RAMESH CHANDRA VAISHYAversusTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.

                           [2023] 6 S.C.R. 643                              643


                  RAMESH CHANDRA VAISHYA                                    A
                                   v.
           THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 1617 of 2023)
                            MAY 19, 2023                                    B
     [S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND DIPANKAR DATTA, JJ.]
       Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 – ss. 3(1)(x), 18 – Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 323,
325, 392, 452, 504, 506 – Prosecution case that the appellant was
                                                                            C
engaged in an altercation with the second respondent-complainant
over the issue of drainage of water – It was alleged that during this
altercation, the appellant verbally hurled caste related abuses
towards the complainant and his family members, and subsequently
physically assaulted the complainant causing him multiple injuries
– Two FIRs were filed – First FIR by the complainant against the            D
appellant and second FIR by appellant against the complainant –
First FIR was registered against the appellant u/ss. 323, 504, IPC
and 3(1)(x), the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Charge-sheet filed – Appellant
sought quashing of criminal proceedings u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. before
                                                                            E
the High Court – High Court held that without evidence, it was not
possible to ascertain the veracity of the allegations, therefore
application u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. was not sustained – On appeal, held:
Neither the first F.I.R. nor the charge-sheet refers to the presence of
a fifth individual (a member of the public) at the place of occurrence
(apart from the appellant, the complainant, his wife and their son)         F
– Since the utterances, if any, made by the appellant were not “in
any place within public view”, the basic ingredient for attracting
section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act was missing/absent – Further, the
allegation in the first F.I.R. is that the appellant had beaten up the
complainant for which he sustained multiple injuries – Chargesheet
                                                                            G
neither refer to any eye-witnesses other than complainant’s wife
and son nor any medical report – The nature of hurt suffered by the
complainant in the process is neither reflected from the first F.I.R.
nor the charge-sheet – On the contrary, the appellant had the injuries
suffered by him treated immediately after the incident – High Court
misdirected itself in failing to appreciate the challenge to the criminal   H
                                   643
644            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 6 S.C.R.


A     proceedings including the charge-sheet in the proper perspective
      and occasioned a grave failure of justice in rejecting such challenge.
            Allowing the appeal, the Court
            HELD: 1. The first F.I.R., registered at the instance of the
      complainant, is silent about the place of occurrence and who,
B     being a member of the public, was present when the appellant is
      alleged to have hurled caste related abuses at the complainant.
      However, on a reading of the second F.I.R. registered at the
      behest of the appellant, it appears that the incident took place at
      the house of the appellant. The first question that calls for an
C     answer is whether it was at a place within public view that the
      appellant hurled caste related abuses at the complainant with an
      intent to insult or intimidate with an intent to humiliate him. From
      the charge-sheet dated 21 st January, 2016 filed by the I.O., it
      appears that the prosecution would seek to rely on the evidence
      of three witnesses to drive home the charge against the appellant
D     of committing offences under sections 323 and 504, IPC and
      3(1)(x), SC/ST Act. These three witnesses are none other than
      the complainant, his wife and their son. Neither the first F.I.R.
      nor the charge-sheet refers to the presence of a fifth individual
      (a member of the public) at the place of occurrence (apart from
E     the appellant, the complainant, his wife and their son). Since the
      utterances, if any, made by the appellant were not “in any place
      within public view”, the basic ingredient for attracting section
      3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act was missing/absent. This Court,
      therefore, hold that at the relevant point of time of the incident
      (of hurling of caste related abuse at the complainant by the
F     appellant), no member of the public was present. [Paras 16,
      17][651-C-G]
             2. That apart, assuming arguendo that the appellant had
      hurled caste related abuses at the complainant with a view to
      insult or humiliate him, the same does not advance the case of
G     the complainant any further to bring it within the ambit of section
      3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. It was noted from the first F.I.R. as well
      as the charge-sheet that the same makes no reference to the
      utterances of the appellant during the course of verbal altercation
      or to the caste to which the complainant belonged, except for the
H     allegation/observation that caste-related abuses were hurled. The
   RAMESH CHANDRA VAISHYA v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                          645
                PRADESH & ANR.

legislative intent seems to be clear that every insult or                A
intimidation for humiliation to a person would not amount to an
offence under section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act unless, of course,
such insult or intimidation is targeted at the victim because of he
being a member of a particular Scheduled Caste or Tribe. If one
calls another an idiot (bewaqoof) or a fool (murkh) or a thief (chor)
                                                                         B
in any place within public view, this would obviously constitute
an act intended to insult or humiliate by user of abusive or
offensive language. Even if the same be directed generally to a
person, who happens to be a Scheduled Caste or Tribe, per se, it
may not be sufficient to attract section 3(1)(x) unless such words
are laced with casteist remarks. Since section 18 of the SC/ST           C
Act bars invocation of the court’s jurisdiction under section 438,
Cr.PC and having regard to the overriding effect of the SC/ST
Act over other laws, it is desirable that before an accused is
subjected to a trial for alleged commission of offence under section
3(1)(x), the utterances made by him in any place within public
                                                                         D
view are outlined, if not in the F.I.R. (which is not required to be
an encyclopaedia of all facts and events), but at least in the charge-
sheet (which is prepared based either on statements of witnesses
recorded in course of investigation or otherwise) so as to enable
the court to ascertain whether the charge sheet makes out a case
of an offence under the SC/ST Act having been committed for              E
forming a proper opinion in the conspectus of the situation before
it, prior to taking cognisance of the offence. Even for the limited
test that has to be applied in a case of the present nature, the
charge-sheet dated 21 st January, 2016 does not make out any
case of an offence having been committed by the appellant under
                                                                         F
section 3(1)(x) warranting him to stand a trial. [Para 18][651-G-
H; 652-A-F]
       3. Section 323, IPC prescribes punishment for voluntarily
causing hurt. Hurt is defined in section 319, IPC as causing bodily
pain, disease or infirmity to any person. The allegation in the
first F.I.R. is that the appellant had beaten up the complainant for     G
which he sustained multiple injuries. Although the complainant
alleged that such incident was witnessed by many persons and
that he sustained injuries on his hand, the charge-sheet does
neither refer to any eye-witness other than the complainant’s wife
and son nor to any medical report. The nature of hurt suffered by        H
646            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2023] 6 S.C.R.


A     the complainant in the process is neither reflected from the first
      F.I.R. nor the charge-sheet. On the contrary, the appellant had
      the injuries suffered by him treated immediately after the incident.
      In the counter-affidavit filed by the first respondent (State) in the
      present proceeding, there is no material worthy of consideration
      in this behalf except a bald statement that the complainant
B     sustained multiple injuries “in his hand and other body parts”. If
      indeed the complainant’s version were to be believed, the I.O.
      ought to have asked for a medical report to support the same.
      Completion of investigation within a day in a given case could be
      appreciated but in the present case it has resulted in more
C     disservice than service to the cause of justice. The situation
      becomes all the more glaring when in course of this proceeding
      the parties including the first respondent are unable to apprise
      the outcome of the second F.I.R. In any event, the court do not
      find any ring of truth in the prosecution case to allow the
      proceedings to continue vis-à-vis section 323, IPC. [Para 21][652-
D     H; 653-A-D]
            Fiona Shrikhande and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra
            (2013) 14 SCC 44 : [2013] 9 SCR 240 – relied on.
            Mohd. Allauddin Khan v. The State of Bihar and Ors.
            (2019) 6 SCC 107 : [2019] 5 SCR 876; State of
E           Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. 1992 Supp
            (1) SCC 335 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259; Hitesh Verma
            v. The State of Uttarakhand and Anr. (2020) 10 SCC
            710 : [2020] 9 SCR 593 – referred to.
                             Case Law Reference
F
      [2019] 5 SCR 876                referred to              para 9
      [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259         referred to              para 10
      [2020] 9 SCR 593                referred to              para 10
      [2013] 9 SCR 240                relied on                para 22
G
           CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
      No.1617 of 2023.
            From the Judgment and Order dated 23.05.2022 of the High Court
      of Judicature at Allahabad in A482 No.38374 of 2018.
H           Ms. Vanshaja Shukla, Abhishek Chaterjee, Advs. for the Appellant.
      RAMESH CHANDRA VAISHYA v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                             647
                   PRADESH & ANR.

     Ardhendumauli Kumar Prasad, AAG, Adarsh Upadhyay,                         A
Divyanshu Sahay, Ashish Madaan, Ms. Pallavi Kumari, Ajay Marwah,
Sanjay Shukla, Adhitya Srinivasan, Tapan Masta, Advs. for the
Respondents.
          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
          DIPANKAR DATTA, J.                                                   B

          Leave granted.
      2. The present appeal, by special leave, questions the judgment
and order dated 23rd May, 2022 passed by a learned Single Judge of the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (“High Court”, hereafter)                C
dismissing an application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 19731 (“Cr. PC”, hereafter) instituted by the appellant seeking
quashing of the charge-sheet as well as the pending criminal proceedings2.
      3. In a nutshell, the prosecution’s case is that on 14th January,
2016, at about 7.00 am, the appellant was engaged in an altercation with       D
the second respondent (“complainant”, hereafter) over the issue of
drainage of water. It is alleged that during this altercation, the appellant
verbally hurled caste related abuses towards the complainant and his
family members, and subsequently physically assaulted the complainant
causing him multiple injuries. Consequently, on 20th January, 2016, a First
Information Report (“first F.I.R”, hereafter) was registered against the       E
appellant under sections 323 and 504, Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”,
hereafter) and 3(1)(x), the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (“SC/ST Act”, hereafter).
       4. Investigation was conducted by the concerned Circle Officer
(“I.O.”, hereafter). Upon investigation, which was completed within a          F
day, the I.O. reached the conclusion that there were materials against
the appellant to send him up for trial and consequently, a charge-sheet
dated 21st January, 2016 under sections 323, 504, IPC and 3(1)(x), SC/
ST Act was filed before the concerned court against him. The court
took cognizance of the offence on 3rd May, 2016.
                                                                               G
      5. It is important to emphasize at this juncture that the appellant
intended to lodge an F.I.R. arising out of the same incident. According to
him, he was badly beaten up by the complainant and his son with canes
1
    Application u/s 482 No. 38374 of 2018
2
    Case Crime No. 23 of 2016; Criminal Case No. 376 of 2016                   H
648                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 6 S.C.R.


A     and lathis on 14th January, 2016, as a result of which he too sustained
      injuries. On the same date, when the appellant approached the police
      station to lodge the F.I.R., it was not registered; instead, the appellant
      was challaned and kept under detention by the concerned inspector in-
      charge under sections 151, 107, and 116, Cr. PC. He was subsequently
      released upon furnishing bail bond. Owing to the failure of the Police to
B
      register the F.I.R., the appellant moved an application under section
      156(3), Cr. PC. Pursuant to the order passed by the Magistrate, an F.I.R.
      dated 18th February, 2016 (“second F.I.R.”, hereafter) was registered
      for the offences under sections 323, 325, 392, 452, 504, 506, IPC against
      the complainant (second respondent).
C            6. It is also noted that the appellant has instituted a suit3 before
      the civil court seeking permanent injunction against the complainant’s
      continued encroachment upon the appellant’s lands. The same is pending
      consideration before the competent court.
             7. Aggrieved by the aforesaid charge-sheet, the appellant invoked
D     the jurisdiction of the High Court on 5th October, 2018 by applying under
      section 482, Cr. PC. He sought quashing thereof as well as the criminal
      proceedings against him on the grounds that the said charge sheet
      discloses no offence and the present prosecution has been instituted
      with mala fide intention for the purposes of harassment.
E           8. Having held that a prima facie case for grant of interim relief
      was set up, the High Court, vide interim order dated 15th November,
      2018, directed that no coercive action be taken against the appellant,
      pending consideration of the application under section 482, Cr. PC.
             9. However, upon a contested hearing, the High Court found no
F     material irregularity in the charge-sheet or the procedure followed by
      the Court below in taking cognizance, and proceeded to dismiss the
      appellant’s application under section 482, Cr. PC vide the impugned
      judgment and order. The High Court held that, at this stage, it cannot be
      concluded that a cognizable offence has not been disclosed, as the
G     allegations are factual in nature and would require leading of evidence
      by the parties. Relying on the decision of this Court in Mohd. Allauddin
      Khan vs. The State of Bihar and Ors.4, the High Court emphasized
      that at the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under
      3
          C.S. No. 07 of 2017
      4
          (2019) 6 SCC 107
H
      RAMESH CHANDRA VAISHYA v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                              649
          PRADESH & ANR. [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]

section 482, Cr. PC, the court has limited jurisdiction and it cannot           A
appreciate the evidence in order to determine whether, prima facie, a
case has been made out against the accused. The High Court noted that
without evidence, it is not possible to ascertain the veracity of the
allegations at this stage; the application for quashing of a charge-sheet
or criminal proceedings under section 482 Cr. PC, therefore, cannot
                                                                                B
sustain.
      10. Appearing on behalf of the appellant, Ms. Shukla, learned
counsel advanced the following submissions:
         a.     The first F.I.R., which was registered after a delay of six
                days, is an afterthought and creates serious doubts over        C
                the allegations of the complainant.
         b.     The charge-sheet was filed on the very next day of
                registration of the first F.I.R., without conducting proper
                investigation. The charge-sheet fails to take note of the
                second F.I.R. registered at the instance of the appellant       D
                and the medical report.
         c.     The complainant, being an influential person in the village,
                maliciously initiated criminal proceedings against the
                appellant with an ulterior motive to scuttle the already
                pending civil dispute in the civil court between the parties.   E
         d.     The Police did not act on the appellant’s complaint. The
                second F.I.R. dated 18th February, 2016 was registered only
                after an order was passed on the appellant’s application
                under section 156(3), Cr. PC by the Magistrate.
         e.     State of Haryana and Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal and Ors.5              F
                was placed in support of the contention that if the contents
                of the F.I.R., taken on their face value, does not make out
                any case against the appellant, such an F.I.R. registered
                with ulterior motive deserves to be quashed.
         f.     Hitesh Verma vs. The State of Uttarakhand & Anr.6               G
                was also placed to support the contention that the High
                Court ignored the misuse and abuse of the provisions of the
                SC/ST Act by the complainant; neither the contents of the
5
    1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
6
    (2020) 10 SCC 710
                                                                                H
650              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2023] 6 S.C.R.


A                   first F.I.R. nor the charge-sheet discloses the precise content
                    of abusive language employed by the appellant so as to
                    attract the provisions of section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act.
            11. It was, accordingly, prayed that relief prayed for by the appellant
      be granted.
B            12. Mr. Prasad, learned Additional Advocate General appearing
      for the first respondent (State) while seeking dismissal of this appeal
      contended as follows:
            a.      The appellant had committed a serious crime as a result of
                    which the complainant had sustained multiple injuries in the
C                   resultant altercation.
            b.      The Police, on the basis of the statement given by the
                    complainant and the investigation that followed, filed the
                    charge-sheet dated 21st January, 2016 before the trial court
                    after following due procedure.
D
            c.      The High Court, vide the impugned judgment and order,
                    has rightly dismissed the application for quashing presented
                    by the appellant.
            d.      It is settled law that the jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr.
                    PC should be sparingly exercised with complete
E
                    circumspection and caution and the High Court was not in
                    error in refusing to exercise jurisdiction.
             13. Mr. Shukla, learned counsel appearing for the complainant
      (second respondent) supported the impugned judgment and order of the
      High Court. According to him, completion of investigation within a day
F
      by the I.O. may seem to be unusual but is not an impossibility. He also
      contended that the charge-sheet having been filed, the law must be
      allowed to take its own course; and, if at all the appellant is aggrieved
      by framing of charges, he may seek his remedy in accordance with law.
      No case for interference having been set up by the appellant, Mr. Shukla
G     prayed for dismissal of the appeal.
            14. We have heard the parties and perused the judgment and
      order of the High Court together with the materials on record.
             15. Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act, prior to its amendment
      notified vide S.O. 152(E) dated 18th January, 2016, read as follows:
H
   RAMESH CHANDRA VAISHYA v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                                  651
       PRADESH & ANR. [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]

       “3. Punishments for offences of atrocities. — (1) Whoever,                A
       not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,
       —
       ***
       (x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a
       member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place             B
       within public view;
       ***”
        16. The first F.I.R., registered at the instance of the complainant,
is silent about the place of occurrence and who, being a member of the           C
public,was present when the appellant is alleged to have hurled caste
related abuses at the complainant. However, on a reading of the second
F.I.R. registered at the behest of the appellant, it appears that the incident
took place at the house of the appellant.
        17. The first question that calls for an answer is whether it was at     D
a place within public view that the appellant hurled caste related abuses
at the complainant with an intent to insult or intimidate with an intent to
humiliate him. From the charge-sheet dated 21st January, 2016 filed by
the I.O., it appears that the prosecution would seek to rely on the evidence
of three witnesses to drive home the charge against the appellant of
committing offences under sections 323 and 504, IPC and 3(1)(x), SC/             E
ST Act. These three witnesses are none other than the complainant, his
wife and their son. Neither the first F.I.R. nor the charge-sheet refers to
the presence of a fifth individual (a member of the public) at the place
of occurrence (apart from the appellant, the complainant, his wife and
their son). Since the utterances, if any, made by the appellant were not         F
“in any place within public view”, the basic ingredient for attracting
section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act was missing/absent. We, therefore,
hold that at the relevant point of time of the incident (of hurling of caste
related abuse at the complainant by the appellant), no member of the
public was present.
                                                                                 G
       18.That apart, assuming arguendo that the appellant had hurled
caste related abuses at the complainant with a view to insult or humiliate
him, the same does not advance the case of the complainant any further
to bring it within the ambit of section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. We have
noted from the first F.I.R. as well as the charge-sheet that the same
makes no reference to the utterances of the appellant during the course          H
652             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2023] 6 S.C.R.


A     of verbal altercation or to the caste to which the complainant belonged,
      except for the allegation/observation that caste-related abuses were
      hurled. The legislative intent seems to be clear that every insult or
      intimidation for humiliation to a person would not amount to an offence
      under section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act unless, of course, such insult or
      intimidation is targeted at the victim because of he being a member of a
B
      particular Scheduled Caste or Tribe. If one calls another an idiot
      (bewaqoof) or a fool (murkh) or a thief (chor) in any place within public
      view, this would obviously constitute an act intended to insult or humiliate
      by user of abusive or offensive language. Even if the same be directed
      generally to a person, who happens to be a Scheduled Caste or Tribe,
C     per se, it may not be sufficient to attract section 3(1)(x) unless such
      words are laced with casteist remarks. Since section 18 of the SC/ST
      Act bars invocation of the court’s jurisdiction under section 438, Cr.PC
      and having regard to theoverriding effect of the SC/ST Act over other
      laws, it is desirable that before an accused is subjected to a trial for
      alleged commission of offence under section 3(1)(x), the utterances made
D
      by him in any place within public view are outlined, if not in the F.I.R.
      (which is not required to be an encyclopaedia of all facts and events),
      but at least in the charge-sheet (which is prepared based either on
      statements of witnesses recorded in course of investigation or otherwise)
      so as to enable the court to ascertain whether the charge sheet makes
E     out a case of an offence under the SC/ST Act having been committed
      for forming a proper opinion in the conspectus of the situation before it,
      prior to taking cognisance of the offence. Even for the limited test that
      has to be applied in a case of the present nature, the charge-sheet dated
      21st January, 2016 does not make out any case of an offence having
      been committed by the appellant under section 3(1)(x) warranting him
F
      to stand a trial.
             19. Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the decision in Hitesh Verma (supra)
      cited by Ms. Shukla can be pressed in aid to support the view that we
      have taken above.
G            20. The second question that would engage our attention is, whether
      the criminal proceedings against the appellant should be allowed to be
      taken further in view of the appellant facing accusation of offences
      punishable under sections 323 and 504, IPC.
             21. Section 323, IPC prescribes punishment for voluntarily causing
H     hurt. Hurt is defined in section 319, IPC as causing bodily pain, disease
      RAMESH CHANDRA VAISHYA v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                                 653
          PRADESH & ANR. [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]

or infirmity to any person. The allegation in the first F.I.R. is that the         A
appellant had beaten up the complainant for which he sustained multiple
injuries. Although the complainant alleged that such incident was
witnessed by many persons and that he sustained injuries on his hand,
the charge-sheet does neither refer to any eye-witness other than the
complainant’s wife and son nor to any medical report. The nature of
                                                                                   B
hurt suffered by the complainant in the process is neither reflected
from the first F.I.R. nor the charge-sheet. On the contrary, the appellant
had the injuries suffered by him treated immediately after the incident.
In the counter-affidavit filed by the first respondent (State) in the present
proceeding, there is no material worthy of consideration in this behalf
except a bald statement that the complainant sustained multiple injuries           C
“in his hand and other body parts”. If indeed the complainant’s
version were to be believed, the I.O. ought to have asked for a medical
report to support the same. Completion of investigation within a day in
a given case could be appreciated but in the present case it has resulted
in more disservice than service to the cause of justice. The situation
                                                                                   D
becomes all the more glaring when in course of this proceeding the
parties including the first respondent are unable to apprise us the outcome
of the second F.I.R. In any event, we do not find any ring of truth in the
prosecution case to allow the proceedings to continue vis-à-vis section
323, IPC.
      22. What remains is section 504, IPC. In Fiona Shrikhande and                E
Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra7, this Court had the occasion to hold
that:
         “13. Section 504 IPC comprises of the following ingredients viz.
         (a) intentional insult, (b) the insult must be such as to give
         provocation to the person insulted, and (c) the accused must intend       F
         or know that such provocation would cause another to break the
         public peace or to commit any other offence. The intentional insult
         must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break
         the public peace or to commit any other offence. The person who
         intentionally insults intending or knowing it to be likely that it will   G
         give provocation to any other person and such provocation will
         cause to break the public peace or to commit any other offence,
         in such a situation, the ingredients of Section 504 are satisfied.
         One of the essential elements constituting the offence is that there
7
    (2013) 14 SCC 44                                                               H
654              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2023] 6 S.C.R.


A            should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult
             and the mere fact that the accused abused the complainant, as
             such, is not sufficient by itself to warrant a conviction under Section
             504 IPC.”
              23. Based on the facts and circumstances of the case, we have
B     little hesitation in holding that even though the appellant might have abused
      the complainant but such abuse by itself and without anything more does
      not warrant subjecting the appellant to face a trial, particularly in t h e
      clear absence of the ingredient of intentional insult of such a degree that
      it could provoke a person to break public peace or commit any other
      offence.
C
             24. We record that the High Court misdirected itself in failing to
      appreciate the challenge to the criminal proceedings including the charge-
      sheet in the proper perspective and occasioned a grave failure of justice
      in rejecting such challenge.

D            25. For the reasons aforesaid, we unhesitatingly hold that it would
      be an abuse of the process of law to allow continuation of Criminal Case
      No.376 of 2016. While setting aside the impugned judgment and order
      of the High Court, we also quash Criminal Case No.376 of 2016.
             26. Consequently, this appeal succeeds. Parties shall, however,
E     bear their own costs.

      Ankit Gyan                                                      Appeal allowed.
      (Assisted by : Mahendra Yadav, LCRA)



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