Holding

Compensation under Section 124A is to be determined according to the Rules in force at the time the payment order is made, so the Tribunal could rightly apply the amended Rules.

Summary

Rathi Menon, a 22‑year‑old passenger, was thrown from a train in 1996, sustaining paraplegia and loss of both an arm and a leg. She filed a claim for compensation under Section 124A of the Railways Act, 1989 before the Railway Claims Tribunal. While the claim was pending, Rule 3(2) of the Railway Accident Compensation Rules, 1990 was amended (effective 1 Nov 1997) raising the compensation amounts, and the Tribunal awarded the enhanced amounts. The Kerala High Court reduced the award, holding that compensation should be based on the Rules applicable at the time of the accident. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the phrase "as may be prescribed" means the amount prescribed at the time the payment order is made, not at the date of the accident, and therefore the Tribunal was correct to apply the amended Rules. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals and directed the Railway Administration to pay the enhanced compensation with interest. The decision clarifies the temporal test for determining compensation under the Railways Act.

Issues considered

The appropriate temporal point for determining the amount of compensation payable under Section 124A of the Railways Act, 1989 – whether it is the date of the untoward incident or the date of the payment order.
The interpretation of the phrase "as may be prescribed" in Section 124A.
Whether the amendment to the Railway Accident Compensation Rules, 1990 can be applied retrospectively to accidents occurring before the amendment.

Legislation cited

Railway Accident (Compensation) Rules, 1990s. Rule 3(1), s. Rule 3(2)
Railways Act, 1989s. 124, s. 124A, s. 126, s. 128, s. 129
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923s. 4, s. 4A

Subjects

Railway Accident CompensationSection 124Aas may be prescribedcompensation amountRule amendmentretrospective applicationRailway Claims Tribunaluntoward incident

Judgment

RATHIMENON A
v.
~ UNION OF INDIA

MARCH 13, 2001

[K.T. THOMAS AND R.P. SETHI, JJ.] B

Raihvay Accident Compensation Rules, 1990: Rule 3(2).

Accident-Untoward incident-Compensation-Payable of-Rules in
'"" force on the date of accident or rules in force at the time of ordering of
c
payment-In acc01rlance with-Applicability of-Passenger tluvwn offfrom a
running train and the wheels ofthe train ran over her right ann severing it J1vm
shoulder point-Another train ran over her n·ght leg causing its amputation~
Raihvay Claims Tribunal awarded enhanced compensation a1· pa amended
•\ Rules which came into force after the accident-But High Cou11 reduced the
compensation qn the ground that the enhanced compensation was not payable D
since the accident took place before amendment of Rules-Correctness of-
Held: Time of ordering payment is more important to detennine the extent of
compensation-Compensation has to be detennined with reference to rules at
the time ofpayment of compensation-Hence, Claims Tribunal rightly awarded
the enhanced compensation-Raihvays Act, 1989, Ss. 124-A and 128
E
1 Woni> and Phrases :

"As may be prescribed"-Meaning of-In the context of S. 124-A of the
Raihvays Act, 1989.

The appellant was thrown offtrom a running train and the wheels of F
the Train ran over the appellant's right arm severing it from the shoulder
joint. Shortly thereafter another train ran over the appellant's right leg
i causing its sudden amputation.

The appellant filed a claim petition under Section 124-A of the
Railways Act, 1989 before the Railway Claims Tribunal. During the G
pendency of the claim Rule 3(2) of ftte Railway Accident Compensation
Rules, 1990 was amended and the amount of compensation was enhanced.
The Tribunal awarded enhanced compensation in accordance with the
.) amended Rules. However, the High Court reduced the compensation on
the ground that the enhanced compensation was not payable to the appel- H
365
. 1.

366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A lant as the accident took place prior to the amendment of the Rules. Hence.
this appeal.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD : 1. The collocation of the words "as may be prescribed" in
B Section 124-A of the Railways Act, 1989 is to be understood as to mean ''as
may be prescribed from time to time". The relevance of the date of unto-
ward incident is that the right to claim compensation from the Railway
Administration would be acquired by the injured on that date. The statute
'(
did not fix the amount of compensation, but left it to be determined by the
Central Government from time to time by means of Rules. This delegation
c to the Central Government indicated that it was difficult for the Parlia-
ment to fix the amount because compensation amount is a varying phe-
nomenon and the Government would be in a far advantageous position to
ascertain what would be just and reasonable compensation in respect of a
myriad different kinds of injuries by taking into account very many fac- i
D tors. What the legislature wanted was that the victim of the accident must
be paid compensation and the amount must represent a reality, which
means the amount should be fair and reasonable compensation. Govern-
ment have the better wherewithal to ascertain and fix such amount. It is
for the said reason that the Parliament left it to the Government to dis-
E charge that function. Sections 124 and 124-A of the Act speak the same
language that "the Railway Administration shall be liable to pay compen-
sation''. Hence, the time of ordering payment is more important to deter-
mine as to what is the extent of the compensation, which is prescribed by
the Rules to be disbursed to the claimant. [372-C-F]

F 2. tr a person files a suit the amount of compensation will depend
upon what the court considers just and reasonable on the date of determi-
nation. Hence, when he goes before the Claims Tribunal claiming compen-
sation the determination of the amount should be as on the date of such
determination. (373-F]
G 3. The Claims Tribunal must consider what the Railway Accident
Compensation Rules, 1990 prescril!ed at the time of making the order for
payment of the compensation. (375-B]

Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata, [1976) 1 SCC 289; PA. '-
H Narayanan v. Union of India, [1998) 3 SCC 67; Maghar Singh v. Jashwant
RATH! MENON v. U.0.1. [THOMAS, J.] 367
Singh, [1998] 9 SCC 134; New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v, V.K. Neelakandan, A
[1999] 8 SCC 256; Kera/a State Electricity Board v. Valsala K., [1999] 8 SCC
254; Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v, Asokan, (1997) 1 KLT 608, referred to.

Black's Law Dictionary, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1778-1779 B
of 2001.

From the Judgment and Order dated 12.8.99 of the Kerala High Court
in M.F.A: Nos. 1292 and 1293 of 1998-B:

K. Sukumaran, Ms. Baby Krishnan, Ms. Karthika S. and Ms. Lekha C
Sudhakaran for the Appellant.

Ms. Rekha Pandey and Anil Kati yar for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D
THOMAS, J, Leave granted.

"Misfortunes do not come single" is an old adage but even the author
.of that adage would not have imagined that multiplicity of misfortunes
would visit the same person in a series on the same night, that too
within the same hour. One may ask aghast, can the destiny be so cruel to E
' a damsel.

Rathi Menon, a Commerce graduate of 22 years, was thrown off from
a running train during the .night of a jinxed train journey as the consequence
of a sudden jerk of the train. In the impact her spinal cord was ruptured and
in a trice she turned a paraplegic. After she fell down, the wheels of the train F
ran over her right arm severing it from the shoulder point forever. The train,
~ not knowing what it did to one of its lawful and innocent passengers,
continued its nnming leaving the paraplegic on the track itself on that
dreadful night.

It was physiologically impossible for the yonng lady to move her leg G
from the position where she fell. Her right leg happened to remain on the
rail-track, and unless a Good Samaritan had passed by that track during the
., night she had to remain there unmoved. As none like that came the poor
female human being remained on the track bleeding and unattended by
anyone. H
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.

A Alas, within half an hour another train crune along the same track
which, without knowing that a badly mauled hum'm being was lying ahe;id,
1
ran over her right leg causing a sudden runputation of that leg also. Thus,
within the span of less than an hour, she became a one-handed and one-legged
paraplegic.

B All those disasters happened duri_ng the night of 3.9.1996. While she
remained on the track unattended by any one she happened to be spotted by
an engine driver who was shunting a railway engine. He got her removed
from that scene to the district hospital, and then to a Medical College Hospital
r
where she had to undergo a long period of hospitalisation. However, she
c remained immovable forever.

Though she was unable to move by herself she was able to make two
petitions before the Railway Claims Tribunal on 27.6.1997, in respect of the
aforesaid two accidents. The Claims Ttibunal awarded a total runount of six
lakhs of rupees with the regret that it could not award more due to the ceiling
D imposed by the statutory rules. However the Claims Tribunal directed interest
to accrue on the amount al the rate of 15% per annum from "the date of
default".

The Railways Department, mindless as it was, dragged the helpless lady
E to the High Court of Kerala before which the Administration filed an appeal
challenging the award passed by tl1e Claims Tribunal only on the ground that
the amount awarded was excessive according to law of the Administration's
interpretation.

The misfortune spree which was haunting the unfortunate lady bnbbled
F up once again when a Division Bench of the High Court had chosen to slash
down substantially the compensation amount awarded to her, on the premise
that the amount granted by the Claims Tribunal ccnld not have been awarded ~
as Ille disaster had not visited her after 1.11.1997. The Division Bench
expressed the helplessness of law in helping the hapless female in her misery
of the superlative dimension.
G
Though her body was disabled dne to t'ie paraplegia afflicted conse-
quent to the rupture of the spinal cord, and though she became limbless in
a major measure, she collected morale to approach the apex Court to ask '-
whether the limbs of law could be so stretched as to give th<; limbless girl__
H solace at least in the form of pecuniary compensation. We, therefore, heard
/
'

RATH! MENON v. U.0.l. [THOMAS, J.] 369
Mr. K. Sukumaran, learned senior counsel for the appellant and Mrs. Rekha A
' Pandey, learned counsel for tl1e Railway Administration.

'TI1cre is no dispute on tl1e factual position of which the following are
some more details. Rathi menon lost her father earlier, and her mother became
a widow. She passed her degree in conunerce and secured a job in Bangalore.
In her early twenties she was in search of better career prospects and it earned B
some response. She was called for an interview at Triehur. It was that trip
which turned out the most cursed one in her life. On her way back to
Bangalore on 3.9.1996 she boarded the Island Express (bonnd for Bangalore)
at 8.00 p.m. from Palakkad Railway Station. After the train started moving
and when it collected momentum her ill-luck prompted her to have a face C
wash for which she moved to the wash basin situated next to the door of the
train. While washing her face the train jerked violently at a turning and in
that impact she was thrown ont of the train. What happened thereafter has
" been summarized earlier and cannot be repeated over again.

As the above facts are not disputed by the Railway Administration D
appellant was relieved of the burden to prove those facts averred in her claim
petition. TI1us, the only question which remained for the Clairns 'Tribunal to
decide was regarding the amount of compensation payable to her. No\V t11e
only question remaining is whether the High Court was so helpless that
learned Judges could not confirm the amount awarded to her by the Claims E
". Tribnnal.

Appellant's claim for the compensation was based on Section 124A of
the Railways Act, 1989 (for short "the Act"). The said Section itself was
introduced as per Railway (Amendment) Act 28 of I 994. The Section pro-
vided for av.arding compensation to victims of any "untoward incident" which F
occurs in the course of wor~ing of a railway. The expression "untoward
incident" was alien to Railways Act before Parliament inse11ed such m1 expres-
sion in the statute as per the Amendment Act 28 of 1994. Prior to it the
Railways could have granted compensation only to the victims of "accident."
As the definition of accident in !he Act did not embrace instances of other
G
types of disasters which frequently happened during train journeys, the Parlia-
ment in its wisdom, decided to insert a new category of disasters, both man-
made and otheiwise, to be the causes of action for claiming compensation.

It was in compliance of the aforesaid intention of the Parliament that
the category "nntoward incidenf' was included by defining its contours in H
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A Section 123 of the Act. The Sections consists of two segments. In the first
segment acts such as terrorists acts, riotous attacks, robbe1y and decoity which f
visit the passengers in the train as well as those who wait within the precincts
of Railway Station are included. In the second segment, which is the relevant
patt for the purpose of this case, is included "the accidental falling of any
passenger from a train canying passengers."
B
Now we have to see Section 124A which is the provision imposing
liability on the Railway Administration to pay compensation to the victims
of untoward incidents. Its proviso excludes from its purview persons who
committed or attempted to commit suicide, persons who inflicted injury by·
self, and those who committed criminal acts or acts done in a state of
c intoxication or insanity and also the cases affected by any natmal cause of
disease etc. After excluding such persons aud cases, Section 124A can be read
thus:

"When in the course of working a railway, ar1 untoward incident
D occurs, then whether or not there has been any wrongful act, neglect
or default on the patt of tl1e railway administration such as would
entitle a passenger, who has been injmed or the dependant of a
passenger who has been killed, to maintain aJ.I action and recover
damages in respect thereof, the railway administration shall, notwith-
standing anything contained in any other law, be liable to pay
E compensation to such extent as may be prescribed and to that extent
only for loss occasioned by tl1e death of, or injmy to a passenger as
a result of such untoward incident."

The liability of the Railway Administration in such a case would be
to pay compensation, but the extent of such compensation is "as may be
F prescribed" which means prescribed by the rules made under the Act. Section
129 of the Act empowered the Central Government to make such rules.

The Railway Accident Compensation Rules 1990 (for short the Rules)
were made by the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred
G on it by Section 129 of the Act. Rule 3(1) says that the ainount of compen-
sation payable in respect of death or injuries shall be as specified in the
Schedule. The Rules as well as the Schedule were amended with effect from
1.11.1997. After tl1e ainendment Rule 3(2) reads thus:

"The amount of compensation payable for an injmy not specified in
H Patt II or Patt III of the Schedule but which in the opinion of the
r
'

RATHI MENON v. U.0.!. [THOMAS, J.] 371

- claims Tribunal, is such as to deprive a person of all capacity to do
work, shall be Rupees four lakhs."
A

Item No.2 of Part III of the Schedule relates to "amputation below
shoulder with stump less than 8 from tip of acromion" for which an amount
of Rs.3.20 lakhs is shown as the compensation.
B
Item 20 in Part III of the Schedule relates to "amputation below lu-i.ee
with stump exceedin~ three and a half inch but not exceeding five inches",
for which an amount of Rupees two lakhs is shown as compensation.

Before the said amendment of the Rules and the Schedule which came
into effect on 1.11.1997 the above amounts were respectively two lakhs
c
(instead of rupees four lakhs) and 1.40 lakhs (instead of 3.20 lakhs) and one
lakh (instead of two lakhs). Such amounts were revised by the Central
Government in 1990. The revision of the rates was made after 8 years and
• thus the new rates were incorporated by amending the Schedule.
D
Learned judges of the Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala,
for reaching the conclusion that appellant is not entitled to the amount
indicated in the Rules as they stand now on account of the fact that
the accident happened prior to 1.11.1997, considered among other things
the effect of Section 126 of the Act. That Section enables an applicant
to claim interim relief. Sub-section (2) of that section empowers the
E
Claims Tribunal to pay to the applicant who has sustained the injury
"snch sum as it considers reasonable for affording such relief, so however,
that the sum paid shall not exceed the amount of compensation payable at
such rates as may be prescribed." The Division Bench thereafter concluded
thus: F

•• "The wording of sub-section (2) of Section 126 would show that the
liability is saddled as soon as the accident happens, not when the
quantum is determined. The wording of Section 124 and 124A also
would clearly show that the liability of the Railway Administration
to pay compensation arises as soon as the accident or untoward
G
incident, as the case may be, happens. But the quanturn of compen-
sation is to be as prescribed. Prescription is under the Rules. There-
fore, it is clear that the liability to pay compensation is to the extent
prescribed under the Rules in force at the time of tl1e accident or the
untoward incident, as the case may be." H
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A It was on the above premise that the Division Bench of the High Court
slashed down the compensation amount considerably from what the Claims
Tribunal awarded. In our perception the provision for payment of inte1im
+
relief indicated in Section 126 of the Act has no utility for dec;~ing as to
what should be the total amount of compcnsatio11 payable to the injured or
other claimant. The right of the injured to claim compensation as wen· as the
B
liability of the Railway Administration are both reposed in Section !24A of
the Act. The right is to maintain an action and recover the damages. "J11e
liability is to "pay compensation to snch extent as may be prescribed."

The collocation of the words "as may be prescribed" in Section 124A
C of the Act is to be understood as to mean "as may be prescribed from time
to time". The relevance of the date of untoward incident is that the right to
claim compensation from the Railway Administration would be acquired by
the injured on that date. The statute did not fix the amount of compensation, .
but left it to be determined by the Central Government from time to time by
means of rules. This delegation to the Central Govermnent indicates that it
D was difficult for the Parliament to fix the amount because compensation
an1ount is a varying phenomenon and the Government would be in a far
advantageous positio'l to ascertain what would be the just and reasonable
compensation in respect of a myriad different kinds of injuries by taking into
account very many factors. Whal the legislature wanted was that the victim
E of the accident must be paid compensation and the amount must represent
a reality which means the amount should he fair and reasonable compensa-
tion. Govemment have the better wherewithals to ascertain and fix such
amount. It is for the said reason that the Parliament left it to the Government
to discharge that function. Sections 124 and 124A of the Act speak the same
language that "the Railway Administration shal! be liable to pay compensa-
F tion". As pointed above, it is the liability of the Railway Administration to
"pay compensation to such extec.t as may be prescribed". Hence the time of
ordering payment is more important to determine as to what is the extent of
the compensation which is prescribed by tl1e rules to be disbursed to the
claimant.
G
In this context a reference to Section 129 of the Act appears useful.
The Central Government is empowered by the said provision to make rules
by_ notification "to carry out the purposes of this chapter". It is evident that
one of the purposes of this chapter is that the injured victims in railway
accidents and rmtoward incidents must get compensation. Though the word
H "compensation" is not defined in the Act or in the Rules it is the giving of
r
'

RATHI MENON v. U.0.1. [THOMAS, J.] 373

- ~
an equivalent or substitute of equivalent value. In Black's Law Dictionary,
"'compensation" is shown as "equivalent in money for a loss sustained; or
giving back an equivalent in either money which is but the measure of value,
A

or in actual value otherwise conferred; or recompense in value for some loss,
injury or service especially when it is given by statute". It means when you
pay the compensation in terms of money it must represent, on the date of
B
ordering such payment, the equivalent value.

In this context we may look at Section 128(1) also. It says that the right
of any person to chum compensation before the Claims Tribunal as indicated
in Section 124 or 124A shall not affect the right of any such person t0 recover
compensation payable under any other law for the time being in force. But
there is an interdict that no person shall be entitled to claim compensation
c
for more than once in respect of the same accident. Tiiis means that the party
has two alternatives, one is to avail himself of his civil remedy to claim
compensation based on common law or any other statutory provision, and t11e
... otl1er is to apply before the Claims Tribunal under Section 124 or 124A of
the Act. As he cannot avail himself of both the remedies he has to choose D
one between the two. The provisions in Chapter Xlll of the Act are intended
to provide a speedier remedy to the victims of accident and untoward
incidents. If he were to choose the latter that does not mean that he should
be prepared to get a lesser amount. He is given the assurance by the
legislature that Central Govemment is saddled with the task of prescribing E
"' fair and just compensation in the rules from time to time. The provisions
are not intended to give a gain to the Railway Administration but they
are meant to afford just and reasonable compensation to the victims in a
speedier measure. If a person files a suit, the amount of compensation will
depend upon what the court considers just and reasonable on the date of
determination. Hence when he goes before the Claims Tribunal claiming
F
compensation the determination of the amount should be as on the date of
y
such determination.

The asinine consequence of accepting the interpretation placed by the
Division Bench of the High Court can be demonstrated through an illustra-
G
tion. If a person sustained injury as described in Rules 3(2) of the Rules, in
an accident in a train on 31.10.1997, and another person sustains the same
kind of injury in another accident in a train tl1e next day i.e. 1.11.1997, when
~•
both persons made separate applications before the same Claims Tribunal for
compensation, the Tribunal can award Rs.2 lak.'ls only in the first case and
Rs. 4 lakhs in the second case. What a woeful discrimination, if not a H
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A glaringly unfair differentiation. See the interval between the two accidents of
identical features. It was only a few hours, but the difference in the compen-
sation amount is enormously high. Any court should avert an interpretation
-
which would lead to such a manifestly absmd fall out, unless the comt is
compelled otherwise by any mandatory provision.

B Why the Central Government decided to make such a vast variation in
the amount of compensation while exercising the powers _c01Jerred by Section
129 of the Act. It cannot be conceived that the Government wanted to make
a discrimination between those victims who suffered the accident prior to
1.11.1997 and those who suffered tl1e identical injury in a similar accident
C on or after that date. The raison d'etre for making such variation is easily
discernible. The Central Government wanted to update the compensation
amount. Rupee value is not an unchanging unit in the monitory system.
Students of economic history know that currency value remained static before
the Second World War. But the post World War II witnessed the new
phenomenon of vast fluctuations in money value of currency notes in
D circulation in each nation. When the U.S. Dollar has registered a steep upward
rise, currencies in many other countries made do\vnward &lip. \\'hat was the
value of one Hundred rnpees twenty years ago is vastly different from what
it is today. This substantial change has caused its impact on the cost of living
also.
E
The Central Government while changing the figure in the compensation Y
amount after an interval of a decade was only influenced by the desire to
update the money vaiue of the compensation. In other words, wh«t you were
to pay ten years ago to one person cannot be the same if it is paid today in
the same figure of currency notes. It is for the purpose of meeting the reality
F that Central Government changed the figures.

The unjust consequence resulting from the interpretation which the
Division Bench placed can be demonstrated in another plane also. If a person
.., .
who sustained injury in a railway accident or in an untoward incident was
disabled from making an application immediately and he makes the applica-
G
tion a few years hence. is he to get the compensation in tenns of the rnoney
value which prevailed on the date of the accident? Suppose a Tribunal
wrongly dismissed a claim after a few years of filing t11e application and the
claimant approaches the High Court in appeal. As it happens quite often now,
some High Comts could take up such an appeal only after.the lapse of many
H years and if the appeal is decided in favour of the claimant after so many
RATII! MENON" U.0.1. [THOMAS, J.] 375
years, what a pity if the amount awarded is only in te1ms of the figure A
indicated on the date of the accident.

From all these, we are of the definite opinion that the Claims Tribunal
must consider what the rules prescribed at the time of making the order for
payment of the compensation.
B
Learned Judges of the Division Bench in the High Court refen-ed to
the decisions of this Court in Pralap Narain Singh Dea v. Srinivas Sabata
and Anr., [1976] 1 SCC 289, PA. Narayanan v. Union of India and Ors.,
[1998] 3 SCC 67 and Maghar Singh v. Jashwant Singh, [1998] 9 SCC 134,
i~ order to gain support for the conclusion an-ived at in the impugned
judgment. Among them PA. Narayanan v. Union of India arose from a writ
c
petition filed for compensation in respect of the death of claimant's wife in
a railway accident which happened on 3.1.1981. The High Court dismissed
the w1it petition against the claimant and approached this Court by special
leave. A plea was made that compensation could be granted in accordance
with the rates prescribed by the rules under Railways Act, 1989. The counsel D
for the Railway Administration disputed the said contention on the ground
that the said Act c.annot have any rct·ospective operation. A two-Judge Bench
of this Court (Dr. A.S. Anand, as His Lordship then was, and S. Rajendra
Babu, J) acceded to the said plea and granted a sum of Rs.2 lakhs as
compensation, which is tl1e suni prescribed in the Rules then in force, despite E
· -.: the fact that the Act itself came into force only in 1990. The said decision,
instead of supporting the view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court,
is more in support of the approach we have made above.

In the other two decisions refen-ed to by the Division llench the claims
made under tl1e Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (W.C. Act, for short) F
were the subject matter. In Pratap Narain Singh Dea (supra) the claimant
workman sustained injuries and one of his anns was amputated in the course
of his employment on 6.7.1968, the Commissioner under the Act passed an
order on 6.5.1969 directing the employer to pay cornpensation together with
penalty and interest for delayed payment. 'foe omployer challenged the said
G
order before the High Court contending that penalty and interest could not
be awarded as his liability to pay had arisen only when the Commissioner
passed the order and not earlier. The High Court repelled such a contention.
Against this the employer approached this Court by special leave. A four-
Judge Bench of this Court held thus: "The employer therefore became liable
to pay the compensation as soon as ti1e aforesaid personal injury was caused H
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] 2 S.C.R.
A to the workman by the accident which admittedly arose out of a.rid in the
course of the employment. It is therefore futile to contend that the compen-
sation did not fall due until after the Commissioner's order dated May 6, 1969
under. Section 19." On the aforesaid order this Court farther held that the
Commissioner. ~lder the Act was fully justified iu making the order for
payment of interest' and penalty. In Maglzar Singh v. Jashwant Singh (supra)
B
the claim made m1der the ·W..C. Act was dealt with and the findings or the
observations therein have no bearing on the question involved in ~his appeal.

The scheme of the provision under the W.C. Act is materially different
from the scheme indicated in Chapter XIII of the Railways Act. In the former,
C compensation payable is fixed in the Act itself through the schedule incor-
porated tl1ereto. Section 4 of the W.C. Act shows that such compensation is
to be linked with the monthly wages of the workman concerned. It also
provides tliat the liability to pay compensation on the employer would a.rise
not when the Commissioner passes tl1e order but on the date of sustaining
the injury itself. A provision is made in Section 4A of W.C. Act that where
D any employer is in default of paying tl1e compensation due within one month
tl1e Commissioner shall direct the employer to pay not only interest but in
appropriate cases a penalty ranging up to 50% of the amount payable. The
said scheme cannot be equated with the scheme in Chapter XIII of the
Railways Act, as the principles involved have differences.
E
Shri K. Sukmnaran, learned senior counsel relied on the decision of
another Division Bench of tlle Kerala High Court in Oriental Insurance
Company Ltd v. Asokan, [1997] l Kerala Law Times 608, in which a decision
of this Court is quoted. That decision of this Court is dated 6.11.1996,
rendered by a two-Judge Bench (Kuldip Singh and Saghir Ahmad, JJ) of this
F Court (C.A. Nos.16904-09 of 1996). Later we came across that the said
decision is reported in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. V.K. Neelakandan
and Ors., [1999] (8) SCC 256. The said decision was also under the W.C.
Act. This is what the two-Judge Bench said:

"We are finally determining the rights of the wo:kmen today. The Act
G is a special legislation for the benefit of the labour. Keeping in view
the scheme of the Act we are of the view that the only interpretation
which can be given to the amendment is that if any benefit is
conferred on the workmen and tl1e said benefit is available on the date
when the case is finally adjudicated, the said benefit should be
H extended to the workmen."
RATH! MENON v. U.0.1. [THOMAS, J.] 377
A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Kerala Stale Electricity Board A
and Anr. v. Valsala K and Anr., [1999] 8 SCC 254 has referred to the
aforesaid decision and held that it was wrongly decided in view of the four-

... Judge Bench decision of this Court in Pralap Narain Singh Deo (supra) .
Nonetheless, in appropriate cases the principle of taking advantage of the
beneficial legislation, subsequently enacted, is not dissented from by the
B
larger Bench.

In the result, we allow these appeals and set aside tl1e impugned
judgment of the High Court. We direct the Railway Administration to pay the
amount awarded by tl1e Claims Tribunal w the appellant (if not already paid)
within three months from today together with interest at the rate of 12% per C
annum from 27.6.1997 (tl1e dale of the order passed by the Claims Tribunal).

V.S.S . Appeals allowed.

.;,'

'"

...