RAMVEER UPADHYAY & ANR.versusSTATE OF U.P. & ANR.

336                       [2022]
               SUPREME COURT     3 S.C.R. 336
                              REPORTS                      [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A                      RAMVEER UPADHYAY & ANR.
                                        v.
                            STATE OF U.P. & ANR.
                 (Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 2953 of 2022)
B                               APRIL 20, 2022
             [INDIRA BANERJEE AND A. S. BOPANNA, JJ.]
             Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s. 482 – Saving of
      inherent powers of High Court – Political animosity between
      petitioner No.1 and Ex. MLA – Complaint u/s. 365/511 IPC and s.
C     3(1)(Dha) of the 1989 Act by respondent no. 2 against the petitioners
      – Sessions Judge took cognizance of the charges against the
      petitioners and issued summons – Application u/s. 482 by the
      petitioner seeking quashing of the proceedings as well as the
      cognizance order – High Court dismissed the application –
D     Petitioners case that this is a case of malicious prosecution arisen
      due to political rivalry – Held: Complaint may have been initiated
      by reason of political vendetta is not in itself ground for quashing
      the criminal proceedings – Possibility of retaliation on the part of
      the petitioners by the acts alleged, after closure of the earlier
      criminal case cannot be ruled out – Allegations in the complaint
E     constitute offence under the Attrocities Act, which would have to be
      decided in the trial – In exercise of power u/s. 482, the Court does
      not examine the correctness of the allegations in a complaint except
      in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that the
      allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence – Complaint
F     case not such which should be quashed at the inception itself without
      further trial – Thus, the High Court rightly dismissed the application
      u/s. 482 – Penal Code, 1860 – s. 365/511 – Scheduled Castes and
      Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act), 1989 – s. 3(1)(Dha).
            Dismissing the Special Leave Petition, the Court
G          HELD: 1.1 Even though, the inherent power of the High
      Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to interfere with criminal
      proceedings is wide, such power has to be exercised with
      circumspection, in exceptional cases. Jurisdiction under Section
      482 of the Cr.P.C is not to be exercised for the asking.In
      exceptional cases, to prevent abuse of the process of Court, the
H
                                       336
  RAMVEER UPADHYAY & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.                     337


High Court might in exercise of its inherent powers under Section     A
482 quash criminal proceedings. However, interference would
only be justified when complaint did not disclose any offence, or
was patently frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. [Para 27, 29]
[347-G-H; 348-B-C]
      1.2 The fact that the complaint may have been initiated by      B
reason of political vendetta is not in itself ground for quashing
the criminal proceedings. It is a well established proposition of
law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justified and based
upon adequate evidence, does not become vitiated on account of
mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or
complainant. If the use of power is of fulfilment of a legitimate     C
object the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal.
[Para 30][348-C-D]
       2. On facts, there was apparently political rivalry between
the petitioner No.1 and Ex-MLA. However, Complaint Case No.
19/2018 has not been lodged against the Petitioners, by Ex-MLA,       D
but by the respondent No.2, a Dhobi by caste, which is a scheduled
caste. It cannot be said that the allegations in the complaint do
not make out offence under the Atrocities Act. It is specifically
alleged that the petitioners had abused the respondent No.2 in
filthy language by reference to his caste. The allegations in the     E
Complaint Case No.19 of 2018, if established, could result in
conviction under the relevant sub-sections of Section 3(1) of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities
Act), 1989. [Para 24][347-B-C]
       2.2 Respondent No.2 being an employee of Ex-MLA, it is         F
possible that Complaint Case No.19/2018 may have been prompted
by political vendetta against the petitioner No.1. However, since
the allegations in the complaint case make out an offence u/s.3 of
the Atrocities Act, it would not be proper to nip the complaint in
the bud, more so, when there are statements recorded in Court
under Section 200 Cr.P.C. The possibility of retaliation on the       G
part of the Petitioners by the acts alleged in the complaint, after
closure of the earlier complaint No.17 of 2010 cannot be ruled
out. Quashing the criminal proceedings at the very inception might
result in injustice. [Para 25][347-D-E]
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338            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A            2.3 Criminal proceedings cannot be nipped in the bud by
      exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. only
      because the complaint has been lodged by a political rival. It is
      possible that a false complaint may have been lodged at the behest
      of a political opponent. However, such possibility would not justify
      interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal
B
      proceedings. The possibility of retaliation on the part of the
      petitioners by the acts alleged, after closure of the earlier criminal
      case cannot be ruled out. The allegations in the complaint
      constitute offence under the Attrocities Act. Whether the
      allegations are true or untrue, would have to be decided in the
C     trial. In exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the
      Court does not examine the correctness of the allegations in a
      complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently
      clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any
      offence. The Complaint Case No.19/2018 is not such a case which
      should be quashed at the inception itself without further Trial.
D
      The High Court rightly dismissed the application under Section
      482 Cr.P.C.The impugned judgment and order of the High Court
      is not interfered with. [Para 39, 40][354-D-H]
            Shantaben Bhurabhai Bhuriya v. Anand Athabhai
            Chaudhari and Ors. 2021 SCC Online SC 974; Monica
E           Kumar (Dr.) v. State of U.P (2008) 8 SCC 781 : [2008]
            9 SCR 943; Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar
            AIR 1990 SC 494 : [1989] Suppl. SCR 165;
            Sheonandan Paswan v. Others (1987) 1 SCC 288 :
            [1987] 1 SCR 702; State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh
F           (1980) 2 SCC 471 : [1980] 1 SCR 1071; Municipal
            Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi and Ors.
            (1983) 1 SCC 1 : [1983] 1 SCR 884; State of Andhra
            Pradesh v. Gourieshetty Mahesh (2010) 6 SCC 588;
            Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttrakhand (2013) 11 SCC
            673; Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao
G           Chandrojirao Angre (1988) 1 SCC 692 : [1988] 2 SCR
            930; Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal
            (2007) 12 SCC 1 : [2007] 10 SCR 847; Kapil Agarwal
            & Ors. v. Sanjay Sharma & Others (2021) 5 SCC 524;
            State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. 1992 Suppl
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  RAMVEER UPADHYAY & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.                             339


      (1) SCC 335 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259; Hamida v.                        A
      Rashid @ Rasheed and Others (2008) 1 SCC
      474:[2007] 5 SCR 937 – referred to.
                         Case Law Reference
[2008] 9 SCR 943                  referred to               Para 28
                                                                              B
[1989] Suppl. SCR 165             referred to               Para 29
[1987] 1 SCR 702                  referred to               Para 30
[1980] 1 SCR 1071                 referred to               Para 30
[1983] 1 SCR 884                  referred to               Para 31
                                                                              C
(2010) 6 SCC 588                  referred to               Para 32
(2013) 11 SCC 673                 referred to               Para 33
[1988] 2 SCR 930                  referred to               Para 34
[2007] 10 SCR 847                 referred to               Para 35           D
(2021) 5 SCC 524                  referred to               Para 36
[1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259           referred to               Para 37
[2007] 5 SCR 937                  referred to               Para 38
       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave                        E
Petition (Crl.) No.2953 of 2022.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 07.03.2022 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in Application U/s 482 No.27904 of 2021.
     Ranjit Kumar, Sr. Adv., Dr. Rajeev Sharma, Prashant Sharma,
Raghuvir Sharma, Vipin Kumar Sharma, Dharmendra Sharma, Ms.                   F
Diksha Sharma, Akhilesh Mishra, Advs. for the Petitioners.
     Siddhartha Dave, Sr. Adv., Swetashwa Agarwal, Sanchit Garga,
Nikunj Jain, Advs. for the Respondents.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                              G
      INDIRA BANERJEE, J.
       1. This special leave petition is against a final judgment and order
dated 7th March 2022 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
dismissing the application filed by the Petitioner under Section 482 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 being case No.29704 of 2021, whereby            H
340             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A     the Petitioner had challenged the order dated 17th September 2021 passed
      by the 4 th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Hathras taking
      cognizance of the complaint filed by the Respondent No.2 under Section
      365 read with Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and
      Section 3(1)(Dha) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention
      of Atrocities Act), 1989, hereinafter referred to as “the Atrocities Act”.
B
             2. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the
      Petitioners opened his arguments contending that this case is a classic
      example of malicious prosecution of the petitioners, who have been
      embroiled in a false criminal case, due to political animosity. The complaint
      in the Court of the 2nd Additional District and Sessions Judge/Special
C     Judge under the Atrocities Act, under section 156 (3) of the CrPC ,
      which has given rise to these proceedings, has been filed by the
      Respondent No. 2 at the instance of Devendra Agarwal, Ex-MLA , a
      political opponent of the Petitioner No. 1. The Petitioner No. 1 and the
      said Devendra Aggarwal had fought elections against each other several
D     times.
             3. Earlier, on or about 1st January 2010, Smt. Meera Devi, wife
      of the Respondent No.2 had filed a complaint before the District
      Magistrate, Mahamaya Nagar District (now Hathras District) stating
      that the Respondent No.2 had been abducted by the brothers of the
E     Petitioner No. 1, to forcibly make him vote in favour of their party, in the
      MLC election of 2010. In the said complaint it was alleged that the
      Petitioner had abused the Respondent No.2 by his caste, using filthy
      language.
             4. On the same day, that is, 1st January 2010, Devendra Aggarwal
F     wrote a letter to the District Magistrate for release of the Respondent
      No.2. In the aforesaid letter, it was stated that the Petitioners had abused
      the Respondent No.2 in filthy language by reference to his caste.
             5. On 2nd January 2010, Meera Devi filed an application in the
      Court of the Judicial Magistrate, Sadabad, Hathras under Section 156(3)
G     of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C ), being Complaint No. 412
      of 2010 for directions on the Station House Officer (SHO) at Chandappa
      Police Station to register her Complaint of abduction of her husband.
            6. A complaint was thereafter registered, pursuant to which Crime
      Case No. 17/2010 was started. The case was investigated by the Circle
      Inspector Sadabad, Hathras. After investigation, the Police filed a final
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  RAMVEER UPADHYAY & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.                               341
              [INDIRA BANERJEE, J. ]

report of closure of the case, opining that no incident of abduction, as        A
alleged had taken place, and the complaint had been filed out of political
animosity.
       7. Meera Devi filed a Protest Petition which was dismissed. The
High Court did not interfere with the order of dismissal of her Protest
Petition. Meera Devi approached this Court. Pursuant to the orders of           B
this court, further investigation was held by the CB CID. The
Investigating Officer filed a final report dated 17.10.2018 in favour of
the Petitioners. Meera Devi filed a Protest Petition. By an order dated
5th September 2020, the Special Judge under the Atrocities Act, Hathras
rejected the Protest Petition filed by Meera Devi in Case No. 17/2010.
                                                                                C
       8. In February 2017, the Petitioner had contested the Assembly
elections from Sadabad Constituency. Mr. Devendra Aggarwal also
contested the election from the same constituency as a candidate of a
rival political party. It is alleged that, on 8th February 2017, when the
Petitioner No 1’s son was campaigning for the Petitioner No 1, Devendra
Aggarwal, who was then a sitting MLA of the ruling party, attacked the          D
Petitioner No 1’s son and his supporters and opened fire indiscriminately.
       9. One Pushpendra Singh, a supporter of the Petitioner No 1, was
killed in the incident. Pushpendra’s father, Ramhari Sharma lodged an
FIR, arraigning Devendra Aggarwal as Accused No.1, pursuant to which
a criminal case was started against Devendra Aggarwal and others,               E
inter alia, under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
       10. It is stated that since Devendra Aggarwal was the sitting MLA
of the ruling party, the police did not take action to arrest him. The father
of the deceased Pushpendra, Ramhari Sharma filed a Criminal Misc.
Writ Petition No.2739/2017 in the High Court praying for action against         F
Devendra Aggarwal.
       11. On 26th October 2017, the Respondent No.2 filed an application
in the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge SC/ST Act,
Hathras under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C alleging that the Petitioner
No.1 along with his Personal Assistant, Ranu Pandit, being the Petitioner
                                                                                G
No.2 and 6-7 other persons had abused him in filthy language and asked
his associates to drag him into the car which they could not do, as a
crowd had gathered, and there was resistance put up. The Respondent
No.2 prayed for direction on the SHO, Chandappa Police Station to
register the case against the Petitioners.
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342             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A           12. The relevant averments in the said complaint are extracted
      hereinbelow for convenience:-
            “1. The applicant belongs to “Dhobi’ caste – a scheduled
            caste and is former BDC Member.
            2. ….
B
            3. That on 01.09.2017, at about 2.45 or 3 P.M. in the
            afternoon, the opposite party no.1 Ramveer Upadhyay came
            to Village-Bisana along with his convoy of vehicles and after
            seeing the Complainant started abusing of his caste and on
            the road, he said that Saley dhobi you had forgotten your
C           position and your wings have come out and you are running
            up to Supreme Court. You will be sent at a place from where
            you will never come back. When the Complainant said you
            are doing your work and I am doing my work, Ramveer
            Upadhyay said to his associates that pull him and put him in
D           the car, then opposite party no.2 Ranu Pandit and 6-7 other
            unknown persons, who can be identified by face, dragged
            the Complainant and with the intention to kill tried to kidnap
            him but due to gathering of people on the road and due to
            resistance shown by Annu R/o Jindpatti, Bisana, Pradeep R/
            o Gambhirpatti, Bisana, they were not successful and went
E           towards Hathras in their vehicles. Due to this incident an
            environment of fear and terror was created in the village.”
            13. Pursuant to the aforesaid application, a case was registered
      and numbered Complaint Case No.19/2018. The Respondent No.2 was
      examined under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. The statement of the
F     Respondent No. 2 being the complainant was recorded under Section
      200 of the Cr.P.C. in the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge/Special
      Judge, SC/ST Act, Hathras. The statements of one Annu son of Rukamal
      and one Yogesh Gupta, son of Dhaniram Gupta were also recorded in
      the same Court under Section 200 Cr.P.C.
G            14. In the meanwhile, in Writ Petition (Civil) No.699/2016 titled
      Ashwini Kumar Upadhayay v. Union of India, a three-Judge Bench
      of this Court presided over by the Chief Justice, passed an order dated
      4.12.2018, taking notice of the fact that there were 4122 cases pending
      against legislators including former legislators, out of which 2324 cases
      were against sitting legislators. A chart, presented in Court by the learned
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  RAMVEER UPADHYAY & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.                             343
              [INDIRA BANERJEE, J. ]

Amicus Curiae, showed that there were 430 cases involving life sentence       A
pending against sitting as well as former legislators.
       15. To expedite the disposal of the cases, this Court requested
each High Court to assign/allocate criminal cases involving former and
sitting legislators to as many as Sessions Courts and Magisterial Courts
as each High Court might consider fit and expedient. Pursuant to              B
administrative directions issued by the High Court, and pursuant to the
directions of this Court, Complaint Case No.19/2018 was transferred to
the Additional District and Sessions Judge Court No.4, Hathras, as the
Petitioner No.1 was a legislator/former legislator.
       16. On being prima facie satisfied that the complaint case No.19/      C
2018 made out a prime facie case against the Petitioners, the Additional
District and Sessions Judge, Court No.4, Hathras passed an order dated
17th September 2021, taking cognizance of the charges against the
Petitioners and issuing summons to the Petitioners.
       17. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 17th September 2021,        D
the Petitioners filed an application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C in the
High Court and prayed that entire proceedings in Complaint Case No.
19/2018 as well as the cognizance order dated 17th September 2021 be
quashed.
      18. By an order dated 5th January 2022, the High Court admitted         E
the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and stayed further
proceedings in Complaint Case No.19/2018 pending in the Court of
Additional District and Sessions Judge, Court No.4, Hathras.
       19. However, on 7th March 2022, the High Court passed the
impugned judgment and order rejecting the application filed by the            F
Petitioners under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
       20. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf
of the Petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the Additional District
and Sessions Judge, Court No.4, Hathras, to take cognizance of the
offence in Complaint Case No.19/2018.
                                                                              G
       21. Emphasizing Section 14 of the Atrocities Act, Mr. Ranjit Kumar
argued that only the Special Judge under the Atrocities Act was competent
to pass an order for issuance of summons. He argued that the order of
the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Court No.4, Hathras being
without jurisdiction the High Court should have quashed the same in
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344               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A     exercise of its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Mr. Ranjt Kumar
      also argued that Complaint Case No.19/2018 patently a case of malicious
      prosecution which stemmed from political rivalry and was in gross abuse
      of the process of Court.
            22. In Shantaben Bhurabhai Bhuriya v. Anand Athabhai
B     Chaudhari and Ors.1, Cited by Mr. Siddharth Dave, learned senior
      counsel, appearing on behalf of the Respondent No.2, this Court rejected
      the contention that only Special Court could take cognizance of offences
      under the Atrocities Act and held:
               23. Therefore, the issue/question posed for the consideration
C              of this Court is, whether in a case where cognizance is taken
               by the learned Magistrate and thereafter the case is committed
               to the learned Special Court, whether entire criminal
               proceedings can be said to have been vitiated considering
               the second proviso to Section 14 of the Atrocities Act which
               was inserted by Act 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26.1.2016?
D
               24. While considering the aforesaid issue/question, legislative
               history of the relevant provisions of the Scheduled Castes
               and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989,
               more particularly, Section 14 pre-amendment and post
               amendment is required to be considered. Section 14 as stood
E              pre-amendment and post amendment reads as under:
                                            ........
                 Provided that in Districts where less number of cases under
               this Act is recorded, the State Government shall, with the
F              concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, by
               notification in the Official Gazette, specify for such Districts,
               the Court of Session to be a Special Court to try the offences
               under this Act;
                        Provided further that the Courts so established or
               specified shall have power to directly take cognizance of
G
               offences under this Act.”
               ******
               28. Considering the aforesaid legislative history which
               brought to insertion of proviso to Section 14 of the Atrocities
      1
H         2021 SCC Online SC 974
RAMVEER UPADHYAY & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.                      345
            [INDIRA BANERJEE, J. ]

  Act, by which, even the Special Court so established or            A
  specified for the purpose of providing for speedy trial the
  power to directly to take cognizance of offences under the
  Atrocities Act, 1989, the issue/question posed whether in a
  case where for the offences under Atrocities Act, the
  cognizance is taken by the learned Magistrate and thereafter
                                                                     B
  the case is committed to the Court of Sessions/Special Court
  and cognizance is not straightway taken up by the learned
  Special Court/Court of Session, whether entire criminal
  proceedings for the offences under the Atrocities Act, 1989
  can be said to have been vitiated, as so observed by the High
  Court in the impugned judgment and order ?                         C
  29. On fair reading of Sections 207, 209 and 193 of the Code
  of Criminal Procedure and insertion of proviso to Section 14
  of the Atrocities Act by Act No. 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26.1.2016, we
  are of the opinion that on the aforesaid ground the entire
  criminal proceedings cannot be said to have been vitiated.         D
  Second proviso to Section 14 of the Atrocities Act which has
  been inserted by Act 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26.1.2016 confers power
  upon the Special Court so established or specified for the
  purpose of providing for speedy trial also shall have the
  power to directly take cognizance of the offences under the
                                                                     E
  Atrocities Act. Considering the object and purpose of insertion
  of proviso to Section 14, it cannot be said that it is not in
  conflict with the Sections 193, 207 and 209 of the Criminal
  Procedure Code, 1973. It cannot be said that it takes away
  jurisdiction of the Magistrate to take cognizance and
  thereafter to commit the case to the Special Court for trial for   F
  the offences under the Atrocities Act. Merely because, learned
  Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offences and
  thereafter the trial/case has been committed to Special Court
  established for the purpose of providing for speedy trial, it
  cannot be said that entire criminal proceedings including FIR
                                                                     G
  and charge-sheet etc. are vitiated and on the aforesaid ground
  entire criminal proceedings for the offences under Sections
  452, 323, 325, 504, 506(2) and 114 of the Penal Code, 1860
  and under Section 3(1)(x) of the Atrocities Act are to be
  quashed and set aside. It may be noted that in view of insertion
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346     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A     of proviso to Section 14 of the Atrocities Act and considering
      the object and purpose, for which, the proviso to Section 14
      of the Atrocities Act has been inserted i.e. for the purpose of
      providing for speedy trial and the object and purpose stated
      herein above, it is advisable that the Court so established or
      specified in exercise of powers under Section14, for the
B
      purpose of providing for speedy trial directly take cognizance
      of the offences under the Atrocities Act. But at the same time,
      as observed herein above, merely on the ground that
      cognizance of the offences under the Atrocities Act is not taken
      directly by the Special Court constituted under Section 14 of
C     the Atrocities Act, the entire criminal proceedings cannot be
      said to have been vitiated and cannot be quashed and set
      aside solely on the ground that cognizance has been taken
      by the learned Magistrate after insertion of second proviso
      to Section 14 which confers powers upon the Special Court
      also to directly take cognizance of the offences under the
D
      Atrocities Act and thereafter case is committed to the Special
      Court/Court of Session.
      30. In support of the above conclusion, the words used in
      second proviso to Section 14 are required to be considered
      minutely. The words used are “Court so established or specified
E
      shall have power to directly take cognizance of the offences
      under this Court”. The word “only” is conspicuously missing.
      If the intention of the legislature would have to confer the
      jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences under the
      Atrocities Act exclusively with the Special Court, in that case,
F     the wording should have been “that the Court so established
      or specified only shall have power to directly take cognizance
      of offences under this Act”. Therefore, merely because now
      further and additional powers have been given to the Special
      Court also to take cognizance of the offences under the
      Atrocities Act and in the present case merely because the
G
      cognizance is taken by the learned Magistrate for the offences
      under the Atrocities Act and thereafter the case has been
      committed to the learned Special Court, it cannot be said that
      entire criminal proceedings have been vitiated and same are
      required to be quashed and set aside.”
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  RAMVEER UPADHYAY & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.                             347
              [INDIRA BANERJEE, J. ]

       23. In view of the judgment of this Court in Shantaben Bhurabhai       A
Bhuriya (supra), the Argument of Mr. Ranjit Kumar that the Additional
District Judge and Sessions Judge, Court No.4 Hathras had no jurisdiction
to take cognizance or issue summons/orders cannot be sustained.
       24. There was apparently political rivalry between the Petitioner
No.1 and Devendra Aggarwal. However, Complaint Case No. 19/2018               B
has not been lodged against the Petitioners, by Devendra Aggarwal, but
by the Respondent No.2, a Dhobi by caste, which is a scheduled caste.
It cannot be said that the allegations in the complaint do not make out
offence under the Atrocities Act. It is specifically alleged that the
Petitioners had abused the Respondent No.2 in filthy language by
reference to his caste. The allegations in the Complaint Case No.19 of        C
2018, if established, could result in conviction under the relevant sub-
sections of Section 3(1) of the Atrocities Act.
        25. Respondent No.2 being an employee of Devendra Aggarwal,
it is possible that Complaint Case No.19/2018 may have been prompted
by political vendetta against the Petitioner No.1. However, since as          D
observed above, the allegations in the complaint case make out an offence
under Section 3 of the Atrocities Act, it would not be proper to nip the
complaint in the bud, more so, when there are statements recorded in
Court under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. The possibility of retaliation on
the part of the Petitioners by the acts alleged in the complaint, after       E
closure of the earlier complaint No.17 of 2010 cannot be ruled out.
Quashing the criminal proceedings at the very inception might result in
injustice.
      26. Section 482 of the Cr.P.C provides:-
      “482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.—Nothing in               F
      this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers
      of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary
      to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent
      abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the
      ends of justice.”                                                       G
       27. Even though, the inherent power of the High Court under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., to interfere with criminal proceedings is wide,
such power has to be exercised with circumspection, in exceptional cases.
Jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C is not to be exercised for
the asking.
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348             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A             28. In Monica Kumar (Dr.) v. State of U.P2., this Court held
      that inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C has to be
      exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such
      exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section
      itself.
B            29. In exceptional cases, to prevent abuse of the process of Court,
      the High Court might in exercise of its inherent powers under Section
      482 quash criminal proceedings. However, interference would only be
      justified when complaint did not disclose any offence, or was patently
      frivolous, vexatious or oppressive, as held by this Court in Mrs.
      Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar3.
C
              30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated by reason
      of political vendetta is not in itself ground for quashing the criminal
      proceedings, as observed by Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan v.
      State of Bihar and Others4. It is a well established proposition of law
      that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justified and based upon adequate
D     evidence, does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political
      vendetta of the first informant or complainant. Though the view of
      Bhagawti, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan (supra) was the minority view,
      there was no difference of opinion with regard to this finding. To quote
      Krishna Iyer, J., in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh5, “if the use of
E     power is of fulfilment of a legitimate object the actuation or catalysation
      by malice is not legicidal.”
           31. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi
      and Ors.6 A three-Judge Bench of this Court held:
             “6. It may be noticed that Section 482 of the present Code is
F            the ad verbatim copy of Section 561-A of the old Code. This
             provision confers a separate and independent power on the
             High Court alone to pass orders ex debito justitiae in cases
             where grave and substantial injustice has been done or where
             the process of the court has been seriously abused. It is not
G            merely a revisional power meant to be exercised against the
             orders passed by subordinate courts. It was under this section
      2
        (2008) 8 SCC 781
      3
        AIR 1990 SC 494
      4
        (1987) 1 SCC 288
      5
        (1980) 2 SCC 471
      6
H       (1983) 1 SCC 1
RAMVEER UPADHYAY & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.                       349
            [INDIRA BANERJEE, J. ]

  that in the old Code, the High Courts used to quash the             A
  proceedings or expunge uncalled for remarks against
  witnesses or other persons or subordinate courts. Thus, the
  scope, ambit and range of Section 561-A (which is now Section
  482) is quite different from the powers conferred by the present
  Code under the provisions of Section 397. It may be that in
                                                                      B
  some cases there may be overlapping but such cases would
  be few and far between. It is well settled that the inherent
  powers under Section 482 of the present Code can be
  exercised only when no other remedy is available to the litigant
  and not where a specific remedy is provided by the statute.
  Further, the power being an extraordinary one, it has to be         C
  exercised sparingly. If these considerations are kept in mind,
  there will be no inconsistency between Sections 482 and
  397(2) of the present Code.
  7. The limits of the power under Section 482 were clearly
  defined by this Court in Raj Kapoor v. State [(1980) 1 SCC          D
  43 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 72] where Krishna Iyer, J. observed as
  follows: [SCC para 10, p. 47: SCC (Cri) p. 76]
    “Even so, a general principle pervades this branch of law
  when a specific provision is made: easy resort to inherent
  power is not right except under compelling circumstances.           E
  Not that there is absence of jurisdiction but that inherent power
  should not invade areas set apart for specific power under
  the same Code.”
  . Another important consideration which is to be kept in mind
  is as to when the High Court acting under the provisions of         F
  Section 482 should exercise the inherent power insofar as
  quashing of criminal proceedings are concerned. This matter
  was gone into in greater detail in Smt Nagawwa v. Veeranna
  Shivalingappa Konjalgi [(1976) 3 SCC 736 : 1976 SCC (Cri)
  507 : 1976 Supp SCR 123 : 1976 Cri LJ 1533] where the
                                                                      G
  scope of Sections 202 and 204 of the present Code was
  considered and while laying down the guidelines and the
  grounds on which proceedings could be quashed this Court
  observed as follows: [SCC para 5, p. 741 : SCC (Cri) pp.
  511-12]
                                                                      H
350     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A           “Thus it may be safely held that in the following cases
      an order of the Magistrate issuing process against the accused
      can be quashed or set aside:
            (1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the
      statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same
B     taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against
      the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential
      ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the
      accused;
            (2) where the allegations made in the complaint are
C     patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent
      person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient
      ground for proceeding against the accused;
             (3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in
      issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based
D     either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly
      irrelevant or inadmissible; and
            (4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal
      defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint
      by legally competent authority and the like.
E     The cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative and provide
      sufficient guidelines to indicate contingencies where the High
      Court can quash proceedings.”
      9. Same view was taken in a later decision of this Court
      in Sharda Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar [(1977) 1 SCC 505
F     : 1977 SCC (Cri) 132 : (1977) 2 SCR 357 : 1977 Cri LJ 1146]
      where Bhagwati, J. speaking for the Court observed as
      follows: [SCC para 2, p. 506 : SCC (Cri) p. 133]
      “It is now settled law that where the allegations set out in the
      complaint or the charge-sheet do not constitute any offence,
G     it is competent to the High Court exercising its inherent
      jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
      Procedure to quash the order passed by the Magistrate taking
      cognizance of the offence.
      10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against
H     an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the
    RAMVEER UPADHYAY & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.                         351
                [INDIRA BANERJEE, J. ]

       face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same,           A
       no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking
       the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding
       or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the
       High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in
       exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code.”
                                                                            B
      32. As held by this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v.
Gourieshetty Mahesh7, the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C, would not ordinarily embark upon an
enquiry into whether the evidence is reliable or not or whether there is
reasonable possibility that the accusation would not be sustained.
                                                                            C
       33. In Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttrakhand8, this Court held:-
           “12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482
       of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is
       to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing
       abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends        D
       of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence
       or not depends 14 upon the nature of facts alleged therein.
       Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present
       or not has to be judged by the High Court. …”
       34. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao                    E
Chandrojirao Angre9, a three-Judge Bench of this Court summarized
the law with regard to quashing of criminal proceedings under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C. This Court held:-
       “The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at
       the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied     F
       by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations
       as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the
       court to take into consideration any special features which
       appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient
       and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to
       continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be           G
       utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of
       the court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and,
7
  (2010) 6 SCC 588
8
  (2013) 11 SCC 673
9
  (1988) 1 SCC 692                                                          H
352             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A            therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing
             a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking
             into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the
             proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.”
            35. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal10, this
B     Court observed:-
                “46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is
                not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking
                private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise
                the accused. On analysis of the aforementioned cases, we
C               are of the opinion that it is neither possible nor desirable
                to lay down an inflexible rule that would govern the
                exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction of
                the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC though wide has
                to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and
                only when it is justified by the tests specifically laid down
D               in the statute itself and in the aforementioned cases. In
                view of the settled legal position, the impugned judgment
                cannot be sustained.”
             36. In Kapil Agarwal & Ors. V. Sanjay Sharma & Others 11,
      this Court observed that Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is designed to achieve
E     the purpose of ensuring that criminal proceedings are not permitted to
      generate into weapons of harassment.
             37. In State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors.12,
      this Court held:

F            “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
             relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
             the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of
             decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power
             under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482
             of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above,
G            we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration
             wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent
             abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the
      10
         (2007) 12 SCC 1
      11
         (2021) 5 SCC 524
      12
H        1992 Suppl (1) SCC 335
RAMVEER UPADHYAY & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.                        353
            [INDIRA BANERJEE, J. ]

  ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any       A
  precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and
  inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an
  exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power
  should be exercised.
  (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report       B
  or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value
  and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute
  any offence or make out a case against the accused.
  (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and
  other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose        C
  a cogizable offence, justifying an investigation by police
  officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an
  order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of
  the Code.
  (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or          D
  complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same
  do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out
  a case against the accused.
  (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
  cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable              E
  offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without
  an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section
  155(2) of the Code.
  (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
  absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no            F
  prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
  sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
  (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of
  the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which
  a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
                                                                       G
  continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a
  specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing
  efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
  (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with
  mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted
                                                                       H
354                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A            with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused
             and with a view to spite him due to private and personal
             grudge.
             103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power
             of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very
B            sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest
             of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking
             upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or
             otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint
             and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer
             an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its
C            whim or caprice.
             37. Ends of justice would be better served if valuable time of the
      Court is spent on hearing appeals rather than entertaining petitions under
      Section 482 at an interlocutory stage which might ultimately result in
      miscarriage of justice as held in Hamida v. Rashid @ Rasheed and
D     Others13.
             39. In our considered opinion criminal proceedings cannot be nipped
      in the bud by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
      only because the complaint has been lodged by a political rival. It is
      possible that a false complaint may have been lodged at the behest of a
E     political opponent. However, such possibility would not justify interference
      under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings. As
      observed above, the possibility of retaliation on the part of the petitioners
      by the acts alleged, after closure of the earlier criminal case cannot be
      ruled out. The allegations in the complaint constitute offence under the
      Attrocities Act. Whether the allegations are true or untrue, would have
F     to be decided in the trial. In exercise of power under Section 482 of the
      Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the allegations in
      a complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear
      that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence. The
      Complaint Case No.19/2018 is not such a case which should be quashed
      at the inception itself without further Trial. The High Court rightly
G
      dismissed the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
             40. For the reasons discussed above, we are not inclined to interfere
      with the impugned judgment and order of the High Court. The special
      leave petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
      13
H          (2008) 1 SCC 474
   RAMVEER UPADHYAY & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.                        355
               [INDIRA BANERJEE, J. ]

      41. Documents have been brought on record by the Petitioners        A
which show that the Petitioner No.1 is a patient of lung cancer of an
advanced stage. He is on strong medication. Considering the condition
of the health of the Petitioner No.1, the Trial Court may consider
exempting the personal appearance of the Petitioner No.1, if such an
application is made to the Trial Court.
                                                                          B

Nidhi Jain                                               SLP dismissed.




                                                                          C




                                                                          D




                                                                          E




                                                                          F




                                                                          G




                                                                          H