Holding

All the ingredients of murder under Section 300 IPC are satisfied; the conviction under Section 302 IPC is upheld.

Summary

The appellants, Ramashraya and another, attacked the deceased Ajeet with a lathi, inflicting severe injuries to his skull and body, which caused his death. They argued that the incident arose from a sudden quarrel, that there was no pre‑meditation or intention to kill, and that the offence should be treated as culpable homicide under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. The trial court convicted them under Section 302 read with Section 34 for murder, a decision affirmed by the High Court. The Supreme Court examined whether the nature of the injuries and the circumstances satisfied the ingredients of murder under Section 300. It held that the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and that the appellants had the intention to cause death, thereby excluding the case from the exceptions to murder. Consequently, the conviction under Section 302 IPC was upheld and the appeal dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the facts constitute murder under Section 300 of the IPC or culpable homicide under Section 304 Part II.
Whether the appellants had the intention to cause death or merely knowledge that death might result.
Whether the offence falls within any of the exceptions to murder under Section 300.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 300, s. 302, s. 304(II), s. 34

Subjects

murderculpable homicideintentionpremeditationSection 302 IPCSection 304 IPCcommon intentionIndian Penal Code

Judgment

RAMASHRAYAAND ANR. A
v.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

FEBRUARY 23, 2001

[U.C. BANERJEE AND K.G. BALAKR!SHNAN, JJ.] B

Penal Code, 1860 : Sections 302134 and 304 Part II.

Murder-Offence of-Conversion-To culpable homicide-Necessary cir-
cumstances for-Accused inflicted serious injuries on the skull and all over the
body of deceased-Accused took the plea that death resulted due to sudden
c
quarrel and there ivas neither pre-meditation nor intention to cause death-
Held : From the nature of injuries it is clear that all the ingredients of the
offence of murder are made out-There is intention to cause death and the
injuries are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death-Plea of
accused rejected-S. 302 Pt. 11 not applicable and accused rightly convicted D
under S. 302.

Words and Phrases :

"Murder"-Meaning of-Jn the context of S. 300 of the Penal Code,
l~ E
The appellants-accused were convicted by the trial court under Sec-
tion 302/34 of the Penal Code, 1860. The High Court confirmed the convic-
tion. Hence this appeal.

According to the prosecution, on the fateful day, the accused persons F
inflicted severe injuries on the skull and all over the body of the deceased
~- after the wordy altercation and quarrel with the deceased.

On behalf of the accused persons it was contended that there was no
pre-meditation and the quarrel took place all of a sudden; that the ac-
cused had no intention to cause the death of the deceased; that the offence G
committed by the accused was not "murder" but only "culpable homicide"
and, therefore, the accused were liable to be punished under Section 304
PartIIIPC.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court
H
75
r
76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] 2 S.C.R.
A HELD: FrJm the nature oflrtjuries and the origin and genesis of the
Incident, it could be spelt out that all the ingredients of the offence of
murder defined Jnder Section 300 or the Penal Code, 1860 are made out
and It Is not possible to bring the offence within any of the five exceptions
or Section 300 JPC. Therefore, Section 304 IPC cannot be invoked. The
appellants' argument that there was no Intention on the part or accused to
B
cause the death of the deceased cannot be accepted in view or the nature of
irtjuries sustained by the deceased. Though the quarrel between the ac·
cosed and the deceased ensued after a wordy altercation. a series of irtju·
ries were caused by the accused on the skull and all over the body of the )•
deceased. Both the appellants had brutally attacked the deceased. Having
c regard to the nature of the injuries and the circumstances under which the
injuries came to be inflicted, it is clearly established that the appellants had
the intention to cause the death of the deceased and the injuries caused
were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The
appellants have been rightly convicted under Section 302 IPC. (82-A-D]
D State of M.P. v. Jhaddu, (1991) Supp. 1 SCC 545; Morcha v. State of
Rajasthan, (1979) 1 SCC 161; Madan/al v. State of Punjab, (1992) Supp. 2
SCC 233; Ramesh Vithalrao Thakre v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1995) SC
1453; Santosh v. State of M.P., [1975] 3 SCC 727; Kapur Singh v. State of
PEP SU, AIR (1956) SC 654; W Slaney v. State of M.P., AIR (1956) SC 116;
E !Axman Kalu v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1960) SC 1390; Ramesh Kumar
v. State of Bihar, [1994] Supp. 1 SCC 116; Afrahim Sheikh v. State of West
Benga4 AIR (1964) SC 1263 and Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (1958)
SC 465, referred to.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos.
F 132-134 of 2000.

From the Judgment and Order dated 21.8.98 of the Madhya Pradesh
High Court in Crl.A. Nos. 568, 950 and 951 of 1989.

Ms. N. Annapoorani, (A.C.) for the Appellants.
G
Ms. Kamakhsi S. Mehlwal and Uma Nath Singh for the 'Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, J, The appellants herein challenge their
H conviction and sentence under Section 302 !PC read with Section 34 !PC.
RAMASHRAYA v. STATE [BALAKRISHNAN, J.] 77

-- They were tried by the Fourth Addi. Sessions Judge, Raipur, alleging that they
caused the death of one Ajeet. The prosecution case was that on 19.12.1987
when the deceased Ajeet and his son, Laljee, were doing some worlc in their
paddy field, the appellants came there in their bullock cart. Deceased Ajeet
A

was grazing his buffaloes near his field and a little away, his son Laljee, was
collecting bundles of paddy. It seems that the appellants wanted to drive their
B
bullock cart through the Tewda field of the deceased. Deceased Ajeet, ob-
jected to this and there ensued a quarrel between Ajeet and the appellants.
Appellant Kripa Ram tried to hit the deceased on his head but the blow fell
on the shoulder of the deceased. Seeing this, Lalj ee came near the deceased
to save him, but Ajeet shouted, "Run away son, they are waiting for you, do
notcome this way." According to the prosecution, both the appellants in- C
flicted severe injuries on the deceased Ajeet and he fell down on the ground_
Seeing the altercation and beating being given to his father, Laljee ran away
and on the way met Hirday Kumar. They returned to the place of incident and
saw Ajeet lying dead on the ground. Later, the matter was reported to the
Police_ The Inquest Report was prepared and the body of Ajeet was subjected. D
to post- mortem_ The recovery report was also prepared_ Two broken pieces
of the tooth of Ajeet were recovered from the place of incident along with
blood stained earth and the 'lathi' alleged to have been used to kill the
deceased_

PW-1, LaljJle; PW-2, Sukalu; and PW-6, Basant are the witnesses who E
were examined on the prosecution side. PW-1 narrated the whole incident in
detail. PW-2 only spoke about the presence of the accused at the place
of the incident. PW-6, Basant deposed that he had heard Ajeet shouting
that he was being killed and saw the appellants assaulting him with
'lathi' - The evidence of these witnesses was satisfactorily proved by the F
prosecution.

We heard the learned counsel for the appellants, who contended that
these witnesses were interested-witnesses and the courts below erred in plac-
ing reliance on these witnesses. We do not find much force in this contention.
G
The learned counsel further contended that the offence, if at all com-
mitted by the appellants, will not come within the definition of 'murder', but
only 'culpable homicide' and the appellants are liable to be punished under
Section 304 Part II, !PC. It was urged by learned counsel that there was no
pre-meditation and the quarrel took place all of a sudden pursuant to a wordy H
78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A altercation between the appellants and the deceased and that the appellants
had not taken undue advantage of the situation. It was also urged that there
was no intention on the part of the appellants to cause the death of the
deceased. The learned counsel submitted that the circumstances of the case
do not also indicate that there was knowledge on the part of the appeliants
that the injuries caused by them were likely to cause death. Reference was
B
made to a series of decisions by learned counsel for the appellants in support
of her contention.

In State ofMadhya Pradesh v. Jhaddu & Ors., [1991] Supp. 1 SCC 545, J>
this Court held that there was no intention to kill, but the accused could be
C imputed with the knowledge that death was the likely result and therefore the
conviction of the accused under Section 304 Part II !PC was affirmed. The
deceased had sustained injuries on the chest resulting in fracture of ribs and
laceration of lungs leading to death. This was on the basis of the nature of
injuries that such a finding was recorded.
D
Morcha v. Stale of Rajasthan, [1979] I SCC 161 was a case where the
accused husband went to fetch his wife at his in-laws village and on her
refusal to accompany him immediately attacked her causing fatal injuries.
The trial court held that the accused had no intention to kill and convicted
him under Section 304 Part II. On appeal by the State, the High Court
E converted the conviction to that under Section 302. This Court held that the
circumstances show that the appellant went armed with a dagger and despite
the willingness expressed by the wife to accompany him next morning the
accused inflicted two injuries on her person and the evidence indicated that
the wound on the posterior axillary line caused injury to the liver and per-
foration of the large colon and was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature
F
to cause death and it was held that the whole affair appeared to be pre-planned
and pre-meditated. That the accused intended to cause the death of the
deceased is further clear from the fact that he inflicted such a severe injury.

In Madan/al v. Stale of Punjab, [1992] Supp 2 SCC 233, the accused
G caused serious injuries to the deceased with the handle of a pump due to which
the deceased died 3 days thereafter. The motive of the crime was that the
accused was hungry for three days and when he demanded food from the
deceased 'Sewadar' of the 'Dera', where free food was being served, the
deceased refused and consequently, the accused, in a fit of anger, attacked the
H deceased suddenly on being deprived of the power of self-control. This Court
RAMASHRAYA v. STATE [BALAKRISHNAN, J.] 79
held that the offence would come under Section 304 Part II !PC instead of A
302.
In Ramesh Vithalrao Thakre & .4.nr. v. State of Maharaihtra, AIR (1995)
SC 1453, there was only one injury on the deceased. The accnsed had given
a single blow by knife on the abdomen of the deceased while the latter was
trying to intervene to save her brother being attacked by the accused. This
B
Court held that the accused could be clothed with knowledge and not intention
that the injury was likely to cause death and, therefore, the offence fell under
Section 304 Part II !PC and not Section 300 !PC.

In Santosh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1975] 3 SCC 727, the Sessions
Judge, relying on an earlier case in AIR (1956) SC 654 (Kapur Singh v. State
c
ofPEPSU) convicted the appellant under Section 304 Part-I !PC on the ground
that the injuries were inflicted on the limbs of the 3 men who died of bleeding,
but infliction of injuries on vital parts of the body was deliberately avoided and,
therefore, an intention to murder was not established. This Court held that the
learned Sessions Judge appeared to have overlooked the various clauses of D
Section 300 !PC. An intention to kill is not required in every case. Knowledge
that the natural and probable consequences of an act would be death will suffice
for a conviction under Section 302 !PC.

In W. Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1956) SC 116, the
accused, a 22 years old, was in love with the sister of the deceased who did E
not like this intimacy. On the day of occurrence there was a quarrel between
the deceased and the accused and the accused was asked to g~t away from
the house of the sister. Shortly afterwards, the accused returned with his
younger brother and called the sister to come out. Instead, the deceased came
out and there was a heated exchange of words. The accused slapptd the F
deceased on the cheek. The accused lifted his fist. The accused snatched a
hockey stick from his younger brother and gave one blow on the head of the
+ deceased with the result that his skull was fractured. The deceased died in the
hospital ten days later. It was held that where the accused, causing the death
of another, had no intention to kill, tl1en the offence would be murder only
G
if (i) the accused knew that the injury inflicted would be likely to cause death
or (ii) that it woltld be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death
or (iii) that the accused knew that the act must in all probability cause death.
On the facts and circumstances of the case, it was held that the offence fell
under Section 304 Part -II !PC and not under Section 302 as there was no pre-
meditation and there was a sudden fight. The nature of the injury was such H
?

80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A that the accused could not be attributed with the special knowledge required
by Section 300 !PC, nor was the injury sufficient in the ordinary course of :
nature to cause death.
~

Reference was also made to the decisions of this Court in AIR (1960)
SC 1390; Laxman Kalu v. State of Maharashtra, [1994] Supp.(!) SCC 116;
B Ramesh Kumar v. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR (1964) SC 1263 and Afrahim
Sheikh & Ors. v. State of West Bengal.

In all the cases referred to above, the facts and circumstances show that ).
the occurrence took place all of a sudden and there was no pre-meditation on
c the part of the accused. From the nature of the injury also, it would be
observed that the accused had only the knowledge that the injury was likely
to cause death, but intention as such cannot be attributed to them. The second
part of Section 304 speaks of 'knowledge' and does not refer to 'intention',
which has been segregated in the frrst part. But the knowledge is knowledge
of the likelihood of death. In order to bring the offence under clause (3) of
D Section 300, the prosecution must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily
injury is present and the nature of injury must be proved.

In Virsa Singh v. Stau of Punjab, AIR (1958) SC 465, it was held as
under:
E
"In considering whether the intention was to inflict the injury found
-.r
to have been inflicted, the enquiry necessarily proceeds on broad lines
as, for example, whether there was an intention to strike at a vital or
a dangerous spot, and whether with sufficient force to cause the kind
of injury found to have been inflicted. It is, of course, not necessary
F to enquire into every last detail as, for instance, whether the prisoner
intended to have the bowels fall out, or whether he intended to
penetrate the liver or the kidneys or the heart. Otherwise, a man who
has no knowledge of anatomy could never be convicted, for, if he
+

G
does not know that there is a heart or a kidney or bowels, he cannot
be said to have intended to injure them. Of course, that is not the kind
of enquiry. It is broad-based and simple and based on commonsense:
the kind of enquiry that "twelve good men and true" could readily
-
appreciate and understand.
.,.
To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts
H before it can bring a case under S. 300 "thirdly";
~

''

RAMASHRAYA v, STATE [BALAKRISHNAN, J.] 81
First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is A
present;

Secondly, the nature of injury must be proved; These arc purely
o~jcctive investigations.

Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict B
that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidcn-
ta! or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended.

Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry
proceeds further, and,
.- c
Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just de-
scribed made up of the three-element set out above is sufficient
to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the
enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do
with the intention of the offender.
D
Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of
course, the burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is
murder under S.300 "thirdly''. It does not matter that there was no
intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was no intention
~
even to cause an.injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in
E
the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction
""'- between the two). It does not even matter that there is no knowledge
that an act of that kind will be likely to canse death. Once the
intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is
proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only
question is whether, as a matter of purely object inference, the injury F
is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No one
has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to
cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are
not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must
face the consequences; and they can only escape if it can be shown, G
or reasonably deduced, that the injury was accidental or otherwise
unintentional.,,

Argument of the appellants' counsel is that the incident happened
-y
pursuant to a sudden quarrel and the appellants had no pre-meditation to cause
the death of the deceased and therefore, the offence would come under H
82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A 'culpable homicide' punishable under Section 304 !PC. In order to decide the
question, the nature of the il\iuries sustained by the deceased and the circum-
stances under which the incident took place are relevant factors. From the
nature of the injuries and the origin and genesis of the incident, it could be
spelt out that all the ingredients of the offence of murder defined under
Section 300 !PC are made out and it is not possible to bring the offence within
B
any of the five exceptions of Section 300 !PC. Therefore, Section 304 !PC
cannot be invoked. The argument of the appellants' counsel that there was
no intention on the part of the accused to cause the death of the deceased
cannot be accepted in view of the nature of injuries sustained by the deceased.
Though the quarrel between the accused and the deceased ensued after a
c wordy altercation, a series of injuries were caused by the accused on the skull
and all over the body of the deceased. Both the appellants had brutally
attacked the deceased. Having regard to the nature of the injuries and the
circumstances under which the injuries came to be inflicted, it is clearly
established that the appellants had the intention to cause the death of the
deceased and the injuries caused were sufficient in the ordinary course of
D
nature to cause death. The appellants have been rightly convicted under
Section 302 !PC. We see no merit in these appeals, which are dismissed.

-
v.s.s. Appeals dismissed.

-