RAVI SHARMAversusSTATE (GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI) AND ANR.

                       [2022] 12 S.C.R. 257                            257


                         RAVI SHARMA                                   A
                                 v.
   STATE (GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI) AND ANR.
              (Criminal Appeal Nos. 410-411 of 2015)
                          JULY 11, 2022                                B
        [ABHAY S. OKA AND M.M. SUNDRESH, JJ.]
      Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.378 – Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 – s.27 – FIR was recorded on finding a dead body –
PW-2 (brother of deceased) identified the dead body – Statements
                                                                       C
of both PW-1, father of deceased and PW-2 were recorded – Both
pointed suspicion on appellant-accused – Trial Court by extending
the benefit of doubt in favour of appellant passed the order of
acquittal – High Court ordered conviction of the appellant – On
appeal, held: High Court have not acted within the legal parameters
set down for s.378 Cr.PC. by the various judgments of Supreme          D
Court – Recoveries made were doubtful as no independent witness
signed the same – Lot of Contradictions in the evidence rendered
by prosecution – Motive not established – Chain of Circumstantial
evidence was not complete to point toward the guilt of the accused
– Report of Ballistic expert is also inconclusive – Judgment of High
                                                                       E
Court was set aside – Order of acquittal by the trial Court was
restored.
      Jafarudheen and Others v. State of Kerala 2022 SCC
      Online SC 495; Mohan Alias Srinivas Alias Seena Alias
      Tailor Seena v. State of Karnataka 2021 SCC OnLine
                                                                       F
      SC 1233, N. Vijayakumar v. State of T.N. (2021) 3 SCC
      687 – relied on.
      Tarsem Kumar v. Delhi Administration (1994) Supp 3
      SCC 367 : [1994] 2 Suppl. SCR 740; Padala Veera
      Reddy v. State of A.P. (1989) 2 Supp SCC 706;
      Chandrakant Ganpat Sovitkar v. State of Maharashtra              G
      (1975) 3 SCC 16 – referred to.
                      Case Law Reference
(2021) 3 SCC 687                 relied on             Para 8
                                                                       H
                                257
258            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 12 S.C.R.


A     [1994] 2 Suppl. SCR 740             referred to            Para 13
      (1989) 2 Supp SCC 706               referred to            Para 14
      (1975) 3 SCC 16                     referred to            Para 15
            CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
B     Nos. 410-411 of 2015.
             From the Judgment and Order dated 17.12.2014 and 24.12.2014
      of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Crl. A. Nos. 585 and 1611 of
      2014.
           Krishan Kumar, Ms. Sunita Arora, Mohit D. Ram, Shivam Bedi,
C     Anubhav Sharma, Advs. for the Appellant.
            Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, ASG, Rajan Kumar Chourasia, Ms. Ruchi
      Kohli, Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, Apoorv Kurup, G. S. Makker, B. V.
      Balaram Das, R. P. Luthra, Ashiesh Kumar, Advs. for the Respondents.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D
            M. M. SUNDRESH, J.
             1. An order of acquittal passed on a scrutiny of evidence before it
      by the District and Sessions Judge, North-East District, Karkardooma
      Court, Delhi in S.C. No.6/12 got overturned by the impugned judgment
E     of the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi based upon the existence
      of motive along with the recovery made under Section 27 of the Indian
      Evidence Act (for short ‘the Act’).
            FACTS IN BRIEF:
             2. On 30.05.2011, the first information report was recorded on
F     finding a dead body. PW2, brother of the deceased, identified the body.
      Statements of both PW1, father of the deceased and PW2 have been
      recorded, which did not indicate any specific suspect. The Investigating
      Officer conducted the inquest and prepared the map. On the next day,
      doubts were raised by PWs 1 and 2 pointing the finger of suspicion on
G     the accused who happens to be a friend of the deceased. Upon securing
      the accused, recovery of the material in the form of firearm was made.
      Both the observation Mahazar along with the sketch and the recovery
      Mahazar under Section 27 of the Act were signed by the police officers
      with the exception that the latter one was signed by PW2 as well.

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RAVI SHARMA v. STATE (GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI)                               259
          AND ANR. [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]

      3. The trial Court disbelieved the evidence of PWs 1 and 2; PW2           A
with reference to the motive, and PW1 on the ground that it did not
support the case of the prosecution. It raised a serious suspicion over
the recovery made under Section 27 of the Act. From the place of
occurrence, recoveries were made by way of a wooden piece of the
butt of a gun along with the cartridges. Of this, four cartridges were
                                                                                B
found in the pocket of the deceased.
      4. Having found that the motive has not been proved and the
recovery being doubtful despite the presence of scores of independent
witnesses on both occasions, the Court in the first instance deemed it
appropriate to extend the benefit of doubt in favour of the appellant.
                                                                                C
       5. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, despite concurring
with the views expressed by the trial Court qua the last seen theory,
nonetheless accepted the evidence of PW2 with respect to the motive
coupled with the recoveries made. Though the trial Court eschewed the
evidence of the Ballistic Expert, which remained inconclusive with respect
to the bullet which caused the death, relatable to the gun belonging to the     D
appellant, the High Court felt that it could be relied upon. Incidentally, it
was held that the wooden piece of the butt did belong to the appellant.
Therefore, the circumstances forming a chain were sufficient enough to
point out guilt towards him and accordingly the High Court rendered a
conviction.                                                                     E
        6. Learned counsel, Mr. Krishan Kumar, appearing for the appellant
submitted that the well-merited judgment of the trial Court ought not to
have been reversed by the High Court by replacing its own views. Having
accepted the views of the trial Court as a plausible one, the conviction
ought not to have been rendered. There was no link in the circumstantial        F
chain as held by the High Court. Motive has not been established in the
manner known to law. In a case of circumstantial evidence, motive
assumes more importance. The opinion of the Ballistic Expert was rightly
taken note of by the trial Court and in fact used in favour of the appellant,
being inconclusive. The manner in which recoveries were made at the
first instance during the inspection of the place of occurrence and             G
thereafter at the instance of the appellant were rightly doubted by the
trial court. The suspicion created by the trial Court has not been dispelled.
As there is no perversity in the decision of the trial Court, the reversal at
the hands of the High Court is unwarranted.
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260            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 12 S.C.R.


A           7. Ms. Aishwarya Bhati learned Additional Solicitor General
      appearing for the respondents submitted that the power of the High
      Court in deciding the appeal is rather wide. The High Court may
      reappreciate the evidence which in fact it did. There is no perversity in
      the cogent reasons rendered by the High Court. PW2 has deposed about
      the motive due to enmity between the deceased and the appellant. This
B
      along with the recoveries made would form sufficient grounds to convict
      the appellant.
             8. Before venturing into the merits of the case, we would like to
      reiterate the scope of Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
      (for short ‘Cr.P.C.’) while deciding an appeal by the High Court, as the
C     position of law is rather settled. We would like to quote the relevant
      portion of a recent judgment of this Court in Jafarudheen and Others
      v. State of Kerala (2022 SCC Online SC 495) as follows:
            25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking
            Section 378 of the Cr.PC, the Appellate Court has to consider
D           whether the Trial Court’s view can be termed as a possible one,
            particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The
            reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of
            innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the Appellate Court
            has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the Trial Court
E           rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the
            accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a
            double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be
            disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal
            parameters.

F           9. This Court in the aforesaid judgment has noted the following
      decision while laying down the law:
            Precedents:
            • Mohan alias Srinivas alias Seena alias Tailor Seena v. State
              of Karnataka, [2021 SCC OnLine SC 1233] as hereunder:
G
               “20. Section 378 CrPC enables the State to prefer an appeal
               against an order of acquittal. Section 384 CrPC speaks of the
               powers that can be exercised by the Appellate Court. When
               the trial court renders its decision by acquitting the accused,
               presumption of innocence gathers strength before the Appellate
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RAVI SHARMA v. STATE (GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI)                           261
          AND ANR. [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]

      Court. As a consequence, the onus on the prosecution becomes          A
      more burdensome as there is a double presumption of
      innocence. Certainly, the Court of first instance has its own
      advantages in delivering its verdict, which is to see the witnesses
      in person while they depose. The Appellate Court is expected
      to involve itself in a deeper, studied scrutiny of not only the
                                                                            B
      evidence before it, but is duty bound to satisfy itself whether
      the decision of the trial court is both possible and plausible
      view. When two views are possible, the one taken by the trial
      court in a case of acquittal is to be followed on the touchstone
      of liberty along with the advantage of having seen the witnesses.
      Article 21 of the Constitution of India also aids the accused         C
      after acquittal in a certain way, though not absolute. Suffice it
      is to state that the Appellate Court shall remind itself of the
      role required to play, while dealing with a case of an acquittal.
      21. Every case has its own journey towards the truth and it is
      the Court’s role undertake. Truth has to be found on the basis        D
      of evidence available before it. There is no room for subjectivity,
      nor the nature of offence affects its performance. We have a
      hierarchy of courts in dealing with cases. An Appellate Court
      shall not expect the trial court to act in a particular way
      depending upon the sensitivity of the case. Rather it should be
      appreciated if a trial court decides a case on its own merit          E
      despite its sensitivity.
      22. At times, courts do have their constraints. We find, different
      decisions being made by different courts, namely, trial court on
      the one hand and the Appellate Courts on the other. If such
      decisions are made due to institutional constraints, they do not      F
      augur well. The district judiciary is expected to be the
      foundational court, and therefore, should have the freedom of
      mind to decide a case on its own merit or else it might become
      a stereotyped one rendering conviction on a moral platform.
      Indictment and condemnation over a decision rendered, on              G
      considering all the materials placed before it, should be avoided.
      The Appellate Court is expected to maintain a degree of caution
      before making any remark.
      23. This court, time and again has laid down the law on the
      scope of inquiry by an Appellate court while dealing with an          H
262   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 12 S.C.R.


A     appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC. We do not
      wish to multiply the aforesaid principle except placing reliance
      on a recent decision of this court in Anwar Ali v. State of
      Himanchal Pradesh, (2020) 10 SCC 166:
         14.2. When can the findings of fact recorded by a court be
B        held to be perverse has been dealt with and considered in
         paragraph 20 of the aforesaid decision, which reads as
         under: [Babu v. State of Kerala, [(2010) 9 SCC 189]:
            “20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be
            held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at
C           by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking
            into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The
            finding may also be said to be perverse if it is “against
            the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously
            defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality.
            (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn. [(1984) 4
D           SCC 635], Excise & Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing
            Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons [1992 Supp (2) SCC
            312], Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3)
            SCC 665], Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1 SCC
            501], Aruvelu v. State, [(2009) 10 SCC 206] and Gamini
E           Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P. [(2009) 10 SCC
            636]).”
            It is further observed, after following the decision of
            this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police [(1999)
            2 SCC 10], that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of
F           no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no
            reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be
            perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which
            is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the
            conclusions would not be treated as perverse, and the
            findings would not be interfered with.
G
         14.3. In the recent decision of Vijay Mohan Singh v. State
         of Karnataka, [(2019) 5 SCC 436], this Court again had an
         occasion to consider the scope of Section 378 CrPC and
         the interference by the High Court [State of Karnataka v.
         Vijay Mohan Singh, 2013 SCC OnLine Kar 10732] in an
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RAVI SHARMA v. STATE (GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI)                        263
          AND ANR. [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]

        appeal against acquittal. This Court considered a catena of      A
        decisions of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In para
        31, it is observed and held as under:
           “31. An identical question came to be considered before
           this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai v. State of Gujarat,
           [(1978) 1 SCC 228]. In the case before this Court, the        B
           High Court interfered with the order of acquittal passed
           by the learned trial court on reappreciation of the entire
           evidence on record. However, the High Court, while
           reversing the acquittal, did not consider the reasons given
           by the learned trial court while acquitting the accused.
           Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this Court         C
           observed and held in para 10 as under:
              ‘10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against
              the order of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to
              reappreciate the entire evidence independently and
              come to its own conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court     D
              would give due importance to the opinion of the
              Sessions Judge if the same were arrived at after
              proper appreciation of the evidence. This rule will
              not be applicable in the present case where the
              Sessions Judge has made an absolutely wrong                E
              assumption of a very material and clinching aspect
              in the peculiar circumstances of the case.’
           31.1. In Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, [(1998) 5 SCC
           412], the High Court reversed the order of acquittal
           passed by the learned trial court and held the accused        F
           guilty on reappreciation of the entire evidence on record,
           however, the High Court did not record its conclusion
           on the question whether the approach of the trial court
           in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the
           conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable.
           Confirming the order passed by the High Court                 G
           convicting the accused on reversal of the acquittal
           passed by the learned trial court, after being satisfied
           that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial
           court was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this
           Court declined to interfere with the order of conviction      H
264   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 12 S.C.R.


A         passed by the High Court. While confirming the order
          of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court
          observed in para 8 as under:
             ‘8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to
             ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to
B            the aforementioned principles. We find that the High
             Court has not strictly proceeded in the manner laid
             down by this Court in Doshi case [Ramesh Babulal
             Doshi v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225] viz.
             first recording its conclusion on the question whether
             the approach of the trial court in dealing with the
C            evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions
             arrived at by it were wholly untenable, which alone
             will justify interference in an order of acquittal though
             the High Court has rendered a well-considered
             judgment duly meeting all the contentions raised before
D            it. But then will this non-compliance per se justify
             setting aside the judgment under appeal? We think,
             not. In our view, in such a case, the approach of the
             court which is considering the validity of the judgment
             of an appellate court which has reversed the order
             of acquittal passed by the trial court, should be to
E            satisfy itself if the approach of the trial court in dealing
             with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusions
             arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable and
             whether the judgment of the appellate court is free
             from those infirmities; if so to hold that the trial court
F            judgment warranted interference. In such a case,
             there is obviously no reason why the appellate court’s
             judgment should be disturbed. But if on the other hand
             the court comes to the conclusion that the judgment
             of the trial court does not suffer from any infirmity, it
             cannot but be held that the interference by the
G            appellate court in the order of acquittal was not
             justified; then in such a case the judgment of the
             appellate court has to be set aside as of the two
             reasonable views, the one in support of the acquittal
             alone has to stand. Having regard to the above
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RAVI SHARMA v. STATE (GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI)                      265
          AND ANR. [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]

              discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment     A
              of the trial court in this case.’
           31.2. In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala,
           [(1999) 3 SCC 309], after observing that though there is
           some substance in the grievance of the learned counsel
           appearing on behalf of the accused that the High Court      B
           has not adverted to all the reasons given by the trial
           Judge for according an order of acquittal, this Court
           refused to set aside the order of conviction passed by
           the High Court after having found that the approach of
           the Sessions Judge in recording the order of acquittal
           was not proper and the conclusion arrived at by the         C
           learned Sessions Judge on several aspects was
           unsustainable. This Court further observed that as the
           Sessions Judge was not justified in discarding the
           relevant/material evidence while acquitting the accused,
           the High Court, therefore, was fully entitled to            D
           reappreciate the evidence and record its own conclusion.
           This Court scrutinised the evidence of the eyewitnesses
           and opined that reasons adduced by the trial court for
           discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses were not
           at all sound. This Court also observed that as the
           evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court was      E
           manifestly erroneous and therefore it was the duty of
           the High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal
           passed by the learned Sessions Judge.
           31.3. In Atley v. State of U.P., [AIR 1955 SC 807], in
           para 5, this Court observed and held as under:              F

                 ‘5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for
                 the appellant that the judgment of the trial court
                 being one of acquittal, the High Court should not
                 have set it aside on mere appreciation of the
                 evidence led on behalf of the prosecution unless      G
                 it came to the conclusion that the judgment of the
                 trial Judge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not
                 correct to say that unless the appellate court in
                 an appeal under Section 417 CrPC came to the
                 conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under       H
266   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2022] 12 S.C.R.


A               appeal was perverse it could not set aside that
                order.
                It has been laid down by this Court that it is open
                to the High Court on an appeal against an order
                of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to
B               come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in
                view the well-established rule that the presumption
                of innocence of the accused is not weakened but
                strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed
                by the trial court which had the advantage of
                observing the demeanour of witnesses whose
C               evidence have been recorded in its presence.
                It is also well settled that the court of appeal has
                as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an
                appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case
                of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject
D               to the riders that the presumption of innocence
                with which the accused person starts in the trial
                court continues even up to the appellate stage and
                that the appellate court should attach due weight
                to the opinion of the trial court which recorded
E               the order of acquittal.
                If the appellate court reviews the evidence,
                keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a
                contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said
                to have been vitiated. (See in this connection the
F               very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh
                v. State [1951 SCC 1207]; Wilayat Khan v. State
                of U.P. [1951 SCC 898]. In our opinion, there is
                no substance in the contention raised on behalf of
                the appellant that the High Court was not justified
                in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its
G               own conclusions.’
          31.4. In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P., [(1979) 1 SCC
          355], this Court has observed that where the trial court
          allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects
          creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a
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RAVI SHARMA v. STATE (GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI)                           267
          AND ANR. [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]

             view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is       A
             the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the
             interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be
             brought to ridicule.”
    • N. Vijayakumar v. State of T.N., [(2021) 3 SCC 687] as
      hereunder:—                                                           B
      “20. Mainly it is contended by Shri Nagamuthu, learned Senior
      Counsel appearing for the appellant that the view taken by the
      trial court is a “possible view”, having regard to the evidence
      on record. It is submitted that the trial court has recorded cogent
      and valid reasons in support of its findings for acquittal. Under     C
      Section 378 CrPC, no differentiation is made between an
      appeal against acquittal and the appeal against conviction. By
      considering the long line of earlier cases this Court in the
      judgment in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, [(2007) 4 SCC
      415] has laid down the general principles regarding the powers
      of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an        D
      order of acquittal. Para 42 of the judgment which is relevant
      reads as under: (SCC p. 432)
         “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the
         following general principles regarding powers of the
         appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order      E
         of acquittal emerge:
             (1) An appellate court has full power to review,
             reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which
             the order of acquittal is founded.
                                                                            F
             (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no
             limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such
             power and an appellate court on the evidence before it
             may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact
             and of law.
                                                                            G
             (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and
             compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”,
             “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”,
             “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail
             extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal
             against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the          H
268      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 12 S.C.R.


A               nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the
                reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal
                than to curtail the power of the court to review the
                evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
                (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that
B               in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour
                of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is
                available to him under the fundamental principle of
                criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be
                presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a
                competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having
C               secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence
                is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by
                the trial court.
                (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the
                basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court
D               should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by
                the trial court.”
      21. Further in the judgment in Murugesan v. State, [(2012) 10
      SCC 383] relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant,
      this Court has considered the powers of the High Court in an
E     appeal against acquittal recorded by the trial court. In the said
      judgment, it is categorically held by this Court that only in cases
      where conclusion recorded by the trial court is not a possible view,
      then only the High Court can interfere and reverse the acquittal
      to that of conviction. In the said judgment, distinction from that of
F     “possible view” to “erroneous view” or “wrong view” is explained.
      In clear terms, this Court has held that if the view taken by the
      trial court is a “possible view”, the High Court not to reverse the
      acquittal to that of the conviction.
                xxx                        xxx               xxx
G     23. Further, in Hakeem Khan v. State of M.P., [(2017) 5 SCC
      719] this Court has considered the powers of the appellate court
      for interference in cases where acquittal is recorded by the trial
      court. In the said judgment it is held that if the “possible view” of
      the trial court is not agreeable for the High Court, even then such
      “possible view” recorded by the trial court cannot be interdicted.
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RAVI SHARMA v. STATE (GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI)                             269
          AND ANR. [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]

    It is further held that so long as the view of the trial court can be     A
    reasonably formed, regardless of whether the High Court agrees
    with the same or not, verdict of the trial court cannot be interdicted
    and the High Court cannot supplant over the view of the trial
    court. Para 9 of the judgment reads as under; (SCC pp.722-23)
       “9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are of        B
       the view that the trial court’s judgment is more than just a
       possible view for arriving at the conclusion of acquittal, and
       that it would not be safe to convict seventeen persons accused
       of the crime of murder i.e. under Section 302 read with Section
       149 of the Penal Code. The most important reason of the trial
       court, as has been stated above, was that, given the time of           C
       6.30 p.m. to 7.00 p.m. of a winter evening, it would be dark,
       and, therefore, identification of seventeen persons would be
       extremely difficult. This reason, coupled with the fact that the
       only independent witness turned hostile, and two other
       eyewitnesses who were independent were not examined, would             D
       certainly create a large hole in the prosecution story. Apart
       from this, the very fact that there were injuries on three of the
       accused party, two of them being deep injuries in the skull,
       would lead to the conclusion that nothing was premeditated
       and there was, in all probability, a scuffle that led to injuries on
       both sides. While the learned counsel for the respondent may           E
       be right in stating that the trial court went overboard in stating
       that the complainant party was the aggressor, but the trial court’s
       ultimate conclusion leading to an acquittal is certainly a possible
       view on the facts of this case. This is coupled with the fact
       that the presence of the kingpin Sarpanch is itself doubtful in        F
       view of the fact that he attended the Court at some distance
       and arrived by bus after the incident took place.”
    24. By applying the abovesaid principles and the evidence on record
    in the case on hand, we are of the considered view that having
    regard to material contradictions which we have already noticed           G
    above and also as referred to in the trial court judgment, it can be
    said that acquittal is a “possible view”. By applying the ratio as
    laid down by this Court in the judgments which are stated supra,
    even assuming another view is possible, same is no ground to
    interfere with the judgment of acquittal and to convict the appellant
                                                                              H
270            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 12 S.C.R.


A           for the offence alleged. From the evidence, it is clear that when
            the Inspecting Officer and other witnesses who are examined on
            behalf of the prosecution, went to the office of the appellant-
            accused, the appellant was not there in the office and office was
            open and people were moving out and in from the office of the
            appellant. It is also clear from the evidence of PWs 3, 5 and 11
B
            that the currency and cellphone were taken out from the drawer
            of the table by the appellant at their instance. There is also no
            reason, when the tainted notes and the cellphone were given to
            the appellant at 5.45 p.m. no recordings were made and the
            appellant was not tested by PW 11 till 7.00 p.m.”
C            10. Applying the said principles and after going through the
      judgment rendered by the trial Court as well as the High Court, we do
      feel that it is a case where the High Court has not acted within the legal
      parameters.
             11. In this connection, we would like to note the following
D     paragraphs of the High Court, wherein it did concur with the views of
      the trial Court with respect to the last seen theory:
            “12. It is from this cross-examination the learned Trial Court
            concludes that the last seen evidence as deposed by Jawahar
            Singh is an after-thought and in fact in retrospect when the family
E           of the deceased had strong suspicion that Ravi was the accused,
            statement dated May 30, 2011 was introduced by the Police
            claiming him to be the last seen witness. A perusal of the cross
            examination of Ashok can reasonably lead to the inference as has
            been drawn by the learned Trial Court.
F           13. Inspector Vijay Sirotiya PW-14 the investigating officer in his
            cross examination has stated that the father and brother of the
            deceased had arrived at the spot around 7.30/7.45 AM, however
            at that point of time they did not disclose the name of any person
            whom they could suspect as the perpetrator of the murder as
G           they were crying and were in a bad condition. He stated that
            statement of Ashok and Jawahar Singh were recorded on the
            same day i.e. May 30, 2011 somewhere in the afternoon after the
            body had been subjected to post-mortem. In cross-examination
            he stated that the name of the suspect had come in the statement
            without any further address of the suspect and thus his house
H
RAVI SHARMA v. STATE (GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI)                             271
          AND ANR. [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]

      could not be visited at that point of time, though the witnesses        A
      mentioned some Gali number as well as the house number but
      since it was a Katcha colony it was difficult to locate the said
      address, unless the address was specifically ascertained with the
      help of witness or other sources.
      14. In view of this cross-examination of Ashok Kumar and Vijay          B
      Sirotiya we cannot hold that the finding of the learned Trial Court
      on the point that the last seen evidence is not reliable is perverse.
      Though both views are possible, however the view taken by the
      learned Trial Judge is also a plausible view.
       12. Thus, when the last seen theory is found to be not true, there     C
has to be much more concrete and clinching evidence to implicate the
appellant. PW1 is the father of the deceased who not only deposed that
there was no animosity between the deceased and the appellant, but
also that he did not know about the past transaction.
       13. Having accepted the views of the trial Court holding that the      D
last seen theory has not been proved, a conviction cannot be rendered
on the basis of evidence, which was rejected qua motive, through the
mouth of PW2. The trial Court gave its reasons for rejecting the evidence
of PW2. It had the advantage of seeing and assessing the demeanor of
this witness, which the High Court did not have. PW2 has stated that
there was a money transaction which led to a dispute between the              E
accused and the deceased and that he had assured the appellant that it
would be repaid. This also occurred few days before the date of
occurrence. When we deal with a case of circumstantial evidence, as
aforesaid, motive assumes significance. Though, the motive may pale
into insignificance in a case involving eyewitnesses, it may not be so        F
when an accused is implicated based upon the circumstantial evidence.
This position of law has been dealt with by this Court in the case of
Tarsem Kumar v. Delhi Administration (1994) Supp 3 SCC 367 in
the following terms:
      “8. Normally, there is a motive behind every criminal act and that      G
      is why investigating agency as well as the court while examining
      the complicity of an accused try to ascertain as to what was the
      motive on the part of the accused to commit the crime in question.
      It has been repeatedly pointed out by this Court that where the
      case of the prosecution has been proved beyond all reasonable
                                                                              H
272            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 12 S.C.R.


A           doubts on basis of the materials produced before the court, the
            motive loses its importance. But in a case which is based on
            circumstantial evidence, motive for committing the crime on the
            part of the accused assumes greater importance. Of course, if
            each of the circumstances proved on behalf of the prosecution is
            accepted by the court for purpose of recording a finding that it
B
            was the accused who committed the crime in question, even in
            absence of proof of a motive for commission of such a crime, the
            accused can be convicted. But the investigating agency as well
            as the court should ascertain as far as possible as to what was the
            immediate impelling motive on the part of the accused which led
C           him to commit the crime in question. …….”
             14. We do find that there is no sufficient link to come to the
      irresistible conclusion pointing the guilt only to the appellant. We do not
      wish to multiply the settled position of law regarding the circumstantial
      evidence, except to quote the following decision in Padala Veera Reddy
D     v. State of A.P., 1989 Supp (2) SCC 706:
            “10. Before adverting to the arguments advanced by the learned
            Counsel, we shall at the threshold point out that in the present
            case there is no direct evidence to connect the accused with the
            offence in question and the prosecution rests its case solely on
E           circumstantial evidence. This Court in a series of decisions has
            consistently held that when a case rests upon circumstantial
            evidence such evidence must satisfy the following tests:
                “(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought
                to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established;
F               (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency
                unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused;
                (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain
                so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that
                within all human probability the crime was committed by the
G               accused and none else; and
                (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction
                must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other
                hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such
                evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the
H
RAVI SHARMA v. STATE (GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI)                           273
          AND ANR. [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]

         accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence. (See        A
         Gambhir v. State of Maharashtra [(1982) 2 SCC 351].”
       15. However, once again, we would like to reiterate the settled
position of law that a mere suspicion, however, strong it may be, cannot
be a substitute for acceptable evidence, as held in Chandrakant Ganpat
Sovitkar v. State of Maharashtra, (1975) 3 SCC 16.                          B
      “16. ……It is well settled that no one can be convicted on the
      basis of mere suspicion, however strong it may be. It also cannot
      be disputed that when we take into account the conduct of an
      accused, his conduct must be looked at in its entirety. …..”
       16. Much reliance has been made on the recoveries made. When         C
the observation Mahazar was prepared along with the sketch and the
inquest conducted, admittedly, scores of persons were present. No
independent witness was made to sign and the evidence on behalf of the
prosecution that they did not volunteer to do so, cannot be accepted. A
witness may not come forward to adduce evidence at times when asked         D
to act as an eyewitness. However, when a large number of persons
were available near the dead body, it is incomprehensible as to how all
of them refused to sign the documents prepared by the police.
       17. Similarly, the trial Court rightly doubted the recovery under
Section 27 of the Act. There was no need to take PW2 and thereafter         E
make him to sign. There are a lot of contradictions in the evidence
rendered. PW2 has stated that many persons were available at the time
of the recovery, but no statement has been obtained from any of them.
PW11, the Head Constable says that the Investigating Officer PW14,
did not ask any neighbor to join the investigation. PW8, who is the Sub-
Inspector of Police has deposed that none was forthcoming. A similar        F
statement was also made by the Investigating Officer. There is a
discrepancy on the mode of traveling to the place from where the recovery
under Section 27 of the Act was made, along with the witnesses, namely
PWs 2, 8, 11 and 14. While PW2 has stated that the police team used a
jeep and motorbike. The other witness has stated that it was either         G
motorbike or by foot, while one witness says that it was a Gypsy. We do
find contradictions with respect to the place of arrest followed by the
disclosure statement.
      18. The report of the Ballistic Expert is obviously a scientific
evidence in the nature of an opinion. It is required to use this evidence
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274              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 12 S.C.R.


A     along with the other substantive piece of evidence available. The report
      is inconclusive with respect to the firearm belonging to the appellant
      being used for committing the offence.
              19. All the aforesaid aspects have been considered threadbare by
      the trial Court. We do not find any perversity in it and the law presumes
B     double presumption in favour of the accused after a due adjudication by
      the trial Court. We do believe that the High Court could have been slower
      in reversing the order of acquittal rendered by the Court of First Instance.
             20. On the aforesaid analysis, the order of conviction rendered by
      the High Court of Delhi stands set aside, by restoring the acquittal by the
C     trial Court. The appeals stand allowed.

      Ankit Gyan                                                   Appeals allowed.
      (Assisted by : Aarsh Choudhary, LCRA)



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