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Supreme Court of India

RAM LALversusSTATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.

Citation
2023 INSC 1047
Decided
4 December 2023
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Holding

The disciplinary dismissal is unlawful and must be quashed because the appellate criminal acquittal, based on identical charges and evidence, disproved the alleged fraud and the disciplinary authority ignored material evidence.

Summary

Ram Lal, a constable of the Rajasthan Armed Constabulary, was dismissed in 2004 after a departmental enquiry found him guilty of altering his date of birth on his 8th standard marksheet to appear of majority age at recruitment. He was later convicted under IPC Section 420 by a trial court, but the appellate court acquitted him, holding that the original marksheet showed the correct date of birth and the prosecution failed to prove any alteration. The Supreme Court examined whether the dismissal was justified and the effect of the criminal acquittal on the disciplinary order. It held that the disciplinary authority ignored material evidence, including the original marksheet and testimony that disproved the alleged fraud. Because the criminal acquittal demonstrated that the charge was disproved, the dismissal was deemed illegal, unfair and oppressive. Consequently, the Court set aside the dismissal and ordered Ram Lal’s reinstatement with back wages and other benefits.

Issues considered

  • Whether the dismissal of the appellant‑constable from service pursuant to the departmental enquiry was justified.
  • What is the effect of the acquittal ordered by the appellate judge in the criminal trial on the dismissal order passed in the departmental enquiry?

Legislation cited

Subjects

service lawdisciplinary dismissalcriminal acquittaljudicial reviewburden of proofdepartmental enquiryreinstatementbackwages

Judgment

                 [2023] 15 S.C.R. 808 : 2023 INSC 1047



                            CASE DETAILS

                                RAM LAL
                                     v.
                   STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.
                     (Civil Appeal No. 7935 of 2023)
                          DECEMBER 4, 2023
     [J. K. MAHESHWARI AND K.V. VISWANATHAN, JJ.]

                             HEADNOTES

     Issue for consideration: Whether the dismissal of the appellant-
constable from service pursuant to the departmental enquiry was justified;
and what is the effect of the acquittal, ordered by the appellate judge in the
criminal trial, on the order of dismissal passed in the departmental enquiry.
      Service law – Dismissal from service pursuant to the departmental
enquiry on allegation of commission of fraud – Justification – Effect
of acquittal ordered by the appellate judge in the criminal trial, on
the order of dismissal – Allegation against the appellant-constable
of altering his date of birth in his 8th standard marksheet to project
himself as having attained majority at the time of recruitment to
the post – Initiation of departmental proceeding – Dismissal from
service – Conviction and sentence of the appellant u/s. 420 IPC by the
trial court, however, acquittal by the appellate court – Writ petition
seeking quashing of the dismissal order and re-instatement in service
– Dismissed by the High Court – Correctness:
      Held: Inference drawn about the proof of the charges by ignoring
the relevant and material evidence being the deposition of the prosecution
witness, the marksheet of 8th class of the appellant enclosed in the
chargesheet and the original marksheet which have direct bearing on the
charge – Disciplinary Authority and the appellate authority merely reiterated
the reasoning in the enquiry report – Explanation given by the appellant
that overwriting in the application form was only due to correction of
an inadvertent error is accepted – As long as the original 8th standard
                                    808
          RAM LAL v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.                           809


marksheet reflected his date of birth as 21.04.1972 and there is no
correction or manipulation in that document, the appellant cannot
be penalised – Furthermore, reading of the entire judgment clearly
indicates that the appellant was acquitted after full consideration of the
prosecution evidence and after noticing that the prosecution miserably
failed to prove the charge – Findings of the appellate judge in the
criminal case clearly indicate that the charge against the appellant
was not just, “not proved”, in fact the charge even stood “disproved”
by the very prosecution evidence – Charges were not just similar
but identical and the evidence, witnesses and circumstances were all
the same – Thus, the order of termination, the order of the appellate
authority, the orders refusing to reconsider and review the penalty,
being illegal and untenable, are quashed – Judgment of the High Court
is set aside – Issuance of direction to re-instate the appellant with all
consequential benefits including 50% of the backwages.
     Judicial review – Order of the Disciplinary Authority – Power
of writ court to review:
      Held: Is very limited – Scope of enquiry is only to examine
whether the decision-making process is legitimate – Courts are entitled
to consider whether the findings of the Disciplinary Authority have
ignored material evidence and if so the courts can interfere – Mere
acquittal by a criminal court would not confer on the employee a right
to claim any benefit, including reinstatement – However, if the charges
in the departmental enquiry and the criminal court are identical or
similar, and if the evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and
the same, then the matter acquires a different dimension – Court would
be entitled to exercise its discretion and grant relief, if it concludes that
allowing the findings in the disciplinary proceedings to stand would
be unjust, unfair and oppressive. [Para 11-13]
    Words and phrases – Expressions “benefit of doubt” and
“honorably acquitted”, used in judgments – Effect:
     Held: Said expressions are not to be understood as magic
incantations – Court of law will not be carried away by the mere use
of such terminology – Court in judicial review is obliged to examine
810          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 15 S.C.R.


the substance of the judgment and not go by the form of expression
used. [Para 25]
      Evidence Act, 1872 – Fact, when said to be ‘disproved’:
      Held: A fact is said to be “disproved” when, after considering
the matters before it, the court either believes that it does not exist or
considers its non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under
the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition
that it does not exist – Fact is said to be “not proved” when it is neither
“proved” nor “disproved”. [Para 26]

       LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES

     G. M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat & Others (2006) 5 SCC 446 –
relied on.
     State Bank of India v. A.G.D. Reddy 2023:INSC : 766 = 2023
(11) Scale 530; United Bank of India v. Biswanath Bhattacharjee
2022:INSC:117 = (2022) 13 SCC 329; Deputy Inspector General of
Police and Another v. S. Samuthiram (2013) 1 SCC 598; State Bank
of Hyderabad v. P. Kata Rao, (2008) 15 SCC 657; Vijayee Singh and
Others v. State of U.P. (1990) 3 SCC 190 – referred to.

       OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
              ORDER AND APPEARANCES

     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7935
of 2023.
     From the Judgment and Order dated 05.09.2018 of the High Court
of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur in SA No.484 of 2011.
      Appearances:
    Adarsh Priyadarshi, Abhijeet Sinha, Sarthak Gaurav, Ms. Rimmi
Bharadwaj, Advs. for the Appellant.
     Vishal Meghwal, Mrs. Padhmalakshmi Iyenger, Ms. Neha Kapoor,
Milind Kumar, Advs. for the Respondents.
          RAM LAL v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.                            811



       JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT

                               JUDGMENT

     K.V. VISWANATHAN, J.
     1. Leave granted.
      2. Ram Lal (the appellant) was a Constable with the Rajasthan Armed
Constabulary, 9th Battalion, Jodhpur. He was appointed on 15.12.1991. A
First Information Report (F.I.R.) was registered on 2.9.2002 against him
under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC. Soon thereafter, on
02.04.2003, a chargesheet in a departmental enquiry was also issued.
     3. The identical allegation in both the proceedings was that the
Appellant altered his date of birth from 21.04.1974 to 21.04.1972 in his 8 th
standard marksheet. It was alleged that this was done to project himself
as having attained majority at the time of the recruitment. The appellant
denied the charges.
       4. Asked about the overwriting in the application, the appellant stated
that it was possible that in the application form he might have written
initially as 21.04.1974 and thereafter corrected it to 21.04.1972. He however
maintained that his date of birth was 21.04.1972.
      5. Five witnesses were examined in the departmental proceeding.
These very five witnesses were also examined in the criminal trial, apart
from eight other witnesses who were also examined at the criminal trial. The
Enquiry Officer in the departmental proceeding found the charges proved
and the Disciplinary Authority, by an order of 31.03.2004, dismissed the
appellant from service. The Appellate Authority also dismissed the appeal.
Attempts to have the order reviewed and the penalty reconsidered were also
in vain.
      6. At the criminal trial, the trial Court convicted the appellant for
the offence under Section 420 of the IPC and sentenced him to undergo
three years’ imprisonment along-with a fine of Rs.5,000/-. However, the
Additional District and Sessions Judge, Jodhpur [‘Appellate Judge’], vide
judgment dated 24.08.2007, allowed the criminal appeal and acquitted the
appellant.
812          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 15 S.C.R.


      7. The appellant, thereafter, represented for his reinstatement.
Subsequently, he filed a writ petition in August, 2008 for quashing the
dismissal order dated 31.03.2004, the order of the Appellate Authority, and
the orders refusing to review and reconsider the above-said orders.
       8. The learned Single Judge, by his judgment dated 13.08.2008,
dismissed the writ petition by holding that the standard of proof in a criminal
proceeding and departmental proceeding is different. The learned Single Judge
found no infirmity in the order of the Disciplinary Authority. The writ appeal
filed by the appellant has also been dismissed by reiterating the findings of
the learned Single Judge and by further elucidating as to how the parameters
for a judicial review against an order in a departmental proceeding are limited
and circumscribed. Being aggrieved, the appellant is in appeal before us.
      Questions for consideration:
      9. The following two questions arise for consideration:
      a) Whether the dismissal of the appellant from service pursuant to the
      departmental enquiry was justified?
      b) On the facts of the case, what is the effect of the acquittal, ordered
      by the Appellate Judge in the criminal trial, on the order of dismissal
      passed in the departmental enquiry?
     10. We have heard Mr. Adarsh Priyadarshi, learned counsel for the
appellant and Mr. Vishal Meghwal, learned counsel for the State. Learned
counsels have reiterated their contentions before the Courts below.
      Legal Position:
      11. We have examined both the questions independently. We are
conscious of the fact that a writ court’s power to review the order of the
Disciplinary Authority is very limited. The scope of enquiry is only to
examine whether the decision-making process is legitimate. [See State Bank
of India vs. A.G.D. Reddy, 2023:INSC:766 = 2023 (11) Scale 530]. As part
of that exercise, the courts exercising power of judicial review are entitled
to consider whether the findings of the Disciplinary Authority have ignored
material evidence and if it so finds, courts are not powerless to interfere.
[See United Bank of India vs. Biswanath Bhattacharjee, 2022:INSC:117
= (2022) 13 SCC 329]
          RAM LAL V. STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.                                813


      12. We are also conscious of the fact that mere acquittal by a criminal
court will not confer on the employee a right to claim any benefit, including
reinstatement. (See Deputy Inspector General of Police and Another v. S.
Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598).
      13. However, if the charges in the departmental enquiry and the
criminal court are identical or similar, and if the evidence, witnesses and
circumstances are one and the same, then the matter acquires a different
dimension. If the court in judicial review concludes that the acquittal in the
criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence
and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge, the Court in
judicial review can grant redress in certain circumstances. The court will be
entitled to exercise its discretion and grant relief, if it concludes that allowing
the findings in the disciplinary proceedings to stand will be unjust, unfair
and oppressive. Each case will turn on its own facts. [See G.M. Tank vs.
State of Gujarat & Others, (2006) 5 SCC 446, State Bank of Hyderabad
vs. P. Kata Rao, (2008) 15 SCC 657 and S. Samuthiram (supra)]
      Discussion:
      Validity of the Disciplinary proceeding – Question No. 1:
      14. A brief analysis of the facts of the case is essential. The origin of
this dispute, which does not inspire confidence at all, is as follows. The
appellant’s cousin Shravan Lal (PW-4 in the departmental enquiry and
PW-6 in the criminal case), deposed as under before the enquiry officer :-
      “Stated on enquiry that about 13 months ago, I was operating engine
      at Well. On that day at about 3.00 p.m., Ramlal after drinking liquor,
      came at well and switched off the engine. Thereafter, Ramlal abused
      me and scuffled with me and said that today I will operate the engine
      and you cannot do anything to me. I have received job by fooling
      the Government. When I enquired him that how you did that, then,
      Ramlal told me that I have received job by altering my date of birth
      as 21.04.1972 in my marksheet, whereas, my date of birth was
      21.04.1974. Thereafter I went to school and enquired about this fact,
      whereupon I came to know that his date of birth was 21.04.1974. Due
      to this reason, I produced an application before the Superintendent of
      Police, Ajmer and made one report to the Commandant, 9th Battalion,
814          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 15 S.C.R.


      RAC, Tonk and I also made one report to the Hon’ble Chief Minister
      and one report to DIG, RAC, Rajasthan, Jaipur…..”
     An F.I.R. was registered on 02.09.2002. A charge-sheet in the
departmental proceeding was issued on 02.04.2003. It will be relevant to
extract the two charges in the disciplinary proceedings:
      “Charge No.1 :-
      In the year 1991, an application for appointment on the post of
      constable was made by you, alongwith which, Marksheet of 8th pass
      issued by Government Secondary School, Tiloniya (Ajmer), bearing
      Roll No. 323 and Admission No. 2314, in which, your date of birth
      was mentioned as 21.04.1974, but you by altering it to 21.04.1972,
      fraudulently got recruited on the post of Constable.
      Charge No.2:-
      As a result of altering your date of birth from 21.04.1974 to 21.04.1972
      in the Marksheet issued by the Government Secondary School, Tiloniya
      (Ajmer), Crime No. 183/02 under Section 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC was
      registered against you in P.S. Mandor, District -Jodhpur.”
     15. Five witnesses were examined in the departmental enquiry, namely,
PW-1 Jagdish Chand, Principal in Government Secondary School, Village
Tiloniya, PW-2 Bhawani Singh (constable who was tasked to bring the
school records), PW-3 Karan Sharma, who was Circle Officer and had
recorded the statement of Shravan Lal; PW-4 Shravan Lal and PW-5 Raj
Singh who conducted the investigation of the criminal case.
      16. The evidence of PW-5/Raj Singh, as set out in the enquiry report
taken as it is, is significant since he clearly disproved the charge. He stated
the following in the cross-examination before the enquiry officer:
      “Raj Singh you conducted investigation of Crime No. 102 and sent the
      copy to Commandant, 9th Battalion, RAC, Tonk, what documents you
      sent alongwith the same - The documents which were sent by me were
      copy of FIR, copy of chargesheet which was submitted in the Court
      and statements of witnesses recorded during the investigation and
      documents; whose photocopies were also given to the accused. Whether
      you had sent the copies of statements recorded in the aforesaid case to
         RAM LAL V. STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.                       815


     the Commandant - I did not send the copies to Commandant Sahab.
     Which officer had submitted the chargesheet, order of result in
     the Court – the then SHO of P.S. Mandor, District - Jodhpur City
     namely Sh. Ram Pratap submitted result of investigation, order
     and chargesheet against the accused, in the Court.”
     During the investigation, you had recorded statements of
     Dharmendra Kumar Jatav and Jairam Gurjar, did you record more
     statements and whether you would identify the copies of those
     statements - Yes, I recorded the statement of witnesses as it is.
     And I am producing herewith the statements of both the aforesaid
     witnesses. Whether those have been written by yourself - Yes,
     those statements have been written by me, which are Exh. D-1 and
     Exh. D-2. In Exh. D-1, I recorded statement of Teacher namely
     Rakishan Dev Murari on A to B part and I filled the marksheet
     of Ramlal, wherein, date of birth of Ramlal is mentioned as
     21.04.1972 in C to D part, which has been written as per the
     dictation of Checking Teacher Ramkishan Dev Murari. Date of
     birth of 21.07.1972 mentioned on E to F part, was not mentioned
     in deliberate manner, in fact, same has been written due to the
     human error, whether you are agree with this statement - This
     statement is correct, whereas, at the time of filling up form for
     recruitment in Police RAC, Ramlal could enclose T.C. of 9th Pass,
     and he was studying in 10th class.”
     Thereafter, referring to the Exh. D-2 [Statement of Jairam Gurjar],
he deposed as under:-
     “Similarly, in Exh. D-2, on A to· B part, you have shown me the
     photocopy of 8th class marksheet of Ramlal S/o Sh. Tejuram
     Chaudhary, R/o Tiloniya, on which, signatures of it’s issuer
     i.e. Teacher namely Sh. Dharmendra Kumar, Ramkishan Dev
     Murari and Headmaster Sh. Vishnu Miyani are mentioned. I am
     acquainted with their signatures.”
     17. Most importantly dealing with the 8th class marksheet of
the appellant, which formed the basis for his application seeking
appointment as Constable, PW-5/Raj Singh stated as under:-
816           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 15 S.C.R.


      “The 8th class marksheet of Ramlal enclosed in the documents, which
      is Exh. P-3, (sic) in which, whether any alteration has been found in the
      date of birth anywhere, and whether date of birth has been mentioned as
      21.04.1972 therein - Yes, no alteration has been made in the marksheet
      of 8th class and date of birth is 21.04.1972.”
     18. It is very clear from the above that no alteration was found in
the Appellant’s 8th class marksheet (which forms part of the enclosed
documents sent to the Commandant) and the date of birth mentioned on it was
21.04.1972. Reference to ‘P-3’ in the above extract appears to be a mistake.
The chargesheet and documents enclosed were Ex. P-12/1 to P-12/12. The
defence also exhibited the original 8th class marksheet separately as Exh.
D-3, as is clear from the chart of Exhibits set out in the enquiry report.
      19. The Enquiry Officer, after setting out the depositions of the
witnesses, set out the chart of the “P” series Exhibits and the Exhibits of
the delinquent, namely the “D” series, and without any further discussion or
marshaling of the evidence recorded the following with regard to charge-1:
      “On perusal of statement of witnesses namely PW-1 PW-2, PW-3,
      PW-4, PW-5 and Exh. P-1 to P-12, it is clear that correct date of birth
      of delinquent constable was 21.04.1974. When, delinquent constable
      submitted application for recruitment on the post of Constable, at
      that time, he did not complete the age of 18 years, therefore, due to
      the apprehension of rejection of his application due to the less age,
      delinquent constable has altered his date of birth as 21.04.1972 from
      21.04.1974, therefore, Charge No.1 stands proved.
      Delinquent Constable has also passed 10th class, whose marksheet
      is Exh. P-4, in which, his date of birth is mentioned as 21.04.1974.”
     In so far as charge-2 was concerned, it was merely noticed that challan
had been filed in the criminal case as on 28.02.2004, the date of enquiry
report, and that the trial had not concluded.
      20. In the operative part of the enquiry report under the head,
‘conclusions’, there is no reference to the 8th class marksheet, (which
was part of the enclosed documents sent by Constable Raj Singh with the
chargesheet) or to Exh.D-3 [the original 8th class marksheet] exhibited by
the defence. There is also no reference to the statement of Raj Singh PW-5
          RAM LAL V. STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.                             817


in the enquiry, who had acknowledged that there was no alteration in the
marksheet of the 8th class. What is referred to in the chart of exhibits are
letter of Jagdish Chand (Ex.P1); the duplicate marksheet of 8 th class issued
by Jagdish Chand (Ex.P2); the statement of Shravan Lal (Ex-P3); 10th
class marksheet of Secondary Education Board Rajasthan, Ajmer, (Ex.P4);
preliminary enquiry dated 16.10.2002 by Circle Officer, Kishangarh (Ex.
P5); FIR No. 183/2000, (Ex.P6); application submitted by Ram Lal for
recruitment to the post of constable (Ex.P-7); letter of appointment dated
08.11.1991 (ExP-8); verification letter filed by Ramlal (Ex.P9); appointment
order dated 16.12.1991, (Ex-P-10); letter of Government School Tiloniya,
Ex.P-11; and chargesheet dated 24.04.2003, Ex.P-12.
       21. It is very clear that relevant and material evidence being, the
deposition of PW-5/Raj Singh; the marksheet of 8 th class of the appellant
[enclosed to the chargesheet] and the original marksheet independently
marked as Ex. D3 by the defence have been completely left out in the
discussion and consideration. Inference has been drawn about the proof
of the charges by ignoring crucial, relevant and material evidence which
had come on record. The evidence of PW-5 Raj Singh and the marksheet
enclosed in the documents annexed to the chargesheet and the original
marksheet marked as Ex. D-3, were materials having a direct bearing on the
charge. The Disciplinary Authority has merely reiterated the reasoning in the
enquiry report. Equally so are the findings of the appellate authority. It is
well settled that if the findings of the disciplinary authorities are arrived at
after ignoring the relevant material the court in judicial review can interfere.
It is only to satisfy ourselves to this extent, that we have scrutinized the
material to see as to what was reflected in the record. We are satisfied that
the disciplinary proceedings are vitiated and deserves to be quashed.
     22. In this scenario, we are inclined to accept the explanation given
by the appellant that overwriting in the application form was only due
to correction of an inadvertent error. As long as the original 8th standard
marksheet reflected his date of birth as 21.04.1972 and there is no correction
or manipulation in that document, the appellant cannot be penalised.
     Effect of Acquittal in the Criminal Proceeding – Question No. 2:
      23. With this above background, if we examine the criminal proceedings
the following factual position emerges. The very same witnesses, who were
818          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 15 S.C.R.


examined in the departmental enquiry were examined in the criminal trial.
Jagdish Chandra, Bhawani Singh, Shravan Lal, Raj Singh and Karan Sharma
were examined as PW2, PW3, PW6, PW9 and PW13 respectively at the
criminal trial. Apart from them, eight other witnesses were also examined.
The gravamen of the charge in the criminal case was that the appellant had
submitted an application for recruitment along with his marksheet and he,
by making alteration in his date of birth to reflect the same as 24.04.1972
in place of 21.04.1974, and obtained recruitment to the post of Constable.
Though the Trial Court convicted the appellant under Section 420 of IPC,
the Appellate Court recorded the following crucial findings while acquitting
the appellant:
      “….Mainly the present case was based on the documents to
      this effect whether the date of birth of accused is 21.04.1972 or
      21.04.1974. Exh. P-3 is original Marksheet, in which, the date
      of birth of accused has been shown as 21.04.1972 and same has
      also been proved by the witnesses examined on behalf of the
      prosecution. Whatever the documents have been produced before
      the Court regarding the date of birth of 21.04.1974 are either the
      letters of Principal or are Duplicate T.C. or Marksheets. Neither
      the prosecution has produced any such original documents in the
      Subordinate Court to this effect that when the admission form of
      accused was filled, what date of birth was mentioned by the accused
      in it, what was the date of birth in Roll Register of School, what
      date of birth was mentioned by accused in the Examination Form
      of Secondary, and nor after bringing the original records from the
      concerned witnesses, same were got proved in the evidence. In
      these circumstances, this fact becomes doubtful that date of birth
      of accused was 21.04.1974, and accused is entitled to receive it’s
      benefit. In the considered opinion of this Court, the conviction
      made by the Ld. Subordinate Court merely on the basis of oral
      evidences and letters or duplicate documents, is not just and proper.
      It is justifiable to acquit the accused.
      Resultantly, on the basis of aforesaid consideration, the present
      appeal filed by the Appellant/Accused is liable to be allowed.”
                                                      [Emphasis supplied]
          RAM LAL V. STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.                                819


       24. What is important to notice is that the Appellate Judge has clearly
recorded that in the document Exh. P-3 – original marksheet of the 8th standard,
the date of birth was clearly shown as 21.04.1972 and the other documents
produced by the prosecution were either letters or a duplicate marksheet. No
doubt, the Appellate Judge says that it becomes doubtful whether the date of
birth was 21.04.1974 and that the accused was entitled to receive its benefit.
However, what we are supposed to see is the substance of the judgment. A
reading of the entire judgment clearly indicates that the appellant was acquitted
after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and after noticing that the
prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charge [See S. Samuthiram
(Supra).]
      25. Expressions like “benefit of doubt” and “honorably acquitted”, used
in judgments are not to be understood as magic incantations. A court of law
will not be carried away by the mere use of such terminology. In the present
case, the Appellate Judge has recorded that Exh. P-3, the original marksheet
carries the date of birth as 21.04.1972 and the same has also been proved by
the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution. The conclusion that
the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the
prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the
charge can only be arrived at after a reading of the judgment in its entirety. The
court in judicial review is obliged to examine the substance of the judgment
and not go by the form of expression used.
      26. We are satisfied that the findings of the appellate judge in the criminal
case clearly indicate that the charge against the appellant was not just, “not
proved” - in fact the charge even stood “disproved” by the very prosecution
evidence. As held by this Court, a fact is said to be “disproved” when, after
considering the matters before it, the court either believes that it does not exist
or considers its non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the
circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does
not exist. A fact is said to be “not proved” when it is neither “proved” nor
“disproved” [See Vijayee Singh and Others v. State of U.P. (1990) 3 SCC 190].
      27. We are additionally satisfied that in the teeth of the finding of the
appellate Judge, the disciplinary proceedings and the orders passed thereon
cannot be allowed to stand. The charges were not just similar but identical and
the evidence, witnesses and circumstances were all the same. This is a case
820            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 15 S.C.R.


where in exercise of our discretion, we quash the orders of the disciplinary
authority and the appellate authority as allowing them to stand will be unjust,
unfair and oppressive. This case is very similar to the situation that arose in
G.M. Tank (supra).
      28. Apart from the above, one other aspect is to be noted. The Enquiry
Officer’s report makes a reference to the appellant passing 10th standard, and
to a 10th standard marksheet exhibited as Exh. P-4 referring to the date of birth
as 24.07.1974. Jagdish Chandra-PW1 (in the departmental enquiry) clearly
deposed that since the appellant was regularly absent from Class 10, his name
was struck off and he did not even pass 10th standard. The appellant has also
come out with this version before the disciplinary authority, stating that the
10th class certificate of Ram Lal produced before the Enquiry Officer, is of
some other Ram Lal.
      29. This issue need not detain us any further because it is not the case
of department that the appellant sought employment based on 10th standard
marksheet. It is their positive case that the appellant sought employment on
the basis of his 8th standard marksheet. Shravan Lal-PW-4 in the departmental
enquiry had also furnished the 10th standard marksheet procured from the
Secondary Education Board, Ajmer. In cross-examination, on being asked, he
admitted that the appellant was recruited on the basis of 8th standard marksheet,
and he admitted that there was no alteration in the 8th standard marksheet.
      30. In view of the above, we declare that the order of termination dated
31.03.2004; the order of the Appellate Authority dated 08.10.2004; the orders
dated 29.03.2008 and 25.06.2008 refusing to reconsider and review the penalty
respectively, are all illegal and untenable.
      31. Accordingly, we set aside the judgment of the D.B. Special Appeal
(Writ) No.484/2011 dated 05.09.2018. We direct that the appellant shall
be reinstated with all consequential benefits including seniority, notional
promotions, fitment of salary and all other benefits. As far as backwages are
concerned, we are inclined to award the appellant 50% of the backwages. The
directions be complied with within a period of four weeks from today.
      32. The appeal is allowed in the above terms. No order as to costs.


Headnotes prepared by:                                             Appeal allowed.
Nidhi Jain


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