Holding

The power to refer an industrial dispute under Section 10(1) is an administrative act, and a writ of mandamus lies where the Government’s refusal is based on irrelevant or extraneous grounds.

Summary

The petitioners, workmen dismissed after domestic enquiries, raised industrial disputes and sought reinstatement. Conciliation failed and the State of Haryana (for four workmen) and the Central Government (for one workman) refused to refer the disputes to an Industrial Tribunal under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, on the ground that the enquiries proved the charges and the punishments were not malafide. The petitioners filed writ petitions under Article 32 seeking a mandamus directing the governments to make a reference. The Supreme Court held that the power to refer under Section 10(1) is an administrative function, not quasi‑judicial, and that the government must base its decision on grounds relevant and germane to the exercise of its power. If the reasons are extraneous or irrelevant, a writ of mandamus lies. The Court found the governments' reasons to be extraneous and ordered mandamus directing them to reconsider and refer the disputes. The writ petitions were allowed and costs awarded.

Issues considered

The appropriate Government's power under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act is administrative or quasi‑judicial.
Whether the refusal to refer the industrial disputes to a Tribunal on the basis that the domestic enquiries proved the charges is justified.
Whether a writ of mandamus can be issued against the Government when its reasons for refusing reference are irrelevant, extraneous or not germane.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 32
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 10(1), s. 11A, s. 2A

Subjects

Industrial disputeSection 10(1)Reference to TribunalAdministrative functionQuasi‑judicial functionWrit of mandamusArticle 32DismissalDomestic enquiryIndustrial relations

Judgment

JlAM AVTAR SHARMA & ORS. ETC.

v.
B
STATE OF HARYANA AND ANR. ETC.

Aprilll, 1985

(D.A. DESAI AND RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.J
c
Constitution of India, Art.32 and 226-Refusa/ by appropriate Government
fo refer industrial dispute to lndustrial Tribuna/flahour Court 11/s, JO, J.D.Act-
Function of Government u/s. 10 - Whether administralative or Quasi-Judicial
-When a writ of mandamus can be issued.

D Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, s. JO-Reference-Exercise of power by
Govt. to refer an industrial dispute to inJr,striaf Tribunal Labour Court-Whe- •
ther a writ can be issued against refusal of Govern1nent to refer the dispute.

Administrative Law-Function of f!overntnent ufs. JO J.D. Act to refer
a dispute-Whether admini'stratfre or quasi~judr'cial.
E.
Jn a11 the writ petitions, the petitioners were dismissed from service on
the grotfnd of miscoilduct after an enquiry held against each of thrm. They
raised an industrial dispute contending that the orders imposing punishment
of removal were illegal and invalid. The conciliation proceedtngs also failed.
1he State Government in W.Ps. Nos. 16226-29 of 1984 and the Central
Government in W.P. No. 16418 of 1984 passed identical orders in each case
F refusing to make a reference to the Tribunal u/s. 10(1) 9f the Industrial
Disputes Act t9t7 holding that the punishment was imposed on the peti-
tioners after an enquiry has been held in accoi-dance with th¢ rules and that
the removal from service is neither malafide nor unjustified and therefore it
was not a fit cai;e for making the refer~n.::~. H'!ncc th-~s~ writ petitions.

Allowing the oetions,
G
lJELD: 1.(i) In making a referl!n.;e u/;;. 10([) the appropriate govern-
ment performs an administrative act and not a judicial or qu:oisi-judicial act and
the fact that it has to f0rm an opinion as to the factual e.tistence of an industrial
dispute as a preliininary step to the discharge of it<; function do·es not make it
ftnY the less administrative in character. Assuming that making or refusing
11 to make a reference under Soc. 10(1) is a quasi.judicial function, there is

'I
RAM AVTAR V. HARYANA 687
)

bound to be a conflict of jurisdiction if the reference is ultimately made. A A
quasi-judicial function is to some extent an adjudicatory function in a tis
bet.ween two contending parties. The Government as an umpire, assuming
that it is performing a qu1'>i-judicial function when it proceeds to make _a
reference, would imply that the quasi-judicial determination of !is prima facie
shows: that one who raised th~ di~pute has established merits of the dispute.
'rhe inference necessarily follows from the assumption that the function per-
formed under Sec. 10(1) is a quasi-judicial function. Now by exercising B
power under Sec. 10, a reference is made to a Tribunal for adjudication and
the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that there was no merit in the dispute,
prima facie a conflict of jurisdiction may emerge. Therefore, the view that
while exercising power under sec. JC(l) the fu'lction performed by the appro-
priate Government is an administrative function and not a judicial or qu!lsi-
judic~al function is beyond the pale of controversy. [692F-H; 693A·CJ
c
State of Madras v. C.P. Saraihy & · Anr. (1953] S.C. R. 335 at 347
Western India Match Co. Ltd. v. Western India Match Co. Workers Union & .
Ors. [1970] 2 SCR' 370 ~and Sa1nbu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda, Jul/u11dur
(1978] 2 SCR 793 followed.

(2) Every administrative determination must be based on grounds re- D
levant and germace to the exercise of power. If the adminhtrative determina-
tion is based on the irrelevant, extraneous or grounds not germane to the
exereise of power it is liable to be questioned in exercise of the power
of judicial review. In such a situation the court would bejustified in
issuing a writ of mandamus even in respect of an administrative order.
Maybe, the court may not issue writ of mandamus, directing the Government
to make a reference but the cour! can after examining the reasons given by the E
appropriate Government for refu"sin2 to make a reference come to a conclu-
sion that they are irrelevant. extraneous or not germane to the determina~
tion and then can direct the Government to reconsider the matter.
[693F-H; 694A]

(3) In the instaJ;lt cases, the workmen questioned the_legality and vali-
dity of the enquiry which aspect the Tribunal in a quasi.judicial determination
was required to examine. A bare statement. that -a domestic enquiry was held F
in which charges were held to be proved, if it is considered sufficient for not
exercising power of making a reference under Sec. 10(1), almost all cases of
termination of services cannot go before· the Tribunal. And it would render
Sec. 2A of the Act denuded of all its content and meaning. The reasons given
by the appropriate. Govenment in each case would show that the Government
examined the relevant papers of enquiry and the Government was satisfied G
that it was legally valid an that there was sufficient and adequate evidence
to bold ·the charges proved. It ~ould further appear that the appropriate
Government in each case was satisfied that the enquiry was not biased against
the workmen and the punishment was commensurate with the· gravity of the
misconduct charged.. All these_ relevant and vital aspects have to be examined
b{' the Industrial Tribunal while adjudicating upon the reference made to it.
H
688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 3 S.C.R.
A ln other words, the reasons given by the Government would tantamount to
adjudic::ition which is impermissible, Tbat i~ the function of the Trjbuilat and
the Government cannot arrogate to itself th:H function. Therefore if the
groUnds on which or the reasons for which the Government deciiaed to
make a reference under Sec, 10 are irrelevant.extraneous or not germane to the
determination, it is well .settled that the party aggrieved thereby would be entitled
to move the Court for a writ of mandamus. Accordingly all the wdt peti-
tions nre allowed directing the appropriate government in each case to re-
consider its decision and to exercise power u/s. 10 on relevant and coi1sidcra-
B tions germane to the decision. In other words a clear case for reference uss.
10(1) in each case is made out. [694G-H;695A-D; 695A; 696-ABl

State of Bombay v. K.P. Krishnan & Ors. [1971] l SCR 227 at 243 and ·
Bombay Union of Journalists & Ors. v, State of Bombay & Anr., (1964] 6 SCR , ~ '.
22 sclicd upon,
c
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 16226·f9 and
16418 of 1984.

Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

0 A. K. Goel for the Petitioners.

llarbans Lal, Ashok Grover, 0. P. Sharma, R.N. Poddar and
C. V. Subba Rao for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was 1.LI ivcred by
E

DESAI, J.In this group of writ petitions, the only point of
law hanvasscd is whether the appropriate Government was justified
in declining to make a reference of an industrial dispute ari;sing out
of the termination of service of each of the petitioners for adjudi- ) -
F catinn to Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court under Sec. 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Writ p, titian Nos. 16256-29/84 : Four petitioners were
the workmen employed by the second respondent Hyderabad
Asbestos Cement Production Ltd. ('employer' for short). The
G employ.er on April 11, 1983 issued charge-sheet in identical
terms to all the four petitioners calling up.on them to show
cause within 48 hours of the receipt of the charge-sheet as to why
suitabk disciplinary aclion should not be taken against each of
them. The charge-sheet referred to an incident that occurred on
J Ith April, 1983 at 8.)5 A.M. between two groups of workers prc-
H sutuably owing loyalty to rival unions. The misconduct alle~ed
RA\! AVTAR v. HARYANA (Desai, J.) 689

A
against each petitioner was the one set out in Standing Order 20
(XIV) and 20(XXVJ of the Certified Standing Orders of the cmp·
loyer. Briefly stated, the charges were that the petitioners were
guilty of fighting or riotous or disorderly behaviour as also man-
handling beating etc. other workmen of the Company which acts were
subversive of the discipline expected of the workmen of the Com-
8
pany. It is alleged that di•ciplinary enquiry followed and the enquiry
officer_ submitted his report holding each of the petitioners guilty of
the misconduct imputed against him. The Assistant Vice-President
of the employer Company, after having gone through the report
submitted by the enquiry officer and after perusal' of the record of
proceedings of enquiry and the connected documents concurred with c
-~ the findings recorded and reported by the enquiry officer holding
the petitioners guilty of charges. After taking into consideration
Various relevant circumstances including the past record of the
workmen, each of the petitione·rs was dismissed from the employ-
ment of the employer. It may be mentioned that during the pen-
dency of the enquiry, all the petitioners had been put under suspen- D
sion and while dismissing the petitioners, the period of suspension
was treated as absence without leave. The petitioners raised an
industrial dispute as per notice dated May i2, 1984 calling upon the
employer to reinstate them wi\h backwages and treat them in ser~
vice without a break. Copies of the notice were· also s~rved upon
E
the authorities in the Labour Department of the Haryana Govern -
ment. The Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer held conciliation pro-
ceedings and submitted a failure report on June 30, 1984. The
second respondent, the State of Haryana, after taking into consi-
deration the report of the Concilation Officer, by its order dated
September l, J984 declined to make a reference on the ground that F
'the Goverument does not consider -the case to be fit for reference
-~- for adjudication to the Tribuna! as it has been learnt that the ser-
vices,of the.petitioners were terminated only after charges against
them were proved in a domestic enquiry.' T~e present writ petition
is filed questioning the correctness and validity of this order.
G
Writ Petition No. 16418/84: Petitioner S.K. ·Sharma was, at
the relevant time, employed as Electrical Fitter in tb'e Diesel Shed
at Tuglakabad. He was Assistant Secretary of the Uttar Railway
Karamchari Union, Diesel Shed Branch. He was also a member~
of the Canteen Committee. On August 2, 1981 th·e petitioner went
to the Canteen, according to him, in his capacity as the member· of H
690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ti 985] 3 s.c.R.
A
the Canteen Committee, to enquire about the working of the Can-
teen. On Shri Gurbachan Singh, a Foreman, marked the petitio.ner
absent from duty and made an entry indicating that the petitioner
had absented himself from duty and gave a direction that the peti-
tioner should not be allowed to join duty without his permission.
B On the next day i.e. August 3, 1981, when the petitioner reported
for duty, token was not issued to him by the Time Keeper and he
was informed that the token could not be issued to him until he
brought a slip from Foreman Shri Gurbachan Singh. As the latter
was not on duty on that day, petitioner and 10 other workmen .who
too had been marked absent went to the residence of the Foreman
c Shri Gurbachan Singh and enquired from him why they were not ~-·
permitted to join duty, Shri Gurbachan Singh declined to have
given any direction in this behalf and rebuked the petitioners for
coming to his residence and accused them of misbehaviour. The
petitioner and several others then approached the General Foreman
who intervened and ordered the petitioner and others to join duty.
D Gurbachan Singh thereafter lodged a complaint with the third res-
pondent, Senior Divisional Mechanical Engineer, alleging that the
petitioner has misbehaved with him and had attempted to man-
handle him. On receipt of this report from Gurbacran Singh, Peti-
tioner was placed under suspension on August 5, 1981, and was
served with a charge-sheet. The petitioner denied the imputation.
E A disciplinary enquiry followed. Surprisingly the enquiry officer,
Senior Loco Inspector Shri Joginder Lal, did not record the state-
ment of Shri Gurbachan Singh who was the prime witness but exa-
mined two other witnesses who claimed to be the neighbourers of
Shri Gurbachan Singh. The enquiry officer submitted his report dated
F October 24, 1981 holding the petitioner guilty of mis-conduct. On }
the basis of the report, 4th respondent exercising powers under Rule ·
6 of the Raiway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 impo-
sed punishment of removal from service on the petitioner. After
an unsuccessful appeal to the Divisional Mechanical Engineer, the
Uttar Railway Karamchari Union espoused the cause of the petitio-
ner and raised an industrial dispute contending that the order impo-
G sing punishment of removal from service was illegal and invalid.
Central Labour Commissioner pursuant to the application from the
Union dated may 29, 1982 held conciliation proceedings in which
the respondents did not participate. Consequently, a failure report
was submitted. The appropriate Government being the Central
RAM AVfAR v. HARYANA (Desai, J.) 691

Government as por its order dated Deeember 9, 1983 rejected the "A
req\lest for a reference under Sec. JO of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 on the ground 'that the penalty of removal from service was
imposed on the workmen on the basis of enquiry held in accordance
with the procedure laid down in the Railway Servants (Discipline
and Appeal) Rules, 1968 and that the action of the management in
R
imposing the penalty of removal from service is neither malafide
nor unjustified and therefore the appropriate Government . does not
consider it necessary to refer the dispute to an Industrial Tribun-al
for adjudication.' It is this order which is challenged in this writ
petition.

The neat and narrow question of law raised in these two writ
c
petitions can be formulated thu.s : whether the appropriate Govern-
ment in each case was justified in refusing to make a reference on
the grounds mentioned in each order more specifically that as the
punishment was imposed after an enquiry held in accordance with
the rules and on the report of the enquiry officer, it is not a fit case D
for making the reference. In other words, the question of Jaw is
what are the parameters of power of the appropriate .Government
under Sec. I 0 while making or refusing to make a reference to an
industrial tribunal for adjudication of an industrial dispute.

The first question to be posed is whether while exercising the F
power conferred by Sec. 10 to refer an industrial dispute to a
Tribunal for adjudication, the appropriate Government is dischar-
ging an administrative function or a quasi-judicial function. This
is no more res integra. In State of Madras v. c~P. Sarathy & Anr .1)
a Constitution Bench of this Court observed as under :
E
"But, it must be remembered that in making a refe-
rence under Sec. 10(1) the Government is doing an admi-
nistrative act and the fact that it has to form an opinion'
as to the factual .existence of an indvstrial dispute as a pre-
liminary step to the discharge of its function does not make
it any the less administrative in charact~r. The Court can- G
not, therefore, canvass the order of reference closely to see
if there was any material before the Government to support
its conclusion, as if it was a judicial or quasi-judicial deter-
mination.''

(I) (1953] S.C.R. 334 at 347. Hff
6C)2 SUPREME CollRT ll.EPORTS (1985) 3 S.C.ll.·

A
Explaining the ratio of the decision in Sara thy' s c.ise(1), iri Wes-
tern fndia Match Co. Lid. v. Western fndia Match Co. Workers
Union'& Ors.('> it was observed as under :

B "In the State of Madras v. C.P. Sarathy(')' this Court
held on construction of s. 10(1) of the Central Act that the
function of the appropriate Government thereunder is an
administrative function. It was so held presumably
because the Government cannot go into the merits of the
dispute its function being only to r~fer such a dispute for ad-
c judication so that the industrial relations between the e.mp-
loyer and his employees may not continue to remain dis-
turbed and the dispute may be resolved through a judicial
process as speedily as possible." (Emphasis supplied)

D After referring to the earlier decisions on the subject in
Sliambhu Nath Goel v. Bank of Baroda, Jullundurr'J it was hel.d that,
in making a reference under Sec. 10(1), the appropriate Govern-
ment is doing an administrative act and the fact that it has to form
an opinion as to the factual existence of an industrial displi.te 'its a
preliminary steo to the discharge of its function does not make it
E any the less administrative in character. Thus, there is a consider-
able body of the judicial opinion that while exercising power of
making a reference under Sec. 10(1), the appropriate Government
·performs an administrative act and not a judicial or quasi-judicial
act.

F
The view that while e<ercising pJw<r under Sec. 10(1), the )- ~
Government performs administrative function c1n be supported by
an alternative line of r~asoning, Ai;suming that inaking or refus-
0

ing to make a reference under Sec. lO(l) is a quasi-judicial function,
there is bound to boa CJntlict of jurisdiction if the reference is
G ultimately made. A qua>i·judicial function is to some extent an
adjudicatory funi:tion in a !is.between two contcnling parties. The
Government as an umpire, assuming that it is performing a quasi-

(I) [1970] 2 S.C.R. 370.
(2) [1978) 25 S.C.R. 793.
H
RAM AVTAR V. HARYANA (De.ai, J.) 693

judicial function when it proceeds to make a reference, would imply A
that the quasi-judicial determination of lis prima facie show that
one who raised the dispute has established merits of the dispute. The
inference necessarily follows from the assumption. that the function
performed under Sec. 10(1) is a quasi-judicial function. Now by
exercising power under Sec. 10, a reference is made to a Tribunal
for adjudication and the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that B
there was no !merit in the dispute, Prima fade a conflict of
jurisdiction may emerge. Therefore the view that while exercising
power under Sec. 10(1) the function performed by the appro-
priate Government is an administrative function and not
a judicial or quasi-judicial function is beyond the pale of contro-
versy.
c

Now if the Government performs an administrative act while
either making or refusing to make a reference under Sec. 10(1), it
cannot delve into the merits of the dispute and take upon itself the
determination of lis. That would certainly be in excess of the D
power conferred by Sec. 10. Section 10 requires the appropriate
Government to be satisfied that an industrial dispute exists or is
apprehended. This may permit the appropriate Government to
determine prima facie whether an industrial dispute exists or the
claim is frivolous or bogus or put forth for extraneous and irrcle-
E
v:fit reasons not for justice or industrial peace and harmony. Every
administrative determination must be based on grounds relevant
and germane to tile exercise of power. If the admini~trative deter-
mination is based on the irrelevant, extraneous or grounds not
germane to the exercise of power it i> liable to be questioned in
exercise of the power of judicial review. In State of Bombay v.
··tf· K. P. Krishnan and Ors.l') it was hcld1that a writ of mandamus would F
lie against the Government if the order passed by it under Sec. 10(1)
is based or induccJ by reasons as given by the Government are
extraneous, irrelevant and not germane to the determination. In
Sucl1 a situation the Court would be justified in issuing a writ of
mandamus even in respect of an administrative order. Maybe, the
Court may not issue writ of mandamus, directing the Government
to make a reference but the Court can after examining the reasons
given by the approriate Government for refusing to make a refernce

11961) 1SCR227 at 243. H
694 SUPIIBME COURT REPORTS (1985) 3 $.C.R.
A come to a conclusion that they are irrelevant, extraneous or not
germane to the determination and then can direct the Government
to reconsider the matter. This legal position appears to be beyond
the pale of controversy.
B
Accordingly, it is necessary to examine the reasons giveµ by
the Government to ascertain whether the determination of the
Government was based on relevant considerations or irrelevant,
extraneous or considerations not germane to the determination.

c Re: Writ Petition Nos. 16226-29/84: The reasons assigned by the
Government for refusing to make a reference are to be called out
from the letter Annexure 'A' dated September 1, 1984 sent by the
Joint Secretary, Haryana Government, Labour Department to the
petitioners. It is stated in the letter that: "the Govt. does not con-
sider your case to be fit for reference for adjudication, to the Tri-
0
bunal as it has been learnt that your services were terminated only
after charges against you were proved in a domestic enquiry." The
assumption underlying the reasons assigned by the Government
are that the enquiry was consistent with the rules and the standing
orders, that it was fair and just and that there was unbiased deter-
mination and the punishment was commensurate with the gravity
E
of the misconduct. The last aspect has assumed considerable im-
portance after the introduction of Section 11 A in the lndusfrial
Disputes Act by Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1971 with
effect from December 15, 1971., It confers power on the Tribunal
not only to examine the order of discharge or dismissal on merits
F as also to determine whether the punishment was commensurate
with the gravity of the misconduct charged. In other words, Sec.
ilA confers power on the Tribunal/Labour Court to examine tbe
case of the workmen whose service has been terminated either by
discharge or dismissal qualitatively in the matter of nature of
enquiry and quantitatively in the matter of adequacy or otherwise
G of punishment. The workmen questfoned the legality and validity
of the enquiry which aspect the Tribunal in a quasi-judicial deter-
mination was required to examine. A bare statement that a domes-
tic enquiry was held in which charges were held to be proved, if it
is considered sufficient for not exercising power of making a refe-
rence under Sec. 10(1), almost all cases of termination of services
H cannot go before the Tribunal. And it would render Sec. 2A of
RAM AVTARV. HARYANA (Desai, J.) 695
,.I.
the Act denuded of all its conient and meaning. Th'e reasons given A
by the Government would show that the)Government examine_d the
relevant papers of enquiry and the Government was satisfied that it
was legally valid and that there was sufficient and adequate ·eviden_9e
·to hold the charges ·proved. It would further· appear that the
Government was satisfied that the enquiry wasnot biased against
n
the Workmen and the punishment was commensurate with the gravity
of the misconduct charged. All these relevant and vital aspects have
to be examined by the Industrial Tribunal while adjudicating upon
the reference made to it. In other words, the reasons given by the .
Government ·would tantamount to adjudication which ·is· impermis-
sible. That is the funC!ion Of the Tribunal and the Government c
cannot arrogate to itself that function. Therefore if the grounds on
"hich or the reasons for which the Government declined to make
a reference under Sec. 10 aie irrelevant, extraneous or not germane
to the determination, it is well settled that the party aggrieved there-
by would be entitled to move the Court for a writ of mandamus.
(See Bombay Union of Journalists & Ors. v. The State of Bombay-& •ID
Anr.(1) It is equally well-settled that where the Government p~r
ports to give reasons which tantamount to adjudication and refuses
to make a reference, the appropriate Government could' be said to
have acted on extra 1eom, irrelevant grounds or grounds not ger-
mane to the determination and a writ of m mdamus would lie calling
upon the Government to reconsider it.; decision. In this case a clear
case for grant of writ of mandamus is made out.
Writ Petition No. 16418/84: !he appropriate Government
being the Central GJVernment in this case declined to make a re-
ference as per its order dated December 9, 1983 in which it is stated
that 'the action of the management in imposing on the workmen F
penalty of removal from service on the basis. of an enquiry and in.
accordance with the procedure laid down .in the Railway Servanis
(Discipline & Appeal)·Rules, 1968 is neither malafide nor unjustified.
The appropriate Government does not consider it necessary to refer
the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication.' Ex facie
G
it would appear that the Government acted on extraneous and irre-
levant. considerations and the reasons hereinbefore mentioned will
mutatis murandfr apply in respect of present order of the Govern-
ment under challenge. Therefore for the same reasons, a writ of
mandamus must be issued.

\!) [1964] 6 S.C.R. 22. II
696 SUPREME COURT RBPORfS [I %5] 3 S.C.R.
,l,
A Accordingly all the writ petitions are allowed and the rule is
made absolute in each case. Let a writ of mandamus be issued
directing the appropriate Government in each case namely the State
of Haryana in the first mentioned group of petitions and the Central
Government in the second petition to reconsider its decision and to
exercise power under Sec. 10 on relevant and considerations ger-
B mane to the decision. In other words, a clear case of reference
.>
under Sec. 10(1) in each case is made out. We order accordingly.

Respondent No. 2, Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Products
Limited in WP Nos. 16226-29 of 1984 shall pay the costs which is
quantified at Rs. 2,000/- to the petitioners within four weeks from
c today. There will be no order as to costs in WP No. 16418/84.

D M.L.A. · Petitivn'l a/loll'ed.