Holding

An appellate court may validly take further evidence under Section 391 of the CrPC to cure procedural irregularities, provided it does not prejudice the accused and is not a substitute for a re‑trial.

Summary

The appellant, a Sub‑Inspector of Police, and a co‑accused were tried under Sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The trial court acquitted them, but the High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted them, citing that the demand for illegal gratification on 24 January 1989 had not been put to the accused under Section 313 of the CrPC. To cure this alleged irregularity, the High Court exercised its power under Section 391 of the CrPC and re‑examined the accused. The Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the High Court had authority to take such additional evidence. The Court held that Section 391 is a valid exception allowing appellate courts to take further evidence to rectify procedural irregularities, provided it does not prejudice the accused or amount to a re‑trial. The power must be exercised with caution, and the irregularity in this case was not a fatal defect. Consequently, the High Court’s conviction was upheld and the appeal dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether an appellate court may take additional evidence under Section 391 of the CrPC to remedy an alleged irregularity in the examination of the accused under Section 313.
Whether the exercise of Section 391 amounts to a re‑trial and violates the doctrine of finality of judicial proceedings.
What are the limits and principles governing the exercise of the power conferred by Section 391.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 41 Rule 27
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313, s. 391
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 13(1)(d), s. 13(2)

Subjects

Prevention of Corruption ActSection 391 CrPCadditional evidenceappellate jurisdictionirregularitySection 313criminal appealconviction upheld

Judgment

A RAMBHAU AND ANR.
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

APRIL 26, 2001

B [UMESH C. BANERJEE AND K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, JJ.]

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988:

Sections 13(l)(d) and 13(2)-Conviction under-Validity of r
c Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Sections 313, 391.

Court-Power to take additional evidence-Principles for exercise of
such power.

D Accused-Charge ofaccepting illegal gratijication-Factum ofpayment
of illegal gratification-Not put to accused persons in examination under
Section 313-Additional Examination of accused persons conducted by High
Court-Held valid-Object of Section 391 explained.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:
E
Order 41, Rule 27-Nature ofpower-Held akin to Section 391 Cr.P.C.

The a1>pellant, a Sub-Inspector of Police, alongwith another co-accused,
was 1>rosecuted under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the
Prevention of Corru1>tion Act, 1988. The trial court acqujtted the accused
F persons but on appeal the High Court convicted them for the offences charged.
During the hearing of appeal defence pointed out an irregularity to the High
Court vis. that the factum of the payment of alleged illegal gratification as
per the version of complainant was not put to the accused persons in their
examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
With a view to rectify the alleged irregularity the High Court exercised its
G power under Section 391 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and
conducted additional examination of both the accused persons.

In a1>peal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that
the High Court had no authority or jurisdiction to examine the accused
H persons so as to rectify the defect and the lacuna in the prosecution.
210
RAMBHAU v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 211
Dismissing the appeal, this Court A
HELD : 1. The finding of the High Court that accused persons are
guilty of the offence for which they were charged is correct. (217-F]

2. Section 391 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 forms an
exception to the general rule that an appeal must be decided on the evidence B
which was before the Trial Court and the 1wwers being an exception shall
always have to be exercised with caution and circumspection so as to meet
the ends of justice. The doctrine of finality of judicial proceedings does not
stand annulled or affected in any way by reason of exercise of power under
Section 391 since the same avoids a denovo trial. It is not to fill up the lacuna C
but to sub-senre the ends of justice. The power is available to the Court not
to fill up any gap in the prosecution case but to oversee that the concept of
justice does not suffer. No set of principles can be set forth for such an
exercise of power under Section 391, since the same is dependant upon the
fact-situation of the matter and having due regard to the concept of fair play
and justice, well being of the society. But additional evidence cannot and D
ought not to be received in such a way so as to cause any prejudice to the !

accused. It is not a disguise for a re-trial or to change the nature of the case
against the. accused. [213-A-C, 212-G]

Rajeswar Prasad Misra v. State of West Bengal and Anr:, AIR (1965)
SC 1887, referred to. E
3. The word 'irregularity' means and implies contrary to rule. It
clearly covers any case where a thing has not been done in the manner laid
down by the statute, irrespective of what that manner might be. The omission
rectified by the High Court cannot but be ascribed to be a mere irregularity.
It is not a defect incurable in nature but a mere irregularity which the High F
Court thought it fit to cure. No material objection can be taken to such a
method adopted by the High Court. [217-C-E]

The Martin Burn Ltd. v. The Corporation of Calcutta, AIR (1966) SC
529, referred to.
G
Corporation of Calcutta v. Chandoola/ Bhai Chand Modi 57 Calcutta
W.N. 882; AIR (1953) Calcutta 773, approved.

Black's Law Dictionary, referred to.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. H
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 3 S.C.R.

A 636 of 1995.

From the Judgment and Order dated 18.6.93 of the Bombay High Court ).....,,
in Crl. A. No. 118of1992.

M.P. Verma and N.K. Agga1wal for the Appellant.
B
S.V. Deshpande and S.M. Jadhav for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BANERJEE, J. There is available a very wide discretion in the matter
C of obtaining additional evidence in terms of Section 391 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. A plain look at the statutory provisions (Section 391)
would reveal the same and the same reads as below:
'
"391. Appellate Court may take further evidence or direct it to be
taken - (1) In dealing with any appeal u!lder this Chapter, the Appellate
D Court, if it thinks additional evidence to be necessary, shall record its
reasons and may either take such. evidence itself, or direct it to be
taken by a Magistrate, or when the Appellate Court is a High Court,
by a Court of Session or a Magistrate. (2) When the additional
evidence is taken by the Court of Session or the Magistrate, it or he
shall certify such evidence to the appellate Court, a.11d such Court
E shall thereupon proceed to dispose of the appeal.

(3) The accused or his pleader shall have the right to be present when
the additional evidence is taken.

(4) The taking of evidence under this section shall be subject to the
F provisions of Chapter XXIII, as if it were an inquiry.

A word of caution however, ought to be introduced for guidance, to wit:
that this additional evidence cannot and ought not to be received in such a
way so as to cause any prejudiee to the accused. It is not a disguise for a
G re-trial or to change the nature of the case against the accused. This Court
in the case of Rajeswar Prasad Misra v. State of West Bengal and another,
AIR (1965) SC 1887 in no uncertain terms observed that the order must not
ordinarily be made if the prosecution has had a fair opportunity and has not
availed of it. This Court was candid enough to record however, thM it is the
concept of justice which ought to prevail and in the event, the same dictates
H exercise of power as conferred by the Code, there ought not to be any
RAMBHAU v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [BANERJEE, J.] 213

hesitation in that regard. A
Be it noted that no set of principles can be set forth for such an exercise
of power under Section 391, since the same is dependant upon the fact- :
situation of the matter and having due regard to the concept of fair play and ·
justice, well being of the society.
B
Incidentally, Section 391 forms an exception to the general rule that an
Appeal must be decided on the evidence which was before the Trial Court
and the powers being an exception shall always have to be exercised with
caution and circumspection so as to meet the ends of justice. Be it noted
further that the doctrine of finality of judicial proceedings does not stand I
annulled or affected in any way by reason of exercise of power under Section C
391 since the same avoids a de novo trial. It is not to fill up the lacuna but
to sub-serve the ends of justice. Needless to record that on an analysis of
the Civil Procedure Code, Section 391 is thus akin to Order 41Rule27 of the
C.P. Code.

On the factual backdrop of the matter in issue, it appears that against ~ D
an order of acquittal for the offence punishable under Section 13 (1) (d) read '
with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the High Court
reversed the finding of acquittal and held the accused persons guilty for the
offence for which they were charged and convicted them for the offence
under Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and sentenced the E
Appellant No. I to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and
to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000 and as against accused No. 2, the imprisonment ,
period was for one year together with a fine amount of Rs. 3000 and hence 1

the Appeal before this Court.

Before going into the factual score further, it is convenient to note at F
this juncture that during the course of hearing of this appeal, the High Court
thought it fit to conduct an additional examination of both the accused
persons with a reasoning as below: "We have examined them to rectify the
irregularity as cropped up and pointed out by the defence". The word ~
'irregularity' in common English parlance means and implies contrary to rule. ' G
This Court in the case of The Martin Burn Ltd. v. The Corporation of .
Calcutta, AIR (1966) SC 529 while explaining the meaning of irregularity
observed: "A point was, however, made that Section 131 (2)(b) apply only to
a cancellation on the ground of irregularity, that is a procedural defect such
as, absence of notice, omission to give. a hearing etc., There is, however, no
reason to restrict the ordinary meaning of the word 'irregularity' and confine H
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 3 S.C.R.

A it to procedural defects only. None has been advanced. Such a contention
was rejected and we think rightly in 57 Calcutta W.N.882: (AIR 1953 Calcutta ·
773). That word clearly covers any case where a thing has not been done in
the manner laid down by the statute, irrespective of what that manner might
be". Black's Law Dictionary defines the word as 'not according to rule and
not regular' i.e. which stands contrary to rule. As noticed above, the purpose
B of introduction of Section 391 (earlier Section 428) in the s.tatute book has
been for the purpose of making it available to the Court nor to fill up any gap
in the prosecution case but to oversee that the concept of justice does not
suffer. The High Court itself records "to rectify the irregularity", the issue
therefore, is whether this rectification by an additional evidence is a mere
C irregularity or goes to the root of the issue and instead of sub-serving the
ends of justice, the same runs counter to the concept of justice.

.Jt is at this stage however, the entire factual set up ought to be adverted
to. On 19-01-1989 one Mr. Hiwanje lodged a com1>,laint of abuses and quarrel
between Sangan1lal and his wife. The Appellant No. I being the Sub-Inspector
D called tl1em to the Police Station on 23-1-1989 and on their reporting at about
9.30 a.m., Appellant No. I demanded ~s. 1500 from Sangamlal for terminating
the proceedings. Witl1 the intervention of the Appellant No. 2 however, the
demand was settled at Rs. 1300. The complainant (PW 1) Sangamlal, however,·
at around 12.45 hours lodged a report with the Anti Corruption Bureau and
E accordingly a Panchnama was drawn. One Purushottam Manapure was
introduced as Panch and 13 tainted currency notes of 100 denomination were
entrusted to the complainant P. W. l. The raiding party in the afternoon arranged
a trap, it was however unsuccessful.

The factual context depicts that on 24.1.1989 at about 8.30 a.m., PW I
F Sangamlal and Panch PW 3 Manapure went to the accused No. I in the Police
Station and the later directed Sangamlal to go with the accused No.2 for the
purpose of exchange of notes. Certain other factual details though available
on record but can be avoided as irrelevant for the present purpose, suffice

G
it to note that eventually the tainted currency notes in possession with the
complainant reached P. W.6 Raman Wadekar and the raiding party headed by
PW 9 Sub-Inspector Saraf reached the spot and seized the tainted currency
·-
notes from PW 6 Wadekar in the petrol pump. The seizure thus took place
at a spot which was 2 kilometers away from the Police Station. The second
Panchnama was accordingly drawn up and after necessary investigation,
chargesheet was filed upon obtaining sanction from the Commissione1 of
H Police for the launch of {>rosecution. The defence of the accused No. I was
RAMBHAU v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [BANERJEE , J.] 215
of total denial and according to him, it is by reason of annoyance and A
vendetta that has brought the complaint into light and has no factual support
./ -i
therefor.

Incidentally, be it noted that P. W. 7 Tijare, a neighbour of Sangam Lal
(P.W. I) was throughout in the company of Sangamlal. Coming back to the
defence once again, the Appellant No.2 also denied such an involvement.and B
according to him, since the vehicle of one relation of P. W. 7 Tijare was
questioned on the road, P. W. 7 has given false version against him.
--<.
~
Records depict that learned Special Judge, however, recorde~ a finding
of acquittal on the ground that the sanction as accorded is bad in law since c
the Commissioner of Police, though was the appointing authority but no
evidence has been laid that he was also the disciplinary authority and as such
the Commissioner is not otherwise competent to accord sanction to prosecute.
The High court negatived it and we do not see any reason for a different
conclusion in the matter. Significantly, even the defence counsel, as has been
recorded in the judgment, could not support such a reasoning. As regards D
the merit, the learned Special Judge held that the demand and acceptance by
;&. the Appellant No. I have not been proved. The learned Special Judge in his
~'
judgment did mention the instance of demand on 22nd January and reached
a conclusion that the same has not been proved but there has been a total
omission as regards t11e demand on 23rd January. This aspect of the matter E
has been elaborately dealt with by the High Court and the High Court upon
,' consideration of all relevant evidence came to a conclusion that taking into
account the version of Sangamlal, the complainant and that of Tijare (P. W. 7),
there cannot be any manner of doubt ·that the prosecution has fully established
_, ~ the demand by Appellant No. I on 23rd January, 1989. As regards the demand
.and acceptance on 24th January, !98?, the High Court <also negatived the F
finding of the learned Special Judge who reached a conclusion that the
demand on 24th January, 1989 is completely untrustworthy. It is on this score,
it was argued before the High Court that the factum of payment on 24th
January as per the version of P. W. I Sangamlal was not put to the accused
persons in their examination under Section 313 or'the Code of Criminal
G
- Procedure and as such circumstances cannot be used against the accused.
It is on this count, the High Court conducted additional examination of both
the accused persons in the High Court so as "to rectify the irregularity as
·~
cropped up and P?inted out by the defence.

Before the High Court strenuous submissions made pertaining to the H,
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 3 S.C.R.

A effect of acceptance of uncorroborated testimony, and the High Court dealt
with the issue in the manner following:

"7. There cannot be any debate on a broad proposition. Judicial
prudence ordinarily look for a corroboration from an independent
witness, to the version of the complainant. Undisputedly the Panch
B does not render corroboration to the version of the complainant on
the aspect of demand on 24.1.1989. However, ·as discussed the
circumstances and the facts of the case are peculiar. In the instant
case, the demand and acceptance did not take place then and there.
After the demand, as claimed, the seizure took place at a distance of
c 2 kilometers from the Police Station from PW 6. Between demand and
seizure, the peculiarity of the case is that there were intervening
events. Moreover, the prosecution does not claim direct acceptance
by the accused No. I. We, therefore, propose to examine whether the
circumstances which have been brought on record, render corroboration
to the demand and acceptance.
D
We may mention at this stage that the accused No.2 only in his
statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, tried .......
to suggest that owing to his venture of kicking PW I Sangamlal, he
lodged a false complaint. However, during the entire cross-examination
no such allegation was made to PW I Sangamlal. The motive as tried
E to be attributed, is imaginary and by way of an afterthought.

8.......................................... .

9. During the course of arguments or even otherwise in the cross-
examination it is not explained as to how the· PW 1 complainant A-,_
F Sangamlal !pproached the accused No.2 for getting the notes changed.
No suggestion was made to PW 1 Sangamlal in cross-examination on
behalf of accused No.2. There was no even formal inquiry as to why
and what for the complainant needed the change of the notes. It was
also not suggested that the complainant in any manner was in need
of the notes of smaller denominations. As such the entire claim as put
G forth by the accused No.2 is completely infirm. It goes to suggest that
he took the mission of getting the notes changed as decided earlier.
His defence that he happened to be in Shere Punjab Hotel and
incidentally the complainant _came there, is patently false. Thking into
account the evidence of PW 1 Sangamlal, PW 3 Manapure, PW 4
H Dongre, PW 5 Hadke, PW 6 Wadekar and PW 7 Tijare it is fully
RAMBHAU v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [BANERJEE, J.] 217
established that it is the accused No.2 who took the complainant for A
getting the notes exchanged. Even otherwise the defence has not
seriously challenged the testimony of PW 4 Dongre, PW 5 Hadke and
PW 6 Wadekar in this behalf.

Mr. Verma, the learned Senior Advocate very strognly contended that
High Court had no authority or jurisdiction to examine the accused persons B
in the High Court to rectify the defect and the lacuna in the prosecution. The
High Court records it to be a mere irregularity and on the complexities of
issue, we do not see any reason as to why such a course ought not to be
'\..
......,., " permitted to be taken recourse to, in the fact-situation of the matter under
consideration. The omission cannot but be ascribed to be a mere irregularity.
The High Court on the basis of relevant evidence on record held that the
c
prosecution has fully established the demand by the accused No. I on 23rd
» January, 1989. It is the demand of 24th January which was said to have not
been put to the accused but the factum of demand on an earlier day stands
proved and concluded together with the seizure of the tainted notes on 24th
January, completes the o:ffence, as such omission to put to the accused, the D,
demand on 24th cannot be said to be of such a nature which would go to
the root of the matter. It is not a defect incurable in nature but a mere
~
irregularity which the High Court thought it fit to cure, as such we do not
find any material objection to such a method as stands adopted by the High
Court. The irregularity has been cured. The prosecution has clearly established E,
that the Appellant No.1 is a public servant and in discharge of his official
. duties made a demand of Rs. 3000 from PW 1 Sangamlal as an illegal gratification
and taking into account the evidence as is available on record, the accused
No.2 also has played a very significant role in negotiating on the figure of
_., ...... the amount and further having the notes exchanged at the dictate of the
Appellant No.I, it cannot thus but be said that the Appellant No.2 substantially F
abetted the crime and thus we record our agreement in the finding of the High
Court that the accused persons are guilty of the offence for which they were
charged and question of recording a finding of acquittal in the matter cannot
by any stretch be sustained. In that view of the matter, this Appeal fails and
is dismissed.
G
~ T.N.A. Appeal dismissed.

i....