Holding

Flour, maida and suji derived from wheat are not "wheat" within the meaning of Section 14(i)(iii) of the Central Sales Tax Act and therefore are not declared goods.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined whether the term "wheat" in Section 14(i)(iii) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 includes flour, maida and suji. Dealers argued that these milled products remain wheat and should be treated as declared goods, thereby enjoying tax relief, while the states contended that the statute refers only to wheat in its primary form. The Court held that flour, maida and suji are distinct commodities that lose the identity of wheat once processed, and therefore are not "declared goods" under the Act. It emphasized that the restrictions in Sections 14 and 15, read with Article 286 of the Constitution, must be construed strictly and not extended by implication. Consequently, the appeals of the states were allowed and the dealers' appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

Does the expression "wheat" in Section 14(i)(iii) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 include flour, maida and suji?
Are flour, maida and suji to be treated as "declared goods" exempt from the tax restrictions imposed by Sections 14 and 15?
How should the phrase "that is to say" in the statutory language be interpreted?
Should the restrictions under Sections 14, 15 and Article 286 be construed strictly or liberally?

Legislation cited

Subjects

Central Sales TaxDeclared goodsWheatFlourMaidaSujiStatutory interpretationArticle 286Tax exemptionCommodity classification

Judgment

A RAJASTHAN ROLLER FLOUR MILLS ASSOCIATION
AND ANR. ETC. ETC.
v.
STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ORS.

SEPTEMBER 1, 1993
B
[B.P. JEEVAN REDDY AND S.P. BHARUCHA, JJ.)

Central Sales Tax Act, 1956-Section 14(i)(iii)-£xpression 'WheatL-
Whether includes Flour, Maida and Suji and therefore, declared goods-Com-
C mercially are they different goods.

Central Sales Tax Act, 1956-Sections 14 and 15 read with Constitution
of India Art. 286-Restrictions on levying tax-lts application-Words "That
is to say''-Meaning of

D Constitution of India-VI/th Schedul~Entry 92-A of List I and Entry
54 of List II and Article 286--Power of the State Legislatures to levy taxes on
sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers.

Under Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act as amendedin the year
1976, certain goods of special importance were treated as "declared goods".
E The Section imposes certain restrictions upon the States in the matter of
imposition of tax on sale or purchase of"declared goods". Section 14(i) (iii)
of the Act declares "wheat" as goods of special importance in interstate
trade or commerce and hence "declared goods".

In the Writ Petitions filed by the dealers in the High Courts, it was
F contended that the expression 'Wheat" in Section 14(i) (iii) of the Act
included Flour, Maida and Suji and were, therefore, 'declared' goods. The
High Courts of Karnataka and Patna upheld the contention of the dealers,
whereas the same was rejected by the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh and
Rajas than.
G
Against the High Court Judgments both the States as well as the
dealers filed their appeals by special leave in this Courts.

The contention of the dealers was that even after being milled Flour,
Maida and Suji remained and continued to be wheat but in different forms
H Sections 14 and 15 were amended in 1976, to save cereals which included
72
RATASTIIAN ROLLER FLOUR MILLS ASSN. ·v. STATE 73

wheat, from multiple taxation, since both the sections 14 and 15 were A
beneficial in nature to provide relief to common man, they must be con-
strued liberally, and treating flour, maida and suji as different com-
modities and taxing them would defeat the purpose for which clause (i) was
introduced in section 14.

The States of Karnataka, Bihar, Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh B
contended that Section 14(i) (iii) speaks of wheat in primary form and not
flour, maida and suji which were products derived therefrom and were
commercially different goods understood as such in common parlance, if
wheat included flour derived from it, then paddy should include rice be-
cause just as wheat was obtained by milling wheat, rice was obtained by C
milling paddy, yet rice was mentioned as a seperate commodity in sub-
clause (ii) of clause (i), and this clause would become superflous if the
dealer's contention had to be accepted.

Disposing of the appeals, the Court
D
HELD: 1. Flour, Maida and Suji derived from wheat are not 'Wheat"
within the meaning ofsection 14(i) (iii) of the Central Sales Tax Act. Flour,
Maida and Suji are not "declared goods" as they are different and distinct
goods from wheat. [93-D]

2. Where certain goods are consumed to bring into existence different E
goods different in commercial and common parlance both of them must be
treated as different goods. Hence there is no warrant for reading flour,
maida and suji into the expression "wheat" in Section 14(i)(iii). (82-C-D]

Ganesh Trading Co. v. State of Haryana, 32 S.T.C 623, Babu Ram
F
Jagdish Chemical Co. v. State of Punjab, 44, S.T.C. 159 and State of Kar-
nataka v. Raghurama Shetty, 47 S.T.C. 369, relied on

3. When wheat is consumed for producing Flour, Maida or Suji the
commodities so obtained are different commodities from wheat. Wheat
loses its identity. It gets cosumed and in its place new goods/commodities G
emerge. The new goods so emerging have higher utility than the com-
modity consumed. They are different goods commercially speaking.
(86-E-F]
4. Sections 14 and 15 of the Act read with clause (3) of Article 286 of
the Constitution constitute restrictions upon the power of the State Legis- H
74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A lature to levy tax upon the sale of goods. Such restrictions ought to be
construed strictly and not liberally. (80-F]

5. The use of the words "that is to say" occurring in clause (i) of
section 14 clearly indicates the intention of the Parliament to limit the
restriction to those goods alone as are specifically mentioned therein. The
B ambit of several sub-clauses cannot be extended by a process of interpreta-
tion. Clause (i) is not of an inclusive nature. Hence there is no room for
reading other commodities than those specifically mentioned in the clause.
(80-G-H, 81-A]
State of Tamil Nadu v. Pyarelal Malhotra, 37 S.T.C. 319 referred to.
c 6. The provisions of sections 14 and 15 of the Act, being restrictions
upon plenary power of the State Legislatures to levy tax on sale/purchases
of goods, must be construed strictly. Nothing more should be read into
them except the goods mentioned expressly. (81-F-G]

D J.K Jute Mills Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1961) 12 S.T.C. 429, C.S.
Bureau v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Benga~ (1973) 1 S.C.C.46, and
Iswari Khetan Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1980) 4 S.C.C.
136, referred to.

Alladi Venkateswarlu and Ors. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh &
E Anr., 41S.T.C.394; Tungabhadra Industries Ltd., Kumool v. Commercial Tax
Officer, Kumool, 11 S.T.C. 827; Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Pio
food Packers, 46 S.T.C. 63; State of Gujarat v. Sakarwala Brothers, 19 S.T.C.
24; Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. State of Kerala & Ors. 74 S.T.C. 176 and State
of Tamil Nadu v. Mahi Traders, (1989) 1 S.C.C. 724, distinguished
F Devi Das Gopal Krishnan & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors., 20
S.T.C.430; Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh,
(1982) S.C.R.129 andPorritis & Spencer (Asia) Ltd. v. State of Haryana, 42
S.T.C. 433, referred to.

7. Commodities other than those specified cannot be introduced into
G
the relevant provisions on the ground that they are dervied from the
primary commodities mentioned in section 14(i). (84-G]

8. If the Parliament proposes to treat Flour, Maida and Suji also as
declared goods, it can always say so, by effecting necessary amendment.
H [95-A]
RAJASTIIANROLLERFLOURMILLSASSN. v. STATE(JEEVANREDDY,J.] 75

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. 3922-25 of A
1991.

From the Judgment and Order dated 13.8.1991 of the Rajasthan
High Court in D.B. Civil W.P. No. 4633/90, 4636/90, 1646/91 and 1647/91.

With B
C.A. 4749-4801/91, 5082-84/91, 1292-98/90, 1291/90, 4996-5014/91 I.A.
3 & 4/93, SLP(C) 185/92 and 8275/92.

R.N. Narasimhamoorthy, Vijay Bhojwani, M.L. Verma,
C.Seetharamiah, M.Veerappa, K.H. Nobin Singh, Indra Makwana, Sudhan- C
shu Atreya, Pramod Swarup, M.P. Jha, T.V.S.N. Chari, Ranjit Kumar, M.M.
Kashyap, Sushil Kr. Jain and Aruneshwar Gupta for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the .Court was delivered by :

B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J. 1. A difference of opinion has arisen D
among the High Courts in the country over the question whether the
expression 'wheat' in section 14(i) (iii) of Central Sales Tax Act (Act)
includes flour, maida and 'suji'. Karnataka and Patna High Courts have
held that it does so include, while Andhra Prad~sh, Rajasthan and - we are
told- Madras High Courts have taken a contrary view.
E
2. Section 14 occurs in Chapter IV which carries the heading "Goods
of special importance in Inter-State Trade or Commerce." Section 14
declares certain goods to be of special importance in inter-state trade and
commerce, hereinafter referred to as "declared goods". The first clause,
introduced in 1976* is cereals. As many as ten commodities ar~ mentioned
under clause (i) which reads as follows: F

"Section 14. Certain goods to be of special importance in inter-
state trade of commerce. - It is hereby declared that the following
goods are of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce:-

(i) Cereals, that is to say, G

(i) Paddy (Oryza Sativa L.)

(ii) Rice (Oryza Stiva L.)
the then existing clause (i) was renumbered as clause (ii). H
76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A (iii) Wheat (Triticum Vulgare, T. compactum T. sphaerococcum,
T. durum, T. aestivum L., T. dicoccum)

(iv) Jowar or milo (Sorghum wlagare pers)

(v) Bajra (Pennisetum typhoideum L)
B
(vi) Maize (Zea mays L)

(vii) Ragi (Eleusine coracana Gaertn)

(viii) Kodon (Paspalum scrobiculatum L.)
c (ix) Kutki (Panicum Millare L.)

(x) Barley (Hordeum Vulgare L.)

3. Section 15 imposes certain restriction upon, and conditions in
D regard to the imposition of tax on sale or purchase of declared goods by a
st-ate Legislature. It says that "every Sales Tax Law of a State shall, in so far
as it imposes or authorises-the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of
declared goods be subject to the following restrictions and conditions ... "
Section 15 specifies four restrictions/conditions. They are: (a) the tax on
declared goods shall not exceed 4 per cent and the tax shall not be levied at
E more than one stage; (b) where a tax has been levied on an intra-State sale
and such goods are later sold in the course of inter-State trade or commerce,
the tax levied on intra-State sale be reimbursed to the person effecting the
inter-State sale; ( c) if a tax has been levied on the sale or purchase of paddy,
and the rice derived from such paddy is sold later, the tax on sale of rice shall
be reduced by the amount of tax paid on paddy; and ( d) the pulses referred
F to in clause (vi) (a) of section 14 shall mean and include pulses whole or
seperated, and pulses whether with or without husk. ·

4. Clause (i) (cereals), clause (vi) (a)'(oilseeds) in Section 14 and
clauses (c) and (d) in section 15, it may be noted, were inserted by Central
G Sales Tax (Amendment) Act 103of1976, with effect from September 7, 1976.

5. Under Scheme of our Constitution, the power to levy tax on sale
of goods is vested in the States by entry 54 in List II of the Vllth Schedule
but this power is subject to the limitations .contained in Article 286. Article
286, before its amendment by the Constitution Sixth (Amendment) Act,
H 1956, declared that the State legislature shall not be competent to levy tax
RAJASTHANROLLERFLOURMILLSASSN. v. STATE[JEEVANREDDY,J.] 77

on inter-State sales, sales in the course of import and export(into or from A
India) and on the sale of declared goods. After the said amendment, the
prohibition with respect to inter- state sales and sales effected in the course
of import/export remains though framed differently. However, so far as the
declared goods are concerned, the absolute prohibition has given way to
restrictions and conditions as may be imposed by Parliament by law. Clause B
(3) of Article 286, which is immediately relevant for our purpose, read and
read as follows before and after the Vlth Amendment Act:

After the Sixth Amendment Act
Before the Sixth Amendment Act
(w.e.f. 11.9.1956)
(3) No law made by the Legislature (3) Any law of a State shall, in so C
of a State imposing, or authorising far as it imposes, or authorises the
the imposition of, a tax on the sale imposition of,-
or purchase of any such goods as (a) a tax on the sale or purchase of
have been declared by Parliament goods declared by Parliament by
by law to be essential for the life of law to be of special importance in D
the community shall have effect inter-State trade or commerce, or
unless it has been reserved for the (b) a tax on the sale or purchase of
consideration of the President and goods, being a tax of the nature
has received his assent. referred to in sub-clause (b), sub-
clauses (c) or sub- clause (d) of
clause (29A) of article 366, E
be subject to such restrictions and
conditions in regard to the system
of levy, rates and other incidents of
the tax as Parliament may by law
specify." F
(Note:- Clause (b) was inserted by
Forty-Sixth Amendment Act)

6. As contemplated by the un-amended clause (3) of Article 286, the
Parliament had enacted the Essential Goods (Declaration and Regulation
of Tax on Sale or Purchase) Act, 1952 declaring certain goods as essential G
for the life of the community. It came into force on August 9, 1952. The
Schedule to the Act contained the list of 'declared goods'. Item (i) in the
Schedule pertained to cereals and pulses. It read thus:

"1. Cereals and pulses in all forms, including bread and flour, H
78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] SUPP. 2S.C.R.

A including atta, maids, suji and bran) except when any such article
is sold in sealed containers)"

7. The 1952 Act was repealed by Section 16 of the Central Sales Tax
Act( as originally enacted). The Act came into force on and with effect from
September 1, 1957. It is a post-Sixth amendment enactment.
B
8. Section 14, as originally enacted, did not contain any clause
relating to cereals - or for that matter relating to pulses. Both of them were
introduced by the 1976 (Amendment) Act as already mentioned. Clause
(i) has been set out hereinbefore. Clause (vi) (a) may now be set out:

c (vi) (a) pulse, that is to say,-

(i) gram or gullab gram (cicerarietinum L.);

(ii) tur or arhar (Cajanus cajan);

D (iii) moong or green gram (Phaseolus aureus);

(iv) masur or lentil (Lens esculenta Moench, Lens culinaris Medic).

(v) urad or black gram (Phaseolus mungo);

E (vi) moth (Phaseolus aconitifolius Jacq);

(vii) lakh or khesari (Lathyrus sativus L.)"

9. Section 15, omitting clauses (c) and (d) may also be set out at this
stage:
F "Section 15. Restrictions and conditions in regard to tax on sale or
purchase of declared goods within a State. - Every sales tax law of
a State shall, in so far as it imposes or authorises the imposition
of a tax on the sale or purchase of declared goods, be subject to
the follo~g restrictions and conditions, namely:-
G
(a) the tax payable under that law in respect of any sale or
purchase of such goods inside the State shall not exceed [four
per cent.] of the sale or purchase price thereof, and tax shall
not be levied at more than one stage;

H (b) where a tax has been levied under that law in respect of
RAJASTHANROLLERFLOURMILLSASSN. v. STATE(JEEVANREDDY,J.) 79

the sale or purchase inside the State of any declared goods A
and such goods are sold in the course of inter-State trade or
commerce, [and tax has been paid under this Act in respect
of the sale of such goods in the course of inter-State trade or
commerce, the tax levied under such law] [shall be reim-
bursed to the person making such sale in the course of B
inter-State trade or commerce] in such manner and subject
to such conditions as may be provided in any law in force in
that State."

10. The restrictions, to reiterate are: (i) the State tax on intra-State
sale of declared goods shall not exceed 4%, (ii) the tax shall not be imposed C
at more than one stage, and (iii) if declared goods are subjected to State
tax on their sale within the State (intra-State sale) and such goods are later
sold in the course of inter-State trade or commerce (inter-State sale), the
tax paid on intra-State sale shall be reimbursed to the person effecting
inter-State sale.
D
11. Clauses (c) and (d) in Section 15 qualify the goods mentioned in
Section 14(i) (ii) and Section 14 (vi) (a) respectively. The 1976 (Amend-
ment) Act specified both 'paddy' and 'rice' as declared goods. Evidently,
with a view to reduce the burden upon the consumer, the Parliament
provided by clause (c) that where tax has been levied upon sale/purchase E
of paddy sold/purchased, within the State and later rice derived from such
paddy is sold/purchased the tax leviable on rice shall be reduced by the
amount of tax paid on paddy. Clause ( d) of section 15 seeks to explain that
pulses in clause (vi)( a) Section 14 would include pulses whole or seperated
and pulses with or without husk. (Pulses are set out in clause (vi)(a) in the
same manner as the cereals are set out in clause (i)). F

12. It is in the light of the above provisions of law that the question
at issue has to be answered. The learned counsel for the dealers put their
case in the following fashion: Wheat is the stale food of a majority of
population of this country. Wheat is not consumed as such. It has to be G
ground/milled into flour before it is consumed. For certain purposes, wheat
is milled into maida or suji, as the case may be. Flour, maida and suji are
not commodities different from wheat. Even after being milled, they remain
and continue to be wheat. They are merely different forms of wheat. The
very idea behind the 1976 (Amendment) Act which introduced clause (i)
in Section 14 is to save the cereals including 'wheat' from excessive or H
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A multiple taxation by the States. The idea is to make the same available to
consumers without being unnecessarily loaded by the tax burden. Any
interpretation placed upon the said expression 'wheat' should be consistent
with and should be designed to further the object underlying the provision.
Since th~ provisions in Sections 14 and 15 are beneficial in nature and are
meant to provide relief to common man, they should be construed liberally.
B In common parlance wheat and wheat flour are not different and are not
understood to be different. Taking the wheat as well as the flour, maida
and suji treating them as different commodities would defeat the very
purpose and object for achieving which clause (i) was introduced in
Section 14.
c 13. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the States
of Karnataka, Rajasthan, Bihar and Andhra Pradesh submit that wheat,
flour, maida and suji are commercially different goods and are understood
as such in common parlance. What is specified as a declared goods by
Section 14(i) (iii) is wheat in its primary form and not the products derived
D therefrom. Learned counsel emphasised the distinction in the language
employed in Entry I of the Schedule to the 1952 Act and Sub-clause (iii)
of clause (i) of Section 14. They point out that whereas in the case of pulses
specified under clause (vi) (a) (which are also mentioned in the same
manner as the cereals), clause (d) of Section 15 hastens to explain that
pulses even after they are separated and de-husked still remain to be pulses
E for the purposes of clause (vi) (a) in Section 14. No such explanation is
provided with respect to wheat. If 'wheat' includes flour derived from it,
then paddy should include rice because just as wheat is obtained by milling
wheat, rice is obtained by milling paddy; yet rice is mentioned as a separate
commodity in sub-clause (ii) of clause (i). If the dealers' contention is
F correct then sub-clause (ii) of clause (i) in Section 14 is superfluous.
Conversely, if rice is a different commodity from paddy, so is flour, maida
and suji different from wheat. Sections 14 and 15 of the Act read with
clause (3) of Article 286 of the Constitution constitute restrictions upon
the plenary power of the State legislatures to levy tax upon the sale of
G goods. Such restrictions ought to be construed strictly and not liberally.
Moreover, the use of the words "that is to say" occurring in clause (i) of
Section 14 clearly indicates the intention of the Parliament to limit the
restriction to those goods alone as are specifically mentioned therein. The
ambit of the several sub-clauses cannot be extended by · a process of
interpretation. Clause (i) is not of an inclusive nature. In such a situation,
H
RAJASTHANROLLERFLOURMILLSASSN. V. STATE(JEEVANREDDY,J.) 81

there is no room for reading other commodities than those specifically A
mentioned into it.

14. Entry 54 of List II of the Vllth Schedule to the Constitution vests
in the State legislatures the power to levy "taxes on the sale or purchase of
goods other than newspaper subject to the provisions of Entry 92-A of List
I". Entry 92-A of List I, introduced by the Sixth Amendment, empowers B
the Parliament to levy tax on inter-State sales/purchases of goods other
than newspapers whereas Entry 92 in List I relates· to taxes on the sale or
purchases of newspapers and on advertisements published therein. Similar-
ly, Entry 42 in List I empowers the Parliament to make laws with respect
to inter-State trade or commerce. Article 286 as already .stated contains C
certain prohibitions and restrictions upon the power of the State legisla-
tures to levy tax on the sale of goods. As stated by this Court in J.K lute
Mills Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1961) (12) S.T.C. 429 and affirmed in
C.S. Bureau v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, (1973] 1 S.C.C.
46 "where transaction is one of sale of goods as known to law, the power
of the legislature to impose a tax thereon, in our view, is plenary and D
unrestricted subject only to any limitation which have been imposed by the
Government of India Act or the Constitution." Article 286 represents
mainly the limitations contemplated in the above passage. Clause (3) of
Article 286 read with Sections 14 and 15 of the Act disables the State
legislatures from taxing even the intra-State sales/purchases of declared E
goods at a rate exceeding 4% and at more than one stage. They further
compel the States to refund the sales tax levied and collected by them on
intra-State sales of declared goods in cases where such goods are sub-
sequently sold in the course of inter-state trade or commerce; the refund
of tax has to be made to the person effecting the inter-state sale. We are,
therefore, inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the States that the F
provisions of Sections 14 and 15 of the Act, being restrictions upon plenary
power of the State legislatures to levy tax on sale/purchase of goods must
be construed strictly.* In other words, the restriction must be limited to
the goods expressly mentioned and nothing more must be read into it
except what it says clearly. This is the view taken by the Constitution Bench G
of this Court in a somewhat similar situation in lshwari Khetan Sugar Mills

We do not wish to, nor is it necessazy to, consider and examine the issue in terms of
federalism or the need to . maintain a balance between the powers of the federal
government and the States, as has been done in certain decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court rendered with reference to the 'commerce clause'. H
82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1980) S.C.C. 136, to which we shall
presently refer.

15. It must also be remembered that wheat flour - and similarly maida
and suji - are different commodities from wheat. Three decisions of this
Court Ganesh Trading Co. v. State of Haryana, 32 S.T.C. 623; Babu Ram
B Jagdish Chemical Co. v. State of Punjab, 44 S.T.C. 159 and State of Kar-
nataka v. Raghurama Shetty, 47 S.T.C. 369 have held that rice (it is also
derived from paddy just as flour is derived from wheat by the process of
milling) is different from paddy. We shall refer to these decisions at some
detail a little while later. Indeed, in one of the decisions, this Court has, by
C way of illustration, explained that wheat is different from wheat flour. The
principle of all these three decisions is that where certain goods are
consumed to bring into existence different goods - different in commercial
and common parlance - both of them must be treated as different goods.
The meaning and content of the expression "consuming" has also been
D explained in these decisions. If so, there appears to be no warrant for
reading flour, maida and suji into expression 'wheat' in Section 14(i) (iii).
If the dealers' contention is correct then it should mean that rice is
included in paddy - in which case it was not necessary for the Parliament
to mention rice separately under sub-clause (ii) of clause(i) of Section 14.
(The counsel for the States may probably be right when they suggest that
E flour, maida and suji were not separately mentioned in clause (i) of Section
14 for the reason that in the year 1976 when the said clause was introduced,
the volume of trade in flour, maida and suji and more particularly inter-
state trade therein was at an insignificant level whereas the trade in both
paddy and rice was substantial, for which reason rice was mentioned as a
F separate declared goods but not flour, maida or suji). It is in this context
that clause (d) of Section 15 becomes relevant. Clause (vi) (a) Section 14
was introduced simultaneously with clause (i) by the 1976 (Amendment)
Act. But while introducing clause (d) to explain the scope and content of
clause (vi)( a) no such explanation or qualification was provided in the case
of wheat nor were the flour, maida and suji mentioned as separate com-
G modities in Section 14. Further the fact that while re-specifying cereals and
pulses as declared goods in 1976, the Parliament departed from the lan-
guage employed in Item I in the Schedule to the 1952 Act is not without
relevance.

H 16. The learned counsel for the States also appear to be justified in
RAJASTHANROLLERFLOURMILLSASSN. v. STATE[JEEVANREDDY, J.J 83

emphasising the meaning and significance of the phrase "that is to say" A ,
occurring in clause (i) of Section 14. The clause reads: "(i) cereals, that is
to say.-- (i) paddy (ii) rice (iii) wheat---". The meaning and purport of the
words "that is to say" is explained by a four Judge-Bench of this Court in
State of Tamil Nadu v. Pyare Lal Malhotra, 37 S.T.C. 319. Beg, J., speaking
for the Bench first quoted the meaning of the words "that is to say" assigned B
in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (IVth Edn.) Vol. 5 at page 2753 to the
following effect:

"That is to say,--.(1) 'That is to say' is the commencement of an
ancillary clause which explains the meaning of the principal clause.
It has the following properties: (1) it must not be contrary to the C
principal clause: (2) it must neither increase nor diminish it; (3)
but where the principal clause is general in terms it may restrict
it: see this explained with many examples, Stukeley v. Butler,

- Hob.171."

The learned Judge then proceeded to observe: D

' "The quotation. given above, from Stroud's Judicial Dictionary
shows that, ordinarily, the expression "that is to say" is employed
to make clear and fix the meaning of what is to be explained or
defined. Such words are not used, as a rule, to amplify a meaning E
while removing a possible doubt for which purpose the word
"includes" is generally employed ................ bqt, in the context of
single point sales tax, subject to special conditions when imposed
on separate categories of. specified goods, the expression was
apparently meant to exhaustively enumerate the kinds of goods on
a given list. The purpose of an enumeration in s statute dealing F
with sales tax at a single point in a series of sales would, very
naturally, be to indicate the types of goods each of which would
constitute a separate class for a series of sales. Otherwise, the
listing itself loses all meaning and would be without any purpose
behind it." G
17. In this connection, it would be equally relevant to bear in mind
the following statement of law 'from the very same decision:

"...........sales tax law is intended to tax sales of different commercial
commodities and not to tax the production or manufacture of . H
84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) SUPP. 2S.C.R.

A particular substances out of which these commodities may have
been made. As soon as separate commercial commodities emerge
or come into existence, they become separately taxable goods or
entities for purposes of sales tax. Where commercial goods,
without change of their identity as such goods, are merely subjected
to some processing or finishing or are merely joined together, they
B may remain commercially the goods which cannot be taxed again,
in a series of sales, so long as they retain their identity as goods
of a particular type.

18. We may at this stage refer to the decisions mentioned
C hereinabove at some detail.

19. In lshwari Khetan Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh,
[1980] 4 S.C.C. 136, a Constitution Bench of this Court pointed out the
approach to be adopted by the courts in matters where the legislative
D power of the State is trenched upon by parliament. Entry 24 of List II
speaks of industries but it is made subject to the provisions of Entries 7
and 52 of List I. Entry 52 of List I read: "Industries, the control of which r
by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the Public
interest." Dealing with the impact of entry 52 List I one entry 24 of List II,
Desai, J., speaking for himself and two other learned Judges observed:
E
"Industry as a legislative head finds its place in Entry 24, List II.
The State Legislature can be denied legislative power under Entry ,...
24 to the extent Parliament makes declaration under Entry 52 and
by such declaration Parliament acquires power to legislate only in
F respect of those industries in respect of which declaration is made
and to the extent as manifested by legislation incorporating. the
declaration and no more. The Act prescribes the extent of control
and specifies it. As the declaration trenches upon the State legis-
lative power it have to be construed strictly."

G 20. In our opinion, the restrictions upon the legislative power of the
States provided by Sections 14 and 15 read with clause (3) of Article 286
must similarly be construed strictly. Therefore, commodities other than
those specified cannot be introduced into the relevant provisions on the
ground that they are derived from the primary commodities mentioned in
H S.14 (i). The said clause refers to certain primary commodities; the goods
RAJASTIIANROLLERFLOURMILLSASSN. v. STATE[JEEVANREDDY,J.] 85

produced or manufactured out of them cannot be included into those A
commodities. Otherwise, problem of 'where to draw the line' would also
arise. May be that part of the tax collected on inter-state sales is ultimately
made over to the states as contemplated by Article 269(1)(g) but that
aspect has no relevance to the question of power of the State legislatures.

21. In three decisions of this Court viz., Ganesh Trading Co. Kamal
B
v. State of Haryana, 32 S.T.C. 632, Babu Ram Jagdish Chemical Co. v. State
of Punjab, 44 S.T.C. 159 and State of Kamataka v. Ragurama Shetty, 47
S.T.C.369, it has been held that paddy and rice are two distinct com-
modities and that milling of paddy involves a manufacturing process. This
was so held without reference to fact that paddy and rice are mentioned C
as two separate commodities in Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act.
In Ganesh Trading Company, it was stated:

"Now, the question for our decision is whether it could be said that
when paddy was dehusked and rice produced, its identity D
remained. It was true that rice was produced out of paddy but it
is not true to say that paddy continued ~o be paddy even after
dehusking. It had changed its identity. Rice is not known as paddy.
It is a misnomer to call rice as paddy. They are two different things
in ordinary parlance. Hence quite clearly when paddy is dehusked E
and rice produced, there has been a change in the identity of the
goods."

22. The following observations of Venkataramiah, J. in Raghurama
Shetty can usefully be quoted:
F
"There is no merit in the submission made on behalf of the
assessees that they had not consumed paddy when they produced
rice from it by merely carrying out the process of dehusking at
their mills. Consumption in the true economic sense·does not mean
only use of goods in the production of consumers' goods, or final
utilisation of consumser' goods by consumers involving activities G
like eating of food, drinking of beverages, wearing of clothes or
using of an automobile by its owner for domestic purposes. A
manufacturer also consumes commodities which are ordinarily
called raw materials when. he produces semi-finished goods which
have to undergo further processes of production before they· can H
86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A be transformed into consumers' goods. At every suc_h inter-
meditiate stage of production, some utility or value is added to
goods which are used as raw materials and at every such stage the
raw materials are consumed. Take the case of bread. It passes
through the first stage of production when wheat is grown by the
f anner, the second stage of production when wheat is conve1ted into
B flour by the miller and the third stage of production when flour is
utilised by the baker to manufacture bread out of it. The miller and
the baker have consumed wheat and flour respectively in the course
of their business. We have to understand the word "consumes" in
section 6 (i) of the Act in this economic sense ....... .At every stage
c of production, it is obvious there is consumption of goods even
though at the end of it there may not be final consumption of goods
but only production of goods with higher utility which may be used
in further productive processes ...... .Applying the above test, it has
to be held that the assessees had consumed the paddy purchased
by them when they converted it into rice which is commercially a
D
different commodity."

(emphasis added)

23. Applying the reasoning adopted hereinabove, it must be held that
E when under wheat is consumed for producing flour or maida or suji, the
commodities so obtained are different commodities from wheat. The wheat
loses its identity. It gets consumed and in its place new goods/commodities
emerge. The new goods so emerging have a higher· utility than the com-
modity consumed. They are different goods commercially speaking. In-
-
deed, the portion underlined by us in the above extract. clearly affirms the
F
said aspect.

24. The High Courts which have held in favour of the dealers have
uniformly relied upon certain decisions of this Court which need be ex-
amined. The judgment uniformly relied upon is inAlladi Venkateswarlu and
G Ors. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh & Anr., 41 S.T.C. 394, a judgment
rendered by a Bench comprising Beg and Untwalia, JJ. The matter did no
concern Sections 14/15 of the Central Sales Tax Act. The only question
there was whether parched rice (Atukulu) and puffed rice (Muramaralu)
are 'rice' within the meaning of Entry 66(b) of the First Schedule to the
H Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957. Entry 66 read thus:
RAJAS1HANROLLERFLOURMILLSASSN. v. STATE(JEEVANREDDY, J.] 87

"Description of goods Point of levy Rate of tax A
.... 66. Rice At the point of sale by 6 paise in the rupee .
(a) Rice not covered the first wholesale
by sub-item (b) below. dealer in the State
effecting the sale.
Provided that a rebate of two paise in the rupee shall be allowed on the B
rice sold and consumed in the State in ;iccordance with such rules as may
be prescribed.
(b) Rice obtained from At the point of sales by 1 paise in the rupee."
paddy that has met tax the first wholesale
under this Act. dealer in the State c
effecting the sale.

25. Parched rice or puffed rice were not mentioned under any of
the entries in any of the Schedules to the Act. According to the scheme of
the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, as it then obtained, goods not D
falling in any of the Schedules to the Act were treated as general goods
and were subject to multi-point tax @4% of 5%, as the case may be under
Section 5(1) of the Act. The High Court had taken the view that parched
rice and puffed rice were different commodities and were taxable as such.
The question arising for consideration before the Supreme Court was
posed by the bench in the following terms: E

"The question, therefore, before us is whether "rice", which is
obtained from paddy, already taxed under item 8 of the Second
Schedule, ceases to be "rice" falling prima facie under item 66(b)
as rice on which a tax was already paid when i~ was in the form of F
paddy? Does heating or parching only make it edible have that
effect?

It was answered in the following words:

"It is clear that there is a distinction between "paddy'', as found in G
item 8 of the Second Schedule, and "rice", as mentioned under
item 66 of the First Schedule. Apparently, the removal of the husk
makes this difference. It is true that the First Schedule, which
contains as many as 136 items, includes a number of separate fairly
detailed entries. Entry 58 is for bran or husk of "rice", and entry H
88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A 59 is for ''deoiled bran of rice". It appears, therefore, that "rice in
husk" is paddy''. When it is removed from husk, the husk and rice .
become separately taxable. But, there are no separate entries for
rice and rice reduced into an edible form by heating or parching
without any addition of ingredients or appreciable change in
chemical composition. The term "rice" is wide enough to include
B rice in its various forms whether edible or inedible. Rice in the
form of grain is not edible. Parched rice and puffed rice are edible.
But, the entry "rice" seems to us to cover both forms of rice. At
any rate, it is wide enough to cover them."

C 26. The Bench also relied upon the earlier decision in Tungabhadra
Industries Ltd., Kumool v. Commercial Tax Officer, Ku.moo~ 11 S.T.C.827
in support of its opinion. It is thus clear that what influenced the decision
mainly was the fact that parched rice and puffed rice were not mentioned
as separate commodities under any other item in any of the Schedules to
J
D the Act. It was, therefore, held that the term 'rice' in entry 66(b) includes
rice in all its forms. The High Courts while applying the principle of this
judgment to the question at issue herein ignored the fact that the said
decision did not deal with the meaning and ambit of the several sub-clauses
in clause (i) of Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act and also the fact
that the Andhra Pradesh Act did not place parched rice and puffed rice
E under separate entries in any of the Schedules to the Act. In our opinion,
the principle of the said decision has no application in the context and
scheme of Sections 14 and 15.

27. The next decision relied upon by the High Courts is in Tungab-
F hadra Industries Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, Ku.moo~ 11 S.T.C. 827.
The question arose under the Madras General Sales Tax Act and the
Madras General Sales Tax (Turn-over and Assessment) Rules, 1939. Rule
18(2) provided for deduction of the tax paid by a manufacturer on purchase
of groundnut and/or kernel from out of the tax paid by him on the sale of
oil derived therefrom. It would be appropriate to set out Rule 18: ·
G
"18 (I) Any dealer who manufactures groundnut oil and cake from
groundnut and/or kernel purchased by him may, on application to
the assessing authority having jurisdiction over the area in which
he carries his business, be registered as a manufacturer of
H groundnut oil and cake.
RAJASfHANROLLERFLOURMILLSASSN. v. STATE[JEEVANREDDY,J.) 89

(2) Every such registered manufacturer of groundnut oil will be A
entitled to a deduction under clause (k) of sub-rule (1) of rule 5
equal to the value of the groundnut and/or kernel, purchased by
him and converted into oil and cake if he has paid the tax to the
State on such purchases:

Provided that the amount for which the oil is sold is included B
in his net turnover:

Provided further that the amount for the turnover in respect of
which deduction is allowed shall not exceed the amount of the
turnover attributable to the groundnut and/or kernel used in the C
manufacture of oil and included in the net turnover."

28. It is in the context of the said rule that question arose whether
refined groundnut oil and hydrogenated groundnut oil, popularly known as
"Vanaspati", is groundnut oil to merit the deduction provided by Rule
18(2). The High Court had taken the view that while refined groundnut oil D
is groundnut oil, hydrogenated oil is not. The process adopted in obtaining
the vanaspati was stated by the High Court in the following words:

"......in the case of hydrogenated oil which is prepared from refined
oil by the process of passing hydrogen into heated oil in the E
presence of a catalyst (usually finely powered nickel), two atoms
of hydrogen are absorbed. A portion of the oleic acid which formed
a good part of the content of the groundnut oil in its raw state is
converted, by the absorption of the hydrogen atoms, into stearic
acid and it is this which gives the characterstic appearance as well
as the semi-sold condition which it attains. In the language of the F
chemist, an intermolecular or configurational chemical change take
place which results in the hardening of the oil. Though it continues
to be the same edible fat that it was before the ha~dening, and its
nutritional properties continue to be the same, it has acquired new
properties in that the tendency to rancidity is greatly removed, is G
easier to keep and to transport."

29. This Court was of the opinion that the process of hydrogenation
does not change the identity of the commodity and that it is merely a
process adopted to render the oil more stable and thereby improve its
quality and utility. This again was not a case, it must be pointed out, arising H
90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] SUPP. 2S.C.R.

A under Sections 14 and 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act. It is equally well
to remember that at the relevant time, the Madras General Sales Tax Act
did not treat groundnut oil and vanaspati as two distinct commodities.

30. Devi Das Gopal Krishnan & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors., 20
S.T.C. 430 was a case arJsing under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act. One
B of the questions considered by the Constitution Bench in this decision was
whether oil seeds and the oil produced from out of them constitute same
or different commodity. The contention for the dealer was that clause (ff)
of Section 2 of the Act offends Section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act,
1956 (as it then stood), which imposed a restriction on the State not to tax
c the same goods at more than one stage. This contention was rejected
holding that the goods purchased and the goods sold viz., oil seed and oil
derived from such seeds are not identical goods. The manufacturing
process, it is stated, changes the identity of the goods. The relevant
paragraph reads thus:

D "Then it is contended that while section 15 of the Central Sales
Tax Act, 1956 (Act 74 of 1956) imposes a restriction on the State
not to tax at more then one stage, the amending Act by introducing
the definition of "purchase" enables the State to tax the same goods
at the purchase point and at the sale point. But this argument
E misses the point that goods purchased and the goods sold are not
identical ones. Manufacture changes the iden~ity. Therefore, the
same goods are not taxed at two stages."

31. Clause (vi) of Section 14, as it stood at the relevant time, i.e.,
prior to the Central Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1972 read as follows:
F
"(vi) Oil-seeds, that is to say, seeds yielding non-volatile oils used
for human consumption, or in industry, or in the manufacture of
varnishes, soaps and the like, or in lubrication, and volatile oil used
chiefly in medicines, perfumes, cosmetics and the like."
G 32. In fact, this decision tends to support the States' contention.

33. In Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Ltd. v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 129, a Bench comprising Tulzapurkar and Pathak,
JJ. considered the question whether the expression "metal" occurring in the
H notifications issued by the Uttar Pradesh Government under Section
RAJASTHANROLLERFLOURMILLSASSN. v. STATE(JEEVANREDDY,J.) 91

3(A)(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948 takes in the fabricated A
forms of metal. The relevant words of the notification were "all kind of .
minerals, ores, m~tals and alloys including sheets ..... ". It was held that the
expression "metal" has been employed in the notification to refer to the
metal in its primary sense i.e., in the form in which it is marketable as the
primary commodity and that the primary form and the forms fabricated B
from the primary form constitute two distinct commodities marketable as ·
such and must be regarded as different commercial commodities. While ·
this is not a case dealing with Sections 14 and 15 of the Central Sales Tax
Act, it does hold that where the primary goods are consumed in bringing
to existence different commodites - i.e., commodities understood in com-
mercial circles as different commodities - the new commodities cannot yet C
be treated as the primary commodity. The Court re-affirmed the following
rule of interpretation relevant under Sales Tax law:

11
a word describing a commodity in a sales tax statute should
•••••••

be interpreted according to its popular sense, the sense being that D
in which people conversant with the subject matter with which the
statute is dealing would attribute to it. Words of everyday use must
be construed not in their scientific or technical sense but as
understood in common parlance. That principle has been
repeatedly reaffirmed in the decisions of this Court. It holds good
where a contest exists between the scientific and technological E
connotation of the word on the one hand and its understanding in
common parlance on the other. We are here concerned, however,
with a very different situation. We are concerned, with the manner
in which these and similar expressions have been employed by
those who framed the relevant notifications, and with the inference
that can be drawn from the particular arrangement of the entries
F
in the notifications. We must derive the intent from a contextual
scheme."

34. This was so held following the earlier decision of this Court in
Porritts and Spencer (Asia) Limited v. State of Haryana, 42 S.T.C. 433. G

35. The decision of this Court in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax
v. Pio Food Packers, 46 S.T.C. 63 is of no help to the dealers. That was a
case where the question was where the pineapple is processed and cut into
pineapple slices for the purpose of being sold in sealed cans, whether there H
92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] SUPP. 2 S.C.R

A is a consumption of original pineapple fruit for the purpose of manufacture
of slices. It was held that no such manufacture was involved though a
certain degree of processing was involved. It was held that by cutting the
pineapple into slices and thereafter canning it, on adding sugar to preserve
it, did not change the identity nor did it bring into existence different goods.
However so far as pineapple jam and pineapple squash were concerned, it
B was conceded by the dealer himself that they were different goods.

36. Strong reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the dealers
•-
on the decision of this Court in State of Gujarat v. Sakarwala Brothers, 19
S.T.C. 24 where it was held that sugar processed into 'patasa', 'harda' and
C 'alchidana' continued to be sugar and that by the said process the essential
characterstic and identity of sugar did not undergo a change. But this
decision must be understood in the context of the language employed in
the relevant Entry. Entry 47 in Schedule-A to the Bombay Sales Tax Act
defined sugar "as defined in Item No.8 of the First Schedule to the Central
D Excise and Salt Act, 1944." The said Item No.8 read as follows:" 'sugar'
means any form of sugar containing more than 90% of sucrose." The
contention of the State was that the words "any from of sugar" do not mean
"sugar in any form". But this argument was rejected by both the Gujarat
High Court and this Court holding that 'patasa', 'harda' and 'alchidana' are
but forms of sugar. The following observations bring out the ratio:
E
"It is not disputed on behalf of the appellant that the chemical
composition of patasas, harda and alchidana in the same as that
of sugar, viz., there is more than 90 per cent of sucrose. Mr. Bindra,
however, laid stress on the argument that patasa, harda and al-
F chidana were sweets used on festive occasions. But this cir-
cumstance has no rel9vance on the question of legal classification
for the purposes ofthe Bombay Sales Tax Act. On th other hand,
it appears from the judgment of the Tribunal that it is possible to
convert these articles into sugar by dissolving them in water and
by subjecting the solution to- an appropriate process. It is stated
G by the Tribunal that these articles can be put to the same use to
which sugar-candy can be put. It is, therefore, manifest that patasa,
harda and alchidana are only different forms of refined sugar with
the requisite sucrose contents."

H 37. This decision has indeed been distinguished in the case of Ganesh
RAJASTHANROLLERFLOURMILLSASSN. V. STATE(JEEVANREDDY,J.) 93

Trading Co. A
38. We do not think any purpose will be served by referring to
decisions of this Court in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. State Kera/a & Ors:,
(74 S.T.C. 176) since it was concerned with the question whether galvanis-
ing of steel pipes and tubes does bring about a change in the identity and
character of pipes and tubes. The Court held, it does not. We see no B
analogy between that case and the one before us. Same is the case with
respect to the decision in State of Tamil Nadu v. Mahi Traders, (1989] 1
S.C.C. 724 where it was held that leather splits (cuts and scrap of leather
left after cutting out the sizes) are nothing but leather.

39. Certain decisions of High Courts have been brought to our notice
c
by counsel for both sides. We do not think that it would be of any help on
the question at issue since those decisions turned upon the particular
language of the relevant enactment and the scheme of entries therein.

40. For the above reasons, we hold that flour, maida and suji derived D
from wheat are not "wheat" within the meaning of Section 14(i) (iii) of the
Central Sales Tax Act. Flour, maida and suji are different and distinct
goods from wheat. In other words, flour, maida and suji are not declared
goods.

41 Leaned counsel for the dealers repeatedly emphasised that flour, E
maida and suji are commodities of daily use by a large segment of the
population of this country and that our opinion may add to the burden on
the common man. This submission would have carried some force if all the
High Courts in the country had taken one uniform view and we proposed
to upset it. As we shall presently point out, there is no such unanimity, nor F
can it be said that decisions holding in favour of the dealers have held the
field for a long time. On the contrary, it appears that the decisions
upholding the States' contention are far earlier in point of time. Clause (i)
in section 14 was introduced in the year 1976. In the year 1982, two
decisions were rendered by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The earlier
one was in Udata Narasimha Rao & Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 51 G
S.T.C.126. It was held by a Bench that "rawa" derived from rice is a
different product from rice and that, therefore, "rawa is not declared goods
within the meaning of Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act. ("Rawa"
was mentioned as a separate commodity under Entry 144 of the First
Schedule to the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act.) In the same year, H
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A another Bench in State of Andhra Pradesh v. V. Venkatasubbaiah & Sons,
52 S.T.C. 133, of which one of us (B.P. Jeevan Reddy, JJ.) was a member,
held following Alladi Venkateswarlu, that "ravva" drawn from rice is rice
within the meaning of Entry 66 of the First Schedule to the said enactment.
The decision in Venkiatasubbaiah dealt with the position obtaining prior to
the 1976 (Amendment) Act. This decision has no relevance to the position
B obtaining under Section 14(i) (iii) or Section 15. Thereafter, in the year
1991, a Division Bench of the said High Court held following Udata
Narasimba Rao that flour, maida ravva, suji and bran drawn from wheat
are distinct and different commodities from wheat and cannot, therefore,
be treated as declared goods.
c
42. In Karnataka, there does not appear to be any judgment holding
one way or the other till the judgment now under appeal - rendered in the
year 1991. The Karnataka High Court has held that the flour, maida and
suji are included within the expression "wheat" in Section 14(i) (iii) and,
therefore, are declared goods. Reference may also be had to another
t) decision of the Karnataka High Court in S.T.R.P. No.99 of 1981 disposed
of the June 23, 1982 where the question was "whether parched gram with
or without husk is or is not a commodity different from gram with or
without husk included in Entry No. 10 of the IVth Schedule to the Act?"
IVth Schedule to the Karnataka Act refers to declared goods. It was· held
E that parched gram with or without husk is the same as gram with or without
husk. The decision was mainly influenced by the decisiOn of this Court in
Alladi Venkateswarlu.

43. In Rajasthan High Court too, there does not appear to have been
any decision one way or the other till the decision under appeal in Civil
F Appeal Nos. 3922-25 of 1991. The decision under appeal was rendered in
August, 1991. The Rajasthan High Court has held that flour, maida and
suji being goods different from wheat are not declared goods.

44. In Patna High Court too, there does not appear to be any decision
G on the question until the one -now under appeal, which was rendered in
April, 1989. The Patna High Court has taken the view that they are same
goods. In fact, this decision was referred with approval by the Karnataka
High Court but was dissented from by Rajasthan High Court.

45. We have been informed that recently the Madras High Court has
H taken the same view as the Andhra Pradesh High Court and that a Special ·
RAfASTIIAN ROLLER FLOUR MILLS ASSN. v. STATE (JEEVAN REDDY, J.] 95

Leave Petition has been filed against it in this Court.

46. It is obvious that if the Parliament proposes to treat flour, maida
and suji also as declared goods, it can always say so, by effecting necessary
amendments.

47. We, therefore, set aside the judgments .of the Karnataka and B
Patna High Courts and accordingly allow Civil Appeal Nos. 1291- 98/90,
5082-84/91, 4749-4801/91, 4996-5104/91 and I.A Nos. 3 and 4/92 in C.A.
No. 1291/91 filed by the said States and dismiss the appeals preferred by
the dealers being Civil Appeal Nos. 3922-25of1991, S.L.P. (C) Nos. 185/92
and 8275/92 against the judgments of Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan High
Courts. C
I R.S.K. Appeals disposed of.