Holding

The order of dismissal was not justified; the punishment was disproportionate to the offence, and the appellant is entitled to reinstatement with back wages, subject to withholding two future increments.

Summary

Rama Kant Misra, a workman with over 14 years of service and secretary of the workers' union, was charged on 18 November 1971 with using abusive and threatening language towards a senior officer over a wage deduction. An inquiry found the charge proved and recommended dismissal, which was effected on 6 April 1972 before the procedural notice required under Article 311 was served. The Labour Court upheld the dismissal and the High Court dismissed the petition under Article 227. On special leave, the Supreme Court examined whether the dismissal was justified under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, holding that the penalty was disproportionate to the single‑occasion misconduct and that dismissal was not justified. Consequently, the Court set aside the Labour Court’s award, reinstated the appellant with back wages, and ordered that two future increments be withheld as a lesser punishment.

Issues considered

Whether the dismissal of a workman for a single incident of abusive language is justified under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Whether the punishment of dismissal is proportionate to the gravity of the misconduct alleged.
Whether the appellant is a ‘workman’ within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, as opposed to a government servant protected by Article 311.
Whether the Labour Court correctly exercised its power under Section 11A in upholding the dismissal.
Whether procedural requirements under Article 311 were complied with before imposing dismissal.

Legislation cited

Subjects

dismissalproportionalityindustrial disputesSection 11Adisciplinary actionabusive languagelabour lawreinstatementback wagesprocedural fairnessArticle 311

Judgment

RAMA KANT MISRA ....

v.
B STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS

October 21, 1982

jO.A. DESAI AND V. BALAICRISHNA ERADJ, Jl.] .

c lndu1trial Disputes Act, 1947-Seetion llA-Workman chQJ'fed with use of
threatening and abusive language against' a senior officer unbecoming of a
disciplined worker-Dismissed from 1errie1-Punlshment, whether disproportionately
heavy or ex,ceuive-Tests for determining punishment.
\

In order to avoid the charge of vindictiveness, justice, equity and fairplay
D demand that punishment must alwa)'S be oommensurate with tbe gravity of the
offence charged. Io the development of industrial relation norms law has
moved far from the days when quantum of punis_hment was considered a
managerial function with the courts having no power to substitute their own
decision in place of that of the management. More often, the courts found that,
while the misconduct was proved, the punishment was disproportionately heavy.
As the situation then stood, courts reinained powerless and had to be passive
E sufferers incapable of curing the injustice. Parliament stepped in and enacted
s. IJA of the Industrial Disputes Act by which the Labour Court is clothed with
jurisdiction and. power to substitute its measure of punishment in place of the
(
managerial wisdom once it is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal
was not justified in the facts apd ctrcumsl•nces of the case. Tl:iis Court, while
exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 can examine wbecher the LabOur Court
F bas properly approached the matter in exercising or rtfusing to exercise its
power under section llA. The words that the court must be "satisfied that the
order of discharge or dismissal was not justified" occurring in section llA
indicace that even though misconduct is proved and a penalty bas to be imposed,
the extreme penalty of dismissal or discharge: was not justified in the faces andill
circumstan~es of the case meaning thereby that the .punisbmept . was eith~
disproportiona!e.ly heavy or excessive.
G
In the instant case the char~e against the appellant-workman. was chat be
bad used threacening and abusive language against ~ senior officer unbecoming
of a disciplined workman and bad adopced·a threatening poscure, subversive of
discipline. An inquiry was conducted. On the recommendations of tho Inquiry
Officer the workman was dismissed "from service.
H
The La'lour Court upheld the order of dismissal and the High Court
dismissed the appellant's petition under Article 227.
RAMAKANT v. U.P. STATE (Desai, J.) 649

A
On the question whether the· order of dismissal Was justified on the facts
and in the circumstances of the case.

HELD: The order of dismissal was not justified. [653 A]

It is a well recognized prin~iple of jurisprudence, which permits penalty to
be imposed for misconduct, that the penalty must be commensurate with the B
gravity of the offence charged. [653 C-DJ

The appellant-workman had put in more than 14 years of service and
bad been the Secretary of the ~orkers~ uniOn. The management had not shown
that there was any blameworthy conduct on_ his part during the period of bis
service. The misconduct aiJeged against him consisted of use of language which
was indiscreet and improper, disclosing a 1hreatening posture. [653 E-F] ·
c
•
When it is ·said that his language disclosed a threatening posture it was the
subjective conclusion of the person who heard the language because voice
modulation of each person in the society differs. Indiscreet, improper, abusive
language may show lack of culture. But mere use of such language on one
occasion unconnected with any subsequent positive action and not preceded 0
by any blameworthy conduct cannot permit an extreme penalty .of dismissal from
service. [653 F-H]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1531 of
1980.
• E
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
the 9th August, 1978 of the Alla.habad High Court in C.M. Writ No.
6788 of 1978

, •.K. Goel for the Appellant
• F
S. Markendeya for. Respondent.

The Order of the Court was delivered by

DESAI J. Appellant Ramakant Misra joined service in the
Kanpur Electric Supply Administration· ('Administration' for short) G
which was then a Department .of the Government of Uttar Pradesh.
On the constitution of U.P. Electricity Board .('Board' for short),
under the provisions of Electricity (supply)· Act, 1948 ('Act' for
short), with effect from April 1, 1958, the Kanpur Electric Supply
Administration stood transferred to the Board and the employees H
workinl! in the Admi11istr11tiol! were deeme<j to be 011 deputation to
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . (1983) I S.C.R.

A the Board though they would continue to be Government servants a~
provided iu a· Circular dated March f3, 1959. As per Notification
No. 3721E/74-23P (3)-155E/74 dated August 3, 1974 the posts
held formerly in the Administration by the employees working in
the ·Administration were abolished and the deputationists were
. absorbed in the servke of the Board. However, before· the appellant
B could be so absorbed he was served with a charge sheet. on
November 19, 1971, alleging that he was guilty of disorderly
behaviour punishable under the relevant Standing orders. Simul·
taneously the appellant was suspended from service pending a
departmental inquiry. The inquiry officer who was appointed to
hold the inquiry after holding the inquiry recorded his finding that
c the charge was proved. It would be advantageous to reproduce the
charge. It is extracted from the report of the inquiry officer :

"Shri Rama Kant was charged for misconduct under
clause. 20 (9) . 18 and 28 of the Standing Orders for
D disorderly behaviour or conduct likely to cause a breach of
peace threatening an employee within the premises and
conduct prejudiced to good order and discipline".

The specific allegation is· that on November 18, -1971, around
E· 2.50 p.m. appellant was complaining about the deduction that was •
being made from his wages for his absence from the place of work
and '1ate attendance with Shri Mahendra Singh. When Shri
Mahendra Singh replied that he had no separate rules ·for him, the
appellant is alleged to have lost his balance. The threatening
language alleged to have been used by the appellant when freely
F translated reads : •

"Are other persons your father. I will make you forget • / •
your high handedness either here or somewhere else. An r '
G officer of yesterday's making discloses power consciousness".

The.inquiry officer held th.at the words attributed to the appellant
were used by him in reference to Shri Mahendra Singh and that use
of such lang.uage would constitute misconduct within the relevant
clauses of the Standing Orders hereinbefore mentioned. The inquiry
H officer recommended dismissal from service. As the matter was
being dealt with on the footing that the appellant· was a Go,ernment
servant entitled to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution,
l\AMAK"'NT v. U.P. STATE (Desai, JJ 651

a second show cau~e notice according -to the provisions , then A
,_ contained in Art. 311 was required to be served before penalty was
finally imposed upon him. But even ·before the notice was served the
appellant was dismissed from service on April 6, 1972. ·

;
A dispute having been raised questioning the validity of B
-termination of service of the appellant, the !st respondent made a
reference to· -the Labour Court,· U.P. for adjudication of the
dispute. The Labour Court by its Award d_ated March 21,-Ll78,
held that the termination of service of the _appellant- w_as legal and
.proper. A petition .under Article 227 of the Constitution to the
High Court fail~d. Hence this appeal by special leave. c
'.
-.. - Mr. Markandeya, learned connsel who· appeared for the
respondent urged that-any person who claims to be a Government
employee cannot seek. relief both under Article 311 on the footing

- that be is holding a civil post or is a member of the civil service of
the State on the one band and a workman falling under the purview
oftbe Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, on the- other, and that this
D

aspe~t is being exam_ined by a larger Bench. Io this case it is not
- necessary to resolve the controversy because we requested Mr.
Markandeya to state specifically whether according to him the
·- appellant on the date of his dismissal was a
Government servant E
governed by Art. 311 or a workman· within the meaning of the
Industrial Disputtes Act, 1947. Mr. Markandeya specifically stated
and it was also held by the ~bour Court thongh wrongly but which
aspect at present is not relevant that the a'ppellant is not a
Government ·servant holding a civil post or a member·o'r the civil·
• service of the State bu( that be is a workman entitled to ·the F
~ proiectiQn of the Industrial _Disputes Act. We are proceeding on that
~~ssumption in this case.

The charge _of which appellant is found guilty is already
extracted herein before. It amounts to a riotous or. disorde_rly G
behaviour during working hours at the establishment. At least 'this
could not be said to be an act subversive of discipline. The miscon-
duct attributed to the appellant is !pat he used some language
unbecoming of a disciplined workman and may have thereby exposed
a threatening posture which is alleged to be subversive of '.discipline. H
Shorn of all embellishments, enraged by deduction from-his wages_
'appellant, a Joint Secretary of Union of'Workmen
. ' - ..........
us~<:\ sQJJle
~
/

652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1983).1 S.C.R.

A language which can be said to be indiscreet. In order not to minimise
the gravity of the charge we .have extracted the charge by its free
translation and it must be. confessed that both the learned counsel -~

who appeared on either side were · fully conversant with the Hindi <..
language and, therefore, ~lbarly understood the· import of the
language used by the appellant. Jn the ultimate analysis the mis-
B conduct is use of language indiscreet or may be said to be indecent
or may be disclosing a threatening posture. We will proceed on the
assumption that use of such language is punishable under the relevant
Standing Orders. So \_Vhat.

The punishment must be ·for misconduct. To some extent
c misconduct is a civil crime which ls visited with civil and pecuniary
~onsequences. In this case it has resulted in dismissal from service.
In ·order to avoid the charge of vindictiveness, justice, equity and
fairplay demand that punishment must always be commensurate with
the gravity of the offence charged. In the development of industrial
relation norms we have moved far from the days when quantum of
D punishment was _considered a managerial function with the courts
,...
having no power to substitute their. own decision in place of that of
the management. More often the courts found that while the
misconduct is proved tbe punishment was disproportionately heavy.
As the situation then stood, courts remained powerless and had to
.E ' be passive sufferers incapable to -curing the injustice. Parliament
stepped in and enacted s. llA of the Industrial Disputes Act which
reacts as under :
,
"II A. Where an industrial di~pute relating to the
discharge or dismissal of a workman has been referred to a
Labour Court, Tribunal or ·National Tribunal for
adjudication and, in the course of the adjudication
proceeding, the LabJur Court Tribunal or National
Tribunal, as the case may be, is satisfied that the qrder of /
discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may, by its
award, set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and
G direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and
conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such pther
relief to . the workman including the award of any lesser
punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as .the
circumstances of the case may require" ..
,...H It is:-now crystal clear that the Labour Court has the
jurisdi9tion, and pow~r ~? sub~titqte its measarc of p11~isb.me nt ill.
I ,
RAMAKANT v. U.P•.STATE (Desai, J.) 653

place of the managerial wisdom once it is satisfied that the order of
A.
discharge ·or dismiss~! was not justified iii .the facts and circumstances
>
of the case. And this Court is at preseni exercising jurisdiction under
.Art. 136 over the decision of the Labour Court. Therefore this
Court can examine , whether . the Labour: Court has properly
approached the matter for exercising 'or refusing to exercise its ·8
power under s. II A. Before we can exercise the discretion conferred
. by s. HA, the Couri has to be satisfied that the "order of discharge
or dismissal was not justified in the facts and circumstances of the
case. These words indicate that even though misconduct is proved
and a penalty has to be imposed, the extreme penalty of dismissal or
discharge wa_s not justified in the facts and circumstances of the case c
meaning thereby that the punishment was either disproportionately
heavy or_ excessive. As stated earlier, it is a well recogiiised principle
of jurisprudence which permits penalty .to be imposed for misconduct
that the penalty must be commensurate with the gravity of the
offence charged.
D
What has happened here. The appellant was employed since
1 1957. The alleged misconduct consisting of use of indiscreet or
abusive or threatening fanguage occurred 011 November 18, 1971,
meaning thereby that he had. putin 14 years of service. Appellant
was·secretary of ihe workmen's Union. The respondent management
has not shown that there was any blameworthy oonduct \Of .the E
appellant during the period of 14 years' service he rendered prior,to
the date of misconduct and the misconduct consists-._ of language
indiscreet, improper or disclosing a -·threatening posture. When it is
said that language discloses a threatening posture. it is the subjective
conclusion of the person who hears the .language because voice
• modulation of each person in the society differs and indiscreet
F
'-......._ improper, abusive language may sh'ow lack of culture but merely the
··- use of such language on one occasion unconnected with any .
';ubsequent p·ositive action and not preceded by any blameworthy
"'>I conduct cannot permit an extreme penalty of dismissal from service.
Therefore, we are satisfied ·that the order of dismissal was not
G
justified in the facts and circumstances of the case and the Court
must interfere. Unfortunately, the Labour Court has completely
misdirected iiself by looking at the dates contrary to record and has
landed itself in an unsustainable order~ Therefore, we are required
to interfere.

What ouglii to \>~ the proper pu'!isqm,~n! ill this case 1 In ou(
.' .
654 SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS . · [1983] J SC.R.

A . opinion, m such a situation withholding of two increments with
future effect will be more than adequate punishment for. such a low
paitl empl_oyee.

Accordingly,- this appeal is allowed and the Award of the
Labour Court is set aside as also the penalty imposed by the
B ... management is quashed and set aside. The appellant is reinstated
.with all the benefits, including the back wages, but his two increments
falling due from the date of his termination of service be withheld ,_
:with,!uture effect.
1 .
:Appeal .allowed.

" . •

r'.