RAJIV GHOSHversusSATYA NARYAN JAISWAL

          [2025] 5 S.C.R. 458 : 2025 INSC 467

                       Rajiv Ghosh
                             v.
                   Satya Naryan Jaiswal
      (Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 9975 of 2025)
                         07 April 2025
       [J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]


                    Issue for Consideration
In view of the unequivocal admission made by the defendant
in his written statement, whether the High Court was right in
decreeing the suit for recovery of possession applying Or.XII
r.6 of the CPC thereby, affirming the decree of eviction passed
by the trial court.

                          Headnotes†
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Or.XII, r.6 – Judgment on
admissions – West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 –
s.2(g) – Suit for recovery of possession – Admission of
certain facts by the defendant in his written statement – In
view thereof, the plaintiff filed application u/Or.XII r.6 for
decree upon admission – Trial Court decreed the suit –
Appeal filed by the defendant, dismissed by High Court –
Correctness:
Held: r.6(1) empowers the court to pronounce a judgment upon
admissions made by parties without waiting for the determination
of other questions – The words “or otherwise” used in Or.XII,
r.6 are wide enough to include all cases of admissions made in
the pleadings or de hors the pleadings – In the present case,
having regard to the clear and unequivocal admission made by
the defendant in his written statement, the High Court committed
no error much less any error of law in decreeing the suit applying
Or.XII r.6. [Paras 35, 44]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Or. XII r.6 – Nature of – Exercise
of discretion u/Or. XII r.6:
Held: The provisions of r.6 are enabling, discretionary and
permissive – They are not mandatory, obligatory or peremptory –
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                    Rajiv Ghosh v. Satya Naryan Jaiswal


     This is also clear from the use of the word “may” in the rule – The
     powers conferred on the court by this rule are untrammeled and
     cannot be crystallized into any rigid rule of universal application –
     They can be exercised keeping in view and having regard to the
     facts and varying circumstances of each case – If the court is of
     the opinion that it is not safe to pass a judgment on admissions, or
     that a case involves questions which cannot be appropriately dealt
     with and decided on the basis of admission, it may, in exercise
     of its discretion, refuse to pass a judgment and may insist upon
     clear proof of even admitted facts. [Paras 28-30]
     Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Or. XII r.6 – Object of – Code of
     Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976. [Paras 25, 26]
     Words and Phrases – ‘Otherwise’ – Civil Procedure Code,
     1908 – Or. XII r.6 – Discussed. [Para 37]

                              Case Law Cited
     ITDC Limited v. Chander Pal Sood and Son (2000) 84 DLT 337
     (DB) : (2000 AIHC 1990) – approved.
     Uttam Singh v. United Bank of India [2000] Supp. 2 SCR 187 :
     (2000) 7 SCC 120; Bai Chanchal v. United Bank of India [1971]
     SCR 2 171 : AIR 1971 SC 1081; Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan
     [1999] Supp. 2 SCR 258 : (1999) 8 SCC 396 – referred to.
     Sivalinga v. Narayani, AIR 1946 Mad 151; Sher Bahadur v. Mohd.
     Amin, AIR 1929 Lah 569; Throp v. Holdsworth, Jessel, reported,
     (1876)3 Ch D 637 (640); Brown v. Pearson (1882) 21 Ch D 716 –
     referred to.

                                List of Acts
     Civil Procedure Code, 1908; West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act,
     1997; Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976.

                             List of Keywords
     Order XII, Rule 6 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908; Judgment
     on admissions; Admission in written statement; Recovery of
     possession; Eviction decree; Original tenant; Statutory right of
     inherited tenancy; Written statement; Decree upon admission; Legal
     heir of original tenant; Admission made in pleadings; Rejoinder;
     Non-admitted claim.
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                              Case Arising From
       EXTRAORDINARY CIVIL JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition
       (Civil) No. 9975 of 2025
       From the Judgment and Order dated 14.11.2024 of the High Court
       of Calcutta in FAT No. 7 of 2024

                           Appearances for Parties
       Advs. for the Petitioner:
       Ramnath Jha, Amit.

                  Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                    Order

1.     Delay condoned in filing Special Leave Petition.
2.     This petition arises from the judgment and order passed by the High
       Court at Calcutta (Civil Appellate Jurisdiction) dated 14.11.2024 in
       FAT 7 of 2024 with IA No. CAN 1 of 2024 by which the appeal filed
       by the petitioner-herein came to be dismissed thereby affirming the
       judgment and decree of eviction passed by the Vth Bench, City Civil
       Court at Calcutta, District Calcutta dated 2nd December 2023 in title
       suit no. 1068 of 2021.
3.     For the sake of convenience, the petitioner-herein shall be referred
       to as original defendant and the respondent-herein shall be referred
       to as original plaintiff.
4.     It appears from the materials on record that the plaintiff is the lawful
       owner of the suit premises in which the defendant claims to be the
       lawful tenant. The plaintiff instituted title suit no. 1068 of 2021 for
       recovery of possession and mesne profits against the defendant. The
       father of the defendant, Late Ranjan Ghosh was a regular tenant
       under the plaintiff in respect of the suit premises at a monthly rent
       of Rs. 1700 including corporation taxes.
5.     Ranjan Ghosh, the original tenant passed away on 13.07.2016. It
       appears that the defendant being the son of Ranjan Ghosh was
       residing in the suit premises up to the date of demise of his father.
6.     The plaintiff served a notice dated 20th July 2018 to the defendant
       informing him that since the original regular tenant, Ranjan Ghosh
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                    Rajiv Ghosh v. Satya Naryan Jaiswal


     passed away on 13.07.2016 and the defendant being the son of the
     regular tenant who at the time of demise of the regular tenant was
     residing in the scheduled property he can at best take the benefit of
     his statutory right of inherited tenancy up to 5 years from the date
     of death of his father, Ranjan Ghosh on 13.07.2016.
7.   The notice further informed the defendant that he cannot be regarded
     as tenant within Section 2(g) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy
     Act, 1997.
8.   The said notice was received by the defendant on 21.07.2018,
     however, the defendant failed to give any satisfactory reply.
9.   In such circumstances referred to above, the plaintiff had to institute
     the title suit for recovery of the possession. The defendant filed his
     written statement and in the same he is said to have admitted few
     facts arising thereof. The defendant in his written statement admitted
     the following claims of the plaintiff.
     a)    the defendant unequivocally admitted in paragraph no. 10(a) of
           his written statement that Ranjan Ghosh was the sole tenant
           in respect of the suit property. The said Ranjan Ghosh passed
           away in 13.07.2016 leaving behind the defendant as his heir
           and legal representative.
     b)    The defendant admitted that the plaintiff is the owner of the
           scheduled property and the rent was paid till May 2021 to the
           plaintiff.
10. In view of the aforesaid admissions made by the defendant in his
    written statement, the plaintiff preferred an application before the
    trial court under Order XII Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code and
    prayed for a decree upon admission.
11. The application filed by the plaintiff under Order XII Rule 6 of the
    CPC was opposed by the defendant by filing reply which reads thus:
           “1. That the said application is neither maintainable in law
           nor on facts and the same is bad, frivolous, vexatious,
           baseless, unfounded and misconceived as such the said
           application is liable to be rejected with cost to the defendant.
           2. That there is no admission in the pleadings on behalf of
           the defendant, C.P. Code does not define the expression
           “admission” Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act defines
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       admission as a statement made in the oral, documentary
       or electronic form suggesting an inference to a fact in
       issue or relevant fact. Section 23 of the Indian Evidence
       Act lists the circumstances under which an admission will
       be relevant in civil cases. However, the proviso to the
       Section states that the Court has discretionary power to
       require the alleged admitted, facts to be proven by means
       other than such admission. It is pertinent to note that the
       Rule provides that Court “may” pass a judgment or order
       based on the admission. Thus, it is clear that the legislative
       intent is to confer a discretionary power of the Court and
       judgment based on admission cannot be clarified as a
       matter of right. The legislative intent is further clarified by
       the proviso to Order 6 Rule 5. The proviso provides that
       even, where a fact has been admitted by an admission,
       the Court has discretionary power to require the admitted
       fact to be proved by any other means.
       3. That the defendant states that there are material issues
       involved in the instant suit which are very much triable
       therefore, the Ld. Court should not, proceed with the
       passing, a decree under Order 12 Rule 6 of C.P.Code.
       In order to fair disposal of the instant suit, the instant
       suit needed to be decided by a full fledged trial and an
       opportunity to be given the defendant to lead evidence
       for the interest of justice, therefore, the said application
       is liable to be rejected in limine.
       4. With reference to the statements made in paragraph
       Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of the said application, the defendant
       denies the same save and except what are matters of
       record and calls, upon the plaintiff to strictest proof thereof.
       5. With reference to the statements made in paragraph
       Nos. 5 and 6 of the said application, the defendant denies
       the same save and except what are matters of record
       and calls upon the plaintiff to strictest proof thereof. The
       defendant states that by his Written Statement, filed in
       Court has been categorically challenged the allegations
       made by the Plaintiff which is required to be proved by
       way of an evidence by the parties of this suit.
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                    Rajiv Ghosh v. Satya Naryan Jaiswal


           6. With reference to the statements made in paragraph No.
           7 of the said application, the defendant denies the same
           save and except what are matters of record.
           7. With reference to the statements made in paragraph No.
           8 of the said application, the defendant denies the same.
           8. With reference to the statements made in paragraph
           No. 9 of the said application, the defendant denies the
           same save and except what are matters of record and
           calls upon the plaintiff to strictest proof thereof.
           9. With reference to the statements made in paragraphs
           No. 10, 11 and 12 of the said application, the defendant
           denies the same. The defendant denies that he admitted
           anything in his pleadings that the defendant is a trespasser
           as alleged, on the other hand, he categorically stated that
           he is a tenant in respect of the suit premises and he paid
           rent to the plaintiff in respect of the suit premises. Moreover,
           the defendant filed an application u/s 7(1) & 7(2) of the
           W.B.P.T. Act before this Ld. Court for payment of current
           rent as well as arrears rent if any due and payable and
           those applications are pending before this Ld. Court. The
           defendant states that the facts of this case as made out in
           the plaint should be considered by this Ld. Court as a whole
           for the interest of justice because the cause of action of
           this suit arose on the bundle of facts. The defendant never
           admitted in pleadings that he is enjoying the suit premises
           as trespassed. Therefore, without taking an evidence, the
           instant suit cannot be adjudicated properly, therefore the
           said application is liable to be rejected with cost.
           It is prayed that the said application be rejected with cost.”
12. The trial court adjudicated the application and ultimately decreed the
    suit having regard to the specific admissions made by the defendant.
13. The defendant being dissatisfied with the decree passed by the trial
    court based on admissions challenged the same before the High
    Court by filing FAT No. 7 of 2024. The High Court dismissed the
    FAT holding as under:
           “12. According to the said clause, the dependent heir of
           the original tenant, unless she is the widow of the original
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       tenant, is entitled to carry on as a tenant [coming within
       the definition of “tenant” as defined in Section 2(g)] to
       continue in such capacity for a period of 5 years from the
       demise of the original tenant
       13. Hence, although the defendant has not pleaded in
       the Written statement that he was a dependent of the:
       original tenant, which should have further cut short his
       period of tenancy, even proceeding on the premise that
       the defendant was a dependent, he, being the Son of the
       original tenant, would be :entitled to sustain his tenancy
       in such capacity only up to the, expiry of a period- of 5
       years from the demise of the original tenant.
       14. From the pleadings in the written statement, it is
       evident that the said period was already over at the time
       of institution of the suit, since the original tenant, his father
       Ranjan Ghosh, met his demise on July 13, 2016.
       15. It is further admitted in the written statement that the
       landlord/plaintiff, quite rightly, stopped accepting rent, from
       the defendant after May, 2021 i.e. after the expiry of the
       said period of five years from the death of the original
       landlord.
       16. Hence, the pleadings in the written statement comprise
       of sufficient ingredients to bring the defendant within the
       fold of Section 2(g) of the 1997 Act.
       17. It may be clarified here that, it is well-settled that law
       of legal ‘arguments need not be pleaded in the pleadings,
       either by way of a plaint or a written statement.
       18. As such, the defendant need not have specifically
       pleaded, the applicability of Section 2(g) of the 1997 Act
       for the purpose of the pleading to acquire the Character
       of an admission, for the purpose of Order XII Rule 6 of
       the Code. It would suffice, as in the present case, if the
       necessary factual ingredients to satisfy Section 2(g) are
       pleaded in the written statement, for it to be deemed to be
       an admission that the defendant comes within the purview
       of Section. 2(g).
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                              465

                    Rajiv Ghosh v. Satya Naryan Jaiswal


           19. That is precisely the case here.
           20. In the event the defendant comes within Section 2(g)
           of the 1997 Act, nothing remains to be adjudicated further
           in the. suit, since the defendant is automatically relegated
           to the status of a trespasser, and the plaintiff immediately
           becomes entitled to get a decree for eviction in the absence
           of any further of independent right having been claimed
           by the defendant.
           21. The defendant, in the written statement, claims entirely
           through his father, the original tenant. The pleading as
           to there being a talk of a fresh tenancy being granted in
           favour of the defendant is neither here nor there since
           even the said pleading does not tantamount to-establish
           that a new tenancy has already been created in favour of
           the defendant, in which case, the outcome of the litigation
           might have been otherwise.
            22. As such, the learned Trial Judge was fully justified in
           resorting to Section 2(g) of the 1997 Act, read with Order
           XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to come to the
           finding that the plaintiff automatically gets entitled to a
           decree for eviction by way of a judgment on admission.
           23. In such view of the matter, we do not find any justification
           to interfere with the impugned judgment and decree.
           24. Accordingly, FAT 7 of 2024 is dismissed on contest,
           thereby affirming the judgment and decree dated December
           2, 2023 passed by the learned Judge, Fifth Bench, City
           Civil Court at Calcutta, District- Calcutta in Title Suit No.
           1068 of 2021.
           25. There will be no order as to costs.
           26. Keeping in view the pendency of the appeal till now,
           the defendant/appellant is granted a further period of three
           months to vacate the premises in favour of the plaintiff/
           respondent. The pending execution n case shall remain
           stayed for such period.
           27. In the event the defendant/appellant does not vacate
           the premises within the said period, of three months from
           this date, the plaintiff/decree holder will be at liberty to
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          proceed with the execution case and the same will be
          expedited by the executing court.
          28. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
          29. A formal decree be drawn up accordingly.”
14. In such circumstances referred to above, the defendant is here before
    this Court with the present petition.
15. We heard Mr. Ramnath Jha, the learned counsel appeared on behalf
    of Mr. Amit Kumar, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant.
16. Section 2(g) of the 1997 Act reads thus:
          “2. Definitions.” In this Act, unless there is anything,
          repugnant in the subject or context,
          (g) “tenant” means any person by whom or on whose
          account or behalf the rent of any premises is or, but for
          a special contract, would be payable, and includes, any
          person continuing in possession after termination of his
          tenancy and, in the event of death of any tenant, also
          includes, for a period not exceeding five years from the
          date of death of such tenant or from the date of coming
          into force of this Act, whichever is later, his spouse, son,
          daughter, parent and the widow of his predeceased son,
          who were ordinarily living with the tenant up to the date
          of death of the tenant as the members of his family and
          were dependent on him and who do not own or occupy
          any residential premises, and in respect of premises let
          out for non-residential purpose his spouse, sort, daughter
          and parent who were ordinarily living with the tenant up to
          the date of his death as members of his family, and were
          dependent on him or a person authorised by the tenant
          who is in possession of such premises but shall not include
          any person, against whom any decree or order for eviction
          has been made by a Court of competent jurisdiction:
           Provided that the time-limit of five years shall not apply
          to the spouse of the tenant who was ordinarily living with
          the tenant up to his death as a member of his family and
          was dependent on him and who does not own of occupy
          any residential premises:
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                           467

                    Rajiv Ghosh v. Satya Naryan Jaiswal


           Provided further that the son, daughter, parent or the
           widow of the predeceased son of the tenant who was
           ordinarily residing with the tenant in the said premises
           up to the date of death of the tenant as a member of his
           family and was dependent on him and who does not own
           or occupy any residential premises, shall have a right of
           preference for tenancy, in a fresh agreement in respect of
           such premises on condition of payment of fair rent. This
           proviso shall apply mutatis mutandis to premises let out
           for non-residential purpose.”
17. Thus, the plain reading of Section 2(g) referred to above would
    indicate that the dependent heir of the original tenant unless she
    is the widow of the original tenant would be entitled to carry on as
    a tenant [coming within the definition of “tenant” as defined under
    Section 2(g)] in such capacity for a period of 5 years from the demise
    of the original tenant.
18. In the case on hand, the defendant is the son of the original tenant.
    It is not in dispute that he claims his right to continue as a tenant in
    the suit premises through his father i.e. the original tenant.
19. Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC reads thus:
           6. Judgment on admissions.—(1) Where admissions of
           fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise,
           whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage
           of the suit, either on the application of any party or of its
           own motion and without waiting for the determination of
           any other question between the parties, make such order
           or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard
           to such admissions.
           (2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under sub-rule
           (1) a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the
           judgment and the decree shall bear the date on which
           the judgment was pronounced.

     LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
20. By the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, the following
    changes had been effected:
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       (1)   Original Rule 6 had been substituted and redrafted into sub-
             rule (1) and
       (2)   Sub-rule (2) had been newly inserted,

       OBJECT OF AMENDMENTS
21. Rule 6, as originally enacted, enabled a court to pronounce judgment
    or admission “either in pleading or otherwise”. It read thus:
             “6. Judgment on admissions.— Any party may, at any
             stage of a suit. where admissions of facts have been
             made, either on pleadings or otherwise, apply to the Court
             for such judgment or order as upon such admissions he
             may be entitled to, without waiting for the determination
             of any other question between the parties and the Court
             may upon such application make such order or give such
             judgment, as the Court may think just.”
22. The Law Commission considered the provision. With a view to
    clarify the position as to admission and also to empower the court
    to pronounce a judgment: suo motu and to draw a decree on such
    judgment, recommended to modify the rule. It stated:
             “Where a claim is admitted, a court has jurisdiction under
             Order XII Rule 6 to enter a judgment for the plaintiff, and
             to pass a decree on the admitted claim (with liberty to the
             plaintiff to proceed with the suit in the ordinary way as to
             the remainder of the claim).
             The object of the rule is to enable a party to obtain speedy
             judgment, at least to the extent of the relief to which,
             according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff
             is entitled.
             The rule has been held to be wide enough to cover oral
             admissions. The use of the words ‘or otherwise’ in Rule 6,
             without the words ‘in writing’ which are used in Rule 1 of
             Order XII, shows that a judgment may be given even on an
             oral admission. It is desirable to codify this interpretation.
             It may be noted that under the present rule, a judgment
             on admission can be passed only on an application.
             According to a local amendment. the Court may, on the
             application of any party or of its own motion, make such
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                    Rajiv Ghosh v. Satya Naryan Jaiswal


           order or give such judgment. This is a useful amendment,
           and should be adopted.
           In our view, it is also desirable to provide that a decree
           shall follow or » judgment on admissions.” (See: Law
           Commission’s Fifty-fourth Report, p. 145)
23. In Statement of Objects and Reasons, it had been stated:
           “Clause 65, sub-clause (ii)- Under Rule 6, where a claim
           is admitted, the Court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment
           for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on the admitted claim.
           The object of the rule is to enable a party to obtain speedy
           judgment at least to the extent of relief to which, according
           to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled.
           The rule is wide enough to cover oral admissions. The rule
           is being amended to clarify that oral admissions are also
           covered by the rule” (See: Notes on Clauses, Gazette of
           India, dt. 08-04-1974, Pt. II, S.2, Extra., p. 316)
24. Rule 6(1) empowers the court to pronounce a judgment upon
    admissions made by parties without waiting for the determination
    of other questions.
25. Rule 6(2) states that a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with
    the judgment.
26. The primary object underlying Rule 6 is to enable a party to obtain
    speedy judgment at least to the extent of admission. Where a
    plaintiff claims a particular relief or reliefs against a defendant and
    the defendant makes a plain admission, the former is entitled to the
    relief or reliefs admitted by the latter. [See: Uttam Singh v. United
    Bank of India, (2000) 7 SCC 120]
27. As observed in the Statement of Objects and Reasons for amending
    Rule 6, “where a claim is admitted, the court has jurisdiction to enter
    a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted claim.
    The object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy
    judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which according to
    the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled.”
28. The provisions of Rule 6 are enabling, discretionary and permissive.
    They are not mandatory, obligatory or peremptory. This is also clear
    from the use of the word “may” in the rule.
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29. The powers conferred on the court by this rule are untrammeled
    and cannot be crystallized into any rigid rule of universal application.
    They can be exercised keeping in view and having regard to the
    facts and varying circumstances of each case.
30. If the court is of the opinion that it is not safe to pass a judgment
    on admissions, or that a case involves questions which cannot be
    appropriately dealt with and decided on the basis of admission, it
    may, in exercise of its discretion, refuse to pass a judgment and may
    insist upon clear proof of even admitted facts.
31. To make order or to pronounce judgment on admission is at the
    discretion of the court. First, the word “may” is used in Rule 6 and
    not the word “shall” which prima facie shows that the provision is an
    enabling one. Rule 6 of Order 12 must be read with Rule 5 of Order
    8 which is identical to the Proviso to Section 58 of the Evidence Act.
    Reading all the relevant provisions together, it is manifest that the
    court is not bound to grant relief to the plaintiff only on the basis
    of admission of the defendant. (See: Sher Bahadur v. Mohd. Amin,
    AIR 1929 Lah 569)
32. In the leading decision of Throp v. Holdsworth, Jessel, reported
    in (1876)3 Ch D 637 (640) M.R. said: “This rule enables the plaintiff
    or the defendant to get rid of so much of the action, as to which
    there is no controversy.”
33. In Uttam Singh (Supra) the plaintiff bank filed a suit for recovery
    of a large sum of money against the defendant. It also filed an
    application under Order 12, Rule 6 for judgment upon admission in
    respect of part of claim. The application was allowed and a decree
    was passed. An appeal against the decree was also dismissed
    by the High Court. The defendant approached this Court. It was
    contended before this Court by the defendant that (i) Rule 6 of Order
    12 covers only those admissions made in pleadings; (ii) the effect of
    the admissions can only be considered at the trial of the suit; and
    (iii) the provision of Order 12, Rule 6 must be read along with the
    provisions of Order 8 and the court should call upon the plaintiff to
    prove its case independent of so called admissions.
34. Negativing the contentions and referring to the object of Order 12,
    Rule 6, the Court observed that “where a claim is admitted, the
    court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to
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                    Rajiv Ghosh v. Satya Naryan Jaiswal


     pass a decree on admitted claim. The scope of Rule 6 should not
     be narrowed down where a party applying for judgment is entitled to
     succeed on a plain admission of the opposite party. The admission
     by the defendant was clear, unambiguous, unequivocal and
     unconditional. The courts below were, therefore, right in decreeing
     the suit of the plaintiff.”
35. The words “or otherwise” are wide enough to include all cases of
    admissions made in the pleadings or de hors the pleadings. Under
    Rule 6, as originally enacted, it was held that the words “or otherwise”
    without the words “in writing” used in Rule 1 showed that a judgment
    could be given upon oral or verbal admission also. [See: Beeny, re,
    (1894) 1 Ch D 499] The Amendment Act of 1976, however, made the
    position clear stating that such admissions may be “in the pleading
    or otherwise” and “whether orally or in writing”. Thus, after the
    amendment in Rule 6, the admissions are not confined to Rule 1 or
    Rule 4 of Order 6, but are of general application. Such admissions
    may be express or implied (constructive); may be in writing or oral;
    or may be before the institution of the suit, after the suit is brought
    or during the pendency of proceedings.
36. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court very correctly laid down the
    following interpretation of the provision of O. 12, R. 6, CPC, in the
    decision of ITDC Limited v. Chander Pal Sood and Son, reported in
    (2000) 84 DLT 337 (DB): (2000 AIHC 1990):
           “Order 12, R. 6 of Code gives a very wide discretion to
           the Court. Under this rule the Court may at any stage of
           the suit either on the application of any party or of its own
           motion and without determination of any other question
           between the parties can make such order giving such
           judgment as it may think fit on the basis of admission of
           a fact made in the pleadings or otherwise whether orally
           or in writing.”
37. The use of the expression ‘otherwise’ in the aforesaid context came
    to be interpreted by the High Court. Considering the expression the
    Court interpreted the said word by stating that it permits the Court
    to pass judgment on the basis of the statement made by the parties
    not only on the pleadings but also dehors the pleadings i.e. either
    in any document or even in the statement recorded in the Court. If
    one of the parties’ statement is recorded under O. 10, Rr. 1 and 2
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       of the Code of Civil Procedure, the same is also a statement which
       elucidates matters in controversy. Any admission in such statement
       is relevant not only for the purpose of finding out the real dispute
       between the parties but also to ascertain as to whether or not any
       dispute or controversy exists between the parties. Admission if any
       is made by a party in the statement recorded, would be conclusive
       against him and the Court can proceed to pass judgment on the
       basis of the admission made therein.
38. Rule 6 of Order XII, before the amendment, allowed judgment on
    admission only on an application by a party. The Law Commission,
    however, suggested that a judgment may be pronounced either on
    an application by a party or even suo motu [See: Throp (supra)]
39. This rule authorizes the court to enter a judgment where a claim is
    admitted and to pass a decree on such admitted claim. This can
    be done at any stage. [See: Uttam Singh (supra)]. Thus, a plaintiff
    may move for judgment upon admission by the defendant in his
    written statement at any stage of the suit although he has joined
    issue on the defence.” [See: Brown v. Pearson, (1882) 21 Ch D
    716]. Likewise, a defendant may apply for dismissal of the suit on
    the basis of admission by the plaintiff in rejoinder.
40. The court may, in an appropriate case, give a judgment at an
    interlocutory stage of the proceedings on admission by a party. [See:
    Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan, (1999) 8 SCC 396]. But if the case
    involves questions which cannot conveniently be disposed of at a
    motion stage, the court may not give judgment at that stage. [See:
    Simla Wholesale Mart (Supra)]
41. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 6 as inserted by the Code of Civil Procedure
    (Amendment) Act, 1976 requires the court to draw up a decree in
    accordance with the judgment on admission. Sub-rule (2) is thus
    consequential and logical sequence to sub-rule (1).
42. Since the object of sub-rule (1) is to enable the plaintiff to get judgment
    on admission of the defendant to the extent of such admission, he
    must get the benefit thereof immediately without waiting for the
    determination of “non-admitted claim”. Sub-rule (2) makes it imperative
    for the court to draw up a decree in terms of judgment on admission
    which can be executed by the plaintiff.” [See: Uttam Singh (supra)].
    In such cases, there may be two decrees; (i) in respect of admitted
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                           473

                    Rajiv Ghosh v. Satya Naryan Jaiswal


     claim; and (ii) in respect of “non-admitted” or contested claim. [See:
     Bai Chanchal v. United Bank of India, AIR 1971 SC 1081].
43. A decree under Rule 6 may be either preliminary or final. [See:
    Sivalinga v. Narayani, AIR 1946 Mad 151]
44. We are of the view having regard to the clear and unequivocal
    admission made by the defendant in his written statement, the High
    Court committed no error much less any error of law in decreeing
    the suit applying Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC.
45. At this stage we should take note of the submission canvassed by the
    learned counsel that the petitioner is not governed by the provisions
    of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 and therefore the
    entire discussion as regards Section 2(g) of the Act, 1997 was
    unnecessary. In other words, the attempt on the part of the learned
    counsel was to persuade us to accept the argument that if Section
    2(g) of the Act, 1997 is not applicable then in such circumstances
    the petitioner has a right to continue in occupation of the premises
    in question as the legal heir of the original tenant.
46. We are afraid, we are not impressed with the submission canvassed
    by the learned counsel as noted above. We take notice of the fact
    that this point was never raised or argued before the High Court. We
    wonder if it was at all argued even before the trial court. We called
    upon the learned counsel to point out from the reply filed by the
    petitioner to the application filed by the respondent under Order XII
    Rule 6 of the CPC that this point was raised before the High Court.
    There is nothing in the objections/reply of the petitioner to indicate
    that such contention was ever raised. On the contrary, para 9 of the
    reply filed by the petitioner-herein which we have incorporated in
    para 11 of this order clinches the issue. In para 9 of the reply to the
    application filed by the plaintiff under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC
    it is stated thus:-
           “Moreover, the defendant filed an application u/s 7(1) &
           7(2) of the W.B.P.T. Act before this Ld. Court for payment of
           current rent as well as arrears rent if any due and payable
           and those applications are pending before this Ld. Court.”
     If according to the petitioner the provisions of the Act, 1997 are
     not applicable then what was the good reason for him to file the
     application under Sections 7(1) & (2) of the Act, 1997 respectively.
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47. In view of the aforesaid, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
48. Registry shall circulate one copy each of this order to all the High
    Courts and the High Courts in turn shall circulate the order in their
    respective District judiciary.

       Result of the case: Petition dismissed.



       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey