Holding

The termination orders were unsustainable as Rule 21 does not govern eligibility and the Department violated natural justice by excluding vocational marks without proper notice.

Summary

The appellants, three teachers appointed in 2015, were terminated in 2016 on the ground that they had not secured the required percentage of marks in their intermediate examination and that their graduation certificates were invalid. They contended that, as Scheduled Tribe candidates, they were entitled to a 5% relaxation (40% threshold) and that marks obtained in vocational subjects should be included as per the reverse side of their marksheets. The State argued that Rule 21 of the Jharkhand Primary School Teacher Appointment Rules, 2012, barred inclusion of vocational marks and that the termination complied with the eligibility criteria. The Supreme Court held that Rule 21 governs only the preparation of merit lists and not eligibility, and that the Department’s exclusion of vocational marks without fresh notice violated the principles of natural justice. Consequently, the termination orders were set aside, the appellants were deemed to have continuous service with full arrears, and the heirs of the deceased appellant were awarded arrears and the possibility of compassionate employment.

Issues considered

The validity of the termination of service on the basis of alleged failure to meet the 40% intermediate marks requirement.
Whether Rule 21 of the Jharkhand Primary School Teacher Appointment Rules, 2012, applies to the determination of eligibility for appointment.
Whether the exclusion of vocational subject marks without a fresh show‑cause notice violated principles of natural justice.
The validity of graduation certificates awarded by Hindi Vidyapeeth prior to 26‑02‑2015.
The relief entitled to the heirs of the deceased appellant.

Legislation cited

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Despite fresh appointment of the appellants, the basic question that survives is whether the termination of services of the appellants, on the ground that their graduation certificates were not valid and they had not secured at least 40% marks in the intermediate nature and extent of grant of relief, if any, should the basic question be decided in favour of the appellants; claim of the other appellant (since deceased) in the changed circumstances. Headnotes† Jharkhand Primary School Teacher Appointment Rules, 2012 – Show cause notices

Subjects

TerminationIntermediate Trained Teacher (Classes I to V)Teacher Eligibility Test ExaminationEligibility criterionMinimum 45% marks in intermediate examination (Class XII)Minimum qualifying marksVocational subjectExclusion of marks secured in vocational subjectMethod for calculation of marksShow cause noticesOriginal chargeDifferent chargeNo fresh show cause noticeGraduation certificates valid40% marks in intermediate examinationRules 4, 21 of the Jharkhand Primary School Teacher Appointment Rules, 2012Natural justiceDue process

Judgment

[2025] 11 S.C.R. 226 : 2025 INSC 1212

Ravi Oraon
v.
The State of Jharkhand & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 11748 of 2025)
09 October 2025
[Dipankar Datta* and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Despite fresh appointment of the appellants, the basic question that
survives is whether the termination of services of the appellants,
on the ground that their graduation certificates were not valid
and they had not secured at least 40% marks in the intermediate
examination taken by them, was proper; nature and extent of grant
of relief, if any, should the basic question be decided in favour of
the appellants; claim of the other appellant (since deceased) in
the changed circumstances.

Headnotes†
Jharkhand Primary School Teacher Appointment Rules, 2012 –
Show cause notices were issued to the appellants-teachers
alleging that they did not fulfil the eligibility criterion of
having secured a minimum of 45% marks in their intermediate
examination (Class XII) and that their graduation certificates
were not valid – Appellants replied that being members of the
ST category, they were required to secure only 40% marks which
they did and were thus, eligibile – However, the respondents
terminated the appellants’ services by computing their marks
after excluding the marks secured in the vocational subject and
stated that they had secured less than 40% marks and that their
certificates of graduation were also not proper – Termination
orders set aside by Single Judge – Division Bench allowed the
appeals filed by the respondents – Interference with:
Held: 1.1 The degrees awarded to the appellants prior to 26.02.2015
have been treated to be valid by the Government of Jharkhand
by way of a policy decision – Further, termination orders are
unsustainable and vitiated for violation of principles of natural justice,
set aside – Appellants successfully defended the charge against
them but the respondents found them guilty of a different charge
in respect whereof they were not put to notice – In such a case,
* Author
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 227

Ravi Oraon v. The State of Jharkhand & Ors.

the finding of guilt which is at variance with the original charge
without proper opportunity to respond offends due process and
renders any order or action unsustainable. [Paras 10, 32, 33, 38]
1.2 Appellants, in their replies to the show cause notices
categorically demonstrated that they were not required to secure
45% marks in their intermediate examination – They were required
to secure more than 40% marks in the intermediate examination,
which they did secure – However, the respondents terminated
the appellants’ services by computing their marks after excluding
the marks secured in the vocational subject without affording the
appellants notice or an opportunity to contest such exclusion –The
allegation that the appellants had failed to secure 40% marks
(after exclusion of marks secured in the vocational subject) in the
intermediate examination did not even figure as an allegation in
the show cause notices – Therefore, findings were returned by the
respondents which were at variance with the allegations levelled
in the show cause notices. [Paras 32, 36]
1.3 Appellants having successfully defended the allegations, the
respondents were precluded in law from proceeding with such
notices – In the absence of fresh show cause notices specifically
requiring the appellants to explain why the marks secured in the
vocational subject should not be taken into account for determining
their overall percentage, the appellants were denied a fair and
reasonable opportunity of hearing – Moreover, the procedure in r.21
is only to be used for the purpose of preparation of merit list and r.4
does not provide for exclusion of marks secured in the vocational
subject – Judgments of the Division Bench set aside. [Paras 32, 38]
1.4 Appellants to be treated to have been in continuous service from
the date(s) of their original appointment, as if their services were
never terminated – Entitled to service benefits like arrears of pay
in full and seniority counted from the dates of initial appointment –
However, for the purpose of meeting the experience criterion for
promotion, the period not spent on duty will not be counted. [Para 39]
1.5 The other appellant (since deceased) shall be deemed to
have died-in-harness and if there be a scheme for compassionate
employment, his heirs may apply thereunder. [Para 40]

Jharkhand Primary School Teacher Appointment Rules, 2012 –
rr.4, 21 – Whether r.21 will bar/override the method provided
in the marksheet:
228 [2025] 11 S.C.R.

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Held: 1.1 No reason as to why the method of calculation of the
percentage, as provided on the reverse of the marksheet of the
appellants, should not be applied for the purpose of calculation
of their marks – Marks secured in the vocational subject is a way
for a candidate to improve his/her overall percentage of marks –
A vocational subject, though optional, would place an additional
burden on an examinee which he/she shoulders in the fervent
hope of improving his/her overall percentage – In the absence
of a bar or an alternate method provided by any law, the method
provided on the marksheet has to be followed – Therefore, the
onus of proof shifted to the respondents to show that calculation
as per the marksheet is not warranted. [Paras 23, 24]
1.2 The heading of r.21 makes it clear that the procedure in this
rule applies only at the time of preparing the “Merit List” – r.21
is no way concerned with providing a mechanism for deciding
whether a candidate is eligible or not – That consideration falls
within the exclusive domain of r.4, which provides for an eligibility
criteria for the purpose of appearing in the Teacher Eligibility
Test. [Para 26]
1.3 A combined reading of both the rules, therefore, is that the
eligibility of a candidate for appearing in the Teacher Eligibility
Test is to be decided in accordance with r.4 and Merit list (for the
purposes of appointment) is to be prepared in accordance with
r.21 – Thus, the respondents erred in applying r.21 for the purpose
of deciding whether the appellants fulfilled the eligibility criteria –
Division Bench also committed the same error. [Para 28]
1.4 In accordance with r.4, which does not provide for exclusion
of marks secured in the vocational subject, and r.21 not being
applicable for determining the eligibility of a candidate, the only
method for calculation of the marks is the one which is provided
on the reverse side of the marksheet of the appellants, according
to which the appellants have secured more that 40% marks –
Therefore, the appellants were eligible to appear in the Teacher
Eligibility Test Examination. [Para 29]

Case Law Cited
Escorts Farms Ltd. v. Commissioner, Kumaon Division, Nainital,
V.P. & Others [2004] 2 SCR 543 : (2004) 4 SCC 281 – held
inapplicable.
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 229

Ravi Oraon v. The State of Jharkhand & Ors.

Vijoy Kumar v. State of Jharkhand W.P.(C) No. 3115 of
2015 – referred to.

List of Acts
Jharkhand Primary School Teacher Appointment Rules, 2012;
Constitution of India.

List of Keywords
Termination; Intermediate Trained Teacher (Classes I to V);
Teacher Eligibility Test Examination; Eligibility criterion; Minimum
45% marks in intermediate examination (Class XII); Minimum
qualifying marks; Vocational subject; Exclusion of marks secured
in vocational subject; Method for calculation of marks; Show cause
notices; Original charge; Different charge; No fresh show cause
notice; Graduation certificates valid; 40% marks in intermediate
examination; Rules 4, 21 of the Jharkhand Primary School Teacher
Appointment Rules, 2012; Hindi Vidyapeeth; Termination arbitrary,
illegal; Method provided in the marksheet; Reverse side of the
marksheet; Compulsory subjects; Termination order unsustainable;
Violation of principles of natural justice.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 11748
of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 03.08.2021 of the High Court
of Jharkhand at Ranchi in LPA No. 83 of 2019
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 11749 and 11750 of 2025

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Binod Singh, Ms. Sangeeta Singh.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Syed Uruj Abbas, A.A.G., Rajiv Shankar Dvivedi, Shantanu Sagar,
Anil Kumar, Gunjesh Ranjan, Niket Nalin, Manoneet Dwivedi,
Abhishek Kumar Gupta, Jayesh Gaurav, Ms. Diksha Ojha, Ishwar
Chandra Roy, Farrukh Rasheed.
230 [2025] 11 S.C.R.

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Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Dipankar Datta, J.

The Appeals
1. The lead appeal1 challenges the judgment and order dated 3rd August,
2021 passed by the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in L.P.A. No.
83 of 2019, whereby the High Court allowed the intra-court appeal filed
by the respondents. Relying upon the said judgment, the High Court
later allowed two other intra-court appeals of the respondents, viz.
L.P.A. No. 332 of 2021 and L.P.A. No. 331 of 2021, by two separate
judgments of the same date, i.e., 20th December, 2022. These latter
judgments are under challenge in the connected appeals2 before us.

Facts
2. Facts, relevant for the disposal of the present appeals, are these:
a. Certain posts of Intermediate Trained Teacher (Classes I to V)
were advertised on 10th August, 20153 by the District Education
Superintendent, Dhanbad (respondent no. 4)4. The appellants
applied for the post and acquitted themselves successfully in the
recruitment process. After completion of the joining formalities,
the appellants started discharging their duties from December,
2015 as teachers.
b. On 27th September, 2016, show cause notices were issued
to the appellants alleging that they did not fulfil the eligibility
criterion of having secured a minimum of 45% marks in their
intermediate examination (Class XII). Questions were also raised
on the validity of their certificates of graduation.
c. In October 2016, through separate replies to the show cause
notices, the appellants contended that being members of the

1 Civil Appeal No. 11748 of 2025
2 Civil Appeal Nos. 11749 and 11750 of 2025
3 Advertisement No. 10/2015
4 Department
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 231

Ravi Oraon v. The State of Jharkhand & Ors.

Scheduled Tribe category, they were required to secure only
40% marks in the intermediate examination and not 45%. In
other words, they were entitled to a relaxation of 5% marks in
terms of the advertisement. It was further asserted that Ravi,
Premlal and Surendra had secured 42.55%, 40.22%, and
41.33% marks, respectively, in the intermediate examination
and, thus, were eligible for participation in the recruitment
process. With respect to the issue concerning their graduation
certificates, the appellants clarified that no graduation certificate
was required for appointment on posts of teachers in Classes
I–V, and that the same had been furnished by them only for
the sake of completeness.
d. On 7th October, 2016, by separate office orders, the services
of the appellants were terminated on the ground that they had
secured less than 40% marks in the intermediate examination
and that their certificates of graduation were not proper.
According to the calculation made by the Department, Ravi,
Premlal, and Surendra had secured 38.56%, 39.78%, and 39%
marks, respectively in the intermediate examination. In arriving
at this calculation, the Department excluded the additional marks
secured by the appellants in the vocational subject. We shall
examine the validity of this method of calculation a little later.
e. Appellants challenged the termination orders dated 7th October,
2016, before the High Court by filing separate writ petitions5.
A Single Judge of the High Court allowed these petitions in
the years 2018 and 2022 and, consequently, the impugned
termination orders were set aside.
f. Aggrieved thereby, the respondents preferred intra-court
appeals. As noted before, a Division Bench of the High Court
allowed these appeals and dismissed the challenge laid by the
appellants to the orders terminating their services.
g. Crestfallen by such determination, the appellants have invoked
this Court’s appellate jurisdiction.

5 W.P. (S) Nos. 6607, 6704 and 6608 of 2016
232 [2025] 11 S.C.R.

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Judgments of the Single Judge
3. The writ petition filed by Ravi was allowed vide judgment and order
dated 16th August, 2018 whereas the remaining two writ petitions
presented by Premlal and Surendra were allowed vide a common
judgment and order dated 10th November, 2022. A summary of the
judgments reads thus:
a. W.P. (S) No. 6607 of 2016 of Ravi: The Single Judge noted
that the respondent (department), for ascertaining the minimum
qualification of the candidate, erroneously relied on Rule 21
of the Jharkhand Primary School Teacher Appointment Rules,
20126, which laid down the procedure for preparing the ‘merit-
list’ of candidates and did not provide for ascertaining ‘minimum
qualification’. It was further held that Ravi’s services could not
have been terminated merely on a show-cause notice without
a departmental enquiry. Noting that Ravi had secured more
than 40% (383/900) marks in his intermediate examination, the
Court quashed the order of termination of service.
b. W.P. (S) Nos. 6704 & 6608 of 2016 of Premlal and Surendra,
respectively: The Single Judge allowed the writ petitions upon
finding that Premlal and Surendra had secured more than
40% marks in the intermediate examination taken by them. A
submission was made by the counsel for the Council that in
calculating the percentage of marks secured by Premlal and
Surendra, the Department had considered only the marks
secured in the main subjects and excluded the marks in the
vocational subject. Had the marks secured in the vocational
subject been included, both Premlal and Surendra would
stand to score above 40%. In view of the submission made on
behalf of the Council, the writ petitions were allowed and the
termination orders quashed.

Impugned Judgments and Orders of the Division Bench
4. We propose to summarise the judgment and order impugned in the
lead appeal as the other judgments and orders, impugned in the
connected appeals, were passed relying upon the former.

6 2012 Rules
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 233

Ravi Oraon v. The State of Jharkhand & Ors.

a. In the impugned judgment the Division Bench reasoned that
the marks secured by Ravi in the vocational subject could not
have been included for preparing the “merit list”. Although a
regulation printed on the reverse side of the marksheet provided
that the bonus marks (over and above the pass marks) secured
in the vocational subject will be added to the sum total of marks
secured in the main subjects, the Division Bench held that such
regulation would not apply for the purpose of calculation of marks
under the present recruitment. In support thereof, the Division
Bench assigned three reasons which are reproduced below:
First, the Regulation, as mentioned in the mark-sheet
does not govern the matter of recruitment rather it
only governs the process of examination and nothing
more. Secondly, when the rules have been framed in
the year 2012 the recruitment process will proceed
as per the statutory provision as framed in the year
2012. Thirdly, the Regulation only speaks about
addition of marks obtained in the vocational subject
for the preparation of result and nothing else.
b. Appellants argued that once the Department had accepted their
reply to the show cause notice – wherein they explained that
they were required to secure only 40% marks in the intermediate
examination being members of the reserved category – the
Department was obliged to issue a fresh show cause notice
before terminating their services on the ground that they had
not secured 40% marks. The Division Bench, placing reliance
on paragraph 64 of the decision of this Court in Escorts Farms
Ltd. v. Commissioner, Kumaon Division, Nainital, V.P. &
others7, rejected this argument after noting that the offending
act of the Department did not violate the principle of natural
justice as there was “no requirement to follow the principle of
natural justice when the fact is not in dispute”. Since, Rule 21
of the 2012 Rules precludes the addition of marks secured in
the vocational subjects, the Division Bench noted that even if
fresh show cause notices were issued, the appellants could not
have rebutted the requirement of the said rule.

7 (2004) 4 SCC 281
234 [2025] 11 S.C.R.

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c. The Division Bench noted that the Single Judge had held that
since Ravi was allowed to participate in the Teacher Eligibility
Test under Rule 4 (considering him to have secured 40%
marks), he would be deemed to have secured 40% marks
for the purpose of appointment as well. Disagreeing with this
reasoning, the Division Bench observed that Rule 4 and Rule
21 operate in different contexts. Chapter 2 of the Rules deals
with participation in the Teacher Eligibility Test, while Chapter
3 prescribes the process for recruitment as a teacher. Both
chapters serve distinct purposes: Chapter 2 establishes eligibility
to appear in the Test, whereas Chapter 3 governs the actual
recruitment process. It was further noted that the Teacher
Eligibility Test is only an eligibility criterion for consideration
for appointment on the post of teacher. Allowing a candidate
to appear in the Test, even without meeting the 40% marks
requirement under Rule 4, does not confer any right to claim
appointment. Thus, the Division Bench found the termination
of the appellants to be proper.

Developments since the parties were involved in litigation
5. Before proceeding to examine the merits of the rival contentions, it
is necessary to note certain developments after the parties started
litigating.
6. First, the controversy as to whether the degrees awarded by Hindi
Vidyapeeth, Deoghar8 were valid was set to rest by a judgment and
order of the High Court dated 10th May, 2022 in Vijoy Kumar v. State
of Jharkhand9. It was declared therein that the various degrees10
awarded by the Vidyapeeth prior to 26th February, 2015 would be
valid. Vide a letter11 issued by the Secretary to the Government of
Jharkhand, Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms &
Rajbhasha, the Government upon considering the opinion of the
Advocate General notified its decision inter alia to the effect that
the degrees awarded by the Vidyapeeth prior to 26th February, 2015
would be valid for appointment and promotion and those awarded

8 Vidyapeeth
9 W.P.(C) No.3115 of 2015 and batch matters
10 Praveshika, Sahitya Bhushan and Sahitya Alankar
11 No.-15/Policy Ni.-07-03/2022 Ka.-3475 dated 15th June, 2023
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 235

Ravi Oraon v. The State of Jharkhand & Ors.

thereafter would not be valid. It was also sought to be informed that
the policy decisions taken by the Government, mentioned in such
letter, would be effective from 26th February, 2015.
7. Secondly, consequent upon the aforesaid development, it has been
brought to our notice that the appellants – Ravi and Premlal – have
been freshly appointed as teachers on 17th January, 2025. As a result
of such fresh appointment, however, they stand to lose the benefit
of their past services.
8. Laslty, it has also been brought to our notice that the appellant –
Surendra – breathed his last on 5th August, 2024, i.e., prior to fresh
appointment of the other appellants – Ravi and Premlal. He could
not thus be extended the benefit of fresh appointment. Be that as
it may, if the other appellants – Ravi and Premlal – succeed in
persuading us to hold in their favour, the heirs of the appellant –
Surendra – would be entitled to similar but limited relief other than
reinstatement in service.

Questions
9. Despite fresh appointment of the appellants – Ravi and Premlal –
the basic question that survives for an answer by us is, whether the
termination of services of the appellants, on the ground that their
graduation certificates were not valid and they had not secured at
least 40% marks in the intermediate examination taken by them, was
proper? The other question would necessarily relate to the nature and
extent of grant of relief, if any, should the basic question be decided
in favour of the appellants – Ravi and Prem Lal. Also, we would be
required to consider the claim of the other appellant – Surendra – in
the changed circumstances.

Analysis and Reasons
10. The degrees were awarded to the appellants by the Vidyapeeth on
unspecified dates but prior to 26th February, 2015. As discussed
above, the degrees awarded prior to the said date have been treated
to be valid by the Government of Jharkhand.
11. With the recognition of their degrees as valid, the surviving dispute
in the present appeals is regarding the other ground of termination,
i.e., whether the appellants had secured the minimum qualification
marks in the intermediate examination taken by them.
236 [2025] 11 S.C.R.

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12. According to the appellants, they scored more than the required
qualifying marks after taking into account the marks secured by
them in the respective vocational subjects. They assert that as per
the guidelines contained on the reverse side of their marksheet,
bonus marks secured in the vocational subjects, over and above
the minimum pass marks, are to be added to the aggregate of
compulsory and optional subjects and in this way, they scored
more than 40% marks. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced
below:
4. The result of a candidate offering an additional subject
shall be determined on the basis of marks obtained by
him in all the compulsory and in the three out of the four
optional and additional subjects taken together in which
he/she has secured higher marks.
6. The marks obtained by a candidate in vocational
subjects over and above pass (theory and practical
taken together) will be added in aggregate to improve
his/her result and determine division. This advantage
will be available only to such candidates who have
appeared at the examination in both theory and practical
papers.
(emphasis ours)

13. On the other hand, countering this method of calculation, the
respondents relied on Rule 21 A (ii)(A) of the 2012 Rules which
provides that the marks secured by a candidate in an “additional
subject” will not be taken into consideration while calculating the
“educational merit point”.
14. Before analysing the aforesaid contentions, we need to note and
consider the 2012 Rules, to the extent relevant.

2012 Rules
15. In exercise of powers conferred under the proviso to Article 309
of the Constitution of India, the Governor of Jharkhand framed the
2012 Rules for “Appointment on posts of Teachers and Instructors in
Primary Schools under Human Resources Development Department
[Primary Education Directorate]”.
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 237

Ravi Oraon v. The State of Jharkhand & Ors.

16. Rule 312 provides that for testing the eligibility for appointment on
the post of Teacher in schools including government and aided
non-governmental schools, an examination shall be held by the
concerned authority.
17. Rule 4 provides for eligibility criteria, which a candidate must fulfil to
appear in the Teacher Eligibility Test. Portion of the said rule, which
is material, is reproduced below:
4. For appearing in Teacher Eligibility Test minimum
qualification shall be as follows:
(a) The candidate must be citizen of India.
(b) Educational and Technical Qualifications.
(i) For appointment of Teachers of Primary Class:
(a) Higher Secondary with minimum 50 %
marks or its equivalent and two years
Diploma in elementary Education. [Known
by whatever name]
Or
Higher Secondary with minimum 45 %
marks or its equivalent and two years
Diploma in elementary Education Science
[Known by whatever name], which is
obtained as per National Teacher Education
Council (Recognition, Standard and
Activities) Regulation 2002,
Or
******

12 For testing the eligibility for appointment on the post of Teacher, examination shall be held by Jharkhand
Academic Council or any Authority, authorized by State Government, in which successful candidate shall
be eligible of appointment in following schools.
A. All such school which are operated by the Government of Jharkhand or Jharkhand Education
Project Council.
B. Such Non-Governmental School, which are aided by State Government.
C. Such Non-Governmental School, which are granted (sic.) by State Government.
D. Such Non-Governmental Non-Aided School, which are recognized by State Government.
E. Such School which is affiliated /recognized by any National Education Board and to whom No
Objection Certificate is issued by State Government.
238 [2025] 11 S.C.R.

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Or
******
And
(b) Qualified in Teacher Eligibility Test (T.E.T.)
held for class 6 to 8 by the Government
of Jharkhand under guideline framed by
National Teacher Education Council.
(c) To the candidates of Schedule Caste/
Schedule Tribe and disabled category
relaxation shall be given of 5 percent in
minimum obtained marks mentioned in
rule 4 (b) (i) (A) and 4 (b) (ii) (A).
(d) Such candidate of which training is complete
and Teacher Training Examination is held,
then also said candidate may appear in
Teacher Eligibility Test Examination, but his
final passing shall depend on the result of
Teacher Training Examination.
(emphasis ours)

18. Furthermore, Rule 21 reads as follows:
21. For appointment of Teachers/Instructors on vacant
posts Merit List shall be prepared at district level as
per following process:
A. Determination of Merit List for appointment of Inter
Trained Teachers:
(i) For appointment of Inter Trained Teachers
category wise Merit List shall be prepared by
Dist. Education Establishment Committee on
basis of total merit point of candidate.
(ii) Total merit point of candidate shall be sum
of educational merit point and merit point of
Teacher Eligibility Test, of which calculation shall
be made as follows:
(A) For determination of educational merit point,
after aiding percentage of obtained marks of
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 239

Ravi Oraon v. The State of Jharkhand & Ors.

Matric Examination, Intermediate Examination
and Teacher Training Examination, on dividing
total sum by three, resultant percentage shall
be educational merit point of candidate. But in
this calculation, marks obtained in additional
subject shall not be included.
(B) On basis of obtained marks of Teacher
Eligibility Test, the determination of merit point
of Teacher Eligibility Test of candidate shall be
made as follows:

i. 90% and above 10 point
ii. 80% and above but Below 90% 06 point
iii. 70% and above but Below 80% 04 point
iv. 52% and above but Below 70% 02 point
B. Determination of Merit List for appointment of
Graduate Trained Teachers:
******************
(emphasis ours)

19. The aforesaid rule provides for a method of calculation of merit point,
for the purpose of preparation of merit list of eligible candidates. The
merit point, as per the rule, shall be a sum total of “education merit
point” (which shall be the equivalent of the sum total of percentage
of marks secured by a candidate in his/her matric, intermediate and
Teacher Training Examination, divided by three) and “merit point of
Teacher Eligibility Test”. For calculation of “educational merit point”,
it is provided that the marks secured by a candidate in his/her
vocational subject shall not be taken into consideration. We have
done a detailed analysis of the rule in the upcoming part of the
judgment. At this point, it is suffice to mention that this rule applies
at the time of preparation of “Merit List”.

Calculation of marks secured by the Appellants
20. Admittedly, the Department, while calculating the percentage of marks
secured by the appellants in the intermediate examination taken by
them did not take into account the marks secured by them in the
respective vocational subjects.
240 [2025] 11 S.C.R.

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21. It is also clear that if the marks secured by the appellants in their
vocational subjects are taken into account, then they score more
than 40% marks; otherwise, not.
22. The relevant guideline from the marksheet has already been
reproduced above. For better understanding of the same, we wish
to look into the marks secured by the appellant – Prem Lal - in his
intermediate examination with and without addition of the marks
secured in the vocational subject and calculate the percentage of
marks. It is found that:
a. In his two compulsory subjects, Prem Lal secured 30/100
marks in one and 87/200 marks in the other. In his optional
subjects, he secured 80/200, 83/200 and 78/200 marks. Thus,
the aggregate of marks secured by him in the main 5 subjects
stood at 358/900 marks, which is roughly 39.77% (less than the
required 40% for a candidate belonging to a Schedule Tribe).
b. Prem Lal secured 39/100 in his vocational subject. The minimum
qualifying marks in the vocational subject was 35 marks. As per
guideline 6 (on the reverse of the marksheet), the additional
marks secured over and above the minimum qualifying marks
are to be added to the aggregate to improve the result of a
candidate and determine his division. The additional marks
secured by Prem Lal (4 marks), when added to the aggregate
(358/900) increased his score to 362/900, which is roughly
40.22%.
c. This is how addition of marks secured in the vocational subjects
could come to the aid and advantage of the appellants.
23. In the present case, we find no reason as to why the method of
calculation of the percentage, as provided on the reverse of the
marksheet, should not be applied for the purpose of calculation of
marks of the appellants. Marks secured in the vocational subject
is a way for a candidate to improve his/her overall percentage of
marks. The reasoning behind this method, is clear to us. A vocational
subject, though optional, would place an additional burden on an
examinee which he/she shoulders in the fervent hope of improving
his/her overall percentage.
24. In the absence of a bar or an alternate method provided by any law,
the method provided on the marksheet has to be followed. Therefore,
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 241

Ravi Oraon v. The State of Jharkhand & Ors.

the onus of proof shifted to the respondents to show that calculation
as per the marksheet is not warranted. As discussed above, the
respondents rely on Rule 21 of the 2012 Rules which the appellants
have vehemently refuted. The only issue which therefore remains
is, whether Rule 21 of the 2012 Rules will bar/override the method
provided in the marksheet.

Rule 21 – Whether applicable?
25. Indeed, at first blush, it appears to be attractive on a plain reading
of Rule 21 A (ii)(A) that the marks secured by the appellants in their
vocational subjects could not have been considered for calculation
of their overall percentage of marks in the intermediate examination.
However, on a deeper scrutiny, the argument suffers from a prodigious
error.
26. The heading of Rule 21 makes it very clear that the procedure in
this rule applies only at the time of preparing the “Merit List”. Rule
21 is no way concerned with providing a mechanism for deciding
whether a candidate is eligible or not. That consideration falls within
the exclusive domain of Rule 4, which provides for an eligibility
criteria for the purpose of appearing in the Teacher Eligibility Test.
27. That both these rules function in their exclusive domain is further
strengthened by the fact that Rule 4 of the 2012 Rules is under
Chapter 2 named “Teacher Eligibility Test” while Rule 21 falls under
Chapter 3 named “Appointment”.
28. A combined reading of both the rules, therefore, is that the eligibility
of a candidate for appearing in the Teacher Eligibility Test is to be
decided in accordance with Rule 4 and Merit list (for the purposes
of appointment) is to be prepared in accordance with Rule 21. Thus,
the respondents erred in applying Rule 21 for the purpose of deciding
whether the appellants fulfilled the eligibility criteria. The Division
Bench also committed the same error.
29. In accordance with Rule 4, which does not provide for exclusion
of marks secured in the vocational subject, and Rule 21 not being
applicable for determining the eligibility of a candidate, the only
method which remains for calculation of the marks is the one which
is provided on the reverse side of the marksheet of the appellants,
according to which the appellants have secured more that 40% marks.
242 [2025] 11 S.C.R.

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Therefore, the appellants were eligible to appear in the Teacher
Eligibility Test Examination.

Principles of Natural Justice – Whether violated?
30. A deeper concern now beckons our attention. We shall place the
appellants’ termination under the sharp lens of natural justice.
31. In the show cause notices issued to the appellants, a question
was raised about them not fulfilling the eligibility criterion of having
secured a minimum of 45% marks in their intermediate examination.
The validity of their graduation certificates was also questioned. The
appellants replied by stating that they secured more than 40% marks
in their intermediate examination, which perfectly fulfilled the eligibility
criterion. To wit, it was their contention that being members of the
Scheduled Tribe, they were entitled to a 5% relaxation of marks. As
regards the graduation certificate, it was made clear that the same
was not a requirement for appointment of a teacher for Classes
I-V and the same was provided only for the sake of completeness.
However, on the very next day, the respondents terminated
their services by following a course of action which shocks our
conscience.
32. Why is this course of action shocking? The appellants, in their replies
to the show cause notices, had categorically demonstrated that
they were not required to secure 45% marks in their intermediate
examination. They were required to secure more than 40% marks in
the intermediate examination, which they did secure. Confronted with
this situation, the respondents conveniently proceeded to terminate
the appellants’ services by computing their marks after excluding the
marks secured in the vocational subject. Significantly, the allegation
that the appellants had failed to secure 40% marks (after exclusion
of marks secured in the vocational subject) in the intermediate
examination did not even figure as an allegation in the show cause
notices. Therefore, findings were returned by the respondents which
were at variance with the allegations levelled in the show cause
notices. The appellants having successfully defended the allegations,
the respondents were precluded in law from proceeding with such
notices. In the absence of fresh show cause notices specifically
requiring the appellants to explain why the marks secured in the
vocational subject should not be taken into account for determining
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 243

Ravi Oraon v. The State of Jharkhand & Ors.

their overall percentage, in our considered view, the appellants had
been denied a fair and reasonable opportunity of hearing and the
termination orders are wholly unsustainable and stand vitiated being
in violation of the principles of natural justice.
33. The present is akin to a situation where the noticee successfully
defends the charge against him but is made to suffer civil consequences
because the notifier finds the noticee guilty of a different charge in
respect whereof he is not put to notice. In such a case, the finding
of guilt which is at variance with the original charge without proper
opportunity to respond offends due process and renders any order
or action unsustainable.
34. Therefore, the Division Bench of the High Court fell in error in
holding that the principles of natural justice were not violated on the
ground that a fresh show cause notice was unnecessary, as there
was “no requirement to follow the principles of natural justice when
the fact is not in dispute.” This conclusion was reached only after
the Division Bench held that Rule 21 was applicable to the case of
the appellants, thereby precluding the inclusion of marks secured
in vocational subjects. However, as already discussed, since Rule
21 has no application to the present case, the very foundation upon
which the Division Bench rested its decision stands vitiated.
35. Reliance placed by the Division Bench on Escorts Farms (supra)
appears to be wholly misplaced. The approach of the Division
Bench was flawed as would appear from the foregoing discussions.
Appellants, if provided a fair and reasonable opportunity, could have
pointed out the error committed by the respondents. Complying with
natural justice principles, on facts and circumstances, would not have
been an idle formality and/or the decision a forgone conclusion.

Conclusion
36. For these two reasons, i.e., (i) the procedure that Rule 21 enshrined
is only to be used for the purpose of preparation of merit list and Rule
4 does not provide for exclusion of marks secured in the vocational
subject; and (ii) the termination order stands vitiated for violation of
principles of natural justice, inasmuch as the respondents excluded
the marks secured in the vocational subjects without affording the
appellants notice or an opportunity to contest such exclusion, we
have no other option but to interfere.
244 [2025] 11 S.C.R.

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Relief
37. The judgments and orders of the Division Bench under challenge in
these appeals are set aside.
38. Since the respondents had acted in a rather highhanded, arbitrary
and illegal manner in terminating the services of the appellants
without justifiable reason and also following due process, the orders
terminating the services of the appellants are also set aside.
39. The appellants – Ravi and Prem Lal – shall be treated to have
been in continuous service right from the date(s) of their original
appointment (December, 2015), as if their services were never
terminated. They shall be entitled to service benefits like arrears of
pay in full and seniority counted from the dates of initial appointment.
However, for the purpose of meeting the experience criterion for
promotion, the period not spent on duty will not be counted. The
rationale behind this direction is that practical experience of teaching
is gained through imparting of lessons to the students. They cannot,
thus, be held to have acquired experience without hands-on work.
Though the appellants are not at fault, we have attempted to suitably
compensate them by awarding full arrears of pay.
40. Insofar as the appellant – Surendra – is concerned, he cannot be
reinstated in service. However, while setting aside the order of his
termination from service, we order that from the dates of termination
of service till his death, his heirs too would be entitled to full arrears of
pay. Additionally, Surendra shall be deemed to have died-in-harness
and if there be a scheme for compassionate employment, his heirs
may apply thereunder. If an application is received, the respondents
shall proceed to consider the same on its own merits.
41. Arrears of pay shall be released to the appellants – Ravi and Premlal –
as early as possible but not later than 3 (three) months from date
of receipt of a copy of this judgment and order.
42. Insofar as release of arrears to the heirs of the appellant – Surendra –
is concerned, such heirs shall be at liberty to approach the Department
with all supporting documents. Upon a satisfaction being reached that
they are the heirs of late Surendra, the Department shall proceed to
disburse the amount payable in equal shares. If any heir is a minor,
his/her share shall be released in favour of the widow of Surendra.
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 245

Ravi Oraon v. The State of Jharkhand & Ors.

The disbursement be effected also within three months of the heirs
approaching the Department.
43. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed on the aforesaid terms. No
costs.
44. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeals allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey