RAJU @ UMAKANTversusTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

                    [2025] 6 S.C.R. 1 : 2025 INSC 615

                            Raju @ Umakant
                                    v.
                      The State of Madhya Pradesh
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 2377 of 2025)
                                   01 May 2025
             [Sanjay Karol and K.V. Viswanathan,* JJ.]


                             Issue for Consideration
       Whether the conviction of the appellant under Sections 366,
       376(2)(g) and 342, Penal Code, 1860 and Section 3(2)(v),
       Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
       Act, 1989 is justified.

                                    Headnotes†
       Penal Code, 1860 – Explanation 1 to s.376(2)(g) – Scheduled
       Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
       1989 – s.3(2)(v) – Appellant convicted u/ss.366, 376(2)(g) and
       342, IPC and s.3(2)(v), 1989 Act – Challenge to:
       Held: In a case of gang rape u/s.376(2)(g), IPC an act by one is
       enough to render all in the gang for punishment as long as they have
       acted in furtherance of the common intention – Common intention
       is implicit in the charge of s.376(2)(g) itself and all that is needed is
       evidence to show the existence of common intention – Prosecutrix
       clinchingly and unwaveringly deposed about the commission of
       rape by both the appellant and the co-accused – Ingredients of
       s.376(2)(g) are squarely attracted in view of the abduction of
       the victim, her wrongful confinement, her testimony about being
       subjected to sexual assault – Appellant along with co-accused
       acted in concert and with a common intention to sexually assault
       the prosecutrix – Conviction of the appellant u/ss.366, 342 and
       376(2)(g), IPC upheld – However, on facts, offence u/s.3(2)(v),
       1989 Act is not attracted – Appellant acquitted from the charge of
       s.3(2)(v), 1989 Act. [Paras 19(d), 23]

       Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
       Atrocities) Act, 1989 – s.3(2)(v) – When not attracted – Present
       case, if covered within the threshold set out in Patan Jamal
       Vali case:
* Author
2                                                            [2025] 6 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


     Held: No – No evidence to establish that the victims caste identity
     was one of the grounds for the occurrence of the offence – On
     facts, no evidence to bring the case within the threshold of Patan
     Jamal Vali – In the absence of any evidence attracting the offence
     of s.3(2)(v), the conviction of the appellant u/s.3(2)(v), 1989 Act
     is set aside and he is acquitted from the charge thereunder.
     [Para 44, 45]

     Criminal Law – Rape – Testimony of prosecutrix – Reliance
     upon:
     Held: Prosecutrix is not an accomplice and if her evidence inspires
     confidence it can be acted upon without corroboration – In the
     present case, not only does the evidence of the prosecutrix
     sound natural, it also inspires confidence – On facts, any need
     for corroboration can be safely dispensed with – All that the law
     mandates is that the Court should be alive to and conscious
     of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who
     is interested in the outcome of charge levelled by her – If after
     keeping that aspect in mind if the Court is satisfied that the
     evidence is trustworthy, the Court can act on the sole testimony
     of the prosecutrix. [Paras 17, 18]

     Evidence Act, 1872 – s.114A – Presumption as to absence of
     consent in certain prosecutions for rape:
     Held: Plea that the prosecutrix was in a relationship with the
     co-accused and there was consent, rejected – Evidence of the
     prosecutrix makes it clear that she was subjected to forcible sexual
     intercourse against her consent – Apart from a feeble suggestion
     that the prosecutrix was having physical relations with the co-
     accused for the last four years and that she went to his house
     out of her free will, there is nothing concrete adduced to rebut the
     presumption. [Para 25]

     Criminal Law – Rape – Two-finger test – Practice deprecated –
     Reiterated that such degrading practice be not repeated:
     Held: Though the medical examination of Prosecutrix was done
     on 29.06.2004 long before the judgments of this Court deprecating
     such practice and directing that any person who conducts the
     “two-finger test” or per vaginum examination (while examining
     a person alleged to have been subjected to a sexual assault)
[2025] 6 S.C.R.                                                           3

            Raju @ Umakant v. The State of Madhya Pradesh


     in contravention of the directions of this Court shall be guilty of
     misconduct however, it is reiterated that this obnoxious, inhuman
     and degrading practice be not repeated on victims of sexual
     assault and in future these practices do not recur. [Paras 29, 31]

     Words and Phrases – Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
     Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – s.3(2)(v) – “on
     the ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled
     Caste or a Scheduled Tribe” – 2016 Amendment – Discussed.
     [Paras 35-42]

                             Case Law Cited
     Patan Jamal Vali v. State of Andhra Pradesh [2021] 3 SCR 470 :
     (2021) 16 SCC 225 – held inapplicable.
     State of Rajasthan v. N.K. the Accused [2000] 2 SCR 818 : (2000)
     5 SCC 30; Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan [1952] 1 SCR 377 :
     (1951) SCC 1213; State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash
     Kewal Chand Jain [1990] 1 SCR 115 : (1990) 1 SCC 550; State
     of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh [1996] 1 SCR 532 : (1996) 2 SCC
     384; Selvamani v. State Rep. by the Inspector of Police [2024]
     6 SCR 653 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 837; Neeraj Dutta v. State
     (Government of NCT of Delhi) [2023] 2 SCR 997 : (2023) 4 SCC
     731; Pramod Mahto and Others v. State of Bihar (1989) Supp. 2
     SCC 672; Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana (2003) 2 SCC 143;
     State of Rajasthan v. Roshan Khan and Others [2014] 1 SCR
     418 : (2014) 2 SCC 476; Mohd. Iqbal and Another v. State of
     Jharkhand (2013) 14 SCC 481; Central Bureau of Investigation and
     Another v. Mohd. Parvez Abdul Kayuum and Others [2019] 8 SCR
     439 : (2019) 12 SCC 1 (para 65); Lillu alias Rajesh and Another v.
     State of Haryana [2013] 2 SCR 774 : (2013) 14 SCC 643; State
     of Jharkhand v. Shailendra Kumar Rai alias Pandav Rai [2022]
     13 SCR 1033 : (2022) 14 SCC 299; Dinesh alias Buddha v. State
     of Rajasthan [2006] 2 SCR 793 : (2006) 3 SCC 771; Asharfi v.
     State of Uttar Pradesh [2017] 12 SCR 128 : (2018) 1 SCC 742;
     Khuman Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2019] 11 SCR 270 :
     (2020) 18 SCC 763 – referred to.

                                List of Acts
     Penal Code, 1860; Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
     (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989; Evidence Act, 1872.
4                                                           [2025] 6 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


                             List of Keywords
     Penal Code, 1860 – Explanation 1 to s.376(2)(g); Gang rape;
     Furtherance of the common intention; Common intention is implicit
     in the charge of Section 376(2)(g), Penal Code, 1860; Ingredients
     of Section 376(2)(g), IPC attracted; Abduction of the victim;
     Wrongful confinement, Subjected to sexual assault; Section 3(2)(v),
     Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
     Act, 1989; Patan Jamal Vali case; Two-finger test; Presumption as
     to absence of consent in certain prosecutions for rape.

                            Case Arising From
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
     2377 of 2025
     From the Judgment and Order dated 19.09.2024 of the High Court
     of Madhya Pradesh Principal Seat at Jabalpur in CRLA No. 2324
     of 2006

                         Appearances for Parties
     Advs. for the Appellant:
     Susheel Tomar, Vishnu Kant, Avinesh Tiwari, Sanjeev Malhotra.
     Advs. for the Respondent:
     Sarthak Raizada, Ms. Mrinal Gopal Elker, Mukesh Kumar Verma,
     Aditya Chaudhary.

                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                Judgment

     K.V. Viswanathan, J.

1.   Leave granted.
2.   The present appeal challenges the judgment and order of the Division
     Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Criminal
     Appeal No. 2324 of 2006. By the said judgment, the High Court
     confirmed the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant
     by the Special Judge, (SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Katni,
     Madhya Pradesh in Special Sessions Case No. 140 of 2004 and
     Special Sessions Case No. 136 of 2005. The appellant thus stands
[2025] 6 S.C.R.                                                         5

            Raju @ Umakant v. The State of Madhya Pradesh


     convicted for offences punishable under Sections 366, 376(2)(g)
     and 342 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘IPC’) and
     Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
     (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short ‘1989 Act’). For the
     offence punishable under Section 366 IPC, the appellant has been
     sentenced to 5 years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 2000/-
     and, in default of fine, to undergo a sentence of 6 months rigorous
     imprisonment. For the offences punishable under 376(2)(g) IPC and
     Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act, the appellant has been sentenced
     to rigorous imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs. 2000/- and, in
     default of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 1 year. For the
     offence under Section 342 IPC, the appellant has been sentenced to
     undergo 6 months’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 200/- and,
     in default of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 2 months.
     Aggrieved, the appellant is before us.
3.   The appellant was Accused No. 1 and one Jalandhar Kol was Accused
     No. 2. Accused No. 2 was sentenced for the same offences as that
     of the appellant except that there was no conviction and sentence
     on Accused No. 2 under the 1989 Act. The other difference was
     that insofar as Section 376(2)(g) was concerned, Accused No. 2
     was sentenced to 10 years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of
     Rs. 2000/- and, in default of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment
     for 1 year. The Accused No. 2 is not before us.

     PROSECUTION CASE: -
4.   The prosecution case originated with a missing report No. 11/2004
     lodged on 24.06.2004 at 18:30 hrs. at Police Station, Kymore, District
     Katni, Madhya Pradesh. The complainant – ‘S’ (PW-2) informed
     the Police that on the previous night at 10:00 PM, his daughter-the
     prosecutrix (hereinafter referred to as ‘R’) went to see the barat at
     the house of one Fagun Chaudhary along with ‘SA’ (DW-1). The
     complainant averred that ‘R’ did not return home. Description was
     given and it was also mentioned that ‘R’ was wearing a green colored
     Sari and Blouse. Investigation was taken up on the missing report
     after registration.
5.   As per the recovery memo Exhibit P-1, on 28.06.2004 at 11:30 hours,
     ‘R’ was recovered from the house of ‘LB’ (DW-2) mentioned as wife
     of the appellant (though it has subsequently come on record as part
6                                                         [2025] 6 S.C.R.

                        Supreme Court Reports


     of the evidence of prosecutrix that the appellant Raju and LB were
     only having a relationship). The recovery memo was witnessed by
     an independent witness PW-3, ‘TP’ and other Panch witnesses and
     was signed by PW-11 Sub-Inspector - J. L. Mishra. The recovery
     memo stated that: -
          “In the presence of us, aforesaid Panchas R (prosecutrix),
          Village Jhiriya who was earlier in Raju’s house was brought
          by LB to her house who was recovered by the Kymore
          Police from LB’s house.”
     ‘LB’ also signed the recovery memo.
6.   PW-11 J. L. Mishra on recovery of the prosecutrix ‘R’, recorded the
     statement of ‘R’ as per her narration and registered Case Crime No.
     113 of 2004 under Sections 376, 363, 366, 342, 506/34 IPC and
     Section 3(1-12) of the 1989 Act. Exhibit P-20 is the FIR and was
     registered on 28.06.2004 at 16:00 hours. In her statement, which
     resulted in the FIR, ‘R’ stated that accused Jalandhar abducted
     ‘R’ by threatening her and raped her by threatening to kill her and
     appellant Raju helped Jalandhar in committing the offence and kept
     Jalandhar in his room in Haristone Kachhgawan. By Exhibit P-2, the
     prosecutrix ‘R’ consented to her medical examination by stating that
     accused Jalandhar committed wrongful act with her. Consent to the
     same effect was also given by PW-2 ‘S’, the father of ‘R’.
7.   PW-13 S.K. Pandey has deposed that he was posted as DSP, AJAK,
     PS Katni, and that case diary pertaining to Case Crime No. 113 of
     2004 was received for investigation on 30.06.2004. PW-13 further
     deposed that prosecutrix along with her father appeared before
     AJAK Katni and gave Exhibit P-3 on 30.06.2004. In Exhibit P-3, it
     was mentioned by the father of the prosecutrix that his daughter ‘R’
     went to see the barat of the daughter of Fagun; that while returning
     from the barat, she has been kidnapped; that the appellant Raju of
     Village Jhiriya and his servant Jalandhar Kol of village Barchheka
     were stalking her; that on not finding ‘R’, PW-2 kept track by giving
     information to Kymore Police Station; that PW-2 came to know
     that the appellant Raju and Jalandhar have together kidnapped ‘R’
     and kept her confined at various places; that coming to know that
     police had been informed, Jalandhar fled the place; the prosecutrix
     ‘R’ was freed; that the appellant Jalandhar and Raju are goons and
     prosecutrix ‘R’ was scared of them; that ‘R’ was scared when she
[2025] 6 S.C.R.                                                          7

            Raju @ Umakant v. The State of Madhya Pradesh


     stated that Raju and Jalandhar forcibly kidnapped ‘R’ and confined
     her in the house of the field and committed rape on her; that by
     threatening her, they confined the prosecutrix in various places under
     their custody; that because of fear, this could not be stated earlier
     and hence the application is given today; that Raju and associates
     are giving threats and hence an investigation was prayed for.
8.   During the investigation, on 22.07.2004, ‘R’ gave Exhibit P-6 to SHO
     about threats being given by Jalandhar and Raju due to lodging of
     the report with Police. It is also stated that on 20.07.2004 appellant
     Raju abused them and even kicked the door of the house. Legal
     action was prayed for.
9.   Raju was arrested on 23.07.2004 and Jalandhar was arrested on
     22.05.2005. Charge-sheet has been filed on 31.07.2004 stating that
     Raju and Jalandhar are accused, and it was stated that a supplementary
     challan would be filed against Jalandhar separately. Chargesheet was
     filed for offences punishable under 376(2), 366, 363, 342, 34 and 506
     IPC read with Section 3 (1-12), 3 (2) (v) of the 1989 Act. Charges were
     framed by the Trial Court in Sessions Case No. 140 of 2004 against
     the accused on 25.05.2005 for offences punishable under Sections
     366, 376(2)(g) & 342 IPC and 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act.
10. At the Trial, the prosecution examined thirteen witnesses and
    produced several exhibits and the defence examined two witnesses.
    On appreciation of the evidence, the Trial Court recorded conviction
    for the appellant and accused Jalandhar and sentenced them. The
    details have already been set out in Para one above. The High Court
    confirmed the same. The Accused No.1 is in appeal before us.
11. We have heard Shri Susheel Tomar, learned Counsel for the appellant
    and Shri Sarthak Raizada, learned Counsel for the State and have
    perused the records. We have also called for the Trial Court records
    from the High Court and obtained translation of the Hindi documents.
    We have carefully examined the Trial Court records also.

     ANALYSIS AND REASONS: -
12. Learned Counsels have reiterated the respective contentions put
    forth before the Courts below. We have dealt with the arguments
    as part of the discussion and hence are not separately setting out
    the contentions herein.
8                                                        [2025] 6 S.C.R.

                        Supreme Court Reports


13. Though at the trial Court and at the High Court stage, a dispute with
    regard to the age of the prosecutrix was raised, it was found at the
    trial that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond doubt that the
    age of the prosecutrix was less than 18 years as on the date of the
    incident. This finding was confirmed by the High Court. We see no
    ground to interfere with the said finding.
14. The case revolves around the testimony of the prosecutrix ‘R’ who
    was examined as PW-1. She has categorically deposed that, at
    around 1:00 AM, when she and her friend ‘SA’ were returning from the
    wedding ceremony, they halted to attend calls of nature. Thereafter,
    when they were proceeding towards their house, the accused persons
    caught hold of them from behind. According to the prosecutrix, while
    the appellant Raju caught her, Jalandhar was accompanying him.
    PW-1 states that at the same time her friend ran away. She further
    states that while one caught hold of her the other gagged her mouth
    and were threatening to kill her if she raised a hue and cry. She
    deposed that the accused had a two-wheeler and they forcefully
    made her sit on the two-wheeler and took her to the house of the
    appellant which was in the middle of the fields. She deposed that
    both the appellants locked her in the room and committed wrongful
    act with her. She deposed that she was wearing a green colored
    Sari and further stated that Jalandhar committed wrongful act by
    inserting his penis into her vagina. Raju also committed wrongful
    act by putting his penis into her vagina. Thereafter, the accused
    took her to Dair Salaiya on a Motorcycle. The appellant took her to
    his house where ‘LB’, with whom he had a relationship, was there
    and locked her and after two days her father got her released from
    there. She further clearly deposed that she had told her parents,
    brother and sister-in-law about the incident and that appellant Raju
    stayed with ‘LB’ and Jalandhar after taking keys from ‘LB’ took her
    to another house.
15. PW-1 further deposed that Jalandhar drank alcohol and made her
    also to drink alcohol. Thereafter, she clearly deposed that Jalandhar
    committed rape on her. Further, she categorically deposed that
    appellant Raju also reached the other house in Dair Salaiya and
    committed wrongful act with her. She stated that Dair Salaiya was
    a dense colony where she stayed for two days; that she used to
    have meals at the residence of ‘LB’, that she had taken bath and
    washed her clothes and that she did not tell ‘LB’ about the wrongful
[2025] 6 S.C.R.                                                         9

            Raju @ Umakant v. The State of Madhya Pradesh


     act committed by the accused. The prosecutrix denied the suggestion
     that her father wanted Jalandhar to leave the services under Raju
     and that Raju didn’t remove Jalandhar and, as such, her father filed
     a false case against Raju. She denied the suggestion that she was
     in a physical relationship with Jalandhar for four years. She admitted
     that she was first married in village Pauri. She denied that she went
     to the house in the field at her free will. PW-1 denied the suggestion
     that Raju did not commit any forceful act on her.
16. PW-1 stated that during the time she was gagged and lifted,
    Jalandhar caught hold of her and Raju (appellant) went to take the
    Motor Bike and both took her in the Motorcycle. She further deposed
    that the accused lifted up her Petticoat and tore her undergarment.
    She deposed that appellant-Raju raped first and Jalandhar raped
    thereafter. She also stated that Raju was drunk, and Jalandhar was
    not. She stated that there was darkness in the room and that they
    were unable to see each other and that Jalandhar laid the mat and
    accused one after the other did wrongful act.
17. We have carefully considered the evidence of PW-1. We are convinced
    that notwithstanding the minor contradictions, her evidence inspires
    confidence and that she has clearly spoken about the accused
    abducting her and also committing rape on her. She has also clearly
    spoken about the wrongful confinement. Nothing has been elicited
    in the cross-examination to dilute her testimony. The charges under
    Section 366, 376(2)(g) and 342 IPC are clearly made out. It is now
    fairly well settled that the prosecutrix is not an accomplice and that
    if the evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence it can be acted
    upon without corroboration.
18. Not only does the evidence of ‘R’ sound natural, it also inspires
    confidence and we have no manner of doubt whatsoever that on
    the facts of this case, any need for corroboration can be safely
    dispensed with. As has been rightly observed, a woman or a girl
    subjected to sexual assault is not an accomplice but a victim of
    another person’s lust and it will be improper and undesirable to test
    her evidence with suspicion. All that the law mandates is that the
    Court should be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing
    with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of
    charge levelled by her and if after keeping that aspect in mind if the
    Court is thereafter satisfied that the evidence is trustworthy, there
10                                                           [2025] 6 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


      is nothing that can stop the Court from acting on the sole testimony
      of the prosecutrix. [See State of Rajasthan v. N.K. the Accused,
      (2000) 5 SCC 30, Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, 1951 SCC
      1213, State of Maharashtra Vs. Chandraprakash Kewal Chand
      Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550, State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996)
      2 SCC 384]
19. The variation in the narration in the FIR Exhibit P-20 dated 28.06.2004
    and the complaint Exhibit P-3 dated 30.06.2004 and the minor
    contractions in the evidence do not detract from the clinching
    testimony of the prosecutrix (PW-1) clearly implicating the appellant
    and the co-accused. The fact that in the F.I.R. (Exhibit P-20) only
    rape by accused Jalandhar was clearly mentioned and the role of
    the appellant was only to help and the further fact that the consent
    letter given by the prosecutrix and her father only mentioned about
    rape by Jalandhar also does not enure to the benefit of the appellant.
    We say so for the following reasons: -
      (a)   Firstly,- In this case, the aspect of abduction under Section 366
            IPC is clearly spoken about and on that there is no contradiction.
      (b)   Secondly, - PW-2, the father of the prosecutrix, lodged the
            missing report promptly on the morning of 24.06.2004 and on
            28.06.2004 the prosecutrix was recovered from the house of
            ‘LB’ after she was brought from the house of Raju-appellant.
            This is spoken to by PW-1, PW-2, PW-3 ‘TP’ and PW-11,
            J.L. Mishra.
      (c)   Thirdly, - Even if PW3 ‘TP’ was treated as hostile, on the aspect
            of recovery, his evidence is clearly believable as he states that
            Police recovered the girl in his presence from ‘LB’s house and
            that the recovery memo Exhibit P-1 was signed by him and
            that recovery memo was prepared in his presence. It is well-
            settled that the evidence of the prosecution witness cannot be
            rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat
            him as hostile and cross-examined him. It has been held that
            the evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as effaced
            or washed off the record altogether but the same can be
            accepted to the extent their version is found to be dependable
            on a careful scrutiny thereof. It has been held that where the
            evidence of such a witness is consistent with the case of the
            prosecution, it can be relied upon. [See Selvamani vs. State
[2025] 6 S.C.R.                                                              11

            Raju @ Umakant v. The State of Madhya Pradesh


           Rep. by the Inspector of Police, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 837
           and Neeraj Dutta vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi)
           (2023) 4 SCC 731 (para 87). Hence, there is clear evidence
           on the aspect of recovery from the confinement made by the
           accused of the prosecutrix.
     (d)   Fourthly, in her evidence, the prosecutrix clearly, clinchingly
           and unwaveringly deposed about the commission of rape by
           both the appellant and the co-accused Jalandhar.
     (e)   Fifthly, it is important to note that the charge against the appellant
           is under Section 376 (2)(g), which reads as under:-
                “376. Punishment for rape.-
                (2) Whoever,-
                (g) commits gang rape, shall be punished with
                rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not
                be less than ten years but which may be for life
                and shall also be liable to fine:
                Provided that the Court may, for adequate and
                special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment,
                impose a sentence of imprisonment of either
                description for a term of less than ten years.
                Explanation 1.-Where a woman is raped by one or
                more in a group of persons acting in furtherance
                of their common intention, each of the persons
                shall be deemed to have committed gang rape
                within the meaning of this sub-section.”
20. It is important to note that in Explanation 1 to 376(2)(g) in the Criminal
    Law (Amendment) Bill, 1980 (which eventually became Criminal Law
    (Amendment) Act, 1983), it was proposed that gang rape be defined
    as rape committed by three or more persons acting in furtherance
    of their common intention. The Joint Committee of Parliament
    recommended that in cases of gangrape “even if one commits rape
    all the other persons involved should be held responsible and be
    equally punished” and recommended that gangrape should be defined
    as “rape committed by one or more in a group of persons”. [See
    the Report of the Joint Committee presented on 02.11.1982 on the
    Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill, 1980.] This recommendation was
12                                                         [2025] 6 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


      accepted and the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1983 was enacted
      with the explanation in the present form as extracted hereinabove.
21. This aspect has also come up for judicial consideration before this
    Court in Pramod Mahto and Others vs. State of Bihar, (1989) Supp
    (2) SCC 672 wherein this Court held that the Explanation has been
    introduced with a view to effectively dealt with the growing menace
    of gang rape and in such circumstances, it was not necessary that
    the prosecution should adduce clinching proof of complete act of
    rape by each one of the accused on the victim or on each one of
    the victims where there are more than one.
22. Further, in Ashok Kumar vs. State of Haryana, (2003) 2 SCC 143,
    it was held as under:-
           “8. Charge against the appellant is under Section 376(2)(g)
           IPC. In order to establish an offence under Section 376(2)
           (g) IPC, read with Explanation I thereto, the prosecution
           must adduce evidence to indicate that more than one
           accused had acted in concert and in such an event, if
           rape had been committed by even one, all the accused
           will be guilty irrespective of the fact that she had been
           raped by one or more of them and it is not necessary
           for the prosecution to adduce evidence of a completed
           act of rape by each one of the accused. In other words,
           this provision embodies a principle of joint liability and
           the essence of that liability is the existence of common
           intention; that common intention presupposes prior concert
           which may be determined from the conduct of offenders
           revealed during the course of action and it could arise and
           be formed suddenly, but, there must be meeting of minds.
           It is not enough to have the same intention independently
           of each of the offenders. In such cases, there must be
           criminal sharing marking out a certain measure of jointness
           in the commission of offence.”
                                                (Emphasis supplied)

23. In view of this, it is very clear that in a case of gang rape under
    Section 376(2)(g), an act by one is enough to render all in the
    gang for punishment as long as they have acted in furtherance of
[2025] 6 S.C.R.                                                         13

            Raju @ Umakant v. The State of Madhya Pradesh


     the common intention. Further, common intention is implicit in the
     charge of Section 376(2)(g) itself and all that is needed is evidence
     to show the existence of common intention.
24. In this case, as is clear from the sequence of events, the abduction
    of the victim, her wrongful confinement, her testimony about being
    subjected to sexual assault clearly points to the fact that the
    ingredients of Section 376(2)(g) are squarely attracted and the
    appellant herein along with Jalandhar Kol acted in concert and with
    a common intention to sexually assault the prosecutrix ‘R’. Even
    though the prosecutrix had clearly deposed in the evidence that the
    appellant also subjected her to sexual assault, we have delved into
    this aspect only because of the argument of the learned counsel
    for the appellant that in the FIR and in the consent form, the role
    of the appellant as a participant in the sexual assault of rape is not
    specifically mentioned.
     (f)   Lastly, - The argument that the prosecutrix was in a relationship
           with the co-accused Jalandhar Kol and the implication that there
           was consent has only to be stated to be rejected. Section 114A
           of the Evidence Act, as it stood in 2004, reads as under:-
                “114A. Presumption as to absence of consent in
                certain prosecutions for rape.- In a prosecution for
                rape under clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (c) or
                clause (d) or clause (e) or clause (g) of sub-section
                (2) of Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of
                1860), where sexual intercourse by the accused is
                proved and the question is whether it was without the
                consent of the woman alleged to have been raped
                and she states in her evidence before the Court that
                she did not consent, the Court shall presume that
                she did not consent.”
25. This section came up for consideration before this Court in State
    of Rajasthan vs. Roshan Khan and Others, (2014) 2 SCC 476
    and Mohd. Iqbal and Another vs. State of Jharkhand, (2013)
    14 SCC 481. This Court held that in view of Section 114A of the
    Evidence Act, there is a presumption as to absence of consent
    in case of gang rape and it will be presumed that the prosecutrix
    did not give consent as long as the prosecutrix states in evidence
14                                                        [2025] 6 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


      before the Court that she did not consent. It has further been held
      that the presumption is based on the reasoning that nobody can be
      consenting to several persons simultaneously. In this case, apart
      from feebly suggesting that the prosecutrix has been having physical
      relations with the co-accused Jalandhar Kol for the last four years
      and that she went to the house of Jalandhar Kol out of her free
      will, there is nothing concrete adduced to rebut the presumption.
      A reading of the evidence of the prosecutrix makes it amply clear
      that she was subjected to forcible sexual intercourse against her
      consent. She has also specifically denied the suggestion that she
      went with Jalandhar on her free will.
26. We are not inclined to believe ‘SA’ (DW-1) who has deposed in
    favour of the defence that the prosecutrix ‘R’ had told her that while
    returning from the wedding, she had to go somewhere and then she
    had gone with Jalandhar Kol and further that Raju was not present.
    In her cross-examination itself, she clarified that she did not know
    what Jalandhar did with the prosecutrix after taking her away nor
    did she know where they went. DW-1 admitted that her father works
    for the appellant. She further deposed that she never told anyone
    where the prosecutrix went or with whom. It should also be pointed
    out that PW-2, father of the prosecutrix who lodged the missing
    report had mentioned in the report that DW-1 told him that she did
    not know where the prosecutrix went. Further, PW-1 ‘R’ herself had
    deposed that when she was being abducted DW-1 had run away.
    For all these reasons, we are not prepared to attach any importance
    to the evidence of DW-1.
27. Equally, the evidence of ‘LB’ (DW-2) who claims that the prosecutrix
    rented the house at Rs.200/- per month and paid Rs.200/- as advance
    is also not sounding true or natural. Her evidence is also contrary
    to the contents of the recovery memo Exh. P-1 inasmuch as DW-2
    denies that she brought the girl from the house of Raju at the time of
    her recovery. There is also evidence to show that she is acquainted
    with the appellant and we are inclined to believe that the defence
    witnesses have been put up only to present a false narrative. The
    witness also had not produced any receipt given for the amount of
    Rs.200/- or any rental arrangement or agreement.
28. Nothing much turns on the evidence of the Doctor, (PW-10) who
    performed the medical examination on the prosecutrix. Her evidence
[2025] 6 S.C.R.                                                            15

            Raju @ Umakant v. The State of Madhya Pradesh


     that no definite opinion could be given, and that no other injury
     other than the one on the lip of ‘R’ was present, does not mean that
     sexual assault was not committed on the prosecutrix ‘R’. It is also
     well-settled that where the ocular evidence is clear, it will prevail over
     the medical evidence. [See Central Bureau of Investigation and
     Another vs. Mohd. Parvez Abdul Kayuum and Others, (2019) 12
     SCC 1 (para 65)]
29. However, we need to comment on one aspect of the matter. The
    prosecutrix had been subjected to the two-finger test, though the
    medical examination is of 29.06.2004 and long before the judgments
    of this Court in Lillu alias Rajesh and Another vs. State of Haryana,
    (2013) 14 SCC 643 and State of Jharkhand vs. Shailendra
    Kumar Rai alias Pandav Rai, (2022) 14 SCC 299. We are only
    re-emphasizing this aspect so that this obnoxious, inhuman and
    degrading practice is not repeated on victims of sexual assault.
30. In Shailendra Kumar (supra), this Court, after relying on Lillu
    (supra), held as under:-
           65. Whether a woman is “habituated to sexual intercourse”
           or “habitual to sexual intercourse” is irrelevant for the
           purposes of determining whether the ingredients of Section
           375IPC are present in a particular case. The so-called
           test is based on the incorrect assumption that a sexually
           active woman cannot be raped. Nothing could be further
           from the truth — a woman’s sexual history is wholly
           immaterial while adjudicating whether the accused raped
           her. Further, the probative value of a woman’s testimony
           does not depend upon her sexual history. It is patriarchal
           and sexist to suggest that a woman cannot be believed
           when she states that she was raped, merely for the reason
           that she is sexually active.
           66. The legislature explicitly recognised this fact when it
           enacted the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 which
           inter alia amended the Evidence Act to insert Section
           53-A. In terms of Section 53-A of the Evidence Act,
           evidence of a victim’s character or of her previous sexual
           experience with any person shall not be relevant to the
           issue of consent or the quality of consent, in prosecutions
           of sexual offences.
16                                                        [2025] 6 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


31. This Court further exhorted the Union and State Governments to
    do the following:
           “69.1. Ensure that the guidelines formulated by the
           Ministry of Health and Family Welfare are circulated to
           all government and private hospitals.
           69.2. Conduct workshops for health providers to
           communicate the appropriate procedure to be adopted
           while examining survivors of sexual assault and rape.
           69.3. Review the curriculum in medical schools with a
           view to ensuring that the “two-finger test” or per vaginum
           examination is not prescribed as one of the procedures
           to be adopted while examining survivors of sexual assault
           and rape.”
      It was further directed in para 71 that any person who conducts
      the “two-finger test” or per vaginum examination (while examining
      a person alleged to have been subjected to a sexual assault)
      in contravention of the directions of this Court shall be guilty of
      misconduct.
32. Even though the two-finger test in this case was carried out on
    29.06.2004, long before the awareness about its inhumane nature
    was created, we are only reiterating this aspect so that in future
    these practices do not recur.

      CHARGES UNDER SC/ST ACT – 1989 ACT – NOT MADE OUT.
33. Before we conclude, there is one aspect which the courts below
    have completely overlooked and which should enure to the benefit of
    the appellant. The appellant has been convicted under Section 3(2)
    (v) of the1989 Act. Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act, at the relevant
    time, reads as under:-
           “3. (2) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled
           Caste or Scheduled Tribe—
           ***
           (v) commits any offence under the Indian Penal Code, 1860
           punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years or
           more against a person or property on the ground that such
           person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
[2025] 6 S.C.R.                                                          17

            Raju @ Umakant v. The State of Madhya Pradesh


           Tribe or such property belongs to such member, shall be
           punishable with imprisonment for life and with fine;”
34. A careful perusal of the section reveals that when any person
    not being a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe
    commits any offence under IPC, punishable with imprisonment with
    ten years or more against a person or property on the ground that
    such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe
    or such property belongs to such member, shall be punishable with
    imprisonment for life and with fine.
35. As far as the ingredients of Section 3(2)(v) are concerned, the words
    “on the ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste
    or a Scheduled Tribe” has come up for consideration before this
    Court on a few occasions. In Dinesh alias Buddha vs. State of
    Rajasthan, (2006) 3 SC 771, this Court held as follows:-
           “15. Sine qua non for application of Section 3(2)(v) is
           that an offence must have been committed against a
           person on the ground that such person is a member of
           the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes. In the
           instant case no evidence has been led to establish this
           requirement. It is not the case of the prosecution that the
           rape was committed on the victim since she was a member
           of a Scheduled Caste. In the absence of evidence to that
           effect, Section 3(2)(v) has no application. Had Section 3(2)
           (v) of the Atrocities Act been applicable then by operation
           of law, the sentence would have been imprisonment for
           life and fine.”
36. The holding was that the sine qua non for application of Section
    3(2)(v) was that the offence must have been committed against a
    person on the ground that such person is a member of the Scheduled
    Caste/Scheduled Tribe.
37. To the same effect was the holding in Asharfi vs. State of Uttar
    Pradesh, (2018) 1 SCC 742 wherein in para 8 and 9, it was held
    as under:-
           “8. In the present case, unamended Section 3(2)(v) of
           the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act is applicable as
           the occurrence was on the night of 8-12-1995/9-12-1995.
           From the unamended provisions of Section 3(2)(v) of
18                                                        [2025] 6 S.C.R.

                        Supreme Court Reports


          the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act, it is clear that
          the statute laid stress on the intention of the accused in
          committing such offence in order to belittle the person as
          he/she belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe
          community.
          9. The evidence and materials on record do not show that
          the appellant had committed rape on the victim on the
          ground that she belonged to Scheduled Caste. Section
          3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act can be
          pressed into service only if it is proved that the rape has
          been committed on the ground that PW 3 Phoola Devi
          belonged to Scheduled Caste community. In the absence
          of evidence proving intention of the appellant in committing
          the offence upon …………. only because she belongs to
          Scheduled Caste community, the conviction of the appellant
          under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities
          Act cannot be sustained.”
38. Similar was the holding in Khuman Singh vs. State of Madhya
    Pradesh, (2020) 18 SCC 763.
39. However, we find that the section was subjected to a closer analysis
    in Patan Jamal Vali vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2021) 16 SCC
    225. Speaking for the Court, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud (as the
    learned Chief Justice then was), after adverting to the three earlier
    judgments, rightly held that the statute did not utilize the phrase
    “only on the ground”. It was held in Patan Jamal Vali (supra) that
    reading the expression “only” would be to add a restriction which
    was not found in the statute. It was held that undoubtedly the
    statute used the word “on the ground” but the juxtaposition of “the”
    before “ground” does not invariably mean that the offence ought to
    have been committed only on that ground. The Court held that to
    read the provision in that manner would dilute a statutory provision
    meant to safeguard the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
    against acts of violence which pose a threat to their dignity. It was
    further held that, as the Section stood in its unamended form,
    knowledge by itself that the victim belonged to Scheduled Caste or
    Scheduled Tribe cannot be said to be the basis of the commission
    of the offence. We respectfully concur with the holding in Patan
    Jamal Vali (supra).
[2025] 6 S.C.R.                                                             19

            Raju @ Umakant v. The State of Madhya Pradesh


40. The Court went on to hold in Patan Jamal Vali (supra) as under:
           “59. … … As we have emphasised before in the judgment,
           an intersectional lens enables us to view oppression as a
           sum of disadvantage resulting from multiple marginalised
           identities. To deny the protection of Section 3(2)(v) on
           the premise that the crime was not committed against
           an SC & ST person solely on the ground of their caste
           identity is to deny how social inequalities function in a
           cumulative fashion. It is to render the experiences of
           the most marginalised invisible. It is to grant impunity
           to perpetrators who on account of their privileged social
           status feel entitled to commit atrocities against socially
           and economically vulnerable communities. This is not to
           say that there is no requirement to establish a causal link
           between the harm suffered and the ground, but it is to
           recognise that how a person was treated or impacted was a
           result of interaction of multiple grounds or identities. A true
           reading of Section 3(2)(v) would entail that conviction
           under this provision can be sustained as long as caste
           identity is one of the grounds for the occurrence of
           the offence. In the view which we ultimately take, a
           reference of these decisions to a larger Bench in this
           case is unnecessary. We keep that open and the debate
           alive for a later date and case.”
                                                   (Emphasis supplied)

41. Earlier, in the same judgment, dealing with the situation where
    oppression operated at an intersectional fashion, this Court held in
           “54. The key words are “on the ground that such person
           is a member of an SC or ST”. The expression “on the
           ground” means “for the reason” or “on the basis of”. The
           above provision (as it stood at the material time prior to
           its amendment, which will be noticed later) is an example
           of a statute recognising only a single axis model of
           oppression. As we have discussed above, such single axis
           models require a person to prove a discrete experience
           of oppression suffered on account of a given social
           characteristic. However, when oppression operates
20                                                       [2025] 6 S.C.R.

                        Supreme Court Reports


          in an intersectional fashion, it becomes difficult to
          identify, in a disjunctive fashion, which ground was the
          basis of oppression because often multiple grounds
          operate in tandem. Larrisa Behrendt, an aboriginal
          legal scholar from Australia, has poignantly stated the
          difficulty experienced by women facing sexual assault,
          who are marginalised on different counts, to identify the
          source of their oppression:
          “When an Aboriginal woman is the victim of a sexual
          assault, how, as a black woman, does she know
          whether it is because she is hated as a woman and
          is perceived as inferior or if she is hated because
          she is Aboriginal, considered inferior and promiscuous
          by nature?” [ Larissa Behrendt, “Aboriginal Women and
          the White Lies of the Feminist Movement : Implications
          for Aboriginal Women in Rights Discourse”, 1 Australian
          Feminist Law Journal 1 (1993), p. 35.]”
                                               (Emphasis supplied)

42. Section 3(2)(v) has since been amended (amended on 26.01.2016)
    and in the amended form it reads as under:-
          “3. (2) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled
          Caste or Scheduled Tribe—
          ***
          (v) commits any offence under the Indian Penal Code
          (45 of 1860) punishable with imprisonment for a term of
          ten years or more against a person or property knowing
          that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste
          or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such
          member, shall be punishable with imprisonment for life
          and with fine;”
43. The Court notices in Patan Jamal Vali (supra) that the amendment
    has decreased the threshold of proving that the crime was committed
    on the basis of the caste identify to a threshold where mere knowledge
    is sufficient to threshold a conviction. The Court also noticed that
    presumption in Section 8 which provided that if the accused was
    acquainted with the victim or his family, the court shall presume that
[2025] 6 S.C.R.                                                        21

               Raju @ Umakant v. The State of Madhya Pradesh


     the accused was aware of the caste or tribal identity of the victim
     unless proved otherwise.
44. Reverting to the facts of this case, we find that there was no evidence
    to bring the case within the threshold of Patan Jamal Vali (supra).
    There is no evidence whatsoever to establish the fact that the
    victims caste identity was one of the grounds for the occurrence of
    the offence. In the absence of any evidence attracting the offence
    of Section 3(2)(v), we are constrained to record an acquittal for the
    appellant from the charge of Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act.

     CONCLUSION:
45. For the reasons stated above, while maintaining the conviction of
    the appellant under Sections 366, 342 and 376(2)(g) of the IPC,
    we set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 3(2)(v)
    of the 1989 Act. Coming to the sentence, we are not inclined to
    disturb the sentence of five years imposed on the appellant for the
    offence punishable under Section 366 IPC as well as the fine and
    default sentence imposed on him by the trial Court and affirmed by
    the High Court. We are also not inclined to disturb the sentence
    imposed under Section 342 IPC by the trial Court and confirmed
    by the High Court. However, to bring the sentence on par with that
    imposed on Jalandhar Kol (A-2) for the offence under Section 376
    (2)(g), we modify the sentence of life imprisonment imposed on the
    appellant to that of rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and fine of
    Rs.2,000/- with default sentence of rigorous imprisonment of one year
    in case of non-payment of fine. All sentences to run concurrently. The
    accused, who is in custody shall serve out the remaining sentence,
    as directed.
46. The appeal is partly allowed in the above terms.

     Result of the case: Appeal partly allowed.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey