act has led to discovery of any
       incriminating fact.
24. Another aspect that needs to be noted is that, the only evidence
    with regard to recording of the memorandum of accused persons
    under Section 27 of the Evidence Act is concerned, is that of B.R.
    Singh, the then Investigating Officer (IO) (PW-16). The relevant part
    thereof reads thus:
            “1. ….I wrote the statement of accused Ravi Shankar as
            per memorandum Ex. P-10 after taking him into custody in
            which my signature is on part B to B. I wrote the statement
            of accused· Um end as per his memorandum Ex. P-11
            and accused Dinesh as per his memorandum Ex. P-12
            in which my signature is on part B to B.”
25. It could thus be seen that the IO (PW-16) has failed to state as
    to what information was given by the accused persons which led
    to the discovery of the dead body. The evidence is also totally
    silent as to how the dead body was discovered and subsequently
    recovered. We find that therefore, the evidence of the IO (PW-16)
    would also not bring the case at hand under the purview of Section
    27 of the Evidence Act. Reliance in this respect could be placed on
    the judgments of this Court in the cases of Asar Mohammad and
    Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh3 and Boby v. State of Kerala4.
26. We therefore find that the prosecution has utterly failed to prove any
    of the incriminating circumstances against the appellants herein. In
    any case, the chain of circumstances must be so complete that it
    leads to no other conclusion than the guilt of the accused persons,
    which is not so in the present case.
27. In the result, we pass the following order:



3   [2018] 13 SCR 248 : (2019) 12 SCC 253 : 2018 INSC 985
4   [2023] 1 SCR 335 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 50 : 2023 INSC 23
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                      575

               Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh


     (i)    The appeals are allowed;
     (ii)   The judgment dated 2nd January 2023 passed by the High Court
            and the judgment dated 5th February 2013 passed by the trial
            court are quashed and set aside; and
     (iii) The appellants are directed to be acquitted of all the charges
           charged with and are directed to be released forthwith, if not
           required in any other case.
28. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.


     Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey               Result of the case:
                                                         Appeals allowed.