RAVINDER SINGHversusTHE STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI

480                      [2023]REPORTS
               SUPREME COURT    4 S.C.R. 480                 [2023] 4 S.C.R.


A                              RAVINDER SINGH
                                         v.
                    THE STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI
                       (Criminal Appeal No. 1031 of 2023)
B                                APRIL 25, 2023
               [ABHAY S. OKA AND SANJAY KUMAR, JJ.]
             Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 432 – Penal Code,
      1860 – ss. 45, 53 – Power to impose a modified punishment – Special
      category sentencing to life imprisonment in excess of 14 years –
C
      Appellant was convicted for having committed offence u/s. 376,
      377, 506 and was sentenced to life imprisonment – Trial Court
      directed that the appellant should not be given any clemency by the
      State before he spent at least 20 years in jail – Same was confirmed
      by the High Court – On appeal, held: It is settled that the power to
D     impose a modified punishment within the punishment provided for
      in the Penal Code for such specified offences can only be exercised
      by the High Court and in the event of further appeal, by the Supreme
      Court, and not by any other Court in the country – In the light of
      this settled legal position, it was clearly not within the domain of
      the Additional Sessions Judge to impose a restriction that the term
E
      of the appellant’s life imprisonment should be for at least 20 years
      and that he should not be given any clemency till then – Such power
      could only be exercised by the High Courts or by Supreme Court –
      In the instant case, the child was raped by her father during the
      month of August, 2012, so the amended provisions s.376(2)(f) and
F     s.376(3) have no role to play – Now, the maximum punishment
      prescribed by law is imprisonment for life with nothing further –
      Even in such cases, it would be a parody of justice to allow the
      convicts so sentenced to avail the benefit of remissions and the like,
      liberally conferred by the State, and cut short the length of their life
      sentence to a mere 14 years – Special category sentencing to life
G
      imprisonment in excess of 14 years by fixing a lengthier term would
      be available to the High Courts and this Court, even in cases where
      the maximum punishment, permissible in law and duly imposed, is
      life imprisonment with nothing further – Exercise of such power
      must be restricted to grave cases – Appellant herein was found guilty
H     of one of the most monstrous and horrific of offences – Therefore,
                                        480
 RAVINDER SINGH v. THE STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI                         481


the appellant directed to serve the life imprisonment for a minimum        A
of 20 years of actual incarceration before he can seek remissions
under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or
any other enacted law – Constitution of India – Arts.72 and 161.
      Disposing of the appeal, the Court
       HELD: 1. Affirming the view taken in Swamy                          B
Shraddananda, the majority opinion in V. Sriharan observed that
it could be said without any scope for controversy that, when by
way of a judicial decision after a detailed analysis, having regard
to the proportionality of the crime committed, it is decided that
the offender deserves to be punished with the sentence of life             C
imprisonment, i.e., till the end of his life or for a specific period of
20 years or 30 years or 40 years, such a conclusion should survive
without any interruption. It was, therefore, held that in order to
ensure that the punishment imposed, which is legally provided
for in the Penal Code read along with Criminal Procedure Code,
operates without any interruption, the inherent power of the Court         D
concerned should empower the Court, in public interest as well
as in the interest of the society at large, to make it certain that
such punishment will operate, as imposed, by stating that no
remission or other liberal approach should come into effect to
nullify such imposition. It was further observed that no prohibition       E
is prescribed in the Penal Code, or for that matter any of the
provisions where death penalty or life imprisonment is provided
for, that imprisonment cannot be imposed for a specific period
within the said life span and, when life imprisonment means the
whole life span of the person convicted, it cannot be said that the
Court which is empowered to impose the said punishment cannot              F
specify the period up to which the said sentence of life should
remain, befitting the nature of the crime committed. The majority
opinion, therefore, concluded by stating that the ratio laid down
in Swamy Shraddananda, that a special category of sentence,
instead of death, can be substituted by the punishment of                  G
imprisonment for life or for a term exceeding 14 years and that
category can be put beyond application of remission, is well
founded. It was further held that the power to impose a modified
punishment within the punishment provided for in the Penal Code
for such specified offences can only be exercised by the High
                                                                           H
482            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2023] 4 S.C.R.


A     Court and in the event of further appeal, by the Supreme Court,
      and not by any other Court in the country. [Para 9][486-G-H;
      487-A-D]
            2. In the light of this settled legal position, it was clearly
      not within the domain of the learned Additional Sessions Judge
B     to impose a restriction that the term of the appellant’s life
      imprisonment should be for at least 20 years and that he should
      not be given any clemency till then. Such power could only be
      exercised by the High Courts or by this Court. No doubt, the
      Delhi High Court confirmed the sentence passed by the learned
      Additional Sessions Judge but mere affirmation of the hollow
C     exercise of a power, that was not conferred, by the Additional
      Sessions Judge does not qualify as an independent exercise by
      the High Court and would not suffice in terms of the legal
      requirement. It is only the High Courts or this Court that would
      have the power, upon proper application of mind, to take recourse
D     to special category sentencing, depending upon the nature of the
      offence and its gravity. To that extent, the sentence imposed by
      the Additional Sessions Judge was, therefore, without legal basis.
      [Para 10][487-E-G]
             3. The observations manifest the applicability of the same
E     principle in cases where the maximum punishment prescribed
      by law is imprisonment for life with nothing further. Even in such
      cases, it would be a parody of justice to allow the convicts so
      sentenced to avail the benefit of remissions and the like, liberally
      conferred by the State, and cut short the length of their life
      sentence to a mere 14 years. The law laid down in Swamy
F     Shraddananda and V. Sriharan with regard to special category
      sentencing to life imprisonment in excess of 14 years by fixing a
      lengthier term would be available to the High Courts and this
      Court, even in cases where the maximum punishment,
      permissible in law and duly imposed, is life imprisonment with
G     nothing further. However, the exercise of such power must be
      restricted to grave cases, where allowing the convict sentenced
      to life imprisonment to seek release after a 14-year-term would
      tantamount to trivializing the very punishment imposed on such
      convict. [Para 15][491-G-H; 492-A-B]

H
 RAVINDER SINGH v. THE STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI                      483


       4. The ends of justice would be sufficiently served if the       A
life imprisonment of the appellant is for a minimum of 20 years of
actual incarceration before he can seek remissions under the
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or any other
enacted law. [Para 17][492-F]
      Maru Ram v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 107 : [1981]              B
      1 SCR 1196; Union of India v. V. Sriharan Alias
      Murugan and Others (2016) 7 SCC 1 : [2015] 14 SCR
      613 – followed.
      Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1961
      SC 600; Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka                  C
      (2008) 13 SCC 767 : [2008] 11 SCR 93; Gouri Shankar
      v. State of Punjab (2021) 3 SCC 380; Shiva Kumar @
      Shiva @ Shivamurthy v. State of Karnataka 2023 SCC
      OnLine SC 345; Madan Gopal Kakkad v. Naval Dubey
      and Another (1992) 3 SCC 204 : [1992] 2 SCR 921 –
      referred to.                                                      D

                       Case Law Reference
[1981] 1 SCR 1196                  followed            Para 7
[2015] 14 SCR 613                  followed            Para 7
                                                                        E
[2008] 11 SCR 93                   referred to         Para 8
(2021) 3 SCC 380                   referred to         Para 13
[1992] 2 SCR 921                   referred to         Para 16
      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1031 of 2023.                                                           F

      From the Judgment and Order dated 01.09.2017 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in CRLA No. 1509 of 2014.
      Sudhir Naagar, Digvijay Chaudhary, Vikrant Mehta, Advs. for the
Appellant.                                                              G
      Ms. Sonia Mathur, Sr. Adv., Abhishek Singh, B. K. Satija,
Ms. Suhasini Sen, Dr. N. Visakamurthy, Simarjeet Singh Saluja, Divik
Mathur, Nikhil Chandra Jaiswal, Shreekant Neelappa Terdal, Advs. for
the Respondent.
                                                                        H
484             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2023] 4 S.C.R.


A            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
             SANJAY KUMAR, J.
             1. Convicted and sentenced for the dastardly and most depraved
      of offences – the rape of his own 9-year-old daughter, the appellant is
      before this Court.
B
             2. By judgment dated 18.02.2013 in Sessions Case No. 01 of
      2013, the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Special Fast Track Court),
      Dwarka Courts, New Delhi, held the appellant guilty under Sections
      376, 377 and 506 IPC. By order of sentence dated 23.02.2013, the
      appellant was imposed with imprisonment for life under Section 376
C     IPC and payment of fine of ` 25,000/-; imprisonment for life under Section
      377 IPC and payment of fine of ` 25,000/-; and rigorous imprisonment
      for 2 years under Section 506 IPC along with payment of fine of
      ` 10,000/-. Default in payment of fines entailed further periods of
      imprisonment. In addition thereto, the learned Additional Sessions Judge
D     directed that the appellant should not be given any clemency by the
      State before he spent at least 20 years in jail. In appeal, a Division Bench
      of the Delhi High Court upheld the appellant’s conviction and sentence,
      vide judgment dated 01.09.2017 in Criminal Appeal No. 1509 of 2014.
      Hence, this appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution.

E           3. By order dated 19.03.2018, this Court issued notice to the State
      only on the question of sentence.
           4. Heard Mr. Sudhir Naagar, learned counsel for the appellant;
      and Ms. Sonia Mathur, learned senior counsel, appearing for the State.
             5. As the scope of this appeal has been restricted to the sentence
F     imposed upon the appellant, we need not dilate on or deal with the issues
      raised vis-à-vis the merits of his conviction for the offences under Sections
      376, 377 and 506 IPC.
              6. Section 376(2) IPC, prior to its amendment with retrospective
      effect from 03.02.2013 by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013,
G     consisted of clauses (a) to (g). Section 376(2)(f), as it stood then, provided
      that whoever commits rape on a woman when she is under 12 years of
      age shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall
      not be less than 10 years but which may be for life and shall also be
      liable to fine. Section 377 IPC states that whoever voluntarily has carnal
      intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or animal
H
    RAVINDER SINGH v. THE STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI                           485
                   [SANJAY KUMAR, J.]

shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of           A
either description for a term which may extend to 10 years, and shall
also be liable to fine. It was in exercise of power under Sections 376(2)(f)
and 377 IPC that the learned Additional Sessions Judge sentenced the
appellant to life imprisonment, as the victim was merely 9 years of age
and was also subjected to carnal intercourse against the order of nature.
                                                                                B
He, however, added the riderthat the appellant should not be given
clemency by the State until he spent at least 20 years in jail. In effect,
the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment of a minimum term of
20 years.
       7. Imprisonment for life, in terms of Section 53 IPC read with
Section 45 IPC, means imprisonment for the rest of the life of the prisoner,    C
subject to the right to claim remission, etc., as provided under Articles 72
and 161 of the Constitution and under Section 432 Cr.P.C. In Gopal
Vinayak Godse Vs. State of Maharashtra1, this Court held that a
sentence of imprisonment for life must, prima facie, be treated as
imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the convicted             D
person’s natural life. InMaru Ram Vs. Union of India2, a Constitution
Bench endorsed this view and affirmed that a life sentence is nothing
less than life-long imprisonment and would last until the last breath. Again,
in Union of India Vs. V. Sriharan alias Murugan and others3, another
Constitution Bench reiterated that imprisonment for life means
imprisonment for the rest of the life of the convict.                           E

       8. However, in actual practice, one finds that a sentence of life
imprisonment works out only to a term of 14 years, in terms of Section
433 Cr.P.C., and may prove to be grossly inadequate to the gravity of
the offence for which the convict had been so sentenced. In Swamy
Shraddananda Vs. State of Karnataka4, this Court noted that the days            F
of remission earned by a prisoner are added to the period of his actual
imprisonment to make up the term of the sentence and the question that
then arises is how such remission can be applied to life imprisonment, as
the way in which remission is allowed can only apply to a fixed term of
imprisonment and life imprisonment, being for the rest of the life, is          G
indeterminate by nature. It was observed that, in the States of Karnataka
and Bihar, remissionis granted to life convicts by ‘deemed’ conversion
1
  AIR 1961 SC 600
2
  (1981) 1 SCC 107
3
  (2016) 7 SCC 1
4
  (2008) 13 SCC 767                                                             H
486             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2023] 4 S.C.R.


A     of life imprisonment into a fixed term of 20 years by executive orders
      issued by the State Government, flying in the face of a long line of decisions
      by this Court, and no provision of law exists sanctioning such a course.
      It was pointed out that life convicts are granted remission and released
      from prison upon completing a 14-year-term, without any sound legal
      basis, and one can safely assume that the position would be no better in
B
      other States. This Court, therefore, took judicial notice of the fact that
      remission is allowed to life convicts in the most mechanical manner
      without any sociological or psychiatric appraisal of the convict and without
      proper assessment as to the effect of an early release of a particular
      convict on the society. This Court also noted that grant of remission is
C     the rule and remission is denied, one may say, in the rarest of rare cases.
      Faced with this conundrum, while commuting a death sentence to life
      imprisonment in that case, this Court pondered over what should be
      done in such a situation. It was observed that, if the option is limited only
      to two punishments - one, being a sentence of life imprisonment, for all
      intents and purposes, of not more than 14 years, and the other, death, the
D
      Court may feel tempted and find itself nudged into endorsing the death
      penalty and such a course would indeed be disastrous. It was therefore
      held that a far more just, reasonable and proper course would be to
      expand the options and to take over what, as a matter of fact, lawfully
      belongs to the Court, i.e., the vast hiatus between 14 years’ imprisonment
E     and death, and substitute a death sentence by life imprisonment or by a
      term in excess of 14 years and, further, to direct that the convict must
      not be released from prison for the rest of his life or for the actual term
      as specified in the order, as the case may be. It was emphasized that the
      Court would take recourse to this expanded option primarily because, in
      the facts of the case, the sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment would
F
      amount to no punishment at all.
              9. Affirming the view taken in Swamy Shraddananda (supra),
      the majority opinion in V. Sriharan (supra)observed that it could be said
      without any scope for controversy that, when by way of a judicial decision
      after a detailed analysis, having regard to the proportionality of the crime
G     committed, it is decided that the offender deserves to be punished with
      the sentence of life imprisonment, i.e., till the end of his life or for a
      specific period of 20 years or 30 years or 40 years, such a conclusion
      should survive without any interruption. It was, therefore, held that in
      order to ensure that the punishment imposed, which is legally provided
H     for in the Penal Code read along with Criminal Procedure Code, operates
 RAVINDER SINGH v. THE STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI                              487
                [SANJAY KUMAR, J.]

without any interruption, the inherent power of the Court concerned             A
should empower the Court, in public interest as well as in the interest of
the society at large, to make it certain that such punishment will operate,
as imposed, by stating that no remission or other liberal approach should
come into effect to nullify such imposition. It was further observed that
no prohibition is prescribed in the Penal Code, or for that matter any of
                                                                                B
the provisions where death penalty or life imprisonment is provided for,
that imprisonment cannot be imposed for a specific period within the
said life span and, when life imprisonment means the whole life span of
the person convicted, it cannot be said that the Court which is empowered
to impose the said punishment cannot specify the period up to which the
said sentence of life should remain, befitting the nature of the crime          C
committed. The majority opinion, therefore, concluded by stating that
the ratio laid down in Swamy Shraddananda (supra), that a special
category of sentence, insteadof death, can be substituted by the
punishment of imprisonment for life or for a term exceeding 14 years
and that category can be put beyond application of remission, is well
                                                                                D
founded.It was further held that the power to impose a modified
punishment within the punishment provided for in the Penal Code for
such specified offences can only be exercised by the High Court and in
the event of further appeal, by the Supreme Court, and not by any other
Court in the country.
        10. In the light of this settled legal position, it was clearly not     E
within the domain of the learned Additional Sessions Judge to impose a
restriction that the term of the appellant’s life imprisonment should be
for at least 20 years and that he should not be given any clemency till
then. Such power could only be exercised by the High Courts or by this
Court. No doubt, the Delhi High Court confirmed the sentence passed             F
by the learned Additional Sessions Judge but mere affirmation of the
hollow exercise of a power, that was not conferred, by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge does not qualify as an independent exercise
by the High Court and would not suffice in terms of the legal requirement.
It is only the High Courts or this Court that would have the power, upon
proper application of mind, to take recourse to special category                G
sentencing, depending upon the nature of the offence and its gravity. To
that extent, the sentence imposed by the learned Additional Sessions
Judge was, therefore, without legal basis.
      11. That being said, the fact still remains that the appellant was
held guilty of the most heinous of offences, viz., the rape of his own little   H
488             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                               [2023] 4 S.C.R.


A     daughter. The trust and faith that a young girl would repose in her father
      and the sanctity of the very relationship were destroyed by his debauched
      and devastating acts. In such a situation, allowing him the freedom to
      seek liberal remissions, so as to cut short his life imprisonment, would be
      nothing short of a travesty of justice. Significantly, Section 376 IPC was
      amended with retrospective effect from 03.02.2013. The amended
B
      provision now reads very differently. Section 376(2) IPC has been
      enlarged and presently comprises clauses (a) to (n). The new Section
      376(2)(f) states that whoever, being a relative, guardian or teacher of, or
      a person in a position of trust or authority towards the woman, commits
      rape on such woman, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a
C     term which shall not be less than 10 years, but which may extend to
      imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder
      of that person’s natural life, and shall also be liable to fine. Further, Section
      376(3) has been inserted in the statute book and it provides that whoever
      commits rape on a woman under 16 years of age shall be punished with
      rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than 20 years,
D
      but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean
      imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural life, and shall
      also be liable to fine. It may also be noted that the new Sections 376A,
      376D and 376E, brought into the statute book by the Criminal Law
      (Amendment) Act, 2013, and the new Sections 376AB, 376DA and
E     376DB inserted therein by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018,
      provide for the enlarged punishment of life imprisonment for the remainder
      of the convict’s natural life.
             12. In the case on hand, the new Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(3)
      IPC would have had application had the offence been committed after
F     03.02.2013. However, as it is an admitted fact that the child was raped
      by her father during the month of August, 2012, these amended provisions
      would have no role to play. Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India
      would come to the undeserving rescue of the appellant, as it provides
      that no person shall be subjected to a penalty greater than that which
      might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of commission
G     of the offence.Suffice it to state, at this stage, that this Court is mindful
      of the fact that the lawmakers deemed it fit and appropriate to provide
      for more stringent punishment for the offence of rape in certain
      circumstances and made it clear that when imprisonment for life is
      imposed upon the perpetrator of the offence in those situations, such a
H     perpetrator would be liable to remain in prison for the remainder of his
      natural life.
    RAVINDER SINGH v. THE STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI                                 489
                   [SANJAY KUMAR, J.]

       13. Notably, the law laid down in Swamy Shraddananda (supra)                   A
and V. Sriharan (supra), with regard to special category sentencing,
was in the context of cases where death sentence had been imposed
and the same was commuted to imprisonment for life. The question
would then arise as to whether the power of the High Courts and this
Court to impose a modified punishment, specifying the term of life
                                                                                      B
imprisonment in excess of 14 years, can be exercised even in cases
where the death sentence is not imposed. Reference may be made to
Gouri Shankar Vs. State of Punjab5, wherein the Trial Court passed a
sentence of life imprisonment, directing that it shall be for the remainder
of the convict’s natural life. Noting that such a direction could not be
passed by the Trial Court, this Court considered it fit to order that the             C
sentence of imprisonment for life in that case should mean till the remainder
of the natural life of the convict. Pertinent to note, this was not a case
where death sentence was imposed and thereafter commuted to life
imprisonment, as was the case in Swamy Shraddananda(supra)and
V. Sriharan(supra). On similar lines, in Shiva Kumar @ Shiva @
                                                                                      D
Shivamurthy Vs. State of Karnataka6, this Court was considering a
case involving Section 302 IPC, where the Trial Court had sentenced
the appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for the rest of his life.
While noting that the power to impose a modified punishment providing
for a specific term of incarceration or till the end of the convict’s life, as
an alternate to death penalty, can be exercised only by the High Courts               E
and the Supreme Court and not by any other Court, in terms of the law
laid down in V. Sriharan(supra), this Court observed:
                 “12. In a given case, while passing an order of conviction
          for an offence which is punishable with death penalty, the Trial
          Court may come to a conclusion that the case is not a ‘rarest of            F
          the rare’ case. In such a situation, depending upon the punishment
          prescribed for the offence committed, the Trial Court can impose
          other punishment specifically provided in Section 53 of the IPC.
          However, when a Constitutional Court finds that though a case is
          not falling in the category of ‘rarest of the rare’ case, considering
          the gravity and nature of the offence and all other relevant factors,       G
          it can always impose a fixed-term sentence so that the benefit of
          statutory remission, etc. is not available to the accused. The
          majority view in the case of V. Sriharancannot be construed to
5
    (2021) 3 SCC 380
6
    Criminal Appeal No. 942 of 2023, decided on 28.03.2023 = 2023 SCC OnLine SC 345   H
490            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 4 S.C.R.


A           mean that such a power cannot be exercised by the Constitutional
            Courts unless the question is of commuting the death sentence.
            This conclusion is well supported by what the Constitution Bench
            held in paragraph 104 of its decision, which reads thus:
                      “104. That apart, in most of such cases where death
B              penalty or life imprisonment is the punishment imposed by
               the trial court and confirmed by the Division Bench of the
               High Court, the convict concerned will get an opportunity
               to get such verdict tested by filing further appeal by way
               of special leave to this Court. By way of abundant caution
               and as per the prescribed law of the Code and the criminal
C              jurisprudence, we can assert that after the initial finding
               of guilt of such specified grave offences and the imposition
               of penalty either death or life imprisonment, when comes
               under the scrutiny of the Division Bench of the High Court,
               it is only the High Court which derives the power under
D              the PenalCode, which prescribes the capital and alternate
               punishment, to alter the said punishment with one either
               for the entirety of the convict’s life or for any specific period
               of more than 14 years, say 20, 30 or so on depending
               upon the gravity of the crime committed and the exercise
               of judicial conscience befitting such offence found proved
E              to have been committed.”
                   13. Hence, we have no manner of doubt that even in a
            case where capital punishment is not imposed or is not proposed,
            the Constitutional Courts can always exercise the power of
            imposing a modified or fixed-term sentence by directing that a life
F           sentence, as contemplated by “secondly” in Section 53of the IPC,
            shall be of a fixed period of more than fourteen years, for example,
            of twenty years, thirty years and so on. The fixed punishment
            cannot be for a period less than 14 years in view of the mandate
            of Section 433A of Cr.P.C.”
G            Holding so, this Court modified the sentence passed by the Trial
      Court and directed that the appellant should undergo imprisonment for
      life and should not be released till he completed 30 years of actual
      sentence.
            14. Significantly, both Gouri Shankar (supra) and Shiva Kumar
      (supra) were cases wherein the Trial Court could have imposed a death
H
 RAVINDER SINGH v. THE STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI                            491
                [SANJAY KUMAR, J.]

sentence had the circumstances warranted it, as those cases arose under       A
Section 302 IPC. The question would then arise as to whether the power
to pass a modified sentence of life imprisonment would be available to
the High Courts and this Court even in cases where the law does not
prescribe the death sentence as one of the punishments and limits the
maximum punishment to imprisonment for life with nothing further, as in
                                                                              B
the case on hand. In this context, we may note that the observations
made in Swamy Shraddananda(supra) and V. Sriharan(supra) clearly
indicate the existence of such power, though the Court stopped short of
declaring so and linked the special category sentences passed in those
cases to substitution for a death sentence. As pointed out in Swamy
Shraddananda(supra), the Court would take recourse to the expanded            C
option primarily because the life sentence of 14 years imprisonment may
amount to no imprisonment at all in a given case. This observation is
wide enough to take within its ambit all sentences of life imprisonment.
Similarly, in V. Sriharan (supra), the majority opinion noted that there is
no prohibition in the Penal Code, where death penalty or life imprisonment
                                                                              D
is provided for, that imprisonment cannot be imposed for a specified
period within the said life span and when life imprisonment means the
whole life span of the convict, the Court which is empowered to impose
the said punishment would also have the power to specify the period up
to which the said sentence of life should remain, befitting the nature of
crime. Again, this edict would hold good for all sentences of life            E
imprisonment. No doubt, the majority opinion also linked it to capital
punishment, by observing that such special category of sentences could
be substituted for death. More recently, in Shiva Kumar (supra), this
Court affirmed that even in a case where capital punishment is not
‘proposed’, Constitutional Courts would have the power to impose a
                                                                              F
modified or fixed-term sentence.
       15. The above observations manifest the applicability of the same
principle in cases where the maximum punishment prescribed by law is
imprisonment for life with nothing further. Even in such cases, it would
be a parody of justice to allow the convicts so sentenced to avail the
benefit of remissions and the like, liberally conferred by the State, and     G
cut short the length of their life sentence to a mere 14 years. We are,
therefore, of the considered opinion that the law laid down in Swamy
Shraddananda(supra) and V. Sriharan(supra) with regard to special
category sentencing to life imprisonment in excess of 14 years by fixing
a lengthier term would be available to the High Courts and this Court,        H
492                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 4 S.C.R.


A     even in cases where the maximum punishment, permissible in law and
      duly imposed, is life imprisonment with nothing further. We must, however,
      hasten to add that exercise of such power must be restricted to grave
      cases, where allowing the convict sentenced to life imprisonment to seek
      release after a 14-year-term would tantamount to trivializing the very
      punishment imposed on such convict. Needless to state, cogent reasons
B
      have to be recorded for exercising such power on the facts of a given
      case and such power must not be exercised casually or for the mere
      asking.
             16. In the case on hand, the appellant was found guilty of one of
      the most monstrous and horrific of offences, viz, the physical violation of
C     his own daughter, who was not even in the first flush of youth. In the
      event he secures release after putting in just 14 years in jail, his possible
      re-entry into his daughter’s life, while she is still in her twenties, may
      cause her further trauma and make her life difficult. His incarceration
      for a sufficiently long period would not only ensure that he receives his
D     just deserts but also allow his daughter more time and maturity to settle
      down and move on with her life, even if her villainous father is set at
      liberty. We are, therefore, of the opinion that this is a fit and deserving
      case for exercise of the power vesting in this Court to impose a modified
      special category sentence of fixed-term life imprisonment. As pointed
      out by this Court in Madan Gopal Kakkad Vs. Naval Dubey and
E     another7, Judges who bear the sword of justice should not hesitate to
      use that sword with utmost severity to the full and to the end, if the
      gravity of the offence so demands.
            17. The ends of justice would be sufficiently served if the life
      imprisonment of the appellant is for a minimum of 20 years of actual
F     incarceration before he can seek remissions under the provisions of the
      Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or any other enacted law. We,
      accordingly, direct so. Imposition of fines and imprisonment in default of
      payment thereof shall stand confirmed.
               The appeal is disposed of in terms of the above directions.
G
      Ankit Gyan                                                 Appeal disposed of.
      (Assisted by : Mahendra Yadav, LCRA)




H     7
          (1992) 3 SCC 204