RAMANversusUTTAR HARYANA BIJLI VITRAN NIGAM LTD. & ORS.

                          [2014] 13 S.C.R. 842


A                            RAMAN
                                v.
       UTTAR HARYANABIJLI VITRAN NIGAM LTD. & ORS.
                (Civil Appeal No. 11466 of 2014)
B                     DECEMBER 17, 2014
         [V. GOPALA GOWDAAND C. NAGAPPAN, JJ.]
          Electricity Act, 2003 - s. 68 - Electrocution -
     Compensation - Four year old boy suffered 100% permanent
     disability in electrocution accident - Boy lost all the amenities
C   and became a deadwood throughout his fife - Award of
     Rs. 60 fakhs compensation by Single Judge of the High
     Court - Rs. 30 fakhs to be deposited in a fixed deposit
    account jointly in the name of the claimant in a nationalized
    Bank, which would be available to the claimant on attaining
D   age of majority, and in case he does not survive, deposit
    amount would be revert back to the respondents- Remaining
    amount of Rs. 30 fakhs to be deposited in a fixed
    deposit account of corpus fund, out of which an interest of
    Rs. 20,0001- p.m. to be paid to the claimant towards the
E   expenses - Division Bench on concession by the counsel
    reduced the monthly amount to Rs. 10,0001- - On appeal,
    held: Compensation awarded by the Single Judge
    restored - However, the direction by Single Judge that if the
    claimant is not alive at the time of attaining the age of majority,
F   the amount deposited would be reverted to the respondent
    is set aside since the same is not legal and valid - Once
    compensation amount is awarded by the Court, it should go
    to the claimant/appellant and after his demise, to his legal
    heirs or representative - Directions issued as regards the
G   mode of payment of amount to the appellant.
          Allowing the appeal, the Court
       HELD: 1.1. The compensation awarded at Rs. 60
  lakhs in the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the
H High Court, out of which 30 lakhs were to be deposited
                             842
 RAMAN v. UTTAR HARYANABIJLI VITRAN NIGAM LTD.           843


jointly in the name of the appellant represented by his A
parents as natural guardian and the Chief Engineer or
his nominee representing the respondent-Nigam in a
nationalised Bank in a fixed deposit till he attains the age
of majority, is just and proper but we have to set aside
that portion of the judgment of the learned Single Judge B
directing that if he survives, he is permitted to withdraw
the amount, otherwise the deposit amount shall be
 reverted back to the respondents as the same is not legal
 and valid for the reason that once compensation amount
 is awarded by the court, it should go to the claimant/ c
 appellant. Therefore, the victims/claimants are legally
 entitled for compensation to be awarded in their favour.
 If the claimants die, then the Succession Act of their
 respective religion would apply to succeed to such
 estate by the legal heirs of victims/ claimants or legal D
 representatives as per the testamentary document if they
 choose to execute the will indicating their desire as to
 whom such estate shall go after their death. [Para
 19][863-D-H; 864-A]
     1.2 The remaining compensation amount of Rs. 30 E
lakhs to be deposited in a fixed deposit account in the
name of the appellant (minor) under joint guardianship
of the parents of Raman and the Engineer-in-Chief or
his nominee representing the respondent-Nigam, in the
Nationalised Bank as corpus fund, out of which an F
interest of Rs.20,000/- p.m. towards the expenses as
indicated in sub-para (vi) of the order passed by the
learned Single Judge, cannot be said to be on the higher
side, but in our view, the said amount of compensation
awarded is less and not reasonable and having regard G
to the nature of 100% permanent disability suffered by
the appellant, it should have been much higher as the
appellant requires permanent assistance of an attendant,
treatment charges as he is suffering from agony and loss
of marital life, which cannot be compensated by the H
844      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 13 S.C.R.


A amount of compensation awarded by the learned Singh
  Judge of the High Court. Hence, having regard to the
  facts and circumstances of the case, it would be just and
  proper to restore the judgment of the learned Single
  Judge on this count and we hold that the directions
B contained in the said judgment are justifiable to the
  extent indicated above. The Division Bench while
  exercising its appellate jurisdiction should not have
  accepted the alleged requisite instructions received by
  the counsel on behalf of the appellant and treated as ad
c idem and modified the amount as provided in the order
  of the Single Judge which is wholly unreasonable and
  therefore, it is unsustainable in law as it would affect
  the right of the appellant for getting his legal entitlement
  of just and reasonable compensation for the negligence
o on the part of the respondents. [Para 20][864-D-H;
  865-A]
        General Manager, Kera/a State Road Transport
        Corporation, Trivandrum v. Susamma Thomas
        and Ors. (1994) 2 SCC 176; Sar/a Dixit and Anr.
E       v. Ba/want Yadav & Ors. (1996) 3 SCC 179 : 1996
        (3) SCR 30; U.P. State Road Transport
        Corporation & Ors. v. Trilok Chandra & Ors. (1996)
        4 SCC 362 : 1996 (2) Suppl. SCR 443; United
        India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. v. Patricia Jean
F       Mahajan & Ors. 2002 (6) SCC 281 : 2002 (3) SCR
        1176; Abati Bezbaruah v. Dy. Director General,
        Geological Survey of India & Anr. (2003) 3 SCC
        148: 2003 (1) SCR 1229; Sar/a Verma & Ors. v.
        Delhi Transport Corporation &Anr. (2009) 6 SCC
G       121 : 2009 (5) SCR 1098; Dr. Bairam Prasad v.
        Kuna/ Saha (2014) 1 SCC 384: 2013 (12) SCR
        30; Rekha Jain v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.
        (2013) 8 sec 389 - referred to.
        Fowler v. Grace (1970) 114 Sol Jo 193 (CA) -
H       referred to.
 RAMAN v. UTTAR HARYANABIJLI VITRAN NIGAM LTD.                     845


                     Case Law Reference:                           A
(1994) 2   sec 116          referred to            Para 8
1996 (3) SCR 30             referred to            Para 8
1996 (2) Suppl. SCR 443 referred to                Para 8
                                                                   B
2002 (3) SCR 1176            referred to           Para 8
2003 (1) SCR 1229            referred to           Para 8
2009 (5) SCR 1098            referred to           Para 17
2013 (12) SCR 30             referred to           Para 17         c
(2013) 8   sec 389           referred to           Para 18
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 11466 of2014.
     From the Judgment and Order dated 30-10-2013 of the D
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Letter
Patent Appeal No. 1631 of 2013 in Civil Writ Petition No. 14046
of2012.
     Sushil Kr. Jain, Sr. Adv., Nitin Jain, Ms. Anisha Jain, Dr.
Mrs. Vipin Gupta, Advs. with him for the Appellant.                 E
    NarenderHooda,MG, S.S. Hooda, Ms. Bano D., Manoj
Sheeran, Kamal Mohan Gupta, Advs., with him for the ·
Respondents.
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                     F
     V. GO PALA GOWDA, J. 1. Leave granted.
      2. The appellant, represented through his natural
guardian father - Manoj Kumar, has filed this appeal
questioning the judgment and order dated 30 .10.2013 passed         G
by the Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana
at Chandigarh in the Letters Patent Appeal No.1631 of 2013
in Civil Writ Petition No. 14046 of 2012.
      3. The brief facts are stated herein:
                                                                    H
846        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014] 13 S.C.R.


A       The appellant, a four year old boy was electrocuted on
   03.11.2011 by coming in direct contact with the naked electric
  wire lying open on the roof of his house. Immediately after the
  incident, the boy was taken for first aid to a nearby R.M. Anand
   Hospital in Panipat, Haryana from where he was referred to
B Post Graduate Institute of Medical Sciences, Rohtak. The final
  treatment was given at Safdarjang Hospital, New Delhi, where
  the doctors left with no other option but to carry out triple
  amputation by removing both his arms upto arm pit and left
  leg upto knee as the grievous injuries suffered were not curable.
c On 08.02.2012, the disability certificate was issued to the
  appellant certifying to be 100% permanent disability.
         4. It is stated on behalf of the appellant that prior to this
  tragic incident, on 16.08.2011 the appellant's father along with
  other neighbours had approached the SDO, Chhajpur, Panipat
D i.e. respondent No. 3 through a representation, to remove the
  iron angle from the vicinity of the residential area, as it
  endangers the life of around 40 to 60 families which is densely
  populated. But no action was taken by him.
E       5. The appellant approached the High Court by filing a
  writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
  seeking for an award of compensation from the respondents
  on account of the negligenc~ on the part of the respondents
  which resulted in the tragic electric shock leading to triple
F amputation of the appellant.
         6. The said writ petition was opposed by the respondents
  by filing a written statement denying the allegations made
  therein stating that the iron angle found on the roof of the house
  was not installed by any employee of the respondent electricity
G department. It is stated by the respondents that the father of
  the appellant was to be squarely blamed for installing the
  insulator himself on the roof of the house on which high tension
  wire was erected to keep it at bay so as not to touch brick and
  mortal. Therefore, neither the first respondent-Uttar Haryana
H
 RAMAN v. UTTAR HARYANABIJLI VITRAN NIGAM LTD.                  847
             [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. nor its employees can be held            A
responsible or accountable for the mishap occurred on the
fateful day much less the damages or monetary compensation
to be awarded in favour of the appellant herein.
      7. The learned Single Judge of the High Court adverted
to Section 68 of the Indian Electricity Act, 2003 (for short "the B
Act") and Rule 91 of the Electricity Rules, 1956 (for short "the
Rules") which lay down the procedure of safety and protective
devices to be provided for overhead electric lines erected over
any part of the street or public place or any consumer's
premises and mandate that those shall be protected with a C
device approved by the Inspector for rendering the line
electrically harmless in case it breaks.
       8. The learned Single Judge of the High Court further
referred to Rules 29, 44 and 46 of the Rules which are statutory 0
in nature which require the electricity authorities to conduct
periodical inspection of the lines maintained by them and to
take all such safety measures to prevent accident and maintain
the lines in such a manner tl'lat life and property of the general
public is protected. The learned Single Judge has considered E
the position of law declared by this Court in catena of cases
for awarding compensation, particularly, the electrocution
cases, and held the principle of "strict liability" and
consequential negligence in awarding compensation in favour
of the claimant against the State Electricity Board. This Court F
and the various High Courts such as High Courts of Madras,
Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Kerala and Gujarat have awarded
compensation to the victims of electrocution in exercise of the
extraordinary and appellate jurisdiction, and have held that the
Electricity Board Supply Companies are duty bound to take G
precautionary measures under the provisions of the Act.
Therefore, the learned Single Judge has held the electricity
authority - the first respondent to be liable to pay the
compensation to the claimant irrespective of the fact that the
harm could have been avoided by the consumer by taking H
848         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 13 S.C.R.


A precautionary measures. The learned Single Judge of the High
  Court has referred to various judgments of this Court as well
  as the aforesaid High Courts rendered under the Motor
  Vehicles Act for determination and awarding just and
  reasonable compensation in favour of the claimant, viz.
B General Manager, Kera/a State Road Transport
      Corporation, Trivandrum v. Susamma Thomas and Ors. 1,
      Sar/a Dixit and Anr. v. Ba/want Yadav & Ors. 2 , U.P. State
      Road Transport Corporation & Ors. v. Trilok Chandra &
      Ors. 3, United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. v. Patricia
c     Jean Mahajan & Ors. 4 and Abati Bezbaruah v. Dy. Director
      General, Geological Survey of India &Anr. 5 by applying
      the multiplier method as specified in the schedule of the M.V.
      Act.
       · 9. The learned Single Judge awarded compensation to
D the appellant and issued directions to the respondent which
  runs into (xiii) clauses/paragraphs. Therelevant paragraph Nos.
  (v) and (vi) of the judgment of the learned Single Judge, prior
  to modification by the Division Bench of the High Court in its
  judgment, are extracted below:
E
           "v) In order to secure the financial and monetary future of
           the minor Raman, it is directed that the respondent-
           Nigam would pay compensation of Rs. 30 lacs to him
           immediately for loss of enjoyment of life, trauma suffered
           and to act as a guard against neglect and dependence
 F
           on others, loss of future employability and the agony of it
           all, pain and mental shock suffered and continue to be
           suffered by an irreconcilable event that has completely
           changed the life of a family. This amount would when
           made available with interest on reaching the age of 21
G
           years act as a financial security and building block for
      1
        (1994) 2 sec 176
      2
        (1996)3SCC179
      3
        (1996)4SCC362
      4
        (2002) 6 sec 306
 H    s (2003) 3 sec 148
RAMAN   v. UTTAR HARYANABIJLI VITRAN NIGAM LTD.                  849
               [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

  the future. The amount will be deposited in a fixed deposit A
  account in the name of the petitioner (minor) under joint
  guardianship of the parents of Raman and the Engineer-
  in-Chief or his nominee representing the respondent-
  Nigam, in a nationalised bank, preferably in the State
  Bank of Patiala, Branch at Punjab and Haryana High B
  Court, Chandigarh. The amount is directed to be so
  deposited within 60 days of receipt of certified copy of
  this order failing which the amount will carry 8.5% interest
  till deposit in the Bank where after the principal amount
  will earn interest at bank rates for fixed deposits fixed c
  from time to time. However, the amount awarded under
  this head will only be available to the minor Raman on
  attaining the age of majority i.e. 21 years. In case the
  minor Raman does not survive till the age of majority,
  this amount with all interest accrued shall revert to the o
  respondent-Nigam with no claim on it by any third party
  or the parents or siblings of Raman. This would ensure
  that the child is valued and cared for till he attains majority.
   vi) Since the above amount of Rs.30 lakhs would remain
   inaccessible to the petitioner for his use he would require   E
   running income to meet his daily expenses for paid
   caregivers/attendants or family help/labour equivalent to
 . such expenses and other bare and sundry expenses,
   which are quantified at about Rs.20,000/- plus per month
   for life as at present. To earn interest of Rs.20,000/- per   F
   month a corpus of Rs. 30 lakhs is required to be invested
   in the Bank to earn interest@ 8.5% being current rates
   on long term fixed deposits. Therefore, in addition to
   Rs.30 Lakhs as awarded in direction (v), the respondent-
   Nigam would pay and deposit compensation of a further         G
   amount of Rs.30 lakhs to be kept in a separate interest
   bearing account in the same bank as direded under
   point no. (v), under the .same joint guardianship
   arrangement. This will be an interest accruing account
   with interest proceeds available to meet the day-to-day       H
850       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2014] 13 S.C.R.


A          needs of the petitioner. The interest so accrued will be
           transferred in a separate savings bank account to be
           opened in the same branch in minor Raman's name to
           be operated jointly by the parents payable to the
           petitioner on regular monthly basis to be applied for the
B          care of the child by the parents, his educational
           expenses, nutritious food, costs of attendants/care givers
         ·.to minister to him day after day etc. The above amount
           of Rs.30 lacks from which interest will be used for the
           petitioner from month to month will also not be allowed
c          to be withdrawn for any purpose, till the petitioner attains
           the age of 21, without obtaining orders from this Court, if
           circumstances so warrant, except the monthly interest
           as directed. The State Bank of Patiala, Branch at Punjab
           and Haryana High Court, Chandigarh would open the said
 D         Savings Bank Account in the name of the minor; under
           the guardianship of mother and father and transfer the
          _said savings Bank Account to the Branch nearest to the
           residence of the petitioner and the bank would remit the
           interest accrued thereon every month to the said savings
 E         account at Panipat Branch, to be auto-renewed till the
           petitioner reaches the age of 21 years. The amount is
           directed to be so deposited within 60 days of receipt of
           certified copy of this order failing which the amount will
           carry 8.5% interest till deposit in the bank where after
 F        _the principal amount will earn interest at bank rates for
           fixed deposits from time to time."
          In addition to the compensation awarded by the learned
   Single Judge in the above terms in favour of the appellant,
   certain other directions were also given to the respondents for
 G its compliance to avert any unfortunate electrocution accidents
   in future.
        10. Being aggrieved of the judgment and order dated
   02.07.2013 of the learned Single Judge, the respondents filed
 H the LPA in the High Court urging various grounds and prayed
 RAMAN v. UTTAR HARYANABIJLI VITRAN NIGAM LTD.                     851
             [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

to set aside the same. The Division Bench of the High Court A
on 30.10.2013 passed a cryptic order while partially allowing
the LPA filed by the respondents on the basis of the alleged
concession given by the advocate on behalf of the appellant,
holding that the learned counsel for the parties have obtained
requisite instructions and they are ad idem that instant appeal B
be disposea of on the following agreed terms, which read thus:-
     "( 1) The impugned order is accepted by the parties,
     except to the extent of modification hereinafter specified.
     (2) The amount of Rs. 30 lakhs specified in clause (v) of     c
     the direction would be deposited in the State Bank of
     Patiala, Panipat Branch, instead of Branch at Punjab and
     Haryana High Court, Chandigarh.
     (3) This amount will be deposited within 10 days in the
     account number given to the appellants and to be D
     converted immediately into FDR in terms of directions
     contained in same sub-para;and
     (4) The directions given in sub-para (vi) will stand
     substituted by a direction to pay a sum of Rs.10,000/-
     p.m. on or before 71h of every month in advance, directly E
     to the bank account already intimated and such payment
     will continue to be made till the minor attains the age of
     21 years."
      11. It is urged by the learned senior counsel on behalf of F
the appellant Mr. Sushi! Kumar Jain that the unfortunate
appellant boy or his parents who are his natural guardians in
the proceedings were unaware of the nexus of their advocate
with the respondents and when they came to know about the
order passed in LPA, a legal notice dated 27.01.2014 was G
sent to his advocate for purging from breach of trust and for
committing professional misconduct under the Advocates Act,
1961 in giving concession before the Division Bench of the
High Court without their either oral or written instructions.
                                                                   H
852         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014] 13 S.C.R.


A           Hence, the appellant has approached this Court with this
      appeal questioning the correctness of the impugned judgment
      and order of the Division Bench of the High Court by urging
      various grounds.
            12. The learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellant
B     has contended that the order of the Division Bench Qf the High
      Court reducing the compensation amount awarded by the
      learned Single Judge from Rs. 60 lakhs to Rs.30 lakhs
      and reducing the monthly payment from Rs.20,000/- to
      Rs.10,000/-,'till he attains the age of 21 years, on account of
c     ad idem, which in fact is arbitrary, unreasonable and is not
      correct, as the appellant has not given such instructions to his
      lawyer to give concessions before the Division Bench for
      reducing the compensation awprded by the learned Single
      Judge.
D           13. It is further urged by the learned senior counsel on
      behalf of the appellant that the Division Bench of the High Court
      was required to examine the case keeping in mind the nature
      of grievous injuries sustained by the appellant in the
      electrocution accident and the compensation awarded by the
E     learned Single Judge under sub-para (vi) should not have been
      modified to the extent of payment of Rs.10,000/-p.m. in place
      of Rs.20,000/- p.m. as per the impugned judgment, on the
      basis of the alleged instructions received by the counsel from
      the appellant and disposed of the appeal by passing impugned
      judgment by reducing compensation awarded in favour of the
F     appellant, which action of.it is wholly unsustainable in law and
      therefore, the same is liable to be set aside.
            14. On the other hand, Mr. Narendra Hooda, the learned
      senior counsel appearing. on behalf of the respondents
G     submitted that there is no reduction of compensation awarded
      by the learned senior counsel, except modification made as
      mentioned at para 4 in the impugned judgment to the extent of
      Rs.10,000/- p.m. instead of Rs.20,000/-p.m. towards monthly
      expenses of the appellant which would not affect the rights of
      the appellant and hence, he has prayed for dismissal of the
H     appeal as the same is devoid of merit.
 RAMAN v. UTTAR HARYANA BIJLI VITRAN NIGAM LTD.                     853
             [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

      15. We have heard learned senior counsel for the parties A
who have made their respective submissions in support of their
respective claim which were carefully examined by us with
reference to the undisputed facts, particularly, the amputation
of both the arms upto the arm pit and the left leg upto knee
which has resulted in 100% permanent disability caused to B
the appellant as per the Doctor's certificate which is produced
in the case.
       16. Having regard to the age of the boy as 5 years at the
time of the incidence and longevity of life of Indian citizen as
70 years, the remaining 65 years the appellant is required to       C
suffer from mental agony and hardship. He is virtually dead
wood and further he has to undergo continuous pain and
suffering at the time of attending the nature's call, sitting,
standing, walking and sleeping. He has to face difficulties on
all walks of life, which is worse than death. His childhood is      D
lost, the marital status and happiness is lost, which cannot be
compensated in terms of money. He has to undergo the great
ordeal and agony throughout his life. He requires a permanent
attendant throughout his lifetime to assist him for all purposes,
to whom the appellant is required to pay minimum at an              E
average of Rs.10,000/- to Rs.15,000/- p.m. and it is a hard
reality that the cost of living in our country is also steadily
increasing day by day. This aspect of the matter should have
been taken into consideration by the Division Bench of the
High Court at the time of reducing the compensati9n awarded         F
to the appellant.
     17. The learned Single Judge of the High Court has
awarded compensation keeping all these aspects of the matter
and has applied the guiding principle of multiplier method after G
adverting to the case of Sar/a Verma & Ors. v. Delhi
Transport Corporation & Anr°. for the purpose of
computation of just and reasonable compensation in favour of
the appellant which method should not have been applied to
a (2009) 6 sec 121                                                  H
854          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2014] 13 S.C.R.


A the case on hand, particularly, having regard to the statutory
  negligence on the part of the respondents in not providing the
  safety measures to see that live electric wires should not fall
  on the roof of the building by strictly following the Rules to
  protect the lives of the public in the residential area. This Court
B in the case of Dr. Bairam Prasad v. Kuna/ Saha 7, has
  deviated from following the multiplier method to award just and
  reasonable compensation in favour of the claimant in a medical
  negligence case. The same principle will hold good in the case
  on hand too. The following case law is followed by this Court in
c the above referred case, the relevant paragraphs are extracted
  herein to award just and reasonable compensation in favour
  of the appellant:
              68 ......... three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in
             Indian Medical Assn. v. V.P. Shantha, wherein this Court
 D           has categorically disagreed on this specific point in
             another case wherein "medical negligence" was
             involved. In the said decision, it has beeh held at para
             53 that to deny a legitimate claim or to restrict arbitrarily
             the size of an award would amount to substantial injustice
 E           to the claimant.
                                      *********

             99. In Govind Yadav v. New India Insurance Co. Ltd.
             this Court at para 15 observed as under which got
 F           reiterated at SCC pp. 639-40, para 13 of Ibrahim v. Raju:
                "15. In Reshma Kumariv. Madan Mohan
                 [(2009) 1.3 SCC 422) this Court reiterated that the
                compensation awarded under the Act should be just
 G              and also identified the factors which should be kept in
                mind while determining the amount of compensation.
                The relevant portion::; of the judgment are extracted
                below:                ··
      1
          (2014)1sec384
 H
RAMAN v. UTTAR HARYANABIJLI VITRAN NIGAM LTD.                   855
            [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

      26. The compensation which is required to be A
      determined must be just. While the claimants are
      required to be compensated for the loss of their
      dependency, the same should not be considered to
      be a windfall. Unjust enrichment should be
      discouraged. This Court cannot also lose sight of B
      the fact that in given cases, as for example death of
      the only son to a mother, she can never. be
      compensated in monetary terms.
      27. The question as to the methodology required to
       be applied for determination of compensation as          C
       regards prospective loss of future earnings,
       however, as far as possible should be based on
       certain principles. A person may have a bright future
       prospect; he might have become eligible to
       promotion immediately; there might have been             D
       chances of an immediate pay revision, whereas in
       another (sic situation) the nature of employment was
       such that he might not have continued in service; his
     · chance of promotion, having regard to the nature of
       employment may be distant or remote. It is, therefore,   E
       difficult for any court to lay down rigid tests which
       should be applied in all situations. There are
       divergent views. In some cases it has been
       suggested that some sort of hypotheses or
       guesswork may be inevitable. That may be so.             F
        xxx                      xxx               xxx
      46. In the Indian context several other factors should
      be taken into consideration including education of
      the dependants and the nature of job. In the wake of G
      changed societal conditions and global scenario,
      future prospects may have to be taken into
      consideration not only having regard to the status of
      the employee, his educational qualification; his past
                                                                H
856   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2014] 13 S.C.R.


A         performance but also other relevant factors, namely,
          the higher salaries and perks which are being offered
          by the private companies these days. In fact while
          determining the multiplicand this Court in Oriental
          Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jashuben held that even
 B        dearness allowance and perks with regard thereto
          from which the family would have derived monthly
          benefit, must be taken into consideration.
          47. One of the incidental issues which has also to
          be taken into consideration is inflation. ls the practice
 c        of taking inflation into consideration wholly incorrect?
          Unfortunately, unlike other developed countries. in
          India there has been no scientific study. It is expected
          that with the rising inflation the rate of interest would
          go up. In India it does not happen. It. therefore, may
.o        be a relevant factor which may be. taken into
          consideration for determining the actual ground
          reality. No hard-and-fast rule. however. can be laid
          down therefor.'
                              ********
 E
      101. .. ........................ he has also strongly placed
      reliance upon the observations made at para 170 in
      Malay Kumar Ganguly's case referred to supra wherein
      this Court has made observations as thus: (SCC p. 282)
 F       "170. Indisputably, grant of compensation involving an
         accident is within the realm of law of torts. It is based
         on the principle of restitutio in integrum. The said
         Q.rinciple provides that a person entitled to damages
         should, as nearly as possible, get that sum of money
 G       which would put him in the same position as he would
         have been if he had not sustained the wrong. (See
         Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co.)"
                              **********

 H
  RAMAN v. UTTAR HARYANABIJLI VITRAN NIGAM LTD.                    857
              [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

      103.1. In Ningamma's case, this Court has observed at A
      para 34 which reads thus: (SCC p. 721)
        "34 . ....... in our considered opinion a party should not
        be deprived from getting 'just compensation' in case
        the claimant is able to make out a case under any
        provision of law. Needless to say, the MVA is beneficial 8
        and welfare legislation. In fact. the court is duty-bound
        and entitled to award 'just compensation' irrespective
        of the fact whether any plea in that behalf was raised
        by the claimant or not."
                              *********
                                                                    c
      112. The claimant has also placed reliance upon
     Nizam's Institute of Medical Sciences v. Prasanth
     S.Dhananka's [(2009) 2 SCC 688] case in support of
     his submission that if a case is made out, then the Court D
     must not be chary of awarding adequate compensation.
     The relevant paragraph reads as under:
         "88. We must emphasise that the court has to strike a
         balance between the inflated and unreasonable
         demands of a victim and the equally untenable claim E
         of the opposite party saying that nothing is payable.
         Sympathy for the victim does not, and should not. come
         in the way of making a correct assessment, but if a
         case is made out, the court must not be chary of
         awarding adequate compensation. The 'adequate F
         compensation' that we speak of. must to some extent,
         be a rule of thumb measure. and as a balance has to
         be struck, it would be difficult to satisfy all the parties
         concerned."
                                                                     G
      Further in para 119, it is held ...... this Court has rejected
the use of multiplier system to calculate and award the quantum
of compensation which must be just and reasonable. The
relevant paragraph is quoted hereunder: (SCC para 92)
                                                                    H
858        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2014] 13 S.C.R.


A          "92. MrTandale, the learned counsel for the respondent
           has, further submitted that the proper method for
           determining compensation would be the multiplier
           method. We find absolutely no merit in this plea. The
           kind of damage that the complainant has suffered, the
 B         expenditure that he has incurred and is likely to incur
           in the future and the possibility that his rise in his chosen
           field would now be restricted, are matters which cannot
           be taken care of under the multiplier method."
                                                 (emphasis supplied)
.c
           Further under paragraph No. 121, the relevant paragraph
      from United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Patricia Jean
      Mahajan read as under: (SCC pp. 295-96, paras 20)
           "20. The court cannot be totally oblivious to the realities.
 D         The Second Schedule while prescribing the multiplier,
           had maximum income of Rs 40,000 p.a. in mind, but it is
           considered to be a safe guide for applying the prescribed
           multiplier in cases of higher income also but in cases
           where the gap in income is so wide as in the present
 E         case income is 2.26,297 dollars. in such a situation. it
           cannot be said that some deviation in the multiplier would
           .be impermissible. Therefore. a deviation from applying
           ~he multiplier as provided in the Second Schedule may
           j1ave to be made in this case. Apart from factors indicated
 F         earlier the amount of multiplicand also becomes a factor
           to be taken into account which in this case comes to
           ~~.26,297 dollars, that is to say, an amount of around Rs
           g8 lakhs per annum by converting it at the rate of Rs 30.
            f3y Indian standards it is certainly a high amount.
 G         Jherefore, for the purposes of fair compensation, a lesser
            multiplier can be applied to a heavy amount of
            !]1Ultiplicand. A deviation would be reasonably
            permissible in the figure of multiplier even according to
            the observations made in Susamma Thomas where a
 H
RAMAN v. UTTAR HARYANA BIJLI VITRAN NIGAM LTD.                  859
            . [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

   specific example was given about a person dying at the A
   age of 45 leaving no heirs being a bachelor except his
   parents."
                                        (emphasis supplied)

                                                                 B
   Further, in paragraph 177, it was held as under:-
   "177. Under the heading of loss due to pain and suffering
   and loss of amenities of the wife of the claimant, Kemp
   and Kemp write as under:
                                                                 c
     "The award to a plaintiff of damages under the head
     "pain and suffering" depends as Lord Scarman said
     in Lim Poh Choo v. Camden and Islington Area health
     Authority, "upon the claimant's personal awareness of
     pain, her capacity of suffering. Accordingly, no award o
     is appropriate if and in so far as the claimant has not
     suffered and is not likely to suffer pain, and has not
     endured and is not likely to endure suffering, for
     example, because he was rendered immediately and
     permanently unconscious in the accident. By contrast. E
     an award ofdamages in respect of loss of amenities
     is appropriate whenever there is in fact such a loss
     regardless of the claimant's awareness of the loss."
       xxx                  xxx                   xxx
                                                                   F
       'Even though the claimant may die from his injuries
      shortly after the accident. the evidence may justify an
      award under this head. Shock should also be taken
      account of as an ingredient of pain and suffering and
      the claimant's particular circumstances may well be G
      highly relevant to the extent of her suffering .......... .'
      By considering the nature of amenities lost and the
      injury and pain in the particular case, the court must
      assess the effect upon the particular claimant. !!l
                                                                  H
860        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2014] 13 S.C.R.


A            deciding the appropriate award of damages. an
             important consideration show long will he be deprived
             of those amenities and how long the pain and suffering
             has been and will be endured. If it is for the rest of his
             life the court will need to take into account in assessing
B            damages the claimant's age and his expectation in
             life ....... "
                                                (emphasis supplied)
           18. Further, in the case of Rekha Jain v. National
c Insurance Co. Ltd.8 this Court at paras 34 and 35, with regard
      to the quantum of damages, has held as under:
               "34 ........... In deciding on the quantum of damages
               to be paid to a person for the personal injuries suffered
             . by him, the Court is bound to ascertain all
 D             considerations which will make good to the sufferer
               of the injuries, as far as money can do, the loss which
               he has suffered as a natural consequence of the wrong
               done to him. [K. Narasimha Murthy vs. the Manager,
               Oriental Insurance Company Limited and Anr.]. [ILR
 E             2004 KAR 2471]
           35 ......... Therefore, the general principle which should
           govern the assessment of damages in personal injury
           cases is that the Court should award to injured person
           such a sum of money as will put him in the same position
 F         as he would have been in if he had not sustained the
           injuries ..But, it is manifest that no award of money can
           possibly compensate an injured man and renew a
           shattered human frame."
           39 ..... In Mediana, in re [1900 AC 113 (HL)], it is held at
 G
           para 32 which is extracted as herein
              '. ........ 32 .... In personal injury cases, the Court is
              constantly required to form an estimate of chances
              and risks which cannot be determined with precision.
 H
 RAMAN v. UTTAR HARYANABIJLI VITRAN NIGAM LTD.                    861
             [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

       It is because, the law will disregard possibilities which A
       are slight or chances which are nebulous; otherwise,
       all the circumstances of the situation must be taken
       into account, whether they relate to the future which
       the plaintiff would have enjoyed if the accident had not
       happened, or to the future of his injuries and his earning B
       power after the accident. Damages are compensation
       for an injury or loss, that is to say, the full equivalent of
       money so far as the nature of money admits; and
       difficulty or uncertainty does not prevent an
       assessment.' [K. Narasimha Murthy vs. the Manager, c
       Oriental Insurance Company Limited and Anr.] [ILR
       2004 KAR 2471]
     In Fowlerv. Grace, [(1970) 114 Sol Jo 193 (CA)] Edmund
Davies, L.J., has said that:
                                                                    D
        "It is the manifest duty of the Tribunal to give as perfect
        a sum as was within its power'. There are many losses
        which cannot easily be expressed in terms of money.
        If a person, in an accident, loses his sight, hearing or
        smelling faculty or a limb, value of such deprivation E
        cannot be assessed in terms of market value because
        there is no market value for the personal asset which
        has been lost in the accident, and there is no easy
        way of expressing its equivalent in terms of money."
     41. McGregor on Damages (14th Edn.) at Para 1157,            f
     referring to the heads of damages in personal injury
     actions, states as under:
        "The person physically injured may recover both for
        his pecuniary losses and his non-pecuniary losses.
        Of these the pecuniary losses themselves comprise G
        two separate items viz. the loss of earnings and other
        gains which the plaintiff would have made had he not
        been injured and the medical and other expenses to
        which he is put as a result of the injury, and the courts
                                                                   H
     862   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 13 S.C.R.


     A       have subdivided the non-pecuniary losses into three
             categories viz. pain and suffering, loss of amenities
             of life and loss of expectation of life.
             Besides, the Court is well advised to remember that
             the measures of damages in all these cases 'should
      B      be such as to enable even a tortfeasor to say that he
             had amply atoned for his misadventure.' The
             observation of Lord Devlin that the e.roe.er ae.e.roach
·•           to the e.roblem or to adoe.t a test as to what
             conteme.oract. societ'i. would deem to be a fair sum,
      c      such as would allow the wrongdoer to 'hold ue. his
             head among his neighbours and sa'i. with their
             ae.e.roval that he has done the fair thing', is guite
             aee.osite to be kee.t in mind b'i. the Court in assessing
             come_ensation in e.ersonal injuct. cases."
      D
                                               (emphasis supplied)
           42. In R. Venkatesh v. P. Saravanan the High Court of
           Karnataka while dealing with a personal injury case
           wherein the claimant sustained certain crushing injuries
      E    due to which his left lower limb was amputated, held that
           in terms of functional disability, the disability sustained
           by the claimant is total and 100% though only the
           claimant's left lower limb was amputated. In para 9 of
           the judgment, the Court held as under: (Kant LJ p. 415)
      F       '9. As a result of the amputation, the claimant had been
              rendered a cripple. He requires the help of crutches
              even for walking. He has become unfit for any kind of
              manual work. As he was earlier a loader doing manual
              work, the amputation of his left leg below the knee,
      G       has rendered him unfit for any kind of manual work.
              He has no education. In such cases, it is well settled
              that the economic and functional disability will have to
              be treated as total, even though the physical disability
              is not 100%.'
      H
  RAMAN v. UTTAR HARYANABIJLI VITRAN NIGAM LTD.                               863
              [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

     43. Lord Reid in Bakerv. Willoughby has said: (AC p. A
     492A)
         "... A man is not compensated for the physical injury:
         he is compensated for the loss which he suffers as a
         result of that injury. His loss is not in having a stiff leg:
         it is in his inability to lead a full life, his inability to enjoy   B
         those amenities which depend on freedom of
         movement and his inability to earn as much as he used
         to earn or could have earned .... "
       19. In view of the law laid down by this Court in the above            c
referred cases which are extensively considered and granted
just and reasonable compensation, in our considered view,
the compensation awarded at Rs. 60 lakhs in the judgment of
the learned Single Judge of the High Court, out of which 30
lakhs were to be deposited jointly in the name of the appellant               D
represented by his parents as natural guardian and the Chief
Engineer or his nominee representing the respondent-Nigam
in a nationalised Bank in a fixed deposit till he attains the age
of majority, is just and proper but we have to set aside that
portion of the judgment of the learned Single Judge directing                 E
that if he survives, he is permitted to withdraw the amount,
otherwise the deposit amount shall be reverted back to the
respondents as the same is not legal and valid for the reason
that once compensation amount is awarded by the court, it
should go to the claimant/appellant. Therefore, the victims/                  F
claimants are legally entitled for compensation to be awarded
in their favour as per the principles/guiding factors laid down
by this Court in catena of cases, particularly, in Kuna/ Saha's
case referred to supra. Therefore, the compensation awarded
by the Motor Vehicle Tribunals/Consumer Forums/State                          G
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commissions/National
Consumer' Disputes Redressal Commission or the High
Courts would absolutely belong to such victims/claimants. If
the claimants die, then the Succession Act of their respective
 religion wquld apply to succeed to such estate by the legal
                                                                              H
864         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014) 13 S.C.R.


A heirs of victims/ claimants or legal representatives as per the
  testamentary document if they choose to execute the will
  indicating their desire as to whom such estate shall go after
  their death. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that portion of
  the direction the of the learned Single Judge contained in sub-
B para (v), to the effect of Rs. 30 lakhs compensation to be
  awarded in favour of the appellant, if he is not alive at the time
  he attains majority, the same shall revert back to the
  respondent-Nigam after paying Rs.5 lakhs to the parents of
  the appellant, is wholly unsustainable and is liable to be set
C aside. Accordingly, we set aside the same and modify the
  same as indicated in the operative portion of the order.
             20. The remaining compensation amount of Rs. 30 lakhs
      to be deposited in a fixed deposit account in the name of the
      petitioner (minor) under joint guardianship of the parents of
 D    Raman and the Engineer-in-Chief or his nominee representing
      the respondent-Nigam, in the Nationalised Bank as corpus
      fund, out of which an interest of Rs.20,000/- p.m. towards the
      expenses as indicated in sub-para (vi) of the order passed by
      the learned Single Judge, cannot be said to be on the higher
 E    side, but in our view, the said amount of compensation
      awarded is less and not reasonable and having regard to the
      nature of 100% permanent disability suffered by the appellant,
      it should have been much higher as the appellant requires
      permanent assistance of an attendant, treatment charges as
 F    he is suffering from agony and loss of marital life, which cannot
      be compensated by the amount of compensation awarded by
      the learned Singh Judge of the High Court. Hence, having
      regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it would be
      just and proper for this Court to restore the judgment of the
 G    learned Single Judge on this count and we hold that the
      directions contained in the said judgment are justifiable to the
      extent indicated above. The Division Bench while exercising
       its appellate jurisdiction should not have accepted the alleged
       requisite instructions received by the counsel on behalf of the
 H     appellant and treated as ad idem and modified the amount
 RAMAN v. UTTAR HARYANABIJLI VITRAN NIGAM LTD.                    865
             [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

as provided under sub-para (vi) of the order of the learned A
Single Judge and substituted the para 4 in its judgment as
indicated in the aforesaid portion of the judgment which is
wholly unreasonable and therefore, it is unsustainable in law
as it would affect the right of the appellant for getting his legal
entitlement of just and reasonable compensation for the B
negligence on the part of the respondents.
       21. In view of the foregoing reasons, after considering
rival legal contentions and noticing the 100% permanent
disability suffered by the appellant in the electrocution accident
on account of which he lost all the amenities and become a C
deadwood throughout his life, and after adverting the law laid
down by this Court in catena of cases in relation to the guiding
principles to be followed to award just and reasonable
compensation in favour of the appellant, we pass the following
order:-                                                            D
     (I) The appeal is allowed after setting aside the
        substituted paragraph No.4 of the impugned judgment
        and order of the Division Bench of the High Court
        particularly, in place of sub par~ (vi) of the judgment   E
        and order of the learned Single Judge with
        modifications made by us in this judgment in the
        following terms.
     (II) We restore the compensation awarded at sub-paras
         (v) and (vi) of the order of the learned single Judge:   F
        (a) in the modified form that the compensation is
        awarded with direction to the respondents to keep
        Rs.30 lakhs in the Nationalised Bank in the name of
        the appellant represented by his father as a natural
        guardian till the age of attaining majority of the        G
        appellant.
        (b) The further direction contained in the judgment of
        the learned Single Judge that if the appellant is not
        alive at the time of attaining the age of majority, the   H
866   SUPREME COURT REPORTS.·                 [2014] 13 S.C.R.


A      deposit amount shall be reverted to the respondents,
       is set aside.
       (c) We further declare that the said amount of
       compensation of Rs.30 lakhs exclusively belongs to
       the appellant and after his demise it must go to the
B      legal heirs or representatives as it is the exclusive
       estate of the appellant as the it is the compensation
       awarded to him for the 100% permanent disability
       suffered by him due to electrocution on account of the
       negligence of the respondents. The monthly interest
c      that would be earned during the period of his minority
       shall be withdrawn by the appellant's guardian and
       spend the same towards his monthly expenses and
       after he attains the majority, it is open for him either to
       continue the deposit or withdraw the same and
 D     appropriate for himself or his legal heirs or legal
       representative, if he does not survive.
       (d) The deposit of Rs. 30 lakhs as corpus amount as
       directed at sub-para(vi) of the judgment of the learned
       Single Judge shall be in the name of the appellant
 E
       exclusively represented by his. natural guardians/
       parents till he attains majority, the income that would
       be earned on such deposit amount can be drawn by
       the parents every month to be spent for personal
       expenses. The Bank in which the deposit is made in
 F
       the name of Chief Engineer shall be deleted and the
       name of the appellant shall be entered as directed
       above. After attaining the age of majority, the appellant
       is at liberty to withdraw the above said amount also. If
       for any reason the appellant does not stay alive, his
 G     heirs/legal representatives can withdraw the said
       amount.
       (e) The other directions in the judgment of the learned
       Single Judge to the respondents for compliance shall
 H
  RAMAN v. UTTAR HARYANABIJLI VITRAN NIGAM LTD.                      867
              [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

             remain intact, the same shall be complied with and A
             the report shall be submitted before the learned Single
             Judge.
      The appeal is allowed in the above said terms, but without
costs.
                                                                     B

Nidhi Jain                                         Appeal allowed.