Supreme Court of India
RAJINDER SINGHversusSTATE OF PUNJAB
- Citation
- 2015 INSC 161
- Decided
- 26 February 2015
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- T S THAKUR
Holding
A demand for money or property by persons covered under Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, if reasonably connected to the death of a married woman, constitutes dowry, and the term "soon before" is a relative expression; therefore the conviction under IPC s.3048 is upheld.
Summary
The appellant Rajinder Singh was convicted under IPC s.3048 for the death of his wife Salwinder Kaur, who died by poisoning within four years of marriage after repeated demands for dowry money and alleged ill‑treatment by the husband and his relatives. The trial court and the High Court upheld the conviction, finding that the demands for money to build a house constituted dowry and that the cruelty occurred "soon before" her death. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the meaning of "dowry" under the Dowry Prohibition Act, s.2, and the expression "soon before" in s.3048 and Evidence Act s.113B, holding that any demand for money/property by persons covered by s.2, if reasonably connected to the death, is dowry, and that "soon before" is a relative term, not requiring immediacy. Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found the prosecution’s evidence sufficient and affirmed the conviction.
Issues considered
- The proper construction of "dowry" under Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 in the context of Section 3048 IPC.
- The meaning and temporal scope of the term "soon before" in Section 3048 IPC and Section 113B Evidence Act.
- Whether the demand for money to construct a house qualifies as dowry and is linked to the death.
- Whether the prosecution established the requisite nexus between dowry demand, cruelty, and the death.
Legislation cited
Subjects
dowry deathIPC 3048Dowry Prohibition Actsoon beforestatutory interpretationpenal statutessuicideconviction upheld
Judgment
[2015) 2 S.C.R. 835
RAJINDER SINGH A
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB
(Criminal Appeal No. 2321 of 2009) B
FEBRUARY 26, 2015.
[T.S. THAKUR, R.F. NARIMAN AND
PRAFULLA C. PANT, JJ.)
Penal Code, 1860 - s.3048 - Dowry death - Conviction
c
by courts below - Held: In the facts of the case it is proved
that it was a case of dowry death - Conviction upheld.
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 - s.2 - Dowry- Meaning
of - Held: Any money/property/valuable security demanded D
by any persons mentioned in s.2 of the Act, at/before/any
time after marriage which is reasonably connected to the
death of a married woman, would be in connection with the
marriage, unless unequivocally pointed otherwise.
E
Words and Phrases:
'Dowry' - Meaning of, in the context of s.2 of Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961.
"Soon before her death" - Meaning of, in the context F
of s.3048 of /PC - Discussed.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. There are four ingredients of the offence G
u/s. 3048 IPC and they are said to be that (a) death of
a woman must have been caused by any burns or
bodily injury or her death must have occurred otherwise
835 H
836 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 2 S.C.R.
A than under normal circumstances; (b) such death must
have occurred within seven years of her marriage; (c)
soon before her death, she must have been subjected
to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative
of her husband; and (d) such cruelty or harassment
B must be in connection with the demand for dowry. [para
9) [846-8-D]
Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2010 (7) SCR 1119
= (2010) 12 SCC 350; Bachni Devi & Anr. v. State of
C Haryana 2011 (2) SCR 627 =(2011) 4 SCC 427, Pathan
Hussain Basha v. State of A.P. 2012 (7) SCR 290 =(2012)
8 SCC 594, Ku/want Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab2013
=
(5) SCR 604 (2013) 4 SCC177, Surinder Singh v. State
of Haryana, (2014) 4 SCC 129, Raminder Singh v. State of
D Punjab, (2014) 12 SCC 582, Suresh Singh v. State of
Haryana, (2013) 16 SCC 353, Sher Singh v. State of
Haryana 2015 1 SCALE 250 - relied on.
2. The word "soon" occurring in s.3048 of IPC
E does not mean "immediate". A fair and pragmatic
construction keeping in mind the great social evil that
has led to the enactment of Section 3048 would make
it clear that the expression is a relative expression.
Days or months are not what is to be seen. Time lags
F may differ from case to case. All that is necessary is
that the demand for dowry should not be stale but
should be the continuing cause for the death of the
married woman under Section 3048 IPC. [para 23) [858-
8-C]
G
Surinder Singh v. State of Haryana (2014) 4 SCC 129;
Sher Singh v. State of Haryana 2015 (1) SCALE 250 -
relied on.
Dinesh v. State of Haryana, 2014 (5) SCALE 641 -
H
RAJINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 837
held not correct law. A
3. Section 3048 of IPC is a stringent provision,
meant to combat a social evil of alarming proportions.
In order to give a fair, pragmatic, and common sense
interpretation so as to fulfill the object sought to be B
achieved by Parliament, it is held that any money or
property or valuable security demanded by any of the
persons mentioned in Section 2 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, at or before or at any time after the
marriage which is reasonably connected to the death C
of a married woman, would necessarily be in
connection with or in relation to the marriage unless,
the facts of a given case clearly and unequivocally point
otherwise. [paras 13 and 20] (847-H, 854.-G-H; 855-A-B]
D
M. Narayanan Nambiar v. State of Kera/a, 1963 Supp.
(2) SCR 724; Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of
=
Enforcement 2005 (1) Suppl. SCR 49 (2005) 4 SCC 530
- followed.
E
Appasaheb v. State of Maharashtra 2007 (1) SCR 164
= (2007) 9 SCC 721; Vipin Jaiswal vs. State of Andhra
=
Pradesh 2013 (3) SCR 449 2013 (3) sec 684 - held not
correct law.
Bachni Devi v. State of Haryana 2011 (2) SCR 627 = F
(2011) 4 SCC 427; Ku/want Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab
=
2013(5) SCR 604 (2013) 4 SCC 177; Surinder Singh v.
State of Haryana (2014) 4 SCC 129; and Raminder Singh
v. State of Punjab (2014) 12 SCC 582; K. Prema S. Rao
and another v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao and others 2002 (3) G
=
Suppl. SCR 339 (2003) 1 SCC 217; Reema Aggarwal v.
=
Anupam 2004 (1) SCR 378 (2004) 3 SCC 199- referred
to.
H
838 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 2 S.C.R.
A 4. In the present case, demands for money were
made shortly after one year of the marriage. A she-
buffalo was given by the father to the daughter as a
peace offering. The peace offering had no effect. The
deceased was ill-treated. She went back to her father
B and demanded money again. The father, then, went
along with his brother and the Sarpanch of the village
to the matrimonial home with a request that the
daughter be not ill-treated. The father also assured the
said persons that their money demand would be
C fulfilled Fifteen days before her death, the deceased
again visited her paren1s' house on being maltreated by
her new family. Then cal'l"P her death by poisoning. The
cross-examination of the father of the deceased has,
in no manner, shaken his evidence. Therefore, the
0
concurrent findings recorded by both the cour1s below
are upheld. [para 26) [858-H; 859-A-D]
Case Law Reference
E 2010 (7) SCR 1119 relied on para 10
· 2011 (2) SCR 627 relied on para 10
2012 (7) SCR 290 relied on para 10
2013 (5) SCR 604 relied on para 10
F
2014 (12) sec 582 relied on para 10
2013 (16) sec 353 relied on para 10
2015 1 SCALE 250 relied on para 10,22
G
2007 (1) SCR 164 held not correct law para 11,20
2013 (3) SCR 449 held not correct law para 12,20
2013 (5) SCR 604 referred to para 12
H
RAJINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 839
(2014) 4 sec 129 referred to para 12 A
(2014) 12 sec 582 referred to para 12
1963 Supp. (2) SCR 724 followed para 14
2005 (1) Suppl. SCR 49 followed para 15 B
2002 (3) Suppl.SCR339 referred to. para 19
2004 (1) SCR 378 referred to. para 19
2014 (4) sec 129 relied on para 21 c
2014 (5) SCALE 641 held not correct law para 24
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal
Appeal No.2321 of 2009 D
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.12.2008 of the
High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal
No. 84-SB of 1998
Sudhir Walia, Niharika Ahluwalia, Dr. Abhishek Atrey for E
the Appellant.
Jayant K. Sud, Jasleen Chahal, AAG, Kuldip Singh for
the Respondent.
F
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
R.F.NARIMAN, J. 1. The facts of this case raises
questions relating to one of the two great social evils
practiced against the women of this country for centuries. G
In the facts presented before us, a young woman consumes
pesticide having been driven to do so by repeated dem.ands
being made on her for money by the family into which she
is supposed to merge her identity. Sati and dowry deaths
have plagued this nation for centuries. Sati - the practice H
840 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 2 S.C.R.
A of i;ending a widow to her husband's funeral pyre to burn
in it - was first outlawed under British Rule in 1829 and
1830 under the Governor Generalship of Lord William
Bentinck in the Bengal, Madras and Bombay Presidencies.
General Sir Charles Napier, the Commander-in-Chief of the
B British Forces in India between 1859 and 1861, is supposed
to have said to the Hindu Priests who complained to him
about the prohibition of Sati that "the burning of widows is
your custom but in my country, when a man burns a woman
alive, we hang them and confiscate all their property. Let
C us both, therefore, act in accordance with our national
customs."
2. It took free India many years before the Commission
of Sati (Prevention) Act, 1987 was passed by Parliament
D setting down various offences relating to the commission
of Sati and the trial of such offences by special courts. In
this appeal, however, we are confronted with the other major
problem, namely, dowry deaths. Parliament responded
much earlier so far as the prohibition of dowry is concerned
E by enacting the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 under which
minimum sentences were prescribed as penalty for the
giving or taking of dowry. The specific menace of dowry
deaths, however, was tackled by the introduction of a new
F provision in 1986 - Section 304B in the Penal Code together
with another new provision Section 113B of the Evidence
Act. These two Sections read as follows:
"304-B. Dowry death.-( 1) Where the death of a
woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs
G otherwise than under normal circumstances within
seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon
before her death she was subjected to cruelty or
harassment by her husband or any relative of her
husband for, or in connection with, any demand for
H
RAJINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 841
[R.F.NARIMAN, J.]
dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and A
such husband or relative shall be deemed to have
caused her death.
Explanation.-For the purpose of this sub-section,
"dowry'' shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 B
of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished
with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less
than seven years but which may extend to c
imprisonment for life."
"113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.-When the
question is whether a person has committed the dowry
death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her
0
death such woman had been subjected by such person
to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any
demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such
person had caused the dowry death.
Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, "dowry E
death" shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-
B of Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)."
3: Coming back to the facts of the present appeal, a
young woman, namely, Salwinder Kaur was married to the F
appellant Rajinder Singh sometime in the year 1990. On
31•1 August, 1993, within four years of the marriage,
Salwinder Kaur consumed Aluminium Phosphide, which is
a pesticide, as a result of which her young life was snuffed
. out. On the same day, an FIR was lodged against the G
husband, his older brother and the older brother's wife. The
trial court after examining the evidence of the prosecution
and the defence, acquitted the ,appellant's older brother and
his wife but convicted the appellant under Section 3048 and H
842 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 2 S.C.R.
A sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven
years, which is the minimum sentence that can be
pronounced on a finding of guilt under the said Section.
This was done after examining in particular the evidence
of PW.2 - Kamai! Singh, the father of the deceased woman,
B PW-3 - Guizar Singh, his elder brother and PW-4 -
Balwinder Singh, Sarpanch of the village. The High Court
of Punjab and Haryana confirmed the conviction and the
sentence vide the impugned judgment.
c 4. For the purpose of this appeal it is sufficient to set
out the dead woman's father's evidence which has been
accepted by the two courts below.
"I have three daughters and two sons, Paramjit Kaur,
D Manjit Kaur and Salwinder Kaur are my daughters.
Salwinder Kaur my daughter was married to Rajinder
Singh r/o Bathwala. She was married to Rajinder Singh
four years prior to her death. After one year of the
marriage, my daughter came to me and told that her
E husband Rajinder Singh, the brother-in-law Davinder
Singh and Gurmit Kaur, present in court, are demanding
money for constructing a house. She also informed me
that they were quarrelling with her for the said demand
of money. At the time of marriage of my daughter, I
F had given sufficient dowry according to my status. I
told my daughter that at that moment I am not in
possession of money. However, I gave she-buffalo to
my daughter for taking the same to her in-laws' house
and asked her to pull on with the parents-in-law. After
G 7/8 months, when my daughter was again ill-treated by
the accused, she came to me and again demanded
money. The accused, present in court, were
demanding and compelling my daughter to back with
a promise that I would visit her shortly and on the
H
RAJINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 843
[R.F.NARIMAN, J.]
following day, I alongwith my brother Guizar Singh, the A
then Sarpanch Balwinder Singh and Ex-Sarpanch
Hazura Singh went to the house of the accused in
village Bathawals. On arrival at the house of the
accused, the accused, present in court, along with
father-in-law of my daughter were present at their B
house. Harjinder Singh, my son-in-law along with
Gurmit Kaur and Davinder Singh were also present. I
requested all of them not to quarrel with my daughter
on account of demand of money. I also assured the
accused that I would pay them the said amount at the C
time of harvesting the crop. The accused insisted about
the demand of money. My daughter Salwinder Kaur
visited my hous~ 15 days prior to her death. I again
pacified my daughter that I would definitely pay the
0
amount after harvesting the crop. Salwinder Kaur was
'•ot happy for not getting the money from me. She was
maltreated by the accused. After the death of Salwinder
Kaur, member panchayat Harbhajan Singh of V.
Bathwala and Davinder Singh accused came to my E
house and informed that my daughter has died after
consuming some poisonous substance and I was
asked to acconipany them for cremating the dead
body."
F
5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
Counsel for the appellant relied upon the cross-examination
of Karnail Singh which is set out hereinbelow:-
"I do not know if Devinder Singh had separate portion.
My daughter had come to me for the first time 5/6 G
months after her marriage, but she did not make any
complaint to me regarding the conduct of the accused
persons. She complained to me only after about a year
and she had told me that they wanted to build a joint H
844 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 2 S.C.R.
A house and asked her to bring money for that purpose.
I however did not give any money to her for this
purpose. No written complaint was ever made to the
panchayat. I never talked about it to Balwinder Singh.
It is incorrect to suggest that no demand of money was
B ever made from my daughter or that I have deposed
falsely."
6. Based on this, learned counsel argued that the link
required between the demand made being connected with
C the marriage was snapped as also the fact that since
initially, the complaints were made at long intervals, no
offence under Section 3048 could be said to be made out.
Counsel for the State of Punjab reiterated the findings of
both courts and argued in support of the judgment of the
D High Court.
7. The primary ingredient to attract the offence under
Section 3048 is that the death of a woman must be a
"dowry death". "Dowry" is defined by Section 2 of the Dowry
E Prohibition Act, 1961, which reads as follows:
"2. Definition of "dowry".-ln this Act, "dowry" means
any property or valuable security given or agreed to be
given either directly or indirectly-
F
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the
marriage; or
(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by
any other person, to either party to the marriage or to
G any other person,
at or before [or any time after the marriage] [in
connection with the marriage of the said parties, but
does not include] dower or mahr in the case of persons
H to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies.
RAJINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 845
[R.F.NARIMAN, J.)
Explanation I.-[***] A
Explanation 1/.-The expression "valuable security" has ·
the same meaning as in Section 30 of the Indian Penal
Code (45 of 1860)."
B
8. A perusal of this Section shows that this· definition
can be b°roken into six distinct parts.
1) Dowry must first consist of any property or valuable
security - the word "any'' is a word of width and would,
therefore, include within it property and valuable C
security of any kind whatsoever.
2) Such property or security can be given or even
agreed to be given. The actual giving of such
. property or security is, therefore, not necessary. D
3) Such property or seturity can be given or agreed to
be given either directly or indir~ctly.
4) Such giving or agreeing to give can again be not E
orlly,py one party to a marriage to the other but also
by the parents of either party or by any other person
to either party to the marriage or to any other person.
It will be noticed that this clause again widens the
reach of the Act insofar as those guilty of committing F
the offence of giving or receiving dowry is concerned.
5) Such giving or agreeing to give can be at any time.
It can be at, before, or at any time after the marriage.
Thus, it can be many years af'.~r a marriage is G
solemnised.
6) Such giving or receiving must be in connection with
the marriage of the parties. Obviously, the expression
"in connection with" would in the context of the social
evil sought to be tackled by the Dowry Prohibition Act H
846 SUPREME COURT REPORTS· (2015) 2 S.C.R.
A mean "in relation with" or "relating to".
9. The ingredients of the offence under Section 3048
have been stated and restated in many judgments. There
are four such ingredients and they are said to be:
B
(a) death of a woman must have been caused by any
burns or bodily injury or her death must have occurred
otherwise than under normal circumstances;
(b) such death must have occurred within seven years
c of her marriage;
(c) soon before her death, she must have been
subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or
any relative of her husband; and
D
(d) such cruelty or harassment must be in connection
with the demand for dowry.
10. This has been the law stated in the following
E judgments:
Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2010) 12 SCC 350
at pages 360-361; Bachni Devi & Anr. v. State of Haryana,
(2011) 4 SCC 427 at 431, Pathan Hussain Basha v. State
of A.P., (2012) 8 SCC 594 at 599, Kulwant Singh & Ors.
F v. State of Punjab, (2013) 4 SCC 177 at 184-185, Surinder
Singh v. State of Haryana, (2014) 4 SCC 129 at 137,
Raminder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 12 SCC 582
at 583, Suresh Singh v. State of Haryana, (2013) 16 SCC
G 353 at 361, Sher Singh v. State of Haryana, 2015 1
SCALE 250 at 262.
11. This Court has spoken sometimes with divergent
voices both on what would fall within "dowry" as defined and
what is meant by the expression "soon before her death".
H
RAJINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 847
[R.F.NARIMAN, J.]
In Appasaheb v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC 721, A
this Court construed the definition of dowry strictly, as it
forms part of Section 3048 which is part of a penal statute.
The court held that a demand for money for defraying the
expenses of manure made to a young wife who in turn
made the same demand to her father would be outside the B
definition of dowry. This Court said:
"A demand for money on account of some financial
stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic
expenses or for purchasing manure cannot be termed C
as a demand for dowry as the said word is normally
understood. The evidence adduced by the prosecution
does not, therefore, show that any demand for "dowry"
·as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was
made by the appellants as what was allegedly asked D
for was some money for meeting domestic expenses
and for purchasing manure." (at page 727)
12. This judgment was distinguished in at least four
other judgments (see: Bachni Devi v. State of Haryana E
(2011) 4 SCC 427 at pages 432 to 434; Kulwant Singh &
Ors. v. State of Punjab, (2013) 4 SCC 177 at page 185;
Surinder Singh v. State of Haryana (2014) 4 SCC 129 at
pages 139 to 141 and Raminder Singh v. State of Punjab
(2014) 12 SCC 582 at page 586. The judgment was, F
however, followed in Vipin Jaiswal v. State of Andhra
Pradesh, (2013) 3 SCC 684 at pages 687-688.
13. In order to arrive at the true construction of the
definition of dowry and consequently the ingredients of the G
offence under Section 3048, we first need to determine how
a statute of this kind needs to be interpreted. It is obvious
that Section 3048 is a stringent provision, meant to combat
a social evil of alarming proportions. Can it be argued that
it is a penal statute and, should, therefore, in case of H
848 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 2 S.C.R.
A ambiguity in its language, be construed strictly?
14. The answer is to be found in two path-breaking
judgments of this Court. In M. Narayanan Nambiar v. State
of Kerala, 1963 Supp. (2) SCR 724, a Constitution Bench
B of this Court was asked to construe Section 5(1)(d) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. In construing the said
Act, a penal statute, Subba Rao,J. stated:
"The preamble indicates that the Act was passed as it
c was expedient to make more effective provisions for the
prevention of bribery and Corruption. The long title as
well as the preamble indicate that the Act was passed
to put down the said social evil i.e. bribery and
corruption by public servant. Bribery is form of
D corruption. The fact that in addition to the word "Bribery''
the word "corruption" is used shows that the legislation
was intended to combat also other evil in addition to
bribery. The existing law i.e. Penal Code was found
insufficient to eradicate or even to control the growing
E evil of bribery and corruption corroding the public
service of our country.- The provisions broadly include
the existing offences under Sections 161 and 165 of
the Indian Penal Code committed by public servants
and enact a new rule of presumptive evidence against
F the accused. The Act also creates a new offence of
criminal misconduct by public servants though to some
extent it overlaps on the pre-existing offences and
enacts a rebuttable presumption contrary to the well
known principles of Criminal Jurisprudence. It also aims
G to protect honest public servants from harassment by
prescribing that the investigation against them could be
made only by police officials of particular status and by
making the sanction of the Government or other
appropriate officer a pre-condition for their prosecution.
H
RAJINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 849
[R.F.NARIMAN, J.]
As it is a socially useful measure conceived in public A
interest, it should be liberally construed so a::; to bring
about the desired object, i.e. to prevent corruption
among public servants and to prevent harassment of
the honest among them.
B
A decision of the Judicial Committee in Dyke v. Elliott,
cited by the Learned Counsel as an aid for construction
neatly states the principle and therefore may be
extracted: Lord Justice James speaking for the Board
observes at page 191: C
"No-doubt all penal Statutes are to be construed strictly,
that is to say, the Court must see that the thing charged
as an offence is within the plain meaning of the words
used, and must not strain the words on any notion that o
there has been a slip, that there has been a casus
omissus, that the thing is so clearly within the mischief
that it must have been intended to be included if
thought of. On the other hand, the person charged has
a right to say that the thing charged although within the E
words, is not within the spirit of the enactment. But
where the thing is brought within the words and within
the spirit, there a penal enactment is to be construed
like any other instrument, according to the fair
commonsense meaning of the language used, and the F
Court is not to find or make any doubt or ambiguity in
the language of a penal statute, where such doubt or
ambiguity would clearly not be found or made in the
same language in any other instrument."
G
In our view this passage, if we may say so, restates
the rule of construction of a penal provision from a
correct perspective.'.'
15. In Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of H
850 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 2 S.C.R.
A Enforcement, (2005) 4 SCC 530 at page 547, another
Constitution Bench, 40 odd years later, was faced with
whether a corporate body could be prosecuted for offences
for which the sentence of imprisonment is mandatory. By a
majority of 3:2, the question was answered in the
B affirmative. Balakrishnan,J. held:
"23. The counsel for the appellant contended that the
penal provision in the statute is to be strictly construed.
Reference was made to Tolaram Relumal v. State of
c Bombay [(1955) 1 SCR 158: 1954 Cri LJ 1333], SCR
at p. 164 and Girdhari Lal Gupta v. O.H. Mehta [(1971)
3 SCC 189 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 279] . It is true that all
penal statutes are to be strictly construed in the sense
that the court must see that the thing charged as an
D offence is within the plain meaning of the words used
and must not strain the words on any notion that there
has been a slip that the thing is so clearly within the
mischief that it must have been intended to be included
and would have been included if thought of. All penal
E provisions like all other statutes are to be fairly
construed according to the legislative intent as
expressed in the enactment. Here, the legislative intent
to prosecute corporate bodies for the offence
committed by them is clear and explicit and the statute
F
never intended to exonerate them from being
prosecuted. It is sheer violence to common sense that
the legislature intended to punish the corporate bodies
for minor and silly offences and extended immunity of
G prosecution to major and grave economic crimes.
24. The distinction between a strict construction and a
more free one has disappeared in modern times and
now mostly the question is "what is true construction
of the statute?" A passage in Craies on Statute Law,
H 7th Edn. reads to the following effect:
RAJINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 851
[R.F.NARIMAN, J.]
"The distinction between a strict and a liberal A
construction has almost disappeared with regard to
all classes of statutes, so that all statutes, whether
penal or not, are now construed by substantially the
same rules. 'All modern Acts are framed with regard
to equitable as well as legal principles.' 'A hundred B
years ago,' said the court in Lyons' case [Lyons v.
Lyons, 1858 Bell CC 38 : 169 ER 1158] , 'statutes
were required to be perfectly precise and resort was
not had to a reasonable construction of the Act, and
thereby criminals were often allowed to escape. This C
is not the present mode of construing Acts of
Parliament. They are construed now with reference
to the true meaning and real intention of the
legislature."
D
At p. 532 of the same book, observations of Sedgwick
are quoted as under:
"The more correct version of the doctrine appears to
be that statutes of this class are to be fairly construed E
and faithfully applied according to the intent of the
legislature, without unwarrantable severity on the one
hand or unjustifiable lenity on the other, in cases of
doubt the courts inclining to mercy."
F
16. Concurring with Balakrishnan,J., Dharmadhikari,J.
added:
"36. The rule of interpretation requ1r1ng strict
construction of penal statutes does not warrant a G
narrow and pedantic construction of a provision so as
to leave loopholes for the offender to escape (see
Murlidhar Meghraj Loya v. State of Maharashtra [(1976)
3 SCC 684 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 493] ). A penal statute
has to also be so construed as to avoid a lacuna and H
852 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 2 S.C.R.
A to suppress mischief and to advance a remedy in the
light of the rule in Haydon's case [(1584) 3 Co Rep 7a
: 76 ER 637] . A common-sense approach for solving
a question of applicability of a penal statute is not ruled
out by the rule of strict construction. (See State of A.P.
B v. Bathu Prakasa Rao [(1976) 3 SCC 301 : 1976 SCC
(Cri) 395] and also GP. Singh on Principles of Statutory
Interpretation, 9th Edn., 2004, Chapter 11, Synopsis 3
at pp. 754 to 756.)"
c 17. And Arun Kumar,J., concurring with both the
aforesaid Judges, followed two earlier decisions of this
Court as follows:-
"49. Another three-Judge Bench of this Court in a
D judgment in Bairam Kumawat v. Union of India [(2003)
7 SCC 628] to which I was a party, observed in the
context of principles of statutory interpretation: (SCC p.
635, para 23)
E "23. Furthermore; even in relation to a penal statute
any narrow and pedantic, literal and lexical
construction may not always be given effect to. The
law would have to be interpreted having regard to the
subject-matter of the offence and the object of the
F law it seeks to achieve. The purpose of the law is
not to allow the offender to sneak out of the meshes
of law. Criminal jurisprudence does not say so."
50. In M. II.Java/iv. Mahajan Borewe// & Co. [(1997) 8
G SCC 72 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 1239] this Court was
considering a similar situation as in the present case.
Under Section 278-B of the Income Tax Act a company
can be prosecuted and punished for offence committed
under Section 276-B; sentence of imprisonment is
H required to be imposed under the provision of the
RAJINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 853
[R.F.NARIMAN, J.]
statute and a company being a juristic person cannot A
be subjected to it. It was held that the apparent
anomalous situation can be resolved only by a proper
interpretation of the section. The Court observed: (SCC
p. 78, para 8)
B
"8. Keeping in view the recommendations of the Law
Commission and the above principles of
interpretation of statutes we are of the opinion that
the only harmonious construction that can be given
to Section 276-B is that the mandatory sentence of C
imprisonment and fine is to be imposed where it can
be imposed, namely on persons coming under
categories (ii) and (iii) above, but where it cannot be
imposed, namely on a company, fine wm be the only
punishment." D
.
18. In keeping with these principles, in K. Prema 5.
Rao and another v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao and others,
(2003) 1 SCC 217, this Court said:
E
"The legislature has by amending the Penal Code and
the Evidence Act made penal law more strident for
dealing with and punishing offences against married
women."
F
19. In Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam, (2004) 3 SCC
199, in construing the provisions of the Dowry Prohibition ·
Act, in the context of Section 498A, this Court applied the
mischief rule made immortal by Haydon's case and followed
Lord Denning's judgment in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. G
Asher, where the learned Law Lord held:
"He must set to work on the constructive task of finding
the intention of Parliament, and he must do this not only
from the language of the statute, but also from a
consideration of the social conditions which gave rise H
854 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 2 S.C.R.
A to it and of the mischief which it was passed to remedy,
and then he must supplement the written word so as
to give 'force and life' to the intention of the legislature."
(at page 213)
8 The Court gave an expansive meaning to the word
'husband' occurring in Section 498A to include persons who
entered into a ri;ilationship with a woman even by feigning
to be a husband. The Court held:
c ".... It would be appropriate to construe the expression
'husband' to cover a person who enters into marital
relationship and under the colour of such proclaimed
or feigned status of husband subjects the woman
concerned to cruelty or coerce her in any manner or
D for any of the purposes enumerated in the relevant
provisions Sections 3048/498A, whatever be the
legitimacy of the marriage itself for the limited purpose
of Sections 498A and 3048 IPC. Such an interpretation,
known and recognized as purposive construction has
E . to come into play in a case of this nature. The absence
of a definition of 'husband' to specifically include such
persons who contract marriages ostensibly and
cohabitate with such woman, in the purported exercise
of his role and status as 'husband' is no ground to
F exclude them from the purview of Section 3048 or 498A
IPC, viewed in the context of the very object and aim
of the legislations introducing those provisions." (at
page 210)
G 20. Given that the statute with which we are dealing
must be given a fair, pragmatic, and common sense
interpretation so as to fulfill the object so~ght to be achieved
by Parliament, we feel that the judgment in Appasaheb's
case followed by the judgment of Vipin Jaiswal do not state
H the law correctly. We, therefore, declare that any money or
RAJINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 855
[R.F.NARIMAN, J.]
property or valuable security demanded by any of the A
persons mentioned in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition
Act, at or before or at any time after the marriage which is
reasonably connected to th~ death of a married woman,
would necessarily be in connection with or in relation to the
marriage unless, the facts of a given case clearly and B
unequivocally point otherwise. Coming now to the other
important ingredient of Section 3048 - what exactly is
meant by "soon before her death"?
21. This Court in Surinder Singh v. State of Haryana C
(2014) 4 sec 129, had this to say:
"17. Thus, the words "soon before" appear in Section
113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 and also in Section
304-8 IPC. For the presumptions contemplated under
0
these sections to spring into action, it is necessary to
show that the cruelty or harassment was caused soon
before the death. The interpretation of the words "soon
before" is, therefore, important. The question is how
"soon before"? This would obviously depend on the E
facts and circumstances of each case. The cruelty or
harassment differs from case to case. It relates to the
mindset of people which varies from person to person.
Cruelty can be mental or it can be physical. Mental
cruelty is also of different shades. It can be verbal or F
emotional like insulting or ridiculing or humiliating a
woman. It can be giving threats of injury to her or her
near and dear ones. It can be depriving her of economic
resources or essential amenities of life. It can be putting
restraints on her movements. It can be not allowing her G
to talk to the outside world. The list is illustr;;itive and
not exhaustive. Physical cruelty could be actual beating
or causing pain and harm to the person of a woman.
Every such instance of cruelty and related harassment
has a different impact on the mind of a woman. Some H
856 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . (2015] 2 S.C.R.
A instances may be so grave as to have a lasting impact
on a woman. Some instances which degrade her dignity
may remain etched in her memory for a long time.
Therefore, "soon before" is a relative term. In matters
of emotions we cannot have fixed formulae. The time-
s lag may differ from case to case. This must be kept in
mind while examining each case of dowry death.
18. In this connection we may refer to the judgment of
this Court in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab ((2000) 5 SCC
C 207 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 935] where this Court considered
the term "soon before". The relevant observations are
as under: (SCC pp. 222-23, para 15)
"15 . ... 'Soon before' is a relative term which is
required to be considered under specific
D
circumstances of each case and no straitjacket
formula can be laid down by fixing any time-limit. This
expression is pregnant with the idea of proximity test.
The term 'soon before' is not synonymous with the
E term 'immediately before' and is opposite of the
expression 'soon after' as used and understood in
Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act.
These words would imply that the interval should not
be too long between the time of making the statement
F and the death. It contemplates the reasonable time
which, as earlier noticed, has to be understood and
determined under the peculiar circumstances of each
case. In relation to dowry deaths, the circumstances
showing the existence of cruelty or harassment to the
G deceased are not restricted to a particular instance
but normally refer to a course of conduct. Such
conduct may be spread over a period of time. If the
cruelty or harassment or demand for dowry is shown
to have persisted, it shall be deemed to be 'soon
H before death' if any other intervening circumstance
RAJINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 857
[R.F.NARIMAN, J.] ·
showing the non-existence of such treatment is not A
brought on record, before such alleged treatment and
the date of death. It does not, however, mean that
such time can be stretched to any period. Proximate
and live link between the effect of cruelty based on
dowry demand and the consequential death is B
required to be proved by the prosecution. The
demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment based upon
such demand and the date of death should not be
too remote in time which, under the circumstances,
be treated as having become stale enough." C
Thus, there must be a nexus between the demand of
dowry, cruelty or harassment, based upon such
demand and the date of death. The test of proximity
will have to be applied. But, it is not a rigid test. It D
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case
and calls for a pragmatic and sensitive approach of the
court within the confines of law."
22. In another recent judgment in Sher Singh v. State E
of Haryana, 2015 (1) SCALE 250, this Court said:
"We are aware that the word 'soon' finds place in
Section 304B; but we would prefer to interpret its use
not in terms of days or months or years, but as F
. necessarily indicating that the demand for dowry should
not be stale or an aberration of the past, but should be
the continuing cause for the death under Section 304B
or the suicide under Section 306 of the IPC. Once the
presence of these concomitants are established or G
shown or proved by the prosecution, even by
preponderance of possibility, the initial presumption of
innocence is replaced by an assumption of guilt of the
accused, thereupon transferring the heavy burden of
proof upon him and requiring him to produce evidence H
858 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 2 S.C.R.
A dislodging his guilt, beyond reasonable doubt." (at page
262)
23. We endorse what has been said by these two
decisions. Days or months are not what is to be seen. What
8 must be borne in mind is that the word "soon" does not
mean "immediate". A fair and pragmatic construction
keeping in mind the great social evil that has led to the·
enactment of Section 3048 would make it clear that the
expression is a relative expression. Time lags may differ
C from case to case. All that is necessary is that the demand
for dowry should not be stale but should be the continuing
cause for the death of the married woman under Section
3048.
D 24. At this stage, it is important to notice a recent
judgment of this Court in Dinesh v. State of Haryana, 2014
(5) SCALE 641 in which the law was stated thus:
"The expression "soon before" is a relative term as held
E by this Court, which is required to be considered under
the specific circumstances of each case and no straight
jacket formula can be laid down by fixing any.time of
allotment. It can be said that the term "soon before" is
synonyms with the term "immediately before". The
F determination of the period which can come within term
"soon before" is left to be determined by courts
depending upon the facts and circumstances of each
case." (at page 646)
G 25. We hasten to add that this is not a correct reflection
of the law. "Soon before" is not synonymous with
"immediately before".
26. The facts of this appeal are glaring. Demands for
H money were made shortly after one year of the marriage.
RAJINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 859
[R.F.NARIMAN, J.)
A she-buffalo was given by the father to the daughter as a A
peace offering. The peace offering had no effect. The
daughter was ill-treated. She went back to her father and
demanded money again. The father, then, went along with
. his brother and. the Sarpanch of the village to the
matrimonial home with a request that the daughter be not B
. ill-treated on account of the demand for money. The father
also assured the said persons that their money demand
would be fulfilled and that they would have to wait till the
crops of his field are harvested. Fifteen days before her
death, Salwinder Kaur again visited her parents' house on C
being maltreated by her new family. Then came death by
poisoning. The cross-examination of the father of Salwinder
Kaur has, in no manner, shaken his evidence. On the facts,
therefore, the concurrent findings recorded by both the
.o
courts below are upheld. The appeal is dismissed.
Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal dismissed.
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