Supreme Court of India

RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDALversusTHE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.

Citation: 2023 INSC 771
Decided: 25 August 2023
Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed
Bench: S RAVINDRA BHAT

Holding

The Supreme Court held that the Remission Board must reconsider the petitioner’s premature release application afresh, with a reasoned opinion from the presiding judge that addresses the Laxman Naskar factors, and may not rely solely on the judge’s adverse view.

Summary

The petitioner, serving a life sentence for murder and a weapons offence, applied for premature release after 24 years of incarceration, claiming denial of remission and parole. The Remission Board rejected his applications twice, relying heavily on adverse opinions of the presiding judge, despite favorable reports from the probation officer and jail superintendent. The Supreme Court examined whether the Board’s reliance on the judge’s opinion complied with Section 432(2) of the CrPC, the requirement to consider holistic factors as laid down in Laxman Naskar, and which remission policy (pre‑2002 or post‑2002) should apply. The Court held that the presiding judge’s opinion was inadequately reasoned and that the Board must not mechanically follow it, but must consider all relevant factors, including the petitioner’s post‑conviction conduct, age, health, and earned remission. Accordingly, the Court directed the presiding judge to submit a fresh, reasoned opinion and the Remission Board to reconsider the application within three months. The writ petition was allowed.

Issues considered

The validity of the Remission Board's reliance on the presiding judge's adverse opinion under Section 432(2) CrPC.
Whether the appropriate government must consider the five factors from Laxman Naskar v. State of West Bengal when deciding on premature release.
The applicability of the pre‑2002 remission policy versus the post‑2002 policy to the petitioner’s case.
The relevance of Section 433A CrPC in restricting remission for life‑imprisoned convicts of offences punishable with death.
Whether the presiding judge’s opinion complied with the requirement of providing adequate reasons under Section 432(2) CrPC.

Legislation cited

Arms Act, 1959s. 27
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 429, s. 432, s. 433A
Constitution of Indias. Article 161, s. Article 72
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 34

Subjects

remissionpremature releaselife imprisonmentSection 432 CrPCpresiding judge opinionLaxman Naskar factorsexecutive discretionsentencingArticle 32Bihar

Judgment

[2023] 11 S.C.R. 484 : 2023 INSC 771

CASE DETAILS
RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDAL
v.
THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.
(Writ Petition (Criminal) No(s). 252 of 2023)
AUGUST 25, 2023
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, JJ.]

HEADNOTES

Issue for consideration: Petitioner serving a sentence of life
imprisonment for commission of oﬀences punishable u/ss.302/34 of the
IPC, 1860 and s.27 of the Arms Act, 1959 sought direction for his premature
release on the ground that he has been in custody for 24 years without grant
of remission or parole.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Remission – Grant of:
Held: Remission Board rejected the petitioner’s application for
premature release twice – The reason for rejection of the petitioner’s
application was the adverse report submitted by the presiding judge in
the ﬁrst round, which was perfunctorily relied upon and reiterated in the
report submitted by the then presiding judge in the second round as well –
Both the reports submitted by the presiding judges (at the relevant time),
demonstrate a casual opinion, based solely on the judicial record which
presumably consisted of the ﬁnding of guilt, by the trial court and High Court
– Overemphasis on the presiding judge’s opinion and complete disregard
of comments of other authorities, while arriving at its conclusion, would
render the appropriate government’s decision on a remission application,
unsustainable – The appropriate government, should take a holistic view
of all the opinions received (in terms of the relevant rules), including the
judicial view of the presiding judge of the concerned court, keeping in mind
the purpose and objective, of remission – Remission Board to reconsider the
petitioner’s application for remission afresh – Concerned presiding judge
to provide an opinion on the petitioner’s application for premature release,
by examining the judicial record, and provide adequate reasoning, taking
484
RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDAL v. THE STATE 485
OF BIHAR & ORS.

into account the factors laid down in Laxman Naskar case – Given the long
period of incarceration already suﬀered by the writ petitioner and his age,
the Remission Board should render its decision, preferably within three
months from the date of this judgment.[Paras 14-17, 25]
Sentencing – Judicial exercise vis-à-vis executive function –
Statutory and Constitutional powers– s.432 CrPC; Articles 72, 161,
Constitution of India:
Held: Sentencing is a judicial exercise of power – The act thereafter
of executing the sentence awarded, however, is a purely executive function
which includes the grant of remission, commutation, pardon, reprieves, or
suspension of sentence – This executive power is traceable to Article 72
and 161 of the Constitution of India – Whilst the statutory (u/s.432 CrPC)
and constitutional (under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution) powers
are distinct- the former limited power, is still an imprint of the latter (much
wider power), and must be understood as such and placed in this context –
This executive power which is inherently discretionary in nature, has to be
exercised fairly, reasonably, and not arbitrarily – Absence to do so, would
compel the court to exercise its judicial review and in appropriate cases
remit the matter for reconsideration – Procedure laid out in s.432(2), has
been held to be mandatory.[Paras 9 and 10]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Remission – Parameters to
be considered – Discussed.[Para 11]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Remission – Role of presiding
judge’s view – Weightage to be attached:
Held: The discretion that the executive is empowered with in executing
a sentence, would be denuded of its content, if the presiding judge’s view-
which is formed in all likelihood, largely (if not solely) on the basis of the
judicial record- is mechanically followed by the concerned authority – Such
an approach has the potential to strike at the heart, and subvert the concept
of remission- as a reward and incentive encouraging actions and behaviour
geared towards reformation- in a modern legal system – If the presiding
judge’s report is only reﬂective of the facts and circumstances that led to
the conclusion of the convict’s guilt, and is merely a reiteration of those
circumstances available to the judge at the time of sentencing (some 14 or
more years earlier, as the case may be), then the appropriate government
should attach weight to this ﬁnding, accordingly – Such a report, cannot be
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

relied on as carrying predominance, if it focusses on the crime, with little
or no attention to the criminal.[Paras 16 and 17]
Sentencing – Heinous crimes:
Held: Even at the stage of sentencing, the judge ideally is to exercise
discretion after looking at a wide range of factors relating to the criminal
and not just the crime; but as noticed in numerous precedents that have dealt
with sentencing in the commission of heinous crimes, this is unfortunately,
often not the reality – Guidance has been oﬀered by this court on how to
mitigate this in recent years, but it is pragmatic to acknowledge that it will
require time for our criminal justice system to incorporate, and uniformly
reach such standards.
Sentencing – Imprisonment – Aim and goal of – Discussed.[Para
19]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Remission – Report submitted
by the SP in the second round was adverse – Duty of the appropriate
government:
Held: Report submitted by the Superintendent of Police in the second
round (was diametrically diﬀerent from that which was submitted in the
ﬁrst round), was adverse – In each case, the appropriate government has
to be cognizant of the latent (not always) prejudices of the crime, that the
police as well as the investigating agency, may be citing- especially in a
case such as the present one, where the slain victims were police personnel
themselves, i.e., members of the police force – These biases may inform
the report, and cannot be given determinative value – Apart from the other
considerations (on the nature of the crime, whether it aﬀected the society
at large, the chance of its recurrence, etc.), the appropriate government
should while considering the potential of the convict to commit crimes
in the future, whether there remains any fruitful purpose of continued
incarceration, and the socio-economic conditions, review: the convict’s age,
state of heath, familial relationships and possibility of reintegration, extent
of earned remission, and the post-conviction conduct including, but not
limited to- whether the convict has attained any educational qualiﬁcation
whilst in custody, volunteer services oﬀered, job/work done, jail conduct,
whether they were engaged in any socially aimed or productive activity, and
the overall development as a human being – The Board should not entirely
rely either on the presiding judge, or the report prepared by the police – It
RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDAL v. THE STATE 487
OF BIHAR & ORS.

would also serve the ends of justice if the appropriate government had the
beneﬁt of a report contemporaneously prepared by a qualiﬁed psychologist
after interacting/interviewing the convict that has applied for premature
release. [Paras 20 and 21]
Adminstration of Criminal Justice – Sentencing – Balancing
societal interests with the rights of the convict:
Held: The majority view and the minority view in Sriharan underlined
the need to balance societal interests with the rights of the convict (that in
a given case, the sentence should not be unduly harsh, or excessive) – The
court acknowledged that it lies within the executive’s domain to grant, or
refuse premature release; however, such power would be guided, and the
discretion informed by reason, stemming from appropriate rules.[Para 22]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Remission – Diﬀerent policies
on the date of conviction and on the date of consideration for premature
release:
Held: This court had grappled with the situation of diﬀerent remission
policies/rules prevailing at diﬀerent points of the convict’s sentence- i.e.,
when the policy on the date of conviction, and on the date of consideration for
premature release, are diﬀerent – It has been held that the policy prevailing
on the date of the conviction20 , would be applicable – However, in Jagdish
it was also recognised that if a more liberal policy exists on the date of
consideration, the beneﬁt should be provided – In the present case, on the date
of conviction (24.05.2001), it is the pre-2002 policy that was applicable – In
the old pre-2002 policy, there is no mention of any ineligibility criteria, much
less one that is analogous to Rule 529(iv)(b) of the 2002 policy, which was
cited by the Remission Board in its rejection of the petitioner’s application
on 20.04.2023. [Paras 23 and 24]

LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES

Union of India v. V. Sriharan [2015] 14 SCR 613 – followed.
State of Haryana v. Jagdish [2010] 3 SCR 716; Laxman Naskar v. State
of W.B (2000) 2 SCC 595 : [2000] 1 SCR 796 – relied on.
Sangeet v. State of Haryana [2012] 13 SCR 85; Gopal Vinayak Godse
v. State of Maharashtra [1961] 3 SCR 440; Maru Ram v. Union of India
[1981] 1 SCR 1196; Sarat Chandra Rabha v. Khagendranath Nath [1961] 2
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

SCR 133; Kehar Singh v. Union of India [1988] Supp. 3 SCR 1102; State of
Haryana v. Mohinder Singh [2000] 1 SCR 698; Sangeet v. State of Haryana
[2012] 13 SCR 85; Rajan v. The Home Secretary, Home Department of Tamil
Nadu [2019] 6 SCR 1035; Ram Chander v. State of Chhattisgarh [2022] 4
SCR 1103; Union of India v. V. Sriharan [2015] 14 SCR 613; Laxman Naskar
v. State of W.B. (2000) 7 SCC 626 : [2000] 3 Suppl. SCR 62; Jaswant Singh
v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 35; Swamy Shraddananda
(2) @ Mural Manohar Mishra v. State of Karnataka [2008] 11 SCR 93;
Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra [2009] 9
SCR 90; Chhannu Lal Verma v. State of Chattisgarh [2018] 14 SCR 355;
Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra [2018] 14 SCR 585;
and Manoj v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2022] 9 SCR 452; Maru Ram v.
Union of India [1981] 1 SCR 1196; State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar, (2021)
9 SCC 292 – referred to.

OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES

CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Criminal)
No. 252 of 2023.
(UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA)
Appearances:
Randhir Kumar Ojha, Adv. for the Petitioner.
Azmat Hayat Amanullah, T. G. Shahi, Advs. for the Respondents.

JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT

JUDGMENT
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
1. The petitioner, currently serving a sentence of life imprisonment
for commission of oﬀences punishable under Section 302/34 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 approaches this
court under its Article 32 jurisdiction, seeking appropriate direction to the
ﬁrst respondent to prematurely release him, on the ground that he has been
in custody for 24 years without grant of remission or parole.
RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDAL v. THE STATE 489
OF BIHAR & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

2. The petitioner (aged 40, at the time), with three other co-accused
persons, was convicted1 on 24.05.2001 for the murder of three persons – two
of which were police personnel (dafadars) and the third being a chowkidar,
who were all on duty during a village mela – by indiscriminate ﬁring, while
they were waiting to be served food. The petitioner was accused to be one
among those who had shot at the deceased victims, in a premediated and
planned manner. The trial court sentenced the petitioner and three other
co-accused persons to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life; while three
other accused were acquitted on all charges. A co-accused (Baudha Mandal),
who was the ﬁrst to ﬁre at the victims, was killed during the pendency of
investigation/trial in a police encounter. The petitioner’s conviction and
sentence (along with that of three other co-accused convicts), was aﬃrmed
by the High Court on 01.09.2005.2 Owing to a lack of means and awareness,
the petitioner could not approach this court to challenge the same, and his
conviction by the High Court, attained ﬁnality.
3. Pursuant to an order of this court, after notice was issued, the
respondent-state has ﬁled an aﬃdavit indicating the computation of his
period of sentence undergone, the status of his plea for remission to be
granted, as well as the remission policies (as amended from time to time)
of the state government. This aﬃdavit conﬁrms that the petitioner long
completed 14 years of actual imprisonment (on 19.07.2013), and in fact
has, as on 26.07.2023, completed over 24 years of actual imprisonment.
Accounting for the remission earned (of over 4 years and 8 months of
remission, i.e., a total 1694 days), he has served 28 years, 8 months and
21 days. It is pertinent to mention that he completed 20 years of actual
imprisonment on 19.07.2019, and if computed with remission earned as
per prevailing rules, then on 05.11.2014 itself.
4. After the completion of the mandatory 14 years actual imprisonment,
and 20 years of custody with remission, the petitioner’s case (application
dated 14.04.2021) was considered by the Remission Board on 19.05.2021.
In accordance with the prescribed rules, prior to this meeting, the opinion
of the Presiding Oﬃcer of the convicting court, probation oﬃcer and

1 By the Sessions Court, Madhepura in Sessions Case No. 123/2000 and Sessions Case
No. 194/2000.
2 By the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 327/2001 (which was disposed
along with Criminal Appeal No 309/2001, ﬁled by three co-accused persons).
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

Superintendent of Police, was also sought. The Board rejected the petitioner’s
application for premature release – despite a favourable report by the
Probation Oﬃcer and Superintendent of Police – noting the adverse report
by the Presiding Judge.
5. After this rejection, a writ petition was ﬁled before the High Court,
seeking relief similar to what is sought in the present petition. It was
however dismissed for non-prosecution. Later, in terms of prevailing rules 3,
the petitioner’s proposal was again put up before the Remission Board in
its meeting dated 20.04.2023. This time, the proposal was rejected in light
of adverse/negative opinions received from the Superintendent of Police,
Purnea and the Presiding Oﬃcer of the convicting court, and noting Rule
529(iv)(b) of the remission policy contained in the Bihar Jail Manual (as
amended by Notiﬁcation dated 10.12.2002 and notiﬁed on 28.12.2002). The
relevant rule is extracted below:
“(iv)Ineligibility for premature release
The following category of convicted prisoners undergoing life sentence
may not be considered eligible for premature release. –
a) Prisoners convicted of the heinous oﬀences such as rape, dacoity,
terrorist crimes, etc.
b) Prisoners who have been convicted for organized murder in a
premeditated manner and in an organized manner.
c) Professional murders who have been found guilty of murder by
hiring.
d) Convicted prisoners, who commit murder while involving in
smuggling operations or who are guilty of murder of public
servants on duty”
(emphasis supplied)
6. These are the facts, leading to the present writ petition.
Analysis and conclusion
7. Section 432(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereafter
‘CrPC’) empowers the appropriate government to suspend or remit sentences
and applies only in the case of additional remission, over and above what is
earned as per the jail manual or statutory rules. 4 Section 432(2) prescribes

3 Rule 6(d) of the Notiﬁcation No. 3106 dated 10.12.2002 which stipulates that rejection
of proposal for pre-mature release shall not be a bar for reconsideration.
4 Sangeet v. State of Haryana[2012] 13 SCR 85.
RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDAL v. THE STATE 491
OF BIHAR & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

the procedure whereby the appropriate government may seek the opinion of
the Presiding Judge of the court before, or by which the applicant had been
convicted, on whether the applications should be allowed or rejected, along
with reasoning. Section 432(2) of the CrPC is extracted for ready reference:
“432. Power to suspend or remit sentences.—(1)***
(2) Whenever an application is made to the appropriate Government
for the suspension or remission of a sentence, the appropriate
Government may require the Presiding Judge of the Court before or
by which the conviction was had or conﬁrmed, to state his opinion as
to whether the application should be granted or refused, together with
his reasons for such opinion and also to forward with the statement
of such opinion a certiﬁed copy of the record of the trial or of such
record thereof as exists.”
8. This statutory power to grant remission is limited by Section 433A
(which was incorporated in the CrPC subsequently5) when it comes to those
convicted for an oﬀence where death is one of the punishments:
“433-A. Restriction on powers of remission or commutation in
certain cases.—Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 432,
where a sentence of imprisonment for life is imposed on conviction
of a person for an oﬀence for which death is one of the punishments
provided by law, or where a sentence of death imposed on a person has
been commuted under Section 433 into one of imprisonment for life,
such person shall not be released from prison unless he had served at
least fourteen years of imprisonment.”
9. Sentencing is a judicial exercise of power. The act thereafter of
executing the sentence awarded, however, is a purely executive function
– which includes the grant of remission, commutation, pardon, reprieves,
or suspension of sentence.6 This executive power is traceable to Article 72
and 161 of the Constitution of India, by which the President of India, and
Governor of the State, respectively, are empowered to grant pardons and to
suspend, remit or commute sentences in certain cases. Whilst the statutory

5 By Act 45 of 1978, sec. 32 (w.e.f. 18.12.1978).
6 See Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra [1961] 3 SCR 440; Maru Ram v.
Union of India[1981] 1 SCR 1196; Sarat Chandra Rabha v. Khagendranath Nath [1961] 2
SCR 133; Kehar Singh v. Union of India [1988] Supp. 3 SCR 1102.
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

(under Section 432 CrPC) and constitutional (under Articles 72 and 161 of
the Constitution) powers are distinct- the former limited power, is still an
imprint of the latter (much wider power), and must be understood as such
and placed in this context. This framework of executive power and how it
is to be exercised, is lucidly explained, in the judgment of State of Haryana
v. Jagdish7:
“27. Neverthelesswe may point out that the power of the sovereign to
grant remission is within its exclusive domain and it is for this reason
that our Constitution makers went on to incorporate the provisions
of Article 72 and Article 161 of the Constitution of India. This
responsibility was cast upon the executive through a constitutional
mandate to ensure that some public purpose may require fulﬁlment
by grant of remission in appropriate cases. This power was never
intended to be used or utilised by the executive as an unbridled power
of reprieve. Power of clemency is to be exercised cautiously and in
appropriate cases, which in eﬀect, mitigates the sentence of punishment
awarded and which does not, in any way, wipe out the conviction.
It is a power which the sovereign exercises against its own judicial
mandate. The act of remission of the State does not undo what has
been done judicially. The punishment awarded through a judgment
is not overruled but the convict gets beneﬁt of a liberalised policy of
State pardon. However, the exercise of such power under Article 161
of the Constitution or under Section 433-A CrPC may have a diﬀerent
ﬂavour in the statutory provisions, as short-sentencing policy brings
about a mere reduction in the period of imprisonment whereas an
act of clemency under Article 161 of the Constitution commutes the
sentence itself.”
10. That this executive power which is inherently discretionary in
nature, has to be exercised fairly, reasonably, and not arbitrarily, has been
held by this court in numerous cases. 8 Absence to do so, would - like is the

7 [2010] 3 SCR 716 [hereafter referred to as ‘Jagdish’]
8 State of Haryana v. Mohinder Singh [2000] 1 SCR 698; Sangeet v. State of Hary-
ana[2012] 13 SCR 85; Union of India v. V. Sriharan[2015] 14 SCR 613; Rajan v. The Home
Secretary, Home Department of Tamil Nadu [2019] 6 SCR 1035; Ram Chander v. State of
Chhattisgarh [2022] 4 SCR 1103.
RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDAL v. THE STATE 493
OF BIHAR & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

case for other executive action- compel the court to exercise its judicial
review, and in appropriate cases remit the matter for reconsideration.9 The
procedure laid out in Section 432(2), has been held to be mandatory by a
ﬁve-judge bench of this court, in Union of India v. V. Sriharan10. The court
also observed how the said procedure operated as a safeguard, much like
the ones provided under Article 72 and 161 of the Constitution:
“141. […] Therefore, when in the course of exercise of larger
constitutional powers of similar kind under Articles 72 and 161 of the
Constitution it has been opined by this Court to be exercised with great
care and caution, the one exercisable under a statute, namely, under
Section 432(1)CrPC which is lesser in degree should necessarily be
held to be exercisable in tune with the adjunct provision contained in
the same section. Viewed in that respect, we ﬁnd that the procedure
to be followed whenever any application for remission is moved, the
safeguard provided under Section 432(2)CrPC should be the sine qua
non for the ultimate power to be exercised under Section 432(1)CrPC.
142. By following the said procedure prescribed under Section
432(2), the action of the appropriate Government is bound to survive
and stand the scrutiny of all concerned, including the judicial forum.
It must be remembered, barring minor oﬀences, in cases involving
heinous crimes like, murder, kidnapping, rape, robbery, dacoity, etc.
and such other oﬀences of such magnitude, the verdict of the trial
court is invariably dealt with and considered by the High Court and
in many cases by the Supreme Court. Thus, having regard to the
nature of opinion to be rendered by the Presiding Oﬃcer of the court
concerned will throw much light on the nature of crime committed,
the record of the convict himself, his background and other relevant
factors which will enable the appropriate Government to take the right
decision as to whether or not suspension or remission of sentence
should be granted. It must also be borne in mind that while for the
exercise of the constitutional power under Articles 72 and 161, the

9 See Rajan and Ram Chander (ibid).
10 [2015] 14 SCR 613 [hereafter referred to as ‘Sriharan’].
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

Executive Head will have the beneﬁt of act and advice of the Council
of Ministers, for the exercise of power under Section 432(1)CrPC, the
appropriate Government will get the valuable opinion of the judicial
forum, which will deﬁnitely throw much light on the issue relating to
grant of suspension or remission.”
The court then proceeded to approve the following reasoning in Sangeet
v. State of Haryana11 on this point (Sangeet SCR pp. 119-120):
“63. It appears to us that an exercise of power by the appropriate
Government under sub-section (1) of Section 432CrPC cannot be suo
motu for the simple reason that this sub-section is only an enabling
provision. The appropriate Government is enabled to “override” a
judicially pronounced sentence, subject to the fulﬁlment of certain
conditions. Those conditions are found either in the Jail Manual or
in statutory rules. Sub-section (1) of Section 432CrPC cannot be
read to enable the appropriate Government to “further override” the
judicial pronouncement over and above what is permitted by the Jail
Manual or the statutory rules. The process of granting “additional”
remission under this section is set into motion in a case only through
an application for remission by the convict or on his behalf. On such
an application being made, the appropriate Government is required
to approach the Presiding Judge of the court before or by which the
conviction was made or conﬁrmed to opine (with reasons) whether the
application should be granted or refused. Thereafter, the appropriate
Government may take a decision on the remission application and
pass orders granting remission subject to some conditions, or refusing
remission. Apart from anything else, this statutory procedure seems
quite reasonable inasmuch as there is an application of mind to the
issue of grant of remission. It also eliminates “discretionary” or en
masse release of convicts on “festive” occasions since each release
requires a case-by-case basis scrutiny.”
(emphasis supplied)

11 [2012] 13 SCR 85[hereafter referred to as ‘Sangeet’]
RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDAL v. THE STATE 495
OF BIHAR & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

11. This court, in various judgments, has outlined the parameters to
be considered, when considering grant of remission. In Jagdish (supra) this
court held:
“38. At the time of considering the case of premature release of a life
convict, the authorities may require to consider his case mainly taking
into consideration whether the oﬀence was an individual act of crime
without aﬀecting the society at large; whether there was any chance
of future recurrence of committing a crime; whether the convict had
lost his potentiality in committing the crime; whether there was any
fruitful purpose of conﬁning the convict any more; the socio-economic
condition of the convict’s family and other similar circumstances.”
(emphasis supplied)
This was based on an earlier judgment (though not expressly cited in
Jagdish) - Laxman Naskar v. State of W.B12 which prescribed ﬁve guiding
factors.
12. In Sriharan (supra), the court went on to discuss speciﬁcally,
the role of the report submitted by the presiding oﬃcer, and held that the
“ultimate order of suspension or remission should be guided by the opinion
to be rendered by the Presiding Oﬃcer of the court concerned.” 13 This in
turn, was relied upon, and explained recently, in Ram Chander v. State of
Chhattisgarh14 as follows:
“20. In Sriharan [Union of India v. V. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC
1 : (2016) 2 SCC (Cri) 695] , the Court observed that the opinion of
the Presiding Judge shines a light on the nature of the crime that has
been committed, the record of the convict, their background and other
relevant factors. Crucially, the Court observed that the opinion of the
Presiding Judge would enable the Government to take the “right”
decision as to whether or not the sentence should be remitted. Hence,
it cannot be said that the opinion of the Presiding Judge is only a

12 (2000) 2 SCC 595[para 6] [hereafter referred to as ‘Laxman Naskar’]. These factors
were reiterated in Laxman Naskar v. State of W.B. (2000) 7 SCC 626 [para 6] as well.
13 Para 143.
14 [2022] 4 SCR 1103[hereafter referred to as ‘Ram Chander’]
496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

relevant factor, which does not have any determinative eﬀect on the
application for remission. The purpose of the procedural safeguard
under Section 432(2)CrPC would stand defeated if the opinion of the
Presiding Judge becomes just another factor that may be taken into
consideration by the Government while deciding the application for
remission. It is possible then that the procedure under Section 432(2)
would become a mere formality.
21. However, this is not to say that the appropriate Government
should mechanically follow the opinion of the Presiding Judge. If the
opinion of the Presiding Judge does not comply with the requirements
of Section 432(2) or if the Judge does not consider the relevant factors
for grant of remission that have been laid down in Laxman Naskar v.
Union of India [Laxman Naskar v. Union of India, (2000) 2 SCC 595
: 2000 SCC (Cri) 509], the Government may request the Presiding
Judge to consider the matter afresh.
22. In the present case, there is nothing to indicate that the
Presiding Judge took into account the factors which have been laid
down in Laxman Naskar v. Union of India [Laxman Naskar v. Union
of India, (2000) 2 SCC 595 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 509] . These factors
include assessing:
(i) whether the oﬀence aﬀects the society at large;
(ii) the probability of the crime being repeated;
(iii) the potential of the convict to commit crimes in future;
(iv) if any fruitful purpose is being served by keeping the convict
in prison; and
(v) the socio-economic condition of the convict’s family.
In Laxman Naskar v. State of W.B. [Laxman Naskar v. State of
W.B., (2000)7 SCC 626: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1431] and State of Haryana
v. Jagdish [State of Haryana v. Jagdish, (2010) 4 SCC 216 : (2010)
2 SCC (Cri) 806], this Court has reiterated that these factors will be
considered while deciding the application of a convict for premature
release.
RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDAL v. THE STATE 497
OF BIHAR & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

23. In his opinion dated 21-7-2021 the Special Judge, Durg
referred to the crime for which the petitioner was convicted and simply
stated that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case it would
not be appropriate to grant remission. The opinion is in the teeth of
the provisions of Section 432(2)CrPC which require that the Presiding
Judge’s opinion must be accompanied by reasons. Halsbury’s Laws of
India (Administrative Law) notes that the requirement to give reasons
is satisﬁed if the authority concerned has provided relevant reasons.
Mechanical reasons are not considered adequate. The following extract
is useful for our consideration:
“[005.066] Adequacy of reasons Suﬃciency of reasons, in a
particular case, depends on the facts of each case. It is not
necessary for the authority to write out a judgment as a court of
law does. However, at least, an outline of process of reasoning
must be given. It may satisfy the requirement of giving reasons
if relevant reasons have been given for the order, though the
authority has not set out all the reasons or some of the reasons
which had been argued before the court have not been expressly
considered by the authority. A mere repetition of the statutory
language in the order will not make the order a reasoned one.
Mechanical and stereotype reasons are not regarded as adequate.
A speaking order is one that speaks of the mind of the adjudicatory
body which passed the order. A reason such as ‘the entire
examination of the year 1982 is cancelled’, cannot be regarded
as adequate because the statement does explain as to why the
examination has been cancelled; it only lays down the punishment
without stating the causes therefor.” [Halsbury’s Laws of India
(Administrative Law) (Lexis Nexis, Online Edition).]
24. Thus, an opinion accompanied by inadequate reasoning
would not satisfy the requirements of Section 432(2)CrPC. Further,
it will not serve the purpose for which the exercise under Section
432(2) is to be undertaken, which is to enable the executive to make
an informed decision taking into consideration all the relevant
factors.”
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

13. Noting that the presiding judge’s opinion did not consider the ﬁve
parameters laid out in Laxman Naskar (supra), a coordinate bench of this
court in Ram Chander (supra) directed the presiding oﬃcer of the concerned
court, to consider the matter afresh and in light of these factors, so that the
appropriate government could in turn reconsider the petitioner’s application
for premature release. A similar fate awaited the writ petitioner in Jaswant
Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh 15 (wherein both writ petitions arose from the
same facts and commission of oﬀence).
14. In the present case, the Remission Board rejected the petitioner’s
application for premature release twice. A brief glance at all the reports
submitted by the authorities to the Remission Board before each of its two
meetings where it considered the petitioner’s case, is telling:
Considered in Remission Board Considered in Remission Board meeting
meeting dated 19.05.2021 dated 20.04.2023
Jail Superintendent report dated Jai l S up e rin ten de nt re por t d at e d
27.04.2021: 15.09.2022:
“conduct of prisoner is satisfactory. “Recommended for premature release.”
Recommended for premature release from
jail.”
Probation Officer’s report dated Prob atio n O f fic e r ’s rep or t d ate d
05.04.2021: 08.06.2022:
“can be considered to release the prisoner “Keeping in view at the residential resources
prematurely in accordance with Rules” and means for livelihood for the convicts, the
social and economic status of the household,
the no- objection and acceptance of the
people of the family and the society , the need
for rehabilitation and the possibility of living
as a normal citizen a clear recommendation
is made regarding the timely release of the
above convicted prisoner.”
Police Superintendent’s report dated Police Superintendent’s report dated
11.01.2021: 22.07.2022:
“…DPO has reported that on release of Noting the input received from the concerned
prisoner, there does not seem to be any DPO - “…The local people have got the

15 Jaswant Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 35
RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDAL v. THE STATE 499
OF BIHAR & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

possibility of any law-and-order problem information regarding his premature release.
will arise” The local people speak in the crossroads
about the adverse eﬀect of his release due
to his premature release, an atmosphere of
unrest and fear will arise in the society and
criminal incidents may also increase NCR
(Sanha) No. 211 dated 10.07.2022 is marked
in this regard. In this context, the premature
release of the said prisoner does not seem
appropriate”
Remarks of the Presiding Judge dated Remarks of the Presiding Judge dated
15.12.2018: 02.07.2022:
“… I per us ed the j ud gmen t and Noting the report submitted earlier by the
supplementary case record of above noted then presiding oﬃcer on 15.12.2018, stated
sessions case, from which it appears that
“….Further having gone through the case
it is a triple murder case in which two
record, I also ﬁnd that the manner of the
dafadars were killed under a calculated
occurrence in alleged oﬀence done by the
move and in plan manner and both Dafadar
Rajo@Rajua@Rajendra mandal along
and Chaukidar were sincere in duty and
with other co-accused person was so harsh
dedicated to their work and they used
and professional under such facts and
to jointly move from duty, as a result of
circumstances, I also agreed with the opinion
which the criminals were under constant
of the then P.O of this court. Therefore prayer
fear psychosis and the criminals including
for remission and commutation of sentence
the convicts murdered these two oﬃcials.
in favor of Rajo@Rajua@Rajendra Mandal
Considering the manner of occurrence and
may be refused.”
seriousness of the case, in my opinion the
application remission and commutation
of sentence ﬁled on behalf of the convict
petitioner should be refused.”
Screening Committee/ Inspector General:
Took note of the adverse reports of Police
Superintendent and Presiding Judge and
noted that
“2. In the Notification No. 3106 dated
10.01 2.20 02 of the Home (Spe cial )
Department Bihar, it is provided in clause (iv)
(b) that the prisoners who are convicted for
organizing murders in a systematic manner
shall not be eligible for premature release.
3. In that light, the proposal for untimely
release from prison can be rejected.”
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

Taking note of the reports before it at the time, the Remission Board
concluded as follows:
Remission Board meeting dated Remission Board meeting dated 20.04.2023
19.05.2021
“Favourable report by Probation Taking note of the adverse reports by the
Oﬃcer/ Superintendent of Police, but Police Superintendent, Presiding Judge, and
adverse report by Presiding Judge” conclusion of the Screening Committee/
Inspector General regarding clause (iv)(b) –
“3. After due consideration, the proposal for
premature release from prison is rejected.”

15. The record clearly indicates that the reason for rejection of the
petitioner’s application, is the adverse report submitted by the presiding
judge in the ﬁrst round, which was perfunctorily relied upon and reiterated
in the report submitted by the then presiding judge in the second round as
well. Both the reports submitted by the presiding judges (at the relevant
time), demonstrate a casual opinion, based solely on the judicial record
which presumably consisted of the ﬁnding of guilt, by the trial court and
High Court. This oﬀers only a dated insight on the petitioner, one that has
limited opportunity to consider the progress the convict has made in the
course of serving his sentence. Yet, the Remission Board has privileged
the presiding judge’s opinion over the other authorities – like the Probation
Oﬃcer, and Jail authorities, who are in a far better position to comment on
his post-conviction reformation – oﬀering a cautionary tale.
16. In this court’s considered view, overemphasis on the presiding
judge’s opinion and complete disregard of comments of other authorities,
while arriving at its conclusion, would render the appropriate government’s
decision on a remission application, unsustainable. The discretion that the
executive is empowered with in executing a sentence, would be denuded of
its content, if the presiding judge’s view– which is formed in all likelihood,
largely (if not solely) on the basis of the judicial record– is mechanically
followed by the concerned authority. Such an approach has the potential to
strikes at the heart, and subvert the concept of remission – as a reward and
incentive encouraging actions and behaviour geared towards reformation
– in a modern legal system.
RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDAL v. THE STATE 501
OF BIHAR & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

17. All this is not to say that the presiding judge’s view is only one
of the factors that has no real weight; but instead that if the presiding
judge’s report is only reﬂective of the facts and circumstances that led to
the conclusion of the convict’s guilt, and is merely a reiteration of those
circumstances available to the judge at the time of sentencing (some 14 or
more years earlier, as the case may be), then the appropriate government
should attach weight to this ﬁnding, accordingly. Such a report, cannot be
relied on as carrying predominance, if it focusses on the crime, with little
or no attention to the criminal. The appropriate government, should take
a holistic view of all the opinions received (in terms of the relevant rules),
including the judicial view of the presiding judge of the concerned court,
keeping in mind the purpose and objective, of remission.
18. The views of the presiding judge, are based on the record, which
exists, containing all facts resulting in conviction, including the nature of
the crime, its seriousness, the accused’s role, and the material available at
that stage regarding their antecedents. However, post-conviction conduct,
particularly, resulting in the prisoner’s earned remissions, their age and
health, work done, length of actual incarceration, etc., rarely fall within the
said judge’s domain. Another factor to bear in mind, is that the presiding
judge would not be the same presiding judge who had occasion to observe
the convict (at a much earlier point in time) and thus form an opinion.
The presiding judge, at this stage, would only look into the record leading
to conviction. This judicial involvement in executive decision making is
therefore, largely limited to the input it provides regarding the nature of the
crime, its seriousness, etc. Undoubtedly, even at the stage of sentencing, the
judge ideally is to exercise discretion after looking at a wide range of factors
relating to the criminal and not just the crime; but as noticed in numerous
precedents16 that have dealt with sentencing in the commission of heinous
crimes, this is unfortunately, often not the reality. Guidance has been oﬀered
by this court17 on how to mitigate this in recent years, but in this court’s

16 Sangeet (supra); Swamy Shraddananda (2) @ Mural Manohar Mishra v. State of Kar-
nataka [2008] 11 SCR 93; Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra
[2009] 9 SCR 90; Chhannu Lal Verma v. State of Chattisgarh [2018] 14 SCR 355; Rajen-
dra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra [2018] 14 SCR 585; and Manoj v. State of
Madhya Pradesh [2022] 9 SCR 452.
17 Ibid.
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

considered view, it is pragmatic to acknowledge that it will require time
for our criminal justice system to incorporate, and uniformly reach such
standards. In fact, earlier cases of conviction (such as the present one - in
2001), have an even lesser probability of a judicial record which reﬂects
consideration of such multi-dimensional factors at the sentencing stage; the
lack of which should not serve as an obstacle to the convict seeking release
(after serving almost two decades, or more), erasing the reformative journey
they may have undertaken as a result of their long incarceration.
19. It has been repeatedly emphasized that the aim, and ultimate
goal of imprisonment, even in the most serious crime, is reformative, after
the oﬀender undergoes a suﬃciently long spell of punishment through
imprisonment. Even while upholding Section 433A, in Maru Ram v. Union
of India18, this court underlined the relevance of post-conviction conduct,
stating whether the convict,
“Had his in-prison good behavior been rewarded by reasonable
remissions linked to improved social responsibility, nurtured by familial
contacts and liberal parole, cultured by predictable, premature release,
the purpose of habilitation would have been served, If law—S. 433-A
in this case—rudely refuses to consider the subsequent conduct of the
prisoner and forces all convicts, good, bad and indiﬀerent, to serve
a ﬁxed and arbitrary minimum it is an angry ﬂat untouched by the
proven criteria of reform.”
20. Another aspect of note in this case, is the report submitted by
the Superintendent of Police in the second round (which is diametrically
diﬀerent from that which was submitted in the ﬁrst round), was adverse.
Without casting aspersions on the veracity of it, or questioning it on merits,
it is appropriate to ﬂag another concern in such a context. In each case,
the appropriate government has to be cognizant of the latent (not always)
prejudices of the crime, that the police as well as the investigating agency,
may be citing – especially in a case such as the present one, where the slain
victims were police personnel themselves, i.e., members of the police force.
These biases may inform the report, and cannot be given determinative value.
Doing so will potentially deﬂect the appropriate government from the facts

18 [1981] 1 SCR 1196
RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDAL v. THE STATE 503
OF BIHAR & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

relevant for consideration for premature release, and instead, focus almost
entirely upon facts which evoke a retributive response.
21. Apart from the other considerations (on the nature of the crime,
whether it aﬀected the society at large, the chance of its recurrence, etc.),
the appropriate government should while considering the potential of the
convict to commit crimes in the future, whether there remains any fruitful
purpose of continued incarceration, and the socio-economic conditions,
review: the convict’s age, state of heath, familial relationships and possibility
of reintegration, extent of earned remission, and the post-conviction
conduct including, but not limited to – whether the convict has attained any
educational qualiﬁcation whilst in custody, volunteer services oﬀered, job/
work done, jail conduct, whether they were engaged in any socially aimed
or productive activity, and the overall development as a human being. The
Board thus should not entirely rely either on the presiding judge, or the report
prepared by the police. In this court’s considered view, it would also serve
the ends of justice if the appropriate government had the beneﬁt of a report
contemporaneously prepared by a qualiﬁed psychologist after interacting/
interviewing the convict that has applied for premature release. The Bihar
Prison Manual, 2012 enables a convict to earn remissions, which are limited
to one third of the total sentence imposed. Special remission for good
conduct, in addition, is granted by the rules.19 If a stereotypical approach
in denying the beneﬁt of remission, which ultimately results in premature
release, is repeatedly adopted, the entire idea of limiting incarceration for
long periods (sometimes spanning a third or more of a convict’s lifetime
and in others, result in an indeﬁnite sentence), would be defeated. This
could result in a sense of despair and frustration among inmates, who might
consider themselves reformed– but continue to be condemned in prison.
22. The majority view in Sriharan (supra) and the minority view, had
underlined the need to balance societal interests with the rights of the convict
(that in a given case, the sentence should not be unduly harsh, or excessive).
The court acknowledged that it lies within the executive’s domain to grant,
or refuse premature release; however, such power would be guided, and
the discretion informed by reason, stemming from appropriate rules. The

19 See Rules 405 and 413 of the Bihar Prison Manual, 2012.
504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

minority view (of Lalit and Sapre JJ) had cautioned the court from making
sentencing rigid:
“73. […] Any order putting the punishment beyond remission will
prohibit exercise of statutory power designed to achieve same purpose
Under Section 432/433 Code of Criminal Procedure In our view Courts
cannot and ought not deny to a prisoner the beneﬁt to be considered for
remission of sentence. By doing so, the prisoner would be condemned
to live in the prison till the last breath without there being even a ray of
hope to come out. This stark reality will not be conducive to reformation
of the person and will in fact push him into a dark hole without there
being semblance of the light at the end of the tunnel.”
This concern suﬀuses the reasoning in Ram Chander(supra).
23. This court, on earlier occasion, had grappled with the situation
of diﬀerent remission policies/rules prevailing at diﬀerent points of the
convict’s sentence – i.e., when the policy on the date of conviction, and on
the date of consideration for premature release, are diﬀerent. It has been
held that the policy prevailing on the date of the conviction20, would be
applicable. However, in Jagdish(supra) it was also recognised that if a
more liberal policy exists on the date of consideration, the beneﬁt should
be provided:
“43. […] The State authority is under an obligation to at least exercise
its discretion in relation to an honest expectation perceived by the
convict, at the time of his conviction that his case for premature
release would be considered after serving the sentence, prescribed
in the short-sentencing policy existing on that date. The State has
to exercise its power of remission also keeping in view any such
beneﬁt to be construed liberally in favour of a convict which may
depend upon case to case and for that purpose, in our opinion, it
should relate to a policy which, in the instant case, was in favour
of the respondent. In case a liberal policy prevails on the date of
consideration of the case of a “lifer” for premature release, he should
be given beneﬁt thereof.”

20 See State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar, (2021) 9 SCC 292 [para 16].
RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDAL v. THE STATE 505
OF BIHAR & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

24. Applying these principles in the case at hand, on the date of
conviction (24.05.2001), it is the pre-2002 policy21 that was applicable. The
relevant extract is as follows:
“[…] the State Government has decided that to give remission to the
accused who has been sentenced to life imprisonment and subsequently
to release him from prison, life imprisonment should be considered
as imprisonment for 20 years and the following procedure should be
adopted in the matter of releasing the prisoners sentenced for life
imprisonment –
1. Under Section 429 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Act No. 2 of 1974, the prisoner who gets life imprisonment will
not get the beneﬁt of presumptive report (ambiguous) i.e. in the
case in which he has been sentenced to life imprisonment, the
period spent in jail during the period of enquiry, investigation
and disposal of the case and before the date of conviction may
be deducted from the imprisonment of 20 years.
2. Upon conviction, if any person has been sentenced to imprisonment
for life for an oﬀense for which one of the punishments is death
or if the death sentence has been commuted to life imprisonment
under Section 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and
where such sentence of imprisonment for life has been awarded
on or after 18.12.1978, such prisoner shall be released from
prison only if-
a. He has spent a period of 14 years in prison from the date
of conviction.
b. The total of the period of remission and imprisonment is 20
years.
[….]”
It is pertinent to point out that in the old pre-2002 policy, there is no
mention of any ineligibility criteria, much less one that is analogous to Rule
529(iv)(b) of the 2002 policy, which was cited by the Remission Board in
its rejection of the petitioner’s application on 20.04.2023.

21 No. A/P.M-03/91-550 dated 21.01.1984.
506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

25. In light of these ﬁndings and the precedents discussed above, it
would be appropriate if the Remission Board reconsidered the petitioner’s
application for remission afresh, considering the reports of the police and
other authorities, the post-prison record of the petitioner, the remissions
earned (including that which is earned for good conduct) his age, health
condition, family circumstances, and his potential for social engagement,
in a positive manner. The concerned presiding judge is hereby directed to
provide an opinion on the petitioner’s application for premature release,
by examining the judicial record, and provide adequate reasoning, taking
into account the factors laid down in Laxman Naskar (supra), within one
month from the date of this judgment. With the beneﬁt of this new report,
the Remission Board may reconsider the application – without entirely
or solely relying on it, but treating it as valuable (maybe weighty) advice
that is based on the judicial record. Given the long period of incarceration
already suﬀered by the writ petitioner and his age, the Remission Board
should endeavour to consider the application at the earliest and render its
decision, preferably within three months from the date of this judgment.
A copy of this judgment shall be marked by the Registry of this Court, to
the Home Secretary, Government of Bihar, who is the chairperson of the
Remission Board, as well as the concerned Presiding Judge, through the
Registrar, High Court of Judicature at Patna High Court.
Before parting, this court would like to place on record its deep
appreciation for the valuable assistance provided by Mr. Randhir Kumar
Ojha, appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. Azmat Hayat Amanullah,
appearing on behalf of the State.
26. The writ petition is allowed in the above terms. Pending
applications, if any, are disposed of.

Headnotes prepared by: Writ petition allowed.
Divya Pandey

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