RAVI DHINGRAversusTHE STATE OF HARYANA

164                      [2023]REPORTS
               SUPREME COURT    2 S.C.R. 164                [2023] 2 S.C.R.


A                               RAVI DHINGRA
                                        v.
                          THE STATE OF HARYANA
                        (Criminal Appeal No. 987 of 2009)
B                               MARCH 01, 2023
        [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND B. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.]
             Penal Code, 1860 – ss.364A, 363 and 364 – Modification of
      conviction u/s.364A to s.363 – Appellants convicted u/ss.148, 364A
      r/w s.149, IPC – Sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3
C
      years u/s.148, rigorous imprisonment for life and fine u/s.364A r/w
      s.149 – On appeal, held: s.364A has three components- kidnapping
      or abduction of a person and keeping them in detention; threat to
      cause death or hurt, and the use of kidnapping, abduction, or
      detention with a demand to pay the ransom; and when the demand
D     is not met, then causing death – In the present case, there are two
      statements of PW-21-child victim, one made to the police 2 days
      after he had returned home from the captivity of appellants and
      another made before the Trial Court, two years after the initial
      statement – Three changes are noticed therein, first, a change in
      the exact timing of the threat; second, the specificity of the delivery
E
      of the threat to kill; and third, omission of the intent behind the
      threat i.e. to prevent PW-21 from crying out – These details are
      crucial to proving the second ingredient of the charge u/s.364A i.e,
      ‘threat resulting in giving rise to a reasonable apprehension that
      such person may be put to death or hurt’ – Thus, this ingredient was
F     not proved beyond reasonable doubt – For proving the ingredient
      of threat, the intimidation of the child victim, for the purpose of
      making him silent cannot be enough – If the sentence carrying a
      maximum sentence of death and a minimum sentence of life sentence
      has such a low evidentiary threshold, the difference between
      punishments for kidnapping u/ss.363, 364 and 364A shall become
G
      meaningless – Conviction of the appellants u/s.364A is unsustainable
      – Appellants convicted u/s.363 and sentenced to imprisonment for
      seven years with fine – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.216.


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                                       164
         RAVI DHINGRA v. THE STATE OF HARYANA                          165


      Partly allowing the appeals, the Court                           A
      HELD: 1.1 Section 363 of the IPC punishes the act of
kidnapping and Section 364 thereof punishes the offence of
kidnapping or abduction of a person in order to murder him.
Section 364A further adds to the gravity of the offence by involving
an instance of coercive violence or substantial threat thereof, to     B
make a demand for ransom. Accordingly, the maximum
punishment for the three crimes is seven years imprisonment;
ten years’ imprisonment and imprisonment for life or death,
respectively. Under section 364A, it is necessary to prove not
only that such kidnapping or abduction has taken place but that
thereafter, the accused threatened to cause death or hurt to such      C
person or by his conduct gave rise to a reasonable apprehension
that such person may be put to death or hurt or cause hurt or
death to such person in order to compel the Government or any
foreign State or international, inter-governmental organization or
any other person to do or abstain from doing any act or to pay a       D
ransom. [Paras 12 and 13][173-F-G; 176-E-F]
      Lohit Kaushal v. State of Haryana (2009) 17 SCC 106;
      Anil v. Administration of Daman & Diu (2006) 13 SCC
      36 : [2006] 9 Suppl. SCR 466; Vishwanath Gupta v.
      State of Uttaranchal (2007) 11 SCC 633 : [2007] 4                E
      SCR 332; Vikram Singh v. Union of India (2015) 9 SCC
      502 : [2015] 10 SCR 816 – relied on.
      1.2 The Courts below, as is usual in kidnapping cases, have
placed singular reliance on the testimony of PW-21 to prove the
element of ‘threat to cause death or hurt’, or to determine whether    F
the appellants’ conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension
that such person may be put to death or hurt. The statement of
PW-21 made to the police on 18.02.2000, i.e., two days after he
had returned home from the captivity of appellants herein records
that he was threatened at night by the appellants with a ‘revolver,’
which was claimed to be possessed by them. The exact statement         G
was, “One handkerchief and one black cloth were tied on the eyes
and said to me they have revolver and they will kill him if [he]
raises any voice.” However, the statement before the Trial Court
dated 15.04.2002, nearly two years after the initial statement,
includes a substantial detail that was omitted in the previous         H
166           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2023] 2 S.C.R.


A     statement. After mentioning that the PW-21 was forcibly put
      inside the car and gagged, the statement reads, “The occupants
      threatened me with a knife and pistol and threatened me to kill.”
      Thus, three crucial changes may be noticed: first, a change in the
      exact timing of the threat; second, the specificity of the delivery
      of the threat to kill; and third, omission of the intent behind the
B
      threat i.e. to prevent PW-21 from crying out. These details are
      crucial to proving the second ingredient of the charge under
      Section 364A and essential to bring home the guilt under this
      section namely, threat resulting in giving rise to a reasonable
      apprehension that such person may be put to death or hurt. It is
C     clear that this ingredient has not been proved beyond reasonable
      doubt. The Courts below did not thoroughly address this doubt
      before convicting the appellants. For proving the ingredient of
      threat, the intimidation of the child victim, for the purpose of
      making him silent, cannot be enough. If the sentence carrying a
      maximum sentence of death and a minimum sentence of life
D
      sentence has such a low evidentiary threshold, the difference
      between punishments for kidnapping under 363, 364 and 364A
      shall become meaningless. [Para 15][179-F-H; 180-A-D]
            2. This Court has wide power to alter the charge under
      Section 216 of the Cr.PC whilst not causing prejudice to the
E     accused. In the facts of the present case, the conviction of the
      appellants is unsustainable under Section 364A of the IPC. The
      conviction under Section 364A of the IPC is set aside. The
      judgments of the Trial Court and the High Court are modified to
      the above extent. The appellants are now convicted for the offence
F     under Section 363 of the IPC; i.e., kidnapping and sentenced to
      imprisonment for seven years and a fine of Rs.2000/-. [Paras 17
      and 18][180-H; 181-A, G-H; 182-A]
            Sk. Ahmed v. State of Telangana (2021) 9 SCC 59;
            Jasvinder Saini v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2013)
G           7 SCC 256 : [2013] 7 SCR 340; Central Bureau of
            Investigation v. Karimullah Osan Khan (2014) 11 SCC
            538 : [2014] 3 SCR 588; Dr. Nallapareddy Sridhar
            Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2020) 12 SCC 467
            : [2020] 1 SCR 1116 – relied on.

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         RAVI DHINGRA v. THE STATE OF HARYANA                           167


      Malleshi v. State of Karnataka (2004) 8 SCC 95 : [2004]           A
      4 Suppl. SCR 441 – referred to.
                       Case Law Reference
[2006] 9 Suppl. SCR 466             relied on            Para 13
[2007] 4 SCR 332                    relied on            Para 13        B
[2015] 10 SCR 816                   relied on            Para 13
[2004] 4 Suppl. SCR 441             referred to          Para 16
[2013] 7 SCR 340                    relied on            Para 18
[2014] 3 SCR 588                    relied on            Para 18        C
[2020] 1 SCR 1116                    relied on           Para 18
      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
987 of 2009.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 13.02.2008 of the High Court    D
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRLA No. 525 of 2003.
      With
      Criminal Appeal Nos. 989-990, 986, 988 of 2009 and 645 of 2023.
     Gaurav Agrawal, (SCLSC), Saurav Sunil, Santosh Krishnan, Simon
                                                                        E
Benjamin, Ms. Deepshikha Sansanwal, Krishnam Mishra, Rajeev Kumar
Dubey, Kamlendra Mishra, Advs. for the Appellant.
     Rakesh Mudgal, A.A.G., Dr. Monika Gusain, Dinesh Mudgal,
Rakesh Kumar Yadav, Ms. Savita Kaushik, Advs. for the Repondent.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                        F
      NAGARATHNA, J.
       Leave granted in Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.5296 of 2012.
In all other cases, leave has already been granted.
      2. The present appeals have been filed by five accused whose      G
convictions were confirmed by the impugned judgement of the Punjab
and Haryana High Court dated 13.02.2008, under Sections 148, 149 and
364A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’, for short).The details of
the cases are as under:

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168            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2023] 2 S.C.R.


A




B




C




D



            Criminal Appeal No.987 of 2009, filed by Raman Goswamistands
      abated on account of his death vide order dated 08.04.2019. Accordingly,
E     Criminal Appeal No.987 of 2009, is considered in respect of Ravi
      Dhingraalone. All these matters were heard together and they are being
      disposed of by this common judgment.
             3. Facts in brief, as per FIR No.64 dated 15.02.2000 at Police
      Station, City Thanesarlodged at the instance of complainant, Dr. H.K.
F     Sobti (PW-20) are that the appellants accused kidnapped Harsh (PW-
      21), aged 14 years, son of Dr H.K. Sobti and Smt Indra Sobti (PW-5)
      when he was going to school, at about 8:15 a.m. on the aforesaid date.
      The Station House Officer had filed the FIR with a remark that a case
      under Section 364/34 of the IPC seems to be made out from the facts.
      As per the statement of PW-21, he was intimidated by co-accused Ravi
G
      Dhingra to ride as a pillion rider on his scooter and upon his refusal, he
      was forcibly put inside a car. Upon screaming for safety, he was
      threatened to be killed with a knife and pistol if he cried. They also told
      him that his affluent father could even pay the ransom of Rs.50 lakhs.
           It emerged in the investigation that PW-21 was kept in House
H     No.772, Sector-13, Kurukshetra. Smt.Kanta Goyal (PW-2) who was a
          RAVI DHINGRA v. THE STATE OF HARYANA                               169
                  [B. V. NAGARATHNA, J.]

resident of house No. 1653/13 which was near the said school and another     A
student of 9th Standard, namely, Manish (PW-4) told them that at 8:15
a.m., two boys with muffled faces had put Harsh in a Maruti car without
a number plate and having tinted window glass.Later,on the same day,
calls demanding ransom were received, acting on which, PW-20 reached
the concerned location with the ransom demanded. While he was waiting
                                                                             B
for the appellants accused to receive the ransom and release his child,
PW-21 Harsh Sobti was released between 04:00 a.m. and 04:30 a.m.on
16.2.2000 and dropped near the house of PW-11 Suraj BhanRathee. He
made a phone call to his mother, who took him to his house at around
5:30 a.m.
       4. That demands and enquiries for ransom were made through            C
letters and telephonic messages to PW-20 on 09.03.2000, 12.03.2000,
13.03.2000 and 14.03.2000. Another message regarding ransom was
received via telephoneon 15.03.2000 at 2:30 p.m.He informed the
appellants that while he could not arrange Rs.15 lakhs, he had arranged
Rs.12 lakhs.Acting on the instructions received in these messages,           D
PW-20, after intimating the police, boarded the train at 8:15 p.m. with a
bag of money. When the train stopped at Ambala, he got down.He went
back to Kurukshetra wherefrom he was asked to leave his house with
the bag of money and come to Karnal. PW-20 went in his car with two
sub-inspectors in civil dress. Upon the delivery of the cash in a bag near
a bridge, it was discovered that calls were made from a mobile phone         E
registered in the name of an engineering student, Ravi Duhan (PW-19).
He revealed that his friends, appellants herein, had borrowed his phone.
On 17.03.2000, upon receiving secret information about the whereabouts
of four accused persons, namely, Ravi Dhingra, Baljit Pahwa, Parvej
Khan and Raman Goswami, were apprehended by the police except                F
accused Laxmi Narain who was apprehended on 03.04.2000. The Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Kurukshetra, committed the case to the Court of
Sessions for trial on 06.06.2000.
       5. Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Kurukshetra,(‘Trial
Court’, for the sake of convenience) tried the appellants accused for the    G
commission of offences under Sections 364, 364A, 342, 506 read with
Section 148 of the IPC. The prosecution presented 27 witnessesand 72
documentary Exhibits, including statements of the appellants under
Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter ‘Cr.PC’,
for short) and 5 case properties.From the appellants’ side,13 documentary
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170             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2023] 2 S.C.R.


A     exhibitswere presented.The Trial Court recorded the appellants’-
      accused’s statements under Section 313 of the Cr. PC.
             6. Appellants maintained that they were falsely implicated and
      had been kept in illegal confinement after being apprehended. They also
      argued that they were produced before the Court after their pictures
B     had been widely publicised through local media and confronted with
      prosecution witnesses. Further, it was submitted that they were tortured
      before being presented before the court on 18.03.2000. They also stated
      that they were forced to sign statements prepared by Investigating Officer
      on 20.03.2000.
C            7. The Trial Court considered the aforementioned statements and
      the other evidence on record and held that appellants formed an unlawful
      assembly and in pursuance of a common object, kidnapped PW-21 to
      compel his father to pay a ransom amount of Rs.15 Lakhs. The Trial
      Court also concluded that theappellants sought to take advantage of
      PW-21’s confinement and the threat to cause death to him for compelling
D     PW-20 to pay the ransom.
           The Trial Court found no reason to disbelieve the statement of the
      PW-21.
             Thus, appellants were held guilty for the commission of offences
E     punishable under Sections 148 and 364A read with Section 149 of the
      IPC.Appellants prayed for leniency in the sentence on the ground that
      they had old parents and there was no one else to look after them.The
      Trial Court concluded the trial and rendered its verdict on 29.05.2003.The
      Trial Court sentenced the accused-appellants to undergo rigorous
      imprisonment for three years under Section 148 of the IPC, rigorous
F     imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.2000/- each under Section
      364A read with Section 149 of the IPC.The Trial Court further clarified
      that the period of under-trial detention would be set off and both sentences
      shall run concurrently.
            8. Appellants appealed against the order of conviction and sentence
G     before the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The High Court considered
      the question as to whether there existed reliable evidence to identify and
      connect the appellants with the offence of kidnapping for ransom under
      Section 364A of the IPC.The High Court termed PW-21’s statement to
      be crucial, and placing reliance on the same, held that all ingredients of
      Section 364A of the IPC had been satisfied.
H
          RAVI DHINGRA v. THE STATE OF HARYANA                                 171
                  [B. V. NAGARATHNA, J.]

       The High Court rejected the plea that there was material                A
discrepancy in the prosecution’s case and held that there was no reason
to cast any doubt on the veracity of the versions of prosecution witnesses.
Regarding PW-21, the High Court remarked that he was “a child
witness, but he faced long and searching cross-examination” and
there is no contradiction in his version. It rejected the contention as to
                                                                               B
the contradictions in PW-20’s stance by declaring that “Discrepancy in
investigation cannot by itself a ground to reject the testimony of a
reliable witness.”Further, the High Court concluded that by virtue of
the testimony of PW-20 and PW-21 itself, the “connection of the
accused with the crime stands established beyond reasonable
doubt.”                                                                        C
        9. The High Court rejected the plea of the appellants to modify
the conviction to that for an offence under Section 363 or 365 of the IPC
or under Section 506 IPC, which did not provide for a minimum sentence
of life imprisonment on the ground of prolonged detention of over seven
years.                                                                         D
       Being aggrieved by the judgement and sentence of the High Court,
the accused have approached this Court by filing their respective Special
Leave Petitions, in which leave has been granted and are now considered
Criminal Appeals.
       On 11.05.2009, this Court noted that the appellants had served          E
seven years in prison and could be granted bail on the satisfaction of the
Trial Court of necessary conditions. It also granted leave to appeal in the
Special Leave Petitions and admitted the matters.
        10. Appellants-accused before this Court have submitted that there
is grave doubt about the fact that the appellants herein are the very          F
persons who had kidnapped Harsh Sobti, PW-21, but the Courts below
have found reasons to believe the evidence of PW-21. Thus, without
conceding the arguments made for acquittal by raising questions about
the investigation, appellants have urged that judicial notice may be taken
of the long period of their incarceration and their conviction under Section   G
364A of the IPC be modified to a conviction under Section 363 of the
IPC.
      Sri Gaurav Agrawal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellantsappointed by Supreme Court Legal Services Committee, placed
reliance on Sk. Ahmed vs. State of Telangana, (2021) 9 SCC 59
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172             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2023] 2 S.C.R.


A     (“SK Ahmed”), to contend that the essential ingredients of Section 364A
      of the IPC have not been proved in this case. The crux of his argument
      was that the Sessions’ Court as well as the High Court have disregarded
      the fact that PW-21’s statement before the Court on 15.04.2002 was a
      substantial improvement upon the statement made to the police on
      15.02.2000. Therefore, he submitted that no threat to cause death or
B
      hurt has been proven. He also submitted that no demand for ransom on
      the basis of the cause of death or hurt could be proven as these emanated
      from the police. He submitted that PW-12 turned hostile and PW-13
      was only a chance witness. Hence, the judgments impugned may be
      interfered with and the appellants may be granted relief by modifying
C     the sentences imposed on them even if acquittal of the appellants may
      not be possible.
             On the other hand, Sri Rakesh Mudgal, learned AAG for the
      respondent-State supported the judgment of the High Court and
      contended that there is no merit in these appeals and the same may be
D     dismissed. He submitted that the High Court was justified in its reasoning
      and in dismissing the appeals filed by the appellants herein.
             11. In view of the facts on record and the rival submissions of the
      parties, we deem it appropriate to limit the point for consideration in this
      appeal to whether the facts, in this case, attract the offence under Section
E     364A of the IPC and if the answer is in the negative, would it be just and
      proper to modify the conviction to a sentence under Section 363of the
      IPC.
            To put the matter in perspective, the provisions of Section 361
      read with Sections 363, 364 and 364A ought to be compared. The said
F     provisions read as under:
            Section 361:Kidnapping from lawful guardianship.Whoever
            takes or entices any minor under sixteenyears of age if a male, or
            under eighteen years of age if a female, or any person of unsound
            mind, out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor or
G           person of unsound mind, without the consent of such guardian, is
            said to kidnap such minor or person from lawful guardianship.
            Explanation.—The words “lawful guardian” in this section include
            any person lawfully entrusted with the care or custody of such
            minor or other person.
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         RAVI DHINGRA v. THE STATE OF HARYANA                                  173
                 [B. V. NAGARATHNA, J.]

      Exception.—This section does not extend to the act of any person         A
      who in good faith believes himself to be the father of an illegitimate
      child, or who in good faith believes himself to be entitled to the
      lawful custody of such child, unless such act is committed for an
      immoral or unlawful purpose.
                             x      x       x                                  B
      Section 363: Punishment for kidnapping. Whoever kidnaps
      any person from India or from lawful guardianship, shall be
      punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
      may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
      Section 364. Kidnapping or abducting in order to murder.                 C
      Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person in order that such person
      may be murdered or may be so disposed of as to be put in danger
      of being murdered, shall be punished with imprisonment for life or
      rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years,
      and shall also be liable to fine.                                        D
      Section 364A. Kidnapping for ransom, etc. - Whoever kidnaps
      or abducts any person or keeps a person in detention after such
      kidnapping or abduction, and threatens to cause death or hurt to
      such person, or by his conduct gives rise to a reasonable
      apprehension that such person may be put to death or hurt, or            E
      causes hurt or death to such person inorder to compel the
      Government or any foreign State or international inter-
      governmental organization or any other person to do or abstain
      from doing any act or to pay a ransom, shall be punishable with
      death, or imprisonment for life, andshall also be liable to fine.”
                                                                               F
       12. We note that Section 363 of the IPC punishes the act of
kidnapping and Section 364 thereof punishes the offence of kidnapping
or abduction of a person in order to murder him. Section 364A further
adds to the gravity of the offence by involving an instance of coercive
violence or substantial threat thereof, to make a demand for ransom.
Accordingly, the maximum punishment for the three crimes is seven              G
years imprisonment;ten years’ imprisonment and imprisonment for life
or death, respectively.
      The nuanced, graded approach of the Parliament while
criminalising the condemnable act of kidnapping must be carefully
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174             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2023] 2 S.C.R.


A     interpreted.Before interpreting the varying ingredients of crime and rigours
      of punishment, and appraising the judgments impugned, we deem it
      appropriate to reiterate the observations of this Court in Lohit Kaushal
      vs. State of Haryana, (2009) 17 SCC 106, wherein this Court observed
      as under:
B               “15. ... It is true that kidnapping as understood under Section
            364-A IPC is a truly reprehensible crime and when a helpless
            child is kidnapped for ransom and that too by close relatives, the
            incident becomes all the more unacceptable. The very gravity of
            the crime and the abhorrence which it creates in the mind of the
            court are, however, factors which also tend to militate against the
C           fair trial of an accused in such cases. A court must, therefore,
            guard against the possibility of being influenced in its judgments
            by sentiment rather than by objectivity and judicial considerations
            while evaluating the evidence.”
              13. This Court, notably in Anil vs. Administration of Daman &
D     Diu, (2006) 13 SCC 36 (“Anil”), Vishwanath Gupta vs. State of
      Uttaranchal (2007) 11 SCC 633 (“Vishwanath Gupta”) and Vikram
      Singh vs. Union of India, (2015) 9 SCC 502 (“Vikram Singh”) has
      clarified the essential ingredients to order a conviction for the commission
      of an offence under Section 364A of the IPC in the following manner:
E            a) In Anil, the pertinent observations were made as regards
      those cases where the accused is convicted for the offence in respect
      of which no charge is framed. In the said case, the question was whether
      appellant therein could have been convicted under Section 364A of the
      IPC when the charge framed was under Section 364 read with Section
F     34 of the IPC. The relevant passages which can be culled out from the
      said judgment of the Supreme Court are as under:
                   “54. The propositions of law which can be culled out from
            the aforementioned judgments are:
                  (i) The appellant should not suffer any prejudice by reason
G           of misjoinder of charges.
                   (ii) A conviction for lesser offence is permissible.
                   (iii) It should not result in failure of justice.
                   (iv) If there is a substantial compliance, misjoinder of charges
H
   RAVI DHINGRA v. THE STATE OF HARYANA                                175
           [B. V. NAGARATHNA, J.]

may not be fatal and such misjoinder must be arising out of mere       A
misjoinder to frame charges.
       55. The ingredients for commission of offence under Section
364 and 364-A are different. Whereas the intention to kidnap in
order that he may be murdered or may be so disposed of as to be
put in danger as murder satisfies the requirements of Section 364      B
of the Penal Code, for obtaining a conviction for commission of
an offence under Section 364-A thereof it is necessary to prove
that not only such kidnapping or abetment has taken place but
thereafter the accused threatened to cause death or hurt to such
person or by his conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension
that such person may be put to death or hurt or causes hurt or         C
death to such person in order to compel the Government or any
foreign State or international inter-governmental organisation or
any other person to do or abstain from doing any act or to pay a
ransom.
       56. It was, thus, obligatory on the part of the learned         D
Sessions Judge, Daman to frame a charge which would answer
the description of the offence envisaged under Section 364-A of
the Penal Code. It may be true that the kidnapping was done with
a view to get ransom but the same should have been put to the
appellant while framing a charge. The prejudice to the appellant       E
is apparent as the ingredients of a higher offence had not been
put to him while framing any charge.”
b) In Vishwanath Gupta, it was observed as under:
       “8. According to Section 364-A, whoever kidnaps or abducts
any person and keeps him in detention and threatens to cause           F
death or hurt to such person and by his conduct gives rise to a
reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to death or
hurt, and claims a ransom and if death is caused then in that case
the accused can be punished with death or imprisonment for life
and also liable to pay fine.                                           G
       9. The important ingredient of Section 364-A is the abduction
or kidnapping, as the case may be. Thereafter, a threat to the
kidnapped/abducted that if the demand for ransom is not met then
the victim is likely to be put to death and in the event death is
caused, the offence of Section 364-A is complete. There are three
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176                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 2 S.C.R.


A           stages in this section, one is the kidnapping or abduction, second
            is threat of death coupled with the demand of money and lastly
            when the demand is not met, then causing death. If the three
            ingredients are available, that will constitute the offence under
            Section 364-A of the Penal Code. Any of the three ingredients
            can take place at one place or at different places.”
B
            c) In Vikram Singh, it was observed as under:
                   “25. … Section 364-A IPC has three distinct components
            viz. (i) the person concerned kidnaps or abducts or keeps the
            victim in detention after kidnapping or abduction; (ii) threatens to
C           cause death or hurt or causes apprehension of death or hurt or
            actually hurts or causes death; and (iii) the kidnapping, abduction
            or detention and the threats of death or hurt, apprehension for
            such death or hurt or actual death or hurt is caused to coerce the
            person concerned or someone else to do something or to forbear
            from doing something or to pay ransom.These ingredients are, in
D           our opinion, distinctly different from the offence of extortion under
            Section 383 IPC. The deficiency in the existing legal framework
            was noticed by the Law Commission and a separate provision in
            the form of Section 364-A IPC proposed for incorporation to cover
            the ransom situations embodying the ingredients mentioned above.”
E            It is necessary to prove not only that such kidnapping or abduction
      has taken place but that thereafter, the accused threatened to cause
      death or hurt to such person or by his conduct gave rise to a reasonable
      apprehension that such person may be put to death or hurt or cause hurt
      or death to such person in order to compel the Government or any foreign
F     State or international, inter-governmental organization or any other person
      to do or abstain from doing any act or to pay a ransom.
            14. Most recently, this Court in SK Ahmed has emphasised that
      Section 364A of the IPC has three stages or components, namely,
            i.       kidnapping or abduction of a person and keeping them in
G                    detention;
            ii.      threat to cause death or hurt, and the use of kidnapping,
                     abduction, or detention with a demand to pay the ransom;
                     and
            iii.     when the demand is not met, then causing death.
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   RAVI DHINGRA v. THE STATE OF HARYANA                                   177
           [B. V. NAGARATHNA, J.]

The relevant portions of the said judgement are extracted as under:       A
      “12. We may now look into Section 364-A to find out as to
what ingredients the section itself contemplate for the offence.
When we paraphrase Section 364-A following is deciphered:
      (i) “Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person or keeps a
person in detention after such kidnapping or abduction”                   B

       (ii) “and threatens to cause death or hurt to such person, or
by his conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that such
person may be put to death or hurt,
      (iii) or causes hurt or death to such person in order to compel     C
the Government or any foreign State or international inter-
governmental organisation or any other person to do or abstain
from doing any act or to pay a ransom”
        (iv) “shall be punishable with death, or imprisonment for
life, and shall also be liable to fine.”                                  D
The first essential condition as incorporated in Section 364-A is
“whoever kidnaps or abducts any person or keeps a person in
detention after such kidnapping or abduction”. The second
condition begins with conjunction “and”. The second condition
has also two parts i.e. (a) threatens to cause death or hurt to such
                                                                          E
person or (b) by his conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension
that such person may be put to death or hurt. Either part of above
condition, if fulfilled, shall fulfil the second condition for offence.
The third condition begins with the word “or” i.e. or causes hurt
or death to such person in order to compel the Government or any
foreign State or international inter-governmental organisation or         F
any other person to do or abstain from doing any act or to pay a
ransom. Third condition begins with the words “or causes hurt or
death to such person in order to compel the Government or any
foreign State to do or abstain from doing any act or to pay a
ransom”. Section 364-A contains a heading “Kidnapping for
                                                                          G
ransom, etc.” The kidnapping by a person to demand ransom is
fully covered by Section 364-A.
      13. We have noticed that after the first condition the second
condition is joined by conjunction “and”, thus, whoever kidnaps or
abducts any person or keeps a person in detention after such
                                                                          H
178      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2023] 2 S.C.R.


A     kidnapping or abduction and threatens to cause death or hurt to
      such person.
             14. The use of conjunction “and” has its purpose and object.
      Section 364-A uses the word “or” nine times and the whole section
      contains only one conjunction “and”, which joins the first and
B     second condition. Thus, for covering an offence under Section
      364-A, apart from fulfilment of first condition, the second condition
      i.e. “and threatens to cause death or hurt to such person” also
      needs to be proved in case the case is not covered by subsequent
      clauses joined by “or”.
C            15. The word “and” is used as conjunction. The use of
      word “or” is clearly distinctive. Both the words have been used
      for different purpose and object. Crawford on Interpretation of
      Law while dealing with the subject “disjunctive” and “conjunctive”
      words with regard to criminal statute made following statement:

D            “… The court should be extremely reluctant in a criminal
      statute to substitute disjunctive words for conjunctive words, and
      vice versa, if such action adversely affects the accused.”
                                   xxx
             33. After noticing the statutory provision of Section 364-A
E     and the law laid down by this Court in the above noted cases, we
      conclude that the essential ingredients to convict an accused under
      Section 364-A which are required to be proved by the prosecution
      are as follows:
            (i) Kidnapping or abduction of any person or keeping a
F     person in detention after such kidnapping or abduction; and
            (ii) threatens to cause death or hurt to such person, or by
      his conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that such
      person may be put to death or hurt or;
             (iii) causes hurt or death to such person in order to compel
G     the Government or any foreign State or any Governmental
      organisation or any other person to do or abstain from doing any
      act or to pay a ransom.
      Thus, after establishing first condition, one more condition has to
      be fulfilled since after first condition, word used is “and”. Thus, in
H
          RAVI DHINGRA v. THE STATE OF HARYANA                               179
                  [B. V. NAGARATHNA, J.]

      addition to first condition either Condition (ii) or (iii) has to be   A
      proved, failing which conviction under Section 364-A cannot be
      sustained.”
       Thus, this Court in SK Ahmed set aside the conviction under Section
364A of the IPC and modified the same to conviction under Section 363,
for the reason that the additional conditions were not met by observing      B
as follows:
      “42. The second condition having not been proved to be
      established, we find substance in the submission of the learned
      counsel for the appellant that conviction of the appellant is
      unsustainable under Section 364-A IPC. We, thus, set aside the         C
      conviction of the appellant under Section 364-A. However, from
      the evidence on record regarding kidnapping, it is proved that the
      accused had kidnapped the victim for ransom, demand of ransom
      was also proved. Even though offence under Section 364-A has
      not been proved beyond reasonable doubt but the offence of
      kidnapping has been fully established to which effect the learned      D
      Sessions Judge has recorded a categorical finding in paras 19 and
      20. The offence of kidnapping having been proved, the appellant
      deserves to be convicted under Section 363. Section 363 provides
      for punishment which is imprisonment of either description for a
      term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to       E
      fine.”
       15. Now, we shall consider the applicability of the above ratio to
the present case and deal with appellants’ argument about contradictions
in the statements of the PW-21. We agree with the High Court that the
statements are crucial. We also note that the Courts below, as is usual in   F
kidnapping cases, have placed singular reliance on the testimony of
PW-21 to prove the element of ‘threat to cause death or hurt’, or to
determine whether the appellants’ conduct gives rise to a reasonable
apprehension that such person may be put to death or hurt. We have
perusedthe statement of PW-21 made to the police on 18.02.2000, i.e.,
two days after he had returned home from the captivity of appellants-        G
herein. The statementsrecord that he was threatened at night bythe
appellants with a ‘revolver,’ which was claimed to be possessed by them.
The exact statement was, “One handkerchief and one black cloth
were tied on the eyes and said to me they have revolver and they
will kill him if [he] raises any voice.” However, the statement before       H
180            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 2 S.C.R.


A     the Trial Court dated 15.04.2002, nearly two years after the initial
      statement, includes a substantial detail that was omitted in the previous
      statement. After mentioning that the PW-21 was forcibly put inside the
      car and gagged, the statement reads, “The occupants threatened me
      with a knife and pistol and threatened me to kill.” Thus, three crucial
      changes may be noticed: first, a change in the exact timing of the threat;
B
      second, the specificity of the delivery of the threat to kill; and third,
      omission of the intent behind the threat i.e. to prevent PW-21 from crying
      out. These details are crucial to proving the second ingredient of the
      charge under Section 364A and essential to bring home the guilt under
      this section namely, threat resulting in giving rise to a reasonable
C     apprehension that such person may be put to death or hurt. It is clear
      that this ingredient has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.The
      Courts below did not thoroughly address this doubt before convicting the
      appellants. For proving the ingredient of threat, the intimidation of the
      child victim, for the purpose of making him silent,cannot be enough. If
      the sentence carrying a maximum sentence of death and a minimum
D
      sentence of life sentence has such a low evidentiary threshold, the
      difference between punishments for kidnapping under 363, 364 and 364A
      shall become meaningless.
             16. In particular, we note that the High Court did not apply the
      precedent in Malleshi vs. State of Karnataka, (2004) 8 SCC 95
E     (“Malleshi”) properly. The facts in the said case, concerning the
      kidnapping of a major boy, revolved around the party to whom the demand
      for ransom ought to be made to bring home the guilt under Section 364A.It
      was observed in SK Ahmed that the Malleshi case dealt with demand
      for ransom and held that demand originally was made to the person
F     abducted and the mere fact that after making the demand the same
      could not be conveyed to some other person as the accused was arrested
      in the meantime does not take away the effect of conditions of Section
      364A. As clarified by this Court in SK Ahmed, Malleshi was merely
      concerned with ransom and its ratio would be of no assistance to cases
      where the fulfilment of other ingredients of crime under Section 364A is
G     brought into question.
             17. In the facts of the present case, we therefore agree with the
      submission of the learned counsel for the appellants, Sri Gaurav Agrawal,
      that the conviction of the appellants is unsustainable under Section 364A
      of the IPC.
H
          RAVI DHINGRA v. THE STATE OF HARYANA                                181
                  [B. V. NAGARATHNA, J.]

       18. This Court has wide power to alter the charge under Section        A
216 of the Cr.PC whilst not causing prejudice to the accused, as reiterated
in Jasvinder Saini vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2013) 7 SCC
256, para 11;Central Bureau of Investigationvs. Karimullah Osan
Khan (2014) 11 SCC 538, paragraph Nos. 17 and 18. The following
observations of thisCourt inDr.Nallapareddy Sridhar Reddy vs. State
                                                                              B
of Andhra Pradesh (2020) 12 SCC 467, paragraph No. 21are also
instructive:
             “21. From the above line of precedents, it is clear that
      Section 216 provides the court an exclusive and wide-ranging
      power to change or alter any charge. The use of the words “at
      any time before judgment is pronounced” in sub-section (1)              C
      empowers the court to exercise its powers of altering or adding
      charges even after the completion of evidence, arguments and
      reserving of the judgment. The alteration or addition of a charge
      may be done if in the opinion of the court there was an omission in
      the framing of charge or if upon prima facie examination of the         D
      material brought on record, it leads the court to form a presumptive
      opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting
      the alleged offence. The test to be adopted by the court while
      deciding upon an addition or alteration of a charge is that the
      material brought on record needs to have a direct link or nexus
      with the ingredients of the alleged offence. Addition of a charge       E
      merely commences the trial for the additional charges, whereupon,
      based on the evidence, it is to be determined whether the accused
      may be convicted for the additional charges. The court must
      exercise its powers under Section 216 judiciously and ensure that
      no prejudice is caused to the accused and that he is allowed to         F
      have a fair trial. The only constraint on the court’s power is the
      prejudice likely to be caused to the accused by the addition or
      alteration of charges. Sub-section (4) accordingly prescribes the
      approach to be adopted by the courts where prejudice may be
      caused.”
                                                                              G
      Therefore, we allow the appeals in part and set aside the conviction
under Section 364A of the IPC.
      The judgments of the learned Trial Court and the High Court are
modified to the above extent. The appellants arenow convicted for the
offence under Section 363 of the IPC; i.e., kidnapping and sentenced to       H
182             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2023] 2 S.C.R.


A     imprisonment for seven years and a fine of Rs.2000/-. If the appellants
      have completed imprisonment of more than seven years with remission
      and have paid the fine of Rs.2000/-, we direct the appellants to be released
      forthwith; if not on bail. If not, the appellants shall surrender within a
      period of four weeks and serve the remainder of the sentence.
B
      Divya Pandey                                             Appeals partly allowed.
      (Assisted by : Pranav Dhawan and Shevali Monga, LCRAs)




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