RAVEESH CHAND JAINversusRAJ RANI JAIN

                          [2015) 1 S.C.R. 1096


A                       RAVEESH CHAND JAIN
                                     v.
                             RAJ RANI JAIN
                    (Civil appeal no. 1822 of 2015}
                          FEBRUARY 12, 2015
B
           [M.Y. EQBAL AND SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, JJ.]

          Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Or.XII r. 6 - Suit for
    recovery of possession and for damages against appellant
C   who was respondent-plaintiffs son alleging that suit property
    was purchased by plaintiff from her own funds and she was
    absolute owner - Appellant-defendant opposed the suit
    contending that the suit property was a HUF property having
    been purchased in the name of the respondent using the
o   funds of his grandfather, father and himself - Respondent
    filed application u!Or.Xll r.6 stating that a suit for partition filed
    by appellant earlier on the same ground that suit property was
    HUF was dismissed and same amounted to unequivocal
    admission by the appellant that the respondent was entitled
E   to possession - Trial court dismissed' the application - High
    Court held that the suit for partition having been dismissed,
    the same will operate as res judicata and decreed the suit -
    Held: High Court was correct in decreeing the suit so far as
    recovery of possession was concerned in view of question of
F   ownership having been already decided in earlier suit - The
    second question with regard to recovery of Rs. 5,55,0001- and
    future damages admittedly was not decided either in the
    earlier suit or in this suit - In that view of the matter, decreeing
    the entire suit on the basis of ownership of the respondent
    already decided in the earlier suit, the decree for recovery of
G   damages ought not to have been passed by the High Court
    - However, while admitting the SLP the court had directed
    appellant to deposit Rs. 5 lacs and notice was issued only
    confining to the question as to whether the decree passed u/

H                                  1096
      RAVEESH CHAND JAIN v. RAJ RANI JAIN                1097


Or. XII r. 6 was justified - Hence matter need not be remanded    A
back to trial court for deciding the issue as to the quantum of
damages- The amount of Rs. 5 lacs held to be just and
proper.

    Dismissing the appeal, the Court                              B
      HELD: 1. The High Court not only decreed the suit
for possession but also directed the plaintiff I respondent
to file an affidavit .giving details of the cost of litigation
since the appeal was allowed with cost. There is no
dispute that Order XII Rule 6 confers wide discretion on          C
the Court to pass judgment either at the stage of the suit
on the basis of admission of the facts made in the
pleadings or otherwise, but the Court shall later on
decide the other questions which arise for consideration
in the Suit.It is equally well settled that the provision of      D
Order XII Rule 6 of the Code is not a mandatory provision
rather discretionary. While exercising power of passing
judgment on admission made in the pleading or
otherwise, the Court must keep the matter pending for
adjudication so far as other issues are concerned. [Paras         E
14, 15 and 16] [1105-B-E]

    2. The view taken by the High Court was correct
having regard to the question of ownership already
decided in the earlier suit filed by the defendant/
                                                                  F
appellant. The said issue need not have to be decided
afresh and hence on the basis of the finding of ownership
decided in favour of the plaintiff/respondent, the suit has
to be decreed so far as the recovery of possession is
concerned.So far as the second question with regard to
the entitlement of the plaintiff/respondent to claim a            G
decree for recovery of a sum of Rs. 5,55,000/- and future
damages @ Rs.15,000/- per month was concerned,
admittedly this question was not decided either in the
earlier suit or in this suit. In that view of the matter,
decreeing the entire suit on the basis of ownership of the        H
    1098     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2015) 1 S.C.R.


A plaintiff/respondent already decided in the earlier suit, the
  decree for recovery of damages ought not to have been
  passed by the High Court. However, in the instant case,
  since at the time of admission of this Special Leave
  Petition, the orde~ was passed that in the event the
B appellant deposit a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- in the account
  of his mother-Respondent, notice was issued only
  confining to the question as to whether the decree
  passed under the provisions of Order XII Rule 6 CPC was
  justified. In compliance of the said order, the appellant
c had already deposited the said amount. Hence, taking
  into consideration the relationship of the appellant and
  the respondent being mother and son, it is not proper to
  again remand the matter to the trial court for deciding the
  issue as to the quantum of damages the respondent is
D entitled to get from the appellant for his unauthorized
  possession of the suit property. Therefore, the amount
  of Rs.5,00,000/- would be just and proper so far as the
  claim for damages is concerned. [Paras 18 to 21] [1105-
  G-H; 1106-A-C-G-H]

E       Karan Kapahi and Ors. v. Lal Chand Public Charitable
    Trust and Anr. 2010 (4) Sec 753: 2010 (4) SCR 422 - Relied
    On.
                         Case Law Reference:
F       2010 _(4) SCR 422           relied on           Para 11
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    1822 of 2015.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 28.08.2014 of the
G High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in C. R. P. No. 113 of 2014.
        Sushil Kumar Jain, Khushbu Jain, Ms Pratibha Jain for the
    Appellant.
      Randhir Singh Jain, Ruchika Jain, Dhananjai Jain for the
H Respondent.
      RAVEESH CHAND JAIN v. RAJ RANI JAIN                   1099


    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                       A

    M. Y. EQBAL, J.1. Leave granted.
     2. This appeal by special leave is directed against the
judgment and order dated 28.8.2014 of the High Court of Delhi
allowing the revision petition preferred by the respondent/          B
plaintiff against the order of the trial court which has dismissed
her application in a suit for recovery of possession and
damages with respect to a portion of the property being in
unauthorized occupation of the appellant/defendant.
                                                                     c
      3. The factual matrix of the case is that the plaintiff-
respondent filed a suit against the defendant/appellant who is
her son, for recovery of possession and damages alleging that
she had purchased the suit property out of her own fund and
she is the absolute owner, but part of the property was under        D
the illegal occupation of the appellant-defendant, who opposed
the suit contending that the suit property was a Hindu Undivided
Family property having been purchased in the name of the
respondent using the funds of his grandfather, father and himself
and not purchased by the respondent as she was a housewife           E
having no income. Appellant-defendant further pleaded that
though there was a dispute regarding his ownership and
possession, the same was settled between all the family
members vide compromise deed dated 22.10.199?.

      4. The respondent filed an application under Order XII Rule    F
6 of the Code of Civil Procedure for passing a decree in her
favour on the ground that a suit for partition, which had earlier
been filed by the appellant on the same ground i.e. that the suit
property was a HUF property, had been dismissed by the
District Court vide judgment dated 8.9.2003 and affirmed by          G
the High Court vide judgment dated 12.9.2011 and the
respondent contended that the same amounted to an
unequivocal admission by the appellant that the respondent was
entitled to possession.
                                                                     H
    1100      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 1 S.C.R.


A      5. The trial court held that though the judgment dated
  8.9.2003 of the District Court and judgment dated 12.9.2011
  of the High Court had rejected the plea of the appellant that the
  suit property was a HUF property, these findings were made
  in a suit for partition whereas the present suit was filed for
B recovery of possession and damages. The trial court further
  held that for passing a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, the
  defendant had to make an unequivocal and unqualified
  admission. The appellant herein h~s not made such an
  admission regarding his liability to pay the damages claimed
c by the respondent. The trial court dismissed the application vide
  judgment dated 7.6.2013.

        6. Aggrieved by the judgment of the trial court, the
  respondent filed a revision petition before the High Court. The
  High Court while allowing the appeal and decreeing the suit with
D costs held that the pleas taken by the appellant-defendant
  regarding the contribution made by his grandfather, father and
  himself in the purchase of the suit property had been rejected
  by the High Court vide judgment dated 12.9.2011 and the
  same will operate as res judicata. The High Court further held
E that while there was no evidence for holding the suit property
  to be a HUF property, the title deeds of the suit property and
  the land records stood in favour of the respondent-plaintiff. The
  High Court noted that the only new plea taken by the defendant
  in his written statement was that he was a co-ow:ier vide
F compromise deed dated 22.10.1997 and held that this plea
  was barred on the grounds·of constructive res judicata having
  not been raised ear1ier in the partition suit filed by the defendant.
  The High Court accordingly set as;de the order passed by the
  trial court and decreed the suit.
G
        7. Hence, the present appeal by special leave by the
    defendant-son.

        8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. Mr.
    Sushil Kumar Jain, learned senior counsel appearing for the
H
      RAVEESH CHAND JAIN v. RAJ RANI JAIN                   1101
                [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]
appellant, assailed the order passed by the High Court manly         A
on the ground that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction
under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. According
to the learned senior counsel there is categorical denial that
the appellant's possession in the suit property is not that of a
trespasser but on the basis of his own right. Learned senior         B
counsel submitted that for passing a judgment under Order XII
Rule 6 CP.C there must be unequivocal admission by the
defendant in the pleading. According to the learned counsel
judgment should not have been passed by applying the
principles of res"judicata inasmuch as the issue of res judicata     c
does not arise in a case of judgment passed under Order XII
Rule 6, CPC.

     9. In order to appreciate the submission made by the
learned senior counsel we would like to quote Order XII Rule 6
CPC, which\ reads as under:-                                         D

     "Judgment 'on admissions.- (1) \Nhere admissions of
     fact have been made ei(her in the pleading or otherwise,
     whether orally o~ in writing, the court may at any stage of
     the suit, either on the application of an party or of its own   E
     motion and without waiting for the determination of any
     other question between the parties, make such Order or
     give such judgment as It may think fit, having regard to such
     aC:missions.
                                                                     F
     (2) When.ever a judgment is pronounced under sub-rule (1)
    a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the
    judgment and the decree shall bear the date on which the
    judgment was pronounced."

     10. The bare perusal of the aforesaid provision makes it        G
clear that it confers wide discretion on the court to pass a
judgment at any stage of the suit on the basis of admission of
facts made in the pleading or otherwise without waiting for the
determination of any other question arose between the parties.
Since the Rule permits the passing of judgment at any stage          H
    1102     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015) 1 S.C.R.


A without waiting for determination of other question, it follows that
  there can be more than one decree that may be passed at
  different stages of the same suit. The principle behind Order
  XII Rule 6 is to give the plaintiff a right to speedy judgment so
  that either party may get rid of the rival claims which are not in
B controversy.

       11. The provision of Order XII Rule 6 has been discussed
  by this Court in the case of Karam Kapahi and Others vs. Lal
  Chand Public Charitbale Trust and Another, (2010) 4 SCC
C 753, wherein this Court observed:-

               "39. In the 54th Law Commission Report, an
        amendment was suggested to enable the court to give a
        judgment not only on the application of a party but on its
        own motion. It is thus clear that the amendment was
D       brought about to further the ends of justice and give these
        provisions a wider sweep by empowering the Judg~s to
        use it "ex debito justitiae", a Latin term, meaning a debt
        of justice. In our opinion the thrust of the amendment is that
        in an appropriate case, a party, on the admission of the
E       other party, can press for judgment, as a matter of legal
        right. However, the court always retains its discretion in the
        matter of pronouncing judgment.

              40. If the provision of Order 12 Rule 1 is compared
        with Order 12 Rule 6, it becomes clear that the provision
F       of Order 12 Rule 6 is wider inasmuch as the provision of
        Order 12 Rule 1 is limited to admission by "pleading or
        [pic]otherwise in writing" but in Order 12 Rule 6 the
        expression "or otherwise" is much wider in view of the
        words used therein, namely: "admission of fact ... either
G       in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing".

              41. Keeping the width of this provision (i.e. Order 12
         Rule 6) in mind this Court held that under this Rule
         admissions can be inferred from the facts and
H        circumstances of the case (see Charanjit Lal Mehra v.
      RAVEESH CHAND JAIN v. RAJ RANI JAIN                    1103
                [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]
    Kamal Saroj Mahajan, SCC at p. 285, para 8).                      A
    Admissions in answer to interrogatories are also covered
    under this Rule (see Mullas's Commentary on the Code,
    16th Edn., Vol. 11, p. 2177).

         42. In Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United               8
    Bank of India this Court, while construing this provision,
    held that the Court should not unduly narrow down its
    application as the object is to enable a party to obtain
    speedy judgment."

      12. Coming back to the instant case there is no dispute         C
that the plaintiff/respondent filed the suit for possession of the
suit property and also for recovery of Rs.5,55,000/- and future
damages at the rate of Rs. 15,000/- per month. The plaintiff/
respondent claimed title in the suit property and averred that
the appellant is in unauthorized occupation of the suit property      D
without any authority or justification. In the plaint it was
specifically pleaded that the ownership right in the suit property
has already been decided in favour of the respondent and
against the appellant by judgment and decree dated 8.9.2003
and the appeal filed by the appellant was also dismissed vide         E
judgment dated 12.9.2011. Hence, the appellant is in illegal
possession of the suit property.

      13. On an application filed by the plaintiff/respondent under
Order XII Rule 6 CPC seeking a judgment in the suit, the trial
court dismissed the application stating that there is no              F
unequivocal admission for passing a judgment in the suit. The
High Court, however, reversed the order passed by the trial
court and held that considering the earlier judgment deciding
the ownership of the suit property in favour of the appellant, the
suit for possession ought to have been decreed by the trial court.    G
Consequently, the High Court decreed the suit. Paras 6 and 7
of the impugned judgment passed by the High Court are quoted
herein below:-

     "6. The only new aspect urged in the present written             H
    1104    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 1 S.C.R.


A      statement is that the respondent/defendant claimed that he
       received ownership share in the suit property by virttie of
       a written compromise entered into before the police station
       Anand Vihar on 22.10.1997, however, it is noted that the
       earlier suit, which was a suit for partition filed by the
8      respondent/defendant, the issue as regards the claim of
       the respondent/defendant to the ownership rights in the suit
       property was very much in issue, and hence the
       respondent/defendant had to urge in the earlier
       proceedings all the basis of his claims of ownership rights
c      in the suit property and if that was not done the
       respondent/defendant is now barred by the principle of
       constructive res judicata from raising any claims which
       ought to have been urged in the earlier proceedings. The
       principle with respect to doctrine of res judicata is that
       there must be finality achieved to litigation and parties
D
       must not be harassed over and over again merely by
       changing certain facts with respect to the main relief
       claimed viz., of ownership rights in the suit property.

       7. In view of the above, the impugned order dated 7.6.2013
E      is completely illegal and the issues in the present case
       stand covered against the respondent I defendant by the
       principle of res judicata enshrined in Section 11 CPC. So
       far as the relief of possession is concerned, suit of the
       plaintiff/petitioner/mother will hence stand decreed against
F      the respondent/defendant for the portion so in pos$ession
       of the respondent/defendant as per the site plant filed.
       Since the respondent I defendant I son is harassing the
       mother from 1998 and today we are in the year 2014, this
       appeal is allowed with actual cost. Petitioner I plaintiff will
G      file an affidavit in this Court supported by certificate of fees
       of her counsels in this appeal with respect to the fees paid
       to the counsels, and such fees paid will be the cost which
       will be payable by the respondent I defendant to the
       petitioner I plaintiff. The aforesaid affidavit accompanied -
       by the certificate of the fees of the counsels be filed by the
H
      RAVEESH CHAND JAIN v. RAJ RANI JAIN                    1105
                [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]

    petitioner within a period of four weeks and costs be paid        A
    thereafter within a period of four weeks."

      14. From the reading of para 7 of the order, as quoted
hereinabove, it reveals that the High Court not only decreed the
suit for possession but also directed the plaintiff I respondent      8
to file an affidavit giving details of the cost of litigation since
the appeal was allowed with cost.

     15. As discussed hereinabove, there is no dispute with
regard to the law settled by this Court that Order XII Rule 6
confers wide discretion on the Court to pass judgment either          C
at the stage of the suit on the basis of admission of the facts
made in the pleadings or otherwise, but the Court shall later
on decide the other questions which arise for consideration in
the Suit.
                                                                      D
     16. It is equally well settled that the provision of Order XII
Rule 6 of the Code is not a mandatory provision rather
discretionary. While exercising power of passing judgment on
admission made in the pleading or otherwise, the Court must
keep the matter pending for adjudication so far as other issues       E
are concerned.

     17. Indisputably, the plaintiff/respondent filed the suit for
following relief:-

     (i) A decree for possession of the suit property;                F
   (ii) A decree for recovery of Rs.5,55,000/- and future
damages @ Rs.15,000/- per month against the defendant.

     18. So far as the first relief for a decree for possession is
concerned, we are in full agreement with the view taken by the        G
High Court having regard to the question of ownership already
decided in the earlier suit filed by the defendant/ appellant. The
said issue need not have to be decided afresh and hence on
the basis of the finding of ownership decided in favour of the
                                                                      H
    1106     SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [2015] 1 S.C.R.


A   plaintiff/respondent, the suit has to be decreed so far as the
    recovery of possession is concerned.

        19. So far as the second question with regard to the
  entitlement of the plaintiff/respondent to claim a decree for
  recovery of a sum of Rs. 5,55,000/- and future damages @
8
  Rs.15,000/- per month is concerned, admittedly this question
  has not been decided either in the earlier suit or in this suit. In
  that view of the matter, decreeing the entire suit on the basis
  of ownership of the plaintiff/respondent already decided in the
C earlier suit, the. decree for recovery of damages ought not to
  have been passed by the High Court.

         20. However, in the instant case, at the time of admission
    of this Special Leave Petition, the following order was passed
    on 12.11.2014:-
D
               "In the event the petitioner deposit a sum of
        Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) in the account of his
        mother-Respondent, notice shall be issued only confining
        to the question as to whether the decree passed under the
        provisions of Order XII Rule 6 CPC is justified. The amount
E
        to be deposited within four weeks from today.

               Put up the case on 11.12.2014.

             Till then, status quo, as on today, shaJI be
F       maintained."

       21. In compliance of the aforesaid order, the appellant had
  already deposited the aforesaid amount. Hence, taking into
  consideration the relationship of the appellant and the
  respondent being mother and son, we do not think it proper to
G again remand the matter to the trial court for deciding the issue
  as to the quantum of damages the respondent is entitled to get
  from the appellant for his unauthorized possession of the suit
  property. We, therefore, hold that the amount of Rs.5,00,000/-
  would be just and proper so far as the claim for damages is
H concerned.
      RAVEESH CHAND JAIN v. RAJ RANI JAIN                      1107
                [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]

      22. We, therefore, think it fit not to interfere with the order   A
passed by the High Court. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
However, we allow the appellant to remain in possession of the
suit property till 31.12.2015 on payment of Rs.10,000/- per
month by way of damages for use and occupation of the suit
property. It is made clear that in the event the appellant fails to     B
vacate and hand over the vacant possession of the suit property
and also fails in payment of monthly damages as fixed
hereinabove on or before 31.12.2015, respondent will be
entitled to execute the decree for recovery of possession and
also for damages.                                                       c
Devika Gujral                                      Appeal dismissed.