RAMJI PRASAD JAISWAL @ RAMJEE PRASAD JAISWAL AND ORS.versusSTATE OF BIHAR

                  [2025] 6 S.C.R. 582 : 2025 INSC 738

  Ramji Prasad Jaiswal @ Ramjee Prasad Jaiswal and Ors.
                            v.
                      State of Bihar
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 490 of 2025)
                                  20 May 2025
                [Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan,* JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Whether in the facts of the case there was a breach of s.313,
       CrPC causing prejudice to the appellants and vitiating the trial
       against them.

                                   Headnotes†
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.313 – Penal Code,
       1860 – ss.420, 468, 471, 120B – Prevention of Corruption Act,
       1947 – ss.5(2), 5(1)(d) – Appellants were convicted u/ss.420,
       468, 471, 120B, IPC r/w ss.5(2), 5(1)(d), PC Act and sentenced
       accordingly – Incriminating circumstances which had come on
       record against them in the prosecution evidence were not put
       to them in their examination u/s.313 CrPC – Trial, if vitiated:
       Held: Yes – Appellants were asked four identical questions in a
       mechanical manner without putting them to notice the specific
       material brought on record by the prosecution witnesses against
       them – These questions did not reflect the specific prosecution
       evidence which came on record qua the appellants – Since, all the
       incriminating evidence were not put to the notice of the appellants,
       there was a breach of s.313, CrPC as well as the principle of audi
       alteram partem causing serious prejudice to the appellants to put
       forth their case – Ultimately, such evidence were relied upon by
       the court to convict the appellants – Such omission which is a
       serious irregularity completely vitiated the trial – Appellants given
       the benefit of doubt because of such omission in the recording of
       their statements u/s.313, CrPC since the trial court had relied on
       the evidence adverse to the appellants while convicting them –
       Conviction and sentence of appellant Nos.1 and 2 untenable –
       Judgment of the trial court as affirmed by the High Court qua
       appellant no.3 is set aside on the ground of juvenility – Juvenile
       Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. [Paras 28, 36-39]

* Author
[2025] 6 S.C.R.                                                                583

      Ramji Prasad Jaiswal @ Ramjee Prasad Jaiswal and Ors. v.
                           State of Bihar

                               Case Law Cited
     Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [1974] 1
     SCR 489 : (1973) 2 SCC 793; Dharnidhar v. State of Uttar Pradesh
     [2010] 8 SCR 173 : (2010) 7 SCC 759; Raj Kumar Singh alias
     Raju alias Batya v. State of Rajasthan [2013] 8 SCR 599 : (2013) 5
     SCC 722; Raj Kumar alias Suman v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2023] 5
     SCR 754 : (2023) 17 SCC 95; Ashok v. State of Uttar Pradesh
     [2024] 12 SCR 335 : (2025) 2 SCC 381 – referred to.

                                  List of Acts
     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860; Prevention
     of Corruption Act, 1947; Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
     Children) Act, 2000.

                              List of Keywords
     Section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Breach of
     Section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Incriminating
     circumstances; Incriminating evidence not put to notice; Identical
     questions asked; Mechanical manner; Omission; Omission in
     the recording of statements under Section 313, Code of Criminal
     Procedure, 1973; Irregularity; Trial vitiated; Principle of audi alteram
     partem; Benefit of doubt; Juvenility; Plea of juvenility; Juvenile on
     the date of commission of the offence; Curable material defect.

                             Case Arising From
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
     490 of 2025
     From the Judgment and Order dated 24.11.2011 of the High Court
     of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 418 of 2006

                          Appearances for Parties
     Advs. for the Appellants:
     Ms. Mukta Gupta, Sr. Adv., Mudit Jain, Ms. Samprikta Ghoshal,
     Nitya Gupta, Ms. Mahima Malhotra, Aayush Goswami, Saiful
     Haque, Aditya Samaddar.
     Advs. for the Respondent:
     Vikramjit Banerjee, A.S.G., Santosh Kumar, Ms. Bharti Tyagi,
     Praneet Pranav, Mrigank Pathak, Prashant Rawat, Nring Chamwibo
     Zeliang, Abhishek Singh, Mukesh Kumar Maroria.
584                                                           [2025] 6 S.C.R.

                           Supreme Court Reports


                  Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                  Judgment

       Ujjal Bhuyan, J.

       This appeal by special leave arises out of the judgment and order
       dated 24.11.2011 in Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 418/2006 passed by
       the High Court of Judicature at Patna. By the aforesaid judgment and
       order dated 24.11.2011, a learned Single Judge of the High Court of
       Judicature at Patna (High Court) dismissed Criminal Appeal (SJ) No.
       430 of 2006 (Shiv Narayan Bansal and another Vs. State of Bihar)
       and Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 418 of 2006 (Ramji Prasad Jaiswal
       alias Ramjee Prasad Jaiswal and two others Vs. State of Bihar).
2.     In this appeal, we are concerned with the decision of the High Court
       dated 24.11.2011 in respect of Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 418 of 2006.
       The three appellants in this case are:
            1.    Ramji Prasad Jaiswal alias Ramjee Prasad         Jaiswal,
            2.    Ashok Kumar Jaiswal, and
            3.    Bal Mukund Jaiswal.
3.     It may be mentioned that appellants along with the appellants of
       Criminal Appeal (SJ) No.430 of 2006 were tried by the Court of
       learned Special Judge, Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), South
       Bihar, Patna (‘CBI Court” hereinafter) in Special Case No. 52/1983
       for allegedly committing offences under Sections 420, 440, 468, 471
       and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) read with Section
       5(2) and 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.
       3.1. By the judgment and order dated 29.05.2006, appellants in both
            the criminal appeals were held guilty of committing offences
            under Sections 420, 468, 471 and 120B IPC read with Section
            5(2) and 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947
            (briefly ‘the PC Act’ hereinafter). Accordingly, appellants in both
            the appeals were directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment (RI)
            for three years under Section 420 IPC and also to pay fine of
            rupees forty thousand. They were further directed to suffer RI
            for three years under Section 468 IPC besides paying fine of
            rupees five thousand. That apart, each of the appellants were
[2025] 6 S.C.R.                                                       585

      Ramji Prasad Jaiswal @ Ramjee Prasad Jaiswal and Ors. v.
                           State of Bihar

           directed to suffer RI for two years and one year respectively
           under Section 471 read with Sections 468, 420 and 120B IPC.
           The substantive sentence of imprisonment of one year was
           inclusive of the sentence awarded to each of the appellants
           for the offence under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of
           the PC Act. It was directed that the sentences imposed were
           to run concurrently.
4.   Aggrieved by their conviction and sentence, all the convicts filed two
     criminal appeals before the High Court, being Criminal Appeal (SJ)
     Nos. 418 and 430 of 2006. It may be mentioned that after filing of
     appeal in the High Court, the second appellant Chetharu Singh in
     Criminal Appeal (SJ) No.430 of 2006 passed away. Therefore, the
     appeal qua him stood abated. The said appeal proceeded against
     the remaining sole appellant Shiv Narayan Bansal.
     4.1. High Court vide the common judgment and order dated
          24.11.2011 came to the conclusion that the appellants were
          appropriately convicted and correctly sentenced. Accordingly,
          both the appeals were dismissed.
5.   As noted above, appellants in Criminal Appeal (SJ) No.418 of 2006:
     (1) Ramji Prasad Jaiswal alias Ramjee Prasad Jaiswal (2) Ashok
     Kumar Jaiswal and (3) Bal Mukund Jaiswal preferred the related
     SLP (Criminal) No. 2629 of 2012.
6.   By order dated 26.03.2012, this Court after condoning the delay
     issued notice qua appellant Nos.1 and 2 on the question of sentence
     only. In respect of appellant No.3, notice was issued on the question
     of sentence as also on the question of his being a juvenile on the
     date of commission of offence.
7.   On 21.09.2012, this Court considered the plea of juvenility raised by
     appellant No.3. As per the matriculation certificate, appellant No.3
     was born on 24.12.1965 which would mean that he was around 17
     years of age in December 1982 when the offence in question was
     allegedly committed by him. Learned Additional Solicitor General
     upon instructions submitted that according to the preliminary enquiry
     made by CBI, the certificate relied upon by appellant was found
     to be genuine. Therefore, this Court directed the Special Judge to
     conduct an enquiry in terms of Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice
     (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 to record a finding on
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       the question qua juvenility of appellant No.3 and thereafter to submit
       a report to this Court. By the said order, this Court enlarged all the
       three appellants on bail and also suspended the remainder of the
       sentences imposed on the appellants. Order dated 21.09.2012 reads
       as under:
            Petitioner No. 3 has filed Crl. M.P. No. 11269 of 2012 inter
            alia pointing out that he was a juvenile within the meaning
            of The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)
            Act, 2000 on the date of the commission of the offence. He
            has, in support of that assertion placed reliance upon two
            documents one of which happens to be the matriculation
            certificate issued by the Bihar School Examination Board.
            According to that certificate, petitioner No. 3 was born on
            24.12.1965 meaning thereby that he was around 17 years
            of age in December, 1982 when the offence in question
            was allegedly committed by him. On 17.08.2012, when this
            special leave petition came up for orders before us we had
            directed Mr. H.P. Raval, Additional Solicitor General to take
            instructions as to the genuineness of the certificate relied
            upon by the petitioner. Mr. Rajiv Nanda, learned counsel
            for the respondent CBI today submits on instructions that
            according to the preliminary inquiry made by the CBI,
            Patna the certificate relied upon by the petitioner in the
            application has been found to be genuine. That being so,
            a case for holding an inquiry under Section 7A of the Act
            in regard to juvenility of petitioner No.3 has been made
            out. We accordingly direct the Special Judge to conduct
            an inquiry in terms of Section 7A of The Juvenile Justice
            (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, summon
            the requisite documents from the Board of Secondary
            Education, record other evidence if any produced in regard
            to the question of juvenility of petitioner No.3, record a
            finding on the question and submit a report to this Court
            expeditiously but not later than three months from the date
            a copy of this order is received by the said court.
            Mr. Nagendra Rai, learned counsel for petitioner No.3
            submits that petitioner No. 3 shall appear before the trial
            court if enlarged on bail and also produce the original
[2025] 6 S.C.R.                                                            587

      Ramji Prasad Jaiswal @ Ramjee Prasad Jaiswal and Ors. v.
                           State of Bihar

           certificates relied upon by him in support of his claim. Mr.
           Rai further contends that petitioner No. 1, Ramji Prasad is
           nearly 72 years old with multiple ailments and has already
           undergone seven years of imprisonment. So also petitioner
           No.2, Ashok Kumar Jaiswal has undergone seven months
           imprisonment out of a total of three years awarded to them.
           He further states that out of total amount of Rs.13,29,266/-
           allegedly swindled by the petitioners, not a penny has
           been received or misappropriated by the petitioners in
           this appeal even according to the prosecution. Appellant
           Shiv Narain Banshal in the connected appeal is said to
           have received Rs.12,57,000/- while the remaining amount
           was taken away by one other accused person who has
           since died. He urged that keeping in view the totality of
           the circumstances the petitioners deserve to be enlarged
           on bail. Prima facie we find merit in that contention. We
           accordingly direct that Ramji Jaiswal, Ashok Kumar and
           Bal Mukund shall stand released on bail on their furnishing
           bail bonds in a sum of Rs.20,000/- with two sureties each
           in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial court. The
           remainder of the sentence awarded to the said petitioners
           shall on that condition remain suspended.
           The petition shall be listed for final hearing on a non-
           miscellaneous day after the report is received from the
           trial court. A copy of this order shall be forwarded to the
           CBI, Patna for appropriate action.
8.   Order dated 05.01.2015 indicates that report from the trial court
     was received.
9.   Finally, the matter was heard on 29.01.2005 on which date leave
     was granted.
10. Relevant facts may be briefly noted.
11. The case relates to a period between September, 1982 to December,
    1982. At that point of time deceased accused Ajay Kumar Srivastava
    was the Branch Manager of State Bank of India, Agriculture Market
    Yard Branch, Mohania (briefly ‘SBI’ hereinafter). The allegation was
    that Ajay Kumar Srivastava misused his official position and conspired
    with deceased appellant Chetharu Singh (proprietor of M/s Bishnujee
588                                                        [2025] 6 S.C.R.

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       Bhandar) and appellant Shiv Narayan Bansal (proprietor of M/s
       Bansal Stores, Mohania) along with the three present appellants i.e.
       Ramji Prasad Jaiswal @ Ramjee Prasad Jaiswal and his two sons
       Bal Mukund Jaiswal and Ashok Kumar Jaiswal thereby fraudulently
       and dishonestly obtained payment of Rs. 71,456.00 to Chetharu
       Singh and Rs. 12,57,810.00 to Shiv Narayan Bansal against certain
       bills which were accompanied by fake transport receipts issued by
       the present three appellants, purportedly on behalf of M/s Rohtas
       Carriers, showing consignment of grains of different consignees. In
       the process, SBI suffered loss to the tune of Rs.13,29,266.00 as
       the principal amount.
12. M/s Bishnujee Bhandar and M/s Bansal Stores had current accounts
    in SBI. M/s Rohtas Carriers was shown as transport agency which
    was being run by the present three appellants. Allegation was that
    all the bills were fake. By entering into criminal conspiracy by and
    between the accused, they had obtained the above payment illegally
    and fraudulently.
13. As regards M/s Rohtas Carriers and the present three appellants
    are concerned, the allegation was that M/s Rohtas Carriers neither
    had a vehicle of its own nor had any godown or business premises
    or branch or office at Mohania. In fact, it had no business in the said
    area. Consignment notes issued by the present appellants were fake.
    Therefore, they were also part of the criminal conspiracy whereby
    and whereunder wrongful loss was caused to the SBI to the tune
    of Rs.13,29,266.00.
14. During the trial, prosecution examined as many as twenty seven
    witnesses and exhibited a large number of documents. Upon
    consideration of the evidence tendered, the trial court convicted
    and sentenced the appellants as above. As already noted, the two
    criminal appeals filed came to be dismissed by the High Court vide
    the impugned judgment and order dated 24.11.2011.
15. Before we proceed to record the submissions of learned counsel for
    the parties, it would be appropriate to highlight the relevant dates:
            1.   Two FIRs were registered by CBI on 23.06.1983 wherein
                 the appellants and others were named as accused.
            2.   CBI filed chargesheet on 31.12.1984.
[2025] 6 S.C.R.                                                            589

      Ramji Prasad Jaiswal @ Ramjee Prasad Jaiswal and Ors. v.
                           State of Bihar

           3.   Charges were framed by the learned Special Judge, CBI
                Court on 02.09.1986.
           4.   Thereafter, the trial commenced.
           5.   At the conclusion of recording of evidence of the
                prosecution witnesses, statements of the appellants were
                recorded on 04.01.2006 under Section 313 of the Code
                of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC).
           6.   Trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellants as
                above on 29.05.2006.
           7.   High Court dismissed both the criminal appeals vide the
                judgment and order dated 24.11.2011.
16. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submits that since leave is
    being granted, all legal contentions are now open to the appellants.
     16.1. Referring to the statements of the appellants under Section
           313 Cr.P.C., he submits that those were recorded in a most
           mechanical manner. The incriminating circumstances which
           had come on record against the appellants in the prosecution
           evidence were not put to them when they were examined under
           Section 313 CrPC. Only four general questions were put. She
           submits that because of such irregularity, grave prejudice was
           caused to the appellants.
     16.2. Because of failure of the courts below to address this issue,
           grave prejudice was caused to the appellants. In any case, since
           a considerable period of about two decades has lapsed, it is
           not practically feasible to revert back to the trial court to restart
           the trial proceedings from the stage of recording of statements
           of the appellants under Section 313 CrPC. Therefore, on this
           ground alone the order of the trial court as well as that of the
           High Court are liable to be appropriately interfered with.
     16.3. Another submission of learned senior counsel for the appellants
           is that appellant No. 3 Bal Mukund Jaiswal was below 18
           years of age during the period September, 1982 to December,
           1982 i.e. the period to which the offence and the chargesheet
           relates. Therefore, on the date of commission of offence he
           was a juvenile. Though this ground was not taken before the
           courts below, she submits that it is settled law that a plea of
           juvenility of an accused/convict can be taken at any stage.
590                                                           [2025] 6 S.C.R.

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       16.4. Learned senior counsel thereafter has referred to the
             matriculation certificate of appellant No. 3 which shows his
             date of birth as 24.12.1965 which would mean that he was
             aged about 17 years of age in December, 1982. Thereafter,
             she has referred to the order of this Court dated 21.09.2012
             as well as to the finding of the Special Judge on the question
             of juvenility.
       16.5. It is, therefore, submitted that all the appellants are liable to
             be acquitted. Firstly, for failure of the court to comply with the
             requirements of Section 313 Cr.P.C. causing great prejudice
             to the appellants. Secondly, in so far appellant No. 3 is
             concerned, he being a juvenile on the date of commission of
             the offence, therefore, the impugned conviction and sentence
             qua him cannot be sustained. Consequently, the appeal should
             be allowed.
17. Per contra, learned Additional Solicitor General submits that in so
    far appellant Nos. 1 and 2 are concerned, their involvement in the
    commission of the offence has been fully established. Learned
    Special judge on the basis of the materials on record had rightly
    convicted them which has been affirmed by the High Court in the
    impugned judgment.
       17.1. He further submits that in so far alleged infraction of Section
             313 Cr.P.C. is concerned, learned Special Judge had brought
             to the notice of the appellant the gist of the evidence qua the
             said appellants which had come on record. Therefore, there
             was substantial compliance to the requirements of Section
             313 Cr.P.C.
       17.2. He submits that even if we proceed on the assumption that
             there has been violation of Section 313 Cr.P.C., appellant Nos.
             1 and 2 should not be let off on a technicality which is to be
             weighed against the totality of the evidence on record. In other
             words, he submits that on a plea of technicality, appellants
             should not be let off in as much as prosecution was able to
             establish their guilt.
       17.3. Further, in so far appellant No. 3 is concerned, learned
             Additional Solicitor General submits that now that the trial court
             has found him to be a juvenile on the date of commission of
             the offence, this Court may pass appropriate order.
[2025] 6 S.C.R.                                                          591

      Ramji Prasad Jaiswal @ Ramjee Prasad Jaiswal and Ors. v.
                           State of Bihar

18. Submissions made by learned counsel for the parties have received
    the due consideration of the Court.
19. Let us first deal with the question of juvenility qua appellant No. 3. It
    has come on record that appellant No. 3 relied upon the matriculation
    certificate issued by the Bihar School Examination Board as per which
    his date of birth is 24.12.1965. This would mean that he was around
    17 years of age during the period September, 1982 to December,
    1982 when the offence in question was allegedly committed by him.
    In Court herein, learned counsel representing CBI submitted on
    instructions that according to preliminary enquiry made by CBI, the
    certificate relied upon by appellant No. 3 was found to be genuine.
    Thereafter, this Court vide the order dated 21.09.2012 already alluded
    to hereinabove directed the learned Special Judge to hold enquiry
    under Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
    Children) Act, 2000 (briefly, ‘the JJ Act’). Section 7A of the JJ Act
    laid down the procedure to be followed when claim of juvenility was
    raised before any court. Section 7A read thus:
           7A. Procedure to be followed when claim of juvenility
           is raised before any court.—(1) Whenever a claim of
           juvenility is raised before any court or a court is of the
           opinion that an accused person was a juvenile on the
           date of commission of the offence, the court shall make an
           inquiry, take such evidence as may be necessary (but not
           an affidavit) so as to determine the age of such person,
           and shall record a finding whether the person is a juvenile
           or a child or not, stating his age as nearly as may be:
           Provided that a claim of juvenility may be raised before
           any court and it shall be recognized at any stage, even
           after final disposal of the case, and such claim shall be
           determined in terms of the provisions contained in this Act
           and the rules made thereunder, even if the juvenile has
           ceased to be so on or before the date of commencement
           of this Act.
           (2) If the court finds a person to be a juvenile on the date
           of commission of the offence under sub-section (1), it shall
           forward the juvenile to the Board for passing appropriate
           orders and the sentence, if any, passed by a court shall
           be deemed to have no effect.
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20. Therefore, what Section 7A contemplated was that when a claim of
    juvenility was raised or if the court was of the opinion that a person
    was a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence, the court
    was mandated to make an inquiry and after taking such evidence
    as might be necessary, was mandatorily required to record a finding
    whether the person was a juvenile or a child or not, stating his age
    as nearly as possible. As per the proviso, a claim of juvenility could
    be raised before any court and at any stage. If upon such inquiry,
    court found the person to be a juvenile on the date of commission
    of the offence, it had to forward the juvenile to the Juvenile Justice
    Board for passing appropriate orders and the sentence if any, passed
    by a court, would be deemed to have no effect.
21. Where a juvenile charged with an offence was produced before
    a Juvenile Justice Board then in terms of Section 14(1) of the JJ
    Act, the Juvenile Justice Board was required to hold an inquiry in
    accordance with the provisions of the JJ Act and make such order in
    relation to the juvenile as it deemed fit. If the Juvenile Justice Board
    found that the juvenile had committed an offence then Section 15
    of the JJ Act kicked in. Under Section 15 of the JJ Act, the Juvenile
    Justice Board could take various steps as contemplated thereunder
    and under sub-section (1)(g) had the discretion to make an order
    directing the juvenile to be sent to a special home for a period of
    3 years, which period could be reduced in an appropriate case in
    terms of the proviso.
22. Pursuant to the order of this Court dated 21.09.2012, learned Special
    Judge conducted the inquiry and thereafter passed an order on
    28.11.2013. Learned Special Judge noted that appellant No. 3 had
    passed matriculation examination from Seva Niketan High School,
    Barhuli, (Kaimur) in the year 1981 and in the matriculation certificate
    his date of birth has been mentioned as 24.12.1965. Secretary of
    Bihar School Examination Board also stated that appellant No. 3
    had appeared in the matriculation examination in the year 1981.
    According to the school register, the date of birth of appellant No. 3
    is 24.12.1965. CBI also confirmed that the date of birth of appellant
    No. 3 is 24.12.1965. In that view of the matter, learned Special Judge
    declared appellant No. 3 to be a juvenile on the date of the offence.
    Relevant portion of the order dated 28.11.2013 of the learned Special
    Judge reads as under:
[2025] 6 S.C.R.                                                           593

      Ramji Prasad Jaiswal @ Ramjee Prasad Jaiswal and Ors. v.
                           State of Bihar

           18. Thus from the evidence both oral and documentary it
           is evident that the convict Balmukund Jaiswal was juvenile
           on the date of offence relating to the instant case.
           19. In the result the convict Balmukund Jaiswal is declared
           juvenile under the provisions of section 7 and 49 of the Act.
23. Therefore, it is established now that appellant No. 3 was a juvenile on
    the date of commission of the offence i.e. the period from September,
    1982 to December, 1982. He was convicted by the trial court vide the
    judgment and order dated 29.05.2006. Ordinarily once an accused
    person was found to be a juvenile on the date of commission of the
    offence, he was required to be dealt with by the Juvenile Justice
    Board for carrying out necessary inquiry in terms of Section 14 of
    the JJ Act and thereafter to pass order under Section 15 including
    an order directing the juvenile to be sent to a special home for a
    period of 3 years. In the instant case, more than four decades have
    passed by since commission of the offence. In the circumstances, it
    is neither possible nor feasible to remand the case of appellant No.
    3 to the concerned Juvenile Justice Board to carry out the exercise
    under Sections 14 and 15 of the JJ Act. Therefore, the judgment
    and order of the trial court dated 29.05.2006 as affirmed by the High
    Court vide the judgment and order dated 24.11.2011 qua appellant
    no. 3 are hereby set aside on the ground of juvenility.
24. Let us now deal with the case of the other two appellants.
25. Insofar the said appellants are concerned, prosecution sought to
    establish their guilt through the evidence of PW-3 Rameshwar Lal
    Sharma and PW-25 Ved Kumar. PW-3 stated that he had started
    M/s. Rohtas Carriers in which Ramji Prasad Jaiswal was one of the
    partners. On 28.11.1979, Ramji Prasad Jaiswal left the partnership.
    Since then, M/s. Rohtas Carriers became the proprietorship firm of
    PW-3 alone. This witness stated that after 1979, his firm shifted to
    Patna. There was no office or business at Mohania of M/s. Rohtas
    Carriers thereafter.
26. PW-25 in his evidence stated that he had served M/s. Rohtas Carriers
    as a business executive in the year 1978. Proprietor of M/s. Rohtas
    Carriers was Rameshwar Lal Sharma. This firm was established
    in 1975-1976. He deposed that Ramji Prasad Jaiswal was earlier
    one of the partners of M/s. Rohtas Carriers but he had left it in the
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       year 1979. Since then, the partnership firm was converted into a
       proprietorship concern which shifted its office and business to Patna.
       Thereafter there was no Rohtas Carriers in existence at Mohania.
27. In addition to this, prosecution also exhibited a letter (Exhibit 5)
    written by Ramji Prasad Jaiswal to the Branch Manager of Central
    Bank of India, Fraser Road, Patna. As per this letter, Ramji Prasad
    Jaiswal had taken out his entire shares of partnership from Rohtas
    Carriers and thereafter he had no connection with Rohtas Carriers at
    all. This letter signed by Ramji Prasad Jaiswal disclosed that Ramji
    Prasad Jaiswal had left Rohtas Carriers on 28.11.1979.
28. After conclusion of the prosecution evidence, statements of the
    accused persons including the appellants were recorded under
    Section 313 CrPC. Insofar the present appeal is concerned, all
    the three appellants were asked four identical questions without
    putting them to notice the specific material brought on record by the
    prosecution witnesses against them. The four identical questions put
    to appellant No. 1 were as under:
            1.   Have you heard the statements given by the witnesses?
            2.   It has come in the evidence that 14 consignment notes/
                 transport receipts Nos. 616, 617, 140 to 148, 1101, 1102,
                 625, 635 and 1104 were prepared in the names of M/s
                 Bansal Stores, Mohania and Vishnuji Bhandar, Mohania
                 during the period August to December, 1982?
            3.   It has also come in the evidence that you in collusion
                 with accused Ajay Kumar Srivastava, Shiv Narain Bansal,
                 Chaithakh Singh, Bal Mukund Jaiswal and Ashok Kumar
                 Jaiswal in furtherance of a particular conspiracy transacted
                 with the State Bank of India on the basis of forged and
                 fabricated documents and after depositing Rs. 71,456.00,
                 you cheated the bank of Rs. 12,57,810.00?
            4.   Do you have to say anything in your defence?
29. Section 313 CrPC deals with the power of the court to examine the
    accused. Section 313 CrPC is as follows:
            313. Power to examine the accused.—(1) In every inquiry
            or trial, for the purpose of enabling the accused personally
            to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence
            against him, the court—
[2025] 6 S.C.R.                                                              595

       Ramji Prasad Jaiswal @ Ramjee Prasad Jaiswal and Ors. v.
                            State of Bihar

            (a) may at any stage, without previously warning the
            accused put such questions to him as the court considers
            necessary;
            (b) shall, after the witnesses for the prosecution have
            been examined and before he is called on for his defence,
            question him generally on the case:
            Provided that in a summons-case, where the court has
            dispensed with the personal attendance of the accused, it
            may also dispense with his examination under clause (b).
            (2) No oath shall be administered to the accused when
            he is examined under sub-section (1).
            (3) The accused shall not render himself liable to
            punishment by refusing to answer such questions, or by
            giving false answers to them.
            (4) The answers given by the accused may be taken into
            consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in evidence
            for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any
            other offence which such answers may tend to show he
            has committed.
            (5) The court may take help of prosecutor and defence
            counsel in preparing relevant questions which are to be
            put to the accused and the court may permit filing of
            written statement by the accused as sufficient compliance
            of this section.
30. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade Vs. State of Maharashtra1, this Court
    was examining Section 342 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure,
    1898 which is pari materia to Section 313 Cr.P.C. and explained the
    rationale behind such provision in the following words:
            16.................. It is trite law, nevertheless fundamental,
            that the prisoner’s attention should be drawn to every
            inculpatory material so as to enable him to explain it. This
            is the basic fairness of a criminal trial and failures in this
            area may gravely imperil the validity of the trial itself, if
            consequential miscarriage of justice has flowed. However,


1   (1973) 2 SCC 793
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                          Supreme Court Reports


            where such an omission has occurred it does not ipso facto
            vitiate the proceedings and prejudice occasioned by such
            defect must be established by the accused. In the event of
            evidentiary material not being put to the accused, the court
            must ordinarily eschew such material from consideration. It
            is also open to the appellate court to call upon the counsel
            for the accused to show what explanation the accused has
            as regards the circumstances established against him but
            not put to him and if the accused is unable to offer the
            appellate court any plausible or reasonable explanation
            of such circumstances, the Court may assume that no
            acceptable answer exists and that even if the accused
            had been questioned at the proper time in the trial court
            he would not have been able to furnish any good ground
            to get out of the circumstances on which the trial court
            had relied for its conviction. In such a case, the court
            proceeds on the footing that though a grave irregularity
            has occurred as regards compliance with Section 342,
            CrPC, the omission has not been shown to have caused
            prejudice to the accused...
31. Section 313 CrPC came up for consideration in Dharnidhar Vs. State
    of Uttar Pradesh2 where this Court outlined the proper methodology
    to be adopted by the court while recording statement of an accused
    under Section 313 CrPC. This Court held thus:
            29. The proper methodology to be adopted by the court
            while recording the statement of the accused under Section
            313 CrPC is to invite the attention of the accused to the
            circumstances and substantial evidence in relation to the
            offence, for which he has been charged and invite his
            explanation. In other words, it provides an opportunity
            to an accused to state before the court as to what is the
            truth and what is his defence, in accordance with law. It
            was for the accused to avail that opportunity and if he
            fails to do so then it is for the court to examine the case
            of the prosecution on its evidence with reference to the
            statement made by the accused under section 313 CrPC.


2   (2010) 7 SCC 759
[2025] 6 S.C.R.                                                           597

       Ramji Prasad Jaiswal @ Ramjee Prasad Jaiswal and Ors. v.
                            State of Bihar

32. This Court discussed the purpose of recording the statement of an
    accused under Section 313 CrPC in Raj Kumar Singh alias Raju
    alias Batya Vs. State of Rajasthan3 and held as under:
            30. In a criminal trial, the purpose of examining the
            accused person under Section 313 CrPC is to meet the
            requirement of the principles of natural jus-tice i.e. audi
            alteram partem. This means that the accused may be asked
            to furnish some explanation as regards the incriminating
            circumstances associated with him, and the court must
            take note of such explanation. In a case of circumstantial
            evidence, the same is essential to decide whether or not
            the chain of circumstances is complete. No matter how
            weak the evidence of the prosecution may be, it is the
            duty of the court to examine the accused, and to seek
            his explanation as regards the incriminating material that
            has surfaced against him. The circumstances which are
            not put to the accused in his examination under Section
            313 CrPC, cannot be used against him and have to be
            excluded from consideration.
33. Again, in Raj Kumar alias Suman Vs. State (NCT of Delhi)4, this
    Court summarized the law as regards Section 313 CrPC in the
    following manner:
            22. The law consistently laid down by this Court can be
            summarised as under:
            22.1. It is the duty of the trial court to put each material
            circumstance appearing in the evidence against the
            accused specifically, distinctively and separately. The
            material circumstance means the circumstance or the
            material on the basis of which the prosecution is seeking
            his conviction.
            22.2. The object of examination of the accused under
            Section 313 is to enable the accused to explain any
            circumstance appearing against him in the evidence.


3   (2013) 5 SCC 722
4   (2023) 17 SCC 95
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            22.3. The Court must ordinarily eschew material
            circumstances not put to the accused from consideration
            while dealing with the case of the particular accused.
            22.4. The failure to put material circumstances to the
            accused amounts to a serious irregularity. It will vitiate the
            trial if it is shown to have prejudiced the accused.
            22.5. If any irregularity in putting the material circumstance
            to the accused does not result in failure of justice, it
            becomes a curable defect. However, while deciding
            whether the defect can be cured, one of the considerations
            will be the passage of time from the date of the incident.
            22.6. In case such irregularity is curable, even the
            appellate court can question the accused on the material
            circumstance which is not put to him.
            22.7. In a given case, the case can be remanded to the
            trial court from the stage of recording the supplementary
            statement of the accused concerned under Section 313
            CrPC.
            22.8. While deciding the question whether prejudice has
            been caused to the accused because of the omission, the
            delay in raising the contention is only one of the several
            factors to be considered.
34. In a recent decision, this Court in Ashok Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh5
    held as under:
            23. In the present case, there is no doubt that material
            circumstances appearing in evidence against the
            appellant have not been put to him. The version of the
            main prosecution witnesses PWs 1 and 2 was not put to
            him. The stage of the accused leading defence evidence
            arises only after his statement is recorded under Section
            313 CrPC. Unless all material circumstances appearing
            against him in evidence are put to the accused, he cannot
            decide whether he wants to lead any defence evidence.



5   (2025) 2 SCC 381
[2025] 6 S.C.R.                                                              599

       Ramji Prasad Jaiswal @ Ramjee Prasad Jaiswal and Ors. v.
                            State of Bihar

           24. In this case, even the date and place of the crime
           allegedly committed by the appellant were not put to the
           appellant. What was reportedly seen by PW-2 was not put
           to the appellant in his examination. Therefore, the appellant
           was prejudiced. Even assuming that failure to put material
           to the appellant in his examination is an irregularity, the
           question is whether it can be cured by remanding the
           case to the trial court.
35. After surveying the law on this print, let us revert back to the facts of
    the present case. The manner in which the trial court had recorded
    the statements of the appellants under Section 313 CrPC was not at
    all in tune with the requirements of the said provision as explained
    by this Court as discussed supra.
36. Four questions generally were put to the appellants, that too, in a
    most mechanical manner. These questions did not reflect the specific
    prosecution evidence which came on record qua the appellants. As all
    the incriminating evidence were not put to the notice of the appellants,
    therefore, there was a clear breach of Section 313 CrPC as well as
    the principle of audi alteram partem. Certainly, this caused serious
    prejudice to the appellants to put forth their case. Ultimately, such
    evidence were relied upon by the court to convict the appellants.
37. Therefore, there is no doubt that such omission, which is a serious
    irregularity, has completely vitiated the trial. Even if we take a more
    sanguine approach by taking the view that such omission did not
    result in the failure of justice, it is still a material defect albeit curable.
    In Raj Kumar (supra), this Court highlighted that while deciding
    whether such defect can be cured or not, one of the considerations
    will be the passage of time from the date of the incident.
38. As we have already noted, the period during which the offence was
    allegedly committed was from September, 1982 to December, 1982.
    Trial was concluded on 29.05.2006. Nineteen years have gone by
    since then. At this distant point of time, instead of aiding the cause
    of justice, it will lead to miscarriage of justice if the case qua the two
    appellants are remanded to the trial court to restart the trial from
    the stage of recording the statements of the accused persons under
    Section 313 CrPC. In such circumstances, we are of the considered
    opinion that it is neither possible nor feasible to order such remand.
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                              Supreme Court Reports


       Consequently, appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt because
       of such omission in the recording of their statements under Section
       313 Cr.P.C. since the trial court had relied on the evidence adverse
       to the appellants while convicting them.
39. Therefore, their conviction and sentence has become untenable.
    Resultantly, we set aside the judgment and order of the trial court
    dated 29.05.2006 and that of the High Court dated 24.11.2011.
40. Since the appellants are on bail, their bail bonds are hereby cancelled.
41. Criminal appeal is accordingly allowed.

       Result of the case: Appeal allowed.



       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey